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2022 Michigan Negative

AT Human Dignity

Autonomous Weapons will be more ethical than humans because human errors cause poor decisions

Arkin, 2008 – the Mobile Robot Laboratory at Georgia Institute of Technology [Ronald “Technical Report GIT-GVU-07-11 Governing Lethal Behavior: Embedding Ethics in a Hybrid Deliberative/Reactive Robot Architecture” Acc 12/27/20 TA]

It is not my belief that an unmanned system will be able to be perfectly ethical in the battlefield, but I am convinced that they can perform more ethically than human soldiers are capable of. Unfortunately the trends in human behavior in the battlefield regarding adhering to legal and ethical requirements are questionable at best. A recent report from the Surgeon General’s Office [Surgeon General 06] assessing the battlefield ethics of soldiers and marines deployed in Operation Iraqi Freedom is disconcerting. The following findings are taken directly from that report: 1. Approximately 10% of Soldiers and Marines report mistreating noncombatants (damaged/destroyed Iraqi property when not necessary or hit/kicked a noncombatant when not necessary). Soldiers that have high levels of anger, experience high levels of combat or those who screened positive for a mental health problem were nearly twice as likely to mistreat non-combatants as those who had low levels of anger or combat or screened negative for a mental health problem. 2. Only 47% of Soldiers and 38% of Marines agreed that noncombatants should be treated with dignity and respect. 3. Well over a third of Soldiers and Marines reported torture should be allowed, whether to save the life of a fellow Soldier or Marine or to obtain important information about insurgents. 4. 17% of Soldiers and Marines agreed or strongly agreed that all noncombatants should be treated as insurgents. 5. Just under 10% of soldiers and marines reported that their unit modifies the ROE to accomplish the mission. 6. 45% of Soldiers and 60% of Marines did not agree that they would report a fellow soldier/marine if he had injured or killed an innocent noncombatant. 7. Only 43% of Soldiers and 30% of Marines agreed they would report a unit member for unnecessarily damaging or destroying private property. 8. Less than half of Soldiers and Marines would report a team member for an unethical behavior. 9. A third of Marines and over a quarter of Soldiers did not agree that their NCOs and Officers made it clear not to mistreat noncombatants. 10. Although they reported receiving ethical training, 28% of Soldiers and 31% of Marines reported facing ethical situations in which they did not know how to respond. 11. Soldiers and Marines are more likely to report engaging in the mistreatment of Iraqi noncombatants when they are angry, and are twice as likely to engage in unethical behavior in the battlefield than when they have low levels of anger. 12. Combat experience, particularly losing a team member, was related to an increase in ethical violations.

2022 Michigan Negative

AT Nuclear Instability

While countries will adopt autonomous systems, most countries will avoid using Destabilizing AI. Nations are Cautious about Nuclear Systems, and will only utilize autonomous AI if they enhance stability.

Horowitz, 2019 – prof of Political Science at Univ of Pennsylvania [Michael with Paul Scharre, and Alexander Velez-Green “A Stable Nuclear Future? The Impact of Autonomous Systems and Artificial Intelligence” December arXiv:1912.05291 https://arxiv.org/abs/1912.05291 Acc 12/27/20 TA]

What might lead to variation in how countries make choices about the relative utility of autonomous systems? The answer could depend on how secure they feel about their non-autonomous nuclear systems. States that feel extremely secure in their second strike capabilities at present may see fewer advantages to automation. In that case, the advantages greater speed and precision but might not appear worth the potential risk of accidents. Instead, states like the United States would likely prefer to use existing non-autonomous systems for nuclear command and control and delivery. In contrast, countries whose nuclear arsenals are more insecure may be more accepting of risk and may find the perceived advantages of automation more valuable. If a country thinks that its nuclear command and control might be at risk of severe degradation or destruction, it might be more likely to automate early warning to increase its response speed, deploy autonomous nuclear delivery platforms with higher endurance, automate new aspects of target selection for nuclear delivery vehicles, or shift towards more automated nuclear launch postures. All may not happen in unison, of course, but as a general relationship, countries whose arsenals are more insecure may be more willing to take risks to better enhance their arsenal’s survivability.

2022 Michigan Negative

AT Crisis Instability

AI doesn’t lower the threshold for war – it is a Political, not Technological issue – banning weapons won’t solve it.

Del Re, 2017 – US Army Major [Amanda “Lethal Autonomous Weapons: Take the Human Out of the Loop A paper submitted to the Faculty of the US Naval War College in partial satisfaction of the requirements for the Ethics of Emerging Military Technology Graduate Certificate. 16 June 2017 https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/citations/AD1041804 Acc 12/27/20 TA]

The above arguments against employing LAW are valid reasons to be hesitant. However, there are a few points to consider in juxtaposition with them. The “tacticization of strategy” is a problem at the higher levels of government. However, this issue has been a problem long before the idea of LAWs has been considered. The “tacticization of strategy” or the idea that technology could lower the bar to entry into war is not the problem, it is only the symptom of the problem. The problem is the misconception that technology wins wars. LAWs may contribute to that way of thinking but banning them will not make it go away.

2022 Michigan Negative

AT Cohesion

Ethics principles cannot create cohesion – there are many other issues that must be resolved for the US to coordinate NATO

Trabucco, 2020 - Research Assistant at the Centre for Military Studies at the University of Copenhagen [Lena, May 10 “AI Partnership for Defense is a Step in the Right Direction – But Will Face Challenges” http://opiniojuris.org/2020/10/05/ai-partnership-for-defense-is-a-step-in-the-right-direction-but-will-face-challenges/ Acc 4/17/22 TA]

Which brings me to the third challenge. The AI partnership symposium did not offer a coherent strategy for the partnership beyond advancing core values the participating nations find important to the AI pipeline. Peter Singer, New America Foundation fellow and strategist, noted that the US has not yet offered a coherent strategy to contrast its “near peers.” In one article, Singer said, “China has a fairly clear and robust vision of this [AI and its applications] and it is actively exporting that vision. There is absolutely no way the US can compete without offering a different and compelling vision and one that involves our friends and allies.” On the one hand, the absence of an overarching strategy gives the DoD and the AI partnership latitude to address inevitable issues that will arise. Secretary Esper noted in his address that this kind of partnership is the first of its kind and needs time to operate in the face of unforeseen challenges. But to accomplish the goal as the preferred security partner in AI, the partnership will need to substantiate its agreement with a vision more concrete than just ethical values. The AI partnership accomplishes getting some allies on board, but does not clarify what vision is driving the newfound partnership. At some point, this will need to change. In essence, the AI partnership is a necessary and welcome development in the US AI strategy, but significant legal and policy challenges are on the horizon. The three outlined here – legal interoperability, trans-Atlantic cooperation, and an uncertain coherent strategy – are certainly not exhaustive. But they represent a span of legal and policy issues the partnership are sure to encounter as it moves forward.

