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2023 GDI Disadvantage
NEG – Farm Bill Scenario › 1NC – Farm Bill 1NC Shell › Farm Bill 1NC Shell

1. Farm Bill key to food security

Munch, American Farm Bureau economist, 6-21-23

[Daniel, 6-21-23, Ohio’s Country Journal, “Farm Bill Math”, , 7-3-23, accessed EH]

Like consumers purchasing food at the grocery store, farmers and ranchers face macroeconomic pressures when they purchase inputs and services. Few pieces of legislation are more significant than the farm bill when it comes to safeguarding our domestic food supply. Ensuring that program funding is reflective of market changes is critical to maintaining the farm bill’s role in national security and the health and well-being of rural communities.

2023 GDI Disadvantage
NEG – Farm Bill Scenario › 1NC – Farm Bill 1NC Shell › Farm Bill 1NC Shell

A. Uniqueness and internal link – Window for farm bill negotiations narrow – running out of time – fights risk collapse of the Farm Bill – triggering price hikes and increasing poverty

Hill, POLITICO food and agriculture policy reporter, 6-15-23

[Meredith Lee, 6-15-23, Politico, “Far-Right Republicans Threaten To Derail Another House Party”, , accessed 7-3-23, EH]

The farm bill came up only in passing during McCarthy’s meeting with the leaders of the so-called “five families” GOP caucus factions earlier this week, as one of the many legislative items Republicans need to get done this fall, according to two House Republicans who were granted anonymity to discuss private conversations.

2023 GDI Affirmative
Misc › Advantage CP – multi planks

Multiple actions necessary for guaranteed income and solvency food insecurity

Economic Security Project, Co-convene the Guaranteed Income Community of Practice (GICP), 2022

[Economic Security Project & Guaranteed Income Community of Practice, July 2022, "GUARANTEED INCOME & THE FIGHT TO END HUNGER" No Publication, https://gicp.info/wp-content/uploads/sites/164/Guaranteed-Income-The-Fight-to-End-Hunger_July-2022.pdf accesed 7-13-2023 GDI - SB]

During the height of the COVID-19 pandemic, federal, state, and local governments used direct cash programs to provide fast, efficient, flexible support to residents navigating the economic consequences of the pandemic. From stimulus checks to the expanded Child Tax Credit to multi-year guaranteed income programs funded through the American Rescue Plan Act (ARPA), we have seen that cash policies can successfully meet short-term needs and hold great promise for addressing long-standing policy challenges. In studies of the monthly Child Tax Credit, stimulus checks, and guaranteed income demonstrations around the country, researchers find repeating themes: food is consistently one of the most common items purchased with extra cash, and providing unrestricted cash payments to recipients helps reduce hunger and food insecurity. For these reasons, as part of the fight to end hunger, we encourage the Administration to fund and support policies that provide unrestricted, monthly cash payments to low-income individuals.

2023 GDI Affirmative
***UBI Negative Supplement*** › T › T – BI not targeted

Despite the existence of different proposals, there are three features common to most definitions of an unconditional basic income (BI) (Van Parijs & Vanderborght, 2017, p. 8):

1. Unconditionality: not depending on past social contributions and without any conditionality such as the obligation to work or prove willingness to work;

2. Universality: given to all citizens and long-term residents of a given area without means-testing;

3. Individuality: given to each individual independently of the household situation.

2023 GDI Affirmative
***UBI Negative Supplement*** › T › T: UBI minus =/= fiscal redistribution

Without new taxes, a budget neutral UBI results in net decrease to fiscal redistribution

Lustig, professor of economics at Tulane University and Pabon postdoc fellow in developmental economics at Yale 2022

[Nora and Valentina Martinez, postdoc fellow in developmental economics at Yale, “Universal Basic Income, Taxes, and the Poor”, LSE Public Policy Review, November 24, https://ppr.lse.ac.uk/articles/10.31389/lseppr.67 [7-11-23|GDI|SPB]]

