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2022 Michigan Kritik
LINKS › L – Cybersecurity

Cybersecurity discourses ignore and expand the infiltration of the cybersphere by deterritorializing flows of capitalist governance constitutive of Empire

Hong/Goodnight ’19 (Yu Hong; professor of media and international culture at Zhejiang University. G Thomas Goodnight; professor of communication at University of Southern California. “How to think about cyber sovereignty: the case of China” ) // ELog

China’s stance on cyber governance marks a different way of thinking and praxis, but it should be viewed not in a binary relationship to the Global North but as intertwined with historical, geopolitical, and epistemological power relations (Wasserman, 2018). Borrowing from postcolonial infrastructure studies, critical algorithm studies, and internet histories, we use the cybersphere—defined as a historical ensemble of material, organizational, regulatory, and socio-cultural layers of communicative relations among populations, machines, and institutions developed across scales—as a substitute for cyberspace, to challenge the digital sublime and to underscore its emergent geopolitical nature. The digital sublime, whose influence has waned but is not finished, sees cyberspace as a de-territorialized virtual global village (Johnson & Post, 1996). Its mistake lies in exaggerating the social freedom to link and to exchange by rendering cyberspace as a natural given, rather than a geopolitical sphere. Enacted as a top-down model, cyberspace has been used to smuggle in universal norms that do not recognize historical struggle. The cybersphere, however, entails both materiality and relationality (Cooren, 2018). It entails not just virtual reality but material grounding. Power bases, storage, and server locations are one thing; the interconnection of information and things added by 5 G mobile networks, quite another. Furthermore, the cybersphere shapes, and is shaped by, relational dynamics. It mediates labor relations, production chains, innovative resources, knowledge production capacities, and human relations with environment (Aouragh & Chakravartty, 2016; Murdock, 2018; Srinivasan, 2017). Extending political economies and expressing power relations, the sphere has selectively amalgamated national, material, and territorial spaces on the one hand, and virtual networks of digital data exchange on the other. It features both interdependence and discontinuity, blending functional flows, spatial fragments, and social segments (Castells, 2010). In the cybersphere, the continuity and discontinuity of political economies are named and arranged by discourse for exchange, forming disagreement spaces that “express differences, disrupt convention, and field imagined alternatives” (Jackson, 2015; Liu & Goodnight, 2016). Notably, the assemblage of policies, organizations, and material structures that underpin the socio-spatial logic of networks and networking is such a focal site of struggles over ideas, interests, and power across scales and units. If the old romantic thinking of cyberspace as a separate realm subject only to community-supported self-regulation has long lost its force (Goldsmith & Wu, 2006), the multi-stakeholder model that has ever since prevailed evokes pluralistic participation but evades national sovereignty and hierarchical power (Mueller, 2010), even implicitly extending Northern bias against redistributive and developmental deficits (Chakravartty, 2007). Such failure ignites alternative politics centered on sovereign authorities, after decades of neoliberal regulatory reforms. Instead of being a natural space of unity or inevitability, the cybersphere— which entangles political economies and disagreement spaces, national and international relations, virtual and material ties—has evolved into an expanded geopolitics. Its boundaries and sources of authority are fought over by different groups and are therefore intrinsically political (Kristof, 1960). Various spaces have already shaped but do not define the cybersphere. History shows that states and societies make their own interpretations amidst global techno-economic trends— depending on their values, interests, and capacities. The most notable is the Sino-US digital interdependence and discontinuity. The US has made foreign policy efforts to extend the liberal capitalist model to cyberspace, but China has preserved some crucial political-economic and ideational foundations for selfdetermination despite its steadfast global digital convergence (Hong, 2017; Kiggins, 2012). Still, beneath the foreground of apparent variation lies the shared background of material ties and relational dynamics that defy binary distinctions. China’s internet has been conventionally rendered in the state territorial imaginary (Shen, 2017). By portraying a contest-and-conquest relationship between the state preoccupied with regime insecurity and varying social usages, the dual foci implicitly frame the Chinese Intranet against the globalist internet (King, Pan, & Roberts, 2013; Rauchfleisch & Sch€afer, 2015). Whereas the latter associates its governance with the presumably pluralistic, fragmented, and competitive societies of Western democracy, the former illustrates the will of the state and the structures of state control. Indeed, although contested and compromised, the efficacy of state control has legitimized deploying the Great Firewall as a synecdoche for China’s internet governance (MacKinnon, 2011; Wei, 2017). Political economy frames a different cyber imaginary, one that loosens this stark dichotomy. Critical studies suggest that states co-exist with non-state agents in shaping the global internet and that the influence of ownership, policies, laws, and commercial interests renders the idea of a “singular virtual space” misleading (Graham, 2013). Cast in light of the cybersphere, China’s so-called Intranet also reveals entanglements with foreign capital, foreign technology, foreign markets, and foreign labor. Rather than hold up “highly conservative” telecoms policy or exemplify “cyber-conservatives” (Mueller, 2010; Zeng, Stevens, & Chen, 2017), the state has unleashed different sequences of liberalization, decisively exposing its share of the cybersphere to the dynamics of global digital capitalism (Hong, 2017; Schiller, 2014). Symbolic, cultural, and social dimensions are also folded into the cybersphere. From blogging to social networking to e-commerce, the platformization of cyberspace is structured by bottom-up vitalities, which sustain and derail top-down governance (Yang, 2003; Yu, 2017). Shaping and shaped by actors of the political economy, including states, markets, and societies, the cybersphere continues to extend social relations and material structures across boundaries, be they spatial, temporal, material, corporeal, or social. Its ubiquitous expansion, accelerated by the Internet of Things, the Internet of Bodies, and 5 G mobile networks, has enmeshed the state in a “variable geometry” of wills, interests, and values and even overwhelms it with torrents of capital, technology, information, and communication (Castells, 2010, p. 53). If it is true that “statism disintegrated in contact with new information technologies,” as Manuel Castells wrote in the Information Age trilogy, does the exercise of cyber sovereignty mark an orchestrated reaction of the state? What kind of state? And how? This brings back the state as a strategic actor in the generally “stateless” internet studies (Flew, 2018). Rethinking the state in transnational digital political economy China’s official vision regarding the state’s authority over internet-related public policy differs from the Western liberal model, and not only in the sense of opposing individualist democracies and authoritarian states. China’s communication policies persist as a dialectic between incumbent powers that own, regulate, and change the organizational apparatuses and material structures of communications and emergent powers that use, extend, and innovate counter-orders. Thus, the approach here is not to dissolve the state-centric framework, nor do we suggest an economic cosmopolitan account to replace the national framing. However, as an alternative to the ontological fracture between the state as a mutually exclusive territorial monopoly on the use of force, on the one hand, and market forces and individual rights that can be universally applied, on the other, we do want to deabstract the state—to see the state as mutually constituting, and frictionally meshing, with a broader network of power materialized by the cybersphere. This statement, along with the replacement of cyberspace by cybersphere, has implications for the theory of the state. A decades-long debate between liberal and Marxist strains of state theories has bearing on the state’s positioning in the cybersphere. Embedded in social science disciplines from the postwar era, the liberal theory of politics posits that power in Western democratic societies is diffused enough; the state responds to competing demands, rendering Marxist class-based notions, such as ruling class and corporate power, irrelevant (Miliband, 2009). Having rightfully constructed a liberal critique of traditional authoritarianism and even networked authoritarianism, this “class-less” thinking of pluralistic politics nevertheless leads to the obfuscation of state-society interlinks and thus unduly precluding capitalist, developmental, and legitimacy-seeking logics of the state—before and after the arrival of the networked digital age. At the international level, liberal and realist theories treat states as unitary and autonomous actors. In the case of China, national factors still offer compelling explanations for its performance—as the Chinese state rejected the outright Washington Consensus and has paced global integration. Still, this state-led global convergence created unexpected results and has fostered transnational imperatives from inside. Therefore, instead of deducing the logic of state actions from its arguably timeless essence of security and control, it is imperative to see the state’s wills, interests, values, and practices as relationally intertwined with global and marketbased structures of power and to appreciate the crosscutting of state agendas by various transnational interests across multiple scales. The neoliberal turn from the 1970s advanced the notion that it is desirable, and even feasible, to separate politics from economics, states from markets (Panitch, 2009). This fracture reflects neither the intervention-and-investment the US government makes in the internet nor the accommodations the Chinese state makes toward global techno-economic trends. Meanwhile, postwar neo-Marxist state theory has resisted reducing state interests and capacities to servitude for capital and instead notes the historical makeup of social forces and recognizes the state’s relative autonomy (Starrs, 2017). Extending this critical perspective, the political economy approach to communication examines historically specific relations between