2022 Michigan Negative

--Extend – JAIC

The JAIC hosted the PfD Symposium – it is a starting point for a global approach to ethical AI development.

Trabucco, 2020 - Research Assistant at the Centre for Military Studies at the University of Copenhagen [Lena, May 10 “AI Partnership for Defense is a Step in the Right Direction – But Will Face Challenges” http://opiniojuris.org/2020/10/05/ai-partnership-for-defense-is-a-step-in-the-right-direction-but-will-face-challenges/ Acc 4/17/22 TA]

On September 15 and 16, 2020, the Defense Department’s Joint Artificial Intelligence Center, or JAIC, held an symposium which hosted delegations from 12 nations including Australia, Canada, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Israel, Japan, Norway, the Republic of Korea, Sweden, and the United Kingdom. According to the JAIC, the symposium gathered nations furthest along in their AI development to discuss “shared lessons learned and best practices in harnessing AI for their respective and shared defense missions.” The goal of the partnership, according to DoD officials, is to promote standards for responsible AI development and establish avenues and tools for data sharing, cooperative development, and enhanced interoperability. The DoD offered few details about the framework and functioning of the partnership beyond a “forum [that] seeks to provide values-based global leadership in defense for policies and approaches in adopting AI,” according to a DoD statement. Nevertheless, some benefits and challenges are clear from the outset. The AI partnership is a step in the right direction. It offers an avenue of AI innovation that will signal consensus and cooperation between the US and crucial partners. At first glance, this cooperation may seem little more than a symbolic gesture, but this partnership was a necessary step in fostering a more reasoned and global approach to military AI development. Additionally, the partnership grants accessibility to a wider network of military and defense organizations to engage in research and development and draw on global AI talent. Adding diverse voices to the complex discussion of AI as a defense technology will yield more insightful dialogue and solutions.

2022 Michigan Negative

Inherency Resps

1. No Inherency – the Status Quo system solves best – DOD policy ensures ethical standards and responsible use, but retains flexibility to address future contingencies

Allen, 2022 - Director, AI Governance Project, Strategic Technologies Program at CSIS [Gregory C. June 6 “DOD Is Updating Its Decade-Old Autonomous Weapons Policy, but Confusion Remains Widespread” TA]

The DOD recently announced that it is planning to update DODD 3000.09 this year. Michael Horowitz, director of the DOD’s Emerging Capabilities Policy Office and the Pentagon official with responsibility for shepherding the policy, praised DODD 3000.09 in a recent interview, stating that “the fundamental approach in the directive remains sound, that the directive laid out a very responsible approach to the incorporation of autonomy and weapons systems.” While not making any firm predictions, Horowitz suggested that major revisions to DODD 3000.09 were unlikely. In general, this is good news. The DOD’s existing policy recognizes that some categories of autonomous weapons, such as cyber weapons and missile defense systems, are already in widespread and broadly accepted use by dozens of militaries worldwide. It also allows for the possibility that future technological progress and changes in the global security landscape, such as Russia’s potential deployment of artificial intelligence (AI)-enabled lethal autonomous weapons in Ukraine, might make new types of autonomous weapons desirable. This requires proposals for such weapons to clear a high procedural and technical bar. In addition to demonstrating compliance with U.S. obligations under domestic and international law, DOD system safety standards, and DOD AI-ethics principles, proposed autonomous weapons systems must clear an additional senior review process where the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, under secretary of defense for policy; and the under secretary of defense for acquisition, technology, and logistics certify that the proposed system meets 11 additional requirements, each of which require presenting considerable evidence.

2022 Michigan Evidence
**Impact Updates** › Heg Good – AT: Offshore Balancing

Mearsheimer and Walt are wrong; offshore balancing undermines global stability

Hoffman 16 (Frank G. Hoffman, Board of Advisors at the Foreign Policy Institute and a Distinguished Research Fellow with the Institute for National Strategic Studies”, “Retreating Ashore: The Flaws of Offshore Balancing”, Foreign Policy Research Institute, July 5th 2016, , WC-NAS)

While Offshore Balancing claims some historical evidence and some relevant geostrategic advantages as the basis for an American strategy, there are a few distinct disadvantages from a pragmatic perspective.  By passing the buck, Mearsheimer and Walt want to have their cake (America’s core interests preserved) and eat it too (a smaller and less costly defense establishment). The authors note that the U.S. represents only 46% of the NATO Alliance’s aggregate GDP but that our defense spending “contributes” 75% of NATO’s military spending.  This is a canard however, as it compares the total US defense establishment as if all these resources were devoted to the defense of NATO countries.  Obviously, U.S. defense spending far exceeds the regional-oriented European states.  Just as obviously the $535B U.S. defense budget includes resources for homeland defense, military health care, a large American R&D establishment, numerous domestic military bases, and a sizable strategic deterrent. Some of our budget directly supports either our own homeland security or our interests in Asia.  But these resources are not directly related to NATO defense and thus the comparison is meaningless.  Untested by the pair is the presumption that by withdrawing our forces from Europe and Korea, there will be substantial savings.    

Some advocates of this approach would abandon many, if not all, of America’s treaties and security obligations.  Walt and Mearsheimer are vague on this in their Foreign Affairs article but many advocates explicitly reject NATO or our bilateral Pacific partners as obligations.  Dr. Mearsheimer has called for U.S.   in the past. No mention is made about other allies or partners, and presumably Israel is also left adrift to care for itself, until it is nearly overrun.

