2022
Michigan
Affirmative
Aff – Techno-Orientalism – BFHR 7wk › Case › Advocacy---Asian Futurity
Posadas 21 (Baryon Tensor Posadas is an associate professor in the Department of Asian and Middle Eastern Studies, University of Minnesota. He is the author of Double Visions, Double Fictions: The Doppelganger in Japanese Film and Fiction (2018) and the translator of Aramaki Yoshio’s The Sacred Era: A Novel (2017). University of Minnesota Press, Volume 14, Number 1, Fall 2021, pp. 185-200, “Hidden Histories, Traveling Time: Science Fiction Translation as Cognitive Estrangement,” ; accessed 7/23/2022) ng *SF = science fiction
At this juncture then, wherein the question that demands addressing becomes what, exactly, might be at stake in thinking of translation as a technique of cognitive estrangement? To speak this point, let me turn to another text, Kawamata Chiaki’s Death Sentences, which also offers a meta-science-fictional exploration that parallels Aramaki’s project in many respects, albeit with more explicit historical commentary that facilitates a more cogent discussion of the politics of New Wave SF in Japan, and the stakes of its subsequent translation. Like Aramaki, Kawamata made his literary debut in the 1970s and also quickly became involved in SF criticism. While Kawamata is perhaps more well known for his space opera and military SF writings in more recent years, his novel Death Sentences is an exception, veering closer to a kind of post-New-Wave meta-SF work. The story of Death Sentences revolves around the discovery of a set of surrealist poems by an enigmatic French-Chinese man named only “Who May” (Hu Mei), whose writings seemingly have the deadly power to transport their readers across space, time, and human consciousness. The text of the novel is divided into three major sections. One part of the novel tells the story of the origin of the poems in an encounter between Who May and French surrealist author Andre Breton in New York during the 1930s, subsequent to which Breton and several other figures in the surrealist movement die (often by suicide) one after another. Another section covers the period when Who May’s lost manuscripts resurface in 1980s Japan following their discovery and publication amid a series of mysterious deaths among the translators and publishing staff. The final section details the aftermath of the mass circulation of Who May’s poems, which have developed a cult following in Japan (and subsequently, the rest of the world), leading to the formation of a Secret Police unit that hunts down and executes those identified as afflicted with the addictive powers of these poems. In the end, the alternate history created by the discovery of Who May’s writings culminates in a vision of a dystopian future wherein resource depletion has led to the settlement of Mars. There, a Martian Guard serves as a private death squad that enforces productivity and ensures corporate profits, even when it involves the extermination of whole communities of colonists who have come into contact with the poems in question. Like Aramaki’s The Sacred Era, Kawamata’s Death Sentences is, strictly speaking, less an SF text per se than it is a novel that is metafictionally about the SF genre, despite the fact that Kawamata’s novel received the 1984 Japanese SF Grand Prize (Nihon SF Taishō). For one thing, with the exception of the final section featuring the Martian Guard acting within a dystopic future scenario, much of its narrative is resolutely low-tech with little attention to issues of technological change that are typical in the genre. For another, its primary plot conceits—specifically, the addictive and almost narcotic quality of the magic poems of Who May, or the travels across space and time that these same poems make possible at the end of the novel—are given barely any attempt (even at the level of techno- babble) at a rational or scientific explanation. That said, regardless of whether or not one includes the text within the category of SF, what is perhaps more interesting about Death Sentences is how its narrative effectively presents a theory and critical account of science fiction as a genre and broader cultural formation. In other words, if Death Sentences is indeed an SF text, it is because the novel is precisely about SF itself. This manifests most visibly in scenes that comment on the history and intellectual genealogy of the SF genre. For example, at one point in the novel, Andre Breton and David Hare— both major figures within the Surrealist movement— discuss a poem of Who May’s titled “Another World.” In their conversation, Hare suggests to Breton that perhaps it would be more apt for the poem to appear in an SF magazine instead of their surrealist publication. “I would wait another fifteen years and bring it out in a science fiction magazine.” “What! Fifteen years?” To his dismay, Breton hadn’t the slightest idea what Hare was trying to say. “Science fiction?” “Today, it isn’t feasible. Readers haven’t matured enough yet. There are some, but this is too avant-garde. This fantasy world called ‘another world’ is quite attractive. It is truly beautiful. It is full of an otherworldly sense of wonder. Unfortunately, however, it doesn’t have a principal hero or heroine. Moreover, the vocabulary is too specialized. The absence of a hero is a fatal flaw in this genre. At least the editors who currently work in this genre in America think so . . . but in another fifteen years or so . . .”20 At first glance, Hare’s declaration seems to imply a stark demarcation between SF and surrealism. Indeed, he explicitly states that he “doesn’t see any connection between this ‘Another World’ and surrealism.”21 Whereas surrealism operates on the principle of “imagination aims to become reality,” Who May’s poems (and, by implication, SF) are an attempt to “leave reality behind, or to otherwise obliterate it completely.”22 However, Hare’s declaration is subsequently undercut by Breton’s unspoken parenthetical comment of “Dogma!,” which hints at not only his disagreement with Hare’s diagnosis, but also Hare’s own seeming hesitation and anxiety with his pronouncements.23 In the end, what this exchange between Hare and Breton highlights is the hypothesis that SF may very well be understood as genre that operates under parallel principles to that of surrealism. Indeed, the end of the subsequent chapter only further underscores this kinship between them when, in the aftermath of the end of the Second World War, several surrealist artists and authors die in quick succession following some form of contact with Who May’s poems. The last name the novel includes in this series is the influential SF author Philip K. Dick. To assert an alliance between surrealism and SF is not an altogether novel move to make. As early as 1976, critic David Ketterer already pointed out “the considerable affinity which exists between surrealism and SF.”24 In particular, Ketterer notes the similarities in their respective projects of expanding and transforming the conception of the real by way of procedures of defamiliarization. Put another way, surrealism arguably operates on a principle that parallels Darko Suvin’s pioneering conceptualization of SF as a “literary genre whose necessary and sufficient conditions are the presence and interaction of estrangement and cognition.”25 Indeed, given Suvin’s own alignment of SF with the radical politics of utopian imagination, one could perhaps be forgiven for suspecting that his conception of the genre might owe a debt to ideas drawn from the revolutionary politics of Breton’s surrealist manifestos and the broader surrealist movement’s collective attempt to imagine an idealized world in the spaces of the impossible, that is, in the literalized no-place of utopia.26 With Kawamata’s novel though, what is interesting is how it takes this purported alliance between surrealism and SF as a point of departure from which to launch into an exploration of the failure of their utopian politics. The scenes subsequent to Breton’s encounter with Who May describe the sense of impasse within the surrealist movement after the end of the Second World War, with Breton lamenting its “terrible reality” with the words “the birth of the atomic bomb cast a cloud over humanity, darkening the end of the Great War. . . . His former comrades had split into various factions, some hostile and some friendly.”27 Put simply, the tenor of this sequence is less one of revolutionary hope and more one of disappointment over the failure of revolution. As if to punctuate this sense of failure further, once the novel shifts to the events of 1980s Japan when Who May’s poems resurface, there is a clear suggestion that the once lofty ambitions of the surrealist movement have since been domesticated, reduced to little more than a brand label for a cultural commodity. Sakakibara, the focalizing character in this section of the novel, first comes into contact with Who May’s poetry when his small publishing company is contracted by the Seito Group, a corporate department store chain, to assist them in one of their “cultural ventures,” namely the translation and preparation for publication of a recently discovered collection of unpublished surrealist manuscripts and artwork. The goal of this project is, in the words of the novel, “to draw on the vitality of these previously unknown materials, tapping into them as a new source for fashions and lifestyles.”28 The implication here is that not only has surrealism (and its renewal and revival) taken on a signaling function indicative of the possession of cultural capital, perhaps more fundamentally, its utopian potentiality had become little more than a set of empty gestures, a set of recognizable tropes and aesthetic techniques ready to be commercially repurposed. This takes on greater significance in light of the novel’s attempt to posit an affinity between surrealism and SF, for what is SF if not precisely the massmarket codification of the utopian project into the set of iconographies and plot formulae that constitute a genre’s megatext? With this in mind, if indeed Death Sentences can be apprehended as a kind of meta-SF text that speaks to the genre’s historical genealogy and political charge, then it would appear that what it brings to the foreground are precisely the limits of SF as a site of radical critical practice. Specifically, it stages what Tom Moylan has identified as an important historical turn toward the dystopian