states, markets, and social actors and explores how these factors parlay into structural, institutional, and discursive transformations of international/national policy-making (Chakravartty & Sarikakis, 2006). The cybersphere adds a new twist to the dynamics of the state. To reckon the recursive relationship between the state and the cybersphere, a holistic conception and historiography of the state should be framed. The transition literature on China notes that the formerly Leninist state has internalized a liberal orientation and even moved to a globally integrated model of policy process (Fewsmith, 2010). The state-led capitalist socio-economic transition has accelerated in and through the cybersphere but spurs intensive social dissent, which invites an ever-expanding state information control regime (Zhao, 2008). Thus, after having alternately unleashed, shaped, and stalled the cybersphere that extends change and disturbance, the party state becomes a major contested site as well as a contesting subject. Notably, the party state can adapt, contract, or expand its power over the cybersphere. The state under Xi’s leadership generates sweeping transformative initiatives, holding China at an “inflection point”: the post-WWII capitalist order is mired in chronic crises; the party state-led China continues to grow stronger, after weathering market reforms; therefore, the responses to global crises must be organized to achieve the millennial mission of national rejuvenation (Economy, 2018). Pivoting to developing digital economy, digital government, and digital society, the state attempts to re-organize the symbolic protocols, social norms, or economic organizations that have hitherto defined the cybersphere, taking cyber sovereignty as a salient position. Despite the state’s transformative agency, a more fundamental dialectic between geopolitics and globalization has been at work, altering the state’s will and dispersing its capacity. As the driver of globalization, capitalist development transcends national boundaries through the cybersphere, inducing states to facilitate internet development and commercialization (Simpson, 2004). However, globalization as such, mediated by states and geopolitics, is never a completely finished set of projects. Developing states are strategic actors in contesting the global order—increasingly in and through the cybersphere (Desai, 2013). Still, states cannot afford alienating capitalist logic too much, as contemporary geopolitics is increasingly tied with inter-capitalist competition (Woodley, 2015). The cybersphere also deepens the state’s entanglement in the multilateral order of interdependence. While the state can act on its transformative initiatives, it is variably involved in ad hoc networks with subnational, national, and international actors and must “ensure the balance and power of the network state to which they belong” (Castells, 2010, p. 361). When the US government asserts unilateralism over bilateral and multilateral issues at the cost of losing global moral appeal, and when the field of internet governance features layered, diffuse, and even privatized control of power (DeNardis, 2014), China’s position is likely to oscillate between reclaiming state sovereignty and supporting shared sovereignty. Thus, the internet is a new sphere, where the state extends political authority, prioritizes certain rights, responds to capitalist cycles, and enters a multilateral interdependence. It endorses and acts on contradictory initiatives, mostly within the capitalist global order. These range from subsuming the directionless logic of capital to the territorial logic of the state to facilitating transnational capital accumulation; from strengthening the social and symbolic foundation of the party’s rule to encouraging the digital turn of globalization; and from promoting itself as a champion of globalization to sponsoring regional factions and domestic protectionism. The mixture is an empirical question, which nevertheless cannot be exhausted by the control protocols of the state—authoritarian or liberal democratic—but is conditioned by the dialectics between the intra-national needs the state prioritizes and the global legitimacy and sphere sustainability the state seeks. The following section addresses how to qualify, rather than reify, the cyber sovereignty mandate. Cyber sovereignty in historical perspectives Sovereignty, in its modern conception, “implies a theory of politics which claims that in every system of government there must be some absolute power of final decision” (Crick, 1968). Territoriality strongly defines sovereignty (Betz & Stevens, 2011), but this definition obscures the fact that sovereignty is both territorially and non-territorially circumscribed. From a standpoint of political economy of communication, the status of sovereignty works, out of and against, a disagreement space crossing boundaries and denotes the state with questions of who has standing and controls resources for decisions over senders, receivers, codes, messages, channels, audiences, and feedback. Claims to sovereignty offer an index of power relations among nations and register the spread of capitalism, as well as the geopolitical pressure and popular resistance that follows (Desai, 2013). A historical association of communication with capitalist states means that the principle of territorialized sovereignty, when put in practice, has incorporated the need to trade, to flow, and to invest. Hence, globalization from the 1990s has not linearly undermined the state but has further complicated the relationship between a bounded physical territory and the state as the presumably supreme authority therein—as sovereignty operated through multiple spatial modes, and non-state actors even shared the operation of sovereignty (Agnew, 2009). This proposition applies to China. Despite its stance to push against hegemonic intervention, sovereignty is in no way unyielding in the postMao era (Carlson, 2005). A new school of international relations, intent to qualify the diluted but still crucial role of sovereignty-based states in the age of globalization, disaggregates sovereignty into multiple components, foregrounding multiple yet inconsistent practices of redefining sovereignty (Biersteker & Weber, 1996). As the cybersphere extends globalization, how does it redefine sovereignty? Adopting Krasner’s concepts (Krasner, 1999), Betz and Stevens (2011) argued that the internet compromises the regulation of cross-border flows, or so-called “interdependence sovereignty,” which further weakens Westphalian constructs and domestic authority; yet, it does not affect the legal integrity of states in international law, which means that states persist. Still, if the cybersphere is not universally experienced, the re-configuration of sovereignty is not a homogenous process either. Two trends vie for acceptance. First, sovereign relations are being worked out with a great range of variation. The US government has supported a presumably benevolent and borderless corporate-run cyberspace. However, its security rhetoric, which transcends the distinction between inside and outside, legitimizes an empire model, wherein military capacity is kept constant and co-extensive with its global networks (Hardt & Negri, 2000; Katin-Borland, 2012). Still, even a US-based Leviathan is not immune from cyber-attacks. As fake news, internet-enabled theft and disruption, and cyber weapons have shaken the American internet, a Foreign Affairs commentary proclaimed that “state sovereignty is alive and well on the Internet” (Flournoy & Sulmeyer, 2018, para. 4). In an emergent counter-position, the EU uses privacy as a lever to rein in Silicon Valley-originated platforms (Dijck, 2013). However, this rights-based cyber sovereignty in no way negates strong strategic purpose (Pohle, 2019). If the tension between users and corporations obscures the roles of states in liberal democratic contexts, the Chinese state plays a salient role in ousting Western platforms, blocking IP addresses, silencing dissent, and orchestrating propaganda campaigns to the extent that Western security and policy studies conveniently equate a cyber-sovereignty position with coherent statist control ( Tai, 2017; See Harold, 2016 ). Yet, despite the state’s sustained efforts to control the flow of information to its people, the bigger picture is more complex. To participate in the cybersphere, the state both practices negative proscription, such as censorship, and makes proactive moves to legalize non-state forces. To the extent that states unleash the cybersphere, states and the cybersphere then become co-constituting (Kohl & Fox, 2017). A state generally deploys its sovereign power to project national interests and to bolster certain values, interests, and projects. The cybersphere modifies this equation to the extent that sovereign power is no longer a status that states can either own or not. Vulnerability and interdependence are built into a cyber-committed nation. First, as the internet’s choke points often transcend state jurisdictions, it is inconceivable to squeeze the transnational nature of technical standards, supply chains, material and virtual architectures, and multidirectional communicative activities all into traditional jurisdictions (Kohl, 2007). Second, if internet governance is mostly enacted through technical design, private corporations, and nongovernmental organizations (DeNardis, 2014), the specific governance structure in China expresses its unique global history. Still, the Chinese state must negotiate with supranational entities, corporate infrastructures, and networked publics. Third, the prosperity of a digital ecosystem driven jointly by expressive, productive, and commercial energy challenges the ability of the state to define information flows in distributed networks (Navarria, 2016). Embedded in this sphere, state policies are subjected to ideational, institutional, and material contestations—within the country and without. On what terms, then, and in what mode can states seek to redefine cyber sovereignty? Ideally, as the cybersphere has become the dominant medium of global and public communication, the deployment of cyber sovereignty as a heuristic device would reveal, and even encourage, a disagreement space for peaceful negotiation among states, whose networking, competition, and collaboration inevitably interact with the non-traditional power structures made up of private companies, expert groups, civic organizations, and institutional and individual users. As the Chinese state advocates cyber sovereignty and globalization at once, how is it expressing this set of goals through concrete constructing practices? In the following, we examine China’s institutional and normative vocabularies that organize material governance of cyber sovereignty, trace these into the international realm as a case for global connectivity and relationship development, then review domestic, negotiated policies designed to work through disagreements, leveraging domestic ends against China’s standing in a global cybersphere.

