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2022 Michigan Kritik
Settler Colonialism K––K Lab › Links––General › L––Fiat

The Plan’s Mandated “consent” via fiat undermines Native Consent – which undermines Native Sovereignty recreates a cycle of horror that every Native is sentenced to experience.

Simpson 08 (10/27/2008 7:57:45 AM. Audra Simpson - Assistant Professor of Anthropology, Columbia University. Many of the sources cited in this article were obtained by the author from personal interviews with Mohawks from Kahnawake. LAW & CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS was thus unable to independently verify this authority. Unless otherwise noted, these sources are on file with the author. “Subjects of Sovereignty: indigeneity, the Revenue Rule, and Juridic of Failed Consent” pgs. 197-202) //Don Markos

CHALLENGES TO SOVEREIGNTY: LOST REVENUES AND HISTORIES OF FAILED CONSENT A. The Problem of Lost Revenues In both Troubled Waters and The Dark Side of Native Sovereignty, “the problem” was revenue lost to Canada. Canada raised the tax on cigarettes to combat teen smoking in 1989 and then in 199130 and saw a rapid increase in smuggling. By 1994, Canada estimated that it had lost $2 billion (Canadian dollars) in revenue31 and consequently lowered the tax to combat smuggling. The public problem of cigarettes then morphed from a corporeal concern with the young citizen’s body to a public concern over the nation’s economy: “smugglers” were harming not only the former, but also the latter—the nation’s pocketbook. In R.J. Reynolds, one nation-state (Canada) acted as a person and filed a civil-action suit against an amalgamation of business interests within another nation-state. The suit was filed in the defendants’ own territory, within their own legal system, in order to sue for damages under RICO for injuries incurred in Canada. Canada argued that an amalgamation of U.S. and Canadian cigarette traders willfully circumvented Canadian taxation by smuggling contraband tobacco and cigarettes—via the Iroquois from reservation communities in the Northeast—from Canada, across the international boundary line for repackaging, and back into Canada, in order to evade Canadian taxation. In conspiring in these ways and in circumventing Canadian taxation, Canada argued, the tobacco company R.J. Reynolds and others “injured” Canadian property and caused additional damages and costs due to the necessity of investigation and legal proceedings. In ruling against Canada by upholding the revenue rule—which states that one country would not act as an enforcer of the other’s laws—the Second Circuit recognized the sovereign status of foreign nations. R.J. Reynolds offers an occasion for insight into the legal process of how “empire” is negotiated, where legal and political territories are acquired and new boundaries and political subjects are decided through the space of courts. In doing so, the terms—and the process—of political recognition are laid bare for analysis. This is a case in empire-building because its complicated legal reasoning both responds to and effaces, again, indigenous people’s claims of their “aboriginal” right to trade, upholds and reinforces the singular forms of sovereignty (even where distributions in capital deterritorialize sovereignty à la Hardt and Negri32), and disables the very possibility of indigenous participation in a contemporary trade network. In R.J. Reynolds, the possibility of a third legal system at work was not admitted into the analysis, thus solidifying settler sovereignty as normal, natural, and ultimately just. B. Histories of Failed Consent In contrast, Mohawks interviewed in the films spoke of an alternative mapping of territory. Consider this conversation on transport, place, and the law: Victor Malarek: “So these boxes move out every night and they’re headed for the Canadian side, but look what it says here—‘Not for sale in Canada.’ Where are they sold?” Loran Thompson: “Canuga Hogga territory, indigenous to the people of this country—the Americas.” Victor Malarek: “But they end up in Canada.” Loran Thompson: “Maybe to you they do, maybe to people like you they do, but to people like me, nationalists of my country and my government, that word Canada to me is Ganada—a village.” Victor Malarek: “When you see this, ‘Not for sale in Canada,’ . . . you’re not breaking the law?” Loran Thompson: “No.”33 Thompson’s arguments speak from Haudenosaunee legal and experiential history, a history that is punctuated by such exchanges and differential understandings of place and territory. Consider the history embedded in these remarks: You are a cunning People without Sincerity, and not to be trusted, for after making Professions of your Regard, and saying every thing favorable to us, you . . . tell us that our Country is within the lines of the States. This surprises us, for we had thought our Lands were our own, not within your Boundaries.34 The white Man put that there, not us, I don’t know why we have to put up with this bullshit. 35 More than two hundred years separate these utterances, yet not much seems to have changed in the Iroquois perspective concerning the border. The central point of each lament, although inflected differently, remains the same: the perception of territory that underpins Iroquois people’s right to cross the border dividing the United States from Canada is radically different from that of either nation. These border utterances speak from the perception of the Northeast as a territory that belongs to the Iroquois, and as a place that was divided and is administered without their consent. These narratives speak as well to the political relationships that underpin this territory, and to the difficulty that Iroquois people have had and still have in moving through the landscape of the Northeast in a manner that is consistent with their self-perception—and rights—as indigenous nationals of that territory. Why is there such a radical difference between their self-perception and the ways in which Iroquois border-crossings are administered? Why is there such incommensurability between Iroquois’ perceptions of the treaty relationship and those of the regimes that now interpret it? What accounts, then, for the dissonance between Iroquois self-perception and state-perception? There are several factors at work in these disjunctions. The most significant are the different understandings of the proper relations that Iroquois and settlers have brought to their interactions through the past two hundred years. These different interpretations are brought to the fore in Mary Druke Becker’s important article on Iroquois sovereignty through time.36 Iroquois chiefs deployed the language of treaty—with concomitant notions of “father” when regarding the British—but did so insofar as these terms furthered their notion of the relation between the two as one of equals. Beginning in the late 1670[]s, the English and French began seeking territorial domination over larger and larger areas of land vis-[à]-vis one another. Each nation argued with the other that the Iroquois had agreed to become their children or subjects. The Iroquois had agreed to use the Iroquoain term for “father” when addressing Euro-Americans. This term was used because within the matrilineal Iroquois society a father was an indulgent, not an authoritarian, figure. The term was commonly used among Iroquois nations and by other Iroquois with whom they were in alliance. It implied a reciprocal relation in which care and aid were provided. It was not one which implied subordination.37 These understandings of the Iroquois and by the Iroquois are common to the different positioning and perception of Indians generally through time, and to settler-state formation and asymmetries of power that allow one perception of difference to become institutionalized through law, policy, and other forms of state practice. Indian tribes were first perceived as nations (hence the model of international treaty-making which marks the earliest period of their interaction with the Dutch, French, and English regimes) and were then perceived to be dependant wards who required protection from white unscrupulousness on the frontier.38 Iroquois, in particular, have resisted their interpretive demotion in political affairs; yet, with the rise of the “welfare state,” many perceive Indians on the Canadian side of the border as clients (among many others) who need to be administered and managed. With this transformation of legal perception in mind, what then is the basis in law for Iroquois self-perception, sense of jurisdiction, and movement across the border? It is largely the nation-to-nation, or “linking arms,”39 metaphor of equality among people, reflective of the treaty relationship, that serves as an interpretive frame for Iroquois engagements with other nations, be they indigenous or nonindigenous.40 This is a notion anchored historically in arguments and deployments of the Two Row Wampum Treaty between the Iroquois and the Dutch,41 manifest in reminders and interactions that have been issued in serial engagements in the national and international arenas over the or repassing with their own proper Goods and Effects of whatever nature, pay for the same any Impost or Duty whatever.46 This explicit right to pass, then, implicitly leaves the legal regimes of Canada and the United States with the power to define who those Indian nations are and how that right to pass shall be rendered and respected. As well, and very critically, the regimes of the United States and Canada were bequeathed the power to choose whom they would recognize as members of these communities. It is prudent now to map out how these longstanding forms of recognition then speak to local forms of recognition, and more critically, how they speak to indigenous notions of citizenship-formation and territory. Connecting these discourses illuminates how legal interests and designations not only affect the possibility of movement, but how these interests also work to define, through identification practices, their own territory and boundaries.47 Such connections may illuminate as well how these identifications and legal and interpretive acts are reformulated in practice and how they are not only “resisted,” but circumvented, denied, or ignored.

2022 Michigan Kritik
Settler Colonialism K––K Lab › Links––General › L––Security Commitments

The 1ac’s invocation of article 5 is representative of the isopolitical relation that normative IR functions under which guarantees a world centered around America as the epicenter

Veracini 11 (Lorenzo Veracini s a historian and professor at Swinburne University of Technology’s Institute for Social Research. He is the editor in chief of Settler Colonial Studies and has been a key figure in the development of the field of settler colonialism. (2011) ISOPOLITICS, DEEP COLONIZING, SETTLER COLONIALISM, Interventions: International Journal of Postcolonial Studies, 13:2, 171-189, DOI: 10.1080/1369801X.2011.573215, ) // JLHS AA