2022 Michigan Evidence
**Impact Updates** › Heg Good – AT: Offshore Balancing

Offshore balancing fails. It causes proxy conflict, intervention, and instability

McKeil 22 (Aaron McKeil, London School of Economics and Political Science, “The Limits of Realism after Liberal Hegemony”, Journal of Global Security Studies, 2022, , NAS)

The Limits of Realist Policy Alternatives Regardless of any analytical limitations of their critiques, however, the pragmatically more significant shortcoming of realist critiques is their struggle to offer more promising alternative paths to international order. Although realist critics identify important problems with liberal hegemony, what of the alternative international order strategies they offer? Are defenders of a US-led “liberal” international order project right that despite its flaws it is still nevertheless the best international order strategy among bad options, if modifications are made? While the critiques leveled by realists may identify important problems and make some damaging points, the alternative policy proposals they offer suffer from their own serious limitations, when scrutinized. From closer examination and consideration, that is, these limitations of alternative realist foreign policies questions their ability to contribute to international order in the twenty-first century and suggest, quite the opposite, that if pursued they would instead become new sources of international disorder, albeit while avoiding some of the problems associated with liberal internationalism. Realist critics have offered variations on balance of power foreign policy proposals, suggesting that the deployment and use of US forces should be restricted to only vital US interests, while abandoning ambitions of democratizing other states.Mearsheimer and Walt in particular make cases for “restraint” and “offshore balancing,” meaning a reservation of the use of force to the most serious threats to US power, coupled with a policy to prevent China’s assumption of regional hegemony in Asia (Mearsheimer and Walt 2016). Mearsheimer explains that when following a realist policy of restraint, there are only a limited number of regions where [the US] should be willing to risk a war. Those places include the great power’s own neighbourhood and distant areas that are either home to another great power or the site of a critically important resource. For the United States, three regions outside the Western Hemisphere are of vital strategic importance today: Europe and East Asia, because that is where the other great powers are located; and the Persian Gulf, because it is the main source of an exceptionally important resource, oil. (Mearsheimer 2018, 222)