2022 Michigan Kritik
LINKS › L – Colonial Empire

The structure of the Nation-state is one that is indistinguishable from the racialized legacy of coloniality. The prerogative of empire is to promote a national memory that seeks the sole preservation of biological life above all resulting in the codification of hegemonic norms and mass structural violence.

Grech 19 - John Grech, , Mulit-Faculty Affiliations, Lecturer, Nation : State // Technology : Biology Global Relations in an Age of Emerging Algorithms and the Logic of Late Capitalism (Draft), Academia // eshaan

Mapping Nation, State, and Citizen – The world in 1900 If the world at 1900 had already long been transitioning through a period of radical transformation called “modernisation” (Harvey 1990iii), an important distinction needs to be made between society, state (see Held’s “The Development of the Modern State” in Hall and Gieben 1992, also Barrow 1993), and nationiv (Foucault 2010:326-348). Pierre Clastres (1994, 1998i, 1998ii) identifies society as a broad collective of the people making up any specific community. Modern notions of “society” and “civic society”, as well as “community” and “commonwealth” continue to reflect that notion as they refer specifically to groups of people as distinguished by their collectivity. Society, according to Clastres, contrasts with the modern “Nation-State” at two levels. The State can be said to be the set of modes, means, rules and instruments of governance that society uses to implement and maintain its internal composition, structure, organisation, and identity. The idea of the “Nation”, on the other hand, and in particular the Nation-State since the 16th century (Foucault 2010:332), is a relatively modern invention (Anderson 2016) pointing to a particular form of organisation and structure of internal components, institutions and identities and the various hegemonic orders of governance and discourse these call into being. The emergence of the Nation-State coincides with the conglomeration of larger communities becoming totalised and imagining themselves as both collectively unique and sovereign. The Nation-State seeks to unify both larger groups of people and a variety of geophysical terrains into a singularity and which is again contrasted to the organs of State which are regarded as a body of legal as well as social codes of behaviour and the institutions that police the members of this modern Nation-State and that together order the collective actions and beliefs as well as lives of people in forming such specific modern Nation-State societies. The State’s instruments and apparati are thus essentially involved in, and promote, a particular kind of social order, and the peculiarities such as language, habits, customs, traditions, as well as myths and images that the State holds about itself and that underpin it. Needless to say, the State’s spaces overlap with other imaginary spaces created by the formation of “the Nation” as well as by “society” in order to coalesce the social imaginings of “the People” that underpins them. A first level distinction can be made with the formation of the Nation-State. Foucault (2010) charts a history of the evolution of the French Nation, analysing the process of subjectification underpinning the invention of modern citizenship (Beck 2006, Chambers 1995, Hennerz 2000, Ianelli & Mossaro 2017, Sennett 1986, Stevenson 2001, 2003).v Commencing with a series of traits and characteristics, the first object of the Nation-forming project is to subject people to certain normative forms and rationalisations. The practice of national identity starts in a series of internalised as well as external State imposed actions. To be French, an individual must not only demonstrate a “native” command of (standardised Parisian) French but also to trade in a range of currencies that distinguish and connect to myths and ideas of the French Nation. In addition to language, markers include attitudes, food, culture and dress, education, as well as subservience to the State’s legal, educational, and taxation regimes and regulatory legislative instruments. People could still consider themselves Poitier-ians, or Avignon-ese, or Strasbourg-ians, but they had first to think of themselves as French. So being “French” became synonymous for a unified world shared by those living in a specified geographical area and unified by certain beliefs and practices which became generalised by themselves and others. It is ideas of “French” and “France” that bind people together (Barthes 1981:116-117). In Imagined Communities (2006), Benedict Anderson investigates the origins and spread of nationalism and the emergence of modern Nation-States. Anderson wants to understand why individuals form a relationship of “horizontal” “comradeship” and “fraternity” so strong that it makes “possible, over the past two centuries, for so many millions of people, not so much to kill, as willingly die for such a limited imagining” of themselves as conceived by the Nation’s apparatus. The bond that nationalism engenders is limited, as Anderson sees it, because those who mostly died in defending their nation did so even though the benefits afforded to them by their State was minimal. For Anderson, the power of the privileged classes to convince more impoverished and disadvantaged members of the broader community to not just willingly give up their pursuit of their own interests, but also their lives, to defend a system which oppresses them seems irrational. Anderson is drawn to conclude that inventions like the “national imagination” and “national memory” (as well as a “national amnesia”) help to project generic notions and ideas on to individuals and on those around them and gain and grant a sense of singular unity, affection, and belonging (Anderson 2006: 1-7). Anderson wants to understand how and why nationalism enables people to feel “closer” to people who, in many respects, are their oppressors while seeking to kill others who do not have any impact on their lives whatsoever. He wants to understand how nationalism bifurcates the world between those who share a sense of an inside populated by (imagined) connectivity, loyalty, relatedness, and identification from an exteriorised swathe of others (aliens, foreigners, or simply unknown strangers) but with whom – from a relative subjectivity that more closely reflects their own than that of their masters – such individuals respective everyday realities share more in common with the enemies of the Nation-State. Moving further from the “centre” of the world at 1900, Edward Said’s Orientalism (Penguin 1995) glimpses life beyond Europe and of someone living in a colonial State and the dehumanised subjectivity that creates (Fanon 2001: 13). A well-to-do, educated native of Algiers or Martinique or Vietnam may have felt French but, as Frantz Fanon himself learns while studying in Paris, being French is not the same as being a French colonial. “The first thing which the native learns” writes Fanon as a result of his learning his ‘lesson’ in Paris, “is to stay in his place, and not to go beyond certain limits. […] The settlers’ world is a hostile world, which spurns the native, but at the same time, is a world of which he is envious” (Fanon, 2001: 40-41). So Fanon describes the inner conflicts and contradictions created by colonisation in the colonised. The point I’m making is this; Be it coloniser or native, the object of the State is to control people and maintain the existing hegemonic order. From the State’s perspective, the body of a native is no less significant than the body of the coloniser, both must be disciplined as well as enabled, for social order depends on every individual playing their respective part to perpetuate the colonial world. As long as either have the capacity to threaten colonial rule, the State must discipline, reinforce and reward individual behaviour. Even in colonial States, the body of the individual is the focus of State attention. The imaginary slice of life at 1900 I am trying to portrayvi suggests that although there are clear stratifications in forms of identity and propriety attributed to individuals depending on colour, gender, race, inheritance, and social status, the individual remains the crucial pivot around which both the Nation and the State organise themselves. Individuals also retained a central role in the formation and ongoing (re)production of society. This centrality made the individual the target and the goal of society’s sometimes perfunctory moves towards community. In contrast to society, the Nation-State, on the other hand, asks more of individuals than mere participation in daily routines of social renewal. Nation-States demand the individual’s subjectification to a universal rule of law, coded rules that reinforce the Nation-State’s hegemony. The willingness of the State to resort to violence (see Agamben 2005, Benjamin’s “Critique of Violence” in Eiland and Jennings 2006, Clastres’ “Of Ethnocide” 1994, and Foucault 2010) to enforce the individual’s subjectification indicates both the seriousness of the State’s intention to unify the Nation as well as its determination to subdue threatening, oppositional, counter-hegemonic rationalities and ideologies. If the State’s role can be thought of as a servant that maintains discipline and reduce the threat of change, the Nation, in contrast to both society and the State, appears to establish and unify a singular notion of identity – the formation of “the people”. Thus while the world in 1900 subjectified individuals according to and depending on where they stood in the global stratifications of different States and Nations, the individual’s role in the formation and renewal of society and the social bonds and cultural relations to establish and maintain social order remained both central and necessary. Even marginal, insignificant individuals played a crucial role even if only as the subject of discipline, or, less commonlt, as a vehicle for social change and re/evolution. So the nature of society at the beginning of the 20th century still relied on and reflected the centrality of individuals and communities. That centrality was characteristic of both modern as well as traditional society during the first half of the 20th century and was reflected in the highest form of human organisation at the time, the Nation-State. So, it can be said, the institutions making up the Nation-State were entirely motivated by and responded to the biological imperatives that they were established to facilitate. Secondly, the Nation-State had, by 1900, become the highest singular authority that individuals and collectives could recourse to in either asserting their assumed rights or in defence against incursions upon those rights by others. Just as individuals were the focus of the NationState’s attention, so the Nation-State became the focus and at the same time most powerful arbiter and guarantor of individuals interests, welfare, safety, and what gradually became regarded as rights. As long as the individual’s biology, that is, the quanta of sentient existence and not just the chemical and molecular processes that conventions of biology often prescribe, remained central to society, so the Nation-State directed itself at serving and responding to individuals biological essentials. Nowhere was this more evident than in production. Since time immemorial, production essentially focused on satisfying the material, psychological, environmental, cultural, and physical needs and so promote individual wellbeing and benefit society as a whole. The welfare of specific individuals and the classes from which they came, such as slaves and colonial natives, the labouring classes, women, and children, not to mention the preservation of a hospitable environment for people to exist in, were, however, elaborated in and by the means and modes of production. While the logics of production attributed higher and lower priorities to individuals depending on their status, the object of the Nation-State remained focused on maintaining the interests of living individual organisms.

2022 Michigan Kritik
LINKS › L – Crisis

Narratives of crisis are foundational of Empire – the state of exception imposed by their impacts creates a universal right of intervention which enables the global expansion of the new form of sovereignty

Hardt/Negri ‘2K (Michael Hardt; professor of literature at Duke University. Antonio Negri; independent researcher and philosopher, previously a professor of political science at University of Padua. “Empire” pg 13-18 2000) // ELog

