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2022 Michigan Kritik
Bronze Night Aff › Case › AT: Tallinn Manual Good

The Tallinn Manual is an ethical and juridical failure.

Barrett 17(Edward, Ethics professor in the Department of Leadership, Ethics and Law, “On the Relationship Between the Ethics and the Law of War: Cyber Operations and Sublethal Harm”, CS)

To begin, the manual’s purely legalistic assumptions—derived from applicable treaties and customary international law—can generate ethically problematic definitions of just cause. Functionally, Article’s concept of armed attack and the ethical concept of just cause are the same: they define a casus belli to which one may justifiably respond with lethal defensive force. But the related legal definitions of “uses of force” and “armed attacks” can—from an ethical perspective—lead to both overly permissive and overly restrictive conclusions. Following international law, the manual defines uses of force as acts “that injure or kill persons or damage or destroy objects.” Those of sufficient “scale and effects” are deemed armed attacks. On the one hand, this framework can be too permissive vis-à-vis property. Ethically speaking, large-scale property destruction and damage do not in themselves justify lethal defensive harm; the property in question must be lifesustaining, and this prerequisite is not intrinsic to the definition of armed attack. On the other hand, this framework can be too restrictive vis-à-vis persons. From an ethical perspective, one may respond to unjustified and culpable threats to life with lethal force if necessary; the scale of death is irrelevant. While legally limiting forceful responses to cases of armed attack–level fatalities might promote utility, it also might contravene the moral right of self-defense. This problem accounts for the “contrary view” of the United States following the International Court of Justice’s Nicaragua judgment, which asserted that “any illegal use of force can qualify as an armed attack triggering the right of self-defense; there is no gravity threshold distinguishing illegal uses of force from armed attacks.” In addition to being simultaneously overly permissive and restrictive, legal definitions of just cause can also be arbitrary because of the way in which judgments are made. What counts as harm sufficient to rise to the level of an armed attack is determined through practice, which in reality can mean that the definitions of stronger parties will prevail. Reliance on international law therefore does little to discourage wars initiated by the powerful in defense of “national interests” that merely support a desired standard of living. A dialogue between ethics and international law thus serves to provide necessary critiques of self-serving legal interpretations of both kinetic and cyber operations. A second ad bellum-related flaw in the manual involves the relationship between culpability and just cause. In assessments of whether an armed attack has occurred, the experts were “divided over the issue of whether the effects in question must have been intended.” The minority of experts asserted that espionage “unexpectedly result[ing] in significant damage” should not be considered an armed attack. On the other hand, the majority concluded that “intention is irrelevant in qualifying an operation as an armed attack and that only scale and effects matter.” According to their analysis, victims of unintentional grave harm would possess a right to respond in kind, if necessary. But from an ethical perspective, on the relationship between the ethics and the law of war majority’s position is erroneous. Culpable acts are those done intentionally, freely, and with knowledge or vincible ignorance of the relevant normative and empirical facts; and only culpable murderous acts compromise one’s capacity for justice and dignity to the degree required to forfeit one’s right to life and incur liability to lethal defensive harm. Although the response advocated by the manual’s majority would be excused if the victim were unable to know that the act was unintended, the response would still not be justified. Third, the discussion of ad bellum proportionality is problematic primarily because it misunderstands the criterion, which requires that the total expected good caused by a war outweighs the total expected harm. Instead, the manual asserts that the issue at hand is “how much force . . . is permissible once force is deemed necessary” (that is, once last resort has been satisfied), and concludes that the proportionality criterion limits this amount to “that required to end the situation that has given rise to the right to act in self-defense.” In other words, the manual stipulates that the ad bellum criterion of proportionality, instead of ensuring that the goods at stake are commensurate with anticipated harms, requires one to use only a necessary amount of force to put an end to the situation. One can easily imagine a case in which this leads to massive defensive retaliation to stop a much less harmful attack. Additionally, the entire analysis is misplaced, as the imperative to use only necessary amounts of force is an in bello issue. Fourth, the manual’s treatment of when temporary functionality losses would qualify as a just cause is self-contradictory. Like kinetic weapons, cyber weapons can physically destroy or damage computers. But because of their potential to be transitory or reversible, cyberattacks can also merely compromise functionality. While permanent losses of functionality can create the same effect as physical destruction, temporary functionality losses are unique to cyber operations and require additional analysis. Part of the manual’s discussion on functionality occurs in the in bello section that defines a cyberattack. Associating attacks on objects with damage or destruction, the majority asserted that interference with functionality would qualify as damage and thus constitute a use of force only if “restoration of functionality requires replacement of physical components.” Accordingly, a transitory or reversible loss of function not requiring the replacement of physical components would constitute neither an attack nor, by extension, a just cause. But elsewhere in the manual some experts argue that actions not resulting in physical damage would qualify as an armed attack if the ensuing negative effects were—although others still maintain that direct “harm to persons or physical damage to property” is a precondition for an armed attack. Ethically speaking, justified responses would be a function of both an attack’s culpability and overall effects. Assuming culpability, a temporary loss of the functionality of a system that was not physically damaged would be a casus belli if the event resulted in death, for example, in the event of the temporary disabling of an air traffic control system that caused mass casualties. Fifth, from an ethical perspective, although the manual’s treatment of in bello proportionality is excellent, it could be improved in one way: Since civilians on both sides retain all of their rights, one should not dismiss consequences such as loss of email or banking services from collateral damage calculations. Of course, such costs could be awarded relatively low values. Sixth and finally, the manual unfortunately adopts a purely legal approach to targeting nonparticipating civilians, arguing that cyber operations that do not qualify as “uses of force”—ones that merely inconvenience—may be intentionally directed against civilian objects such as computers. Interference with functionality is permitted if physical repair or operating system reinstallation is not required. Data, related or unrelated to functionality, is also targetable. Large-scale email blockage also does not qualify as an attack. Additionally, and as mentioned earlier, none of these harms need to be minimized or considered in collateral damage proportionality assessments. That these conclusions follow logically from their premises demonstrates the danger of purely legal approaches. From an ethical perspective, intentionally harming civilians, in addition to usually being strategically ineffective, is unjust. In peacetime or wartime, persons who have not culpably transgressed the rights of others have forfeited none of their own, and are not liable to any degree of harm—not even the inconveniences described above. Accordingly, domestic and international statutes should define these injustices as punishable crimes, and appropriate executive and legislative oversight should be implemented. And if nonparticipating civilians are to be affected by cyber operations before or during war, these effects must be minimized and weighed in the ways currently associated with, respectively, economic sanctions and dual-use objects.