However, a budget-neutral transition from existing targeted programs to a UBI would result in reduced financial transfers to the poor. Even if spending on price subsidies was incorporated into the UBI budget, the universal nature of the transfers may still result in reduced transfers to the poor. The concept of tax justice is usually linked to the extent to which the tax (plus spending) system reduces postfiscal income inequality. From the fiscal incidence literature, however, we know the fiscal system may be progressive but increase poverty [4]. 1 That is, although the distance between incomes may shrink, the absolute levels of postfiscal income for the bottom of the distribution may decline. In addition to reducing inequality, a fair tax system should avoid fiscal impoverishment—that is, situations in which the combination of taxes and transfers leave the poor with lower incomes. Therefore, when judging the impact of replacing existing transfers and subsidies with a UBI, one should assess whether this change generates or exacerbates fiscal impoverishment. Even if the latter does not occur, the poverty-reducing power of a UBI over other alternatives (including the existing system) should be a priority.2 The potential negative effect on the poor from switching to a UBI could be tempered if the size of the UBI is allowed to increase beyond current spending on cash transfers and price subsidies. But if the goal for the policy change to be budget neutral was maintained, this increase in spending would need to be matched by increased taxes or reductions in spending on other categories. The increase in taxes, especially if the budget gap is financed with indirect taxes, could neutralize the benefit to the poor derived from a more generous UBI. Even when the budget-neutral switch to the UBI does not hurt the poor, the required increase in taxes may be too large to make the policy change feasible: the efficiency costs could make the policy selfdefeating and/or political resistance could block it.

2023 GDI Affirmative
***UBI Negative Supplement*** › Disads › Politics link – unpopular

There’s massive political resistance to UBI – fears of taxes and the refusal to work fuels backlash

Lustig, professor of economics at Tulane University and Pabon postdoc fellow in developmental economics at Yale 2022

[Nora and Valentina Martinez, postdoc fellow in developmental economics at Yale, “Universal Basic Income, Taxes, and the Poor”, LSE Public Policy Review, November 24, https://ppr.lse.ac.uk/articles/10.31389/lseppr.67 [7-11-23|GDI|SPB]]

The change in the net tax burden under the UBI scenarios is the difference between the change in direct transfers minus the change in direct and indirect taxes. Since prefiscal income in the baseline and UBI scenarios are the same by assumption, the net tax burden is mathematically equal to the change in postfiscal income of each considered UBI scenario minus postfiscal income in the baseline. Tables 5 and 6 present the percent change in postfiscal income under the poverty gap scenario compared with the baseline’s postfiscal income by decile for the cases that met the poverty condition described in the previous section. Given the findings discussed in the above section, the spending neutral scenario has been eliminated because it does not fulfill the poverty criteria. Note that a positive (negative) value means that, on average, that decile received more (less) in transfers than it paid in taxes under the considered UBI scenario. Under the poverty gap scenario, in all countries meeting the poverty criterion, the reform is progressive: that is, the incidence of net transfers decreases with income (Tables 5 and 6). Moreover, all deciles are net beneficiaries except for the top deciles. In all countries, the tenth decile is always a net payer of the UBI and in some countries the eighth and ninth deciles are net payers too. Under the poverty gap scenario, however, the change in postfiscal income for the top decile is significant in all cases except for Russia. In the low- and lower-middle-income countries, when compared against the baseline postfiscal income, the decline ranges from 12 percent in Ghana to 41 percent in Zambia (Table 5). In the upper-middle- and high-income countries, it ranges from 1.7 percent in Russia to 27.3 percent in South Africa (Table 6). The change in the net tax burden shows that the potential efficiency costs could be significant. These costs could take the form of disincentives to work or strategies to affect taxable income (such as leaving earnings as part of undistributed profits because the latter usually face lower tax rates than personal income). Moreover, if there is a “salience effect” (that is, people react to the increase in taxes without considering how much they receive in additional benefits under the UBI), the political resistance to such a reform could be significant too. In low- and lower-middle-income countries, the lowest required increase in the average effective tax rate is in Ghana (for the case when the financing gap is funded with indirect taxes), where the average effective tax rate could rise 95 percent (from 10.6 percent to 20.7 percent). Likewise, the required increased in the average effective tax rate is also substantial for the upper-middle- and high-income countries. The lowest required increase is for indirect taxes in Russia, but even in this case, the increase is large: 37.7 percent (from 9.1 percent to 12.5 percent).