within the genre of SF during the 1980s in the face of economic restructuring and the resurgence of right- wing politics. For Moylan, this dystopian turn should not be read as simply the negation of utopia, but rather a refashioning of the utopian impulse in the face of its new historical conditions—what has since gone by such names as postmodernity, globalization, and neoliberalism—which are characterized precisely by the dominance of a broader anti- utopian sentiment. In his words: In the face of a powerful anti-utopian campaign, dystopia’s potential for exploring utopian possibilities . . . confronted the devaluation of Utopia by an official neoliberal discourse that proclaimed the end of history and celebrated simultaneously the end of radical social dreaming . . . These works carry out an intertextual intervention that negates the 1980s negation of the critical utopian moment and thus makes room for a new expression of the utopian imagination.29 Put simply, the critical dystopian writings appearing since the 1980s have attempted to address the question of the politics of SF after the end of futurity. While Death Sentences certainly stages these questions, it cannot be said to offer an unambiguous solution to the problem. Its finale presents a vision of a dystopic future of a Martian colony policed with private military contractors whose primary function is the deployment of violence to ensure the smooth flow of the circulation of capital. As the text puts it: “The raison d’être of the Martian Guard lay in maintaining this felicitous relation between supply and demand, and, if possible, enhancing it. In a word, it was a matter of population adjustment through extermination.”30 On the one hand, these scenes present a vision of the world that anticipates the disaster capitalism of the present conjuncture marked by the use of preemptive violence as a mechanism of capital accumulation. Yet on the other hand, the only way out of this world it offers is through a deus ex machina in the form of time travel that allows for a return to the past to ensure that Who May never writes his killer poems such that this world presumably never comes to pass. On its face, this appears like less of an attempt at articulating a site, a struggle, and more of a retreat, a nostalgic lament. In this respect, it provokes a reminder of Fredric Jameson’s claim that in the present conjuncture, “the deepest vocation [of SF] is over and over again to demonstrate and to dramatize our incapacity to imagine the future, to body forth, through apparently full representation, which prove on closer inspection to be structurally and constitutively impoverished.”31 But there is also more to it than just that, for in undoing the writing of the poems and changing the subsequent course of history, it renders the text of the novel into a document of a history that never came to pass. In effect, it leaves the reader with the memory of a history that never happened. Could the SF genre in its totality be thought of as an archive of such unrealized histories and futurities? After all, it provides a record of what Ernst Bloch has called the “cultural surplus” of utopian desire, unrealized futurities that exist as potentialities but do not materialize in actuality.32 This record serves as a reminder of the existence of different horizons of possibility, different horizons of futurity whose affective potential may not be already exhausted or rendered inert in the actualization of history. Viewed in these terms, the practice of translation turns out to be a potential technology for activating a desire for these yet unknown and unrealized utopias. If, indeed, as Lawrence Venuti has suggested, translation offers the potential to draw attention to historical difference, then perhaps it is not too much of a stretch to approach translation in science-fictional terms as a kind of time-travel.33 It operates, as Takayuki Tatsumi once put it in another context, as a “soft time machine” that facilitates “a creative dialogue between two decades and two cultures.”34 In doing so, it cannot help but also participate in the modes of ideological interrogation that the time travel narrative is known for, be it in the form of, to use the terminology of William Burling, the “temporal dislocation” that focuses largely on the mechanics of time travel and the paradoxes it generates, or the “temporal contrast” that places its attention on the differences between two time periods and worlds.35 In Burling’s view, the essential issue at the heart of time travel stories is not their specific manifest contents (the various past and future worlds these texts visit in their narratives) but the very fact of time travel stories, the more fundamental question of “Why are there so many time travel stories?” (italics in original).36 For Burling, this proliferation is indicative of a lack in the present, and a desire to do something about it. When it is framed in these terms, the surge in interest in translated SF in more recent years, amply documented by Rachel Cordasco through her website “Speculative Fiction in Translation,” might be understood symptomatically as themselves science-fictional eruptions of this latent sense of lack, and with it a concomitant desire for something other than the here and now.37 But to fully realize this potential will entail taking seriously SFs from other languages and locations as proper sites of extrapolative potentiality and not mere predictable possibility. In other words, if they are to become a space for the imagination of a radical futurity that can break open the historical limits of the present, other SFs cannot be reduced to mere extensions of an already fixed conception of the form, to little more peripheral traditions derivative of the center in line with more Eurocentric diffusionist models of world literature.38 Instead, they must be encountered in properly science-fictional terms as potential spaces for transformative difference, as sites for the cognitive estrangement of our understanding of the history of the genre itself.
2022
Michigan
Affirmative
Aff – Techno-Orientalism – BFHR 7wk › Case › Advocacy---Asian Futurity
Hsu 20, Allison Hsu is a performance curator, writer, and arts administrator from Connecticut, currently based in Brooklyn, NY. Her research interests include bridging Asian American studies and feminist and queer theory. She is currently an assistant to performing artist Eiko Otake, and she works with a number of arts organizations in New York, including the Museum of Chinese in America, Movement Research, and the Asian American International Film Festival. Allison received her MA in Performance Studies from NYU and BA from Wesleyan University in Feminist, Gender, and Sexuality Studies. (Allison, “Imagining Asian Futurity: History, Multiplicity, and Racial Solidarity”, Color Bloq, ) //CHC-DS 🐱👤
I look to this image to theorize how this performance of Asian futurity breaks away from the techno-Orientalist stereotypes present in contemporary art and performance, as well as in science fiction literature and film. Techno-Orientalism imagines Asia as a futuristic dystopia. It dehumanizes Asian people by presenting them as robot-like technological objects in order to ease Western anxieties about being surpassed by the rise of Asia. This paranoid imagination places a Western protagonist, often as the figure of the space cowboy, at the center of the narrative and relegates Asian subjects to the background. As machines, they are suspended between life and death, marked as both super-human and sub-human, unable to materialize as fully-formed. The Western protagonist must exhibit his superiority over technology (and over race) through exploitation and control. These techno-Orientalist stereotypes make their way into popular narratives, from Blade Runner to Cloud Atlas. More recently, these tropes appear in the third season of Westworld, where scenes set in a futuristic version of Los Angeles were filmed in different locations across Singapore. This suggests that the future will be Asian, but the heroes will never be.
Asian futurism, on the other hand, recasts these technology-driven visions of the future to create speculative worlds in which Asian thinkers and artists are not exoticized as Oriental others. Instead they are at the center of narratives rather than dotting the margins. Asian futurism asks not how future imaginings of Asia and Asian identity are built from the West looking East, but instead, how they emerge from the East looking forward.
2022
Michigan
Affirmative
Aff – Techno-Orientalism – BFHR 7wk › Case › Advocacy---Art
*this card doesn’t have to be read with the electric dress
Roh et al. 15, David Roh is Professor of English at the University of Utah. He holds a BA in English from the University of California, Los Angeles, an Ed.M in Educational Technology from Harvard University, and an MA and Ph.D in English from the University of California, Santa Barbara. He is author of Minor Transpacific: Triangulating American, Japanese, and Korean Fictions (Stanford University Press, 2021), Illegal Literature (University of Minnesota Press, 2015), and coeditor of Techno-Orientalism (Rutgers University Press, 2015). His work has appeared in Law & Literature, MELUS, Journal of Narrative Theory, and Verge., (“Chapter 5: I, Stereotype”, Techno-Orientalism: Imagining Asia in Speculative Fiction, History, and Media, Rutgers University Press) //CHC-DS 🐱👤
If a stereotype is a technology meant to facilitate mental shortcuts, then I have been misusing this technology. More specifically, I have been dwelling on stereotypes of yellow peril—thinking about them at length, spending time with them, treating them as though they were more than two-dimensional, and (unintentionally?) turning them inside out. In doing so, I have come to wonder whether the phenomenon of the stereotype will eventually grow obsolete. A stereotype is a human-shaped technology. Technologies are constantly changing, and they are constantly changing the way humans are shaped—as well as the ways in which human shapes are perceived. (Consider technologies such as Photoshop, cosmetic surgery, and CGI.) What would happen to stereotypes in a world where Zao’s face is universally perceived not as uncanny but as aesthetically ideal? Moreover, what would happen to stereotypes in a world where anthropomorphic shapes are obsolete? Would a posthuman world be a post-stereotype world? Or would stereotypes look posthuman?