2022 Michigan Kritik
Bronze Night Aff › Case › AT: State Key To Solve Cyberwar

Stacktivism overcomes divisions, pools information, and develops interconnectivity in order to create a digital commons to combat the new era of technological war

Lovink 20(Geert, founding director of the Institute of Network Cultures, PhD from the University of Melbourne, “Principles of Stacktivism”, CS)

We need to define new forms of collective action that some call the commons that is defined by the ability to act together. The design question here is what comes next after the model of social networks, which has been so compromised and overshadowed by the social media monopolies. This is a digital commons in which collective forms of money is included, a redistribution of wealth that has been produced together and should never again be allowed to be expropriated. We need to collectivise our knowledge and learn from the mistakes that were made in projects such as Wikipedia and Creative Commons, but also of the self-centric notion of free software as promoted by Richard Stallman, who could only think in terms of individual freedom of the singleuser- as-programmer – until his 2019 downfall. What Bratton’s static metaphysical view in particular lacks is the role of actors (and their interests, ideologies). Instead of trashing the stack, the proposition here is to make the model more dynamic (or dialectical) by introducing stackivism. Let’s define stacktivism as a form of Internet activism that no longer bothers with the distractive noise on social media channels and dares to dig deeper in order to make a real difference. Instead of talking only about upload filters, fake news or the deployment of cheap online moderation armies, we are working on a next Internet. The charm of protocol driven direct action or stacktivism is that it goes both up (from network to platform to stack) and down (protocols, data centres, cables), at the same time. The Internet is more than social media, more than you and your app. This may sound like a simple, self-evident slogan but the integral practice-based vision of stacktivism is a promising one, beyond techno-solutionism and it critics, the liberal-tech engineering status quo procedures, the discontent offline romanticism, liberal privacy concerns, legalistic NGO approaches and the after-the-fact Academic Truth that confines itself to the closed monads of peer-review journals. Stacktivism embodies Adorno’s critique of totality as a lie while climbing up the abstraction ladder in order to enjoy the view. Digitisation Takes Command. The stacktivist dilemma is a classic one: How can the multitudes gain power while pulverizing power at the same time? The digital is now an encompassing global sphere. Is this dark enlightenment in action? In this light, how should we judge the Will to Stack? Dare to think in term of political strategies when talking about cosmotechnics (or cosmic networks, for that matter). We’ve left the era of technology-as-tool far behind us. The nasty feedback machines strike back and try to corner us, suppressing our desires and needs, even without us noticing the closing down of communication and expression. Can The Stack (formerly known as the Internet) only be understood in its totality once it has fallen from its unity and been reduced to fragments (read: geo-political blocks and national webs)? Can we be global in scope on the protocol level, yet act locally in networks of strong-ties? Is it worth to think of cosmotechnics-for-good? Stealing code from the rich and inserting into networks of the poor, in the spirit of Aaron Schwartz and Anonymous’ SkyNet? Do you still believe that another WikiLeaks is possible, beyond the focus on celebrity? Let’s upgrade and broaden the vision how the fight against moral injustices could look like in the age of geo-political cyberwarfare and attacks on our critical infrastructure, not just the Internet but water, gas, electricity, bridges and hospitals. These are The Stacks of the People, and we’ll better not be naïve about their vulnerability. We depend on The Stack. Making visible and defending critical public infrastructure could be one of the many tasks of stacktivism. This leaves us with the question how to organise strategic forecasting in times of collapse. How can we bring together new forms of collective intelligence that are truly planetary in nature, which is to say conflictual and variegated, and not merely designed to replicate Western policy production? Call them organised networks or think tanks, we’re gathering in a closed forum, on Telegram, Mastodon or Signal in order to get things done, overcoming the divisions that aren’t ours. In theory we have all the communication skills, tools and ideas, yet we often do not know how to organise ourselves outside of surveillance capitalism and state control. Ni Zuckerberg, ni Xi Jinping19. How can we redistribute critical resources and talents? The need to bring together different and messy idioms of knowledge (technical, spiritual, cultural, political) is widely felt. What we will do next is act, together. What we need are simple, appealing images, models that bring people together to act.

2022 Michigan Kritik
Bronze Night Aff › Case › AT: Stack=Bad Metaphor

Stack design is a useful metaphor.

Crombie et al. 21(David, Canadian politician, professor and consultant, “Rethinking the Stack: New Narratives for an Era of Collective Intelligences”, 12.1, CS)

We are neither coders nor engineers but driven by a shared sense that the scope and speed of technological change has literally implicated us – folded us – in the workings of distributed intelligent systems that affect how we relate, speak, work. It is this transformation of our own agency we wish to comprehend, and the emergence of collective intelligences that bring human and non-human agency together in new constellations. While we realize that “stack design” is an abstract design proposition, we want to build on the technical metaphor of the stack as a layered system to facilitate a more holistic systems design conversation – and find out more about the role each of us might play in that process. Stacks are generally defined as “the set of technologies an organization uses to build a web or mobile application ... a combination of programming languages, frameworks, libraries, patterns, servers, UI/UX solutions, software, and tools used by its developers”.2 A quick look at the stacks used by key players in and across the platform economy suggests that these modularized systems have more in common than their fierce competition for users might suggest. Rather than repeating the usual invocations of global brands (and their market power), we want to shift the focus of our conversation to the stacks that sustain the power of these actors – a first step toward a more comprehensive understanding of the relational infrastructures behind data-driven societies, what we have termed the condition of distribution, and a different way of thinking about the design of (fairer) markets for a more cooperative economy.3 Adopting the principle that technology stacks are in principle subject to codesign, we showcase a series of complementary co-design processes to explore how we might best facilitate such a conversation. In these examples, we focus on the role of data – from the data monetization controversy (data-as-right vs data as-commodity) to “platform” cooperatives adding a digital technology and data governance layer to the much older organizational practices of the cooperative. We do not, however, assume a comprehensive understanding of data governance approaches. Our invitation to join the “stack design” conversation begins with a much simpler idea – the search for a narrative (with a wide range of characters and multiple conflicting plots) that might be able to frame a cross-sectoral systems design conversation in which many actors see a role for themselves. So before we turn to technology, we define our non-technological point of departure, leaving the question of where exactly to draw the line between the technological and the non-technological to the side for now. While we are not yet sure what the scope and structure of such a conversation will be, we do know that we want such a narrative to allow us to comprehend the condition of distribution that serves as infrastructural context for the ways in which we live and work.

2022 Michigan Kritik
Bronze Night Aff › Case › AT: Stack=Bad Metaphor

Hate to say it, but not our Stack—we reclaim the metaphor via stacktivism.

Lovink, 20—founder of the Institute of Network Cultures at the Amsterdam University of Applied Sciences (Geert, “Principles of Stacktivism,” tripleC 18 (2): 716-724, 2020, dml)

Lately, the concept of “the stack”, once a technical insider term used amongst engineers and geeks[10], has jumped context and transformed into a general container concept, in danger of becoming an empty signifier. As a meta-concept The Stack has been detached from its author and his Californian-nihilist program for the aspirational cool-crowd and turned into a symbol for the need to bring together interrelated crises, from climate change, inequality, AI and automation to covid-19. In Bratton’s world, you sign up from the program and carry the card, otherwise the entry sign points to exit. No affect, behavioural noise or regional ambiguities please – we’re performing Important Theory here. Perhaps this is a form of group therapy for the insecure? That’s fine if you like the taste of testosterone in your milk shake.

This is the time to design one, two, three, indeed many stacks and not to dismiss the ambitious efforts of others because, after all, where are the European antidotes to Bratton or Zuboff? Europe tragically fails in the production of contemporary reference texts, both at the speculative and the critical level. While the late Bernard Stiegler comes in mind, a lot of translation work is still to be done in order to transform his philosophy of technology into workable programs decoupled from his often-obscure neologisms. For instance, where are the counterproposals of the crypto-blockchain system? The Bratton bible, written in the quasi-authoritarian voice of a Master Designer, can also be read from a grass-roots perspective and should be praised for its multi-disciplinary analysis of techno-social (power) practices. Why not be ambitious? There’s a lot at stake. As a proposal, Bratton’s reading of The Stack should be compared to Dante’s hell, Sloterdijk’s notion of the spheres, Deleuze and Guattari’s Mille plateaux, Hui’s cosmotechnics and Stiegler’s The Age of Disruption. But instead of conducting hermeneutic exercises, the proposal here is to transplant the term into the hacktivist context and define the principles of “stacktivism”: dancing stacks[11].