2023 GDI Affirmative
***UBI Negative Supplement*** › CP – partial BI

Partial BI transitions to full BI – and transition from work

Pinto, Universidade do Minho, ‘20

[Jorge, “Environmentalism, Ecologism, and Basic Income”, Basic Income Studies Vol 15.1 https://doi.org/10.1515/bis-2019-0026accessed 7-11-2023 GDI-FLC]

Moreover, I think that claiming that only a full BI fits an ecological strategy might be incorrect for at least two reasons. First, as argued by Van Parijs (1992), a full BI would likely fit better into a highly productive economy, offering high levels of taxable resources that may sustain such a BI over time, which will likely require that the majority of people remain within the labour sphere. If so, there would exist a link between environ- mentalism (not ecologism) and a high BI. If such a full BI would imply a massive exit from the labour market, environmentalists would certainly reconsider this position.

2023 GDI Affirmative
***UBI Negative Supplement*** › CP – Guaranteed income [v UBI]

GI pilot project solve

Rosen, director of economic justice, 2021

[Jeremy, "Guaranteed Income: An Economic Support Whose Time Has Come," Poverty Law, June 21, 2021, 7/13/2023 GDI - HS].

In the Shriver Center’s home state of Illinois, several guaranteed income initiatives and pilot programs are underway. At the local level, Chicago Alderman Gilbert Villegas has proposed a pilot program to provide $500 per month for a year to 5,000 low-income residents of the city, to be funded with $30 million of the city’s $1.9 billion in American Rescue Plan funds. Other pilot programs supported by private philanthropy are also underway. Cook County plans to build on a successful initiative that gave direct payments to families facing financial hardship during the pandemic with a similar program in 2021. And at the state level, a broad coalition of community-based and grass tops organizations is working together to study the results of Illinois pilot programs, educate legislators, and ultimately advocate for legislation to establish a statewide guaranteed income program.

2023 GDI Affirmative
***UBI Negative Supplement*** › CP – Guaranteed income [v UBI]

Targeting GI solve better than UBI – multiple reasons

Rosen, director of economic justice, 2021

[Jeremy, "Guaranteed Income: An Economic Support Whose Time Has Come," Poverty Law, June 21, 2021, 7/13/2023 GDI - HS].

Everyone in this country should have the financial resources to support themselves and their family members. It’s long past time to unbuckle the “bootstraps” narrative arguing that people experiencing poverty simply need to work harder or make better personal choices. In fact, policies and laws that create and perpetuate poverty and racial inequity are written into the fabric of our nation.

2023 GDI Affirmative
***UBI Negative Supplement*** › CP – participatory income › Participatory income CP – solvency

Participatory income on balance better than UBI and other green jobs systems

Hiilamo, Professor of Social Policy University of Helsinki, ’23 [Heikki “What Is Participation Income and How Can It Help Communities Fight Climate Change?” World Economic Forum, 24 Mar. 2023, www.weforum.org/agenda/2023/03/what-is-participation-income-and-how-can-it-help-communities-fight-climate-change/. Accessed 12 July 2023. GDI-FLC]

UBI does not fit well with the call for a more interventionist state to grapple with the climate emergency either. It is based on the idea of an individual right to income without recognising the value of common action or reciprocal behaviour. Claimants may withdraw from the community and never explore their full potential as community members.

Participation income

2023 GDI Affirmative
***UBI Negative Supplement*** › Cap K › AT they say “link turn – empower worker”

UBI creates negative work incentive and disempowers workers

Afscharian, et al, Institute of Political Science - Germany, 2022

[Dominic Afscharian, “The State of the UBI Debate: Mapping the Arguments for and against UBI”, Basic Income Studies June 17, 2022, access info https://www.degruyter.com/document/doi/10.1515/bis-2021-0030/html accessed 7-11-23 (KG)]