2022
Michigan
Affirmative
Aff – Techno-Orientalism – BFHR 7wk › Case › Advocacy---Art
Tanaka appears in her electric dress. Photo courtesy of Nakanoshima Museum of Art, Osaka.
Hsu 20, Allison Hsu is a performance curator, writer, and arts administrator from Connecticut, currently based in Brooklyn, NY. Her research interests include bridging Asian American studies and feminist and queer theory. She is currently an assistant to performing artist Eiko Otake, and she works with a number of arts organizations in New York, including the Museum of Chinese in America, Movement Research, and the Asian American International Film Festival. Allison received her MA in Performance Studies from NYU and BA from Wesleyan University in Feminist, Gender, and Sexuality Studies. (Allison, “Imagining Asian Futurity: History, Multiplicity, and Racial Solidarity”, Color Bloq, ) //CHC-DS 🐱👤
2022
Michigan
Affirmative
Aff – Techno-Orientalism – BFHR 7wk › Case › Thesis---Western Imperialism
Kouch and Wang 18, *June Kuoch is a queer and trans Southeast Asian American. They are a senior at the University of Minnesota majoring in Sociology with a focus in policy analysis and minoring in Asian American Studies, Gender Women and Sexuality Studies, and Comparative Race and Ethnicity in the United States. Kuoch is a local community organizer focusing on abolition through a queer and trans of color lens. Their work has been inspired the activist Yuri Kochiyama. Their current research focuses on haunting brought by United States empire building as it intersects with critical refugee studies, Asian American studies, critical archival studies, and queer of color critic. **Allegro Wang is a queer, trans Chinese-American and an undergraduate at the University of Minnesota. They are currently a sophomore in the U of MN’s College of Science and Engineering and double-majoring in Computer Sciences and Gender, Women’s, and Sexuality Studies. Allegro’s primary area of interest in research is in how technology emerges as a site of both subjugation and resistance in its intersection with whiteness, queerness, and transness., (June and Allegro, “Cyber Fantasies: Rina Sawayama, Asian Feminism, and TechnoOrientalism in the Age of Neoliberalism” in Sprinkle: An Undergraduate Journal of Feminist and Queer Studies, Vol. 11, ) //CHC-DS 🐱👤
The ways in which techno-Orientalism manifests in Asia are predicated on Cold War logics, a kind of Western militarized violence. Jodi Kim (2010) finds in Ends of Empire that the Cold War brought spatial and temporal distinctions for racialized Asian bodies via proxy wars. The United States’ relationship with Asian nations is overdetermined by the events of that era: “The Cold War, as a geopolitical, cultural, and epistemological project of gendered racial formation and imperialism undergirding U.S. global hegemony” (Kim, 2010, p. 4). The United States’ investment in nations like South Korea, Japan, and Vietnam is predicated on Western interests in the geopolitical sphere. The United States rebuilt Japan after World War II as a means of gaining capital and hegemonic power, which is a neo-imperialist and gendered project that undergirds U.S.-Japan relations. Okinawa is a focal point for empires to collide—Japan’s settlement and the US military occupation—both of which have brought genderbased violence to indigenous Okinawans (Yoneyama, 2015). The racialized, gendered dynamic produces a taxonomy of Asian subjectivity in that Asians are tools for the West. Within hegemonic systems, Asian women are pushed to the periphery of Empire. Their subservience and domination are used to further neo-colonial, white, hegemonic, masculine interests, which is evident in the advent of comfort women and the military sex industry (Yoneyama, 2015). Western nations, specifically white men, are invested in Asia because they perceive themselves as “saving” Asian women from an Orientalized depiction of violent Asian men, which propagates a racialized and heteronormative notion of Asia (Park, 2012). The political and economic rise of Asian principalities such as China, Japan, and India transform Oriental epistemologies via a disruption of white hegemonic power. In the attempt of Asian nations to secure capital, security anxieties manifest from white fears of emasculation or the loss of power. In a discursive response to maintain international white supremacy, a new form of othering occurs (Park, 2012; Agathangelou, 2016).
Thus, Cold War logics spectrally transform, haunt, and underlie techno-Orientalism. Asian subjectivity is always within a state of flux or being and exists in nonlinear spatiotemporalities as a result of Western modernities:
2022
Michigan
Affirmative
Aff – Techno-Orientalism – BFHR 7wk › Case › Thesis---Uncanny Valley
Shi 21, University of Pennsylvania, (Vicki, “WHERE IS THE ASIAN BODY? THE PROBLEM OF ERASURE IN WESTERN VISUAL CULTURE”, Thesis in Visual Studies, ) //CHC-DS 🐱👤
In 1970, Japanese scientist Masahiro Mori published an article on what he coined the “uncanny valley,” or his theory of human reactions to objects that are humanistic. On the graph, the y-axis represents human affinity while the y-axis represents the degree of realistic portrayal. Mori explains that as things go further along the x-axis, people start feeling a negative affinity to those objects. For example, a toy robot will vaguely represent a human, but is not frightening because they are not made to look realistic. The toy robot retains features that make it undeniably inhuman. However, something like a prosthetic hand or a corpse may bring about a feeling of unease to a healthy human being, since they resemble something human but are not, or no longer, human. This reaction is represented by the deep plunge at the bottom of the graph, where the curve goes south in measurements of human affinity.7 Mori’s uncanny valley is often used in android design in an autonomous future to describe the unease that occurs when looking at objects that mimic humanity. The response is perhaps even instinctual as androids are a clear example of what could replace humans altogether. It is only natural for people to ostracize that which can destroy them; therefore, the crux of the uncanny valley lies in the innate fear of human mortality.8 In this vein of thought, the uncanny valley can also be applied through a racial context in Western societies, especially in Europe and the United States. Revealed on a microscopic level, “research on immigrant students of color reveals that students undergo a process of racialization as they are incorporated into the existing racial hierarchy of the United States—one that places White people at the top and defines them as the only true Americans.”9 Furthermore, “participants in both of our studies internalized these notions of Americanness, evidenced strongly in their reserving the term ‘American’ to refer to White people, while using ethnically or racially specific language to identify themselves or other people of color.”10 When enlarged to a national scale and enforced by systematic ostracization, compared to the white majority or “true Americans,” the racial Other seems to invade the United States or exists in it unnaturally in the eyes of both parties. Since these “Others” do not resemble the white majority, their existence becomes a parody of white livelihood and their humanity comes into question.
This racial division in the U.S. is further perpetrated by the stereotypes and biases the white majority forces on these Others. By creating these exaggerations, the white majority can control how the racial Other is portrayed. These caricatures are the start of the systematic dehumanization, with different archetypes assigned to different racial group. With East Asians, alienation peaked with the spread of the Yellow Peril ideology. Throughout the late 19th and the early 20th century, mass immigration brought an increase of Asian population in the United States as a direct result of Western military and imperialistic influences on Asia. However, this influx brought fear that these so-called “foreigners” would disrupt or potentially overtake the white majority. As a response, British author Sax Rohmer created Fu Manchu, a crafty Chinese mastermind plotting to overthrow the white, Eurocentric world, at the height of the Yellow Peril. While Fu Manchu himself represented the white man’s fear of the Chinese invasion, his army of minions that carried out his orders had traits that paralleled with what people believed of the Chinese laborers at that time. They were seen as “‘instruments’—that is, as ‘exploitable, containable, and inhuman,’ and as ‘the perfect ‘laboring machine[s]’—a swarm of mindless coolies who could be easily ‘programmed.’”11 The Chinese were seen as unintelligent and robotic; they were “beings that appear human and behave in human-like ways, but that are really subhuman on the ‘inside.’”12 Yet the white man still feels anxiety in regards to the Chinese because they are a “contradiction between [the] thing's appearance and the essence that one has attributed to it.”13 To the white man, the Chinaman is “felt to be both human and subhuman— and therefore as an uncanny entity”14 because he is simultaneously both Fu Manchu and his faceless, mechanical minions.