2022 Michigan Kritik
Bronze Night Aff › Case › AT: IR Good

Prefer our theory of power. Modern IR analysis is distorted and the affs ideological diagram of The Stack effectively maps the digital complexities that make up the modern age of geopolitics.

Dyer-Witheford and Matviyenko 2019—associate professor of information and media studies at the University of Western Ontario; assistant professor of communication at Simon Fraser University (Nick and Svitlana, Cyberwar and Revolution: Digital Subterfuge in Global Capitalism) //ansel

CRITICISM OF ARMS, ARMS OF CRITICISM Our project requires an analysis in terms very different from those of official discussions of cyberwar, and its echoes in the media, discussions often cast in a language that assumes and imposes the inescapable necessity of a technocratic realpolitik and prepares and armors its audiences for trajectories of mounting crisis. Just as, in previous decades, we were habituated to apocalyptic prospects by an anodyne “nukespeak,” so today we are being trained to a more creeping catastrophe by a militarized “cyberspeak” that promises us resilience against hostile intrusion through social media service upgrades, improved smartphones, and the steady surrender of individual and social freedoms to enhanced powers of the security forces. This numbing discourse must be broken open and defamiliarized. The topic of cyberwar has, however, largely been ignored by critical social theorists, sometimes where one would least expect. The most ambitious and sophisticated of all recent scholarly attempts to conceptualize the scope and depth of the internet as a technosocial institution is in our opinion Benjamin Bratton’s (2016) The Stack: On Software and Sovereignty. For Bratton, the concept of a “stack” (in computer science, a collection of data elements that must be accessed in a specific order) provides a metaphor for the architecture of the internet, envisaged as a layered series of terrestrial, platform, urban, communication, interface, and user operations. The combined interactions of these different digital levels, Bratton argues, now compose an “accidental megastructure” of global governance either destabilizing or reinforcing the spatial and temporal boundaries of the nation-state. Yet what is striking is the limited attention this otherwise comprehensive, virtuoso examination of digital networks gives to that most sovereign of activities, war, and the possibility of what Bratton (2016, 298) glancingly refers to as “Stack versus Stack” conflicts, a topic that he defers as a matter for later study. This is all the more surprising because, as Bratton acknowledges in a footnote, the modeling of the internet as a “stack” of technosocial activities was pioneered within U.S. cyberwar agencies with very nonaccidental strategic agendas (441n8). One of the NSA documents released by Snowden, “Bad Guys Are Everywhere, Good Guys Are Somewhere” (Risen and Poitras 2013; Müller-Maguhn 2014), contains a diagram of the architecture of the internet in terms of an interdependent “stack” of geographical, physical network, logical, cyberpersona, and persona levels, derived from the work of national security intellectual Paul Rosenzweig (2012). The diagram is defined as a tool that enables the NSA to conceive how to scan and disrupt the operations of antagonists at multiple levels: “the stack” is a concept for cyberwar fighting. No account of networked sovereigns and subjects can now postpone reckoning with this reality, so we hope that our book can supplement Bratton’s, even though it is written in a different political register

2022 Michigan Kritik
Bronze Night Aff › Case › AT: Global Cybernetics Inevitable

Infrastructurally.

Avila, 20—former Non-Resident Fellow at the Digital Civil Society Lab in Partnership with the Center for Comparative Studies in Race and Ethnicity at Stanford University (Renata, “Against Digital Colonialism,” , dml)

Early manifestations of this process can be seen in the ‘free’ provision of critical infrastructure – from cables to connectivity – to large populations. This process led to the silent privatisation of the digital infrastructure of entire nations.7 Big Tech CEOs were meeting heads of state, shaking hands and promising alliances for a connected future.8 The most audacious even used Washington as a backdoor to reach places like North Korea, Cuba and China.9 Some nations even opened tech embassies in Silicon Valley, signalling their availability to tech companies, which increasingly behaved like states who provided “aid” and well-intentioned efforts to digitise countries through free infrastructure and services.10 This included proposals to build broadband cables and spread connectivity in remote areas using balloons.11 What started as an aggressive public relations campaign around 2013 has continued discreetly by the five leading tech companies in developing countries across the world, particularly in Africa.

The accelerated penetration of tech companies in emerging markets has taken place not only via generous offers of connectivity and infrastructure to populations. Tech giants have also been providing digital infrastructure to dozens of governments, ranging from cloud services to entire mail and office suites. Amazon and Microsoft have led this process, followed closely by Facebook and Google. The fact that an entire nation delegates its digital services to a company based in Silicon Valley is alarming. The company is then in a position to handle not only highly sensitive government documents, but also is in possession of critical information relating to the entire country.

2022 Michigan Kritik
Bronze Night Aff › Case › AT: Global Cybernetics Inevitable

Epistemologically.

Avila, 20—former Non-Resident Fellow at the Digital Civil Society Lab in Partnership with the Center for Comparative Studies in Race and Ethnicity at Stanford University (Renata, “Against Digital Colonialism,” , dml)

Increasingly, there is also a merger of political power and tech power in the US, which is then extrapolated to the rest of the world. A handful of huge corporations, like Amazon Web Services and Palantir, have built a ‘revolving door’ to develop and entrench Silicon Valley’s capacity to expand their services abroad.19 The neocolonial role of international aid takes a new shape, this time as technology, as the revolving door between the most powerful governments in the world and technology companies manifests in global diplomacy. The CEOs of tech companies navigate the world as ‘new envoys’ of digital colonialism – diplomats showcasing the power of their enormous technical empires to heads of state. Often, their revenues are larger than the entire GDP of their countries they are visiting, and their arrival sends a distorted message of prosperity and progress to overcome systemic inequalities and leapfrog into a better future. For many precarious and debt-fuelled governments, it is difficult to reject offers of ‘free’ digital infrastructure and services. In addition, current global trade rules run the risk of consolidating a regime favourable to digital empires, blocking the possibility of smaller actors to innovate and take ownership of their digital futures.

2022 Michigan Kritik
Bronze Night Aff › Case › AT: Communication=Possible

Cybernetics has robbed meaning of its stability.

