Free beta access. 50 free AI tokens each week. Optional top-ups available. See what is included
Open evidence library

Search the archive.

Current and older evidence is free during beta. Sign in for unlimited card access and full source downloads.

Matching cards
2022 Michigan Kritik
LINKS › Soft Power Link

Attempts to sustain soft power are paternalistic and maintain hegemonic masculinity in IR

Claire Duncanson & Catherine Eschle (2008), University of Edinburgh and University of Strathclyde, “Gender and the Nuclear Weapons State: A Feminist Critique of the UK Government's White Paper on Trident , New Political Science, 30:4, 545-563, DOI: 10.1080/07393140802518120

Instead, we want to close with two points. Firstly, although hegemonic masculine forms may shift over time and place, such shifts are not necessarily progressive. Indeed, Charlotte Hooper suggests that the apparent softening of hegemonic masculinity characteristic of Western states in the era of globalisation is not a sign of the imminent demise of male power but rather part and parcel of the adjustment process necessary to maintain power and status.106 More precisely, she argues that changes in “masculinist practices” work to ensure both that hegemonic masculinity remains hegemonic and that it continues to meet the requirements of its elite masculine-identified members (usually white, middle or upper class, heterosexual men).107 If this is indeed how hegemonic masculinity operates, what we are perhaps observing in the White Paper is a shift in the self- image of the British state, but one that enables it to avoid relinquishing the masculine ideal of power and status as measured in nuclear weapons. The construction of the “responsible steward” identity is thus a smokescreen, diverting attention from the lack of substantive change in policy. Having said this, shifts in the masculine identity of the British state remain significant because any disruptions to traditional definitions of masculinity demonstrate the arbitrariness of gendered dichotomies and open up potential for change.108 This leads us onto our second point, that the construction of the “responsible steward” identity remains far from complete. Indeed, as we indicated at several points above, there are several instabilities and tensions in the way in which masculine codes and images are mobilised in the White Paper. Most notably, it appears that the British nuclear state remains attracted to the status and privilege which it believes goes with possession of nuclear weapons, yet it also wants to develop a leadership role based on ethics rather than fear. Further, the role of the British nuclear state as protector of its citizens proves rather difficult to establish in the absence of an obvious enemy Other, and instead we find a problematic reliance on a fear of “weak states” and a contestable characterisation of all states, even current allies, as potential deadly enemies. Finally, we see both an emphasis on the independence of the UK’s nuclear deterrence and a recognition of the importance of interdependence and multilateralism—as well as an effort to avoid drawing attention to the dependent relationship on the United States in nuclear procurement, which means full independence simply cannot be achieved. Such tensions in the UK government’s position are indicative, perhaps, that its masculine underpinnings are less stable than is often assumed. We note that both Hooper109 and R. W. Connell110 suggest that feminists can exploit the contradictions between “softer” and “harder” forms of masculinity, opening up space for alternative identity constructions. The tensions we have exposed in the White Paper should thus give those engaged in the continuing struggle against Trident renewal further fuel for their arguments. It seems to us that exposure and exacerbation of internal instabilities in the gendered discourse of nuclear weapons states remains an important feminist contribution to the struggle for a nuclear-free world.

2022 Michigan Kritik
LINKS › Heg/Hardpower Link

Heg increases the likelihood of conflict, and justifies sustained structural violence that outweighs the small risk of great power war

Sjoberg, 2010 (Laura, Assistant Professor of Political Science at U Florida, PhD in IR and Gender Studies and a law degree specializing in IR. “Gendering Power Transition Theory,” in Gender and International Security edited by Sjoberg, p. 90-93 - spp)

Feminist evaluations of power transition hypotheses A feminist analysis of PTT needs to reformulate the PTT hypotheses. This section applies the feminist critiques of the mechanism (power), the object (great states), and the variables (power parity and dissatisfaction) that PTT uses to explain international conflict to the reformulation of the major PTT hypotheses. It posits alternative explanations and alternative possible solutions and futures (Table 5.1). Relative position, state hegemonic masculinity, and bellicosity: Power transition theorists found that "occupation of a high position in the international hierarchy is associated with war involvement, irrespective of other attributes (ideology, etc.) of the state occupying that position. "88 Even if those states at the top of the international hierarchy are more likely to be involved in wars, 89 feminists question the assumption that this is because nations with the capacity to fight wars are necessarily more likely to fight. Feminist reformulation (R1) (see Table 5.1) posits that the content and salience of a state's hegemonic masculinity will be a factor in its bellicosity. The feminist argument is that the more competitive a state's hegemonic masculinity, the more likely that state is to make war; this risk is compounded by high salience. In World War II Germany, a competitive form of masculinity was very salient. George Mosse's study of the ideal German man90 in the 1930s reveals him as: Tall and muscular, he has no fat on his body and no hair anywhere but on his head. His broad, contoured shoulders narrow to a thin waist. He has a fine colorless chiseled face with a strong prominent square jaw. He is the flawless man . . . , not only did he embody the older aristocratic vlues of bravery, courage, and chivarly, but mirroring bourgeois values, he was also disciplined, orderly, and restrained ... The perfect man, therefore, was committed to sacrifice and heroism, in other words, soldierly values that put the nation ahead of the individual.91 This German masculinity "increasingly came to be linked to ideas about nationalism."92 This idea of masculinity became increasingly salient as "the nationalist press often portrayed Jewish men as the exact opposite of the manly ideal in looks and behavior ... jittery, restless, greedy, selfish, and ... ugly-nearly deformed."93 In the 1930s, "German fascists ... took the notion of masculinity to its awful, ghastly, and seemingly logical extreme."94 Perhaps this can be contrasted with the case of a rising China. Kam Louie, a scholar of Chinese masculinities, explains' that while “Western stereotypes of the 'real man' have described the Occidental male as forming his notion of male-self within images of toughness, courageousness, and decisiveness, ... in the Chinese case, the cerebral male model tends to dominate the macho, brawny male."95 The Communist Revolution in China has further demilitarized Chinese masculinity, since, while "the core meaning of wen-wu still revolves around cultural attainment and martial valour ... [ideal-types of masculinity have been shaped by] Communist insistence that able-bodied citizens work [which] ... has generated idealized images of workers and peasants" rather than soldiers98 Louie suggests that the current Chinese hegemonic masculinity is less aggressive and militaristic, and that it is both more open and less salient now than it has been previously.99 Given these two examples, the feminist reformulation (R 1) would expect bellicosity from 1930s Germany rather than contemporary China. The same empirical evidence that PTT uses could instead support a feminist argument that Germany's level of interest in aggressive masculinity made Germany a belligerent state, and that a dissatisfied China would have less interest in war than the 1930s Germany. A feminist reinterpretation would expect that Germans’ hypercompetitive hegemonic masculinity in the 1930s would motivate German leaders and citizens to try to subordinate other masculinities, while the Chinese government, following their more cerebral hegemonic masculinity, would place less priority on competition with other states.\ Hegemony and Peace: PTT claims that the greater and more stable the concentration of power, the more peaceful that system will be. PIT associates peace with the absence of armed conflict between great powers. As such, the world can still be "at peace" if dozens of civil wars are going on in countries outside of the class of "great powers." The dominant/challenger dichotomy means that PTT ignores all but the most powerful states. Instead of limiting the discourse on security to the concerns of the dominant global power and the (few or even only one) challenger(s), feminists pay attention to the entire global political community. The PTT understanding of "peace" obscures terrible atrocities and conceals a crucial and contradictory effect of the concentration of power in the international arena. Feminist work has consistently shown that, as the powerful wield more power, the weak feel more pressure. This pressure is manifested not only in the form of interstate war, but also in civil war and structural violence. Feminists' interrogation of state centrism suggests that lack of war between great states does not automatically create peace within them, and that the marginalized citizens of great states should be a topic of concern in global politics. Feminists' interest in gender subordination shows that women's security and their lives are constantly at risk. As such, the feminist reformulation (R2) predicts that concentrated power is a net negative, empirically, normatively, and epistemologically. Empirically, it is likely to increase international conflicts and internal unrest outside of the center of power, and to draw attention away from the world's worst humanitarian disasters. As Ann Tickner notes, much of the violence in the world is outside of great power war and, as theorists, "we in the west can no longer afford to privilege a tradition of scholarship that focuses on the concerns and ambitions of great powers." Feminists reject the dominance of the strong over the weak as a mechanism of control in favor of empathy and connectedness. Epistemologically, feminists note different social experience produces different knowledges. A theory of international security that excludes most people also leaves out important knowledge. An empathetic approach might increase the inclusiveness of knowledge about global politics. These insights mean that a feminist perspective would draw attention to the security of the people on the margins rather than focusing on an improbable conflict between the US and China. Feminist insights suggest it is important to recognize that in a world where the US and China compete for dominance, more than four billion other people neither compete nor dominate. Decisions made by states with the preponderance of power-over reverberate around the world. If the US and China decided to fight a nuclear war, their decision would be felt around the world. Even less severe decisions by powerful states have wide-ranging impacts on individuals' lives. For example, the US government’s decision to condition continued military presence in South Korea on mandatory STD testing in Korean prostitution villages impacted the social and economic dynamic between Korean prostitutes. Neither the US nor China provides its poorest citizens adequate humanitarian aid to avoid death from starvation or preventable disease. Yet the US and China are the two biggest military spenders in the world. In real terms, the most marginalized citizens of each nation lose when strategic posturing inspires them to focus on military readiness. Feminists have documented how militarization of women's lives decreases freedoms and changes economic and social patterns.109 Because of the these threats, feminists problematize the assumption that entities called the US and China legitimately merit more consideration than the most marginal citizens within those states or the citizens of states that their dominance subordinates.