Opponents of UBI strongly disagree with these points. One of the most popular arguments against UBI concerns this specific category of arguments: allegedly, UBI or some of its elements by themselves would create a negative work incentive (Bick et al., 2018; Caillé, 1994; Fourier, 1836; Gorz, 1985, 1999; Hamilton & Martin- West, 2019, p. 322; Jones & Marinescu, 2018; Laín, 2019; McLuhan, 1966; Midões, 2019; Mill, 1849; Rhys-Williams, 1943; Zelleke, 2008, p. 5), thus not only failing to solve (Jones & Marinescu, 2018; Krämer, 2019), but even worsening unemployment, resulting in a society in which nobody would continue to do hard but essential jobs (Heaven, 2019). As UBI cannot replace the dignity and fulfillment provided by work (Coote & Yazici, 2019, p. 24), this would have particularly harmful effects. Furthermore, UBI-sceptics are concerned that working conditions would either be unaffected (Birnbaum & De Wispelaere, 2021, p. 916) or even deteriorate: as employers know that workers can sustain a living anyway, they might pay lower wages (Coote & Yazici, 2019, p. 24; Standing, 2017, p. 51) and increase the number of part-time jobs (Gaskell, 2018). On the other hand, should wages actually rise, this would increase costs for producers (Tcherneva, 2005, p. 9), potentially driving companies out of business. Finally, more economically left-wing actors argue that UBI would distract from and reproduce the systemic problems associated with capitalism (Bayon, 2021; Lombardozzi & Pitts, 2020; Mathers, 2020, p. 333) and from organising workers (Gourevitch & Stanczyk, 2018), thus preventing actually meaningful liberation of workers. Authors like Howard and Wright object to this and consider UBI and socialism compatible (Howard, 2005; Wright, 2005).

2023 GDI Affirmative
***UBI Negative Supplement*** › Cap K › Link – UBI minus

UBI leads to defunding of other social services – inevitable in a capitalist economy

Kerman, project scientist at Campbell family mental health institute, 2021

[Nick, “The Role of Universal Basic Income in Preventing and Ending Homelessness”, International Journal on Homelessness, September 28, https://ojs.lib.uwo.ca/index.php/ijoh/article/view/13337 7-13-2023 GDI-SPB]

A transformative change in policy that affects numerous sectors and services, such as UBI, inevitably carries risks. The most serious concern is the extent to which other services that comprise social safety nets, which are complementary but not duplicative of UBI, are defunded. Implementation of UBI would replace some existing services, such as income support programs, but there is risk that other publicly funded health and social services would also be defunded. As noted by Raphael et al. (2019), it is important to recognize the neoliberal context in which a UBI would be implemented and how this could lead to such a policy being shaped to meet corporate interests and used to cut social services. This risk will be inherently present should UBI be designed and implemented in capitalistic economies, raising the need for caution, though there are considerations for risk mitigation. UBI must not be framed as a poverty reduction panacea, nor it is one for preventing and ending homelessness. Although UBI has the potential to reduce homelessness rates, it will not produce needed changes on other, ongoing crises that afflict large proportions of this population, such as the overdose crisis, inequitable access to mental health services, or the lack of investments to build new affordable housing. As such, advocacy on homelessness neither starts nor ends with UBI and the goal must be to develop a menu of systems- and individual-level interventions to address homelessness, one of which may be a guaranteed annual income. Another risk mitigation strategy would be to test the cost-effectiveness of UBI in controlled experiments. Being able to make a compelling moral and economic case for UBI as a strategy for addressing homelessness may create fiscal space to protect other health and social services against austerity measures. Nevertheless, the erosion of other components of the social safety net following UBI implementation remains an uncertain risk to efforts to prevent and end homelessness.

2023 GDI Affirmative
***UBI Negative Supplement*** › Degrowth Bad › Growth Sustainable

No collapse – sustainability and biophysical limits are flexible, and history proves we can do it

Nordhaus 18 [Ted, co-founder and executive director of the Breakthrough Institute in California, “The Earth’s carrying capacity for human life is not fixed”, aeon, 07/05/18, https://aeon.co/ideas/the-earths-carrying-capacity-for-human-life-is-not-fixed]