2022
Michigan
Affirmative
Aff – Techno-Orientalism – BFHR 7wk › Case › Thesis---Techno-Orientalism
Roh et al. 15, David Roh is Professor of English at the University of Utah. He holds a BA in English from the University of California, Los Angeles, an Ed.M in Educational Technology from Harvard University, and an MA and Ph.D in English from the University of California, Santa Barbara. He is author of Minor Transpacific: Triangulating American, Japanese, and Korean Fictions (Stanford University Press, 2021), Illegal Literature (University of Minnesota Press, 2015), and coeditor of Techno-Orientalism (Rutgers University Press, 2015). His work has appeared in Law & Literature, MELUS, Journal of Narrative Theory, and Verge., (“Technologizing Orientalism”, Techno-Orientalism: Imagining Asia in Speculative Fiction, History, and Media, Rutgers University Press) //CHC-DS 🐱👤
From the earliest era of Asian peoples in the United States, their technical abilities were both lauded and erased. An exemplar is the Chinese men who composed more than half of the labor force that completed the transcontinental railroad’s western portion over the high Sierra Nevada mountains to Promontory, Utah, in 1869. In the campaign to extend the Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882, the American Federation of Labor argued in their publication, Some Reasons for Chinese Exclusion, Meat vs. Rice, American Manhood against Asiatic Coolieism: Which Shall Survive? (1902), that the Chinese male body differed radically from the American male body. The publication argued that the Chinese laborer could withstand physical deprivations that American and European laborers could not (American Federation of Labor et al. 5, 14, 16, 18). This constructed difference rationalized discriminatory policies against Chinese railroad workers. Meat vs. Rice did not argue the Chinese had particular technical skills that were valuable for constructing the transcontinental railroad. On the contrary, the publication claimed the Chinese body simply did not require the conditions of safety, sustenance, and shelter that bodies of European descendents required. Implicit in their argument is a threat to the superior European laborer’s way of life or culture by a kind of unfeeling superhuman antithetical to the West’s liberal humanist credo.
The U.S. techno-Orientalist imagination is thus rooted in this view of the Asian body as a form of expendable technology—a view that emerged in the discourse of early U.S. industrialization and continued to evolve in the twentieth century. In 1982, a twenty-seven-year-old Chinese American named Vincent Chin was beaten to death by two white men in Detroit. The attackers, Ronald Ebens and Michael Nitz, were autoworkers in a U.S. auto industry that was losing market share to Japanese cars. Though Chin, a drafter, did not work in automobiles, Ebens and Nitz viewed him as representative—indeed, an embodiment—of Japanese auto manufacturing as they beat him with a baseball bat, reminiscent of Americans smashing Japanese-made cars in reaction to increasing auto imports in the early 1980s.9 The callous brutality of Chin’s death evinces something more than racial hatred; Chin not only was perceived as a convenient stand-in for the Japanese automotive industry, but embodied its traits—unfeeling, efficient, and inhuman. In Ebens and Nitz’s eyes, they were Luddites striking down the automatons that had been sent in to replace them. Techno-Orientalist discourse completed the project of dehumanizing Vincent Chin by rendering him as not only a racialized Other, but a factory machine that had to be dismantled by Ebens and Nitz to reclaim their personhood, subjectivity, and masculinity.10 The shock and outrage over Chin’s murder served as a critical rallying cry under which a coalition of ethnic-specific groups joined as Asian Americans.
2022
Michigan
Affirmative
Aff – Techno-Orientalism – BFHR 7wk › Case › Thesis---Technological Sublime
Roh et al. 15, David Roh is Professor of English at the University of Utah. He holds a BA in English from the University of California, Los Angeles, an Ed.M in Educational Technology from Harvard University, and an MA and Ph.D in English from the University of California, Santa Barbara. He is author of Minor Transpacific: Triangulating American, Japanese, and Korean Fictions (Stanford University Press, 2021), Illegal Literature (University of Minnesota Press, 2015), and coeditor of Techno-Orientalism (Rutgers University Press, 2015). His work has appeared in Law & Literature, MELUS, Journal of Narrative Theory, and Verge., (“Chapter 1: Demon Courage and Dread Engines”, Techno-Orientalism: Imagining Asia in Speculative Fiction, History, and Media, Rutgers University Press) //CHC-DS 🐱👤
While Japan’s march toward world power status was generally celebrated in America, it was also filtered through the West’s complex emotional response to race and emergent technologies, and infused with trepidation over an Asian power dominating a white one. Some Americans found this turn of events inspiring. “White supremacy is getting a terrible black eye in and about Manchuria and Mukden,” wrote the Seattle Republican in March 1905, one of many African American newspapers that saw Japanese victory as a subversively powerful triumph for racial equality in an age of Jim Crow and lynching (qtd. in Kearney 35). Even W.E.B. Du Bois became a “Japanophile” approving the “fear of colored revolt against white exploitation” that Japanese victories produced (Kearney 19, 30, 38, 168).
White Americans’ assessment of Japan’s rise was more ambivalent. Concerns about “race decadence” bumped against the technological sublime, a state of awe attached to the creations of modern science. Enlightenment thinkers like Immanuel Kant and Edmund Burke had posited that confrontations with terror in the form of great natural forces could elevate observers to a “heightened awareness of reason.” With the advent of the Machine Age, some felt that a similar astonishment from encounters with emerging technologies might lead to society’s betterment. In fact, David Nye sees American culture’s celebration of nature-controlling technologies, in awe-inspiring shared experiences like the completion of the transcontinental railroad, as central to the narrative of American greatness from the nineteenth century onward, forming unities across political, religious, regional, and class divides (3, 6–9, 22, 27).
2022
Michigan
Affirmative
Aff – Techno-Orientalism – BFHR 7wk › Case › Thesis---Stereotypes
Roh et al. 15, David Roh is Professor of English at the University of Utah. He holds a BA in English from the University of California, Los Angeles, an Ed.M in Educational Technology from Harvard University, and an MA and Ph.D in English from the University of California, Santa Barbara. He is author of Minor Transpacific: Triangulating American, Japanese, and Korean Fictions (Stanford University Press, 2021), Illegal Literature (University of Minnesota Press, 2015), and coeditor of Techno-Orientalism (Rutgers University Press, 2015). His work has appeared in Law & Literature, MELUS, Journal of Narrative Theory, and Verge., (“Chapter 5: I, Stereotype”, Techno-Orientalism: Imagining Asia in Speculative Fiction, History, and Media, Rutgers University Press) //CHC-DS 🐱👤
Like their fellow humanoid artifacts, stereotypes can elicit a spectrum of human responses. Just as not all robots are uncanny, not all stereotypes are uncanny. There is nothing inherently uncanny, for example, about stereotypes such as “dog lover,” “Sox fan,” “vegan,” “science fiction enthusiast,” and so on. Problems arise, however, when stereotypes are engineered to fabricate, automate, and mechanically reproduce uncanny feelings in response to certain “types” of people. An uncanny stereotype elicits intellectual uncertainty over whether a “type” of person is genuinely human and alive. The uncanniest stereotypes elicit revulsion and profound phobia in response to the person(s) stereotyped as uncanny. Often the manufacture of such uncanny stereotypes happens in the context of war and colonialism. Just as individual members of ethnic groups have found themselves detained in prisons and internment camps, ethnic stereotypes have often found themselves aesthetically detained in the uncanny valley.
Indeed, the detention of “yellow peril” stereotypes in the uncanny valley during World War II corresponded to the detention by the U.S. government of thousands of Japanese Americans in the wake of Pearl Harbor. This correspondence is substantiated by an infamous December 1941 article in LIFE titled “How to Tell Japs from the Chinese: Angry Citizens Victimize Allies with Emotional Outburst at Enemy.” Occupying less than two pages, this article claims the scholarly authority of “physical anthropologists” and “adduces a rule-of-thumb from the anthropometric conformations that distinguish friendly Chinese from enemy alien Japs” (81). Such authority, however, falls apart under scrutiny. Almost all of the article’s rhetorical impact is generated not by logical argumentation but by the illogical interaction between the verbal text and the accompanying visual images. While the annotated photographs of Ong Wen-hao and Hideki Tojo might seem to convey an aura of scientific fact, in truth the diagrams constitute an exercise in Orientalist physiognomic fantasy. The annotations are riddled with anatomical errors and misinformation. For example, the foremost detail noted in each diagram— “yellow complexion”—is inaccurate, whether such yellowness is specified as “parchment” (upper diagram) or “earthy” (lower diagram). As Michael Keevak demonstrates in Becoming Yellow: A Short History of Racial Thinking (2011), the misattribution of yellow skin to East Asians originated in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Moreover, the annotation “epicanthic fold” draws the viewer’s attention to the wrong part of the eye. The term actually refers to a fold of skin over the eye’s inner angle. (The prefix “epi-” means “upon” or “over,” while “canthus” refers to any angle formed by the intersection of the upper and lower eyelids.) In the diagram, however, the phrase “epicanthic fold” is shown as pointing to a crease in the upper eyelid. Perhaps most important, contrary to the article’s claims, no individual can be characterized as “representative” of an entire “anthropological group.”