2022 Michigan Kritik
LINKS › Accidents Link

The aff’s securitization against accidents is a paradigm that enables a constant state of exception that enables a war against difference

Karatzogianni and Robinson, 13 (Athina Karatzogianni - Senior Lecturer in Media and Communication at the University of Leicester, UK. Dr. Andrew Robinson is a political theorist and activist based in the UK and research fellow affiliated to the Centre for the Study of Social and Global Justice (CSSGJ). July 2013, “Schizorevolutions vs. Microfascisms: A Deleuzo- Nietzschean Perspective on State, Security, and Active/Reactive Networks,” pp. 8-11, Date Accessed: 6/27/18)//GraRev

Thesis 2: The threatened state transmutes into the terror state.

The return of state violence from the kernel of state exceptionalism is a growing problem. It is grounded on a reaction of the terrified state by conceiving the entire situation as it is formerly conceived specific sites of exception and emergency (c.f. Agamben, 1998, 2005). New forms of social control directed against minor deviance or uncontrolled flows are expanding into a war against difference and a systematic denial of the ‘right to have rights ‘ (Robinson, 2007). The project is not simply an extension of liberal-democratic models ofsocial control, but breaks with such models in directly criminalizing nonconformity from a prescribed way of life and attempting to extensively regulate everyday life through repression. This new repressive model, expressing a kind of neo-totalitarianism, should be taken to include such measures and structures as the rise of gated communities, CCTV, RFID, ID cards, ASBOs, dispersal zones, paramilitary policing methods, the ‘social cleansing ‘ of groups such as homeless people and street drinkers from public spaces, increasing restrictions on protests and attacks on ‘extremist ‘ groups, the use of extreme sentencing against minor deviance, and of course the swathe of “anti-terrorism” laws which provide a pretext for expanded repression. This increasingly vicious state response leads to extremely intrusive state measures. The magazine Datacide analyses the wave of repression as ‘the real subsumption of every singularity in the domain of the State. From now on if your attributes don't quite extend to crime, a judge's word suffices to ensure that crime will reach out and embrace your attributes ‘ (Hyland n.d.). To decompose networks, the state seeks to shadow them ever more closely. The closure of space is an inherent aspect of this project of control. While open space is a necessary enabling good from the standpoint of active desire, it is perceived as a threat by the terrified state, because it is space in which demonised Others can gather and recompose networks outside state control. Hence, for the threatened state, open space is space for the enemy, space of risk. Given that open space is in contrast necessary for difference to function (since otherwise it is excluded as unrepresentable or excessive), the attempts to render all space closed and governable involve a constant war on difference which expands ever more deeply into everyday life. As Guattari aptly argues, neoliberal capitalism tends to construe difference as unwanted ‘noise ‘ (1996: 137). Society thus becomes a hothouse of constant crackdowns and surveillance, which at best simulates, and at worst creates, a situation where horizontal connections either cannot emerge or are constantly persecuted. Theories such as those of Agamben and Kropotkin show the predisposition of the state to pursue total control. But why is the state pursuing this project now? To understand this, one must recognise the multiple ways in which capitalism can handle difference. Hence, there are two poles the state can pursue, social-democratic (adding axioms) or totalitarian (subtracting axioms), which have the same function in relation to capitalism, but are quite different in other regards. State terror involves the replacement of addition of axioms (inclusion through representation) with subtraction of axioms (repression of difference). This parallels the distinction between ‘hard ‘ and ‘soft ‘ power in international relations. Crucially, ‘hard ‘ power is deflationary (Mann 2005: 83-4). While ideological integration can be increased by intensified command, ‘soft ‘ power over anyone who remains outside the dominant frame is dissipated. Everyday deviance becomes resistance because of the project of control which attacks it. It also becomes necessarily more insurrectionary, in direct response to the cumulative attempts to stamp it out through micro-regulation. What the state gains in coercive power, it loses in its ability to influence or engage with its other. But the state, operating under intense uncertainty and fear, is giving up trying to seem legitimate across a field of difference. A recent example of this concerns the treatment of whistleblowers: Bradley Manning and by extent the publisher Julian Assange in the WikiLeaks case (for a discussion of affect see Karatzogianni, 2012) and Edward Snowden in relation to the recent revelations about NSA surveillance program PRISM (Poitras and Greenwald ‘s video Interview with Edward Snowden, 9 June 2013). This is not to say that it dispenses with articulation. It simply restricts it tautologically to its own ideological space (Negri 2003: 27). Legitimation is replaced by information, technocracy and a simulation of participation (Negri 2003: 90, 111.). There is a peculiarly close relationship between the state logic of command and the field of what is variously termed ‘ideology ‘ (in Althusser), ‘mythology ‘ (in Barthes) and ‘fantasy ‘ (in Lacan): second-order significations embedded in everyday representations, through which a simulated lifeworld is created, in which people live in passivity, creating their real performative connection to their conditions of existence and bringing them into psychological complicity in their own repression. Such phenomena are crucial to the construction of demonised Others which provides the discursive basis for projects of state control. ‘[Conflict is] deflected… through the automatic micro-functioning of ideology through information systems. This is the normal, ‘everyday ‘ fascism, whose most noticeable feature is how unnoticeable it is ‘ (Negri 1998a: 190). In denial of generalisable rights, the in-group defines social space for itself and itself alone. The result is a denial of basic dignity and rights to those who fall outside "society", who, in line with their metaphysical status, are to be cast out, locked away, or put beyond a society defined as being for "us and us only" (the mythical division between social and anti-social). The neo-totalitarian state resurrects the tendency to build a state ideology, but this ideology is now disguised as a shared referent of polyarchic parties and nominally free media. Failing to think in statist terms is no longer any different from criminal intent. Romantically crossing an airport barrier for a goodbye kiss is taken as a major crime, for the state, being terrified, responds disproportionately; the romantic is blamed for producing this response (Baker and Robins, 2010). He should have thought like the state to begin with, and not corrupted its functioning with trivialities such as love. Such is the core of the terror-state: constant exertion of energy to ward off constant anxiety, at the cost of a war on difference.

2022 Michigan Kritik
LINKS › China or Russia Link

Aff is a Western Savior narrative that positions China/Russia as the dangerous Oriental threat that is a risk to “ours” and “their” women

Teresa Heffernan, Professor Saint Mary’s University, Canada. “Feminism Against the East/West Divide: Lady Mary's Turkish Embassy Letters” Eighteenth-Century Studies Volume 33, Number 2, Winter 2000