Dyer-Witheford and Matviyenko 19(Nick and Svitlana, Associate professor at the University of Western Ontario, Professor of Communications at Simon Fraser University “Cyberwar and Revolution”, Chapter Two, CS)

There is no longer a Master-Signifier that stabilizes meaning, that knits together the chain of signifiers and hinders their tendencies to float off into indeterminacy. While the absence of such a master might seem to produce a situation of complete openness and freedom—no authority is telling the subject what to do, what to desire, how to structure its choices—Žižek argues that in fact the result is unbearable, suffocating closure. A “setting of electronically mediated subjectivity [that] is one of infinite doubt and ultimate reflexifisation” intensifies “the fundamental uncertainty accompanying the impossibility of totalization” in a symbolic environment where “there is always another option, link, opinion, nuance or contingency that we haven’t taken into account” (Dean 2014, 212). Computational propaganda that aims to mystify invasions and occupations, or promote cynical disaffection from an adversary’s political system, actively weaponizes the “decline in symbolic efficiency,” but it is endemic to the whole field of cyberwar. The extreme uncertainty and opacity of cyberwar do not, however, inhibit the interpellative effects of contending cyberwar apparatuses as they summon up cybersoldiers, patriotic hackers, vigilante militias, and security-conscious digital citizens. On the contrary, the problems of verifying or disproving multiple alarms and accusations accelerates these processes and puts them into overdrive. To put this point in psychoanalytic terms, as we noted previously, commentators on Althusser have criticized the appropriation of Lacan’s theories of the subject in his account of ISAs. These critics point out that what Althusser misses in Lacan’s account is that the subject is always incomplete; it is precisely what can never be fixed by a specific subject position or identity. However, the implication of this incompletion is not that the subject remains some untouched and primordial haven of authenticity but rather that this lack drives to ever more compulsive (because unfulfillable) attempts to attain a definitive identity. Translating this into political terms, we would say that it is the inescapably incomplete, provisional, and easily falsified nature of all accounts of cyberwar that energizes the adoption of increasingly militarized, extreme, paranoid, and unshakable subject positions vis-à-vis its alleged events.

2022 Michigan Kritik
Bronze Night Aff › 1AC

Plan-focused debates replicate the folly of the Tallinn Manual by attempting to apply liberal technological literacy to a problem that has outpaced liberalism itself. The formation of governable stacks begins not with the question of how security cooperation over cybersecurity “should” occur, but what “is” cybersecurity and how it came to be that way in the first place.

Gray and Eloff, 22—School of Philosophy at North-West University (Chantelle and Aragorn, “Fabulation in a Time of Algorithmic Ecology: Making the Future Possible Again,” Technology, Urban Space and the Networked Community, Chapter 5, 105-133, SpringerLink, dml)

In his 2008 article, “The End of Theory: The Data Deluge Makes the Scientific Method Obsolete”, Wired editor Chris Anderson notoriously argues that the era of the scientific method built around testable hypotheses is fast-becoming obsolete due to the advent of “petabyte-scale” data accumulation and analytics. Observing that tech companies like Google treat this “massive corpus as a laboratory of the human condition” (Anderson 2008), Anderson polemically implores us to forget every theory of human behaviour, from linguistics and sociology to ontology and psychology. “With enough data”, he avers, “the numbers speak for themselves” (ibid.), and statistical correlation renders superfluous any theorisation of causality. The Californian Ideology (Barbrook and Cameron 1996)1 implicit in this overstatement of the benefits of data-driven research has been challenged by several commentators (see, e.g., Pigliucci 2009 and Mazzocchi 2015) and is patently specious. The appeal made by Silicon Valley zealots to ‘pay no attention to the man behind the curtain’ relies on a mythical, and sometimes even eschatologically feverish, conception of science as a purely objective pursuit, as well as a facile conception of human thought and behaviour—indeed, subjectivity—wherein we can be comprehensively understood via the purely quantitative approaches of Big Data analyses and the statistical aggregation of deep learning systems. As Louise Amoore underscores in Cloud Ethics, this ideology confronts our “fallible, intractable, fraught political world with a curious kind of infallibility. In the cloud, the promise is that everything can be rendered tractable, all political difficulty and uncertainty nonetheless actionable” (Amoore 2020, 55). This dream of complete mathematical and technological control over reality—of “a kind of atlas of clouds for the ineffable, a condensed trace of the trajectories of our future lives with one another” (ibid.)—is hardly new. What legal theorist Antoinette Rouvroy refers to as “algorithmic governmentality”2 (Rouvroy and Stiegler 2016, 6), by which she means “the increasingly statistical governance of the ‘real’ ensuing from a convergence of contemporary technological and socio-political evolutions” (Rouvroy 2011, 119), can be traced at least as far back as first-order cybernetics (Wiener 1965, 12) and, before that, to Leibniz’s calculus ratiocinator (cf. Couturat 1901). What makes the contemporary problem novel, however, is that the latest technologies, for example cloud computing, practically unlimited data storage, high-speed global communications networks and, most importantly, machine learning—and here we mean specifically new forms of connectionist ‘artificial intelligence’ that, unlike older symbolic AI models, rely on multi-layer artificial neural networks that are assumed to represent the biology of human cognitive structure—have powerfully exacerbated the quest for (and assumptions of) ‘Algorithmic Supremacy’. As digital technology theorist Dan McQuillan argues, data-driven modelling via statistical induction is assumed to bear inherent significance, but this approach, which McQuillan describes as a form of “machinic Neoplatonism” (McQuillan 2018), tends to entirely elide the broader subjective and inter-subjective contexts within which analyses and modelling unfold and is thus, via this unwarranted delimitation, able to present itself as operating with a level of mathematical objectivity it simply does not possess.

This creates several insidious problems. For one, as Bernard Steigler observes in The Age of Disruption, this deferral to the ‘superiority’ of algorithmic reason legitimises “the systematic exploitation and physical reticulation of interindividual and transindividual relations” in the service of the data economy (Stiegler 2019, 7). In other words, the kinds of transgenerational, intergenerational, interpersonal, personal and even pre-personal3 circuits that used to “emerge through affective relations of various kinds” over time within and across societies to forge “dreams, goals, objectives and common horizons” have been disrupted in unprecedented ways (ibid., 16). Rouvroy argues, in fact, that subjectivity is bypassed by contemporary digital automisation so that subjects are rendered little more than a “collection of infraindividual data” that are “recomposed at a supra-individual level under the form of profile” (Rouvroy and Stiegler 2016, 12). Second, the speed at which what we have elsewhere termed the Algocene4 has emerged, as well as the level of technological literacy a coherent understanding of this shift entails, has far exceeded our capacity to theorise its effects, with the result that many analyses of our contemporary condition remain trapped in anachronism, projecting the image of an old world and its struggles onto a new and largely alien terrain. It is perhaps not too hyperbolic to claim, as many have, that the staggering technological shifts of the last 20-odd years necessitate theoretical engagement on the scale of a new geological era or epoch. This is no longer the world of industrial capitalism, nor even of Foucault’s disciplinary societies (Foucault 1977), Deleuze’s control societies (Deleuze 1992) or Guattari’s Integrated World Capitalism (Guattari 2000), although these are all vestigially inflected in the new situation, which has variously, although far from exhaustively, been termed societies of hyper-control and computational capitalism (Stiegler 2019), cognitive capitalism (Yann Moulier-Boutang 2012), platform capitalism (Srnicek 2016), the age of planetary computerisation (Guattari 2013), The Stack (Bratton 2015), infopolitics (Koopman 2018), instrumentarianism (Zuboff 2019) and algorithmic governmentality (Rouvroy and Berns 2013). Third, because of the speed at which digital innovation operates, whatever effects this new “hyper-synchronization of consciousness” (Vignola 2017, 188) is having on subjectivity can only be perceived in the most miniscule of ways, yet we have to rely on this minimum of information for a symptomatology because, if we follow Deleuze via Nietzsche, it is only through a symptomatology that we can trace etiological factors in order to find the most inventive corrective therapy. A difficult task indeed considering the constraints we are outlining here! The point is, we urgently require new tools to grapple with the implications of the encroachment of algorithmic reason and governmentality into more and more aspects of our lives and minds. Far from eschewing theory in favour of the transcendent mathesis universalis of our new digital overlords, situated thinking about our times has never been more crucial. If, however, this kind of thinking has not been forthcoming to the extent we would hope for, then this too perhaps forms part of the symptomatology of the Algocene. In describing something that is unprecedented, we need to take care, as McKenzie Wark argues, to find “a renewed language for describing the present situation and identifying what in the received language of capitalism [or, for those further behind the times, Marxism] impedes forward movement in thought and action” (Wark 2019, 6). Having said this, we also hold that it is important not to reduce the entire social field to algorithmic control, despite its near-ubiquity. What is rather vital is to understand what this new way of experiencing subjectivity produces and what, in turn, produces it. As Guattari explains of the Freudian Unconscious, it produced new desires, which included “hysteria, infantile neurosis, psychosis, family conflict, the reading of myths, etc.” (Guattari 1995, 10). So too what Stiegler refers to as “negative collective protention”, or the nihilistic expectation of nothing, except perhaps The End (Stiegler 2019, 19, 50), has produced new desires, and here we have to seriously consider that The End might in fact—probably is—desired, even collectively so (especially given that we also face Anthropogenic doom).5