2022
Michigan
Affirmative
Aff – Techno-Orientalism – BFHR 7wk › Case › Thesis---Simulacra
Roh et al. 15, David Roh is Professor of English at the University of Utah. He holds a BA in English from the University of California, Los Angeles, an Ed.M in Educational Technology from Harvard University, and an MA and Ph.D in English from the University of California, Santa Barbara. He is author of Minor Transpacific: Triangulating American, Japanese, and Korean Fictions (Stanford University Press, 2021), Illegal Literature (University of Minnesota Press, 2015), and coeditor of Techno-Orientalism (Rutgers University Press, 2015). His work has appeared in Law & Literature, MELUS, Journal of Narrative Theory, and Verge., (“Chapter 3: Looking Backward, from 2019 to 1882”, Techno-Orientalism: Imagining Asia in Speculative Fiction, History, and Media, Rutgers University Press) //CHC-DS 🐱👤
Both technology and Orientalism shared a common investment in realizing a sustainable future. They converged at efforts to turn the problems of difference into nonissues or even perhaps the very rationale for expansion and development. In making cases for or against these futures, utopian/dystopian texts are test balloons for measuring possible destinies for the present.1 Is that envisioned future one of, say, the orderly liberation of the oppressed and benighted or a chaotic hegemony of inequality and exploitation? The place of Asia in that future becomes an index of success or failure. Is the West’s future more Asian or less Asian, and which is preferable?
Both technology and Orientalism have fueled engines of economic growth. A key difference is that technology still tends to be celebrated as innovative and life-saving, and Orientalism is a relic of racist and exploitative imperialism. On the power of technology, Martin Heidegger, for example, in “The Question Concerning Technology,” suggestively writes, “Technology is a mode of revealing. Technology comes to presence in the realm where revealing and unconcealment take place, where aletheia, truth, happens” (13). Technology has also been the site of profound anxieties about the future, particularly the eclipsing of such quaint notions as discernible reality. Writing in 1936 about the emergent medium of cinema, Walter Benjamin, for example, in “The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction,” observes, “The equipment-free aspect of reality has become the height of artifice; the sight of immediate reality has become an orchid in the land of technology.” As technology becomes more advanced, it develops a deft capacity to conceal or otherwise normalize its apparatuses, which can ironically be increasingly equipment-laden.
2022
Michigan
Affirmative
Aff – Techno-Orientalism – BFHR 7wk › Case › Thesis---Simulacra
Chan 16, Art Forum (Dawn, “ASIA-FUTURISM”, Art Forum, ) //CHC-DS 🐱👤
IS IT POSSIBLE to be othered across time? For almost a century already, the myth of an Asian-inflected future has infiltrated imaginations worldwide. Vivid tableaux of the continent’s cities in hyperdrive, fueled by tech-enabled consumerism, come to mind with ease: Think of the vertical neon signs, the sleep-deprived gamers, the flesh-meets-machine of conveyor-belt sushi. Meanwhile, recent art history serves up examples of Asian artists (and East Asian artists in particular) whose pieces lay ground for even more fantastic futures to come: narratives populated by cyborg love and virtual-reality metropolises. In previous decades there were, of course, Nam June Paik’s televisions and robots, then Lee Bul’s cyborgs; now one finds the trippy digital self-portraits of Lu Yang, and Transmedia Lab’s robot arm programmed to duplicate Buddhist scripture.
In 1986, describing the United States, Jean Baudrillard touched on what the country was not: Japan. Specifically, a Japan that had managed “an unintelligible paradox, to transform the power of territoriality and feudalism into that of deterritoriality and weightlessness.” “Japan,” he continued, “is already a satellite of the planet Earth.” Taking up where he left off, David Morley and Kevin Robins laid out an articulation of techno-Orientalism a few years later, observing that Japan’s path to modernization had become a crucial aspect of its exoticized image as an Oriental other, an image construed to reflect the same Western anxieties that drove the historical violence of colonialism, racism, and exclusion. Yet even as their words set the stage for many a conversation about the formation and transformation of Asian identity through the channels of diaspora and distance, ever-newer avatars of techno-Orientalism continue to be reflected in both high art and low culture. Perhaps, critic Toshiya Ueno suggested, techno-Orientalism loops back on itself or serves as “a kind of mirror stage or an image machine” whose effects ultimately touch everyone. Focusing on Japan, Ueno wrote, “It is through this mirror stage and its cultural apparatus that Western or other people misunderstand and fail to recognize an always illusory Japanese culture, but it also is the mechanism through which Japanese misunderstand themselves.”
2022
Michigan
Affirmative
Aff – Techno-Orientalism – BFHR 7wk › Case › Thesis---Simulacra
Roh et al. 15, David Roh is Professor of English at the University of Utah. He holds a BA in English from the University of California, Los Angeles, an Ed.M in Educational Technology from Harvard University, and an MA and Ph.D in English from the University of California, Santa Barbara. He is author of Minor Transpacific: Triangulating American, Japanese, and Korean Fictions (Stanford University Press, 2021), Illegal Literature (University of Minnesota Press, 2015), and coeditor of Techno-Orientalism (Rutgers University Press, 2015). His work has appeared in Law & Literature, MELUS, Journal of Narrative Theory, and Verge., (“Technologizing Orientalism”, Techno-Orientalism: Imagining Asia in Speculative Fiction, History, and Media, Rutgers University Press) //CHC-DS 🐱👤
While Orientalism as a critical lens describes how Western discourse discursively catalogues or frames the East, it has always been trained on domestic— that is, Western or U.S.—configurations against the Orientalized Other. Edward Said notes his “real argument is that Orientalism is—and does not simply represent—a considerable dimension of modern political-intellectual culture, and as such has less to do with the Orient than it does with ‘our’ world” (12). Techno-Orientalism, with a vision of the future that is global in scope and reach, adds a wrinkle to the critical commonplace that Orientalism actively produces and reproduces an oppositional East to cement Western hegemony. Particularly within the realm of SF, techno-Orientalist tropes have been absorbed, reenvisioned, and replicated by other sites of cultural production, with interesting geopolitical implications.8 For example, Sato writes that Japan’s entry into cyberpunk SF reinvigorates nihonjinron, the idea of an essentialist Japanese superiority that was integral to its imperialist project. With Japan’s surrender in 1945, however, the idea of nihonjinron lost currency— that is, until it was reenabled by cyberpunk fiction in the 1980s. Sato observes that it was cyberpunk that resurrected the idea of Japanese essentialism: “This proud announcement of revived Japaneseness requited through the cutting edge of American culture means that the two separate histories of the West and Japan—the former modernizing, the latter behind—coincide in the discovery of Japan in American cyberpunk” (346). That proves troublesome, she argues, because it assumes Japanese essentialism as the primary reason for Japan’s economic and technological achievements. For example, two paradigmatic cyberpunk works, Ghost in the Shell (1995) and Chōhei Kambayashi’s novel Yukikaze (1985), have strong female cyborg leads paired with weaker, male companions. While Western cyberpunk seeks to claim liberal humanist subjectivity and modernity, having a female cyborg subject allows Japan to circumvent the question of subjectivity and modernity altogether. In both works, the male (Western) subject is deflated and removed from the center, while the cybernetic female embraces technology over humanity, allowing the insertion of Japan-as-signifier of futurity based on the constructed image of the West’s Othering of technology and Asia. In other words, a Japan manufactured by the West can further ethnocentric or nationalist projects on both fronts. Techno-Orientalist discourse, in this case, has been reified in another nationalist context, further demonstrating its discursive hegemony as it serves a site other than its point of origin.