In an episode of Cervantes's Don Quixote (1604) entitled "The Captive's Tale," a Moorish woman and a Spaniard arrive at an inn where Don Quixote and various guests are lodged. After reassuring the guests, who are disturbed by the presence of the veiled woman, that although his companion is "Moorish...in body and dress," she is "in her soul...a very good Christian," the Spaniard begins to tell of his adventures and she is persuaded to remove her veil. 10 While fighting for "his God and king" against the Turks at the battle of Lepanto (1571), the Spaniard recounts, he was captured and imprisoned in Algeria. Coming to his rescue, a wealthy Moorish woman promised to free and marry him in return for taking her to Christian lands. This woman, his traveling companion, "the most beautiful princess in the whole kingdom," according to the Spaniard, betrayed her father, denounced her people, and changed her name from Zoraida to Maria, warning her Spanish savior "'Do not trust [End Page 203] any Moor; they are all deceitful.'" 11 The Christian victory at the battle of Lepanto, was, according to the Spaniard, the moment "when the insolent pride of the Ottoman's was broken for ever," proving to "all the nations" that the Ottoman empire was penetrable; his story of this veiled woman's unveiling seems to support this claim. As the balance of power shifts and Islam begins to lose ground, the West asserts its dominance by speaking for and producing a silenced Orient, much as the Spaniard speaks for his silent Moorish companion. Moreover, this tale of conquest and domination, which involves the emasculation of the Eastern father and the "rescue" of the daughter, underscores a seminal change in the relations of East and West. No longer is this story just about the Christians against the infidels, as in the Crusades. Rather, Zoraida's father, on discovering his daughter's complicity in the betrayal, accuses her of joining the captive not for reasons of faith, but in order to indulge in the "immorality" of the West and to satiate "her wicked desires": "Do not imagine that she has been moved to change her faith out of a belief that your religion is better than ours. No, it is because she knows that immorality is more freely practised in your country than in ours." 12 Caught between the captive's reading of her in terms of a sexual conquest and her father's reading of her in terms of sexual perversion, Zoraida as the (un)veiled woman is doubly silenced. This tale, ostensibly about religious difference (the daughter wants to convert to Christianity), undergoes an important shift in this scene as the religious tension between West and East is recast into its modern form. In this East/West divide, depending on which side articulates the dispute, the West's moral decay is pitted against the East's spirituality or, alternately, Western freedom and reason are pitted against Eastern fundamentalism. Despite the commercial and diplomatic alliance between Britain and Turkey (which encouraged Queen Elizabeth to solicit the help of the Sultan against the idol-worshipping Spanish), like the captive's tale, many of the earliest travel narratives about the Orient written by the merchants of the Levant Company, established in 1581, stressed the cultural divide between East and West, keeping "intact the separateness of the Orient, its eccentricity, its backwardness." 13 Looking back over the life of the Company in 1893 and paying homage to its "heroic" colonial past, Theodore Bent writes in his introduction to an edition of the diaries of two early merchants (Dallam and Covel), The Levant Company, "besides the amount of wealth it accumulated for this country, did infinite service in the development of art and research, geography and travel, the suppression of slavery, and the spread of civilization in countries which would still have been unapproachable, had not the continued efforts of the 244 years [the life of the Company] been towards civilization and humanity." 14 As a burgeoning publishing industry begins to develop around these tales of the "exotic" east in the late seventeenth century, in these narratives, like in the "Captive's Tale," the construction of the (un)veiled woman is central to the depiction of the East as barbaric. These colonial narratives thus justified the economic domination and exploitation of foreign markets with scandalous stories that testified to the essentially uncivilized behavior of distant neighbors. In his diary that details his travels in the Levant (1599), Thomas Dallam mentions catching a glimpse of the Signor's concubines through a grate in a "very thick wall" surrounded by "very strong iron"; he lingers, on pain of death, over the spectacle of these bejeweled captive women, perversely commenting that the sight "did please me wondrous well." 15 In an entry of his diary dated 23 May 1676, John Covel tells a sordid tale about a slave of great beauty, [End Page 204] who is ravished by an admirer. The Sultan, overcome "with madnesse that he lost one so sweet," beheads the man and takes the girl for his harem. 16 Bon Ottaviano writes of the eleven or twelve hundred virgins that make up the Sultan's harem in his 1625 account of the Ottoman Court. He further gives details of the brutality these women faced at the hands of the Grand Seignior, claiming that in some cases the punishment involved them being bound hand and foot, put into a sack, and thrown into the sea in the dark of night. Furthermore, he tells us that these "young, lusty, lascivious wenches" are allowed radishes, cucumbers, and gourds only in slices to prevent them from engaging in any unnatural or unclean acts. 17 Robert Withers, who claimed Ottaviano's 1625 account as his own, embellished this already exaggerated and inaccurate narrative with more lurid details about life in the harem, rashly claiming to have penetrated it. Finally, Jean Dumont comments in A New Voyage to the Levant (1696) on the Sultan's wives who, he reports, are guarded by white and black eunuchs "who never permit'em to enjoy the least Shadow of liberty." 18 These largely fictitious (given the fact that male travelers had no access to women's quarters) and, at the very least, grossly distorted accounts of the abusive treatment of the veiled woman are standard tropes of seventeenth- and eighteenth-century travel narratives to the Levant. At once voyeuristic and indignant, these travel narratives distracted attention from the gender inequities at home, presented the Orient as a place in need of rescue, and secured the idea of Europe as free, fair, and civilized. These narratives also allowed the male reader to experience vicariously the role of hero or savior, in the colonial vein of "white men saving brown women from brown men," while satisfying fantasies of penetration and domination of the East. 19 Furthermore, despite the similarities in the subordinate positions of women in the East and West, the veiled woman, as portrayed in these narratives, becomes one of the most powerful symbols of the "irrationality" and "backwardness" of Islam. Jean Dumont, claiming there is "no slavery equal to that of the Turkish Woman," suggests that these customs are the result of a mind that "is at the bottom nothing else but a pure Insensibility and a Weakness that is altogether inexcusable in any reasonable creature." 20 This seventeenth- and eighteenth-century orientalist literature that foregrounds the trials of the (un)veiled woman is already part of the story of the West's shift to modernity. While the West was preoccupied with the struggle of liberating itself from the tyranny of the father and articulating itself as secular, a story in which paternal rule is replaced by a fraternal order and reason displaces faith, Islam was perceived as arrested, irrational, and backward, still enslaved by despots. The modern understanding of the opposition between a traditional, religious, and conservative Islam that values community, faith, and spirituality and a modern, secular, and progressive society, which is founded on liberty, reason, and materialism, in short, the contemporary East/West divide, is already evident in these tales. Like Zoraida, the (un)veiled woman, captive in this narrative, can only be "saved" from her culture or "submit" to it.

2022 Michigan Kritik
LINKS › China Link

In attempting to find one nation dominating and one lacking, at its root is still a masculine form of politics that ignores violence across the globe because great powers are at peace.

Sjoberg, 2010. (Laura, Assistant Professor of Political Science at U Florida, PhD in IR and Gender Studies and a law degree specializing in IR. “Gendering Power Transition Theory,” in Gender and International Security edited by Sjoberg, p. 90-93 - spp)