2022 Michigan Kritik
Bronze Night Aff › 1AC

Governable stacks are the only solvent mechanism for cybersecurity cooperation. Legal mechanisms for constraining cyberwar are a pipe dream; the proliferation of debates on those terms creates a smokescreen for cybernetic infrastructure to spread across the planet, which makes militarism and nuclear annihilation inevitable. We must reorient the resolutional model of thought towards corporeal care.

Dyer-Witheford and Matviyenko, 19—associate professor of information and media studies at the University of Western Ontario; assistant professor of communication at Simon Fraser University (Nick and Svitlana, “What Is to Be Done?,” Cyberwar and Revolution: Digital Subterfuge in Global Capitalism, Chapter 3, 151-161, dml)

As we have argued, from 1945 on, the hegemonic status of the United States, as the world’s chief capitalist power, was intrinsically related to the development of computers and networks. The role of digital systems in its military–industrial complex, initially tightly coupled with nuclear weapons, spread through other aspects of its war-making system as well as through the general economy. In both aspects, it contributed to the United States’s eventual Cold War victory. In the aftermath of that victory, the United States continued to develop its digital military capacities into the ever more direct weaponization of network, creating the technological human assemblages of what is today referred to as cyberwar. The scope of NSA global surveillance and sabotage programs and the sophistication of the Stuxnet nuclear centrifuge-destroying malware are only the most manifest instances of this process, which is today an integral part of a wider upgrade of U.S. military capacities that ties together a nuclear primacy with the militarization of space and drone warfare. Accompanying and spurring on this process is the additional dynamic of cyberwar adoption by the forces antagonistic to the global dominance of the United States and its allies. These antagonists include the defeated socialist powers, Russia and China, now paradoxically resurrected as capitalist competitors in the world market, or, in the case of North Korea, surviving in a macabre afterlife of state socialism. They also include the forces of militant Islamic jihadism, beckoned into existence by the West as an anticommunist ally, only to become its opponent in the long war on terror. All these actors converge on the militarization of digital networks. Many observers today see a moment that recapitulates the decline of previous imperial hegemons within the global capitalist system—Spain, Holland, Britain—and parallels the moments of extreme instability as old powers and new contenders confront each other.7 The rise of cyberwar is part of this tumult and quite possibly a precursor and preparation for widening and intensifying conflict. Schematically, we can envisage three potentially intertwining trajectories such a process might take:

1. Network degradation. Alexander Klimburg (2017) outlines the possibility of a “darkening web” characterized by persistent and gradually intensifying cyberwar between states and between states and terrorist movements conducted in a variety of registers. Security breaches, aggressive malware, and botnet attacks proliferate. Digital industrial sabotage and critical infrastructure attacks begin to multiply, as do the accidental runaway effects of cyberweapons. Networks are deeply and chronically infected with computational propaganda, fake news, and viral mis- and disinformation. In response to adversarial incursions, states intensify algorithmic surveillance, censorship, and preemptive virtual policing. Cybersecurity provisions become increasingly mandatory and elaborate. Attribution problems, falsification of evidence, and the overlap between military and intelligence forces and criminal networks create a chaotic digital twilight of hacking and trolling, botnets and viruses, malware, surveillance, and bugs, shutdowns, blocking, and filtering, in which uncertainties exacerbate suspicions and hostilities, altogether making the internet increasingly impossible to use. In short, the “darkening web” is what already exists now, only more so. One of the cofounders of Twitter, Evan Williams, offered his diagnosis, suggesting that “the Internet is broken” (Streitfeld 2017). But maybe it’s not. Maybe the internet is finally what it was always meant to be. Maybe it is perfect, but not for us, the excommunicated user-subjects. For cyberwar.

2022 Michigan Kritik
Bronze Night Aff › 1AC

Vote affirmative to pursue insurgent governable stacks that increase security cooperation with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization in the area of cybersecurity. The aff reassembles the technical layers of the cybernetic episteme into new stacks—layered architectures of hardware, software, networks, and infrastructure which divide the world into sovereign spaces—that can fractally spill up to align with radical struggles across the globe.

Schneider, 22—assistant professor of media studies at the University of Colorado Boulder (Nathan, “Governable Stacks against Digital Colonialism,” tripleC 20 (1): 19-36, 2022, dml)

The spinning wheel remains a cipher and a site of conflict, an everyday technology summoned to a contest over the meaning of democracy. Despite having political ties with Gandhi’s assassin, the Hindu nationalist prime minister Narendra Modi promotes homespun cloth and has done photo-ops operating a spinning wheel. Modi has meanwhile shuttered boards that gave artisans a voice in policy under the slogan “Minimum Government and Maximum Governance” (Vincent 2020). The technology itself does not guarantee self-governance, but it can be the symbolic base from which ever-enlarging acts of self-governance defeat an empire.

In the spirit of the technological cipher I propose the pursuit of “governable stacks”: an orientation toward ungovernable organising under digital colonialism.

2022 Michigan Kritik
Bronze Night Aff › 1AC

This transformation is occurring at a level beyond material infrastructures or international governance: digital technology has transformed life, communication, and the mind itself. The cybernetic episteme—the global system of understanding based on quantification and data analysis—is upon us. It weighs thirty trillion tons, it’s alienating friends and families, and it will destroy the planet.

Emmelhainz, 21—independent researcher and writer who has lectured and taught at an array of international institutions (Irmgard, “Authoritarianism and the Cybernetic Episteme, or the Progressive Disappearance of Everything on Earth,” e-flux #122, November 2021, dml) [section 4 was not omitted, the article just skips from 3 to 5]

Life and society worldwide have been transformed by digital technology, including the fabrics of emotional relationships. Many believed the internet would be the largest ungoverned space in the world with unlimited emancipatory potential, and trusted Big Tech to make the world a better place. Yet power and capitalism filled that space with surveillance systems, the production of private capital, the monetization of data, and the control of human lives. Social media now shape daily life and many have lost faith in the possibility of a shared consensus reality. We are living in a scenario similar to one imagined by Black Mirror: our belief in digital communication and social media creates narcissistic personalities, selves dissociated and dislocated from their reflections online. Digital communication offers an opaque mirror that delivers egos without bodies, eliding alterity.