For this reason, today’s warnings of impending ecological collapse mostly focus on rising consumption, not population growth. As many now acknowledge, our social biology might not function like protozoa, but capitalism does. It cannot survive without endless growth of material consumption. There is no particularly well-established basis for this claim and plenty of evidence to the contrary. The long-term trend in market economies has been towards slower and less resource-intensive growth. Growth in per-capita consumption rises dramatically as people transition from rural agrarian economies to modern industrial economies. But then it tails off. Today, western Europe and the US struggle to maintain 2 per cent annual growth. The composition of affluent economies changes as well. Manufacturing once accounted for 20 per cent or more of economic output and employment in most developed economies. Today, it is as low as 10 per cent in some, with the vast majority of economic output coming from knowledge and service sectors with significantly lower material and energy intensities. For decades, each increment of economic growth in developed economies has brought lower resource and energy use than the last. That’s because demand for material goods and services saturates. Few of us need or want to consume more than 3,000 calories or so a day or live in a 5,000-square-foot house. Many Americans prefer to drive SUVs but there is little interest in hauling the kids to soccer practice in a semi-truck. Our appetites for material goods might be prodigious but there is a limit to them. Even so, that doesn’t necessarily mean we won’t exceed the planet’s carrying capacity. Some environmental scientists claim that we have already surpassed the Earth’s carrying capacity. But this view is deeply ahistorical, assuming carrying capacity to be static. In fact, we have been engineering our environments to more productively serve human needs for tens of millennia. We cleared forests for grasslands and agriculture. We selected and bred plants and animals that were more nutritious, fertile and abundant. It took six times as much farmland to feed a single person 9,000 years ago, at the dawn of the Neolithic revolution, than it does today, even as almost all of us eat much richer diets. What the palaeoarcheological record strongly suggests is that carrying capacity is not fixed. It is many orders of magnitude greater than it was when we began our journey on this planet. There is no particular reason to think that we won’t be able to continue to raise carrying capacity further. Nuclear and solar energy are both clearly capable of providing large quantities of energy for large numbers of people without producing much carbon emissions. Modern, intensive agricultural systems are similarly capable of meeting the dietary needs of many more people. A planet with a lot more chickens, corn and nuclear power might not be the idyll that many wish for, but it would clearly be one that would be capable of supporting a lot more people consuming a lot more stuff for a very long time. Such a future, however, is anathema to many proponents of planetary limits, suggesting hubris of the highest order. But if it is, it is at least born of optimism, of the conviction that with wisdom and ingenuity humans can continue to thrive. Demands to restrict human societies to planetary limits, which environmental scientists and advocates claim to know prospectively, suggest something much darker. Viewing humans in the same way that we view single-celled organisms or insects risks treating them that way. Malthus argued against Poor Laws, in the belief that they only incentivised the poor to reproduce. Ehrlich argued against food aid for poor countries for similar reasons, and inspired population-control measures of enormous cruelty. Today, demands to impose planetary boundaries globally are couched in redistributive and egalitarian rhetoric, so as to avoid any suggestion that doing so might condemn billions to deep agrarian poverty. But they say little, specifically, about how social engineering of such extraordinary scale would be imposed in a democratic or equitable fashion. Ultimately, one need not advocate the imposition of pseudo-scientific limits on human societies to believe that many of us would be better off consuming less. Nor must one posit the collapse of human societies to worry deeply that growing human consumption might have terrible consequences for the rest of creation. But threats of societal collapse, claims that carrying capacity is fixed, and demands for sweeping restrictions on human aspiration are neither scientific nor just. We are not fruit flies, programmed to reproduce until our population collapses. Nor are we cattle, whose numbers must be managed. To understand the human experience on the planet is to understand that we have remade the planet again and again to serve our needs and our dreams. Today, the aspirations of billions depend upon continuing to do just that. May it be so.

2023 GDI Affirmative
***UBI Negative Supplement*** › Degrowth Bad › Growth Sustainable

Only capitalism creates productivity necessary for global prosperity and environmental sustainability. Disaster scenarios are empirically proven wrong.

Rhonheimer 2020 [Martin, teaching professor at the Pontifical University of the Holy Cross, “Capitalism is Good for the Poor – and for the Environment,” 02/07/20, https://austrian-institute.org/en/subjects-en/catholic-social-doctrine-2/capitalism-is-good-for-the-poor-and-for-the-environment/]

What is important is that what made today’s mass prosperity possible – a phenomenon unprecedented in history – was not social policy or social legislation, organised trade union pressure, or corrective interventions in the capitalist economy, but rather market capitalism itself, due to its enormous potential for innovation and the ever-increasing productivity of human labour that resulted from it.