Isopolitical interstate associations are especially relevant to settler colonial phenomena. An isopolitical connection enables the seamless transfer of people and their rights between separate polities. In this context, subjects of one polity immediately acquire property rights and enjoy unrestricted political status as they move across jurisdictions. If settlers can be defined as founders of political orders (unlike migrants, who are appellants facing a political order that is already constituted), people who travel with an inherent capacity to possess real estate and father children endowed with political rights, colonizing metropole and settler locale are united in an isopolitical relation. Settlers are indeed subjects who, unlike migrants or other colonized people, can immediately exercise commercium and connubium, both necessary elements of all isopolitical arrangements (of course, not all settlers depart and arrive autonomously, or are immediately endowed with political rights; they can, however, be selectively co-opted at a later stage). Moreover, isopolities, one specific type of ‘interstate kinship’ (Elwyn 1993), and settler colonies are especially related: settler colonialism is inherently about the reproduction of ‘daughter’ colonies. The classical world envisaged a variety of possible relationships between separate political entities, including, for example, isopolity, sympolitical arrangements (when a common federal citizenship is instituted beside the local one), and symmachy (when a warring league is established, with a polity automatically engaging in war as an ally of another). Not all the isopolities of the classical world were colonies, but all colonies were isopolitical (for a discussion of isopolitical relations in the classical world, see Hammond 1951). We should recover this variety and utilize it as a conceptual toolbox in an attempt to escape the constraints of national teleologies and the nation-state. Moreover, even if these categories may look exotic and anachronistic, we should keep in mind that the colonizations practised by the Greeks and the Romans informed in fundamental ways the colonial imaginaries of the European expansion. The intensity of colonialism’s imaginative engagement with the ancients should not be underestimated. The question of how British settler nationalisms and metropolitan imperialisms have co-defined each other while operating concomitantly and in reciprocal tension in a variety of settings is the subject of an extensive scholarly literature, and an issue that is periodically approached (and yet rarely resolved).1 The settler nationalisms of the British Empire (and their respective sub-imperialisms) remain intractably ambivalent: their claims are routinely premised on their arising simultaneously from the settler locale and in relation to the originating metropole (see Berger 1970; Schreuder and Ward 2008). Reflecting on the long-term evolution of the relationship between Australian nationalism and Britishness, and convincingly reversing received nationalist and nationalizing assumptions, Neville Meaney concluded that ‘the history of nationalism in Australia was not one of thwarted Australianness but rather of thwarted Britishness’ (2001: 89). ‘Australians had two views of Britain and the Empire’, he noted; ‘while they overlapped’, they remained distinct. accommodate double allegiances, an isopolitical union allows one to be faithful to a relationship; one does not have to choose. At the same time, isopolitical ties also allow for the local settler claim and the metropolitan one potentially to enjoy equal status; as such, settler colonial formations fundamentally challenge the hierarchical relationship between core and periphery that is inherent in colonial and imperial relations. The distinction between ‘settlers’ and ‘colonists’ as distinct terms and their usage mirrors this shift. ‘Colonist’, ‘colonial’ and ‘creole’ identify people in the context of a hierarchical understanding of the relationship between metropole and settler locale; ‘settler’, on the contrary, expresses a marked degree of political autonomy. Settlers imagine a non-subordinate relationship between settler locale and metropole they operate isopolitically.4 (On the other hand, there is another fundamental distinction that separates ‘colonists’ and ‘settlers’: a ‘colonist’ is someone who may or may not be animated by animus returnandi his intention to stay in the settler locale remains unclear until the question of whether he is a bona fide settler a determination that only a settler society would demand forces the issue. A colonist could indeed be someone bent on accumulating money and returning home, someone who is not fully committed to the local settler project.) In this context, Edward Gibbon Wakefield, for example, espoused a ‘colonial’ conception. In ‘A View on the Art of Colonization’ he noted: speaking generally, colonies and colonists are in fact, as well as in the estimation of the British gentry, inferior, low, unworthy of much respect, properly disliked and despised by people of honour here, who happen to be acquainted with the state of society in the colonies. (Wakefield 1968: 837) Wakefield thus envisaged a hierarchically integrated system with the colonizing metropole on top, and the settler colonial locales as its subordinate elements (however, he was convinced that the settler locales could be made to look very much like the metropole and that this could be done immediately in this sense he proposed that their relationship with the colonizing core be only marginally subordinate). Of course, ‘colonist’ and ‘settler’ as distinct even if often partially overlapping categories interacted in a very dynamic context, and their usage and respective meanings underwent important shifts. As James Belich has recently and persuasively documented, ‘settler’ became progressively more important (on ‘settlerism’, the ideology of the ‘settler revolution’, see Belich (2009: 15365); on shifting patterns of perception, see Grant (2005)). The debates that propelled and accompanied the ‘settler revolution’ during the second half of the nineteenth century comprehensively reinterpreted the relationship between core and periphery. In this context, the settler locale 4 Greene (2002) also emphasizes this distinction: ‘my use of the term settlers is deliberate’, he notes, ‘it has long been employed in the historical analysis of other nations that arose out of the British Empire (Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and South Africa), because it avoids the dependency implications associated with the word colonists (metropolitans always considered colonists to be a category of others)’ (251). On the contradiction between Jeffersonian settlerism and the Hamiltonian ‘creole complex’, see Goudie (2009was redefined as a site for possible political regeneration. J. S. Mill, for example, thought that the colonies he meant the settler colonies could be sites for unprecedented experimentation (see Bell 2010). Belich is right in using a terminology that emphasizes rupture and discontinuity. This was a revolutionary reconceptualization: whereas according to a colonial paradigm the settler locale is appropriate only as far as it resembles the metropole, according to the settler colonial one the settler locale is appropriate primarily because it is dissimilar to it. A colonial relationship was thus reconfigured into a settler colonial one and the imagination became isopolitical. The global settler ‘revolution’, in fact, entailed a global isopolitical turn. And yet, this revolution was grounded in another. The American one had terminated a sympolitical project and defeated a centralizing metropolitan effort to ensure sustained metropolitan ascendancy over its dependencies. Thus, as well as breaking up the first British Empire, the American Revolution could also be seen as actually reconstituting a new one in an alternative form. Not for nothing has Eliga H. Gould defined the second British Empire as a non-unitary collection of polities, ‘a consortium of realms and provinces’. He linked this diversity with the outcome of the Revolution: parliament, he noted, never again attempted to tax in a direct manner the settlers of the empire (Gould 1999: 482). The independence of the North American colonies thus led to a consolidation of (settler) isopolitical forms within the British Empire; that isopolitical ties could grow and consolidate both inside and outside the United States should be emphasized (Belich 2005). The American Revolution could then be seen as an earlier isopolitical moment in a consolidating and expanding settler colonial world. The isopolitical entity that nineteenth-century debates over emigration and ‘systematic’ colonization dealt with is generally referred to as ‘Greater Britain’ (even if, as mentioned, isopolitical imaginings involved the expanding United States as well; see, for example, Kramer 2002; Bell 2007; Belich 2009, esp. 465501). Isopolitics are relevant to these debates. Influential historian J. R. Seeley, for example, was explicitly in favour of isopolitical relationships: in his opinion, the British Empire should do ‘what the United States does so easily, that is hold together in a federal union countries very remote from each other’ (quoted in Gould 1999: 487, n. 50). Froude would argue in very similar terms (see Bell 2009). Seeley’s Expansion of England actually had an educational purpose; it aimed to describe an ‘ethnological unity’ comprising the colonies of settlement, the Caribbean, but not India because it had been ‘conquered’ (Seeley 1931). It was Seeley that popularized ‘Greater Britain’, but the term had originally been invented by Charles Dilke (2005). Seeley was based in Cambridge; E. A. Freeman (a bit later) lectured at Oxford; this was in fact a coherent if not coordinated effort aimed at rethinking the very nature of empire. Freeman toured the United States in 18812, and referred to ‘brethren in a higher brotherhood, born of one ancient stock, speaking one ancient tongue, sharers under different forms in one ancient freedom’ (quoted in Armitage 1999: 437). Sharing ‘under different forms in one ancient freedom’ is a key trait of this type of discourse, a formulation that ultimately amounts to a description of isopolitical ties, where specific entitlements are transferred to different settings and flexibly accommodate changing political circumstances. Albert Venn Dicey, one of the founders of the London School of Economics, eventually explicitly called in 1897 for the establishment of an ‘isopolity’ of the English race (he interpreted it as ‘common citizenship’ ‘isopolity’ was probably only explicitly mentioned at the end of decades of sustained debate because in many ways it had previously gone without saying). Uniting Britain and its settler dominions and the United States, this entity was to be a response to global geopolitical shifts. While Dicey specifically argued that an isopolity should be merely formalized in order to mirror already existing conditions, he was clearly imagining a community of white men: he excluded indigenous peoples from the working of its proposed isopolity, and suggested that an isopolitical move could be effectively used against the migration to the United States of a variety of undesirables (Dicey 1897: 4634, 466). While this framing is a reminder that settler colonial formations are equally exclusive of indigenous and exogenous alterities, his proposal did not ultimately meet with political support. Nation-states were on the rise, but what is remarkable in this context is that in proposing a union between Greater Britain and the United States Dicey was actually taking for granted the sustained isopolitical union of Britain and its settler colonies. Even if the national paradigm was eventually asserted, the long-lasting resilience of isopolitical sensibilities as they applied transnationally to Greater Britain (and the United States) should be emphasized (see, for examples, Gorman 2002; Lake 2003; Lake and Reynolds 2008). Winston Churchill eventually wrote an isopolitical History of the English-Speaking Peoples (see Armitage 1999: 429). The empire proper was then dissolving in the context of a model of decolonization that focused on Westphalian sovereign independence for former colonial possessions; the Commonwealth, despite the protestations and recalcitrance of its settler constituents, had been reorganized in ways that were now including formerly colonized Others (and enlisting them for the Cold War effort), but the ‘empire of racial identity’ was still showing a stubborn imaginative resilience. Isopolity (and indeed simmachy these are times of automatic intervention in foreign theatres) retains contemporary relevance. The ‘special relationship’ between Israel and the United States, for example, is premised on the seamless transfer of people and their rights across jurisdictions and is underpinned by an extraordinary imaginary engagement that is in turn sustained by a shared settler colonial sensitivity (Veracini 2007). Isopolitics should not be seen as solely restricted to the past. Recovering the isopolitical character of settler colonial imaginaries is also important because a focus on the tension between ‘colonial’ subordination and ‘independent’ national sovereignty can make settler colonialism disappear. Both in Canadian and US historiographies, for example, a focus on the fundamental rupture represented by American independence has contributed to making an appraisal of settler colonial phenomena especially difficult (it is probably no coincidence that settler colonialism as a transnational interpretative category is an Australasian contribution). In the United States it resulted in an emphasis on accomplished sovereign national independence; in Canada, on the contrary, it produced an emphasis on a sustained relationship and institutional connection with Britain. A focus on the anticolonial struggle against the British occupiers traditionally prevented ‘colonialism’ from entering the analytical field in the United States, while in Canada ‘colonialism’ did not enter the analytical field because it was by definition something done by someone else. Even the historiographical revisions introduced since the late 1960s did not focus on settler colonialism: in the United States the main argument was that, although it had been previously denied, US foreign and internal engagements were actually imperialist (see Kaplan and Pease (1993), which reflected authoritatively on two decades of historiographical revision); in Canada the argument was that British imperialism was actually Canadian imperialism (see Berger (1970), which authoritatively initiated two decades of historiographical revision). The dialectical opposition between rupture and institutional continuity thus prevented an engagement with settler colonialism as an interpretative category. Without an appraisal of isopolitical relationships, settler colonialism can disappear from view.

2022 Michigan Kritik
Settler Colonialism K––K Lab › Links––General › L––Security Commitments

The archive of security commitments began with the securitization of indigenous peoples

K-Sue Park 2015 [Teresa K-Sue Park Doctor of Philosophy in Rhetoric and the Designated Emphasis in Critical Theory University of California, Berkeley “If Your World Was Built on Dispossession”]//sheima