The collapse of reality, however, is not an unintended consequence of advancements in, for instance, artificial intelligence: it was the long-term objective of many technologists, who sought to create machines capable of transforming human consciousness (like drugs do). Communication has become a site for the extraction of surplus value, and images operate as both commodities and dispositives for this extraction. Moreover, data mediates our cognition, that is to say, the way in which we exist and perceive the world and others. The image—and the unlimited communication promised by constant imagery—have ceased to have emancipatory potential. Images place a veil over a world in which the isolated living dead, thirsty for stimulation and dopamine, give and collect likes on social media. Platform users exist according to the Silicon Valley utopian ideal of life’s complete virtualization.

2022 Michigan Kritik
Bronze Night Aff › 1AC

NATO missed the real significance of the Bronze Night, which was not simply that it was vulnerable to a new form of warfare, but that it was fundamentally outdated in the face of the cybernetic transformation of the planet, as it was founded on the relevance of geopolitical factors like nation-states and physical boundaries like the “North Atlantic” which hold no sway in the digital era. NATO did get one thing right, though: there’s no going back.

Joque, 18—PhD from the European Grad School, researches philosophy, technology and media and is the visualization librarian at the University of Michigan, go blue (Justin, “Buffer Overflow: The Space and Time of Cyberwar,” Deconstruction Machines: Writing in the Age of Cyberwar, Chapter 1, 38-43, dml)

While Moonlight Maze was declared a cyberwar by a few individuals, a row between Russia and Estonia in 2007 is often mentioned as one of the earliest all-out cyberwars.17 On April 26 of that year, Estonia moved the Bronze Soldier, a memorial to Soviet soldiers killed during World War II, from the center of the Estonian capital Tallinn to a cemetery on the outskirts of town. Russians within both Estonia and Russia protested. Riots broke out in Tallinn, killing one and injuring more than a hundred people.18 In response, the Russian parliament called for the resignation of the Estonian government and stopped rail service from St. Petersburg, train shipments of oil through Estonia, and even heavy vehicles from crossing a major bridge from Russia into Estonia.19

At the same time, a host of computer-based services in Estonia were hit with a distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attack. A DDoS attack involves overwhelming a server with traffic such that it is no longer able to respond to legitimate requests. It is relatively easy to automatically block computers that are sending inordinate numbers of requests to a server, so most DDoS attacks must be distributed across a large number of machines to succeed. This is achieved either by maliciously taking over machines to create what is called a botnet, some of which have involved tens of millions of computers, or by convincing people to voluntarily lend their machines for the purpose of an attack. These voluntary or commandeered machines are then turned against servers to overrun them with requests and disable them. DDoS attacks thus do not require breaking into a machine and do not compromise private data that may reside on the server; rather, they disable the server for as long as the botnet can continue sending requests.

2022 Michigan Kritik
Bronze Night Aff › 1AC

Thus, when exploring how we can debate it, “we must resist deciding in favor of catastrophe or boredom, for in doing so, the entirety of cyberwar will certainly escape us. Instead, we must attempt to interrogate the history and discourses of cyberwar… as it hides in the theoretical space between war and nonwar.”

--green highlighting was already read in the tag and doesn’t need to be read twice!

Joque, 18—PhD from the European Grad School, researches philosophy, technology and media and is the visualization librarian at the University of Michigan, go blue (Justin, “Root Kit,” Deconstruction Machines: Writing in the Age of Cyberwar, Introduction, 1-8, dml)

At the start of the twenty-first century, we are faced with the increasing dependence of our life support systems on global networks and the possibility of system-wide catastrophe. From energy supplies to agriculture to the global climate, these systems are now directly exposed to global fluctuations and, with them, the possibility that a local breakdown could spread globally. We seem to be learning repeatedly that the unavoidable dark side of our networks of communication, production, finance, and information is the ever-present threat of contagion and cascading system failure.

2022 Michigan Kritik
Cybernetics K Supplement—Wave 1—FMPS › Answers › AT: Stack

Stacks are just layers of systems—they’re meaningless without the hard political work to ensure those systems function.

Scannell, 18—teaches sociology and women’s, gender, and sexuality studies at Hunter College (R. Joshua, “Architectures of Managerial Triumphalism (Review of Benjamin Bratton, The Stack: On Software and Sovereignty),” , dml)

Design, then, and not theory, because Bratton’s Stack is a speculative document. Given the bewildering and potentially apocalyptic conditions of the present, he wants to extrapolate outwards. What are the heterotopias-to-come? What are the constraints? What are the possibilities? Sounding a familiar frustration with the strictures of academic labor, he argues that this moment requires something more than diagnosis and critique. Rather,

the process by which sovereignty is made more plural becomes a matter of producing more than discoursing: more about pushing, pulling, clicking, eating, modeling, stacking, prototyping, subtracting, regulating, restoring, optimizing, leaving alone, splicing, gardening and evacuating than about reading, examining, insisting, rethinking, reminding, knowing full-well, enacting, finding problematic, and urging. (303)

2022 Michigan Kritik
Cybernetics K Supplement—Wave 1—FMPS › Answers › AT: Degrowth-y Alts

The alt is naïve primitivism that is worse than what we have now.

Bratton 21 – Benjamin Bratton’s work spans Philosophy, Architecture, Computer Science and Geopolitics, He is Professor of Visual Arts at University of California, San Diego, Program Director of The Terraforming program at the Strelka Institute, and author of several books including “The Stack: On Software and Sovereignty.” “The Revenge of the Real - Politics for a Post-Pandemic World.” June 2021. AG

There are certainly aesthetic and stylistic reasons to prefer homogenous village-scale communities to the “alienating” anonymity of the big city. Indeed, there is a direct if implicit anti-urbanism in anti-automation politics and aesthetics. Some may have forgotten that, despite their bucolic pleasures, small towns are also facial recognition–based social control systems from which many people have given their lives to escape.

For example, the petit bourgeois Primitivism of the all-organic neighborhood farmers market stands as a kind of wishful idealization of what infrastructure might be and “where things come from.” Although it provides an anodyne experience, its symbolism reeks of a Restorationist cultural politics that symptomatically prioritizes ambiance at hand over equity at scale. It is an aesthetic indulgence claiming to be an ethical politics that is claiming to be a more resilient economics. And yet, the world cannot actually “be like this always”; it is not possible for every piece of fruit to be handed to you in person.

2022 Michigan Kritik
Cybernetics K Supplement—Wave 1—FMPS › Answers › AT: AI Impacts

No tech accidents, no algorithmic arms race.

Michael Shermer 17. Publisher of Skeptic magazine, a monthly columnist for Scientific American, and a Presidential Fellow at Chapman University. 04/2017. “Why Artificial Intelligence Is Not an Existential Threat.” Skeptic, vol. 22, no. 2, pp. 29–35.