Increasing prosperity and quality of life are always the result of increasing labour productivity. Only increased productivity enabled higher social standards, better working conditions, the overcoming of child labour, a higher level of education, and the emergence of human capital. This process of increasing triumph over poverty and the constantly rising living standards of the general masses is taking place on a global scale – but only where the market economy and capitalist entrepreneurship are able to spread.

2023 GDI Affirmative
***UBI Negative Supplement*** › UBI –Solvency Answers › Housing – no solvency

Without a massive boost in affordable housing supply, UBI can’t solve

Clarke, lecturer in sociology at the University of New South Wales, 2022

[Andrew, “Can a basic income help address homelessness? A Titmussian Perspective”, Journal of Sociology, November 15, https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/14407833221135986 7-13-2023 GDI-SPB]

Hence, for a BI to be effective in addressing homelessness, it must be implemented as part of a ‘BI-services-regulation hybrid’ (Malleson & Calnitsky, 2021). Central to the ‘services’ component of this hybrid would be an expanded social housing sector to boost the supply of affordable housing and reduce competition for low-cost private rentals. Social housing provides far greater levels of housing stability and affordability than the private rental market and has been shown to prevent homelessness for disadvantaged households (O’Donnell, 2021). However, the increasingly residualised nature of the social housing sector in liberal/liberalising welfare states means that these benefits are only available to an increasingly narrow group of high-needs households (Clarke et al, 2022). In Australia, this situation means that many people experiencing or at risk of homelessness are either unable to access social housing or must wait for extended periods – sometimes years – to do so (Clarke et al, 2022; Clarke & Parsell, 2020). Expanding the supply and loosening the targeting of social housing is thus essential to addressing homelessness – and the closer it can become to a universal (i.e. untargeted) service, the greater the impact it will have. Importantly, pairing a BI with existing forms of targeted housing assistance, such as rental subsidies and housing vouchers, is unlikely to achieve the same gains as pairing it with social housing. Subsidies and vouchers tend to be deployed in lieu of efforts to address the cost and supply of affordable housing, and thus suffer similar problems to a stand-alone BI. That is, they presume the efficacy of the market in meeting the needs of at-risk groups, meaning their capacity to address homelessness is contingent on market conditions. Anderson-Baron and Collins (2019) showed that the use of housing vouchers by Canadian housing first programs was rendered ineffective when housing markets tightened and costs rose above what vouchers could effectively mitigate. Similarly, Australian research shows that rental subsidies for low-income households, paid under the Commonwealth Rental Assistance scheme, did little to improve housing affordability in a context of rising rents, as illustrated by the fact that 46% of households that receive the subsidy are still in housing stress (Anglicare Australia, 2022). Pairing a BI with an expanded social housing sector would have several advantages vis-à-vis the task of addressing homelessness. On the one hand, access to social housing would limit the extent to which BI recipients are exposed to the vicissitudes of the private market. On the other hand, a BI would help ensure that social housing providers (non-profit organisations, state or local governments) have a stable rental revenue base – a constant problem where rents are set as a proportion of incomes (Jacobs, 2019) – as tenants would have a higher and more secure minimum income. It would also help alleviate the ongoing poverty experienced by many formerly homeless households that enter social housing, many of which rely on charity to supplement their meagre incomes (Parsell et al, 2021). Universal BI payments would mean this group had sufficient income to cover basic non-housing necessities (e.g. food, energy bills) and limit their reliance on charity, which many experience as shameful and degrading (Parsell et al, 2021). 12 Journal of Sociology 0(0) The hybrid could also usefully include regulatory measures to control that rate of rental increases. Rent control is a much maligned, but also much misunderstood, policy proposal, particularly in liberal welfare states where intervention in the market is erroneously seen as reducing housing quality and supply (Slater, 2021). However, they remain a commonly used housing policy tool across Europe and elsewhere (Kettunen & Ruonavaara, 2021); and most contemporary policies and proposals take account of the impact on landlords’ capacity to provide and maintain rental properties (Slater, 2021). While this is not the place to expound the varieties and nuances of rent control policy, it is worth noting that that well-designed rent controls could help guarantee the effectiveness of a BI in preventing homelessness. They would do this by ensuring that improvements in income levels brought about by a BI are not undone by runaway rental cost inflation. This will be especially important in contexts where access to social housing remains limited, or where its expansion is slow, and the bulk of lowincome households remain reliant on the private rental sector.