The Western fixation on Asian futurism indicates just how important it is to approach techno-Orientalism from several vantages. William Gibson is perhaps the most renowned exemplar of the West’s fascination with the technologized Asian subject, evident in his unapologetic rhapsodizing in a 2001 issue of Wired, but even he merits a second look: “Dining late, in a plasticdraped gypsy noodle stall in Shinjuku, the classic cliché better-than-Blade Runner Tokyo street set, I scope my neighbor’s phone as he checks his text messages. Wafer-thin, Kandy Kolor pearlescent white, complexly curvilinear, totally ephemeral looking, its screen seethes with a miniature version of Shinjuku’s neon light show. . . . Tokyo has been my handiest prop shop for as long as I’ve been writing: sheer eye candy” (Gibson, “My Own Private Tokyo”). Gibson’s meditation touches upon the multipronged reach of techno-Orientalist discourse—he references the dystopic, Asianized cinematic vision of Los Angeles; he admits drawing upon Tokyo’s luminescence for his literary well; and it is the “ephemeral looking” mobile phone that inspires him to imagine new media, as he did with cyberspace in Neuromancer. Essentially, Gibson admits that the futurism he reads in Tokyo is largely superficial (“sheer eye candy”); the phone appears to be futuristic simply because of its alien surroundings, and his own somewhat tautological belief in Tokyo as his futuristic “prop shop.”
2022
Michigan
Affirmative
Aff – Techno-Orientalism – BFHR 7wk › Case › Thesis---Simulacra
Roh et al. 15, David Roh is Professor of English at the University of Utah. He holds a BA in English from the University of California, Los Angeles, an Ed.M in Educational Technology from Harvard University, and an MA and Ph.D in English from the University of California, Santa Barbara. He is author of Minor Transpacific: Triangulating American, Japanese, and Korean Fictions (Stanford University Press, 2021), Illegal Literature (University of Minnesota Press, 2015), and coeditor of Techno-Orientalism (Rutgers University Press, 2015). His work has appeared in Law & Literature, MELUS, Journal of Narrative Theory, and Verge., (“Technologizing Orientalism”, Techno-Orientalism: Imagining Asia in Speculative Fiction, History, and Media, Rutgers University Press) //CHC-DS 🐱👤
These examples perfectly illustrate our definition of techno-Orientalism: the phenomenon of imagining Asia and Asians in hypo- or hypertechnological terms in cultural productions and political discourse.4 Techno-Orientalist imaginations are infused with the languages and codes of the technological and the futuristic. These developed alongside industrial advances in the West and have become part of the West’s project of securing dominance as architects of the future, a project that requires configurations of the East as the very technology with which to shape it. Techno-Orientalist speculations of an Asianized future have become ever more prevalent in the wake of neoliberal trade policies that enabled greater flow of information and capital between the East and the West. Substantial criticism of techno-Orientalism emerged in the mid-1990s when cultural theorists began to trace its manifestations and theorize its causes and implications. Kevin Morley and David Robins, Toshiya Ueno, and Kumiko Sato, principal trailblazers of the field, laid much of the valuable groundwork. Morley and Robins’s Spaces of Identity: Global Media, Electronic Landscapes, and Cultural Boundaries (Routledge, 1995), in which a definition of “techno-Orientalism” first saw print, remains the most cited in critical assessments of technological and Orientalist discourses; however, Ueno has probably written most extensively about techno-Orientalism as a discursive cultural phenomenon in the era of what he identifies as the “post-Fordist social environment of globalization” (223). “The basis of Orientalism and xenophobia is the subordination of Others through a sort of ‘mirror of cultural conceit,’” Ueno explains. “The Orient exists in so far as the West needs it, because it brings the project of the West into focus” (223).
Whereas Orientalism, as a strategy of representational containment, arrests Asia in traditional, and often premodern imagery, techno-Orientalism presents a broader, dynamic, and often contradictory spectrum of images, constructed by the East and West alike, of an “Orient” undergoing rapid economic and cultural transformations. Techno-Orientalism, like Orientalism, places great emphasis on the project of modernity—cultures privilege modernity and fear losing their perceived “edge” over others. Stretching beyond Orientalism’s premise of a hegemonic West’s representational authority over the East, techno-Orientalism’s scope is much more expansive and bidirectional, its discourses mutually constituted by the flow of trade and capital across the hemispheres. As Ueno observes, techno-Orientalism is first and foremost an effect of globalism. “If the Orient was invented by the West,” he writes, “then the Techno-Orient was also invented by the world of information capitalism” (228). Technological developments, driven by the imperial aspirations and the appetites of consumerist societies on both sides of the Pacific, propel the engines of invention and production. In its wake, Western nations vying for cultural and economic dominance with Asian nations find in technoOrientalism an expressive vehicle for their aspirations and fears. Our volume, Techno-Orientalism: Imagining Asia in Speculative Fiction, History, and Media, documents past and current constructions of the role of Asia in a technologized future and critically examines this proliferating phenomenon.
2022
Michigan
Affirmative
Aff – Techno-Orientalism – BFHR 7wk › Case › Thesis---Security
Roh et al. 15, David Roh is Professor of English at the University of Utah. He holds a BA in English from the University of California, Los Angeles, an Ed.M in Educational Technology from Harvard University, and an MA and Ph.D in English from the University of California, Santa Barbara. He is author of Minor Transpacific: Triangulating American, Japanese, and Korean Fictions (Stanford University Press, 2021), Illegal Literature (University of Minnesota Press, 2015), and coeditor of Techno-Orientalism (Rutgers University Press, 2015). His work has appeared in Law & Literature, MELUS, Journal of Narrative Theory, and Verge., (“Chapter 9: “Home Is Where the War Is””, Techno-Orientalism: Imagining Asia in Speculative Fiction, History, and Media, Rutgers University Press) //CHC-DS 🐱👤
The defense of techno-Orientalist militarism has become literally hardwired into American political institutions. The cultivated need for enemies for Americans to define themselves against was complicated when the supposedly intractable Soviet Union crumbled under its own weight to everyone’s surprise in 1991. Think tanks such as the Center for Security Policy, founded by Reagan’s former Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (and CPD member) Frank Gaffney in 1988, and the Middle East Forum, founded in 1990 by Pipes’s son Daniel Pipes, scrambled to find new spectral enemies endangering the world’s largest military in order to maintain their political influence. These think tanks repurposed and remade security discourse rooted in the idea of an intractable civilizational clash between the West and communism into one between the West and the rest—simply recasting new actors into the well-established roles of American strategic drama (Little 226–266). The neoconservative Project for a New American Century (PNAC) outlined the necessity for a more aggressive stance against China and Iraq under the title Present Dangers, edited by Robert Kagan and William Kristol (vii) in its bid to revive a “Reaganite policy of military strength and moral clarity.” When PNAC-supported George W. Bush assumed the presidency later that year, his advisors (including former CPD member Paul Wolfowitz) immediately began strategizing about how to scare the American people and Congress into another round of war against intractable Oriental enemies. However, even the pursuit of this techno-Orientalist fantasy betrayed its own ambivalence. The U.S. military named the December 2003 hunt for deposed Iraqi leader (and former U.S. ally) Saddam Hussein “Operation Red Dawn,” and code named his two suspected hiding places “Wolverine 1” and “Wolverine 2”—as if to suggest that the United States was the overpowering evil occupying force in “Indian country,” and Hussein an Iraqi hiding in the hills to lead a patriotic resistance (Sirota 139–169). Nonetheless, as Americans increasingly equated the mounting failures in Iraq to the failures in Vietnam three decades before, hawkish politicians sought to remake and refocus the war’s goals by founding a short-lived third CPD in 2004 dedicated to channeling American fears of government manipulation toward the threat radical Islamic terrorists pose to the safety of the world (Barry).
2022
Michigan
Affirmative
Aff – Techno-Orientalism – BFHR 7wk › Case › Thesis---Ornamentalism
Lu 21, Vanderbilt University, (Melanie, “Gendering the Techno-Orient: The Asian Woman in Speculative Fiction”, English & Asian Studies Honors Thesis, ) //CHC-DS 🐱👤
According to Cheng, fully understanding the unique nature of western constructions of Asiatic femininity demands a radical reconfiguration of the binaries between personhood and thingness. She offers the term Ornamentalism as a critical lens to examine the relations between objectification, aestheticization, and racialization in articulating a distinct ontology of and for the Asian woman: contrary to autonomous modes of being that arise from natural bodies, the racialization of the Asian woman involves “a process whereby personhood is conceived and suggested (legally, materially, and imaginatively) through ornamental gestures [...] that speak through the minute, the sartorial, the prosthetic, and the decorative” (Cheng 429). The western concept of the Person—which Cheng traces to Enlightenment thinkers such as John Locke and William Blackstone—and its idealization of the organic and integral body as designed by God is thus radically challenged, since the demarcations between personhood and objecthood are violently collapsed in the process (Cheng 436). It is not (yellow) flesh that constitutes a racialized body, but ornament. There is no Person, in the natural, embodied sense, to begin with, and one must imagine an alternative ontology for a being that exists in a realm of thingness.