Why AI is not an Existential Threat First, most AI doomsday prophecies are grounded in the false analogy between human nature and computer nature, or natural intelligence and artificial intelligence. We are thinking machines, but natural selection also designed into us emotions to shortcut the thinking process because natural intelligences are limited in speed and capacity by the number of neurons that can be crammed into a skull that has to pass through a pelvic opening at birth, whereas artificial intelligence need not be so restricted. We don't need to compute the caloric value of foods, for example, we just feel hungry. We don't need to calculate the waist-to-hip ratio of women or the shoulder-to-waist ratio of men in our quest for genetically healthy potential mates; we just feel attracted to someone and mate with them. We don't need to work out the genetic cost of raising someone else's offspring if our mate is unfaithful; we just feel jealous. We don't need to figure the damage of an unfair or non-reciprocal exchange with someone else; we just feel injustice and desire revenge. Emotions are proxies for getting us to act in ways that lead to an increase in reproductive success, particularly in response to threats faced by our Paleolithic ancestors. Anger leads us to strike out, fight back, and defend ourselves against danger. Fear causes us to pull back, retreat, and escape from risks. Disgust directs us to push out, eject, and expel that which is bad for us. Computing the odds of danger in any given situation takes too long. We need to react instantly. Emotions shortcut the information processing power needed by brains that would otherwise become bogged down with all the computations necessary for survival. Their purpose, in an ultimate causal sense, is to drive behaviors toward goals selected by evolution to enhance survival and reproduction. AIs -- even AGIs and ASIs -- will have no need of such emotions and so there would be no reason to program them in unless, say, terrorists chose to do so for their own evil purposes. But that's a human nature problem, not a computer nature issue. To believe that an ASI would be "evil" in any emotional sense is to assume a computer cognition that includes such psychological traits as acquisitiveness, competitiveness, vengeance, and bellicosity, which seem to be projections coming from the mostly male writers who concoct such dystopias, not features any programmer would bother including, assuming that it could even be done. What would it mean to program an emotion into a computer? When IBM's Deep Blue defeated chess master Garry Kasparov in 1997, did it feel triumphant, vengeful, or bellicose? Of course not. It wasn't even "aware" -- in the human sense of self-conscious knowledge -- that it was playing chess, much less feeling nervous about possibly losing to the reigning world champion (which it did in the first tournament played in 1996). In fact, toward the end of the first game of the second tournament, on the 44th move, Deep Blue made a legal but incomprehensible move of pushing its rook all the way to the last row of the opposition side. It accomplished nothing offensively or defensively, leading Kasparov to puzzle over it out of concern that he was missing something in the computer's strategy. It turned out to be an error in Deep Blue's programming that led to this fail-safe default move. It was a bug that Kasparov mistook as a feature, and as a result some chess experts contend it led him to be less confident in his strategizing and to second-guess his responses in the subsequent games. It even led him to suspect foul play and human intervention behind Deep Blue, and this paranoia ultimately cost him the tournamentt.[ 13] Computers don't get paranoid, the HAL 9000 computer in 2001 notwithstanding. Or consider Watson, the IBM computer built by David Ferrucci and his team of IBM research scientists tasked with designing an AI that could rival human champions at the game of Jeopardy! This was a far more formidable challenge than Deep Blue faced because of the prerequisite to understand language and the often multiple meanings of words, not to mention needing an encyclopedic knowledge of trivia (Watson had access to Wikipedia for this). After beating the all-time greatest Jeopardy! champions Ken Jennings and Brad Rutter in 2011, did Watson feel flushed with pride after its victory? Did Watson even know that it won Jeopardy!? I put the question to none other than Ferrucci himself at a dinner party in New York in conjunction with the 2011 Singularity Summit. His answer surprised me: "Yes, Watson knows it won Jeopardy!" I was skeptical. How could that be, since such self-awareness is not yet possible in computers? "Because I told it that it won," he replied with a wry smile. Sure, and you could even program Watson or Deep Blue to vocalize a Howard Dean-like victory scream when it wins, but that is still a far cry from a computer feeling triumphant. This brings to mind the "hard problem" of consciousness -- if we don't understand how this happens in humans, how could we program it into computers? As Steven Pinker elucidated in his answer to the 2015 Edge Question on what to think about machines that think, "AI dystopias project a parochial alpha-male psychology onto the concept of intelligence. They assume that superhumanly intelligent robots would develop goals like deposing their masters or taking over the world." It is equally possible, Pinker suggests, that "artificial intelligence will naturally develop along female lines: fully capable of solving problems, but with no desire to annihilate innocents or dominate the civilization."[ 14] So the fear that computers will become emotionally evil are unfounded, because without the suite of these evolved emotions it will never occur to AIs to take such actions against us. What about an ASI inadvertently causing our extinction by turning us into paperclips, or tiling the entire Earth's surface with solar panels? Such scenarios imply yet another emotion -- the feeling of valuing or wanting something. As the science writer Michael Chorost adroitly notes, when humans resist an AI from undertaking any form of global tiling, it "will have to be able to imagine counteractions and want to carry them out." Yet, "until an AI has feelings, it's going to be unable to want to do anything at all, let alone act counter to humanity's interests and fight off human resistance." Further, Chorost notes, "the minute an A.I. wants anything, it will live in a universe with rewards and punishments -- including punishments from us for behaving badly. In order to survive in a world dominated by humans, a nascent A.I. will have to develop a humanlike moral sense that certain things are right and others are wrong. By the time it's in a position to imagine tiling the Earth with solar panels, it'll know that it would be morally wrong to do so."[ 15] From here Chorost builds on an argument made by Peter Singer in The Expanding Circle (and Steven Pinker in The Better Angels of Our Nature[ 16] that I also developed in The Moral Arc[ 17] and Robert Wright explored in Nonzero[ 18]), and that is the propensity for natural intelligence to evolve moral emotions that include reciprocity, cooperativeness, and even altruism. Natural intelligences such as ours also includes the capacity to reason, and once you are on Singer's metaphor of the "escalator of reason" it can carry you upward to genuine morality and concerns about harming others. "Reasoning is inherently expansionist. It seeks universal application," Singer notes.[ 19] Chorost draws the implication: "AIs will have to step on the escalator of reason just like humans have, because they will need to bargain for goods in a human-dominated economy and they will face human resistance to bad behavior."[ 20] Finally, for an AI to get around this problem it would need to evolve emotions on its own, but the only way for this to happen in a world dominated by the natural intelligence called humans would be for us to allow it to happen, which we wouldn't because there's time enough to see it coming. Bostrom's "treacherous turn" will come with road signs ahead warning us that there's a sharp bend in the highway with enough time for us to grab the wheel. Incremental progress is what we see in most technologies, including and especially AI, which will continue to serve us in the manner we desire and need. Instead of Great Leap Forward or Giant Fall Backward, think Small Steps Upward. As I proposed in The Moral Arc, instead of Utopia or dystopia, think protopia, a term coined by the futurist Kevin Kelly, who described it in an Edge conversation this way: "I call myself a protopian, not a Utopian. I believe in progress in an incremental way where every year it's better than the year before but not by very much -- just a micro amount."[ 21] Almost all progress in science and technology, including computers and AI, is of a protopian nature. Rarely, if ever, do technologies lead to either Utopian or dystopian societies. Pinker agrees that there is plenty of time to plan for all conceivable contingencies and build safeguards into our AI systems. "They would not need any ponderous 'rules of robotics' or some newfangled moral philosophy to do this, just the same common sense that went into the design of food processors, table saws, space heaters, and automobiles." Sure, an ASI would be many orders of magnitude smarter than these machines, but Pinker reminds us of the AI hyperbole we've been fed for decades: "The worry that an AI system would be so clever at attaining one of the goals programmed into it (like commandeering energy) that it would run roughshod over the others (like human safety) assumes that AI will descend upon us faster than we can design fail-safe precautions. The reality is that progress in AI is hype-defyingly slow, and there will be plenty of time for feedback from incremental implementations, with humans wielding the screwdriver at every stage."[ 22] Former Google CEO Eric Schmidt agrees, responding to the fears expressed by Hawking and Musk this way: "Don't you think the humans would notice this, and start turning off the computers?" He also noted the irony in the fact that Musk has invested $1 billion into a company called OpenAI that is "promoting precisely AI of the kind we are describing."[ 23] Google's own DeepMind has developed the concept of an AI off-switch, playfully described as a "big red button" to be pushed in the event of an attempted AI takeover. "We have proposed a framework to allow a human operator to repeatedly safely interrupt a reinforcement learning agent while making sure the agent will not learn to prevent or induce these interruptions," write the authors Laurent Orseau from DeepMind and Stuart Armstrong from the Future of Humanity Institute, in a paper titled "Safely Interruptible Agents." They even suggest a precautionary scheduled shutdown every night at 2 AM for an hour so that both humans and AI are accustomed to the idea. "Safe interruptibility can be useful to take control of a robot that is misbehaving and may lead to irreversible consequences, or to take it out of a delicate situation, or even to temporarily use it to achieve a task it did not learn to perform or would not normally receive rewards for this."[ 24] As well, it is good to keep in mind that artificial intelligence is not the same as artificial consciousness. Thinking machines may not be sentient machines. Finally, Andrew Ng of Baidu responded to Elon Musk's ASI concerns by noting (in a jab at the entrepreneur's ambitions for colonizing the red planet) it would be "like worrying about overpopulation on Mars when we have not even set foot on the planet yet."[ 25] Both Utopian and dystopian visions of AI are based on a projection of the future quite unlike anything history has given us. Yet, even Ray Kurzweil's "law of accelerating returns," as remarkable as it has been has nevertheless advanced at a pace that has allowed for considerable ethical deliberation with appropriate checks and balances applied to various technologies along the way. With time, even if an unforeseen motive somehow began to emerge in an AI we would have the time to reprogram it before it got out of control. That is also the judgment of Alan Winfield, an engineering professor and co-author of the Principles of Robotics, a list of rules for regulating robots in the real world that goes far beyond Isaac Asimov's famous three laws of robotics (which were, in any case, designed to fail as plot devices for science fictional narratives).26 Winfield points out that all of these doomsday scenarios depend on a long sequence of big ifs to unroll sequentially: "If we succeed in building human equivalent AI and if that AI acquires a full understanding of how it works, and if it then succeeds in improving itself to produce super-intelligent AI, and if that super-AI, accidentally or maliciously, starts to consume resources, and if we fail to pull the plug, then, yes, we may well have a problem. The risk, while not impossible, is improbable."[ 27]