Feminist evaluations of power transition hypotheses A feminist analysis of PTT needs to reformulate the PTT hypotheses. This section applies the feminist critiques of the mechanism (power), the object (great states), and the variables (power parity and dissatisfaction) that PTT uses to explain international conflict to the reformulation of the major PTT hypotheses. It posits alternative explanations and alternative possible solutions and futures (Table 5.1). Relative position, state hegemonic masculinity, and bellicosity: Power transition theorists found that "occupation of a high position in the international hierarchy is associated with war involvement, irrespective of other attributes (ideology, etc.) of the state occupying that position. "88 Even if those states at the top of the international hierarchy are more likely to be involved in wars, 89 feminists question the assumption that this is because nations with the capacity to fight wars are necessarily more likely to fight. Feminist reformulation (R1) (see Table 5.1) posits that the content and salience of a state's hegemonic masculinity will be a factor in its bellicosity. The feminist argument is that the more competitive a state's hegemonic masculinity, the more likely that state is to make war; this risk is compounded by high salience. In World War II Germany, a competitive form of masculinity was very salient. George Mosse's study of the ideal German man90 in the 1930s reveals him as: Tall and muscular, he has no fat on his body and no hair anywhere but on his head. His broad, contoured shoulders narrow to a thin waist. He has a fine colorless chiseled face with a strong prominent square jaw. He is the flawless man . . . , not only did he embody the older aristocratic vlues of bravery, courage, and chivarly, but mirroring bourgeois values, he was also disciplined, orderly, and restrained ... The perfect man, therefore, was committed to sacrifice and heroism, in other words, soldierly values that put the nation ahead of the individual.91 This German masculinity "increasingly came to be linked to ideas about nationalism."92 This idea of masculinity became increasingly salient as "the nationalist press often portrayed Jewish men as the exact opposite of the manly ideal in looks and behavior ... jittery, restless, greedy, selfish, and ... ugly-nearly deformed."93 In the 1930s, "German fascists ... took the notion of masculinity to its awful, ghastly, and seemingly logical extreme."94 Perhaps this can be contrasted with the case of a rising China. Kam Louie, a scholar of Chinese masculinities, explains' that while “Western stereotypes of the 'real man' have described the Occidental male as forming his notion of male-self within images of toughness, courageousness, and decisiveness, ... in the Chinese case, the cerebral male model tends to dominate the macho, brawny male."95 The Communist Revolution in China has further demilitarized Chinese masculinity, since, while "the core meaning of wen-wu still revolves around cultural attainment and martial valour ... [ideal-types of masculinity have been shaped by] Communist insistence that able-bodied citizens work [which] ... has generated idealized images of workers and peasants" rather than soldiers98 Louie suggests that the current Chinese hegemonic masculinity is less aggressive and militaristic, and that it is both more open and less salient now than it has been previously.99 Given these two examples, the feminist reformulation (R 1) would expect bellicosity from 1930s Germany rather than contemporary China. The same empirical evidence that PTT uses could instead support a feminist argument that Germany's level of interest in aggressive masculinity made Germany a belligerent state, and that a dissatisfied China would have less interest in war than the 1930s Germany. A feminist reinterpretation would expect that Germans’ hypercompetitive hegemonic masculinity in the 1930s would motivate German leaders and citizens to try to subordinate other masculinities, while the Chinese government, following their more cerebral hegemonic masculinity, would place less priority on competition with other states.\ Hegemony and Peace: PTT claims that the greater and more stable the concentration of power, the more peaceful that system will be. PIT associates peace with the absence of armed conflict between great powers. As such, the world can still be "at peace" if dozens of civil wars are going on in countries outside of the class of "great powers." The dominant/challenger dichotomy means that PTT ignores all but the most powerful states. Instead of limiting the discourse on security to the concerns of the dominant global power and the (few or even only one) challenger(s), feminists pay attention to the entire global political community. The PTT understanding of "peace" obscures terrible atrocities and conceals a crucial and contradictory effect of the concentration of power in the international arena. Feminist work has consistently shown that, as the powerful wield more power, the weak feel more pressure. This pressure is manifested not only in the form of interstate war, but also in civil war and structural violence. Feminists' interrogation of state centrism suggests that lack of war between great states does not automatically create peace within them, and that the marginalized citizens of great states should be a topic of concern in global politics. Feminists' interest in gender subordination shows that women's security and their lives are constantly at risk. As such, the feminist reformulation (R2) predicts that concentrated power is a net negative, empirically, normatively, and epistemologically. Empirically, it is likely to increase international conflicts and internal unrest outside of the center of power, and to draw attention away from the world's worst humanitarian disasters. As Ann Tickner notes, much of the violence in the world is outside of great power war and, as theorists, "we in the west can no longer afford to privilege a tradition of scholarship that focuses on the concerns and ambitions of great powers." Feminists reject the dominance of the strong over the weak as a mechanism of control in favor of empathy and connectedness. Epistemologically, feminists note different social experience produces different knowledges. A theory of international security that excludes most people also leaves out important knowledge. An empathetic approach might increase the inclusiveness of knowledge about global politics. These insights mean that a feminist perspective would draw attention to the security of the people on the margins rather than focusing on an improbable conflict between the US and China. Feminist insights suggest it is important to recognize that in a world where the US and China compete for dominance, more than four billion other people neither compete nor dominate. Decisions made by states with the preponderance of power-over reverberate around the world. If the US and China decided to fight a nuclear war, their decision would be felt around the world. Even less severe decisions by powerful states have wide-ranging impacts on individuals' lives. For example, the US government’s decision to condition continued military presence in South Korea on mandatory STD testing in Korean prostitution villages impacted the social and economic dynamic between Korean prostitutes. Neither the US nor China provides its poorest citizens adequate humanitarian aid to avoid death from starvation or preventable disease. Yet the US and China are the two biggest military spenders in the world. In real terms, the most marginalized citizens of each nation lose when strategic posturing inspires them to focus on military readiness. Feminists have documented how militarization of women's lives decreases freedoms and changes economic and social patterns.109 Because of the these threats, feminists problematize the assumption that entities called the US and China legitimately merit more consideration than the most marginal citizens within those states or the citizens of states that their dominance subordinates.

2022 Michigan Kritik
LINKS › Great Power Politics Link

The AFF narrative positions the “great powers” as a genderless agents, obfuscating the state as a site of gendered performativity

Wadley, 2010. (Jonathan, PhD in IR from Florida and currently professor of IR and sexual politics at San Diego. “Gendering the State: Performativity and Protection in International Security,” in Gender and International Security edited by Laura Sjoberg, pp. 40-41 - spp)

The analysis presented here challenges the discipline’s tendency to treat states as genderless persons by exploring the role of gender in the security performances of states. In doing so, it draws upon the concept of performativity – the idea that, in the words of Judith Butler, “identity is performatively constituted by the very ‘expression’ that are said to be its results.” It argues that performances within the field of security, much like performances within the daily lives of people, carry no intrinsic meaning, but must be made sense of through “a system of symbolic meaning” that cannot be but gendered. Through such performances, identities become salient, and masculine and feminine subjects are created. While this process is less palpable for states than it is for humans, it is nonetheless observable in broad patterns. States can be observed reifying themselves through performances of security, particularly through those which establish them as stable and masculine protectors. Recent work on the politics of protection, particularly that done by Didier Bigo, suggests the constitutive effects that protection has upon both providers and recipients. It stops short, however, of recognizing that these effects may be enabled by the gendered meaning that different forms of protection carry. When such meanings are considered, it becomes evident that by “being” masculine protectors, states can position themselves favorably in relation to other international actors and gain legitimacy from their domestic audiences. This means that states are gendered, and are gendered in much the same way as people are: through repeated performances. When state identity is viewed in this light, the anthropomorphic assumption, as it is commonly used, appears woefully inadequate. To be clear, it is not being suggested that drawing parallels between human subjects and state subjects is bad in-and-of-itself. Indeed, useful parallels can be drawn, despite (or, perhaps, because of) the notion that “both states and persons are fuzzy sets.” The trouble lies in assuming that states, or people, are constituted outside processes of interaction, and that either can be made sense of without considering the relational identities they take on through the systems of symbolic meaning through which they operate. Anthropomorphic assumptions tend to treat the state as a genderless, unitary actor – often, one that is ontologically primitive to its interactions – while neglecting the ways that the “actor-ness” and “unity” of the state are an effect of iterated, gendered performances, particularly in the realm of security. By viewing security performances with an eye toward their constitutive effects, and by moving gender to the center of that analysis, one gains not only a richer understanding of how states reproduce themselves (i.e. where their person-like “identities” come from), but a clearer picture of the hierarchical relations that exist among states and between states and domestic populations. This chapter begins with a consideration of how the state has been conceived of a person throughout the discipline, arguing that such practices almost always import an inadequate understanding of how people are constituted. In both cases, conceptualizing states and conceptualizing humans – this is a result, largely, of substance-oriented, as opposed to process-oriented, approaches. It argues that by making processes, rather than substances, the core of research, scholars will be able to more fully explain how states reproduce themselves as actors in world politics, how they garner power for themselves (in relation to other international actors, particularly states), and how they gain legitimacy from their subjects. Following that, the chapter argues that a theory of performativity can fill this need, especially in the realm of Security Studies. Moreover, such a theory would facilitate the study of gender within these processes and shed light on the incentives states have to behave as masculine actors. The final section of the chapter offers, tentatively, a way for empirical research to bear on the theoretical sketches presented here. It submits that “the rational protector model” may be examined as a type of dominant masculinity for states, one which allows them to “do” security ways that cast them as unitary, masculine actors.

2022 Michigan Kritik
LINKS › Geopolitics / Cartography Link

The drawing of boundaries creates feminized subjects between those with control over a domain and those without

Deerfield, 2016. (Kat, PhD in Critical and Cultural Theory, Cardiff University UK, “Heavenly Bodies: Gender and Sexuality in Extra-Terrestrial Culture,” Dissertation, , SPP)

The relationship between cartographic borders and bodily-spatial borders is a key focus of Kirby’s work on exploration and mapping discourse. In ‘Re:Mapping Subjectivity: Cartographic vision and the limits of politics’, Kirby argues that ‘cartography selectively emphasizes boundaries over sites’: both the boundaries between delineated spaces and the boundaries between body and space.23 Cartography, as Kirby illustrates, intrinsically privileges the boundaries between spaces over the spaces themselves, as this is how spaces become representations on a map. Kirby further argues that carography’s emphasis on boundaries/borders extends beyond the material constraints of mapping. The emphasis on boundaries also applies to the construction of what Kirby identifies as the Enlightenment or Cartesian subject, the subject of the early exploratory ventures that gave Western spatial discourse its origins. Kirby explains: The similarity of mapped space and the mapping subject stems from the way the boundary between them is patterned as a constant barricade enforcing the difference between the two sites, preventing admixture and the diffusion of either entity. Cartography institutes a particular kind of boundary between the subject and space, but is also itself a site of interface, mediating the relationship between space and the subject and constructing each in its own particularly ossified way.24 In cartography, Kirby argues, the exploratory subject’s body is defined by its remaining bounded from exterior space. This ultimate construction of boundedness is threatened by what is traditionally understood as the feminine attribute of bodily permeability.25 This strictly bordered subjectivity is additionally threatened by the risk of the subject getting lost within the landscape. In this way, Kirby argues, cartography as a way for the subject to not be lost relies on two different kinds of borders – the borders drawn on a map, and the borders separating the body of the subject from its exterior.26 In Kirby’s discussion of the Western subject ‘being lost’, she explains that it is necessary for the Western explorer to conceive of himself as separate from the landscape, in a 'position of mastery' above and outside of the territory itself.27 This, Kirby argues, is one of the primary functions of cartography: ...to ensure that the relationship between knower and known remains unidirectional. The mapper should be able to 'master' his environment, occupy a secure and superior position in relation to it, without it affecting him in return. This stance of superiority crumbles when the explorers' cartographic aptitude deteriorates. To actually be in the surroundings, incapable of separating one's self from them in a larger objective representation, is to be lost.28 This has a particularly masculine association, illustrated by considering again Rose’s argument about the ‘master subject’ and this subjectivity’s need to deny its own corporeality. Without a pre-existing map, Kirby argues, the Western exploratory subject in a foreign land is always lost, because his perception of space requires that he be safely bounded from it. A female subject, Kirby goes on to argue, cannot occupy this subjectivity, because of the associations of femininity not only with the body but with a body that is not able to divest itself of spatial awareness.29