This union of unions was not authorized under the charters of the member settlements, which included the newly-created New Haven federation, other federations of the colony of Connecticut, and the colonies of Massachusetts Bay and Plymouth. To govern the union, the United Colonies created Articles of Confederation that justified its formation on the grounds that “hostile Native American tribes to the west” posed an urgent, common threat to its members. They explained: … whereas we live encompassed with people of several nations and strange languages which hereafter may prove injurious to us or our posterity. And forasmuch as natives have formerly committed sundry insolence and outrages upon several Plantations of the English and have of late combined themselves against us. (Pulsifer 1861, 3) ¶ Each colony agreed to maintain its own government and legal order, but approved twelve articles designed to govern their common affairs, including such matters as jurisdiction, procedures for membership, representation and meeting, and proportionate shares of the Confederation’s defense budget and spoils of war, as well as the “removal of residents from one plantation to another; policies towards the Native Americans,” or in other words, immigration and Indian affairs (Pulsifer 1861, 3). To aggregate their power, the colonial federations swore to submit to these Articles, and thereby, to “jointly and severally hereby enter into a firm and perpetual league of friendship and amity for offence and defence, mutual advice and succor upon all just occasions… for their own mutual safety and welfare” (Pulsifer 1861, 3). ¶ Two aspects of this inter-federation compact seem especially noteworthy in light of the foregoing discussion. First, the New England Confederation was analogous to the compacts between individuals that formed its constituent units. Like them, it announced itself as a mutual defense pact, in light of the dangers presented by the hostile relations that they had cultivated with the tribes in the area, or “the state of nature” Locke described. The purpose of this union was similarly to protect colonists’ security and property in America, all of which, in 1643, colonists had but freshly claimed. It facilitated colonists’ ability to hold--but also first to acquire, and then continue to acquire--quantities of goods and land from indigenous people. Another term for this pattern of continuous creation of property through the acquisition of indigenous lands is colonial expansion, which the social compact supported at the inter-group level, as well as the individual level, by making possible the liberal use of violence in transactions with outsiders. The privileges and violence that the social compact distributed placed the collective threat of violence behind every member of the colonial community in its acquisitive, extractive, expansionist endeavors. ¶ Second, the New England Confederation exemplifies a distinct social compact formation that ordered a multi-level system of government. We can thus understand Locke’s narrative as encoding a foundational structural principle that gave rise to a new society in a broader sense, as well as rethinking its character as plausibly historically descriptive. As higher-order social compacts facilitated intergroup cooperation against an ever-expanding background of trade, or “Promises and Barter for Truck” and land, the consent that individuals had expressed to form the lower-order compacts were first once, then twice removed to representatives of the increasingly large imagined communities. The passage of time, or the famous generational problem, did not defeat actual consent within the federated social compact—already an abstraction from the stillfeudal family order-- as much as spatial, territorial ambition, or expansion did. When direct participation became impractical within the government that held itself to be of, by and for the people, consent became synecdochal through political representation.Thus, while the social compacts founding New England towns and uniting colonial federations were analogous in form, they also existed in direct relation to one another and transformed the meaning of consent to political government. By 1700, the growth and proliferation of federations between the originally diverse townships formed by civil covenants, which had determined “where people settled and lived” and “affected virtually all citizens of seventeenth century New England,” resulted in increasing civil and political uniformity (Weir 2005, 236, 233). The United Colonies’ Articles of Confederation emerged in parallel order with the later 1754 Albany Plan of Union, an intercolonial pact that Benjamin Franklin proposed in order to treat with the Iroquois Confederation. Both preceded the Articles of Confederation and Perpetual Union ratified by all thirteen of the original colonies in 1781. As John Quincy Adams stated, “The New England confederacy of 1643 was the model and prototype of the North American confederacy of 1774” (Pulsifer 1861, xiv-xv). In both of these cases, the parties formed the union without authority or sanction from the charters given by the Crown, the authority to which they were supposed to defer. Where the formation of the United Colonies produced tension within this hierarchical relationship, the United States pursued independence through the Revolution, indexing the growing power and appeal of the colonial expansion these unions supported. Adams, indeed, refuted the colonies’ debt of allegiance to the Crown by identifying natural law as the source of authority for these federal compacts, writing, “In both cases it was the great law of nature and of nature's God-- the law of self-preservation and self-defence, which invested the parties, as separate communities, with power to pledge their mutual faith for the common defence and general welfare of all” (Pulsifer 1861, xiv-xv). The law of transnational relations, by his account, licensed the Union to organize their forces against both indigenous nations and the Crown, when it allied with the enemies against whom the colonies had joined forces.In short, as the advantages of civil society in the state of nature made social compacts proliferate across New England, these compacts’ intensification of the state of nature they produced gave rise to a higher-order compact and the principle of federalism itself, which was finally enshrined in the Constitution. This emergence of federations signaled the appearance of rototypical modern state forms, whose consolidation and organization of force raised the stakes of the omnipresent threat of war in the state of nature. At this inter-group level, the comparison we drew earlier between compacts and collusion or conspiracy also translates as a project Charles Tilly has called “war risking and state making.” Drawing from the European, rather than American context, Tilly describes states as “quintessential protection rackets with the advantage of legitimacy,” and historical war and state makers as akin to “coercive and self-seeking entrepreneurs” (1985, 169). However, where Tilly contrasts this image of states as coercive forces of business against benevolent ideas about the state such as “social contract” (1985, 169), I have tried to show here how the social contract is not the opposite but the essence of the form that organizes and directs the violence of the state that Tilly emphasizes. The historical example of New England, I have argued, sheds light on the Second Treatise by illustrating “the place of organized means of violence in the growth and change of those peculiar forms of government we call national states” (Tilly 1985, 170), from the law-founding consolidation of violence of the first individual and federal compacts, to the new orders of violent expropriation, contracts and compacts that emerged under the United States’ expansion efforts, which I will explore below. ¶ First, however, it is worth noting that the same calculation that incentivized the states to consolidate their force also motivated them, conversely, to seek to splinter their enemies’ power. Even before the Revolutionary War, the accumulated pressures of white immigration, land dispossession and the displacement of tribes were laying the groundwork for a coalition of Northern and Southern tribes, and such a union seemed imminent to colonists by the spring of 1774 (Sosin 1967, 85). As the authors of the Federalist Papers note, the states’ independent activities only exacerbated the threat of a full-blown interracial war; they cite “several instances of Indian hostilities… provoked by the improper conduct of individual States, who, either unable or unwilling to restrain or punish offences, have given occasion to the slaughter of many innocent inhabitants” (Hamilton, Jay and Madison 1788, 16). During this period, “[t]he menace of unsettled boundaries was everywhere” (Paxson 2001, 48), and the “vast tract of unsettled territory within the boundaries of the United States” was the source of “discordant and undecided claims” lingering “between several of [the States]” (Hamilton, Jay and Madison 1788, 34).¶ The creation of a speculative land market based on the conquest of western lands would require cooperation between states and with the federal government, and the formation of a strong counter-union that could face its enemies in war. To lessen the causes of war that a “disunited America” would proliferate, the Federalists therefore argued that a “United America” was necessary to consolidate the power of the states in the service of a common aim; a central power would both constrain and mediate between the states, and between the states and Indian nations (1787, 13-14, 16). For the Federalists, “[t]he utility of the UNION” would be to facilitate continuing conquest: future dispossession would relieve member states of their individual and collective debt, manage internal unruliness by creating a central monopoly on violence, and allow for surplus accumulation that could become the basis of a powerful national economy (1787, 6). On the same principle, under the compact that established the United States, the central government promptly adopted a policy of exploiting longstanding rivalries and hostilities between tribes. This divide-and-conquer approach to Indian Affairs constituted a logical counterpoint to the new, centralized strength of the Union. Under the authority of the War Department, General St. Clair, who negotiated separately with the Six Nations and the Great Lakes tribes, thought he could “set them at deadly variance” (Smith 1882, 113).42 Congress counseled Indian agents to “deal with each Indian tribe or nation as separately as possible,” and insisted that “the tribes were to be kept separated so that negotiations would be easier” (Kades 2000, 1120). ¶

2022 Michigan Kritik
Settler Colonialism K––K Lab › Links––General › L––Hegemony

Hegemony is a new name for the white man’s burden

Hobson 14 (October 2014. John M Hobson, John Montagu Hobson, FBA is a political scientist, international relations scholar and academic. Since 2005, he has been Professor of Politics and International Relations at the University of Sheffield. “Race and Racism in International Relations: Confronting the Global Colour Line,” pg 88-93) //Don Markos

A further subliminal strategy has been the normative prescription of a “benign” neo-imperial politics that also goes by a whitewashed or sanitised name. Thus neorealist hegemonic stability theory (HST) elevates the exercise of (Anglo-Saxon) hegemony to the implicit status of a civilising mission (e.g. Gilpin 1981), while neoliberal institutionalism does much the same with respect to the role played by Western international institutions, especially the IFIs (Keohane 1984). In both visions, a major rationale of Western hegemons and their international institutions is to culturally convert Third World states along Western civilisational lines: the very essence of the old liberal mantra of the civilising mission. And both approaches echo the manifest paternalist Eurocentric formula of awarding “pioneering” progressive agency to the West and “conditional agency” to the East. These two terms refer to the point that for paternalist forms of Eurocentrism the West is assumed to have the “fully rational” capability to self-generate into modernity (the “Eurocentric logic of immanence”), while the East is said to be blocked from doing so on account of its “irrational institutions”. This led to the paternalist-imperial formula in which Eastern development can occur but only on condition that the rational institutions of the civilised West are delivered courtesy of the benign-paternalist Western civilising mission. Thus for HST and Keohane’s neoliberal institutionalism, hegemony and international institutions respectively come to replace the terminology of the liberal civilising mission, even if these former terms perform the exact same logic as the latter. The route into this alternative reading of HST lies with the point that in order to celebrate British and American hegemony Gilpin is forced to suspend some of the cardinal axioms of neorealism. For a key property of hegemony is that it must secure world order and development for all states but in the process this leads inevitably to the relative decline of the hegemon via the “free rider problem”. The immediate problem here is that neorealism, especially in its “offensive” variant that Gilpin supported in the period when he constructed HST (i.e. 1975 through 1987), 6 asserts that states seek to maximise their relative gains over others (Gilpin 1975, 23, 34 – 6, 85 – 92). But it is clear that in HST this principle applies to all states bar the hegemon. Or, put differently, in this vision we are treated to a story in which the leading great power not only does not seek to enhance its relative power over others but instead sacrifices its power for the benefit of others, thereby contradicting the cardinal realist axiom – that “the strong do what they can and the weak suffer what they must” . Thus in Gilpin’s HST this cardinal realist axiom is precisely inverted: “The weak do what they can and the strongest does what it must.” That the hegemon is exceptional is clear, though why it is so is not explained other than through a circularity as well as through a structural-functionalist mode of reasoning: specifically, that the hegemon self-sacrifices because “that is what hegemons do” (i.e. the circularity); and that without the presence of a hegemon the world economy descends into recession and rising inter-state competition because the international system requires a hegemon to promote stability and world order (i.e. the structural-functionalist assertion). But simply asserting that the system “requires” a hegemon for ensuring world order and stability does not explain why a leading great power chooses to become a hegemon in the first place, especially as all it can look forward to is its decline relative to those that it “helps”. In essence, then, there is no recourse within neorealist logic to explain the highly anomalous altruistic status that HST ascribes to the United States in the 1945-73 period or to Britain in 1845-73. Explaining this gap in the theory requires focussing on the presence of a subconscious American ethnocentrism and subliminal paternalist Eurocentrism which, I want to suggest, lies at the very base of HST. That is, US hegemony reflects the nineteenth-century discourse of “American exceptionalism” and its accompanying neo-imperialist idiom of America’s “manifest destiny”, much as “British exceptionalism” and “manifest destiny” underpinned the idea of the British Empire. For the notion of helping all other states, especially those in the Third World, conjures up the idiom of the “civilising mission” and the “white man’s burden”. Thus I want to suggest that within Gilpin’s theory it is precisely this Eurocentric-imperialist sensibility that underpins the real explanation for why leading Anglo-Saxon great powers choose to become hegemons and why they supposedly sacrifice themselves for the good of others. Still, while my reading thus far is based on logical deduction, nevertheless there is a clear slippage in Gilpin’s “positivist play of mimetic universalism” where he makes explicit reference to hegemony as a benign imperial civilising mission. As is well known, Gilpin begins by differentiating hegemons from imperial powers. Although Gilpin argues that, with the exception of the Soviet Union, the modern world is governed by the progressive non-imperialist politics of liberal hegemons whereas the pre-modern world was based on the cyclical and stultifying/regressive politics of despotic Eastern empires, this distinction is problematised by the obvious point that Britain was the greatest imperial power prior to 1945, as much as the United States has been the greatest neo-imperial power in the post-1945 era. The critical point is that Gilpin attempts to circumvent this obvious inconsistency by explicitly resorting, paradoxically, to the nineteenth-century imperialist trope of the liberal civilising mission. To this end he invokes Karl Marx’s paternalist civilising mission conception whereby modern European imperial powers transferred capital and technologies to the colonies not to exploit but to uplift them (Gilpin 1981, 142 – 3); or again, that the dominant power helps to create challenging powers. Ironically, as Marx himself appreciated, one of the greatest forces for diffusion has been imperialism…. The imperial power has stimulated the colonized peoples to learn its ways and frequently has taught them advanced military, political, and economic techniques. (Gilpin 1981, 176) Here, then, we encounter the key “paternalist-imperial” civilising mission trope, in which liberal empires take on the guise of a benevolent father who teaches his children – both directly and by way of example – to embrace and develop what he has already pioneered so that they can grow up and one day prosper. Thus in defending his “non-imperialist” reading of hegemony it seems clear that Gilpin, like Hedley Bull, is addressing the wrong target. For his assumption is that imperialism is defined by the exploitation of the weak by the strong. But in Marx’s vision – as well as that of the paternalist Eurocentric liberal – imperialism is conceptualised as a civilising mission precisely because it entails the West engaging in the “paternalist uplift”, rather than the coercive exploitation, of the East.

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The occupation of indigenous land recruits Native bodies on which to write colonial onto-epistemologies, making the annihilation of Native forms of life the aim of colonial world-making through excessive, death-driven violence.

Young 2017(Bryanne Huston “KILLING THE INDIAN IN THE CHILD: MATERIALITIES OF DEATH AND POLITICAL FORMATIONS OF LIFE IN THE CANADIAN INDIAN RESIDENTIAL SCHOOL SYSTEM” Bryanne Huston Young A dissertation submitted to the faculty at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in the Department of Communication in the College of Arts and Sciences. ,Chapel Hill) pg 68-69//ajoseph

What this chapter has sought to establish is the embodied archive of violence that subtends the post/colonial nation-state. This violence indicates a shift Foucault’s identifies as being from ‘territory’ to ‘population’ in the emergence of biopolitics, and the biopolitical imperative that sees sexuality as the potential for a population’s growth and regulation. As Indigenous lands were annexed and occupied, Indigenous bodies—the bodies of children in particular—were recruited as available substratum upon which colonial onto-epistemologies could be authored. In Lacanian psychoanalytic terms, the annihilation of Indigenous forms of life indicates the aim of colonial world-making. The goal of this world-making is the stabilization of civil Canadian society. In terms of this goal, the continual re-presenting of Indigeneity is, in fact, useful, necessary. In the lexicon of the death drive, which props itself or surfs upon existing vital life forces (instincts), the reiteration over and over to “kill the Indian” creates the archive of an impossible telos (Kill the Indian in the Child). The circling around the obstacles that arise on the path to achieving this telos is a function of the death drive, whose mechanism is to double-down around sites of failure with an enjoyment that exceeds pleasure. Unable to master the unruly sexuality of the Indigenous child—an unruliness which we now understand to be so diffused throughout everyday life (remember Freud’s response to the charge of ‘pansexuality’ was the rejoinder that although not everything is sexual, sexuality can be found/can arise in anything) that it only ever eluded attempts to regulate and tamp it down. Frustrated at failure, yet intensely enjoying it—enjoying in the psychoanalytic sense rather than simply the colloquial sense, though they are in many instance imbricated—the drive to mastery satisfies itself with intensifying violence. This is the structure of Fort-da, the child’s game that Freud assures us, is in no way the domain of the gifted, the wise, or the precocious. This is the genocidal logic that, after all, 69 underwrites and helps make logical the affective daily labor of killing an un-killable foe to save and hold sanctified the sovereign innocence of the life that shelters it.

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Settler Colonialism is not a one-time event, but a structuring logic of elimination constantly manifested in everyday reiterations of our spatial inhabitance and subjective being.

Rifkin 14 – Associate Professor of English & WGS @ UNC-Greensboro (Mark, ‘Settler Common Sense: Queerness and Everyday Colonialism in the American Renaissance,’ pp. 7-10)

If nineteenth-century American literary studies tends to focus on the ways Indians enter the narrative frame and the kinds of meanings and associa- tions they bear, recent attempts to theorize settler colonialism have sought to shift attention from its effects on Indigenous subjects to its implications for nonnative political attachments, forms of inhabitance, and modes of being, illuminating and tracking the pervasive operation of settlement as a system. In Settler Colonialism and the Transformation of Anthropology, Patrick Wolfe argues, “Settler colonies were (are) premised on the elimination of native societies. The split tensing reflects a determinate feature of settler colonization. The colonizers come to stay—invasion is a structure not an event” (2).6 He suggests that a “logic of elimination” drives settler governance and sociality, describing “the settler-colonial will” as “a historical force that ultimately derives from the primal drive to expansion that is generally glossed as capitalism” (167), and in “Settler Colonialism and the Elimination of the Native,” he observes that “elimination is an organizing principle of settler-colonial society rather than a one-off (and superceded) occurrence” (388). Rather than being superseded after an initial moment/ period of conquest, colonization persists since “the logic of elimination marks a return whereby the native repressed continues to structure settler- colonial society” (390). In Aileen Moreton-Robinson’s work, whiteness func- tions as the central way of u nderstanding the domination and displacement of Indigenous peoples by nonnatives.7 In “Writing Off Indigenous Sover- eignty,” she argues, “As a regime of power, patriarchal white sovereignty operates ideologically, materially and discursively to reproduce and main- tain its investment in the nation as a white possession” (88), and in “Writ- ing Off Treaties,” she suggests, “At an ontological level the structure of subjective possession occurs through the imposition of one’s will-to-be on the thing which is perceived to lack will, thus it is open to being possessed,” such that “possession . . . forms part of the ontological structure of white subjectivity” (83–84). For Jodi Byrd, the deployment of Indianness as a mobile figure works as the principal mode of U.S. settler colonialism. She observes that “colonization and racialization . . . have often been conflated,” in ways that “tend to be sited along the axis of inclusion/exclusion” and that “misdirect and cloud attention from the underlying structures of settler colonialism” (xxiii, xvii). She argues that settlement works through the translation of indigeneity as Indianness, casting place-based political collec- tivities as (racialized) populations subject to U.S. jurisdiction and manage- ment: “the Indian is left nowhere and everywhere within the ontological premises through which U.S. empire orients, imagines, and critiques itself ”; “ideas of Indians and Indianness have served as the ontological ground through which U.S. settler colonialism enacts itself ” (xix).

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Settler Colonialism exists past the act of colonization – the conceptualization of Natives as the ‘Other’ gives way for systems to ignore indigenous groups even through progressive legislation

Veracini 11 (Lorenzo Veracini s a historian and professor at Swinburne University of Technology’s Institute for Social Research. He is the editor in chief of Settler Colonial Studies and has been a key figure in the development of the field of settler colonialism. (2011) ISOPOLITICS, DEEP COLONIZING, SETTLER COLONIALISM, Interventions: International Journal of Postcolonial Studies, 13:2, 171-189, DOI: 10.1080/1369801X.2011.573215, ) // JLHS AA

Beyond isopolitical relationships, deep colonizing is also essential to an understanding of settler colonial phenomena. Australian-based anthropologist Deborah Bird Rose introduced ‘deep colonizing’ in a 1996 article dealing with the position of Aboriginal women in the context of recent developments in land claims legislation and indigenous tenure. Aboriginal women, she argued, were being disempowered by attempts to integrate Aboriginal policy and Aboriginal structures of governance. Specifically, she noted, women were effectively prevented from meaningfully contributing to evidence gathering processes. Supporting evidence sustaining Aboriginal land claims was premised primarily, if not exclusively, on ‘knowledge’ forwarded by Aboriginal men: While it is demonstrably the case that many formal relations between Indigenous people and the colonizing nation have changed in the past three decades, as have many of the institutions which regulate these relations, it is also the case that practices of colonization are very much with us. More profoundly, many of these practices are embedded in the institutions that are meant to reverse processes of colonization. A land claim is an excellent example. On the one hand it reverses conquest by returning land to Indigenous people. On the other hand, the marginalization of women, along with [invasive] demands for information, perpetuates the colonizing practices of conquest and appropriation. Colonizing practices embedded within decolonizing institutions must not be understood simply as negligible side effects of essentially benign endeavours. This embeddedness may conceal, naturalize, or marginalize continuing colonizing practices. Furthermore, it can be difficult to offer a critique of the colonizing features without calling into question the whole decolonizing project. Again, land rights offer an excellent example. If the double binds are not teased apart, and if the colonizing practices are not separated analytically from decolonizing institutions, conquest will continue. And if it continues in this form it will be wearing a mask of benign, or even radical, decolonization which will make it far more difficult to challenge at all levels. Deep colonizing is the term I use for this process conquest embedded within institutions and practices which are aimed toward reversing the effects of colonization. (Rose 1996) An ostensibly progressive legislation endowed with unprecedented liberating potential some Aboriginal communities were getting their land back could have, and was having, an oppressive outcome (Rose’s warning was somewhat prophetic: the recolonial federal government ‘intervention’ in the Northern Territory of the late 2000s, when white men were ‘compelled’ to intervene in Aboriginal communities in order to ‘save’ Aboriginal women and children, was also premised on the deterioration of Aboriginal women’s political standing and power within their communities a deterioration that was not countered by the land claim legislation and practice that followed the promulgation of the 1994 Native Title Act).5 Deep colonizing as an analytical tool identifying a particular dynamic, however, should be pursued further and applied to all circumstances where a progressive and decolonizing move for some ends up further compromising the position of others (similarly, even if in an entirely different context she was criticizing the concept of ‘Renaissance’ Joan Kelly (1984: xiixiii) famously concluded that ‘events that further the historical development of men, liberating them from natural, social, or ideological constraints, have quite different, even opposite, effects upon women’). Moreover, deep colonizing is an especially necessary conceptual tool for the specific appraisal of settler colonial regimes: if a triumphant colonial society is a state of affairs where, as noted by Partha Chatterjee (1993), change the promised equality between colonizer and colonized is forever postponed (on deferral as a colonial strategy, see also Conklin 1997), where colonizer and colonized know and ultimately retain their respective places, a triumphant settler colonial circumstance, having ceased to be a dependency of a colonizing metropole, having tamed the surrounding ‘wilderness’, having extinguished indigenous autonomies, and having successfully integrated various migratory waves, has also ceased being settler colonial (Veracini 2010). Colonial formations proclaim their permanence; settler colonial formations on the contrary announce their passing. Since it is primarily aimed at producing the conditions of its own supersession, settler colonialism routinely operate via deep colonizing means. That deep colonizing should not be seen as exclusively characterizing the present condition of the settler colonial polities should be emphasized. As long as the decolonization of the settler colonial situation remains unresolved, settler colonial present and settler colonial past inevitably resemble each other. Settler independence is one important example of deep colonizing. On the one hand, as mentioned, settler colonial formations are charged with an inherently anticolonial dimension; they upset the hierarchical structures and organization of colonial formations. On the other, settler independence a specific type of decolonization is actually an acceleration of colonizing practices. Marc Ferro, for example, defines ‘colonist independence’ as the ultimate stage of imperial conquest, the ‘most advanced stage of white colonial expansion’ (1997: 21213). A settler freedom that is premised on indigenous dispossession, however, is not a unique circumstance in which, to paraphrase Kelly, events that further the historical development of some have quite different effects on indigenous peoples. Civil rights agendas might be mentioned in this context: when W. E. B. Du Bois noted, for example, in The Souls of Black Folks that ‘the problem of the color line’ would be the critical question of the twentieth century (1994: 1), he performed simultaneously an act of anticolonial resistance and an act of suppression of indigenous autonomy (one could assume that in his estimation the ‘indigenous problem’ would not be a problem at all). Similarly, the Subaltern Studies Group has extensively documented how anticolonial nationalist stances failed to represent a variety of marginalized subjectivities. The anticolonial Indian nationalists could and would not represent ‘voiceless’ (often indigenous/Adivasi) rural subalterns. While these anticolonial erasures can be construed as examples of deep colonizing, and considering that ‘eliminationist’ shifts in indigenous policies in settler colonial contexts have been routinely couched in a humanitarian rhetoric emphasizing equality and emancipation from controlling legislation, it is not surprising that indigenous militancy in a multiplicity of settings has repeatedly shown a stubborn reluctance in engaging with other insurgencies and with state driven emancipatory programs. Ellinghaus’s (2007) comparative work on ‘assimilative pathways’ in two settler colonial polities highlights instances of indigenous dispossession framed as ‘emancipation’ (in other words, deep colonizing). For their exemplarity, two contemporary instances of deep colonizing could be mentioned in this context. As recently noted by Jody A. Bird in an article dedicated to his dealings with Native American issues, future US president Barack Obama repeatedly and powerfully articulated during the 2008 presidential campaign an ongoing project of democratic inclusion. One especially memorable (and frequently reproduced) speech epitomised this logic: For when we have faced down impossible odds, when we’ve been told we’re not ready or that we shouldn’t try or that we can’t, generations of Americans have responded with a simple creed that sums up the spirit of a people: Yes, we can. Yes, we can. Yes, we can.It was a creed written into the founding documents that declared the destiny of a nation: Yes, we can. It was whispered by slaves and abolitionists as they blazed a trail towards freedom through the darkest of nights: Yes, we can. It was sung by immigrants as they struck out from distant shores and pioneers who pushed westward against an unforgiving wilderness: Yes, we can. It was the call of workers who organized, women who reached for the ballot, a president who chose the moon as our new frontier, and a king who took us to the mountaintop and pointed the way to the promised land: Yes, we can, to justice and equality. Yes, we can, to opportunity and prosperity. Yes, we can heal this nation. Yes, we can repair this world. Yes, we can. (Quoted in Bird 2009: 23) This powerful narrative identifies a series of successive emancipatory enfranchisements: of African Americans, of ethnic migrants, of workers, of women. Even the ‘settler pioneers’ are part of this process even they get to be emancipated. And yet, as Bird perceptively points out, there are no American Indians in this picture. Indeed, Native Americans are doubly absent: they are conspicuously missing from this list of emancipatory passages, and they are erased as an obstacle: the pioneers who ‘pushed westward’ did not move against them (unless we are willing to consider the Indian nations that occupied the continent as part of an ‘unforgiving wilderness’). As such, Bird concludes, as ‘the pioneers, immigrants, slaves and abolitionists progressed towards a destined more perfect union, American Indian nations had to be pushed to the margins and then out of the picture altogether’ (23). Operating within a system that routinely demands that we forget that the pioneers were either dispossessing Indians or receiving stolen property (especially considering that he was in the business of winning a close election)? Yes, he was. In November 2009 a year after his election President Obama invited 500 tribal leaders to a massive conference the first of its kind dedicated to developing a comprehensive new approach in the management of Indian affairs. His administration is not uninterested in Indian affairs; this agenda, however, is essentially framed in terms of welfare rather than sovereignty (what in Australian parlance would be referred to as ‘practical reconciliation’, and in a US context has been defined by Jessica Cattelino (2010) as ‘need-based’ sovereignty).6 While this progressive agenda envisaging yet another emancipatory passage for US indigenous people remains ultimately premised on an original disavowal, attempts to address indigenous disadvantage that fail to recognize the need to decolonize a settler colonial system of relationships can be understood as deep colonizing. Besides, indigenous welfare and ‘rehabilitation’ are about (settler) benevolence and (indigenous) need, not about inherent sovereign entitlements (Kauanui 2008: 34). Rehabilitation without reconciliation isn’t rehabilitation. An ocean away, newly elected Australian prime minister Kevin Rudd’s official parliamentary apology to the ‘stolen generations’, as noted by Maria Giannacopoulos (2009), who wrote an insightful typology of Rudd’s rhetorical strategies of evasion, provides another example of deep colonizing (for the text of the apology, see Rudd 2008). Firstly, she notes, Rudd’s apology is strictly about the theft of children, not the theft of land (as if child removal could be separated from the system of power relationships in which it happened). Secondly, by definition, an apology is about saying sorry and about defending one’s actions: ‘Rudd’s apology appears to be less about benefiting Indigenous peoples and more about serving as an exculpation mechanism for white modes of power’, she notes. In the apology, the state is both defendant and judge, and as such it self-prosecutes, carefully circumscribing the limits of critique that may be made against it or, more specifically, that it calculatedly makes against itself. The apology functions simultaneously as the site of blame (prosecuted) and as the site of justification (defence). (Giannacopoulos 2009: 339) In this sense, the apology amounts to a solipsistic act, where the settler sovereign talks to itself about itself, reconciling itself with its past. Moreover, Rudd’s apology carefully contains its scope, and is construed as only applicable in relation to past occurrences. Thus, Giannacopoulos notes, by ‘blaming itself with reference to its past incarnations the current sovereign controls the parameters of critique whilst also exculpating itself for liability in the present’; ultimately, the ‘apology is made by the current sovereign without the acknowledgment that those things being apologized for persist in the present’ (340). This narrative shift produces a situation in which current indigenous grievances are strategically dismissed: the apology is circumscribed to the past; the past Rudd is quite explicit about this cannot be changed, and the present is another story.7 At the same time, by strictly and explicitly defining the period covered by the apology specifically, the years between 1910 and 1970 Rudd strategically avoids focusing on both the establishment of settler colonial relations (the pre-1910 period), and their ongoing current operation (the post-1970 era).8 As the apology blames ‘bad laws’ enacted by ‘bad parliaments’, a double exculpation takes place: the failure was not settler colonialism’s, and not of those who were personally involved in delivering and enacting genocidal policies. Both the system and the perpetrators are thus effectively excused (even if it is acknowledged that both policies and executors were racist). Ultimately, since the apology is construed as a generous gift, ‘instead of Indigenous people being given something back’ it is them who owe acceptance to Rudd (Giannacopoulos 2009: 344). Rudd’s concluding remarks underscore this peculiar inversion: ‘my proposal is this: if the apology we extend today is accepted in the spirit of reconciliation in which it is offered, we can today resolve together that that there be a new beginning for Australia’ (Rudd 2008). Giannacopoulos points out: ‘Rudd is making the apology, but only if it is accepted can his plan succeed. If the future does not shine as Rudd anticipates it will, it will be the fault of those who have not fallen into line [i.e., the Aboriginal people who would not accept the apology]’ (Giannacopoulos 2009: 345). Rudd’s settler repertoire of evasion thus includes blaming indigenous people for settler colonialism.9 Reconciliation without compensation isn’t reconciliation.