Mearsheimer argues this more strategically “restrained” policy will better manage the balance of power, reduce the amount of wars by eliminating liberal interventionism, and improve great power diplomatic relations by easing liberal antagonism of non-democracies. Walt likewise strongly argues for realist foreign policy of “offshore balancing”, meaning a deployment of US forces only where necessary, while more heavily relying on allies and strategic partners to balance regional challengers and Russia and China. Walt provides a clear description of this policy and its logic, worth quoting at length, to fairly convey its contents: Under a strategy of offshore balancing, the proper role and size of the U.S. national security establishment depends on the distribution of power in the key regions. If there is no potential hegemon in sight in Europe, Northeast Asia, or the Gulf, there is little reason to deploy U.S. ground or air forces there and little need for a national security establishment that dwarfs those of the major powers. If a potential hegemon does appear, the United States should turn to local forces as the first line of defense. It should expect them to uphold the regional balance of power out of their own self-interest and to deal with local security challenges themselves. Washington might provide material assistance and pledge to support certain regional powers if they were in danger of being conquered, but it should refrain from deploying significant U.S. forces under most conditions… In essence, this strategy aims to keep U.S. forces “offshore” for as long as possible while recognizing that sometimes the United States will have to come onshore even before a conflict starts. If that happens, the United States should get its allies in the region to do as much of the heavy lifting as possible and go back offshore once the threat has been defeated. (Walt 2018, 262–63) The realist foreign policy alternative of “offshore balancing” aims to balance against potential hegemons in overseas regions, but with emphasis on using US allies to invest in that balancing. The benefits of this policy, Walt argues, are partly that it reduces costs by requiring allies to contribute more, but more importantly that it preserves US power by managing its de ployment and avoiding costly interventions with US forces. Compared to a policy of liberal hegemony that has been troubled by costly military interventions, these realist policy alternatives on a superficial reading appear sensible and even peace-loving, because they advocate restricting intervention to a much higher threshold condition of defending vital security interests. Yet, under scrutiny, these realist policy proposals suffer from two key limitations that ultimately question their ability to contribute to international order in the twenty-first century and suggest that if pursued they would instead become new sources of international disorder (McKeil 2021), even if they avoided the problems associated with liberal interventionism. Firstly, and most troubling, is the likelihood that realist policy alternatives would contribute to proxy wars between the great powers in strategic regions. That is, a realist policy of restraint and offshore balancing means less US-led interventionism, but an equal amount and plausibly more proxy wars, where the United States would seek to defend its strategic interests indirectly. In fairness to realist policies, they prudently cede key states neighboring Russia and China, such as Ukraine and Myanmar, thereby avoiding proxy wars in such strategically sensitive territories (Mearsheimer 2014). It is nevertheless concerning, however, that realist proposals for “restraint” and “offshore balancing” do not offer a genuine foreign policy alternative for crises such as Syria, where both the Obama and Trump administrations have already sought to avoid direct intervention, by waging protracted a proxy war with regional consequences and casualties in the hundreds of thousands. The costs and dramatically circumscribed successes of interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq, as well as Libya, have already made it an increasingly commonsense belief that direct interventions are infeasible, even misguided, but this has suggested to many that therefore more use of proxies is the only feasible policy option for certain crises. The literature on proxy wars suggests that states engage in proxy wars when their interests are perceived to be threatened, but direct intervention with their own forces is also perceived to be too high-risk or too costly (Groh 2019, 8). Proxy wars are “war on the cheap” and they have the advantage of reducing potential escalation to direct great power conflict and nuclear war at the highest and last stage of escalation. A policy of restraint as such follows the perception that use of US forces in small wars is too costly and too high-risk where great powers may come into direct conflict. Yet, by increasing this threshold for intervention, realist policy alternatives decrease the threshold at which the United States would use strategic partners to wage proxy wars against assumptive hegemons, or to suppress terrorist groups, or secure vital resources. Let me unpack these points further. A degree of skepticism is warranted about the extent to which realist policies of restraint and offshore balancing would be conducive to international order, and not a series of protracted proxy wars. As a recent study on proxy wars notes, “If the United States does less, it must rely on others to do more” (Berman and Lake 2019, 3). Inversely, however, if the United States does less, its proxies must also rely on the United States for more support, and when allies and partners engage in conflict for their own interests, for instance, they likely will call for support in terms of kit, including heavy arms, finance, training, and perhaps air support, even while US “boots on the ground” are denied. Where crises emerge and allies and strategic partners become unstable or engaged in a local or regional conflict, a realist-guided US foreign policy would be inclined to support US partners and allies as proxies for US forces. Because the use of US forces would have a higher threshold, but because realists also advise maintaining the material balance of power, a realist-guided US foreign policy would become more easily persuaded to engage in proxy wars. Furthermore, because it is a “cheap” way to balance, the United States could engage a wide number of proxy wars simultaneously, almost indefinitely. This strategic environment would also tempt the United States to trap Russian or Chinese forces in costly protracted wars against US proxies, along the model of Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, as a strategy to drain the power of China and Russia and limit their ability to engage in other conflicts. The potential for a wide number of proxy wars could potentially condemn the twenty-first century to the miseries and suffering of a series of protracted proxy wars waged with ever-more sophisticated weapons technology. Proxy wars are an immense source of international disorder because they tend to be protracted, devastating the countries in which they are waged. They are also generative of regional consequences including humanitarian and refugee crises, as well as new military groups operating across borders, whose long-term alignment with the United States is not always ensured. The Syrian civil war, for example, evolved into a proxy war with immense loss of life and consequences for regional stability (Hughes 2014). It involved embedding of US forces in proxy forces against Russian-supported government forces. At the same time, the diminishing presence of the United States in the region and inconsistent US support for key partners has been a critical contributor to the intensity, duration, and regional involvement in the Syrian conflict (Phillips 2020). Realists rightly suggest diplomacy is required to unwind the conflict in Syria, yet, where the United States withdraws its presence, as realist policies advise, proxy wars will tend to continue and emerge without diplomatic breakthroughs, which require years to develop, achieve, and implement. Realist thinkers foresee as an emerging “bounded order”, divided between China and the United States (Mearsheimer 2019). A bounded order pocketed by a series of proxy wars is not unimaginable and well within the realist vision of the emerging twenty-first century. The conditions of potential nuclear war and the global scope of the struggle made proxy warfare a common ingredient of the Cold War. A realist policy of US restraint and offshore balancing without sufficient additional measures to develop a stable international order likely would contribute to a series of proxy wars between the great powers seeking to support their partners and defend their vital interests through proxy forces in key regions. The fighting itself would invariably differ from that of the Cold War with state and nonstate proxies likely being mixed with use of remote weapons and cyber war, for instance (Innes 2012; Krieg and Rickli 2019). The ideological contest between the great powers will also instead likely become increasingly geo-cultural and geo-civilizational, not simply geostrategic or purely geopolitical (Coker 2019; Acharya 2020). But the conditions of security competition, high risks of direct conflict, lower costs of proxy warfare, and realist proposals for doctrines limiting the use of US forces with little other institutional measures for managing conflict likely would precipitate protracted proxy wars where conflicts emerge. Proxy wars, moreover, are an international activity with virtually no international rules beyond those applying to the conduct of war in general. This assessment of realist foreign policy proposals suggests that additional policy measures are required for developing a stable international order, to avoid proxy wars where possible and to contain and resolve them when they do emerge, in addition to further global challenges. Realists are not opposed to the use of diplomacy to avoid and manage conflict. To the contrary, they encourage it, but in encouraging the use of diplomacy it is crucial to recognize that diplomacy also requires the support of international institutions and established diplomatic networks. Diplomatic breakthroughs are difficult to achieve, requiring years of skillful and patient negotiations. Diplomacy, moreover, is an inconstant and limited tool without the support of broader international institutions that provide mechanisms of delay, ongoing networks of collaborative great power pressure on belligerent parties, and collaboratively developed processes and agreed terms of dispute resolution, negotiation, and mediation. Realist critics of liberal hegemony often suggest policy-fuzzy gestures toward diplomacy and accommodation. Porter for instance argues that the United States should abandon liberal hegemony in favor of détentestyle collaboration with illiberal powers in the making of global order (Porter 2020, 170–99). The key strategic proposal Porter advances is to attempt a settlement with Russia with significant mutual concessions, including sacrificing the interests of non-NATO countries on its eastern flank, in order to ease the growing sense of mutual threat. To facilitate negotiations, the USA should revive government-togovernment dialogue to reach a new bargain. (Porter 2020, 187) This is a strategy to ease pressure on Russia, in the hopes of encouraging tensions between Russia and China, which Porter proposes to combine with a reduction of forces in the Middle East, and a containment strategy against China in Asia, by cultivating regional strategic partners. This proposal in the abstract sounds promising and genuinely contains helpful strategic thought, but does not propose sufficient measures to produce a lasting and stable order, and crucially requires the willingness to collaborate from Russia, which Porter admits is not guaranteed to be forthcoming (Porter 2020, 188). There is surely more needed for the construction of a stable and lasting order between the United States and China than a containment balancing strategy, even if it were successful in dividing Russia from China. Where the first proxy war between the United States and China would emerge can only be speculated. China, like the United States, has the capacity to wage indirect warfare, incentives to avoid direct conflict, and experience from the Cold War. This as such poses a second limitation of realist policy alternatives; they are insufficiently ambitious in developing new and revised ordering of international institutions and take for granted the role of deeper primary institutions in producing international order (Mearsheimer 1994–1995).2 With limited confidence in the use of international institutions, realists struggle to provide a substantive and sufficient strategy for producing international order. Realists do acknowledge the importance of major institutions such as the United Nations or World Trade Organization for providing general 2 In this discussion, I define international institutions both narrowly as regulative organizations and broadly as bundles of constitutive and patterning rules and norms. “rules of the road” that clarify expectations among states (Mearsheimer 2018, 131; Walt 2018, 71). Yet, realists offer no suggestions for reforming these institutions for current challenges, nor do they see much promise in developing new institutions, and ultimately claim international institutions are ineffective because they have “no coercive leverage over states” in a context where states in anarchy find themselves in security competition precipitating conflict (Mearsheimer 2018, 131). As Mearsheimer states, “The nub of the dispute between liberals and realists regarding both institutions and economic interdependence has to do with whether they promote world peace. Liberals believe they ameliorate conflict; realists do not” (Mearsheimer 2018, 143). Walt provides a clear explanation of the realist lack of confidence in institutions where he states, As multilateral organizations such as NATO, the World Bank, or the World Trade Organization have shown repeatedly, international institutions can facilitate cooperation when states have clear and obvious incentives to work together, but they cannot stop powerful states from acting as they wish and thus cannot remove the danger of conflict and war. International institutions are simply a tool that states use to advance their interests, and they inevitably reflect the interests of the most powerful states. (Walt 2018, 71) Because institutions lack an ability to coerce great powers, realists claim, they have little to no impact on conflict between great powers that arises as a result of security competition. Because of this lack of realist confidence in institutions, Walt and leading economist Dani Rodrick have instead advanced a global order proposal for constructing a collection of select global “meta-norms” as conflict avoidance and resolution mechanisms at a global level (Rodrik and Walt 2021). This proposal is important and in the right direction, as a needed element of building shared global order, but it is also a thin set of meta-norms, highly modest and limited in their order-making capacities and ambitions. The proposal does not include integrative institutions to formalize and embed meta-norms, nor does it provide inclusive principles to legitimate those meta-norms beyond the imperative to avoid direct great power conflict. Walt and Rodrick, moreover, suggest that their international order proposal exists within an emerging “bounded order” marked by proxy wars, and concede their meta-norms do little to help mitigate or resolve proxy wars, focusing more on avoiding direct great power conflict (Rodrik and Walt 2021, 20).