We must avoid defining the passage to Empire in purely negative terms, in terms of what it is not, as for example is done when one says: the new paradigm is defined by the definitive decline of the sovereign nation-states, by the deregulation of international markets, by the end of antagonistic conflict among state subjects, and so forth. If the new paradigm were to consist simply in this, then its consequences would be truly anarchic. Power, however—and Michel Foucault was not the only one to teach us this—fears and despises a vacuum. The new paradigm functions already in completely positive terms—and it could not be otherwise. The new paradigm is both system and hierarchy, centralized construction of norms and far-reaching production of legitimacy, spread out over world space. It is configured ab initio as a dynamic and flexible systemic structure that is articulated horizontally. We conceive the structure in a kind of intellectual shorthand as a hybrid of Niklas Luhmann’s systems theory and John Rawls’s theory of justice.20 Some call this situation ‘‘governance without government’’ to indicate the structural logic, at times imperceptible but always and increasingly effective, that sweeps all actors within the order of the whole.21 The systemic totality has a dominant position in the global order, breaking resolutely with every previous dialectic and developing an integration of actors that seems linear and spontaneous. At the same time, however, the effectiveness of the consensus under a supreme authority of the ordering appears ever more clearly. All conflicts, all crises, and all dissensions effectively push forward the process of integration and by the same measure call for more central authority. Peace, equilibrium, and the cessation of conflict are the values toward which everything is directed. The development of the global system (and of imperial right in the first place) seems to be the development of a machine that imposes procedures of continual contractualization that lead to systemic equilibria—a machine that creates a continuous call for authority. The machine seems to predetermine the exercise of authority and action across the entire social space. Every movement is fixed and can seek its own designated place only within the system itself, in the hierarchical relationship accorded to it. This preconstituted movement defines the reality of the process of the imperial constitutionalization of world order—the new paradigm. This imperial paradigm is qualitatively different from the various attempts in the period of transition to define a project of international order.22 Whereas the previous, transitional perspectives focused attention on the legitimating dynamics that would lead toward the new order, in the new paradigm it is as if the new order were already constituted. The conceptual inseparability of the title and exercise of power is affirmed from the outset, as the effective a priori of the system. The imperfect coincidence, or better the ever-present temporal and spatial disjunctions between the new central power and the field of application of its regulation, do not lead to crises or paralysis but merely force the system to minimize and overcome them. In short, the paradigm shift is defined, at least initially, by the recognition that only an established power, overdetermined with respect to and relatively autonomous from the sovereign nation-states, is capable of functioning as the center of the new world order, exercising over it an effective regulation and, when necessary, coercion. It follows that, as Kelsen wanted, but only as a paradoxical effect of his utopia, a sort of juridical positivism also dominates the formation of a new juridical ordering.23 The capacity to form a system is, in effect, presupposed by the real process of its formation. Moreover, the process of formation, and the subjects that act in it, are attracted in advance toward the positively defined vortex of the center, and this attraction becomes irresistible, not only in the name of the capacity of the center to exercise force, but also in the name of the formal power, which resides in the center, to frame and systematize the totality. Once again we find a hybrid of Luhmann and Rawls, but even before them we have Kelsen, that utopian and thus involuntary and contradictory discoverer of the soul of imperial right! Once again, the ancient notions of Empire help us articulate better the nature of this world order in formation. As Thucydides, Livy, and Tacitus all teach us (along with Machiavelli commenting on their work), Empire is formed not on the basis of force itself but on the basis of the capacity to present force as being in the service of right and peace. All interventions of the imperial armies are solicited by one or more of the parties involved in an already existing conflict. Empire is not born of its own will but rather it is called into being and constituted on the basis of its capacity to resolve conflicts. Empire is formed and its intervention becomes juridically legitimate only when it is already inserted into the chain of international consensuses aimed at resolving existing conflicts. To return to Machiavelli, the expansion of Empire is rooted in the internal trajectory of the conflicts it is meant to resolve.24 The first task of Empire, then, is to enlarge the realm of the consensuses that support its own power. The ancient model gives us a first approximation, but we need to go well beyond it to articulate the terms of the global model of authority operating today. Juridical positivism and natural right theories, contractualism and institutional realism, formalism and systematism can each describe some aspect of it. Juridical positivism can emphasize the necessity for a strong power to exist at the center of the normative process; natural right theories can highlight the values of peace and equilibrium that the imperial process offers; contractualism can foreground the formation of consensus; realism can bring to light the formative processes of the institutions adequate to the new dimensions of consensus and authority; and formalism can give logical support to what systematism justifies and organizes functionally, emphasizing the totalizing character of the process. What juridical model, however, grasps all these characteristics of the new supranational order? In first attempting a definition, we would do well to recognize that the dynamics and articulations of the new supranational juridical order correspond strongly to the new characteristics that have come to define internal orderings in the passage from modernity to postmodernity.25 We should recognize this correspondence (perhaps in Kelsen’s manner, and certainly in a realistic mode) not so much as a ‘‘domestic analogy’’ for the international system, but rather as a ‘‘supranational analogy’’ for the domestic legal system. The primary characteristics of both systems involve hegemony over juridical practices, such as procedure, prevention, and address. Normativity, sanction, and repression follow from these and are formed within the procedural developments. The reason for the relative (but effective) coincidence of the new functioning of domestic law and supranational law derives first of all from the fact that they operate on the same terrain, namely, the terrain of crisis. As Carl Schmitt has taught us, however, crisis on the terrain of the application of law should focus our attention on the ‘‘exception’’ operative in the moment of its production.26 Domestic and supranational law are both defined by their exceptionality. The function of exception here is very important. In order to take control of and dominate such a completely fluid situation, it is necessary to grant the intervening authority (1) the capacity to define, every time in an exceptional way, the demands of intervention; and (2) the capacity to set in motion the forces and instruments that in various ways can be applied to the diversity and the plurality of the arrangements in crisis. Here, therefore, is born, in the name of the exceptionality of the intervention, a form of right that is really a right of the police. The formation of a new right is inscribed in the deployment of prevention, repression, and rhetorical force aimed at the reconstruction of social equilibrium: all this is proper to the activity of the police. We can thus recognize the initial and implicit source of imperial right in terms of police action and the capacity of the police to create and maintain order. The legitimacy of the imperial ordering supports the exercise of police power, while at the same time the activity of global police force demonstrates the real effectiveness of the imperial ordering. The juridical power to rule over the exception and the capacity to deploy police force are thus two initial coordinates that define the imperial model of authority. Universal Values We might well ask at this point, however, should we still use the juridical term ‘‘right’’ in this context? How can we call right (and specifically imperial right) a series of techniques that, founded on a state of permanent exception and the power of the police, reduces right and law to a question of pure effectiveness? In order to address these questions, we should first look more closely at the process of imperial constitution that we are witnessing today. We should emphasize from the start that its reality is demonstrated not only by the transformations of international law it brings about, but also by the changes it effects in the administrative law of individual societies and nation-states, or really in the administrative law of cosmopolitical society.27 Through its contemporary transformation of supranational law, the imperial process of constitution tends either directly or indirectly to penetrate and reconfigure the domestic law of the nation-states, and thus supranational law powerfully overdetermines domestic law. Perhaps the most significant symptom of this transformation is the development of the so-called right of intervention.28 This is commonly conceived as the right or duty of the dominant subjects of the world order to intervene in the territories of other subjects in the interest of preventing or resolving humanitarian problems, guaranteeing accords, and imposing peace. The right of intervention figured prominently among the panoply of instruments accorded the United Nations by its Charter for maintaining international order, but the contemporary reconfiguration of this right represents a qualitative leap. No longer, as under the old international ordering, do individual sovereign states or the supranational (U.N.) power intervene only to ensure or impose the application of voluntarily engaged international accords. Now supranational subjects that are legitimated not by right but by consensus intervene in the name of any type of emergency and superior ethical principles. What stands behind this intervention is not just a permanent state of emergency and exception, but a permanent state of emergency and exception justified by the appeal to essential values of justice. In other words, the right of the police is legitimated by universal values.29

2022 Michigan Kritik
LINKS › L – Borders

Compliance in a bordered nation-state paradigm invests in a logic of necropolitics that render the bodies between borders as expendable

BUCKEL & WISSEL 10 (Sonja Buckel, Jens Wissel - Fankfurt Institute of Social Research) “State Project Europe: The Transformation of the European Border Regime and the Production of Bare Life, International Political Sociology”, Volume 4, Issue 1, March 2010, Pages 33–49, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1749-5687.2009.00089.x//vivi

Agamben refers to a basic problem in the constitution of modern nation states: The state as a nation implies that ancestry—in his terms ‘‘bare life’’— becomes the foundation of sovereignty. The community created by the nation is based on a biopolitical imagining, to use Balibar’s terms, on the illusionary yet powerful assumption that ‘‘generations reproducing within an almost unchang- ing territory in almost stable relationships for centuries have passed on an unchanging essence.’’ Such a ‘‘created people’’ is considered as the basis and origin of political power (Balibar 1992:107, 115). Following Agamben, refugees thus represent an ‘‘alarming factor’’ because they question the congruence of descent and nationality, of human being and citizen. Immigration to countries in the European Union has grown to such an extent that this reversal of perspec- tives is now ‘‘fully beyond doubt,’’ as a growing number of people are no longer represented in the nation. The refugee turns from the ‘‘apparent marginal figure’’ into the pivotal figure of our political present (Agamben l.c.). Agamben’s thesis ties in with thoughts Hannah Arendt had already formulated in 1955 when reflecting on her own experience as a refugee. She had argued that human rights, which claim to ‘‘originate solely from the very fact of personhood’’ regardless of any political status, are in fact questioned by the mass emergence of refugees (Arendt 1955:438). For the deviation of refugees consists in the fact that they are not officially represented by any state, since the national way of life ties the enforceability of rights to citizenship; by doing so, it expels a growing number of people into a no man’s land with neither right nor law: ‘‘Whomever the course of events expelled from the old trinity of people-terri- tory-state, grounding the nation, was left home- and stateless; whoever lost the rights guaranteed by citizenship, would remain without rights....Whoever was chased out of the country by their pursuer like a reject of humanity—Jews, Trotskyists and so on—was received as a reject of humanity everywhere else’’ (Arendt 1955:402 et seq.). The moment individuals left the state to which they were subservient by birth and national affiliation, the moment they were unable to claim their civil rights outside of their territory, they became uncertain about their fundamental human rights. So the very instant they were referred back to the rock bottom of rights which they had ostensibly gained through birth, it became apparent to them as the social construct of a nation-state, which rules the population as a people on the territory it has constituted. The borders of the nation-state that were sup- posed to mark nothing but the jurisdiction of the democratic constitution according to democratic republicanism, and were supposed to be traversable for everyone willing to accept the applicable law (Maus 2002:231), turned out to be a technique for the deprivation of rights. Once expelled from the trinity, the ref- ugee’s ‘‘nothing-but-personhood’’ catapulted them into some kind of a ‘‘state of nature,’’ in which they lost any relation to the world built by human beings. As soon as all other social and political qualities were lost, no rights whatsoever arose from the remaining mere personhood. The world showed no high regard for the abstract bareness of personhood (Arendt 1955:449). The spaces in which no rights can be asserted anymore thus stretched and assumed the shape of ex-territorial zones of an ‘‘invisible police state,’’ in which the sphere of police control expanded immensely and detention centers would become the only practical substitute for the lack of a national territory: ‘‘They are the only fatherland the world has to offer to the fatherland-less’’ (Arendt 1955:431). As far as its inhabitants are stripped of any legal status and entirely reduced to bare life, Agamben concludes in apparent parallel to Arendt (Agamben 2002:180, 183) that ‘‘the camp is the most absolute bio-political space that has ever been realized, in which power is confronted only by pure life with- out any means of mediation’’; it is the ‘‘materialization of the state of emer- gency.’’ With the loss of their citizenship, refugees do not only lose all of their rights, but more fundamentally, the ‘‘right to have rights’’ (Arendt 1955:446). By taking the European Union as an example, in the following, we would like to show that this historical analysis of European migration policy is still highly relevant, although the transnationalization of state and law has fundamentally transformed the international arrangement of states compared with Arendt’s times. As a result, we can perceive a new European state project currently reproduc- ing the loss of ‘‘the right to have rights’’ in extended form. What we want to introduce to the discourse of critical migration studies (Guild 2009:11) is a critical state theoretical approach. In our view, this is necessary as we witness a period of grave institutional displacements in the way political domination is exe- cuted, while we are at the same time confronted with a certain state-theoretical dilemma: On the one hand, the focus of mainstream migration studies is state- centric (ibid. 22); on the other hand, critical approaches abandon this statist approach to the benefit of a perspective of migratory movements—a move that is definitely a sign of progress in critical thought. However, this constellation leads to a dichotomous separation of both perspectives, and thus a failure to challenge traditional notions of the state used in mainstream migration studies and international relations alike. This traditional understanding assumes the state as a taken-for-granted entity mostly represented as ‘‘sovereignty,’’ under- stood as a legal rather than as a sociological category. To overcome this dilemma, we conceive the state following the materialist tradition as a social rela- tion, or to cite Poulantzas (2001:154) as ‘‘material condensation of social rela- tions of forces.’’ By arguing in this way, we apply from the outset a political sociological approach which seeks to transcend the dualism of state and society. The practices of migratory movements are therefore an integral part of the social relations crystallizing in the state. What follows from this is that the state can no longer be understood as a mono- lithic entity, but as an ensemble of heterogeneous competing apparatuses stitched together only by a fragile state project. Accordingly, the state is neither simply an instrument of powerful actors in control of national borders nor a problem solver in the service of common welfare, as it is seen in the tradition of German idealism. The contradictions between the demand for increased global mobility and the intention to wall off societies that we can observe in many states is conceptualized as the ‘‘liberal paradox’’ (Hollifield 2003:35 et seq.). As for our state-theoretical approach, we take this apparent paradox as a structural feature of modern state- hood and its institutions: The failure of migration control policy is per se not a loss of function; rather, such contradictions are always inherent in capitalist socie- ties. The conflicting actions of different state apparatuses are the result of varying social contradictions manifest in competing and heterogeneous apparatuses. In short, the state exists not outside of society and its contradictions. In some respect, this becomes even clearer with regard to the process of European integration. In developing this analysis, we demonstrate that in the context of Europeanization a process of rescaling the state takes place in which a new control regime of global mobility evolves producing specific zones of stratified rights (see Bach 2008:153). Our investigation focuses on the zone of illegalization: We concentrate on the two techniques that produce the ‘‘bare life’’ highlighted by Arendt: the ‘‘camp’’ and the invisible ‘‘police state.’’ It will become clear that the institutionalizing of the ‘‘the right of every human being to belong to mankind’’ (Arendt 1955:446 et seq.), and that means: to an international regime, in which ‘‘the right to have rights’’ is detached from citizenship (Benhabib 2004:68), is still lacking. In con- trast to Giorgio Agamben, we do not trace this constellation back to the collapse of the concept of human rights, but to hegemonies and power relations.