For the Asian woman who is constructed this way, it is not the case that she is transformed into object, that is, objectified, but rather that she already exists as object; flesh and ornament amalgamate in representations of this racialized figure. To make her case, Cheng draws on a range of texts from Euro-American visual and literary culture, while focusing heavily on the Metropolitan Museum of Art’s dazzling 2015 exhibition entitled China: Through the Looking Glass. Indeed, the latter case, which featured more than 140 examples of haute couture and avant-garde wear from renowned western designers such as Yves Saint Laurent and John Galliano, was notable as it epitomizes precisely the kind of lavish ornamental stylization typically used to characterize Asian aesthetics. Looking at the clothing for female models that are supposedly inspired by “a pastiche of Chinese aesthetic and cultural traditions,” one senses a recurring conflation between materiality and organicity (“Exhibition Overview”). As highlighted by Cheng, flesh and ornament are often synonymous in these sumptuous pieces, as porcelain shards are laced into bodices and calligraphy script becomes sartorial prints. Through the exotic vessel of Chineseness and Asiatic femininity, the material ambiguity of the garments effectively racializes the Asian woman as a being that is defined by the ornamental. If this ontological formulation of the Asian woman as object is true, we come to further realize how noteworthy it is that the artificiality of Kyoko is signified in such a way as to contrast the humanness of Ava; the objecthood of her being as yellow woman overlaps with and extends the narrative of the Asian alien as human simulacra, culminating in her racialized figure as uncannily human-like but nonetheless inherently devoid of organic life.
2022
Michigan
Affirmative
Aff – Techno-Orientalism – BFHR 7wk › Case › Thesis---Biotech
Roh et al. 15, David Roh is Professor of English at the University of Utah. He holds a BA in English from the University of California, Los Angeles, an Ed.M in Educational Technology from Harvard University, and an MA and Ph.D in English from the University of California, Santa Barbara. He is author of Minor Transpacific: Triangulating American, Japanese, and Korean Fictions (Stanford University Press, 2021), Illegal Literature (University of Minnesota Press, 2015), and coeditor of Techno-Orientalism (Rutgers University Press, 2015). His work has appeared in Law & Literature, MELUS, Journal of Narrative Theory, and Verge., (“Chapter 7: Racial Speculations”, Techno-Orientalism: Imagining Asia in Speculative Fiction, History, and Media, Rutgers University Press) //CHC-DS 🐱👤
This is the outcome that may result if the reproductive desires like those of “Want to Be a Dad” are met—that our current state of color-blind ideology is one that may boast of multiculturalism but is still engrained with racist beliefs and desires. At a time when headlines include “The End of White America” (Hsu), perhaps it is not too surprising that the emergence of designer babies and reproductive technologies is a growing trend. In this light, we are currently witnessing the scientific and technological manipulation of the face of race.
I introduce the implications of ART here in order to illustrate how race oftentimes produces a power differentiation between technology and reproduction. In 2013, not only are the rates of nonwhite babies rising,3 but the parallel increase of biracial and multiracial birthrates has fostered an atmosphere of what author Danzy Senna has satirically referred to as the “Mulatto Millennium.” Alongside this change in demographics is our growing reliance on biotechnology through which a parent can now select not only a child’s skin/ hair/eye color but also gender, athletic abilities, weight, height, and susceptibility to certain diseases. In terms of race selection, then, a white couple can have either their genetic white baby (via a white or nonwhite gestational carrier) or a nonwhite baby using an embryo adopted from a domestic or international agency. Despite not sharing any genetic link, a white woman can birth a nonwhite baby and nonwhite women can birth white babies.
2022
Michigan
Affirmative
Aff – Techno-Orientalism – BFHR 7wk › Case › Thesis---Bio-Orientalism
Lester 21, Johns Hopkins University, Political Science, Graduate Student, (Quinn, “Bio-orientialism and the Yellow Peril of Yellow Life” Catalyst: Feminism, Theory, Technoscience ; 7(1), ) //CHC-DS 🐱👤
In this article, I argue that a process of orientalism constructs “Yellow Life“ as the antinomy and horizon of possibility for Western “life” as an unmarked category representing the white possessive individual as a distinct form of life. This process I term bio-orientalism for its emphasis on tropes and images of biological life to mark Yellow Life as forms of nonhuman life threatening to perpetually engulf, invade, and corrupt the West. Bio-orientalism has its origins in nineteenth-century Yellow Peril discourse, yet reappears whenever there is a crisis in the imagined security of Western life that must conjure the threat of Yellow Life as a causal agent of blame obscuring Western life’s own suicidal addiction to global white supremacy and racial capitalism. Bio-orientalism marks moments of crisis in the formation of Western life, from the twentieth-century rise of Japan, through the mid-century “loss of China” and rupture of decolonizations, to the contemporary resurgence of China threatening America’s superpower and civilizational status (Kim 2004; Prashad 2008). For over a century, Western countries conjured Asia as both the premodern that the West has decisively put behind it and the threatening future of an Asia that overwhelms and renders extinct Western life as we have come to know it. Climate-impacted crises like the COVID-19 pandemic increase the stakes and scope of bio-orientalist representations of Asia that create material consequences for Asian Americans and Asian populations globally.
Bio-orientalism plays a key role in the replication of anti-Asian racism over time and therefore calls attention to Asian American political efforts to deconstruct and fight orientalist stereotypes. While Asian American politics often responds to bio-orientalism by seeking inclusion in the unmarked life of white possessive individualism, I speculate upon an Asian Americanist response that abandons the Human for a diversity of ways of living (and life) otherwise (Lowe 1996; Okihiro 2014). My argument then contributes to putting Asian American studies in conversation with developments in the humanities and STS, particularly in understanding the mutual processes of defining and racializing what counts as life itself (Cardozo and Subramaniam 2013; Lee 2014; Huang 2017; Tran 2018). To make this argument, in this article I first define bio-orientalism through an attention to what makes it different from orientalisms that highlight Asia as a technological threat to the future and show how in early Yellow Peril literature images of biological threat predominate. I then turn to Bryan Thao Worra’s poetry collection Demonstra to highlight a different archive in the history of bio-orientalism and how Worra diagnoses bio-orientalism as the potential for embracing Yellow Life as life lived otherwise (Chuh 2003). Particularly, in contrast to Donna Haraway’s famous figure of the cyborg, I focus on Worra’s figure of the Zombuddha that plays with recent turns to depicting the zombie as a particularly Asian threat, revealing the Zombuddha as a unique entanglement of Caribbean history, Western horror, and Laotian cosmology that begins to map other ways of embracing the otherness of Yellow Life.
2022
Michigan
Affirmative
Aff – Techno-Orientalism – BFHR 7wk › Case › Impact---TL
Ngai 21, Mae Ngai is an American historian and Lung Family Professor of Asian American Studies and Professor of History at Columbia University. She focuses on nationalism, citizenship, ethnicity, immigration, and race in 20th-century United States history., (Mae, “Racism Has Always Been Part of the Asian American Experience”, The Atlantic, https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2021/04/we-are-constantly-reproducing-anti-asian-racism/618647/) //CHC-DS 🐱👤
In the late 19th century, white Americans faced the prospect that Chinese and other Asians might become a significant portion of the population of the United States. In response, they passed a series of laws excluding Chinese people from immigration and citizenship.
The justification for exclusion was that the Chinese were an “unassimilable” race and therefore could never become Americans. Exclusion soon extended to all Asians and remained in U.S. law until 1952. Its rationale—that Asians pose a racial danger to American society—has endured in our politics and culture to this day.