2022 Michigan Evidence
**Impact Updates** › Heg Bad – Turns War

Hegemony inflames global terrorism – downsizing minimizes the risk

Mearsheimer and Walt 16 (John J, R. Wendell Harrison Distinguished Service Professor of Political Science at the University of Chicago, and Stephen M, Robert and Renée Belfer Professor of International Affairs at the Harvard Kennedy School, “The Case for Offshore Balancing: A Superior U.S. Grand Strategy,” Foreign Affairs, July/August, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2016-06-13/case-offshore-balancing)

Offshore balancing would also reduce the risk of terrorism. Liberal hegemony commits the United States to spreading democracy in unfamiliar places, which sometimes requires military occupation and always involves interfering with local political arrangements. Such efforts invariably foster nationalist resentment, and because the opponents are too weak to confront the United States directly, they sometimes turn to terrorism. (It is worth remembering that Osama bin Laden was motivated in good part by the presence of U.S. troops in his homeland of Saudi Arabia.) In addition to inspiring terrorists, liberal hegemony facilitates their operations: using regime change to spread American values undermines local institutions and creates ungoverned spaces where violent extremists can flourish. Offshore balancing would alleviate this problem by eschewing social engineering and minimizing the United States' military foot-print. U.S. troops would be stationed on foreign soil only when a country was in a vital region and threatened by a would-be hegemon. In that case, the potential victim would view the United States as a savior rather than an occupier. And once the threat had been dealt with, U.S. military forces could go back over the horizon and not stay behind to meddle in local politics. By respecting the sovereignty of other states, offshore balancing would be less likely to foster anti-American terrorism.

2022 Michigan Evidence
**Impact Updates** › Heg Bad – Turns War

Liberal hegemony fuels global prolif

Mearsheimer and Walt 16 (John J, R. Wendell Harrison Distinguished Service Professor of Political Science at the University of Chicago, and Stephen M, Robert and Renée Belfer Professor of International Affairs at the Harvard Kennedy School, “The Case for Offshore Balancing: A Superior U.S. Grand Strategy,” Foreign Affairs, July/August, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2016-06-13/case-offshore-balancing)

Proponents of liberal hegemony also claim that the United States must remain committed all over the world to prevent nuclear proliferation. If it reduces its role in key regions or withdraws entirely, the argument runs, countries accustomed to U.S. protection will have no choice but to protect themselves by obtaining nuclear weapons. No grand strategy is likely to prove wholly successful at preventing proliferation, but offshore balancing would do a better job than liberal hegemony. After all, that strategy failed to stop India and Pakistan from ramping up their nuclear capabilities, North Korea from becoming the newest member of the nuclear club, and Iran from making major progress with its nuclear program. Countries usually seek the bomb because they fear being attacked, and U.S. efforts at regime change only heighten such concerns. By eschewing regime change and reducing the United States' military footprint, offshore balancing would give potential proliferators less reason to go nuclear. Moreover, military action cannot prevent a determined country from eventually obtaining nuclear weapons; it can only buy time. The recent deal with Iran serves as a reminder that coordinated multilateral pressure and tough economic sanctions are a better way to discourage proliferation than preventive war or regime change.

2022 Michigan Evidence
**Impact Updates** › Heg Bad – Turns Democracy

Hegemony harms democracy globally.

Street, 18 — Paul; Holds a doctorate in U.S. history from Binghamton University. He is former vice president for research and planning of the Chicago Urban League. (3-1-2018; "The World Will Not Mourn the Decline of U.S. Hegemony;" Canadian Dimension; https://canadiandimension.com/articles/view/the-world-will-not-mourn-the-decline-of-u.s.-hegemony)

“Democracy” was fine as a slogan and benevolent, idealistic-sounding mission statement when it came to marketing this imperialist U.S. policy at home and abroad. Since most people in the “third” or “developing” world had no interest in neocolonial subordination to the rich nations and subscribed to what U.S. intelligence officials considered the heretical “idea that government has direct responsibility for the welfare of its people” (what U.S. planners called “communism”), Washington’s real-life commitment to popular governance abroad was strictly qualified, to say the least. “Democracy” was suitable to the U.S. as long as its outcomes comported with the interests of U.S. investors/corporations and related U.S. geopolitical objectives. It had to be abandoned, undermined and/or crushed when it threatened those investors/corporations and the broader imperatives of business rule to any significant degree. As President Richard Nixon’s coldblooded national security adviser Henry Kissinger explained in June 1970, three years before the U.S. sponsored a bloody fascist coup that overthrew Chile’s democratically elected socialist president, Salvador Allende: “I don’t see why we need to stand by and watch a country go Communist because of the irresponsibility of its own people.”

The U.S.-sponsored coup government that murdered Allende would kill tens of thousands of real and alleged leftists with Washington’s approval. The Yankee superpower sent some of its leading neoliberal economists and policy advisers to help the blood-soaked Pinochet regime turn Chile into a “free market” model and to help Chile write capitalist oligarchy into its national constitution.

2022 Michigan Evidence
**Impact Updates** › Heg – Bipolarity

Bipolarity inevitable, stable, and solves nuclear conflict

Kupchan 22 (Cliff Kupchan, “Bipolarity is Back: Why it Matters”, The Washington Quarterly, Volume 44, February 2nd 2022, , NAS)

Bipolarity is no longer returning—it is here, and it is here to stay for the foreseeable future. News today is dominated by US-China relations, indicating a recognition of today’s bipolar system, and China continues to close the gap in the economic realm. The effects of this bipolarity have substantially deepened as elites in both Washington and Beijing have become aware of the new global structure and are acting accordingly. Structure and beliefs are amplifying each other.