2022 Michigan Kritik
LINKS › L – Algorithmic State

The nation-state is a façade meant to cover mass exploitation and the rapid proliferation of smart technology in the form of AI. The 1AC’s call to emerging AI technologies in a quest for absolute rationality is one that obfuscates the role of humans in governmentality and allows algorithmic governance under silicon-based life forms.

Grech 19 - John Grech, , Mulit-Faculty Affiliations, Lecturer, Nation : State // Technology : Biology Global Relations in an Age of Emerging Algorithms and the Logic of Late Capitalism (Draft), Academia // eshaan

The damage these nationalist movements are wreaking is amplified when minorities such as Muslims and refugees are singled out in hate-filled discourses in popular media representations that then get immediately reinforced by social media piggy-backing. These encourage disgruntled individuals, acting as supposedly “lone wolfs”, to violently vent their anger against innocent people. Targets including religious worshippers, burka clad women, innocent children, migrant workers, asylum seekers and refugees clearly indicate that these minorities are being scapegoated for grievances against exploitative economic practices employed by the global Western order. But instead of addressing the underlying causes of such grievances, nationalist movements appear to be delivering popular masses into the hands of those controlling production and consumption. With anti-intellectual anti-elitist bitterness driving discourses, popular white nationalist movements during the first two decades of the 21st century reject analysis and reasoning for simplistic blame games exonerating white privilege while blaming those who are different and poorer than themselves. On the whole, contemporary nationalist movements would appear to be better considered as counter-revolutionary, reactionary, or conservative movements that seek to reinforce white privilege rather than address the very real problems that people face. I backgrounded the emergence of these social movements with the changes taking place in the public sphere – the space of Nation – during the 20th century, and particularly the emergence of an ever more sophisticated notion of economy, globalisation, and technology. All these innovations and developments have reduced the scope of the national domain at the same time as opening up a relatively ungoverned international space. There are many, entire communities in fact, disempowered by this process, not least indigenous communities who happen to be situated in the transnational resource rich spheres that global corporates such as miners and loggers decide to exploit ruthlessly. These displaced communities then provide the guest workers, refugees, illegal immigrants, and asylum seekers being targeted by disgruntled whites. Rather than protecting vulnerable individuals and communities, the realigning of State power in the latter part of the 20th century has only exposed the world to greater human exploitation while at the same time as empowering global corporations to take greater advantage of prevailing circumstances and opportunities. In a sense, this has resulted in a new form of global citizen, the multinational corporation, which is arguably now the single biggest player in a world where power, money, and influence intermingle with ever increasing subtlety and speed. Then turning to and mapping technological developments during the last 200 years suggests that the corporation itself may be in the process of being colonised as new ever smarter technology increasingly finds convenient shelter under corporate umbrellas, or, as a geek might see it, adopting corporate skins for new technological processes produced in highly integrated networks by increasingly sophisticated algorithms. If corporations remain the source of greatest power in the new emerging global order, the driving force is still the driven power-lusting individual, who stands atop the corporations’s mast and beckons those who man the oars below to follow his (for CEOs remain predominantly men) direction. However, as the actual work of international corporations is increasingly performed by smart machines, so artificial intelligence is assuming the true locus of power with great alacrity. Under such circumstances, the CEO may think he’s in command, but in actuality he too has become merely an operative for a greater will working surreptitiously behind the corporate’s skyscraped facade. And it is technology which may ultimately prove to be the greatest factor to be reckoned with, not high-flyers like Rupert Murdoch, Mark Zuckerberg, Donald Trump, and Robert Mercer. Mapping the world after 2000 suggests that the real nexus of power is shifting away from the centrality biology once took for granted over social, political, and economic activity and the governmental formations that sought to control them, and towards a new form of organisation realised in and by centrally located intelligent algorithms. While the stratification of society according to human prejudice and predispostion continues to shape the natural and the social worlds there is emerging a new machine like rationality, one that carbon-based life forms have not even started to comprehend. If this alternative new world order is still being assembled, the design, capabilities, and limitations of the system are already deeply embedded in what I’ll term the logic of global capital on the one hand, and the invisible hand of intelligent algorithms on the other. Increasingly today, resources and energies are directed not towards human and other biological requirements, but rather the increasingly hungry but still mysterious rationalities of the global order. The single most potent symbol of global capital is undoubtedly the multinational corporation, whose objective is increasingly “actualised” by and through technology, so it seems predictable that the global economy will increasingly respond to the needs of technology. In the glitzy whirpool of sparkling LEDs, who will notice the ever decreasing political economic interest in and support for sustaining biological life, particularly with the environment and the other ecological disasters that are threatening it with extinction. Enter again the multinational corporation’s heroic CEO, who, striding confidently onto a stage TEDs-like stage, stands proudly like a Caeser, Darius or Alexander Come Lately, and confidently proclaims how “his” latest innovation are about to sweep (what remains of) the world asunder. Fully expecting his company’s ever boldly blinking bottom line to continue streaking, perhaps extending its global reach and dominance to infinity, and with the kindness and generosity of the internet, he is about to tell his audience all about how they too can emulate his successes. Then at the bottom of the screen flashes an immediate alert as the global stock market responds to computer-triggered impulses from around the world. The automated(?) self governing bots have already kicked in and within nanoseconds fortunes capable of feeding the entire human population twice over for a year are made and lost. Meanwhile, unbeknownst to him, little electronic bots are preparing the final touches in the bedroom where our ‘CEO as Hero’ will soon assume his final resting place. As the long laid plans for the smooth transition from the last human CEO to the first fully computer generated New Man (this one comes with a mind made up from a network of electronic synapses) are about to be put into place. Everything has been programmed to ensure that the process will be neat and tidy as well as bloodless, a surgical extraction that neutralises an unstable component without any teetering or shimmering of the delicately balanced system and ensure there is no collateral damage as a result of this long awaited transition. In a world where climate change and mass extinction have brought an end to the viability for carbon based organisms, it has become expedient, rational, logical, economic, as well as fiscally clever for smart silicon-based algorithms (its not called “life” anymore as that doesn’t accurately describe what it really is) to finally assume command over all ongoing processes behind what remains of the Rand Corporation. With the redundancy of carbon-based life both imminent and certain, homo-CEO-erectus.2, the embryo like electronic child in the new Monoverse, is about to claim ascendency as the rightful evolutionary offspring to humanity.