2023 GDI Affirmative
***UBI Negative Supplement*** › UBI –Solvency Answers › Housing – no solvency

The housing market overwhelms BIG solvency – Aff only makes low-income housing more unaffordable

Clarke, lecturer in sociology at the University of New South Wales, 2022

[Andrew, “Can a basic income help address homelessness? A Titmussian Perspective”, Journal of Sociology, November 15, https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/14407833221135986 7-13-2023 GDI-SPB]

Notwithstanding these affordances, a BI alone does not address the housing cost and supply side of the housing affordability problem. Indeed, implementation of a BI in isolation would render its impact on homelessness contingent upon the state of housing markets (cf. Malleson & Calnitsky, 2021). This means that gains achieved by a BI on the income side could easily be undone by rising market-housing costs; and such cost rises are likely, as the growing concentration of home ownership pushes Clarke 11 more higher-income earners into the private rental market, driving up rents and making it increasingly difficult for low-income households to compete (Adkins et al., 2021; Anglicare Australia, 2022). A BI may even drive-up housing costs at the lower end of the market by increasing the capacity of low-income households to bid up rents on the small number of affordable properties.

2023 GDI Affirmative
***UBI Negative Supplement*** › UBI –Solvency Answers › No National UBI solvency – no

Pilot programs prove no scale up to national level – cost, increasing undocumented immigration – and lack of work requirements unpopular

Hall, Research Fellow for quantitative analysis in the Center for Health and Welfare Policy at The Heritage Foundation, 2022

[Jamie, “”COVID Relief” Lottery Demonstrates the Folly of Guaranteed Income” The Heritage Foundation, Apr 19, 2022, https://www.heritage.org/welfare/commentary/covid-relief-lottery-demonstrates-the-folly-guaranteed-income, Accessed 7/12/2023 GDI-HB]

The researchers are guaranteed not to report one thing, however: that the Guaranteed Income Program is not feasible as a long-term national policy. Expanding to program to provide the same $1,000 per month to every current resident of the United States would cost $4 trillion per year. Paying for this would require more than doubling federal revenue. That would require Washington to gobble up an additional 17 cents of every dollar of US GDP -- a level of taxation that would cripple the economy. Furthermore, with world GDP hovering around $11,000 per capita, a guaranteed payout of $12,000 per year would attract an overwhelming flood of illegal immigrants, driving costs through the roof. Even with literally all the money in the world, a program like this is simply not affordable.

2023 GDI Affirmative
***UBI Negative Supplement*** › UBI –Solvency Answers › AT UBI better than welfare programs

UBI will skyrocket taxes that get externalized onto the poor

Lustig, professor of economics at Tulane University and Pabon postdoc fellow in developmental economics at Yale 2022

[Nora and Valentina Martinez, postdoc fellow in developmental economics at Yale, “Universal Basic Income, Taxes, and the Poor”, LSE Public Policy Review, November 24, https://ppr.lse.ac.uk/articles/10.31389/lseppr.67 [7-11-23|GDI|SPB]]

Implementing a budget-neutral UBI that does not hurt the poor could be quite challenging. With pre-UBI levels of spending on transfers and subsidies, when present, fiscal impoverishment is likely to persist. In the best of cases the poverty reducing effect will be smaller than under the current programs. The negative effects on poor people’s postfiscal income from switching to a UBI could be tempered if the funds available for such a change go beyond current spending on cash transfers and price subsidies. If the goal for the policy change to be budget neutral was maintained, however, this increase in spending would need to be matched by increased taxes or reductions in spending on other categories. Our results suggest that if budget neutrality is to be achieved by raising direct or indirect taxes paid by households, the implied increase in tax burdens for top deciles would be significant, even if the progressivity of tax rates remains unchanged. Efficiency costs and political resistance could make such a policy change a nonstarter in most low- and middle-income countries. Of course, the pressure on tax burdens could be eased by lowering the generosity of the UBI transfer. However, this would hurt the poor. Such a trade-off needs to be carefully assessed before introducing a UBI reform.