2022 Michigan Kritik
LINKS › 2NC/1NR Link Ext – Chivalric Masculinity

Chivalric masculinity employs crisis narratives (like the 1AC) to pivot from defensive posturing it into offensive violence, and war gets redeployed against marginalized bodies.

Wilcox, 2010 (Lauren Wilcox, Lecturer in Gender Studies and the Deputy Director of the Centre for Gender Studies at the University of Cambridge, whose work is located at the intersections of international relations, political theory, and feminist theory in investigating the consequences of thinking about bodies and embodiment in the study of international practices of violence and security. “Gendering the Cult of the Offensive,” in Gender and International Security edited by Laura Sjoberg, 2010, pp. 73-75 (SPP))

As gender is a relational concept, hegemonic definitions of masculinity necessarily entail hegemonic definitions of femininity. Nira Yuval-Davis has categorized several ways in which women function in nationalist ideologies, symbolically or in their actions. Women are constructed as the biological reproducers of the nation, as well as the cultural reproducers. After all, “group reproduction – both biological and social- is fundamental to nationalist practice, process, and politics.” Under nationalist regimes, woman are often expected to bear and raise young men who will fight on behalf of the nation. The national is therefore dependent upon women in traditional roles as mothers and caretakers to reproduce itself. The entire nation may be symbolized by a women who must be fought and died for. Indeed, nationalist discourses often present the nation as a woman, a guardian and symbol of the nation’s values, such as Germania, Britannia, or France’s Marianne, or the cult of Queen Louise of Prussia. These symbolic women were Madonna-like in their image as chaste mothers of the nation. Rape, then, becomes a metaphor for national humiliation, as in “the rape of Belgium” or “the rape of Kuwait” as well as a tactic of war used to symbolically prove the superiority of one’s national group. Not only do nationalist projects construct gender identities that prescribe different spheres for men and women, but this production of gender identities has been a necessary condition of nationalism as women have symbolically figured as the markers of the nation who must be protected by the men who run the state (or are trying to create one). Nationalism is naturalized, or legitimated, through gender discourses that naturalized the domination of one group over another through the disparagement of the feminine and the constitution of separate and unequal spheres for men and women. Gender is constitutive of nationalism, which is a factor in the promotion of offensive military doctrines and the cult of the offensive. Nationalism in terms of the assertion of the superiority of our men over their men often legitimates war in terms of a “protection racket,” in which offensive wars are fought in order to defend “women and children” from potential or actual threats. This “protection racket” extends the logic of nationalism to allow for offensive policies to be legitimated as defensive. Protection as offensive military doctrine: Rather than a unified, aggressive and warlike nature that gender essentialists like Fukuyama imagine, the hegemonic masculinity of World War I calls upon men to be courageous protectors of those less strong and capable: a chivalrous version of masculinity that has more frequently accompanied “offensive warfare” than a dominating, conquering bloodlust (although the former may resemble the latter from certain vantage pints). These gendered constructions of identity can make offensive military strategies appear to be defensive, enabling wars to take place. Often, the gendered ideologies that constitute nationalism contribute to forming offensive doctrines. “Chivalric” masculinity is not solely about men, but rather gendered relations of power. In particular, the just war narrative involve “good guys” or “just warriors” who fight against “bad guys” for just and valorous reasons. In order to produce the chivalric masculinity of the “just warrior, a ‘beautiful soul” and a malevolent other are needed. As Iris Marion Young explains, The gallantly masculine man faces the world’s difficulties and dangers in order to shield women from harm… Good men can only appear in the goodness if we assume that lurking outside the warm familial walls are aggressor, the “bad men, who wish to attack them. Not only does this “protection racket” legitimate war, but it may be said to legitimate the constitution of the state as the provider of security of outside threats as well. Feminist scholarship in International Relations has described the various ways in which this ideal of chivalric masculinity has formed the basis of the national security state as well the principles behind just war theory. For example, Jean Bethke Elshtain has described “just warriors” and “beautiful souls” as gender identities that legitimate war. Masculine “just warriors” are only reluctantly violent, but violent nonetheless as they wage war on behalf of the pure and feminine “beautiful souls” who are “too good for this world yet absolutely necessary to it.” While seemingly benign, such chivalric discourses require helpless, feminized victims: not full and equal citizens capable of defending themselves. The protector and the protected cannot be equal to one other. “the male protector confronts evil aggressor in the name of the the right and the good, while those under his protection submit to his order and serve as handmaids to his efforts.” Without this discourse of “protection,” many of the offensive military doctrines that resulted in war would not have been possible, as this discourse enables men to take violent action with the narrative that makes their actions seem moral, even commendable. Even so, specifics of time and place shape the specific forms this form of hegemonic masculinity takes.

2022 Michigan Kritik
LINKS › 2NC/1NR Link Ext – Chivalric Masculinity

The AFF is a rhetoric and politics of Protection, that attempts to secure against vulnerability by building apparatus of power to control risk. The AFF is a form of paternalism, relying on the metaphoric Father Nation State protect is weaker, feminized peoples under its domain and abroad. This “protection racket” passes itself as defensive posturing, but justifies military adventurism and competition – IE “offense” in the name of “defense” – extend Wilcox 10

And, the AFF evokes NATO as an international savior that will garner the strength of allied paternal fathers to protect against global vulnerabilities

Padmi, 2021 (Made Fitri Maya Padmi, IR Scholar, Lecturer at University Jakarta, Master of Science focused in International Security Studies from University of Bristol. “Redifining Gender Role During Wartime: Power Relations, Disparities and Impacts,” Global Insight Journal v. 6 no. 1, ; spp)

In the traditional perspective of international relations, especially the realist one, human behaviour is seen as a reflection of the state’s behaviour. To cope with the anarchic world where competition is the main characteristic, the state has to act rationally and aggressively, and possess great economic and military power in order to survive. While the realists argue that the state is free from gender attributes, feminists challenge this idea by arguing if the state was a human, gender attributes are attached to it. In the realist view of the state’s behaviour, the state represents the value of masculinity. Hobbes’s description in Leviathan emphasises conflict: ‘so that in the nature of man, we find three principal causes of quarrel. First, Competition; Secondly Diffidence; Thirdly, Glory’ (Tuck, 1996 cited in Nabulsi, 1999, p.85).