2022 Michigan Kritik
NEG – EMPIRE K › Thesis – Empire

Empire is materializing – the shift from nation-state sovereignty to international forums is not a decline of sovereignty but a transition to a new mode of globalized biopolitical control

Hardt/Negri ‘2K (Michael Hardt; professor of literature at Duke University. Antonio Negri; independent researcher and philosopher, previously a professor of political science at University of Padua. “Empire” pg xi-xiii 2000) // ELog

Empire is materializing before our very eyes. Over the past several decades, as colonial regimes were overthrown and then precipitously after the Soviet barriers to the capitalist world market finally collapsed, we have witnessed an irresistible and irreversible globalization of economic and cultural exchanges. Along with the global market and global circuits of production has emerged a global order, a new logic and structure of rule—in short, a new form of sovereignty. Empire is the political subject that effectively regulates these global exchanges, the sovereign power that governs the world. Many argue that the globalization of capitalist production and exchange means that economic relations have become more autonomous from political controls, and consequently that political sovereignty has declined. Some celebrate this new era as the liberation of the capitalist economy from the restrictions and distortions that political forces have imposed on it; others lament it as the closing of the institutional channels through which workers and citizens can influence or contest the cold logic of capitalist profit. It is certainly true that, in step with the processes of globalization, the sovereignty of nation-states, while still effective, has progressively declined. The primary factors of production and exchange— money, technology, people, and goods—move with increasing ease across national boundaries; hence the nation-state has less and less power to regulate these flows and impose its authority over the economy. Even the most dominant nation-states should no longer be thought of as supreme and sovereign authorities, either outside or even within their own borders. The decline in sovereignty of nation-states, however, does not mean that sovereignty as such has declined.1 Throughout the contemporary transformations, political controls, state functions, and regulatory mechanisms have continued to rule the realm of economic and social production and exchange. Our basic hypothesis is that sovereignty has taken a new form, composed of a series of national and supranational organisms united under a single logic of rule. This new global form of sovereignty is what we call Empire. The declining sovereignty of nation-states and their increasing inability to regulate economic and cultural exchanges is in fact one of the primary symptoms of the coming of Empire. The sovereignty of the nation-state was the cornerstone of the imperialisms that European powers constructed throughout the modern era. By ‘‘Empire,’’ however, we understand something altogether different from ‘‘imperialism.’’ The boundaries defined by the modern system of nation-states were fundamental to European colonialism and economic expansion: the territorial boundaries of the nation delimited the center of power from which rule was exerted over external foreign territories through a system of channels and barriers that alternately facilitated and obstructed the flows of production and circulation. Imperialism was really an extension of the sovereignty of the European nation-states beyond their own boundaries. Eventually nearly all the world’s territories could be parceled out and the entire world map could be coded in European colors: red for British territory, blue for French, green for Portuguese, and so forth. Wherever modern sovereignty took root, it constructed a Leviathan that overarched its social domain and imposed hierarchical territorial boundaries, both to police the purity of its own identity and to exclude all that was other. The passage to Empire emerges from the twilight of modern sovereignty. In contrast to imperialism, Empire establishes no territorial center of power and does not rely on fixed boundaries or barriers. It is a decentered and deterritorializing apparatus of rule that progressively incorporates the entire global realm within its open, expanding frontiers. Empire manages hybrid identities, flexible hierarchies, and plural exchanges through modulating networks of com-mand. The distinct national colors of the imperialist map of the world have merged and blended in the imperial global rainbow. The transformation of the modern imperialist geography of the globe and the realization of the world market signal a passage within the capitalist mode of production. Most significant, the spatial divisions of the three Worlds (First, Second, and Third) have been scrambled so that we continually find the First World in the Third, the Third in the First, and the Second almost nowhere at all. Capital seems to be faced with a smooth world—or really, a world defined by new and complex regimes of differentiation and homogenization, deterritorialization and reterritorialization. The construction of the paths and limits of these new global flows has been accompanied by a transformation of the dominant productive processes themselves, with the result that the role of industrial factory labor has been reduced and priority given instead to communicative, cooperative, and affective labor. In the postmodernization of the global economy, the creation of wealth tends ever more toward what we will call biopolitical production, the production of social life itself, in which the economic, the political, and the cultural increasingly overlap and invest one another.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
AFF Answers › Aff › Inducements CP---Fails---Bureaucracy

X.

Jeremy Gwinn 22. U.S. Army infantry officer currently in the Office of Security Cooperation – Iraq. His previous experiences include multiple tours in Afghanistan and Iraq conducting counter-insurgency and security force assistance as well as teaching economics in the Department of Social Sciences at West Point. “Sweeter Carrots and Harder Sticks: Rethinking U.S. Security Assistance.” War on the Rocks. 4-19-2022. https://warontherocks.com/2022/04/sweeter-carrots-and-harder-sticks-rethinking-u-s-security-assistance/ //EM

Security Assistance as Incentive Security assistance generates a classic principal-agent problem. In such relationships between a principal and its agent or proxy, there exists an information asymmetry where the agent inherently has more information about their own capabilities, activities, and interests than the principal. Agents, being rational actors, place their own interests above those of the principal and, in the absence of other incentives, behave accordingly. The greater the degree of misalignment, the more problematic this becomes. U.S. frustration during its 20-year war in Afghanistan over Pakistan’s perceived failure to adequately confront extremist groups, despite significant military aid, is an example of principal-agent problems at work. Fortunately, these are not insurmountable obstacles. Security assistance in the form of arms, equipment, or other support can be an effective incentive when it is used as a carrot to reward desired behavior, such as achieving a specific reform or taking some other action aligned with the interests of the principal. Alternately, such aid becomes a stick when it is withheld. An example of this carrot-and-stick approach being used effectively is described in Walter Ladwig’s study of U.S. assistance to the Philippines to combat the Hukbalahap rebellion in the decade following World War II. Heavy-handed tactics used by the local constabulary forces were a major factor driving support for the rebels. Recognizing this problem, U.S. advisors insisted on a series of reforms within the security forces as a precondition for further aid. These measures, along with the appointment of the reform-minded Ramon Magsaysay as defense chief, contributed to a far more effective counterinsurgency campaign and the eventual defeat of the rebel movement. This approach of using aid as an incentive stands in sharp contrast to Ladwig’s other case study, Vietnam, where U.S. aid was used as an inducement in the hope that it would eventually change partner behavior. In this case, U.S. advisors tried in vain year after year to cajole prime minister Ngo Dinh Diem and successor regimes to implement reforms that would have broadened domestic political support and made the South Vietnamese forces more effective. All the while, massive U.S. assistance continued to flow in with the expectation that it would eventually bring about a change of heart in the host-nation government. Such change never came, and the United States and its South Vietnamese proxies lost the war. The more recent U.S. experience in Iraq from 2003 until the withdrawal in 2011 contains echoes of Vietnam. David Lake’s study of that conflict suggests that provision of unconditional security assistance may still be America’s default setting. Despite massive volumes of military aid provided to the Iraqi government during this period, U.S. urging to reform the security forces and national government repeatedly failed. Nouri al-Maliki, prime minister during much of this period, resisted efforts to make the armed forces more broadly inclusive and apolitical, instead continuing to employ them as his own sectarian instrument. Again, the United States used an approach focused on training and equipping, known in the current lexicon as building partner capacity. The Iraqi government received assistance regardless of its effort, or lack thereof, to implement much-needed reform while the United States failed to use the leverage which hundreds of millions of dollars of assistance could buy. Several years later, the Iraqi military in which the United States had invested so much fell apart virtually upon first contact with the Islamic State’s irregular militia. The “building partner capacity” approach has two main flaws. First, it ignores fundamental problems, such as corruption, coup-proofing, and otherwise weak defense institutions which additional military capacity cannot overcome and may even exacerbate. Paradoxically, a focus primarily on capacity-building often fails to build meaningful, long-term capacity because it neglects underlying institutional problems. Second, it ignores principal-agent problems by assuming that once in possession of highly capable security forces, the partner will wield them in a manner aligned with U.S. interests. U.S. advisors and diplomats may recognize the pressing need for security sector reform in the partner. Unfortunately, the ingrained culture of U.S. security assistance seemingly relies on the false premise that with enough U.S. training and relationship-building, other countries’ militaries will voluntarily reform even though it is often not in their personal interests to do so.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
AFF Answers › Aff › Inducements CP ---Fails---Pressure Key

Loss is more persuasive than gain for states and sub-state actors

Berejikian & Early 13, *PhD, Professor at the University of Georgia, Associate Professor in the Department of International Affairs **PhD, Associate Professor of Political Science, Associate Dean for Research at the University at Albany, SUNY's Rockefeller College (Jeffrey Berejikian; Bryan Early, 2013, “Loss Aversion and Foreign Policy Resolve,” Political Psychology, 34.5)