2022 Michigan Kritik
Cybernetics K Supplement—Wave 1—FMPS › Answers › Tech Inevitable

Tech’s inevitable, cat’s out of the bag, regulation stops the worst abuses

Mcintosh 10 – PhD in international studies from the University of Denver, Professor Emeritus of International Relations, Associate Professor of Political Science at Slippery Rock University. “The Transhuman Security Dilemma.” Journal of Evolution and Technology, Vol. 21 Issue 2. Dec 2010. , AG

Personal and political security are at risk from the potential for abuse of NBIC technologies by States and other organizations. Left in the control of elites, these technologies could be used to create dystopian societies to rival anything in science fiction. In fact, the entire notion of personhood could be at risk. If these technologies can be distributed and regulated for the good of the community, however, they hold the promise of making a far better world. The diversity of humanity could be recognized as a value to be protected, even as people learn to see beyond external forms to the humanity within. Yet even under the best regulatory regime, the pressures of competition and the desire of each individual to improve set up the potential for a dilemma that affects not merely the interaction and security of states, but the lives and liberty of each person. This is not a danger that can be edited out of the human genome, for it is inherent in the nature of competitive interaction, coupled with the expected comparative advantage of those who choose to take advantage of the new technologies. Here, then, is the conundrum: in our attempt to remake ourselves, we will not entirely leave our old selves behind, any more than we have escaped our animal past, and nor will we escape the pressures inherent in social and political systems. The balance of factors argues that change is coming. Evolution never ends, even when it is to some extent self-directed. Yet like so many other technologies, the tools of evolution-by-design will not solve the most basic problems of human or global security. There are things we cannot or will not leave behind. Trapped by the dilemmas inherent in security and economic competition, political and security issues will continue to challenge our descendants, no matter what forms or enhancements they possess.

2022 Michigan Kritik
Cybernetics K Supplement—Wave 1—FMPS › Answers › Tech Good—Peace

Tech creates peace along multiple vectors.

Fatima ’18 Quratulain Fatima is the Project Lead of the Agency for Barani Areas Development, with a focus on gender inclusive development and conflict prevention, and she was the first woman to join the Pakistan Air Force. She is a 2018 Aspen New Voices Fellow, a BuildPeace Fellow 2017-18 and Oxford Global Leadership Initiative Fellow 2016. (Quratulain Fatima, "Peace technology: A promising tool against wars at reduced price", news.trust.org, 3-23-2018, https://news.trust.org/item/20180323160358-p5wkq/. Accessed 7-4-2022, RS).

From apps to help citizens avoid missiles and land mines to rumor tracking mobile-based services using SMS, peace technology is one promising tool to prevent conflict

It has been seven years since I left Pakistan's Air Force, where I was part of the war against terrorism. I left hoping our conflicts would end soon, but nothing has changed. A World Bank-UN study "Pathways for Peace" has found that in 2016 alone, more countries experienced conflict than at any time in past 30 years. According to the same study, the economic cost of responding to conflict for 2012 was US $9.46 trillion which is 2.4 times the total GDP of Africa. Whereas, targeting resources toward countries at high risk of conflict each year could result in average net savings of $33 billion per year from avoided conflicts for the international community. But instead of saving more, we are spending more - and more people are dying.

2022 Michigan Kritik
Cybernetics K Supplement—Wave 1—FMPS › Answers › Tech Good—AI

AI key to save millions each year – medical tech.

Bornet ’21 Bornet is Chief Data Officer at Aera Technology and a board member at the Intelligent Automation Council. He is a contributor and senior advisor at The Institute for Robotic Process Automation & Artificial Intelligence (IRPA AI). (Pascal Bornet, "Council Post: Saving Millions Of Lives Per Year With Intelligent Automation", Forbes, 5-13-2021, https://www.forbes.com/sites/forbestechcouncil/2021/05/13/saving-millions-of-lives-per-year-with-intelligent-automation/?sh=352cbe4d1349. Accessed 7-4-2022, RS).

Intelligent Automation (IA) is more than a way to revolutionize business and save money — it also has the potential to save lives by the millions and increase healthy life expectancy. Intelligent automation can be applied to medical diagnosis and research to prevent unnecessary deaths. In addition, it provides more equitable access to healthcare worldwide. It also can be used in transport to augment the abilities of human drivers, preventing deaths and injuries from traffic accidents.

Preventing Deaths Through Diagnosis And Research