2022 Michigan Kritik
1NC › SHELLS › 1NC Shell - Short

ALTERNATIVE: Vote NEG to embrace vulnerability. Only a recognition and embodiment of vulnerability can reshape foreign policy in a manner that does not replicate the hierarchical logic of the AFF’s protection racket

Väyrynen, 2019 (Tarja Väyrynen is a professor of Peace and Conflict Research and a director of Tampere Peace Research Institute (TAPRI). Her research interests include conflict resolution and peacebuilding, feminist theory and post-colonial theory. “Mundane peace and the politics of vulnerability: a nonsolid feminist research agenda,” Peacebuilding, 7:2, 146-159, SPP)

As outlined above, early feminist peace and conflict researchers, such as Elise Boulding and Sara Ruddick, insisted on the importance of the relational body when studying peace. I also argued above that local turn scholarship is limited in its understanding of the everyday and mundane practices of peace. In my view, both the relational body and mundane practices require a more nuanced reading of power, governance and the vulnerabilities that practices of power produce, since the body is always both ‘active and acted upon’.35 In short, practices of governance that are targeted at the body also produce the body.36 Yet the fleshy living body also has agency, which makes it an ‘engaged body-subject’.37 In other words, the body is never a passive target of practices of governance: it also has a capacity to escape these practices.38 Eighty-year-old Kaisu told her story in a Finnish documentary film in 2010.39 She was among the Finnish women accused of having fraternised with German soldiers during the Second World War. She moved to Germany with the withdrawing German troops and was repatriated to Finland after the war. The following is my description of Kaisu’s narrative:

VIGNETTE 2 Kaisu was among the women whose bodies were securitised and transferred to the camp immediately on their arrival on the Finnish soil. She calls it the ‘quarantine camp’ as if there had been something contagious in her body that needed purification. Hence medicalisation also takes hold of her body even in her most intimate memories. Her young body had been securitised and medicalised as it was seen to constitute the contagious risk of knowing too much. In the documentary, her body is stiff, but strong when she sits on the porch of the barracks, in which she thinks she was incarcerated sixty years ago. She is smoking a cigarette with a firm hand. Her body and her solemn voice convey her strength. Kaisu recalls how the Security Police had suspected her of being a German mole. She is very proud of the fact that she did not cry during the interrogations: ‘In front of Hautojärvi [the interrogation officer] I did not cry’. In the narrative, her resistance is not just geared towards the interrogation officer, but also towards the Finnish state, whose security apparatus suspected and humiliated her. In her upright body, she resists the forces that sought to silence her.40

2022 Michigan Kritik
1NC › SHELLS › 1NC Shell - Short

IMPACT: The Protection Racket produces hierarchies and savior narratives that make structural violence and flashpoints for war inevitable

Peet and Sjoberg, 2020 (Laura Sjoberg, Professor of Political Science at U Florida; the Late Jessica Peet taught IR at the University of Florida and USC. Introduction to Gender and Civilian Victimization in War (Print Book), SPP)

As scholars, the "lenses" we use "foreground some things, and background others" in our research (V. Peterson and Runyan 1999). Our research questions start with the ideas, concepts, and variables we see as most important in global politics. For example, the scholars who have written on intentional civilian victimization have started with the ideas, concepts, and variables they see as most important in global politics, including regime type, international law, strategy, and culture. Like other scholars in IR, feminist work uses "lenses" to foreground variables of particular interest, specifically sex, gender, and sexuality; gender identity; and gender hierarchy, using "gender lenses" to view global politics (V. Peterson and Runyan 1999: 2). Looking through gender lenses is a way "to focus on gender as a particular kind of power relation, or to trace out the ways in which gender is central to understanding international processes" (Steans 1998: 5).

While women's oppression is a primary concern for feminists, "the driving force of feminism is its attention to gender and not simply to women .... [T]he concept, nature and practice of gender are key" (Zalewski 1995). Feminists, then, "ask what assumptions about gender (and race, class, nationality, and sexuality) are necessary to make particular statements, policies, and actions meaningful" (Wilcox 2009). In our analysis of civilian victimization, we focus on how the concept, nature, and practice of gender influences states' and other war-fighting parties' decisions to target civilians and ask what assumptions about gender are necessary to make intentional civilian victimization appealing, despite the non-combatant immunity norm. With this focus, we also look at the intersections of gender, race, ethnicity, and nationalism in constituting both the idea of the civilian and her vulnerability.

2022 Michigan Kritik
1NC › SHELLS › 1NC Shell - Short

LINK: The AFF attempt to securitize against geopolitical vulnerabilities produces more violence than it prevents – their politics of chivalric impact avoidance constitutes a “protection racket” that justifies the intensification of militarization

Wilcox, 2010 (Lauren Wilcox, Lecturer in Gender Studies and the Deputy Director of the Centre for Gender Studies at the University of Cambridge, whose work is located at the intersections of international relations, political theory, and feminist theory in investigating the consequences of thinking about bodies and embodiment in the study of international practices of violence and security. “Gendering the Cult of the Offensive,” in Gender and International Security edited by Laura Sjoberg, p. 75-78 (SPP).

While this image of the just warrior as defender of civilization at first glance seems to favor the defensive (and, would therefore not contribute to the cult of the offensive), a closer look shows that the discourse of the protection racket is actually offensive in three distinct ways. First, it leads states to value offense in order to be the best possible protectors, since offense is associated with increased chance at victory and a perception of an active approach to protection. Second, it allows militaries aspiring to the idealized or hegemonic masculinity to identify those in need of protection outside of its borders, and to start aggressive wars to protect those in need. 81 Third, insomuch as protection is a performance rather than an actual service, the appearance of boldness and bravery in actions taken on behalf of this chivalrous ideal brings attention to the protecting which is being done. In these ways, the protection racket can be associated with the increased likelihood of pursuing offensive military strategies.

The chivalric codes in vogue at the turn of the century identified the vulnerable female body as the main cause for war. The enemy was cast as an inhuman, sexual predator. Propagandists described German attacks on Belgium towns in late summer, 1914 as “rape of Belgium.” The famous World War I propaganda poster illustrates this melding of race and gender: a large brown gorilla-like creature with a bloodied bat labeled “kulter” grasps a half-naked white woman who appears to have fainted. “Destroy this mad brute: Enlist,” the poster demands. Posters in Britain encouraging men to volunteer evoked women and children as defenseless targets of war and drew upon chivalric discourses of honor and protection, declaring, “Your rights of citizenship give you the privilege of joining your fellows in defence of your Honour and your Homes,” and “There are Three Types of Men: Those who hear the call and Obey, Those who Delay, and – the Others.” Discourses of chivalrous masculinity served not only to make offensive approaches to international politics in World War I possible but also to constitute a set of gendered power relations that posited white men as protectors of the nation against racialized others who threaten the purity of naïve and defenseless women.

2022 Michigan Kritik
1NC › SHELLS › 1NC Shell - Long

5. Our method of embodied politics is both mutually exclusive with, and a more ethical alternative to, the liberal security paradigm in which the AFF is embedded

Vaittinen, 2018 (Tiina, Academy of Finland Postdoctoral Research Fellow in Global Health and Social Policy, Faculty of Social Sciences, Tampere University, Finland. “Embodied In/Security as Care Needs,” a chapter published in Carol Gentry, Laura J. Shepherd & Laura Sjoberg (eds.) Routledge Handbook in Gender and Security, SPP)

In (neo)liberal political discourses, the ideal subject is an independent homo oeconomicus, that is, a masculine, disembodied being, who is self-sufficient and self-caring, while knowingly making rational, utilitarian, and abstracted ethical choices for the common good of all. The liberal subject is an invulnerable individual, or at least well secured against any risks in life. He is never ill; he does not leak of bodily fluids (because he seems not to have a body); and he never ages. Or, in case he does age, he does so actively and “successfully”, in ways that his body’s care needs would never gain control of his life: the life of a subjective, rational Self. Feminist social and political theory argues that these conceptions of political subjectivity are non-realistic: Such disembodied subjects simply do not exist (cf. Bacchi and Beasley 2002; Beattie and Schick 2013; Cohn 2014; Fineman 2008; Grosz 1994; Hoppania and Vaittinen 2015; Robinson 1999; 2011; Ruddick 1990; Shildrick 2002; 2012; Tronto 1993; Vaittinen 2015; forthcoming)

While vulnerable embodiment is discursively associated merely with women, children, and the weak, the truth is that as human beings we all are bodies, and as such vulnerable, relational and dependent. As political subjects we are perhaps meant to “own” our bodies, to be in control of them and our lives. Yet, the bodies that our subjectivity inhabits may in fact both pre-exist and outlive the subjective “I”. We are intercorporeal: conceived, born, raised, and sustained by other bodies. We live _and die _in concrete relations with others. Thus, as opposed to being the self-caring ideal subjects of (neo)liberal politics, as bodies we are dependent, fleshy, and irrational. We are vulnerable, sometimes sick and dis/abled, every day in contact with our own bodily fluids  _and frequently also with those of others. We are made of and sometimes governed by the fluids, bacteria and hormones that move within, without, and between our bodies (cf. Fishel 2015; Irni 2013; Preciado 2013). Our lives are inherently frail. We start ageing and decaying the moment we are born.

2022 Michigan Kritik
1NC › SHELLS › 1NC Shell - Long

4. Our alternative is to embrace vulnerability. Only a recognition and embodiment of vulnerability can reshape foreign policy in a manner that does not replicate the hierarchical logic of the AFF’s protection racket

Väyrynen, 2019 (Tarja Väyrynen is a professor of Peace and Conflict Research and a director of Tampere Peace Research Institute (TAPRI). Her research interests include conflict resolution and peacebuilding, feminist theory and post-colonial theory. “Mundane peace and the politics of vulnerability: a nonsolid feminist research agenda,” Peacebuilding, 7:2, 146-159, SPP)

As outlined above, early feminist peace and conflict researchers, such as Elise Boulding and Sara Ruddick, insisted on the importance of the relational body when studying peace. I also argued above that local turn scholarship is limited in its understanding of the everyday and mundane practices of peace. In my view, both the relational body and mundane practices require a more nuanced reading of power, governance and the vulnerabilities that practices of power produce, since the body is always both ‘active and acted upon’.35 In short, practices of governance that are targeted at the body also produce the body.36 Yet the fleshy living body also has agency, which makes it an ‘engaged body-subject’.37 In other words, the body is never a passive target of practices of governance: it also has a capacity to escape these practices.38 Eighty-year-old Kaisu told her story in a Finnish documentary film in 2010.39 She was among the Finnish women accused of having fraternised with German soldiers during the Second World War. She moved to Germany with the withdrawing German troops and was repatriated to Finland after the war. The following is my description of Kaisu’s narrative:

VIGNETTE 2 Kaisu was among the women whose bodies were securitised and transferred to the camp immediately on their arrival on the Finnish soil. She calls it the ‘quarantine camp’ as if there had been something contagious in her body that needed purification. Hence medicalisation also takes hold of her body even in her most intimate memories. Her young body had been securitised and medicalised as it was seen to constitute the contagious risk of knowing too much. In the documentary, her body is stiff, but strong when she sits on the porch of the barracks, in which she thinks she was incarcerated sixty years ago. She is smoking a cigarette with a firm hand. Her body and her solemn voice convey her strength. Kaisu recalls how the Security Police had suspected her of being a German mole. She is very proud of the fact that she did not cry during the interrogations: ‘In front of Hautojärvi [the interrogation officer] I did not cry’. In the narrative, her resistance is not just geared towards the interrogation officer, but also towards the Finnish state, whose security apparatus suspected and humiliated her. In her upright body, she resists the forces that sought to silence her.40

2022 Michigan Kritik
1NC › SHELLS › 1NC Shell - Long

3. The Protection Racket produces hierarchies and savior narratives that make structural violence and flashpoints for war inevitable

Peet and Sjoberg, 2020 (Laura Sjoberg, Professor of Political Science at U Florida; the Late Jessica Peet taught IR at the University of Florida and USC. Introduction to Gender and Civilian Victimization in War (Print Book), SPP)

As scholars, the "lenses" we use "foreground some things, and background others" in our research (V. Peterson and Runyan 1999). Our research questions start with the ideas, concepts, and variables we see as most important in global politics. For example, the scholars who have written on intentional civilian victimization have started with the ideas, concepts, and variables they see as most important in global politics, including regime type, international law, strategy, and culture. Like other scholars in IR, feminist work uses "lenses" to foreground variables of particular interest, specifically sex, gender, and sexuality; gender identity; and gender hierarchy, using "gender lenses" to view global politics (V. Peterson and Runyan 1999: 2). Looking through gender lenses is a way "to focus on gender as a particular kind of power relation, or to trace out the ways in which gender is central to understanding international processes" (Steans 1998: 5).

While women's oppression is a primary concern for feminists, "the driving force of feminism is its attention to gender and not simply to women .... [T]he concept, nature and practice of gender are key" (Zalewski 1995). Feminists, then, "ask what assumptions about gender (and race, class, nationality, and sexuality) are necessary to make particular statements, policies, and actions meaningful" (Wilcox 2009). In our analysis of civilian victimization, we focus on how the concept, nature, and practice of gender influences states' and other war-fighting parties' decisions to target civilians and ask what assumptions about gender are necessary to make intentional civilian victimization appealing, despite the non-combatant immunity norm. With this focus, we also look at the intersections of gender, race, ethnicity, and nationalism in constituting both the idea of the civilian and her vulnerability.

2022 Michigan Kritik
1NC › SHELLS › 1NC Shell - Long

2. In proposing FIAT as a solution to vulnerability, the aff bestows authority in the USFG as the masculine protector of “its own” and “other” feminized subjects. This discourse locks gendered and racialized hierarchies into their model of IR.

Vaittinen, 2018 (Tiina, Academy of Finland Postdoctoral Research Fellow in Global Health and Social Policy, Faculty of Social Sciences, Tampere University, Finland. “Embodied In/Security as Care Needs,” a chapter published in Carol Gentry, Laura J. Shepherd & Laura Sjoberg (eds.) Routledge Handbook in Gender and Security, SPP)

For Cohn (2014, 53) “the most important piece of the puzzle” is “the ways in which vulnerability is intensely gendered at the symbolic level”. This is particularly so in the predominant international security theory and practice, where human vulnerability is perceived as a matter of “vulnerable groups” only and thus “displaced onto a subset of humans”. Drawing on her empirical work at the UN Security Council (SC) as an observer of discussions on the SC Resolution 1325 on Women Peace and Security, Cohn demonstrates that vulnerability is frequently discussed at the SC, yet always with a reference to some Others. In these discussions, vulnerability is never attached to those responsible for gendered security practices. The same, of course, applies to much of liberal politics today, where decision makers and state officials are presumed to be invulnerable, rational minds. In security practices, however, the implications of such othering are far-reaching, since they fundamentally shape our gendered understandings of whose in/security is recognised and recognisable.

First, not only is the concept of ‘vulnerable groups’ deeply gendered in practices of security, but it is also heteronormatively gendered to apply to (cis)women, who are inherently connected to the infantilised mass of womenandchildren-and-thedisabledrest. This shows in the framework of UNSCR 1325 (Cohn 2014, 61), but also in the racialised development agendas in the Global South, where campaigns to invest in a girl for women’s financial empowerment are promoted as projects of global justice, even if they may in fact commodify women’s (re)productive bodies for the expansion of neoliberal capitalism (Wilson 2011; Roberts 2015). Such limited conceptions of gendered vulnerability also direct research and activism, as politically motivated funding instruments often require that researchers and NGOs focus their activities on ‘vulnerable groups’ that are explicitly defined as womenandchildren (and the disabled rest).

2022 Michigan Kritik
1NC › SHELLS › 1NC Shell - Long

1. The AFF attempt to securitize against geopolitical vulnerabilities produces more violence than it prevents – their politics of chivalric impact avoidance constitutes a “protection racket” that justifies the intensification of militarization

Wilcox, 2010 (Lauren Wilcox, Lecturer in Gender Studies and the Deputy Director of the Centre for Gender Studies at the University of Cambridge, whose work is located at the intersections of international relations, political theory, and feminist theory in investigating the consequences of thinking about bodies and embodiment in the study of international practices of violence and security. “Gendering the Cult of the Offensive,” in Gender and International Security edited by Laura Sjoberg, p. 75-78 (SPP).

While this image of the just warrior as defender of civilization at first glance seems to favor the defensive (and, would therefore not contribute to the cult of the offensive), a closer look shows that the discourse of the protection racket is actually offensive in three distinct ways. First, it leads states to value offense in order to be the best possible protectors, since offense is associated with increased chance at victory and a perception of an active approach to protection. Second, it allows militaries aspiring to the idealized or hegemonic masculinity to identify those in need of protection outside of its borders, and to start aggressive wars to protect those in need. 81 Third, insomuch as protection is a performance rather than an actual service, the appearance of boldness and bravery in actions taken on behalf of this chivalrous ideal brings attention to the protecting which is being done. In these ways, the protection racket can be associated with the increased likelihood of pursuing offensive military strategies.

The chivalric codes in vogue at the turn of the century identified the vulnerable female body as the main cause for war. The enemy was cast as an inhuman, sexual predator. Propagandists described German attacks on Belgium towns in late summer, 1914 as “rape of Belgium.” The famous World War I propaganda poster illustrates this melding of race and gender: a large brown gorilla-like creature with a bloodied bat labeled “kulter” grasps a half-naked white woman who appears to have fainted. “Destroy this mad brute: Enlist,” the poster demands. Posters in Britain encouraging men to volunteer evoked women and children as defenseless targets of war and drew upon chivalric discourses of honor and protection, declaring, “Your rights of citizenship give you the privilege of joining your fellows in defence of your Honour and your Homes,” and “There are Three Types of Men: Those who hear the call and Obey, Those who Delay, and – the Others.” Discourses of chivalrous masculinity served not only to make offensive approaches to international politics in World War I possible but also to constitute a set of gendered power relations that posited white men as protectors of the nation against racialized others who threaten the purity of naïve and defenseless women.

2022 Michigan Negative
Case › Case Defense › AT: Prolif

No spread AND no impact

Jonas Schneider 20. Senior researcher at the Center for Security Studies, held post-​doctoral fellowships at the German Institute for International and Security Affairs (SWP) in Berlin and at the CSS and worked as a research associate at the Institute for Security Policy at the University of Kiel, holds a PhD in Political Science from the University of Kiel. 2020. “Chapter 26 Nuclear Proliferation and International Security.” Understanding Global Politics: Actors and Themes in International Affairs, edited by Klaus Larres and Ruth Wittlinger, Routledge, pp. 409–425.

Other analysts have sounded a much less alarmist tone, however. Some scholars even suggested that an Iranian bomb held great potential for stabilising an unbalanced and volatile Middle East (Waltz, 2012). Closer to the mainstream of Western strategic discourse, various experts have argued that despite the risks of proliferation, nuclear weapons, and the deterrent they provide should get (more) credit for contributing, in combination with other factors, to what has been labelled ‘the Long Peace’ among the great powers since 1945 (Gaddis, 1999, p. 268–271; Gavin, 2012a, p. 164; Acton 2010, pp. 16–17). Still others have contended that because nuclear proliferation is such a rare phenomenon, and since robust nonproliferation measures tend to be disruptive, the net destabilising effect of new nuclear countries is quite small and, therefore, manageable (Mueller 2010, pp. 95–99; Hymans 2013, pp. 293–296). The question of whether nuclear proliferation has stabilising or destabilising effects is not just fascinating for scholars of the nuclear age, but also highly consequential for practical policy issues. For in order to debate the merits of particular policy choices – such as preventive military strikes against nuclear facilities, grand bargains with potential proliferators or complete nuclear disarmament – we need to understand first how the spread of nuclear weapons impacts regional and global security. The chapter proceeds in three steps. The first section provides the foundation for the other parts by summarising what we know about empirical patterns of proliferation and the utility of nuclear weapons for statecraft. The second section then engages the literature on the consequences of proliferation, focusing in particular on how proliferation has influenced international stability. The final section explores whether some states have been more affected than others, and what measures these states have taken to prevent proliferation, or at least mitigate its negative consequences. Patterns of nuclear proliferation and the utility of nuclear weapons Nuclear proliferation is commonly defined as the spread of nuclear weapons to states that did not previously have them. Within a broader conceptual framework that is rarely used by scholars, yet popular in the arms control community, this diffusion of nuclear weapons to additional states is labelled horizontal proliferation. It is conceptually accompanied by the notion of vertical proliferation, which refers to qualitative improvements and increases in the number of nuclear weapons in the stockpiles of existing nuclear weapon states. In accordance with the typical usage of the term in the scholarly debate, this chapter focuses only on how the horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons affects international stability. One important empirical pattern that has shaped how nuclear proliferation is understood concerns the way in which nuclear weapons have spread. The word ‘spread’ appears to suggest that the established nuclear powers have provided other interested nations with (at least a few) operational nuclear warheads. Yet such transfers have never been undertaken. Certainly, states that sought nuclear weapons have often received significant assistance from other nations (Schofield, 2014; Fuhrmann, 2012), sometimes in the form of highly sensitive technologies (Kroenig, 2010). Nonetheless, since all these transfers remained well below the weapons threshold, nations seeking nuclear weapons always had to build them indigenously. Hence, in reality, the spread of nuclear weapons has meant that merely the ambition to possess a nuclear arsenal has spread to additional states, each of which then had to pursue that goal primarily through indigenous efforts. Importantly, since a state’s national efforts to turn its desire for nuclear weapons into reality naturally span several (and sometimes many) years, nuclear proliferation must be conceived of as a process, as opposed to just a single step (Meyer, 1986). This point is reinforced by the fact that 29 out of 39 states that have embarked upon that path (Müller and Schmidt, 2010, p. 157; Mikoyan, 2012; Santoro, 2017) have not acquired a nuclear arsenal. Hence, a lot of nuclear proliferation activity has been undertaken by nations that did not ultimately become nuclear weapon states. Three patterns explain this situation. First, owing not just to the technological, but also the institutional and managerial challenges of the task, some nations simply failed in their efforts to build the bomb (Hymans, 2012; Braut-Hegghammer, 2016). Second, a few countries have chosen a nuclear ‘hedging’ strategy, intentionally confining their efforts to developing the technological capability to build an arsenal quickly while refraining from exercising that option (Narang, 2016–17, p. 134). Third, several states have undertaken a ‘nuclear reversal’, abandoning their nuclear weapons activities before developing nuclear explosive devices (Müller and Schmidt, 2010).

2022 Michigan Negative
Case › Case Defense › AT: Prolif

No prolif impact

John Mueller 16, Woody Hayes Senior Research Scientist, Mershon Center for International Security Studies; Adjunct Professor, Department of Political Science, Ohio State University, 6/5/16, “Embracing Threatlessness: US Military Spending, Newt Gingrich, and the Costa Rica Option,”

For decades there has been almost wall-to-wall alarm about the dangers supposedly inherent in nuclear proliferation.

However, the proliferation of nuclear weapons has been far slower than has been commonly predicted over the decades primarily because the weapons do not generally convey much advantage to their possessor.

2022 Michigan Negative
Case › Case Defense › AT: NC3

Adversaries lack motive and capability to hack NC3 AND the US can easily counter attacks

Borghard and Lonergan 19. Erica D. Borghard is an Adjunct Research Scholar in the Saltzman Institute of War and Peace Studies and an Adjunct Associate Professor in the Department of Political Science. She is also a senior fellow in the Technology and International Affairs Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Shawn W. Lonergan is a Senior Advisor to the U.S. Cyberspace Solarium Commission. Shawn holds a Ph.D. in Political Science from Columbia University. Shawn is also a graduate of the United States Military Academy at West Point, where, from 2014-2017, he served as an Assistant Professor in the Academy’s Department of Social Sciences and Chief Research Scientist in the Army Cyber Institute.; “Cyber Operations as Imperfect Tools of Escalation”; Fall 2019; Strategic Studies Quarterly , Vol. 13, No. 3 (FALL 2019), pp. 122-145; //BY

Key features of cyber operations—the role of access, nonuniversal lethality of offensive cyber capabilities, and the temporal nature of access and capability development and maintenance—may dramatically circumscribe the escalatory options available to states through cyber means during a time of crisis. First, escalatory cyber response options may simply not be available to a state because it lacks access to an appropriate set of targets against which to deliver an escalatory response. This is because offensive cyber operations deliver effects against targets through exploiting a vulnerability to gain access (through an attack vector) to a target’s network or system and deliver a payload that is activated by communicating back with a host or triggered by a command order written into the code.13 Absent the right access to deploy a capability, the latter might as well not exist.14 While critical to the success of offensive operations, the initial penetration of a target network or system can be resource intensive and net unpredictable results, which is why the employment of cyber capabilities that rely on access to a targeted network require prior planning and resource allocation Indeed, according to Chris Inglis, the planning staff at US Cyber Command during the 2009–10 period assessed that “the first 90 percent of cyber reconnaissance (i.e., ISR), cyber defense, and cyberattack consisted of the common work of finding and fixing a target of interest in cyberspace.”15 Therefore, rather than occurring at lightning speed, cyber operations have crucial aspects that take time and significant resource investments, even if at the tactical level a line of code can indeed be executed at “network speed.”16 Considering means of access and types of targets reveal the various aspects of gaining access that limit potential cyber escalatory responses at a given time. Table 2, Mainstream means of gaining access, depicts various common access methods and evaluates them along a spectrum of cost, risk, and reliability.17 The broadest distinction between means of access is remote (e.g., using the Internet) versus close (e.g., gaining access through a human agent or supply chain interdiction). Most of the low-cost and low-risk means of gaining access to a target (such as through various social engineering mechanisms) are not readily applicable against more hardened (and therefore more strategically valuable) targets, such as the air-gapped networks common in critical infrastructure systems and some military and defense systems. Conversely, the most reliable type of access, physical access through a human intermediary on the ground, is also the riskiest and costliest. The nature of the targeted network or system also shapes access requirements and consequent level of difficulty. For instance, gaining access to operational technology (OT) is typically more difficult than to information technology (IT), although this may be changing as IT and OT systems converge.18 OT networks tend to be closed (they do not touch the global Internet) and run unique protocols used to control highly specific processes and systems.19 Typically, these characteristics also mean that these networks require specific knowledge because the programs they run are customized to those systems and the networking protocols they employ may not be widely proliferated. Additionally, the simple fact of “gaining access” to a target network does not guarantee that an attacker has gained access at the requisite network layer from which to launch an offensive operation.20 Thus, most access operations are followed by operations that enable persistence through access escalation prior to the employment of any cyber weapon. Finally, gaining access to a target via a hardware implant— the actual physical components of a computer (e.g., motherboard, USB and other flash memory devices, routers, etc.)—is appreciably costlier and more difficult than gaining access to software (all of the digital programs on a computer, from the operating system to applications such as Microsoft Word).

*TABLE OMITTED*