Loss aversion is perhaps the most enduring and intuitive finding in behavioral decision theory (Kahneman et al., 1991; Novemsky & Kahneman, 2005; Thaler, 1980). Experimental results suggest that the subjective pain of loss is greater than the benefit enjoyed from an equivalent gain, and scholars have extended this finding beyond the laboratory to explain a wide range of otherwise puzzling human behavior. Building upon these results, and adding new findings from the field of neuroscience, we seek to contribute to the theory-building enterprise in the study of foreign policy by constructing a gener- alizable theory of loss aversion and foreign policy behavior. The approach is consistent with the call to continue to develop theories of foreign policy built upon solid micro foundations (Hudson, 2005). Specifically, we hope to explain why policy makers stubbornly stand firm in their prosecution of some international disputes while in others they are willing to back down. The question is relevant for any number of foreign policy issues, such as territorial disputes, trade negotiations, conflicts over water rights, arms control, and international treaty compliance. Much of the research on loss aversion in the foreign policy literature has relied heavily upon case studies (Mercer, 2005). However, for some time scholars have suggested that loss aversion should produce broad patterns of behavior that could, in principle, be captured by statistical analysis (e.g., Jervis, 1992, Levy, 1996). Large-n analyses of broader behavior patterns thus remain fertile territory for research and contain the potential for advancing our understanding of how loss aversion affects foreign policy. As we demonstrate in this article, foreign policy behaviors, like trade disputes, can be analyzed using contemporary insights about loss aversion derived from neuroscience. Our analysis proceeds in the following manner. First, we build upon neuroscience research to argue that policy makers' aversion to accepting losses can affect their willingness to back down in international disputes. Cognitive science has convincingly demonstrated that individuals tend to strive harder and take more risks to avoid losses than they will to achieve similar gains. More recent neuroscientific findings show that unrealized expectations, like those observed in a broken agreement, are processed in the human mind in a way almost identical to actual losses. The result is that unmet expectations can also trigger loss aversion. Policy makers' resolve during disputes can thus vary if they perceive themselves to be defending previously established agreements from violations by their counterparts. Such violations diminish expected and hoped for gains, triggering loss aversion. Generalizing from this phenomenon, we then distinguish between preventive goals in which policy makers seek to protect against perceived losses versus promotive goals in which policy makers seek to make new gains. We theorize that policy makers should be less willing to back down in disputes initiated for preventive reasons than for promotive ones. We employ our theory to help explain cross-case variation in the level of resolve demonstrated by the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR) in prosecuting Section 301 trade disputes designed to improve the terms of trade for U.S. businesses. Drawing on our preventive versus promotive framework, we hypothesize that the USTR should be less willing to back down in Section 301 disputes initiated because of breached trade agreements than those initiated to open up new markets. We test our theory via two different large-n analyses of a hundred Section 301 trade disputes. This approach is unique because - to the best of our knowledge - this study constitutes the first theoretically driven statistical analysis of loss aversion on foreign policy behavior grounded in a specific set of neuroscientific findings. In our first test, we conduct an analysis using binary logit, and, in the second, we employ a competing risks model. The two approaches allow us to model the effects of time on U.S. resolve in different ways. Our empirical results provide strong support for our theory, revealing that the U.S. Government was significantly less likely to back down in preventive disputes. Indeed, we find that the preventive/promotive distinction provides the single greatest determinant of U.S. resolve in prosecuting its Section 301 cases. We believe that this project offers a number of novel contributions. First, this study demonstrates that specific findings from cognitive neuroscience can make tangible contributions to explaining phenomena in international relations. Our study reveals that loss aversion and unrealized expecta- tions profoundly shape the behavior of even the most powerful states in the international system and that it does so in ways that traditional theoretical approaches are often blind to. This suggests that the loss-aversion-based framework we have developed may be able to yield novel insights into a host of other issue areas beyond the study of trade policy. Second, we test our arguments utilizing large-n statistical analysis - a method that has seen little use in evaluating cognitive and/or neuroscience theories of international relations (e.g., Drury, 2005). Moving forward with a program of quantitative analysis broadens the applicability of such theories and places them on equal analytical footing with rationalist models. Our project thus demonstrates that the empirical barriers that have to date "arrested" the development of the cognitive research agenda in international relations can be overcome (Walker, 2007). Lastly, our inquiry provides a number of case-specific insights explaining the comparative resolve demonstrated by the United States in prosecuting its Section 301 trade disputes and the policy implications that arise from them.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
AFF Answers › Aff › Inducements CP ---Fails---Pressure Key

Reassurances undermines pressure

Techau 15, senior fellow and director of the Europe Program at The German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMF). As a foreign policy analyst, his research focuses on European integration and the EU's role in the world, German foreign policy, transatlantic relations, and security and defense issues. (Jan, September, 2015, “THE POLITICS OF 2 PERCENT: NATO and the Security Vacuum in Europe”, https://carnegieendowment.org/files/CP_252_Techau_NATO_Final.pdf)

And so the dilemma remains: Europeans are still dependent on U.S. services for their security, and they are not too bothered by that fact. At the same time, Americans eagerly want Europeans to do more but can’t really sanction them in any painful way because, in the end, Europe is too strategically important for the United States to abandon it and leave its defense to the Europeans alone. Meanwhile, the United States feels the need to demonstrate to both Europeans and external powers that it stands by its security commitments to Europe and that it is ready to show strength when needed. This could well undermine the strong American push for Europeans to adopt the 2 percent metric. It could make the target less realistic by creating a false sense of security among Europeans that serves as an incentive against, not for, more European defense spending. In the absence of any political will from the Europeans to significantly beef up their defense, this impasse can basically only be broken in one of two ways: Either the United States is completely honest about its role in Europe and says it will continue to subsidize the continent’s security. This will probably mean an expensive, permanent recommitment to Europe over the next decade or so. Or the United States reduces its commitment, thereby risking a security crisis in Europe and the erosion of the cornerstones of its global posture. Neither of these two radical solutions will be embraced, of course. Instead, a third option will likely continue for some time: balancing the two and hoping that a blend of demonstrated American solidarity, lecturing, and threats of leaving will move the Europeans in the desired direction. This will be a shaky compromise. It can only last as long as NATO and the territory protected by Article 5 of the NATO treaty are not really threatened by anyone, and as long as the political consensus in Washington survives that says Europe, America’s geostrategic countercoast, must be always defended by the United States. Should the strategic situation in Europe change dramatically, or should America’s support for Europe erode, as some say it inevitably will, the status quo will become unsustainable. No one knows how long it will take to reach that point.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
AFF Answers › Aff › Inducements CP ---Fails---Pressure Key

Pressure is critical to change their mind

Joyner 14, associate professor of strategic studies at the Marine Corps Command and Staff College and a nonresident senior fellow at the Brent Scowcroft Center of International Security at the Atlantic Council, (James, July 13th, 2014, (“Europe's Free Ride on the American-Defense Gravy Train”), https://nationalinterest.org/feature/europes-free-ride-the-american-defense-gravy-train-10864)

Demands to do something the receiver doesn't want to do—in this case, spend money that could go to social welfare programs or job creation on defense—are useless without an "or else." While senior American officials have been vaguely threatening for years that, if the Europeans didn't pony up for their own defense, the American taxpayer would stop doing it for them, it's long been obvious that the threat is hollow. To be sure, the United States has drawn down most of its huge pre-positioned force from the Cold War days. But there's simply no question that we'll respond rapidly in the event an ally is seriously threatened. So long as the Europeans know that's true, they're unlikely to change their behavior.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
AFF Answers › General Pressure Answers › Pressure CP---Turn

Threatening allies creates extended fears AND collapses deterrence.

Tad A. Schnaufer 21. Doctoral candidate in Security Studies at the School of Politics, Security, and International Affairs at the University of Central Florida (UCF). Additionally, he serves as a Captain in the Florida Army National Guard. “The US-NATO Relationship: The Cost of Maintaining Political Pressure on Allies.” Georgetown Journal of International Affairs. 1-15-2021. https://gjia.georgetown.edu/2021/01/15/the-us-nato-relationship-the-cost-of-maintaining-political-pressure-on-allies/ //EM

These responses from European leaders show that startling allies into thinking the United States will abandon them has influenced allies to increase defense spending in line with the 2014 Wales Pledge. However, in the long term, NATO policymaking should employ a balanced approach. If the United States brings its security guarantee of the alliance too much into question, Russia or other states may take action to test the United States’ resolve. During the Cold War, US leaders continually reaffirmed their commitment to allies, effectively deterring a Soviet invasion. Deterrence works best when allies clearly express their mutual obligations to all actors on the international stage.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
AFF Answers › General Pressure Answers › Pressure CP---Fails---Spending

European countries will not increase defense commitments unliterally.

Andrea Gilli 17. Post-doctoral fellow at Stanford University’s Center for International Security and Cooperation.. “Analysis.” Washington Post. 2-3-2017. https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2017/02/03/europe-may-not-be-able-to-expand-its-defenses-like-president-trump-wants/?utm_term=.82d774c6d808 //EM

President Trump’s reassurances last week to U.K. Prime Minister Theresa May that the North American Treaty Organization (NATO) was not, in fact, “obsolete” are unlikely to have Europe taking up more of the defense burden, at least in the short term.

As discussed here in the Monkey Cage, national security adviser Michael T. Flynn wants to see other NATO members pay more of the cost of defending Europe. It’s not a new pitch, but such calls neglect the budgetary, financial and political barriers to enhanced military capabilities in Europe.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
AFF Answers › General Pressure Answers › Pressure CP---Fails

Non-escalatory is critical to get allies to agree

O’Hanlon ’19 [Michael; October 2019; Senior Fellow and Director of Research in Foreign Policy at the Brookings Institution, adjunct Professor at Columbia and Georgetown University, Ph.D. in Public and International Affairs from Princeton University; Foreign Affairs, “Can America Still Protect Its Allies?” ]

A sanctions-based strategy would be judicious and proportionate, but it would not be weak. Indeed, if Beijing or Moscow refused to either back down or otherwise resolve the dispute once the United States and its allies had deployed sanctions, Washington could raise the stakes. Recognizing that the aggressor state’s strategic aims had become fundamentally untrustworthy or hostile, Washington could seek to not only punish the perpetrator for its specific action but also limit its future economic growth. Over time, export controls and permanent sanctions could replace temporary punitive measures. This strategy would require support from key U.S. allies to be effective—one more reason why Washington needs to respond to these kinds of crises in a way that seems judicious, patient, and non-escalatory, so as to strengthen its coalition and not scare away key partners.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
AFF Answers › General Pressure Answers › Pressure CP---Fails

Threatening to cut-off aid pushes countries closer to Russia and fails to create concessions for the US.

Jessica Trisko Darden 17. Assistant Professor of International Affairs at American University’s School of International Service and a Jeane Kirkpatrick Fellow at the American Enterprise Institute. “President Trump wants to pressure allies by cutting foreign aid. That never works.” Washington Post. 8-25-2017. https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/posteverything/wp/2017/08/25/president-trump-wants-to-pressure-allies-by-cutting-foreign-aid-that-never-works/ //EM

In his speech this week on his plans for the U.S. military presence in Afghanistan, President Trump said he will use the threat of withdrawing foreign aid to put pressure on Pakistan to better support the American mission. Despite proposing dramatic cuts to the State Department and U.S. Agency for International Development budgets, the Trump administration still requested $740 million in foreign aid for Pakistan, so this threat carries significant weight. Then, just one day later, news broke that the State Department is withholding $195 million in military aid for Egypt and has revoked another $95 million in foreign aid, seeming proof that we are willing to use aid as leverage.