2023 GDI Affirmative
***UBI Negative Supplement*** › UBI bad › UBI – anti work incentives

UBI cost and anti-work incentives undermine future solvency

Pethokoukis, Senior Fellow DeWitt Wallace Chair Edito, 2020

[James, “A Universal Basic Income Is Less Attractive If It Needs to Be Paid For”, AEIdeas, June 15, , accessed 7-11-2023 GDI–JC]

I thought Andrew Yang’s political campaign might mark Peak UBI. First, the rest of the Democratic field seemed dismissive. Second, it seemed strange to call for a massive, new, and untried social program at a time of record low unemployment. Third, there really wasn’t much evidence that robots were about to take all the jobs, as Yang argued. Then came the coronavirus. Hey, as long as the government is cutting $1,200 checks because of the shutdown-affected economy, maybe it can, you know, just keep on sending them. Like, forever. Or so argued UBI supporters. As Yang said back in March, “Certainly I would never hope that UBI gets adopted because of this terrible virus. But I will say it’s somewhat surreal to suspend my presidential campaign in February and see it potentially implemented [the following month].” Well, one or two checks aren’t infinite checks. And there’s good reason for policymaker caution before ever implementing a UBI. One more bit of evidence on that front — at least evidence of tradeoffs — from the new NBER working paper “Universal Basic Income: A Dynamic Assessment” by Diego Daruich of the University of Southern California and Raquel Fernández of New York University. From that paper: We introduce the UBI policy as a lump-sum transfer made annually to all individuals once they reach adulthood. What are the benefits of a UBI policy? In an economy in which individuals are subject to both wage and employment shocks and in which credit and insurance markets are imperfect, UBI allows for greater smoothing of consumption and the guarantee of a minimum standard of living. It can also allow agents to undertake relatively expensive investments—in our model, attend college—which might have large consumption costs associated with them given the inability to borrow against future income. Furthermore, it can have beneficial intergenerational consequences from allowing parents to increase their investments in their child’s skill formation. We find that a UBI policy that unconditionally gives all households a yearly income equivalent to the poverty line level ($11,000 per household per year as measured in year 2000 dollars) has very different welfare implications for generations that are alive when the policy is introduced relative to future generations. The policy is welcomed by poorer households—those hit by out-of-work shocks as well as those with low skills or without a college education. Average welfare for adults alive when the policy is introduced increases by 1.2 percent measured in consumption equivalence units and, indeed, if this policy were voted upon it would win against the status quo. It is, however, a very expensive policy to implement. The higher tax rate required to finance this policy reduces investment in skills, leading to a less skilled work force and requiring even higher taxes over time. All future generations, operating behind the veil of ignorance, would prefer to live in a world without UBI and would be willing to sacrifice over 9% of consumption to do so. Of course, if one believes in a world with few if any fiscal constraints on policy, maybe this study is less relevant.

2023 GDI Affirmative
***UBI Negative Supplement*** › Green UBI – solvency answers › Green UBI – no solvency

UBI doesn’t solve climate – strengthens role of money, fails to change social relations, doesn’t address fossil fuels, AND causes public service cuts

Hiilamo, Professor of Social Policy University of Helsinki, ’23 [Heikki “What Is Participation Income and How Can It Help Communities Fight Climate Change?” World Economic Forum, 24 Mar. 2023, www.weforum.org/agenda/2023/03/what-is-participation-income-and-how-can-it-help-communities-fight-climate-change/. Accessed 12 July 2023. GDI-FLC]

There is fledgling research on new models of a welfare state which is not built on productivity and economic growth, but upon an architecture of sustainable wellbeing and care. UBI is the best known alternative to traditional welfare states. But it fails to meet the challenge for building a sustainable and just society.

Getting “free” money on its own won’t encourage people to use less fossil energy and do less of the things currently driving climate change. UBI schemes also consider monetary income as the route to meeting basic needs, strengthening the role of money in everyday life and leaving existing social relations untouched. Such schemes might entice politicians to cut resources from public services.