2022
Michigan
Affirmative
Aff – Techno-Orientalism – BFHR 7wk › 1AC › 1AC – Techno-Orientalism
Roh et al. 15, David Roh is Professor of English at the University of Utah. He holds a BA in English from the University of California, Los Angeles, an Ed.M in Educational Technology from Harvard University, and an MA and Ph.D in English from the University of California, Santa Barbara. He is author of Minor Transpacific: Triangulating American, Japanese, and Korean Fictions (Stanford University Press, 2021), Illegal Literature (University of Minnesota Press, 2015), and coeditor of Techno-Orientalism (Rutgers University Press, 2015). His work has appeared in Law & Literature, MELUS, Journal of Narrative Theory, and Verge., (“Chapter 8: Never Stop Playing”, Techno-Orientalism: Imagining Asia in Speculative Fiction, History, and Media, Rutgers University Press) //CHC-DS 🐱👤
In an essay called “Angels in Digital Armor: Technoculture and Terror Management” (2010), media scholar Marcel O’Gorman argues that notions of heroism in contemporary technoculture aim to satisfy two primary existential needs: the desire for recognition and the denial of death. Most video games interpellate players by reinforcing ideologies that underpin the sovereign subject, who believes herself to be immortal and master of the world represented on the computer screen. Gaming is one part of a broadly conceived digital technoculture for O’Gorman. Appropriating Bernard Stiegler’s thesis that the technologization of culture is linked to profound malaise and ontological indifference, O’Gorman argues that online heroism, constituted through attention garnered on Facebook, YouTube, and the news media, goes hand in hand with the disavowal of mortality and finitude. Toward this O’Gorman analyzes cases of gamer death in China and Korea, the Columbine High School shootings, and Cho Seung-Hui, the Virginia Tech shooter, as “explicitly technological, or even ‘cyber,’ because they involve the perpetrators’ use of media to rehearse or to promote their exploits in a desperate plea for recognition” (O’Gorman). He does not discuss race explicitly but implies that all users of digital media are somehow implicated.
While we agree with O’Gorman’s diagnosis of the culture of online celebrity and the proliferation of technically induced malaise, his analysis runs the danger of overgeneralization with the blanket term “technoculture.” We would like to attend to the specificity of video gaming and its Orientalist figuration by isolating a mechanic of StarCraft that is common to most video games: the acquisition of capital. More specifically, for the remainder of the essay we further interrogate the relationship between work and play. While drawing from McKenzie Wark’s Gamer Theory and key game play mechanics from StarCraft, we argue that extreme video gaming may be read to challenge the presuppositions that deem it “unproductive” labor. In doing so, we argue that extreme gaming upends notions of capitalist time, pointing to ontological aporias that blur the distinction between Occidental and Oriental.
2022
Michigan
Affirmative
Aff – Techno-Orientalism – BFHR 7wk › 1AC › 1AC – Techno-Orientalism
Bahng 15 (Aimee Bahng is an American academic. She is a professor of gender and women's studies at Pomona College in Claremont, California. Her previous denial of tenure at Dartmouth College sparked widespread protests about discrimination against racial minorities in academia. 2015, Techno-Orientalism, p164-166, “The Cruel Optimism of Asian Futurity and the Reparative Practices of Sonny Liew’s Malinky Robot,” ; accessed 7/20/2022) ng
Published amid the financial crisis of 2008, Mahbubani’s book, as well as his Financial Times declaration of a realizable Asian Century that serves as this essay’s epigraph, excite what Alan Greenspan once called “irrational exuberance.” Uttered in a speech Greenspan gave in 1996, in his capacity as chairman of the U.S. Federal Reserve, the phrase characterized the “unduly escalated asset values” of Japan’s economic bubble. The next day, Tokyo’s stock market fell sharply, closing 3 percent down, and Greenspan’s speech largely presaged the Asian financial crash a year later. The extent to which economic projections hang on the words of figureheads like Alan Greenspan demonstrates how such speculations work as performative speech acts that call the future into being. Similarly, the optimism Mahbubani announces in forward-looking, prophetic tones (“optimism will deliver the Asian Century”), affectively structures speculative investment in Asian futures. This vision of the new Asian hemisphere, colonized by empty high-rises reaching toward limitless horizons and built by deterritorialized workers, projects a future of automated speculative building, fueled by investment hungry banks. If Greenspan and Mahbubani both grasp how their respective declarations of pessimism and optimism will affect the global economy, they do so with two different Asias in mind: Japan of the late 1990s and Singapore at the dawn of a “new Asia” in 2008. 2 The so-called Asian Century, toward which Mahbubani’s optimism strains, functions as a largescale speculative fiction spawned from neoliberal fantasies that capitalize on a literary genre’s already problematic investments in techno-Orientalism. In their 1995 examination of techno-Orientalism, David Morley and Kevin Robins call attention to U.S. and European fantasies of Japan and its shift in those imaginaries in the 1980s from an exotic playground to a land of emotionless automatons. Perhaps epitomized by Western dystopian cyberpunk such as Ridley Scott’s Blade Runner (1982) and William Gibson’s Neuromancer (1984), techno-Orientalism figures the Japanese as “unfeeling aliens; they are cyborgs and replicants. But there is also the sense that these mutants are now better adapted to survive in the future”(170). While Morley and Robins understand techno-Orientalism as primarily born out of Western anxieties about Japan’s challenge to U.S. economic hegemony, they also suggest more specifically how techno-Orientalism arises just as Japan emerges as “the largest creditor and the largest net investor in the world” (153). What Morley and Robins never fully develop, and what I want to explore in more depth here, is this coordinated turn toward Asian futures in both financial and cultural forms of speculation. Mathematical models of probability and investment strategies based on extrapolation are forms of speculative fiction that project finance capitalism’s visions of futurity onto the world. Interdisciplinary scholarship from the past two decades has pointed to the performative aspects of economic speculation (MacKenzie, Muniesa, and Siu), the sociological systems of financial markets (Knorr-Cetina and Bruegger), the impact on subjectivity of financial instruments such as derivatives and debt bundling (LiPuma and Lee), and the “financialization of daily life” (Martin). Because speculative economies rely ever more on rhetorical tools and narrative strategies to explain and market the practice of trading on futures and securities, financial speculation and speculative fiction both participate in the cultural production of futurity, and futurity becomes the arena in which new subject formations emerge. Does techno-Orientalism register anxieties about finance capitalism, or does finance capitalism use techno-Orientalism as a basis for its extrapolations of futurity? I emphasize the co-constitutive relationship between the cultural production and financial worlding of Asian futurity. A peculiar question arises then, when Asian economic and political architects themselves participate in the projection of Asian futurity, all the while drawing on a techno-Orientalist toolkit. I argue that critical analysis of the discursive site of Asian futurity reveals points of contradiction in American neoliberalism as it travels that have to do with earlier forms of racial and colonial subjugation providing the scaffolding for the architecture of neoliberalism itself.3 As Asia develops its own neoliberal rhetoric, articulating its own futurity poses certain problems that necessitate a disavowal of the racism of techno-Orientalism. What stands in to “smooth” that difficulty is the heteronormativity techno-Orientalism always espoused that Asian futurity posits anew as part of its road map, capitalizing on aspirational teleologies, valuations of privatized worth, and nationalisms consolidated through processes of racialization. I focus my investigation on techno-Orientalism’s role in the production ofa global neoliberal subject in contemporary Singapore, where a tech economy adopts and adapts localized versions of seemingly universalized notions of “the good life.” Building on Lauren Berlant’s theorization of “cruel optimism,” this essay levies a critique of “the Asian Century” as imagined by economists around the world. It argues that a revisionist Asian futurity needs to intervene in the neoliberal orientations of “the good life” and, in the face of foreclosed futures, open possibilities of what Eve Sedgwick has called “reparative practices.” For an inspiring glimpse of what reparative practice sin the context of techno-Orientalism might look like, I turn to Sonny Liew’s graphic story collection Malinky Robot (Figure12.1), which fabulates an alternative imagining of Asian futurity, as told from the perspective of the global South. Malinky Robot, a title that translated serendipitously from Russian as “odd jobs,” or “little work” (Villarica), depicts a multiethnic Asian futurity burdened with precarious living conditions, precipitous divides in wealth, and ecological as well as economic fallout propagated by global capitalist greed. Liew, born in Malaysia but working mostly out of Singapore, offers gritty, agitated aesthetics and sparse storylines that restore texture, abrasion, and friction to the slick, polished surfaces and epic narrative scales of techno-Orientalist futures. Liew’s personal trajectories map a complex history of Singapore as a site of multiple layers of European (Portuguese, Dutch, British) and Japanese imperialism. In its turn toward self-governance, Singapore has also been the scene of ethnic and class-based tensions among exploited Malaysian workers and a predominantly Chinese ethnic majority population who constitute the managerial class. With particular attention to Singapore’s own aspirations to become a “technopreneurial” city-state of the future (Ong, Neoliberalism 181), this essay looks to Malinky Robot as a crucial counternarrative to techno-Orientalism as it is deployed not only by Western fantasies of a docile East but also by Asian aspirations to challenge U.S. global hegemony.