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The desire for strong International Relations is Settler Anxiety – The constant need to be able to influence the world to control the world feeds into the structure of Colonialism

Cornellier and Griffiths 16 (2016. Bruno Cornellier & Michael R. Griffiths - Bruno Cornellier is an Associate Professor of Cultural Studies in the Department of English. Michael R. Griffiths is a literary scholar whose work focuses principally on settler colonial literatures and histories. “Globalizing unsettlement: an introduction”, Settler Colonial Studies, 305-306, DOI: 10.1080/2201473X.2015.1090522) //Don Markos

This issue of Settler Colonial Studies marks the attempt to think the global adjacent to and, indeed, constituted in relation to questions of internal colonialism and settlement. As editors, we implicitly follow a contention of Scott Morgensen’s that settler colonialism is not merely a violent phenomenon of the colonial periphery, but in fact functions as constitutive of geopolitics at a global level. As Morgensen puts it, ‘Settler colonialism directly informs past and present processes of European colonization, global capitalism, liberal modernity and international governance. If settler colonialism is not theorized in accounts of these formations, then its power remains naturalized in the world that we engage and in the theoretical apparatuses with which we attempt to explain it.’1 Settler colonialism, then, is not merely a global phenomenon, it is also constitutive of the global. So many nation states which were founded on settler colonialism are considered first world nation states, and many are implicated, through this role, in broader operations of regional and global neoimperial control of territory and interests. This is a central premise of many of the contributions to this volume, from Kevin Bruyneel’s analysis of the settler colonial vocabulary that animates US military incursions in the Middle East to Shiri Pasternak’s analysis of the relation between Canadian multi-national private resource extraction and the ongoing dispossession of native lands in Canada to Mark Rifkin’s careful geopolitical reading of indigenous internationalism in the United Nations (UN) Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous People. If the USA is the most paradigmatic (though not the sole) instantiation of global ‘capitalist-territorialism’ (to use Giovanni Arrighi’s phrase), then as Bruyneel asserts elsewhere ‘the persistent reproduction of the American foundational mythos [ ... ] serves critically in the reproduction and legitimation of settler colonialism as a structure’, and does so in the manifest global reach of its neoimperial imprint.2 As such, ‘via the logic of elimination [ ... ] and dependent upon settler colonialism America takes up its imperial stance overlooking the world. This image illustrates that one cannot acknowledge the fact of US empire without acknowledging settler colonialism, and vice versa’.3 To cite US Empire here, as constituted in relation to its own history of internal (settler) colonialism and manifest destiny is to cite an example of this relation that might be explored globally. If settler colonialism bears relation to the global, as the US example illustrates, then global comparisons of such modes of dispossession also might shed light on the complexity of specific internal settler colonial experiences. This issue, then, calls upon scholarship to address the ideologies that traverse comparable political spaces, of which a number are surveyed in this issue: Australia, Canada, and Chiapas, Mexico. From the perspective of a critique of settler colonialism – which this approach, grounded in the initial premise of internal colonialism and the idea of elimination, is uniquely poised to reveal – what these spaces have in common is a certain strange double vision surrounding their self-conception. On the one hand, settler nation states stress their liberalism and inclusivity and on the other, they aim to either repress indigenous presence and difference, or, alternately to occlude its particularly salient claims by subsuming this difference under a wider multicultural settlement on the management of alterity. Here, the more the modernity and liberalism of the settler state is rhetorically stressed and pushed, the more it indulges in the repression of an indigenous presence often imagined as an anachronistic and aliberal residue of the type of ethnically bound and territorially fixed political cultures that violently clashed and sunk in our pre-global and pre-modern world. This is a second crucial premise of this collection’s relation to the globality of settler colonialism: liberal multicultural policies act comparably across multiple sites and spaces as avenues for the reinstitution of dispossession. From Melissa Forbis’ analysis of Chiapas to Michael Griffiths’ argument about the relation between race and culture in Australia, liberal logics are used to conceal new and incipient modes of dispossession globally.

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Re-orienting the way we engage with settler colonial institutions is a prior and necessary project of decolonization

Cordes and Sabzalian 20 (Cordes, A., & Sabzalian, L. (2020). The Urgent Need for Anticolonial Media Literacy. International Journal of Multicultural Education, 22(2), 182–201. ) // JLHS AA

**edited for violent reference to indians and indigenous populations

The hypervisible display of settler superiority, racism, and Indigenous erasure at the Superbowl illustrates one of many ways Native peoples are dehumanized in media. The overt racism that Native peoples experience “is not confined to hate groups but is visible in everyday discourse and throughout the media” (Robertson, 2015, p. 114). Robertson refers to this dynamic as legitimized racism: Racism against American Indians has been normalized and institutionally legitimized, thereby rendering it invisible. To legitimize is to make legitimate, that is, to justify, reason, or rationalize in accordance with established or accepted patterns and standards. In other words, the institutions that shape social norms— those seen as social authorities—reproduce symbolic racial violence against American Indians(Indigenous peoples) through legal structures, public education locations, consumer products, sports associations, and so on. (pp. 114-115) Supporting students in detecting and disrupting the dehumanization of Indigenous peoples, requires first that teachers themselves can recognize the varied ways media legitimizes racism against Indigenous peoples (Robertson, 2015). Given that discourses and narratives circulating in media are often not only racist in nature but also colonial, detecting and interrupting legitimized racism will require teachers to be equipped with both critical race media literacy (Yosso, 2002), as well as anticolonial media literacy. Anticolonial media literacy builds upon the concept of anticolonial literacy (Sabzalian, 2019a). Akin to “equity literacy,” which involves the ability to recognize, respond, and redress bias, discrimination, and inequity in education, as well as to cultivate and sustain bias-free educational spaces (Gorski & Swalwell, 2015, p. 37), anticolonial literacy involves “the ability to critically read and counter Eurocentric and colonizing educational discourses and practices” (Sabzalian, 2019a, p. 202). Preparing teachers to be versed in anticolonial media literacy can support Native students specifically in developing a “critical race vocabulary” that affords them opportunities to “name their pain” (Matias & Liou, 2015, p. 615). More broadly, anticolonial media literacy can support all students in recognizing and deconstructing dehumanizing colonial logics in media and generate anticolonial alternatives. We use the term anticolonial, following Patel (2016), to “draw into relief the ways in which settler coloniality must be known to be countered,” a contrast and complement to the term decolonial which “should always address material changes” (p. 7). Anticolonial literacy is an important complement to decolonial praxis. In this article, we make a more explicit link to the need for media literacy, and its necessary corollary, critical race media literacy (Yosso, 2002). Though we offered this Superbowl vignette as an example of the way society and media sanction ongoing dominant colonial narratives, examples of Indigenous erasure and dehumanization abound. For example, celebrities and ordinary individuals alike still wear headdresses (Cordes & Merskin, 2019; White, 2017), and racist renderings of the large-nose caricatures of Chief Wahoo are plastered in high school gyms (Strong, 2004). Statues of pioneers, enslavers, and other monuments of white3 supremacy still stand in cities, though there has been a notable increase in their necessary removal recently (Attiah, 2020). While it is important that educators can critically read and counter these explicitly degrading examples, educators must also learn to read and counter subtler colonial logics that surface in media. Media is significant for its role in storing historical memory, reflecting/projecting identity politics, and producing and challenging hegemonic discourses. Media are texts that can be read through their codes and structures that work to produce cultural myths (Barthes, 1972). Educators must learn to read what is not explicit or learn to read the erasures in media. Anticolonial media literacy fosters teachers’ ability to detect the way Indigenous peoples are absent from particular representations, and the larger political ramifications of these erasures. To be sure, representational literacy is more important than being able to point at media texts and discern them as “good” (politically correct/humanizing) representations or “bad” (politically incorrect/harmful) representations; it also involves recognizing the ways media texts are re-presentations of dominant cultural ideology and hegemony (Hall, 1997). Re-presentations help members of society make sense of who they are; thus, Indigenous scholars advocate for “the reestablishment of representational sovereignty” or the right for Indigenous peoples to have a say by producing and consuming texts that are not damaging to our communities (Lewis, 2006, p. 175). This concept has also been referred to as “rhetorical sovereignty” in the context of writing (Lyons, 2000), and “visual sovereignty” in the context of film (Raheja, 2010). To set the context for anticolonial media literacy, we draw on existing literature that articulates the need for critical race media literacy. We complement this body of literature by turning to Tribal Critical Race Theory (hereafter TribalCrit) (Brayboy, 2005). As a means of fleshing out TribalCrit’s central claim—that “colonization is endemic to society” (p. 429)—we turn to two Native studies theories to support teachers in recognizing the varied ways colonial logics surface in media: firsting, replacing, and lasting offered by Jean O’Brien (2010), and settler grammars conceptualized by Dolores Calderón (2014). We then put these concepts to work on specific media texts to model anticolonial media literacy in practice. Because anticolonial media literacy requires moving beyond critique to also seek out and offer students meaningful and respectful alternatives, we end by highlighting Debbie Reese’s advocacy for “critical Indigenous literacies” (Reese, 2018). Media literacy equips students with tools to analyze the power of media in society including media construction, production, consumption and its effects (Buckingham, 2013; Kellner & Share, 2005). Beyond individualized skill sets, media literacy allows students to relate to others in their communities (Jenkins, Ito, & boyd, 2016) and engage in contemplative practice to assess the power of media in helping achieve social transformation (Morell, 2012). In her foundational article, “Critical Race Media Literacy: Challenging Deficit Discourse about Chicanas/os,” Tara J. Yosso (2002) draws on critical race theory (CRT) to infuse media literacy with the projects of racial and social justice. Yosso argues this conjoining, what she refers to as critical race media literacy (CRML), is necessary as schools and media both reproduce “delusional ideas” about racism, sexism, and classism (p. 53). Drawing on Freire’s conception of literacy that advocates for providing “students with the tools to not only read the word but also to read the world,” Yosso argues, “CRT can challenge students to critically ‘read’ the racism, sexism, and classism in entertainment media portrayals of Chicanas/os–to develop critical media literacy” (p. 54). Through a series of curriculum sessions, Yosso equipped students with social science theories, concepts, and language in media, as well as critical race vocabulary to support them in detecting the ways media reproduce stereotypes and deficit thinking about Chicanas/os. Yosso found critical race media curriculum sessions effective “in describing how media, through repetition of negative portrayals, teach Chicanas/os that they are inferior to whites, and in turn, whites learn that they are better than Chicanas/os” (p. 59). Students also linked these negative media portrayals to “material repercussions for Chicano communities, including fewer financial aid opportunities and community support programs” (p. 59). While CRML “cannot be a magic bullet,” Yosso argued it can “facilitate students becoming critically conscious of themselves in relation to the structures of power and domination in their world” (p. 59). CRML has since been taken up by scholars in generative ways (Hawkman & Shear, 2017; Hawkman & Van Horn, 2019; King, 2017; Lozenski & Chinang, 2019). King (2017), for example, builds on Yosso’s work to illustrate how the Center for Media Literacy’s (CML) “Key Questions for Media Inquiry,” fail to “explore the dynamics of race or provide a racial lexicon” (p. 36). To remedy this, King revises CML’s key question to foster racial literacy (i.e., supplementing the question “Who created this message?” with the question “What are the racially constructed messages conveyed through the news?” (p. 37). Hawkman and Shear (2017) also build on Yosso’s framework to suggest that teachers guide students through a process of confrontation (confronting problematic racial representations in media), interrogation (questioning and critiquing those representations), and navigation (offering students opportunities to challenge those representations). (See also Hawkman & Van Horn, 2019, pp. 107-108). Anticolonial media literacy is indebted to and builds on this important scholarship.

2022 Michigan Kritik
Settler Colonialism K––K Lab › 1NC SHELL

Thus we endorse diversality – an orientation that recognizes the hybridity of alternative epistemologies that focuses on building mutual connections to build new forms of international relations centered around recognition and not dominance

Taylor 12 (Decolonizing International Relations: Perspectives from Latin America, Lucy Taylor, International Studies Review, September 2012, Vol. 14, No. 3 (September 2012), pp. 386-400 Published by: Wiley on behalf of The International Studies Association Stable URL: ) // JLHS AA

So far, I have focused on politicizing binaries and exposing the colonial wound. This is an important step but it imagines the debate to take place in terms of the colonizer and colonized; what is missing is an appreciation of mixed-ness or mestizaje, a social fact which is integral to theorizing the coloniality of power in the Americas. Here, we return to the colonial difference but emphasize the lived experiences of ‘‘transculturation’’ and ‘‘border thinking.’’ Particularly in Latin America, the colonial wound has generated significant indigenous organizations right across the region, which assert their dignity and political capacity (Maldonado-Torres 2007; Quijano 2008). In doing so, they reveal the existence of the ‘‘colonial difference,’’ marking it as a space of political contestation, but this disjucture is not experienced in the same way by the colonizer and the colonized. While the colonizer, installed in a dominant position, views it as a gap of miscomprehension and disdain, which ‘‘he’’ is not obliged to cross, the colonized must operate in a world dominated by Occidental institutions, languages, and rationales (Mignolo 2000: 64–84). The colonized must incessantly negotiate the colonial difference and reconcile the demands of a colonized reality with cultural meanings embedded in an indigenous worldview. Politicizing this mestizaje is key to decolonial politics, and Gloria Anzaldu´a’s notion of ‘‘border thinking,’’ a Latin American response to hybridity, offers significant insights (Mignolo 2000: 49–90; Anzaldu´a 2007). Anzaldu´a’s vision of hybridity is rooted not in the intricacies of intellectual debate or psychoanalysis but draws on her real-life experiences of living between the labels which attach to the binaries so essential to Occidental thinking. Anzaldu´a grew up and lived on the US–Mexico border: she was a Chicana feminist daughter of share-croppers, a Marxist indı´gena mestiza and seventh generation lesbian citizen of the United States (Keating 2009: 1–15). Living at the intersection of so many boundaries (geographical, sexual, political, linguistic, racial) did not leave her feeling incomplete or dismembered, though; her response was to say: ‘‘They would chop me up into little fragments and tag each piece with a label. You say my name is ambivalence?... Who me, confused? Ambivalent? Not so. Only your labels split me’’ (Anzaldu´a 1984; quoted in Keating 2009: 17). By asserting her completeness, she demonstrates the fallacy of the labels. Anzaldu´a borrowed a Nahuatl word to express the space that she inhabited between these tagged categories: nepantla or (roughly) the place at the broken edges. She explained the technique of border thinking in one poem: ‘‘Because I, a mestiza, continually walk out of one culture, and into another, because I am in all cultures at the same time, alma entre dos mundos, tres, cuatro,...’’ (Anzaldu´a 2007: 99) This vision of human agency derived from inhabiting border lands serves to disempower the idea of the border as a stopping point controlled by the state. That the state which she traversed in real life was the US–Mexico border only heightens the powerfulness of her critique and the subversive potential of her work for both IR and the Americas. Equally important, though, is the concept of transculturation, which indicates that processes of hybridity have not only shaped the lives of subaltern groups, but have also conditioned Whiteness and the Western epistemological project in (Latin) American society (Pratt 2008). The concept of transculturation was devised by Cuban anthropologist Fernando Ortı´z in 1940 to understand how Cuban society was constituted. He focused on the relationship between slaves and slave owners, understanding that both had shifted from their native soil and that each was intimately influenced by the cultural heritage of the other and the experience of colonialism: ‘‘Each immigrant was uprooted from his native land in a double movement of adjustment and readjustment, of deculturation or exculturation and of acculturation or inculturation, and ultimately transculturation’’ (Ortı´z 1940: 255, italics in original, my translation). He was clear that this relationship of mutual influence was not equal or power-free––how could it be––but asserted that both the African and the European communities were full cultural agents, even though they were locked into a brutal and exploitative relationship (Millington 2007). By imagining cultural exchange to be a two-way street (albeit on a steep hill), Ortı´z highlights hybridity as a social experience of both the subaltern and the dominant. He urges us to consider transculturation as part and parcel of society-making, nation-building projects, and look beyond domination and appropriation to ask how Native American thinking, experiences, and practices have molded ‘‘the USA’’ as a global actor. Following this thinking, resistance to the coloniality of power therefore involves not only fighting against the colonizing logic, but also seeking to shake that logic from within by revealing the hybridity and diversity within what seems to be a unified and settled settler society. Border thinking, then, might elicit insights not only at the ‘‘periphery’’ or border but also at the ‘‘core’’ of global power, if we are willing to destabilize its foundations. A useful strategy which might help to unsettle ‘‘core’’ thinking has been proposed by Martinican Edouard Glissant in his Poetics of Relation (1997). He sets out an intellectual politics of diversality (rather than universality) inspired by Caribbean Creole consciousness. Diversality takes the idea of transculturation a step further by theorizing cultural interchange as not only a social fact but also a political strategy. Diversality assumes the existence of profound difference, but Glissant argues that ‘‘thought of the Other is sterile without the other of Thought’’ (1997: 154); that is, merely accepting that differences exist is not enough to generate deep change in our thinking. Rather, he calls for an ‘‘aesthetics of turbulence,’’ which breaks assumptions and allows one’s thoughts to be ‘‘prised open’’ in order to develop new imaginaries and fresh linkages between peoples. The ‘‘other of Thought’’ is thus created by confluences in which ‘‘each is changed by and changes the other’’ (1997: 154–5). Diversality involves not only being prepared to recognize difference on an equal footing but also a willingness to open one’s thoughts to ‘‘turbulence’’ which will destroy assumptions and rebuild hybrid modes of thinking in its wake. The Americas occupies a privileged role in this theorizing because, as Anzaldu´a, Ortı´z, and Glissant assert, social (and sexual) mixing is not a ‘‘new’’ process but rather it is deeply embedded in the Americas––in 500 years of colonial encounter and its resulting hybrid identities. A ‘‘mestizo Americas’’ approach could therefore play a crucial role in developing decolonial political struggle, not only by denouncing the injustice of colonialism but by prising open, shifting, and hybridizing conventional ways of understanding international relationships––and International Relations. The issue of how this might occur requires more time and space to explore, but I begin a discussion here by identifying three questions that a decolonial politics might ask of IR. 1. What other ways are there to understand the world? (And how might this influence our thinking about the international?) This question invites IR to acknowledge diversality. It assumes the completeness, complexity, and sophistication of non-western ontologies and epistemologies in a move which should be humbling. It opens up our minds to new ways of imagining human existence; to imagine time as being circular (King 1993), or that land does not belong to people but people to the land (Silko 2006), or that boundaries are delineated by walking ⁄ presence (Larsen 2006), or that the world is configured not through dualities but threes (Kusch 2010), or that colonialism is an illness (Momaday 1989; Burman 2009). This work has already started; Marshall Beier’s incisive critique of conventional IR conveys the immensities of the colonial difference in his discussion of Lakota life-ways which he contrasts to the ‘‘hegemonologue’’ of mainstream IR (2005). These differences might influence understandings of the international, not so much by adding new ideas but by destabilizing our mode of thinking––our aesthetics of thought, as Glissant might suggest. Encountering fundamental disjunctures of human experience should convey a sensation of difference experienced as a visceral confusion and disorientation. A decolonial IR project must, then, be prepared to approach non-occidental worldviews with a mind that is willing to be made uncomfortable, that is ready not to comprehend, and that is prepared to feel out of control. This is not just an exercise in submission though, because we can use the sensation of disorientation to heighten our awareness of the Occidental project and the contemporary coloniality of power. It helps us to map out the narrow limits of the Western imaginary and to perceive its contours, its regime of knowledge, and worldview more profoundly. An awareness of diversality shows the limits and fallacies of universal thinking, and by unsettling our certainties, it generates space for new thought. 2. What does IR not know? (And what has this got to do with the coloniality of power?) This question highlights the hidden side of knowledge––ignorance. It suggests that the chasm of colonial difference is far too deep and wide to be bridged, which means that single-vision understandings of world history or IR cannot possibly comprehend the experiences and worldviews of ‘‘others’’. Glissant reflects on the academic project and concludes that ‘‘no matter how many studies and references we accumulate, we will never reach the end...; knowing this in advances makes it possible for us to dwell there. Not knowing this totality [of experiences] is not a weakness. Not wanting to know it certainly is’’ (1997: 154). Perhaps counter-intuitively, then, this ignorance brings a number of intellectual benefits. Firstly, being aware of profound difference might act as a brake on drawing easy parallels without listening and thinking very hard first, promoting critical and complex thinking. Secondly, gaining a sense of just how different difference can be helps us to perceive the realm of possibilities because it is an orientation point in a vast galaxy of difference. However, the purpose of identifying deep difference is not to label or pin down with words ideas which are outside the realm of European imagination. Rather, it is to accept that the chasm cannot be closed––that such ideas are simply untranslatable into European languages and regimes of knowledge (Mignolo and Schiwy 2003). That is, a decolonial IR must accept its ignorance and learn what it can about the world not only by studying what is knowable but also by reflecting on what is beyond comprehension. The caveat reminds us, though, that this realm of thinking about the international takes place not on a level playing field of competing worldviews but on a pitch riven with geohierarchies conditioned by the coloniality of power. A decolonial IR project must foreground the colonial nature of this difference to expose the injustices that conventional approaches enact in the name of universalism. 3. How might conventional IR be ‘‘prised open’’ by difference? (And how is this linked to the USA?) This question asks what would happen if IR were to move beyond simply acknowledging diversality to generate an aesthetics of thinking Other-wise (Glissant 1997). This involves recognizing that the chasm of colonial difference is far from absolute, indeed that it is spanned, everyday and often, through processes of mestizaje. Thus, difference should be viewed as a border zone which acts as a space where new ideas and cosmologies might be imagined, emerging from transcultural meetings. One key way in which conventional IR might be opened up by difference is by refocusing attention on ordinary people’s experience of the international, as Te´treault and Lipschutz propose. This takes on a decolonizing role if the coloniality of power is highlighted, a move which not only creates awareness of difference but promotes border thinking––thinking inbetween categories and based on everyday lived experiences of negotiating coloniality ⁄ modernity. Such strategies complement attempts by Inayatullah and Blaney and many more to destabilize IR’s traditional building blocks such as nation-states, sovereignty, and the binary of war⁄peace. The USA as global actor, as Western beacon, and as home of the discipline is intimately entangled with IR. This is why border thinking at the binaried intersection of the Americas is particularly acute in its capacity to destabilize conventional thinking because it is a geographical metaphor for many of the boundaries which set out global hierarchies and help to structure IR. Not least of these is the First World ⁄Third World binary embodied at the US–Mexico border and its attendants, Whiteness⁄Blackness, and civilization⁄ barbarism. Shifting from thinking about the border itself to embrace border thinking invites us to step beyond the fence and its checkpoints to consider the USA as a profoundly hybrid place. We move beyond US hybridity as immigrant melting pot, to focus on mestizaje––a complex amalgam of settler, Native and African slave descendants whose relationships are vividly marked by the coloniality of power and the logics of modernity. A decolonial IR writing from a ‘‘prised open’’ USA not only looks for radical, destabilizing difference, such as Native American thinking but also recognizes hybridized connections which generate openings for dialogues. We should not assume that the USA, like the Cuban slave masters described by Ortı´z, is not profoundly conditioned by the colonial encounter. However, such interactions do not occur in a power-free zone. For this reason, a decolonial analysis of hybridity in the international must vigilantly foreground the presence of inequality, injustice, and the potential for violence in cultural interchanges conditioned by the coloniality of power. Border thinking in this broad sense, inclusive of IR perspectives, offers a realm of imagination, connection and intellectual opportunity from which to rethink and challenge dominant economic, racial and epistemological modes. The role of mainstream IR in such re-imaginings of intergroup relationships is crucial, not least because, as critical scholars like those cited in this article attest, conventional IR is a central mainstay of the unequal global order.

2022 Michigan Kritik
Settler Colonialism K––K Lab › 1NC SHELL

Settler violence threatens the entire planet with endless racist violence

Mishra 18, MA @ Jawaharlal Nehru University in New Delhi (Pankaj, “The Religion of Whiteness Becomes a Suicide Cult,” New York Times, (bless)

In the years that followed, politicians and pundits in Britain and its settler colonies of Australia, Canada and the United States would jointly forge an identity geopolitics of the “higher races.” Today it has reached its final and most desperate phase, with existential fears about endangered white power feverishly circulating once again between the core and periphery of the greatest modern empire. “The fundamental question of our time is whether the West has the will to survive,” President Trump said last year in a speech hailed by the British journalist Douglas Murray, the Canadian columnist Mark Steyn and the American editor Rich Lowry. More recently, Mr. Trump tweeted (falsely) about “large-scale killing” of white farmers in South Africa — a preoccupation, deepened by Rupert Murdoch’s media, of white supremacists around the world. To understand the rapid mainstreaming of white supremacism in English-speaking liberal democracies today, we must examine the experience of unprecedented global migration and racial mixing in the Anglosphere in the late 19th century: countries such as the United States and Australia where, as Roosevelt wrote admiringly in 1897, “democracy, with the clear instinct of race selfishness, saw the race foe, and kept out the dangerous alien.” It is in the motherlands of democracy rather than in fascist Europe that racial hierarchies first defined the modern world. It is also where a last-ditch and potentially calamitous battle to preserve them is being fought today. This “race selfishness” was sharpened in the late 19th century, as the elites of the “higher races” struggled to contain mass disaffection generated by the traumatic change of globalization: loss of jobs and livelihoods amid rapid economic growth and intensified movements of capital, goods and labor. For fearful ruling classes, political order depended on their ability to forge an alliance between, as Hannah Arendt wrote, “capital and mob,” between rich and powerful whites and those rendered superfluous by industrial capitalism. Exclusion or degradation of nonwhite peoples seemed one way of securing dignity for those marginalized by economic and technological shifts. The political climate was prepared by intellectuals with clear-cut racial theories, such as Brooks Adams, a Boston Brahmin friend of Roosevelt, and Charles B. Davenport, the leading American exponent of eugenics. In Australia, Pearson’s social Darwinism was amplified by media barons like Keith Murdoch (father of Rupert and a stalwart of the eugenics movement) and institutionalized in a “White Australia” policy that restricted “colored” migration for most of the 20th century. Anti-minority passions in the United States peaked with the 1924 immigration law (much admired by Hitler and, more recently, by Jeff Sessions), which impeded Jewish immigrants and barred Asians entirely. By the early 20th century, violence against indigenous peoples, immigrants and African-Americans reached a new ferocity, and nativist and racist demagogues entrenched a politics of dispossession, segregation and disenfranchisement. Seeking to maintain white power globally, Roosevelt helped transform the United States into a major imperialist power. Woodrow Wilson, too, worked to preserve, as he put it, “white civilization and its domination of the planet” even as he patented the emollient rhetoric of liberal internationalism that many in the American political and media establishment still parrot. At the post-World War I Paris Peace Conference, which Wilson supervised, the leaders of Britain, the United States, Australia, South Africa, New Zealand and Canada not only humiliated the many Asians and Africans demanding self-determination; they also jointly defeated an attempt by Japan, their wartime ally, to have a racial equality clause included in the Covenant of the League of Nations. The exposure of Nazi crimes, followed by decolonization and civil rights movements, generally discredited quasi-scientific racism and stigmatized overt expressions of white supremacism. In our own time, global capitalism has promised to build a colorblind world through economic integration. But as revolts erupt against globalization in its latest, more disruptive phase, politicians and pundits in the Anglosphere are again scrambling to rebuild political communities around what W. E.B. Du Bois in 1910 identified as “the new religion of whiteness.” The intellectual white web originally woven in late-19th-century Australia vibrates once more with what the historians Marilyn Lake and Henry Reynolds termed “racial knowledge and technologies that animated white men’s countries and their strategies of exclusion, deportation and segregation.” Mr. Trump, for instance, has chosen Australia’s brutal but popular immigration policies as a model: “That is a good idea. We should do that too,” he said in January 2017 to Malcolm Turnbull, Australia’s prime minister at the time, as he explained his tactic of locking up refugees on remote islands. “You are worse than I am,” Mr. Trump told Mr. Turnbull. If right-wing Australian politicians were among the first to mainstream a belligerent white nationalism, the periodicals and television channels of Rupert Murdoch have worked overtime to preserve the alliance between capital and mob in the Anglosphere. Indulged by Mr. Murdoch’s newspapers, writers like Bernard Lewis, Niall Ferguson, David Frum, Andrew Sullivan and Andrew Roberts repeatedly urged American neoconservatives after the Sept. 11 attacks to take up the aging white man’s burden and quell mutinous natives. A broad range of figures in the Anglosphere’s establishment, including some of Mr. Trump’s most ostentatious critics today, contributed manure to the soil in which Trumpism flourishes. Cheered on by the Murdoch press, Tony Blair tried to deepen Britain and America’s “special relationship” in Iraq. Leaders of Australia and Canada also eagerly helped with the torture, rendition and extermination of black and brown brutes. Not surprisingly, these chieftains of white settler colonies are fierce cultural warriors; they are all affiliated with private donors who build platforms where political correctness, Islam and feminism are excoriated, the facts of injustice and inequality denied, chests thumped about a superior but sadly imperiled Western civilization, and fraternal sympathy extended to Israel, the world’s last active settler-colonialist project. Emotional incontinence rather than style or wit marks such gilded networks of white power. For the Anglosphere originally forged and united by the slave trade and colonialism is in terminal crisis today. Whiteness denoted, as Du Bois wrote, “the ownership of the earth forever and ever.” But many descendants of the landlords of the earth find themselves besieged both at home and abroad, their authority as overlords, policemen and interpreters of the globe increasingly challenged. Mr. Trump appears to some of these powerful but insecure men as an able-bodied defender of the “higher races.” The Muslim-baiting British Conservative politician Boris Johnson says that he is “increasingly admiring of Donald Trump.” Mr. Murray, the British journalist, thinks Mr. Trump is “reminding the West of what is great about ourselves.” The Canadian YouTube personality Jordan Peterson claims that his loathing of “identity politics” would have driven him to vote for Mr. Trump. Other panicky white bros not only virulently denounce identity politics and political correctness — code for historically scorned peoples’ daring to propose norms about how they are treated; they also proclaim ever more rowdily that the (white) West was, and is, best. “It is time to make the case for colonialism again,” Bruce Gilley, a Canadian academic, recently asserted and promptly shot to martyrdom in the far-right constellation as a victim of politically correct criticism. Such busy recyclers of Western supremacism, many of whom uphold a disgraced racial pseudoscience, remind us that history often repeats itself as intellectual farce. The low comedy of charlatanry, however, should not distract us from the lethal dangers of a wounded and swaggering identity geopolitics. The war on terror reactivated the 19th century’s imperial archive of racial knowledge, according to which the swarthy enemy was subhuman, inviting extreme and lawless violence. The rapid contraction of suffrage rights witnessed in early-20th-century America is now mimicked by Republican attempts to disenfranchise nonwhite voters. The Australian lawmaker who recently urged a “final solution” for Muslim immigrants was only slightly out of tune with public debate about immigration in Australia. Hate crimes continue to rise across the United States, Britain and Canada. More ominously, demographic, economic and political decline, and the loss of intellectual hegemony, have plunged many long-term winners of history into a vengeful despair. A century ago, the mere suspicion of being thrust aside by black and yellow peoples sparked apocalyptic visions of “race suicide.” Today, the “preponderance of China” that Pearson predicted is becoming a reality, and the religion of whiteness increasingly resembles a suicide cult. Mr. Trump’s trade wars, sanctions, border walls, deportations, denaturalizations and other 11th-hour battles seem to push us all closer to the “terrible probability” James Baldwin once outlined: that the rulers of the “higher races,” “struggling to hold on to what they have stolen from their captives, and unable to look into their mirror, will precipitate a chaos throughout the world which, if it does not bring life on this planet to an end, will bring about a racial war such as the world has never seen.”

2022 Michigan Kritik
Settler Colonialism K––K Lab › 1NC SHELL

Settler Colonialism is the grounding force of the international – the understanding as colonialism as a domestic matter forgoes the way that Settler Colonialism was a project of domination in the name of civilizing the savage

Davis 20 (Making a settler colonial IR: Imagining the ‘international’ in early Australian International Relations, Alexander E. Davis is a postdoctoral research fellow at La Trobe University's Department of Politics, Media and Philosophy, Australia. Review of International Studies (2020), ) // JLHS AA

Sitting alongside themes of imperialism, internationalism, and realism in the study of Australian IR, was a stream of thought on race and empire that focused on settlement. For the history of international thought, this is significant. The control of territory by settlers is the foundational concern of the Australian state. This was therefore foundational to its international thought and its politics. The blurring of the international and the domestic, structured around racial categories and seeking to maintain and advance white supremacy, was a constitutive element of the founding of IR in Australia. This lines up closely with Vitalis’s findings in the US.105 Australia’s Others under IR’s gaze were primarily its nearest neighbours, its colonial projects, and those within: its own settlement, its immigration policy and its Indigenous population. Although dominated by a white man’s view of the world, there were contributions made by women throughout this period. Prior to Coral Bell’s taking up of a realist framework, though, these contributions were sometimes confined to subjects stereotyped as feminine. The settlement of the Northern Territory and the rest of Australia remained parts of Australian IR through the Austral-Asiatic Bulletin’s time as its primary publication outlet. The study of imperial affairs, based on the development of societies, was slowly shifting into the study of international affairs. At this moment in Australian IR, the two sat alongside one another: with articles on events in China and Japan placed next to discussion of the colonial development of Northern Australia and New Guinea. Imperialism and racial development politics sat alongside analysis of great power conflict in East Asia. The Second World War led to another reshaping of Australia’s international thought. The first IR department in the country was placed within Pacific Studies, which was intended to focus on both East Asia and Australia’s colonial projects. Still, race as an explicit subject of IR in Australia shifted, and the explicit maintenance of racial hierarchies moved into racialised psychological and cultural explanations of the irrationality of the postcolonial societies. This erasure made it more difficult to analyse race and racism, allowing them to continue unchecked. In terms of our disciplinary historiography, it led to the exclusion of empire and settlement as insufficiently international to be analysed. We might be tempted to think that, because settlement and land tenure are not viewed as ‘international’ today, we can simply erase them from our disciplinary memory. To do so is anachronistic. Colonial settlement was thought of as international affairs. It was a common topic, discussed thoroughly and regularly. Forgetting this effectively produces the excision of Australia’s settler colonial history from its international affairs. The connection between land, sovereignty, and settlement remains foundational to the international system. That a series of colonial questions of settlement sat alongside Australia’s early studies of its relationship with East Asia reflects the transition from a broadly colonial system to an international system. This transition was not simple or straightforward. It is not even complete. Australia has not decolonised. Neglecting this transition closes our eyes to the contemporary politics of race and hierarchy that postcolonial scholars of IR have repeatedly and forcefully emphasised. Australia’s contemporary international affairs, questions about its defence, Australia’s positioning inside or outside Asia, its relationship with Pacific island neighbours, its strategic culture, fears about foreign ownership of land, all look very different if we place them in this context. If we accept that settler colonial ideologies were a key element of the founding of Australian IR, a claim for which there is ample evidence, IR in Australia needs urgent critical reflection. Australian settlement means the dehumanisation and the genocide of existing populations. This continues today. Settler colonial Australian IR justified and argued for this, presenting it as natural and desirable. As Vitalis put it in the US context, ‘the history of ideas, institutions, and practices has a constitutive role in their present forms and functions’. 106 While Australian IR forgets its settler history, policies of dispossession and intervention, and the ‘civilising mission’, continue at home and abroad.107 Australian foreign policy, often wrapped in liberal idealism, normalises and affirms settler colonialism. We would need to engage deeply with Indigenous perspectives about Australia and the world to understand this in the present. Sadly, few, if any, such voices are in dialogue with IR in Australia. I can only conclude that the rot is particularly deep. Forgetting this history cleanses our thought of colonial violence and the settlement of Australia, making it impossible to reckon with. Addressing these issues requires more than a mild and unthreatening ‘diversification’ of the discipline’s voices, but a thorough and conscious effort to decolonise, which challenges our foundational assumptions.

2022 Michigan Negative
Neg – OCOs 3 – BFHR › AT: Lower A5 Threshold › 2nc – US retal

The US will respond forcefully to Russian cyber attacks

Greig 22 – ZDNet staff writer (Jonathan, “Biden warns of US 'cyber' response after Ukraine says computers wiped during attack,” ZDNet, 1-19-22, https://www.zdnet.com/article/biden-threatens-cyber-response-after-ukraine-says-computers-wiped-during-attack/)//nt-sg

US President Joe Biden responded forcefully to reports of a wide-ranging cyberattack on Ukrainian government systems Wednesday afternoon, telling reporters that the US would respond with its own cyberattacks if Russia continues to target Ukraine's digital infrastructure.

"The question is if it's something significantly short of an...invasion or major military forces coming across," Biden said in response to a question about how the US would respond to a Russian invasion of Ukraine.

2022 Michigan Negative
Neg – OCOs 3 – BFHR › AT: Lower A5 Threshold › 2nc – US retal

The US would have no choice but to retaliate to cyber ops

Healey 22 – Senior Research Scholar at Columbia University's School for International and Public Affairs specializing in cyber conflict (Jason, “Preventing Cyber Escalation in Ukraine and After,” War on the Rocks, 3-9-22, ) //nt-sg

First, Russian offensive cyber operations might spark a wider war. President Vladimir Putin has declared sanctions “are akin to a declaration of war” and may see aggressive cyber attacks as the perfect response, particularly since they are reversible and non-lethal. Russia has been entangled with Western economies for decades, especially in the realms of energy and finance. But now, as ties are being severed quickly and viciously, Russia no longer has to fear the backlash if its cyber forces were to disrupt Western banks or liquified natural gas terminals. If you are dealt out of the game, why not just flip the table?

Russia’s cyber generals may be just as enthusiastic as their Army counterparts. They may assure Putin their forces are ready for battle and can quickly and bloodlessly get the West to back down. Putin could be convinced disruptive attacks against the West are no big deal, a low-cost signal that the West should de-escalate or just the next natural move in a non-escalatory intelligence contest. After all, U.S. research found that in response to cyber attacks, “Americans are less likely to support retaliation with force” compared to a more traditional strike.

2022 Michigan Negative
Neg – OCOs 3 – BFHR › AT: Lower A5 Threshold › 2nc – US retal

NATO countries want to use OCOs to response to cyber attacks

Emmott 17 - Diplomatic Correspondent at Reuters Brussels (Robin, “NATO mulls 'offensive defense' with cyber warfare rules,” Reuters, 11-30-17, ) //nt-sg

TARTU, Estonia (Reuters) - A group of NATO allies are considering a more muscular response to state-sponsored computer hackers that could involve using cyber attacks to bring down enemy networks, officials said.

The United States, Britain, Germany, Norway, Spain, Denmark and the Netherlands are drawing up cyber warfare principles to guide their militaries on what justifies deploying cyber attack weapons more broadly, aiming for agreement by early 2019.

2022 Michigan Negative
Neg – OCOs 3 – BFHR › AT: Lower A5 Threshold › 2nc – only retal = war

Following through with Article V commitments guarentees a disproportionate response

Singer and Friedman 2013 – P.W. Singer is a Strategist for the New America Foundation and a Professor of Practice at Arizona State University. Allan Friedman is the Director of Cybersecurity Initiatives at National Telecommunications and Information Administration in the US Department of Commerce (P.W. and Allan, “Cybersecurity and Cyberwar: What Everyone Needs to Know,” Oxford University Press, 2013, p. 137) //nt-sg

Conversely, making good on a threat in cyberspace can have drastic impacts on international stability. The full impact of an action taken in cyberspace is difficult to control or predict. Therefore, the retaliation may spiral beyond the intended punishment, inflicting damage over and above what would be considered a proportionate response to the breach of a threshold. This risks a minor incident triggering a tit-for-tat escalation and ‘cascading an attack in cyberspace into a much bigger conflict’. This danger is exacerbated by the risk of inadvertently punishing the incorrect actor. Incorrect attribution could trigger unnecessary escalation with a third party while the real aggressor goes unpunished and undeterred.

Thus, once such a cyber deterrence framework’s constructed, a state faces the strategic dilemma of being forced to choose between maintaining its credibility and the risks of collateral damage.

2022 Michigan Negative
Neg – OCOs 3 – BFHR › AT: Lower A5 Threshold › 2nc – only retal = war

Retaliation ensures larger cyber crisis

Libicki 13 – management scientist at the RAND Corporation (Martin C., “Tangled Web,” RAND Review: Vol. 37, No. 1, Summer 2013, ) //nt-sg

In their zeal to protect themselves in cyberspace, countries need to ensure that they do not trigger even greater threats beyond cyberspace, particularly military or economic forms of retaliation. At a time when the reported level of cyber incidents continues to rise and when cyber risks are perceived as growing even faster, the odds are increasing that a country will find itself in a cyber crisis. Such a crisis could take many different forms: the escalation of tensions associated with an actual, major cyberattack; the suspicion that such an attack has already occurred and must be countered; or the simple fear that an attack might soon occur and must be preempted. Cyber crises are less likely to emanate from the unavoidable features of cyberspace than from each side’s fear, often exaggerated, of what might result from its failure to respond. To avoid the unnecessary escalation of such crises, national cyberdefense agencies should monitor the messages and signals they send out about their own cyberoperations, sharpen their analyses of how potential adversaries would likely perceive the escalatory aspect of offensive strategies, and take additional cautionary measures to manage perceptions.

2022 Michigan Negative
Neg – OCOs 3 – BFHR › AT: Lower A5 Threshold › 2nc – only retal = war

Retaliation spirals and ensures conventional warfare

Hunt 16 - Group Head of Information Security at Sanne (Ash, “Tit-for-Tat: Cyber Retaliation,” Info Security Magazine, 8-22-2016, ) //nt-sg

Retaliation often engenders escalation: something that the cyber domain facilitates with unprecedented ease. As nation states all-too-willingly adopt this tit-for-tat mentality, the prospect of attacks spilling over the ether into the conventional domains of war becomes increasingly likely.

As Russia’s revanchist activities in Ukraine show, asymmetric warfare has already begun to rear its head; its efficacy and desirability – a potent combination of cyber and tangible force – will make it the norm. Nation states should make a concerted effort to curtail a spiraling cyber arms race and ensure cooler heads prevail. Cyber’s destructive capacity and ability to destabilize international relationships deserves constant policing and attention.

2022 Michigan Negative
Neg – OCOs 3 – BFHR › AT: Lower A5 Threshold › 2NC - AT: Article V = Deterrence

Even if Article V deters conventional war – it is ineffective to combat cyber

Ross 21 - an intelligence officer with extensive expertise in signals and cyber intelligence and a graduate of the Junior Officer Cryptologic Career Program (Cameron, “Is It Time to Forget about Cyber Deterrence?” Air & Space Power Journal, Spring 2021, ) //nt-sg

Consequently, ideas about cyber deterrence have naturally accompanied the growth of cyberspace and cyber operations. The disruptive and revolutionary nature of cyber and its potential for massive effect resembled the arrival of nuclear weapons in many ways. However, many theorists and strategists quickly noted the challenges to reconciling cyber with ideas of classical deterrence. During the Cold War, deterrence was straightforward. For example, it was easy to know who launched an attack; there was a significant scientific barrier to creating nuclear weapons; every bomb could be as powerful as the first; any use of a nuclear weapon crossed an acknowledged threshold; redlines were usually grounded in geography and easy to conceptualize; and motives were generally discernable and tied to strategic interests.6 Almost none of these apply to the world of cyber. Attribution can be incredibly difficult and usually takes an inordinate amount of time—if one can discern the origins of the attack at all. The low barrier to entry enables many actors, and what would deter each actor is almost as varied as the actors themselves. The use of a cyber weapon makes it less likely that it will be effective in the future as defenders patch the vulnerability. Defining substantive thresholds and redlines is almost impossible. Yet, despite all the barriers to effective deterrence, most authors believe it is possible and should be pursued. But is deterrence the right framework for approaching cyberspace? Perhaps the friction strategists face is indicative of the need for a paradigm shift.

2022 Michigan Negative
Neg – OCOs 3 – BFHR › AT: Lower A5 Threshold › 2NC - AT: Article V = Deterrence

Ambiguity and diversity of threats obviates attempts at cyber deterrence

Smeets and Soesanto 20 - Dr. Max Smeets is a senior researcher at ETH Center for Security Studies and affiliate at Stanford University CISAC. Stefan Soesanto is a senior researcher in the Cyber Defense Team at the Center for Security Studies (CSS) at ETH Zurich. (Max and Stefan, “Cyber Deterrence Is Dead. Long Live Cyber Deterrence!” Council on Foreign Relations, 2-18-2020, ) //nt-sg

Why has the concept fallen out of fashion? The existing literature has certainly done a great job of providing a comprehensive list of reasons why deterrence in cyberspace is more difficult to achieve than deterrence in conventional domains. Cyberattacks are said to be cheaper to execute, while defense is hard. Retaliation in cyberspace is supposedly harder to execute as the attribution of a cyberattack necessitates time-intensive, all-source information, often spanning numerous networks and actors. Signaling is equally problematic, given the secrecy of cyber operations and the difficulty of discerning between offensive and defensive behavior. Furthermore, given the diversity of actors in this domain, including individuals, non-state hacking groups, and military operators, the assumption that all actors in cyberspace act rational is not a given.