Because the world now has a bipolar distribution of capabilities, it will be more peaceful than expected by the consensus view. Bipolar structures deductively and empirically tend to be peaceful (stable); regarding great power war—it is unlikely to happen. That prognosis for the current period is strengthened because balancing or competition between China and the United States will occur in the economic arena to a far greater extent than in the more dangerous military realm. The term “Cold Peace” best captures the current system; it will be broadly peaceful but by no means warm. Nationalist views in both the United States and China present a potential risk to the stability forecast by bipolarity, primarily through the specter of military conflict over Taiwan. This risk, however, is much overhyped—predictability and nuclear deterrence will very likely deter an invasion and preserve the Cold Peace.

2022 Michigan Evidence
**Impact Updates** › Heg Bad – Offshore Balancing

Offshore Balancing works!

Walt 20 (Stephen Walt, columnist at Foreign Policy and the Robert and Renée Belfer professor of international relations at Harvard University, “The United States Forgot Its Strategy For Winning Cold Wars”, Foreign Policy, May 5th 2020, , WC-NAS)

If a potential hegemon does appear, the United States should rely on local forces in the threatened region as the first line of defense, calibrating its support for these local actors with the level of the challenge and their own capabilities. If these regional states cannot contain a potential hegemon on their own, then the United States must commit its own military power to the region to make sure the potential hegemon cannot overawe and dominate its neighbors while at the same time making sure that its local partners bear a fair share of the costs of containment.

During the Cold War, the essential features of containment followed this basic logic perfectly. U.S. leaders did not believe that the local powers in Europe or East Asia could stand up to the Soviet challenge on their own, which is why Washington deployed substantial U.S. forces to these critical regions in peacetime. Of course, it might have been preferable in the abstract for the United States to pass the buck to others, but the distribution of power in Europe and Asia at the time made buck-passing infeasible.

2022 Michigan Evidence
**Impact Updates** › Heg Bad – China Rise Now

Hegemony isn’t sustainable, China is rising now

McCoy 22 (Alfred McCoy, “Will the Fight for Hegemony Survive Climate Change?”, The Nation, February 25th 2022, , WC-NAS)

Consider us at the edge of the sort of epochal change not seen for centuries, even millennia. By the middle of this century, we will be living under such radically altered circumstances that the present decade, the 2020s, will undoubtedly seem like another era entirely, akin perhaps to the Middle Ages. And I’m not talking about the future development of flying cars, cryogenics, or even as-yet-unimaginable versions of space travel.

After leading the world for the past 75 years, the United States is ever so fitfully losing its grip on global hegemony. As Washington’s power begins to fade, the liberal international system it created by founding the United Nations in 1945 is facing potentially fatal challenges.

2022 Michigan Negative
Neg---AI Logistics---Starter Pack › AI Center CP › 2NC---Centralization Link Wall

Digitalization threatens mission command---CP solves

Paolo Spagnoletti & Andrea Salvi 21,. Associate Professor of Information Systems and Organization, Luiss Business School. Postdoctoral Research Fellow at the Department of Business and Management at LUISS. “NATO Decision-Making in the Age of Big Data and Artificial Intelligence” Editors: Sonia Lucarelli; Alessandro Marrone; and Francesco Niccolò Moro. Sonia Lucarelli is Professor of International Relations and European Security at the University of Bologna, and member of the Board of Directors of the Istituto Affari Internazionali (IAI). Alessandro Marrone is Head of the Defence Programme of IAI and teaches at the Istituto Superiore di Stato Maggiore Interforze (ISSMI) of the Italian Ministry of Defence. Francesco N. Moro is Associate Professor of Political Science at the University of Bologna and Adjunct Professor of International Relations at the Johns Hopkins University Europe Campus. This publication is the result of the Conference “NATO Decision-making: promises and perils of the Big Data age”, organized by NATO Allied Command Transformation (ACT), the University of Bologna and Istituto Affari Internazionali (IAI) of Rome. //pipk

As recounted in the previous section, the debacle in the Vietnam War posited the need for a change, and Mission Command slowly gained prevalence. Nonetheless, digitalization posits several challenges to this doctrine. Remote-controlled technologies as well as automatic arms systems and real-time data intelligence have been seeing a widespread application in military organizations. These devices and techniques provide higher ranks with a virtually unlimited control over their subordinates. Being able to see, hear and evaluate what a platoon experiences, commanders may have an incentive to give tactical directions transcending the original intent-setter role. The archetypal scenario would be that of a circle of officers sitting in a controlroom, overseeing and leading a unit on the other side of the globe. As an anecdotal example, in 2011, during Operation Neptune Spear that led to the killing of Osama bin Laden, the President of the United States was able to receive live updates from the battlefield in the White House Situation Room. The risk – or the promise – is that of a renaissance of micromanagement (Storr, 2003). This approach has brought some authors to announce the re-emergence of a C2 doctrine typical of technology-intensive armies (Connor, 2002). This is further reinforced by the widespread use of semi-automated firepower: drones and tele-guided artillery strikes have become a frequent complement to the activity of soldiers. Despite their effectiveness, these tools are managed from the center of the command structure and risk to eliminate the discretion of soldiers on the ground to decide when and where to use them based on sheer necessity. As mentioned in the introduction, technological advancements provide high officers with more intimacy, with the battlefield tempting them to “impose their preferences on tactical units” (Augier et al., 2014: 1430).

This is inherently a risk for the Mission Command model. The centripetal effect of this technologies may hamper initiative and frustrate flexibility. As Augier et al. (2014) argue, changes brought by the implementation of technological systems may have consequences on an organization’s ability to learn and adapt. In turn, subordinates will have an incentive towards de-responsibilization (Bateman, 1996).

2022 Michigan Negative
Neg---AI Logistics---Starter Pack › AI Center CP › 2NC---Centralization Link Wall

Situational awareness is key to Mission Command effectiveness---solves successful execution of broader strategy

Paolo Spagnoletti & Andrea Salvi 21,. Associate Professor of Information Systems and Organization, Luiss Business School. Postdoctoral Research Fellow at the Department of Business and Management at LUISS. “NATO Decision-Making in the Age of Big Data and Artificial Intelligence” Editors: Sonia Lucarelli; Alessandro Marrone; and Francesco Niccolò Moro. Sonia Lucarelli is Professor of International Relations and European Security at the University of Bologna, and member of the Board of Directors of the Istituto Affari Internazionali (IAI). Alessandro Marrone is Head of the Defence Programme of IAI and teaches at the Istituto Superiore di Stato Maggiore Interforze (ISSMI) of the Italian Ministry of Defence. Francesco N. Moro is Associate Professor of Political Science at the University of Bologna and Adjunct Professor of International Relations at the Johns Hopkins University Europe Campus. This publication is the result of the Conference “NATO Decision-making: promises and perils of the Big Data age”, organized by NATO Allied Command Transformation (ACT), the University of Bologna and Istituto Affari Internazionali (IAI) of Rome. //pipk

Yet, the application of Mission Command requires a shared understanding of the ‘why’ behind any given operation. Once the strategic objectives – or the ‘commanders’ intent’ – is known, diffused leadership is used to circumvent environmental constraints, seize the momentum and obtain a favorable outcome. This course of action is grounded on high levels of trust. More specifically, subordinates – at all levels – need to be aware of the strategic goals set by the commanding officers and – most importantly – they need to embrace and share their rationale. Secondly, horizontal balance is required: the operating units need to trust each other. Thirdly, lower officers need to fully embrace the logic of mission command and take initiative to accomplish the objectives. How to achieve such unity then? As Yardley, Kakabadse and Neal (2012: 74) note, “the glue that holds mission command together is the culture and values of the organization”. The latter is the catalyst for trust that is fully realized through Mission Command.

Another crucial element of Mission Command is situational awareness. Delegating tactical decision to subordinates requires them to responsibly take ownership of actions and choices on the field to execute the mission and maximize the outcome in accordance to the superiors’ intent. Similarly to what recent works on coordination of first-responders suggest (Wolbers et al., 2018), specialists need to act with relative independence to achieve broader cooperation. Specific knowledge is thus a key factor to allow them to take informed decisions. The work of Bungay (2005) and Yardley and Kakabadse (2007) in particular, illustrate the decay curve of a plan’s effectiveness over time, illustrating the concept presented.

2022 Michigan Negative
Neg---AI Logistics---Starter Pack › AI Center CP › 2NC---Solvency

CP solves centralization---identifying early failures is key, which means perm can’t solve

Sonia Lucarelli et al 21. “NATO Decision-Making in the Age of Big Data and Artificial Intelligence” Editors: Sonia Lucarelli; Alessandro Marrone; and Francesco Niccolò Moro. Sonia Lucarelli is Professor of International Relations and European Security at the University of Bologna, and member of the Board of Directors of the Istituto Affari Internazionali (IAI). Alessandro Marrone is Head of the Defence Programme of IAI and teaches at the Istituto Superiore di Stato Maggiore Interforze (ISSMI) of the Italian Ministry of Defence. Francesco N. Moro is Associate Professor of Political Science at the University of Bologna and Adjunct Professor of International Relations at the Johns Hopkins University Europe Campus. This publication is the result of the Conference “NATO Decision-making: promises and perils of the Big Data age”, organized by NATO Allied Command Transformation (ACT), the University of Bologna and Istituto Affari Internazionali (IAI) of Rome. //pipk

Digital revolution has substantially transformed the world we live in, providing great opportunities but also making societies more vulnerable. Technology makes external interferences cheaper, faster and allencompassing: citizens can potentially become direct targets of information warfare, all members of a society can be part of conflicts one way or another. From advanced weaponry to command and control, most security-related domains are undergoing deep transformations as data availability and transmission increase exponentially. In this context, three interconnected aspects are explore through this publication with a view to the Alliance’s evolution: Big Data and organizational challenges for NATO; hybrid threats to Allies’ decisionmaking; the adoption of AI in the defense domain and NATO’s role.

Big Data and Organizational Challenges for NATO. Basing decisions on a much larger amount of information than was previously possible could lead to a real revolution in the decision-making processes of complex organizations, especially because this information would concern different dimensions of reality and it would be constantly updated. Beside the huge quantity of information available, the high speed at which the data are generated and need to be processed is another defining factor of Big Data. Also, they will typically be acquired from diverse sources and their trustworthiness has to be carefully evaluated. Finally, any data can have different value in different phases of the decision-making process. All these features impose specific requirements on organizations that aim at using Big Data to reduce the uncertainty in which they operate. For instance, the huge volume of data compels to acquire new data storage technologies, while the high speed demands new processing tools and the variable trustworthiness and value force organizations to elaborate new methods of analysis. Accordingly, any actor that seeks to exploit Big Data should have clear goals and a well-defined strategy to delineate and implement its specific objectives.

2022 Michigan Negative
Neg---AI Logistics---Starter Pack › AI Center CP › 1NC---OFF

Centralization turns the case---now is the key time to shape digital policy to protect Mission Control doctrine

Paolo Spagnoletti & Andrea Salvi 21,. Associate Professor of Information Systems and Organization, Luiss Business School. Postdoctoral Research Fellow at the Department of Business and Management at LUISS. “NATO Decision-Making in the Age of Big Data and Artificial Intelligence” Editors: Sonia Lucarelli; Alessandro Marrone; and Francesco Niccolò Moro. Sonia Lucarelli is Professor of International Relations and European Security at the University of Bologna, and member of the Board of Directors of the Istituto Affari Internazionali (IAI). Alessandro Marrone is Head of the Defence Programme of IAI and teaches at the Istituto Superiore di Stato Maggiore Interforze (ISSMI) of the Italian Ministry of Defence. Francesco N. Moro is Associate Professor of Political Science at the University of Bologna and Adjunct Professor of International Relations at the Johns Hopkins University Europe Campus. This publication is the result of the Conference “NATO Decision-making: promises and perils of the Big Data age”, organized by NATO Allied Command Transformation (ACT), the University of Bologna and Istituto Affari Internazionali (IAI) of Rome. //pipk

This chapter looks at Mission Command as a manifestation of collective mindfulness for HROs. Mission Command (Auftragstaktik) is a doctrine born to address these environmental constraints through diffused leadership to attain strategic objectives set by the higher ranks. In other words, in a Mission Command framework, the goal is identified and indicated at the top of the command chain – how to reach said goal is delegated to lower ranks and to specialists. Decisions in this context are a by-product of a thorough situational analysis that encompasses evidence from the battlefield, condensed in tactical decisions and abiding the strategic address laid out by high-rank decision makers. Such a course of action requires high levels of cooperation and trust at multiple levels. In first place, lower units – at all levels – need to be aware of the strategic goals set by the commanding officers and – most importantly – they need to embrace and share their rationale. Secondly, horizontal coordination is required: the operating units need to trust each other. Thirdly, lower officers need to fully embrace the logic of mission command and take initiative to accomplish the mission.

Such doctrine is in stark contrast with the so-called “managerial approach” adamantly adopted and renown among the ranks of the US Army almost until the Vietnam War (Shamir, 2010). The latter was heavily reliant on traditional “business oriented techniques”: decisions were taken from above, making use of large volumes of data. As Shamir (2010: 649) puts it: “the managerial approach is characterized by centralization, standardization, detailed planning quantitative analysis and aspires for maximum efficiency and certainty”. In other words, the command chain promoted and enforced a purely vertical doctrine of command, rewarding compliance with meticulously detailed orders and discouraging deviance from the established pathway.

2022 Michigan Negative
Neg---AI Logistics---Starter Pack › AI Center CP › 1NC---OFF

Creating new evaluation procedures to measure AI innovations prevents centralization of decision-making

Stefano Costalli 21, Associate Professor of Political Science in the Department of Political and Social Sciences, University of Florence, Italy and Research Fellow of the Michael Nicholson Centre for Conflict and Cooperation, University of Essex. “NATO Decision-Making in the Age of Big Data and Artificial Intelligence” Editors: Sonia Lucarelli; Alessandro Marrone; and Francesco Niccolò Moro. Sonia Lucarelli is Professor of International Relations and European Security at the University of Bologna, and member of the Board of Directors of the Istituto Affari Internazionali (IAI). Alessandro Marrone is Head of the Defence Programme of IAI and teaches at the Istituto Superiore di Stato Maggiore Interforze (ISSMI) of the Italian Ministry of Defence. Francesco N. Moro is Associate Professor of Political Science at the University of Bologna and Adjunct Professor of International Relations at the Johns Hopkins University Europe Campus. This publication is the result of the Conference “NATO Decision-making: promises and perils of the Big Data age”, organized by NATO Allied Command Transformation (ACT), the University of Bologna and Istituto Affari Internazionali (IAI) of Rome. //pipk

First of all, the WG defined the main features of Big Data, which set the terms to evaluate any possible organizational innovation and decision-making method. The first and most apparent characteristic of Big Data is the huge quantity of information available. The high-speed at which the data are generated and need to be processed is another defining factor that needs to be taken into account, in addition to the fact that data will typically be acquired from diverse sources and will have different formats. Moreover, the trustworthiness of the data has to be carefully evaluated, and finally any data can have different value in different phases of the decision-making process. All these features impose specific requirements on organizations that aim at using Big Data to reduce the uncertainty in which they operate. For instance, the huge volume of data compels organizations to acquire new data storage capabilities, while the high-speed demands new processing tools and the variable trustworthiness and value compel organizations to elaborate new methods of analysis. Most importantly, all these innovations must be implemented together, because otherwise the Big Data could not be fruitfully exploited and, on the contrary, could create new problems to the organizations, exposing them to dangerous short circuits.

Considering the available literature and exchanging views among the members of the WG, a general consensus emerged according to which any organization that seeks to exploit Big Data should have clear goals and a well-defined strategy to delineate and implement their specific objectives concerning these tools. This is essential to have a clear understanding of the domains and levels where the organization could profit most from the use of Big Data, which types of data are needed, and what investments will have to be made in order to achieve the organization’s goals. Founding the organization’s decision-making process on the use of Big Data will require important investments, and these have to be guided by a clear strategy. According to the emerging evidence, organizations that invest in Big Data analysis without a clear appraisal of the type of data needed and without carefully defined strategies, are bound to failure, wasting precious resources and possibly ending up in suboptimal situations.

2022 Michigan Negative
Neg---AI Logistics---Starter Pack › AI Center CP › 1NC---OFF

The counterplan solves the aff and is competitive---creating an AI center results in effective evaluation procedures and overcomes resistance but ownership is key

Andrea Gilli et al 20, Senior Researcher at the NATO Defense College where he works on issues related to technological change and military innovation. He has been visiting and postdoctoral fellow at Johns Hopkins University and Columbia University as well as Stanford University (where he remains an Affiliate) and Harvard University. Mauro Gilli is a Senior Researcher in Military Technology and International Security at the Center for Security Studies (CSS) at the Swiss Federal Institute of Technology, ETHZurich. Before joining CSS, he was a post-doctoral fellow at the Dickey Center, Dartmouth College. Ann-Sophie Leonard is a former Mercator Fellow on International Affairs, focusing on the intersection of international security and technology. She was a Visiting Fellow at the Research Division of the NATO Defense College in Rome from September to December 2019. Zoe Stanley-Lockman is an Associate Research Fellow in the Military Transformations Programme at the Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies in Singapore. “NATO-Mation”: Strategies for Leading in the Age of Artificial Intelligence. NDC Research Paper No.15 – December 2020 //pipk

While innovation is often treated and discussed as an outcome, it is in fact also a process whereby champions – whether individuals or organizations – promote and implement changes leading to performance, mission or operational improvement.116 Within NATO, many stakeholders have an inherent interest in AI and in promoting the AI agenda. However, there is no clear “champion” whose goal is to steer the Alliance’s approach to adopting the technology, promoting the necessary reform, and devising the best practices for its employment. For this reason, the process of “NATO-mation” could benefit significantly from a centre specifically intended to serve this goal – tentatively referred to here as an Artificial Intelligence, Integration and Implementation-Enabling Centre (A3IC). Such a centre could lead adoption of AI for the Alliance, support Allies in their own adoption strategies, and connect the relevant offices and institutions at both the national and NATO levels. With a focus on training and interoperability, an AI champion for NATO could ensure that the Alliance treats innovation as an ongoing process and disseminates successful outcomes.

The innovation process often requires a person or an organization mentoring, supervising, advocating and protecting innovations and innovators. Having an innovation champion is important to promote those micro-changes that often permit the successful adoption of an innovation: this is achieved by aligning the interests of all the individuals involved with the overall goal, so that resistance, opposition and sometimes even boycotting are minimized and addressed.117 While the buzzword “innovation” is generally perceived favourably, resistance often emerges because of cultural barriers such as opposition to change, sociological factors such as group identity and concern for loss of status, organizational dynamics such as career advancement being hindered by a new technology, as well as for cognitive and psychological reasons.118 The old adage goes: the thing people really hate, more than the way things are, is change.