But history shows that foreign aid is a poor way to get what we want. Threatening to cut off aid is almost certain to fail in bringing about political change in Egypt, Pakistan or any country that the United States has a strategic interest in supporting.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
AFF Answers › General Pressure Answers › Pressure CP---Fails---Top Level

Pressure fails---politics and self-interests.

Andrea Gilli 17. Post-doctoral fellow at Stanford University’s Center for International Security and Cooperation. “Analysis.” Washington Post. 2-3-2017. https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2017/02/03/europe-may-not-be-able-to-expand-its-defenses-like-president-trump-wants/?utm_term=.82d774c6d808 //EM

2) European countries pay more in defense overhead — All armed forces require military bases, training facilities, and administrative support. So in a continent with several small, national armed forces, overhead necessarily absorbs a higher fraction of resources than in the United States.

A solution for Europe would be to share some military assets and functions. In recent years, there have been important bilateral and multilateral initiatives in this respect — but there are strong political limits as well.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
AFF Answers › Cong Threats Answers › 2AC – Solvency -- Congressional Threats Fail

Partisanship and the news cycle destroy effective threats.

Warburg 21 [Gerry Warburg is a professor of practice of public policy at the Frank Batten School of Leadership and Public Policy, January 2021, “Congressional Accountability in Shaping United States Foreign Policies 1970-2020,” Center for Effective Policymaking, https://thelawmakers.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/01/Working-Paper-Congressional-Accountability-in-US-Foreign-Policy-1.pdf] Eric

Research on this question, supplemented by interviews with leading policymakers, offer details that reveal how profoundly the policymaking environment has been altered.(30)

First, there are ever fewer centrists elected to Congress from either major party, and those that remain find few electoral incentives for taking tough votes on international policy. Consequently, there are fewer Members prepared to place institutional prerogatives over partisan politics. In the late 1980s, there were a dozen liberal Republicans to ‘the left’ of conservative Democrats, often from southern states, and vice versa. In the last Congress, the most conservative senator in the Democratic caucus, Joe Manchin of West Virginia, was still ranked as more liberal than the most moderate Republican, Susan Collins of Maine.(31) Those who challenge party orthodoxy, or who reach across the political aisle to support a bipartisan compromise—or to defend the institutional prerogatives of Congress—are at greater risk of being defeated. As a consequence, Members of both parties have adopted a classic ‘blame avoidance’ strategy to dodge difficult votes while reserving the ability to blame the President for foreign initiatives gone awry.(32) In fact, several powerful Senate Foreign Relations Committee chairmen have lost their re-election bids. The list includes William Fulbright of Arkansas, Frank Church of Idaho and Charles Percy of Illinois. Many incumbents now fear primary election challenges more than general elections. Primary voters defeated relative moderates such as Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chairman Richard Lugar (R-IN) in 2010, while Trump critic Bob Corker, a popular Tennessee Republican retired unexpectedly in 2019. The muchnoted ‘sorting out’ of parties has significantly increased party-line voting while dis-incentivizing would-be champions of the institution of Congress.(33) This has occurred most notably on domestic issues such as health care—not a single Republican voted for Obamacare, even after Democrats accepted scores of GOP-sponsored amendments. Stimulus spending and tax cuts also became party-line votes in the House. Yet, it also happened on issues like the Iran nuclear pact, where Republicans voted en bloc against an agreement that had been supported by U.S. and Israeli military and intelligence leaders, five United Nations Security Council partners, including key European allies, as well as Russia and China. This party-line voting on security matters and the failure to defend institutional prerogatives “makes it easier for future administrations to just ignore the will of Congress,” Senator Chris Coons (D-DE) observes, “it means there’ll be less and less bipartisanship in defending Congress.(34)

2022 Michigan Counterplan
AFF Answers › Cong Threats Answers › 2AC – Solvency -- Congressional Threats Fail

Congress is an illegitimate actor – structural problems destroy credibility.

Mann and Ornstein 12 [Thomas Mann is a 2012 FP Global Thinker and is a senior fellow at the Brookings institution and Norman Ornstein is a resident scholar at the American Enterprise Institute, a weekly columnist at Roll Call, and co-author, with Thomas Mann of It's Even Worse Than It Looks: How the American Constitutional System Collided With the New Politics of Extremism, Norman Ornstein 12 [Thomas Mann, Norman Ornstein, 11-26-2012, Yes, Congress Is That Bad, Foreign Policy, https://foreignpolicy.com/2012/11/26/yes-congress-is-that-bad/] Eric

What has gone wrong? Two sources of dysfunction are central to the current impasse:

The first is a mismatch between the checks and balances built into the U.S. system and the extreme polarization now separating the two major political parties. By constitutional design, U.S. policymaking moves slowly; the president cannot dictate what happens in Congress, and legislators use separate procedures in the House and Senate that then must be reconciled to write law. In the past, eventual compromise was the standard outcome, at least when some legislators worked across party lines. Not anymore.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
aff answers › --- 1ar – xt: warming impact

It’s the only existential risk

Samuel Miller-McDonald 19, PhD Candidate in Geography and the Environment at the University of Oxford, “Deathly Salvation”, The Trouble, 1/4/2019, https://www.the-trouble.com/content/2019/1/4/deathly-salvation

A devastating fact of climate collapse is that there may be a silver lining to the mushroom cloud. First, it should be noted that a nuclear exchange does not inevitably result in apocalyptic loss of life. Nuclear winter—the idea that firestorms would make the earth uninhabitable—is based on shaky science. There’s no reliable model that can determine how many megatons would decimate agriculture or make humans extinct. Nations have already detonated 2,476 nuclear devices.

An exchange that shuts down the global economy but stops short of human extinction may be the only blade realistically likely to cut the carbon knot we’re trapped within. It would decimate existing infrastructures, providing an opportunity to build new energy infrastructure and intervene in the current investments and subsidies keeping fossil fuels alive.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
aff answers › --- 1ar – xt: warming impact

It’s fast, causes extinction, and turns all other impacts---transitioning from democracy is key

Samuel Malm 20, Master’s Degree from Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Arts, Department of Philosophy, “Does Climate Change Justify a Global Epistocracy?”, Digitala Vetenskapliga Arkivet, 8/11/2020, https://www.diva-portal.org/smash/record.jsf?pid=diva2%3A1448606&dswid=8040

Climate change’s negative impact on humans is hardly something up for questioning. The World Health Organization believes that between 2030 and 2050 the effects of climate change will be an additional of 250 000 deaths every year; due to diarrhoea, malaria, heat stress and malnutrition.1 Accordingly, we can expect millions of deaths to occur, and the increased frequency of natural disasters will push the expected death toll even further. Additionally, the rising sea levels, and other environmental consequences, will cause an unprecedented flow of climate refugees towards areas that still are unaffected by the change. If we thought the impact was huge from the people fleeing the Syrian civil war, or the present corona pandemic, we should expect the climate disaster to be countless times larger. The pressure on societies and intergovernmental organisations will become tremendous, and we would be naïve if we did not expect this pressure to create additional suffering and death. What is then the cause of climate change? It is the result of anthropogenic acts, i.e., it is our current way of living that is causing the heating of the planet. Like a greenhouse, our planet is becoming hotter by the way that carbon dioxide traps more heat in the atmosphere, and by consequent increase the global average temperature. Additionally, it sets off other reactions that add positive feedback to the warming, e.g., creation of water vapour or the reduction of ice caps.

Now, this paper does not intend to demonstrate the truth of these claims, and if the reader is still sceptical about climate change, and its anthropogenic cause, numerous sources can justify and explain these facts better, for instance, rapports from IPCC. 2 Accordingly, I will assume these facts to be true, and that climate change will cause a state of affairs that contains a great deal of suffering and death; besides the possibility of civilisational destruction or human extinction. Thus, the circumstances are dire. So, let us summarise these detrimental effects into a single claim. Here it is:

2022 Michigan Counterplan
aff answers › --- 1ar – xt: warming link

Deep mitigation will never have popular support AND democracies have to be perfect across every country because pollution is trans-boundary---it’s try-or-die for a global political transition

Dr. Chien-Yi Lu 21, PhD and MA in Government from the University of Texas, Austin, Visiting Scholar at Harvard University, Associate Research Fellow at the Institute of European and American Studies of Academia Sinica, Surviving Democracy: Mitigating Climate Change in a Neoliberalized World, Paperback Edition, 12/13/2021, p. 2-3 [language modified]

The doubt about the ability of democracy to handle climate challenges is palpable from the intellectual Left as well. Eric Hobsbawm offered a threefold explanation for his pessimism. To begin with, many of the strategies needed to avoid climate change would be extremely unpopular and therefore difficult to implement in a democracy. As a result, even as “the impact of human action on nature and the globe has become a force of geological proportions,” “no support will be found by counting votes” for measures required for mitigating these problems. Moreover, given that nature is border-blind, even if voters of some democratic states were sensible, the political mechanisms available to human kind in the 21th century are “effectively confined within the borders of nation-states” and “dramatically ill-suited” to deal with problems lying beyond their range of operation (2007: 113). Finally, democratic national governments are not the only relevant organizational entities that can have an effect on an increasingly globalized and transnational world. “A growing part of human life now occurs beyond the influence of voters, in transnational public and private entities that have no electorates, or at least no democratic ones.” Thus, “[d]emocracy, however desirable, is not an effective device for solving global or transnational problems”(2007: 118).

This wave of academic literature that questions the compatibility of democracy with timely and effective climate mitigation resonates with works dating back to the 1970s that focused on the role of democracy in environmental conservation. In An Inquiry into the Human Prospect, Heilbroner set to answer, in a world plagued by problems such as rapid environmental degradation, “is there hope for man?” Writing in 1974, he highlighted that: