2022
Michigan
Counterplan
Neg › Internal Net Benefit › 2NC INB—L—SC = Freeriding
Alley, Joshua Keegan, 8-1-2020[Postdoctoral Research Associate (Politics) UVirginia Ph.D. Political Science (Department of Political Science) Texas AM B.A. International Affairs/Political Science Gettysburg college) “Alliance Participation and Military Spending. “Doctoral dissertation, Texas A&M University. Available electronically from .] //EZAY
5.1 What Did I Do? This dissertation addressed the question of alliance participation and military spending. First, I reassessed an alternative to my bargaining-focused argument— the public goods model of alliances. After noting that existing empirical tests of the public goods logic suffer from model specification and generalizability problems, I offered an improved empirical test. My examination of the association between economic weight in alliances and percentage changes in military spending found little evidence that small states decrease military spending and large states increase military spending due to alliance participation. In the second chapter, I showed that deep alliance treaties often decrease non-major power military spending, but participation in shallow alliances is more likely to increase non-major power military spending. Last, I explored the sources of alliance treaty depth. I argued that states use treaty depth to assuage allied concerns about treaty reliability in a way that minimizes the domestic audience costs of international commitment. Because democracies have higher audience costs from military support, they use treaty depth to increase alliance credibility. I then showed that democracies are more likely to form deep alliances using a statistical analysis and illustrative case study of NATO. 5.2 What Did We Learn? We learned four things from this dissertation project. First, we learned that alliance participation can increase or decrease military spending. Second, we learned that a crucial prediction of free-riding in alliances based on economic size has limited empirical support. Third, we learned that the impact of alliance participation on military spending depends on the relative bargaining leverage of alliance members difference alliance members state capability and alliance treaty design. Therefore, claims that alliance participation only increases or only decreases military spending are incomplete, because each applies in a specific set of circumstances. Last, we learned that deep treaties follow from attempts to establish a credible commitment of military support between alliance partners while managing the risk of entrapment. All told, my findings suggest that bargaining between alliance members and the credibility of commitment shape the connection between alliance participation and military spending. States’ leverage over allied military spending depends on how they design alliances in response to abandonment and entrapment concerns. Put differently, efforts to ensure credible commitment through alliance treaty design affect alliance members’ military spending. 5.3 Why Does it Matter? My argument and findings contribute to scholarship on alliance politics and international relations. I first address two implications for alliance politics scholarship. After that, I turn to two implications for research on international institutions and international relations more generally. In alliance politics, the conventional wisdom about non-major powers, alliances, and military spending should be revised. While conventional wisdom expects regular non-major power free-riding, I find that alliance participation often increases or has little effect on non-major power military spending. Some alliances do reduce non-major power military spending, but these alliances are unusually deep and capable. The findings about when non-major powers can reduce military spending in alliances should also inform debates about US alliances. If the United States wants allies to spend more on defense, it may need to change the nature of its alliance commitments. By increasing the credibility of US commitments, deep US alliances may undermine attempts to encourage higher allied defense spending. The United States formed deep alliances to reassure allied states, but reassurance may be incompatible with demanding more investment in military capability. Therefore, reconciling competing views of alliances in US grand strategy will be difficult. If the United States wants allies to spend more on defense, less emphasis on credible commitments may be necessary. If allies have low defense spending, deep alliances like NATO rarely encourage increases. This means that deep engagement to reassure partners may lead allies to maintain low defense spending, which is a common criticism of US alliances in the restraint school. In addition to alliance politics, this dissertation makes two contributions to international relations scholarship. First, the results provide new evidence about how states use different policy tools as complements and substitutes. Arms and alliances are a classic example of substitutes, but I find that they are complements for non-major powers in shallow alliances and substitutes in deep alliances. Therefore, even if policies provide the same good, substitution is unusual. It may be hard to find empirical evidence of substitution in foreign policy (Starr, 2000) because substitution is rare and highly conditional. Second, the argument and findings in Chapter 3 reinforce the importance of accounting for differences in institutional design. Studies of trade e.g. (Allee and Scalera, 2012; Tomz, Goldstein and Rivers, 2007), bilateral investment treaties (Blake, 2013; Simmons, 2014) and the rational design of institutions literature (Koremenos, Lipson and Snidal, 2001) all acknowledge this point. Translating theories of institutional heterogeneity into research design is challenging, however. Many studies of international institutions rely on state-level aggregate measures. When scholars are interested in inferring how institutional characteristics modify the consequences of participation, they could employ variants of the multilevel model in Chapter 3. If scholars are only interested in estimating the specific effects of individual institutions, and states are not neatly nested within institutions, the model in Chapter 2 could facilitate inferences.
2022
Michigan
Counterplan
Neg › Internal Net Benefit › 2NC INB—L—SC = Freeriding
Reveron 15, PhD, Professor @ Naval War College (Derek, “Examining Department of Defense Security Cooperation,” Committee on Armed Services Hearing, Lexis)
The rationale for security cooperation has been based on the as- sumption that instability breeds chaos, which would make it more likely that the U.S. or the international community would face pressure in the future to intervene. Given America's global foreign policy, many countries have large expectations for assistance from the United States. But the U.S. also derives benefits from security cooperation. Among these are obtaining base access as a quid pro quo; augmenting U.S. force structure by providing logistics and in- telligence support to coalition partners in the Middle East; pro- moting a favorable balance of power by selling weapons systems and training programs to Gulf Cooperation Council countries to balance Iran; harmonizing areas of cooperation by working with Japan and Israel on missile defense; promoting self-defense through the Georgia Train and Equip Program; reinforcing sov- ereignty, like programs such as the Merida Initiative with Mexico; and supporting the U.S. industrial base and creating interoperable air forces through the F—35 program. At times, security cooperation can be limitless, dissatisfying, and futile. Further, risks abound. First, the non-exclusive nature of these activities will produce more failures than successes, which negatively impacts confidence in security cooperation as a tool. Second, the personnel system is not producing sufficient talent to support these missions. American forces no longer operate in isolation and need an appreciation of the historical, cultural, and polit- ical context of where they operate. Third, there is a tendency to over-rely on partners, thinking they can accomplish U.S. objectives when they either lack the political motivation or the skills to do so. Without indigenous political legitimacy, programs can only have a marginal impact on a country's security and stability. Finally, other countries will rely on the U.S. to subsidize their own defense budgets, creating a free rider problem. Given the disappointments in Syria, Iraq, and Afghanistan, there is the potential for the value of security cooperation to be ignored. But these programs are not confined to combat zones alone. When thinking about security cooperation, we should look at how international partners contribute to coalition operations, peacekeeping, and global security. U.S. budgetary declines will likely reinforce the importance of security cooperation, as the U.S. will need more partners and allies to augment its own defense capacities.
2022
Michigan
Counterplan
Neg › Internal Net Benefit › 2NC INB—I/L—Threats K2 Burden Sharing—AT: Not Credible
Anika Binnendijk 19 — (Anika Binnendijk; senior fellow with the Scowcroft Center’s Transatlantic Security Initiative, a political scientist at the RAND Corporation, Published: 2019; "An Attack Against Them All? Drivers of Decisions to Contribute to NATO Collective Defense"; RAND Corporation; Accessed: 7-9-2022; https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/AD1080712.pdf)//Pen-SY
Given the length of the U.S. commitment to NATO and NATO’s central role in U.S. grand strategy since World War II, a U.S. exit might, at times, have seemed remote.99 However, several factors could make some allies see it as a possibility. First, because of overwhelming U.S. power advantages, its alliances are asymmetric: U.S. allies are more dependent on the United States for security than vice versa. This means that the United States could see changing the status of its alliance commitments as less costly than a weaker ally might. Second, as noted in Chapter One, changing domestic politics in the United States have led to calls from U.S. senior leadership for making U.S. alliance commitments more contingent on allied burden-sharing.100 Allies might therefore be concerned that failure to contribute to a mission that directly threatened the territory of a NATO member—a core function of NATO—would lead the United States to further question the value of the alliance.
2022
Michigan
Counterplan
Neg › Internal Net Benefit › 2NC INB—I/L—Threats K2 Burden Sharing
Blankenship ’21 [Brian Blankenship; Assistant Professor in the Department of Political Science at the University of Miami. Ph.D. in Political Science from Columbia University, B.A. in Political Science from Indiana University, Bloomington, in May 2012; 12-30-2021; "The Price of Protection: Explaining Success and Failure of US Alliance Burden-Sharing Pressure"; Taylor & Francis; https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/09636412.2021.2018624; Accessed 7-10-2022; AW]
My hypotheses’ predictions fare better than those of alternative explanations. First, whereas a pure internal balancing explanation would have predicted all indicators of shared threat to be positively associated with allied military spending, my theory suggests that shared external threat has cross-cutting effects: higher allied perception of threat increases the chances of successful burden-sharing pressure by making allies more vulnerable to threats of abandonment, whereas higher patron perception of threat has the opposite effect by making allies more valuable and thus undercutting the credibility of the patron’s abandonment threats. Shared threat is only likely to produce greater burden sharing to the extent that the former effect outweighs the latter. Thus, I predicted that land contiguity should have a positive effect on allied military spending, but that the effects of other indicators of shared threat are theoretically indeterminate and likely null (see Table 4). The evidence provides some support for the internal balancing proposition but on balance more strongly supports my expectations. Consistent with both explanations, land contiguity with shared adversaries predicts higher allied military spending. However, whereas shared adversary capabilities are positively associated with allied military spending, which is consistent with internal balancing, the rest of the indicators of shared threat have no clear effect, which is more consistent with my theory. The effect of shared adversary hostile behavior is negative and does not reach statistical significance at conventional levels, whereas allies contiguous to shared adversaries by sea spend no more than allies not contiguous to a shared adversary. Allied proximity to shared adversaries in general has no significant effect; only contiguity to land does (per H1b). This is consistent with my expectation that allies’ proximity to shared adversaries can actually undercut the United States’ ability to pressure them to spend more on defense by making them more strategically valuable to it, but is not consistent with a purely threat-based, internal balancing explanation. Moreover, it is consistent with arguments about the “stopping power of water”; separation from shared adversaries by water insulates allies from attack and thus from the patron’s threats of abandonment.94 Additionally, there is no evidence that democracies spend substantially less on defense than nondemocracies, while GDP does not have the positive effect on defense burdens that Olson and Zeckhauser’s economic theory of asymmetric alliances would predict. Finally, there is no evidence that the size of US troop presence reduces allied military spending. Taken together, these results suggest that the ex ante possibility of US abandonment is a better predictor of allied burden sharing than alternative explanations. Robustness Checks Next, in Table A4 in the online appendix, I test the findings’ robustness by using both broader and narrower codings of my main independent variables—proximity to maritime chokepoints and shared US adversaries. First, I use alternative proxies for allies’ vulnerability to threat and their geostrategic value that include fewer allies in the coding. For chokepoints, in some models, I exclude those near China and Russia in the post–Cold War years, as neither had the power-projection capabilities of a peer competitor such as the Soviet Union, and China’s capability for power projection by sea significantly grew only in the later years of the sample. In another model, I expand the coding to include as a key maritime chokepoint the Strait of Hormuz, as Iran may have had the ability to at least disrupt access through the Strait—though its ability to substantially project conventional power outside the region was quite limited.95 For shared adversaries, in some models I shrink the coding to include as shared Cold War adversaries only those countries that had a defense pact with the Soviet Union; this excludes countries such as China after the 1970s, and Albania after the late 1960s. In other models, I expand the coding to include during the post–Cold War period Libya, Serbia, and Syria, as the United States periodically considered them “rogue states.”96 The results are consistent with the original findings: allies contiguous by land to shared adversaries spend more on defense, whereas those contiguous to maritime chokepoints spend less. Exploring Causal Mechanisms: Fear of Abandonment versus Internal Balancing One challenge in evaluating my theory is that the predictions of H1a and H1b (the presence of and land contiguity with shared adversaries) are identical to those one might make purely on the basis of allies’ perceptions of external threat. To distinguish my findings from this alternative explanation, my approach is twofold. First, I use an alternative dependent variable: allies’ host-nation support (HNS) for US military presence in their countries. Because HNS is compensation to the United States, it is both likely to be the result of American pressure and unlikely to be an internal balancing response. I use US Department of Defense data on allies’ HNS between 1995 and 2002.97 The findings (shown in Tables A5–A6 in the online appendix) suggest that countries that share a US adversary and border it by land provide more HNS. Second, I present qualitative evidence from West Germany and Japan during the 1960s and early 1970s. I selected these cases to concentrate on variation in the threat environment by holding other factors as constant as possible; both countries were large, democratic, close to strategic chokepoints, hosted the most US troops of any allies, and had post–World War II legacies that contributed to US fears about a return to militarism. However, West Germany bordered the Communist bloc by land, whereas Japan was separated by water. I chose the period because it was one of intense burden-sharing interest: the economies of US allies had recovered, and meanwhile US dominance was eroding, its resources constrained by the Vietnam War, and US officials faced congressional pressure for greater burden sharing.98 In these cases, I look for evidence that West Germany feared abandonment more than Japan, that this fear motivated its defense efforts, and that it responded more to US burden-sharing pressure. West Germany Like their predecessors, President John F. Kennedy and his successor Lyndon Johnson favored a strong West German contribution to NATO, and throughout the 1960s the FRG spent upward of 1 percent more of GDP on defense than the rest of European NATO, on average (see Figure 4). Kennedy and Johnson put particular emphasis on the FRG’s purchase of US arms and military equipment, which was dual-purpose: (1) bolstering West German military capability while also making it more dependent on US arms; and (2) reducing the US balance of payments deficit, which produced a large supply of foreign-held US dollars and put pressure on American gold stocks due to the dollar’s convertibility to gold at $35/ounce.99 US and West German policymakers negotiated a series of biannual “offset” agreements wherein the FRG would purchase around $1 billion in US military equipment. Figure 4. West German military spending, 1961–75. Display full size Kennedy and Johnson frequently threatened to withdraw US forces from West Germany to pressure it into greater cost sharing. West German officials repeatedly indicated that they faced budgetary pressure that would constrain the FRG’s military budget and its offset purchases. However, US officials made it clear to them that the continued presence of US forces would be contingent on the size of the FRG defense budget and its offset purchases.100 In late 1962, for example, Kennedy warned Chancellor Konrad Adenauer of “disastrous consequences” if the FRG did not upwardly revise its budget and follow through on its purchases.101 Likewise, the following year Kennedy and his advisers pursued a sustained pressure campaign that included threats of withdrawal in response to lower-than-expected FRG defense spending plans.102 Johnson continued wielding the threat of withdrawal when he took office following Kennedy’s assassination, culminating in 1966 when his insistence on a larger FRG defense budget with the agreed-upon offset purchases, combined with recession and budget deficits in the FRG, contributed to the collapse of West German chancellor Ludwig Erhard’s government and his removal as chancellor.103 Johnson’s successor Richard Nixon was, if anything, even more committed to seeking greater West German burden-sharing contributions. During Nixon’s presidency, FRG military spending rose sharply, from 3% of GDP in 1970 to 4.6% of GDP in 1975. Like his predecessors, Nixon leaned on the threat of troop withdrawals. He instructed NATO officials in 1970 that US contributions to NATO would be partly dependent on their own contributions, and he and other US officials made similar warnings to FRG chancellor Willy Brandt directly. The following year, all NATO capitals were informed that their burden-sharing contributions would influence US force levels in Europe. This pressure yielded commitments from the FRG and other NATO members to increase their defense spending and improve their forces.104 The evidence suggests that FRG policymakers took the US threat of abandonment seriously and tailored their defense contributions to assuage American pressure. One US official noted in 1969 that the Europeans saw “their defense requirements primarily in terms of what they need to provide to keep the Americans committed,” and in 1970 the West Germans requested “an indication … of the minimum European defense contribution” necessary “to constrain [US] budgetary and congressional pressures.”105 Indeed, dating to the 1950s, Chancellor Adenauer and his successors pursued burden sharing not only to hedge against the possibility of abandonment but also to explicitly curry favor with the United States.106 Because of their country’s vulnerability, FRG officials found it difficult to turn down US burden-sharing requests, and US policymakers exploited this.107 Secretary of State Dean Rusk, for example, cautioned the German ambassador in January 1963 that geography made it very dangerous for the FRG to risk defying the United States, while in 1968 National Security Adviser Walt Rostow stressed the “simple fact” of German vulnerability to coerce the FRG into signing the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty.108 A State Department report similarly pointed to the FRG’s position as “an exposed country, with a contiguous border with the Soviet bloc.”109
2022
Michigan
Counterplan
Neg › Internal Net Benefit › 2NC INB—I/L—Threats K2 Burden Sharing
Blankenship ’21 [Brian Blankenship; Assistant Professor in the Department of Political Science at the University of Miami. Ph.D. in Political Science from Columbia University, B.A. in Political Science from Indiana University, Bloomington, in May 2012; 12-30-2021; "The Price of Protection: Explaining Success and Failure of US Alliance Burden-Sharing Pressure"; Taylor & Francis; https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/09636412.2021.2018624; Accessed 7-4-2022; AW]
This article presented a theory of burden sharing in asymmetric alliances. I argued that allies are more likely to burden share when their patron can more credibly threaten to abandon them and when the consequences of abandonment would be more acute for them. Specifically, allies are less likely to burden share when they are more strategically valuable to their patron and more likely when they have a higher perception of threat, which renders them in greater need of protection. I tested these expectations using data on US allies’ military expenditures between 1950 and 2010 and found that US allies vulnerable to attack spend more on defense, whereas strategically valuable allies near key maritime chokepoints spend less. My findings suggest numerous avenues for future research. For one, although this study focuses primarily on the effects of fears of abandonment as a source of variation in burden sharing, further research could investigate the effectiveness of other instruments. These include but are not limited to economic coercion, inducements, and “naming and shaming” undercontributing states. A related line of research could focus on allies’ willingness to contribute to collective goods for reasons unrelated to bargaining or the contributions of other allies, such as normative considerations and values.118 Additionally, more research could be done on when patrons actually want their allies to assume more responsibility for their own defense, as well as on explaining change over time since my independent variables are relatively static year to year. Finally, my findings have implications for debates over US grand strategy. Alliances are central in the debate between those favoring a grand strategy of “restraint,” who advocate reducing US alliance commitments to encourage burden sharing, and those favoring “deep engagement,” who argue that reducing support for allies is likely to lead them to become less cooperative with US preferences and inflame regional security dilemmas.119 This article suggests that US officials may need to lean into allies’ fears of abandonment if they hope to encourage allied burden sharing. However, the United States is not helpless in shaping allies’ burden sharing even when it goes to some length to reassure them by, for example, stationing troops in their territory. Many of the same conditions that make assurances of protection more necessary—doubts about US credibility, concerns about external threat—are also favorable for burden sharing. In these conditions, US policymakers may be able to effectively combine assurances of protection with threats of abandonment, whether tacit or explicit. Thus, the trade-off between reassuring allies and encouraging burden sharing is not absolute.
2022
Michigan
Counterplan
Neg › Internal Net Benefit › 2NC INB—I/L—Conditions Solve Burden Sharing
Tankel 17, assistant professor at American University and Melissa Dalton, senior fellow and the deputy director of the International Security Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (Stephen, “How to Improve Return on Investment for Security Assistance,” Lawfare, )//BB
Finally, where capacity building—vice cooperation or reform—is the objective, positive conditionality can ensure that the partner is investing its own funds to support or sustain the capacity being built. Investing early—i.e., before a crisis—provides additional space to take a firmer line with partner forces. This is not always possible. Where it is, the United States should seize these opportunities.
2022
Michigan
Counterplan
Neg › Internal Net Benefit › 2NC INB—I/L—Conditions Solve Burden Sharing
Jakobsen and Ringsmose ’17 [Peter Viggo Jakobsen and Jens Ringsmose; Professor at the Royal Danish Defence College and Center for War Studies, University of Southern Denmark and a researcher at the University of Southern Denmark; 2017; "Burden-sharing in NATO: The Trump effect won’t last"; Norwegian Institute for International Affairs; https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/resrep17625.pdf; Accessed 7-5-2022; AW]
Introduction The Trump Administration has adopted a more confrontational and transactional approach to burden-sharing in NATO. It has threatened to “moderate” its commitment to the Alliance unless the European members increase their defence spending (US Mission to NATO 2017), and contribute more to out-of-area operations. Since President Trump entered the office, European defence spending has risen at a quicker pace, and the nature of the defence debate in Europe has changed. The Europeans are no longer debating whether they need to increase their spending; the questions discussed are how fast and how much. Is this evidence of a “Trump effect”, and will it last? This is the question addressed in this policy brief. Because it is hard to predict the future, we adopt an historical perspective. Two structural factors have conditioned the burden-sharing games since the creation of the Alliance in 1949: (1) External threats giving the Americans and the Europeans a shared interest in establishing and maintaining the Alliance. (2) The asymmetric power relations between the United States and the Europeans, giving all European allies except France and Great Britain, who needed their own military capabilities to underpin their great power ambitions, a strong incentive to free-ride and spend less on defence. These factors set the stage for a transatlantic burden-sharing game, which had the Americans constantly pressuring its European allies to do more, and the Europeans responding by doing what they deemed necessary to keep the Americans in Europe – but little more. The European willingness to contribute to the Alliance was primarily driven by American pressure and the Soviet threat. It was about keeping the Russians out and the Americans in as NATO’s first Secretary-General Lord Ismay once put it. A combination of shared interests and the liberal values mentioned in the Washington Treaty has prevented this burden-sharing game from tearing the Alliance apart until now, and it is our conclusion that they will continue to do so in the foreseeable future. The Trump effect is therefore limited – if it exists at all. In the analysis below, we show how different levels of external threats have affected NATO’s mission sets, the burdensharing indicators adopted by the Alliance to ensure that all did their fair share, and the credibility of the American threats to reduce their commitment unless the Europeans did more. The analysis reveals a continuity corroborating our claim that the Trump Administration will be unable to make a major difference to European defence spending. The Cold War: Burden-sharing as input NATO was a response to the Cold War. Concern that the Western European countries would be unable to deter and, if need be, defeat a Soviet attack induced American decision-makers to deploy a large number of troops to Europe on a permanent basis. But already in 1949, Washington realized that its commitment to defend Europe would give the European NATO members an incentive to spend less on defence. They therefore inserted Article 3 in the Washington Treaty to prevent this. The emphasis of Article 3 on individual capacity and self-help, Secretary of State Dean Acheson told Congress during the NATO ratification hearings in 1949, was to “ensure that nobody is getting a meal ticket from anybody else so far as their capacity to resist is concerned” (cited in Ringsmose 2010, 321). Defence spending in proportion to GDP was the principal indicator employed to ensure that “nobody got a free meal ticket”. Yet the choice of this indicator set the stage for continuous transatlantic conflict, because the United States spent far more on defence in proportion to GDP than the Europeans. Asymmetric defence spending led to increased frustration in the United States as the Europeans recovered economically from the destruction of World War II. In the 1960s and 1970s, U.S. Senator Mansfield introduced a series of amendments in Congress proposing that the United States should reduce the number of troops permanently stationed in Europe, in order to induce the Europeans to do more themselves. These threats to withdraw a substantial number of U.S. forces had little credibility, because the resolutions failed to pass. However, the congressional pressure did help U.S. Administrations from the 1960s onwards achieve some success with a quid-pro-quo approach promising to maintain their military commitment in Europe in return for increased European defence spending. Yet, the Europeans never met the U.S. demands fully, realizing that the U.S. had no interest in leaving. The Post-Cold War era: Output trumps input The disappearance of the Soviet threat transformed NATO’s strategic environment and the nature of the transatlantic burden-sharing game. NATO’s principal mission shifted from deterrence and defence to out-of-area operations. While the Cold War input burden-sharing indicator remained in use, the United States introduced a set of additional measures to pressure the Europeans to transform forces to more deployable ones. The Defence Capabilities Initiative from 1999, the Prague Capabilities Commitment agreed at NATO’s summit in Prague in November 2002, and the NATO Response Force launched that same year, all served this purpose (Rynning 2005: 102–140). American threats to reduce their commitment to NATO also played an important role in the new burden-sharing game. “Out of area or out of business”, the slogan popularized by U.S. Senator Lugar (1993), captured the new dynamics. These threats induced the Europeans to accept greater use of force and make larger force contributions than they would have done otherwise (Jakobsen 2014). The credibility of U.S. threats to withdraw was higher than it had been during the Cold War because Russia no longer posed an existential threat to NATO. The introduction of new output indicators culminated at the Istanbul Summit in June 2004 with the endorsement of the so-called usability targets. The agreed aim for national land forces was that 40% had to be structured, prepared and equipped for deployed operations, and 8% had to be undertaking or planned for sustained operations. The 40/8 target was adopted at the Riga Summit in 2006, and it was subsequently revised upwards to 50/10 (Ringsmose and Rynning 2009: 23–24). The Riga Summit also dusted off the traditional GDP input measure, as the members committed themselves to work towards spending 2% of GDP on defence. The United States pressured its European partners to make this commitment to stem the fall in European defence spending that had occurred since the end of the Cold War (Ek 2007). In addition to these formal measures, an informal one – the willingness to put one’s troops into harm’s way (risk-sharing) – emerged as a key burden-sharing measure as NATO became involved in combat missions. To give an example, Denmark’s willingness to do high-risk combat missions in Southern Afghanistan, resulting in 43 fatalities, and its contribution in Libya earned it a lot of praise from the United States (Jakobsen 2016: 201). By contrast, Germany, the third largest force contributor to NATO’s Afghanistan mission (5.000 personnel), was heavily criticised for its unwillingness to do combat in the South, and for its unwillingness to contribute to NATO’s Libya mission. The Danish example illustrates how the Europeans exploited the new set of formal and informal burden-sharing measures to “keep the Americans in” without meeting all the U.S. burden-sharing demands. On the one hand, the Europeans made their forces more deployable and increased their contributions to out-of-area operations. On the other, they refrained from spending more on defence. The Post-Crimea era (2014–2016): Input trumps Output This changed when Russia’s annexation of the Crimea in 2014 turned the strategic environment in Europe upside down. Suddenly, the military threat to NATO’s European territory had reappeared, and this put NATO Cold War missions – territorial defence and deterrence – back in the driver’s seat. Although out-of-areas missions did not vanish from NATO’s radar completely, they now played second fiddle. The United States played a key role in shaping the Alliance’s response to the rising Russian threat. The Obama Administration sent aircrafts and soldiers to Eastern Europe, increased U.S. participation in NATO exercises and took steps to enable the swift deployment of major U.S. reinforcements in Eastern Europe. The U.S. was also the key architect behind the Readiness Action Plan adopted at the 2014 Wales Summit. The rise of the Russian threat facilitated the American efforts to pressure its European allies to spend more on defence. Frustrated with European free-riding during the Libya campaign, the Obama Administration had pushed hard since 2011. These efforts made little progress prior to the Russian annexation of the Crimea. After Crimea, the Europeans promised at the Wales Summit to “halt any decline in defence expenditure” and to “aim to move towards the 2% (GDP) guideline within a decade”. The European members also committed to meet another existing NATO target to devote 20% of defence expenditures to military procurement and research and development (NATO 2014). Input measures had reappeared as trumps in the transatlantic burden-sharing game. Yet, the Obama Administration’s attempts to pressure its allies to spend more had limited success. While the collective decline in European defence expenditure was halted, there was little positive movement towards the 2% target as the Europeans’ collective defence spending remained constant at 1.45% of GDP between 2014 and 2016 (NATO 2017: 8). Two factors accounted for this: diverging threat perceptions of Russia, and the strong American response to Crimea. While the Russian behaviour in the Ukraine scared the European NATO members bordering Russia into spending more on defence, the majority of the European members did not view Russia as a direct military threat to the their national security (Jakobsen and Ringsmose 2018). Paradoxically, the Obama Administration’s strong reaction to Crimea reinforced this perception, as the American show of force removed the need for the Europeans to do more themselves. The Trump era (2017–): Spend 2% and contribute more out-of-area or NATO dies. While the threat environment and NATO’s mission set remained unaltered, the election of Mr Trump changed the dynamics of the burden-sharing game. Before his election, Trump called the Alliance “obsolete” and said that he only would defend allies spending 2% of GDP on defence. These threats did not go away after his election. His Secretary of Defense Mattis made clear in February 2017 that the United States would “moderate” its commitment to the Alliance unless the allies spending too little made clear progress towards honouring the commitments made at the Wales Summit. Secretary of State Tillerson added another output measure the following month demanding greater European assistance in the fight against terrorism (U.S. Department of State 2017). Thus, the Trump Administration not only demanded more input, it also wanted more output, and it used harsher rhetoric and threatened more drastic measures if the Europeans did not comply. While previous administrations had made NATO’s longer-term survival conditional upon greater European burden-sharing, a U.S. Administration had never before made the defence of an ally facing an immediate threat contingent upon its defence spending. European diplomats have criticised the Trump Administration severely for its unfair and inaccurate portrayal of their NATO contributions. Yet defence spending is on the rise in most the European member states. 23 of America’s 27 European allies (+ Canada) will increase their spending in 2017, and their combined spending is projected to increase by 4.3% (NATO 2017:2).
2022
Michigan
Counterplan
Neg › Internal Net Benefit › 2NC INB—UQ—European Defense Low—AT: Ukraine
Eyal ’22 (Jonathan Eyal, Associate director at the Royal United Services Institute in London, “Yes, Nato has a new vitality. But its united front could collapse when it has to deal with Russia“, )
Nato calculates that its members have promised to spend £172.6bn in on top of existing defence budgets, with Germany accounting for perhaps half this amount. But the question is how this will be spent and over what period. The easiest way to improve European capabilities would be to use this cash to buy US equipment off the shelf: this offers substantial economies of scale and time. Yet such an approach will go against European aspirations to boost their defence industries; French diplomats are warning that the Ukraine war must not end up as a bonanza for US arms manufacturers. Chances are high that Nato’s eternal “burden-sharing” debate will continue, even if more cash is available. Across the Atlantic, Donald Trump and his disciples are poised to argue – as “The Donald” did when he was in the White House – that Nato is a scam to fleece American taxpayers. Even if he does not stage a comeback, the idea that the US is spending far more than it should to defend fat, wealthy Europeans is likely to feature prominently when a new Congress is elected this November.
The sheer audacity of the Russian aggression has allowed the Biden administration to get the cash it needed from Congress. Still, it is taken for granted in Washington that the recently approved by Congress for security assistance to Ukraine is unlikely to be repeated. And a future Nato burden-sharing debate is bound to get more acrimonious when it is joined with a parallel discussion about paying for Ukraine’s postwar economic reconstruction, a project estimated at an eye-watering $500bn.
2022
Michigan
Counterplan
Neg › Internal Net Benefit › 2NC INB—UQ—European Defense Low
Graham ’22 (Thomas Graham, Distinguished fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, “NATO Countries Signal Resolve at Summit: What Does It Mean for Russia?”, ) //sethlee
NATO’s new force posture and strategic concept are not likely to prompt Putin to rethink his Ukraine strategy. He is making slow but steady progress on the battlefield in the east and south. Nothing suggests that he believes that the West’s provision of more sophisticated weaponry is going to shift fortunes on the ground. But the new circumstances in Europe do pose a long-term strategic challenge to Russia. Increasingly isolated in Europe, Putin was surely pleased to attend the recent summits of the BRICS grouping (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa) and of the Caspian states to underscore that Russia has friends and allies elsewhere. Whether they can compensate for the loss of European ties is another matter.
The summit was an impressive show of resolve to counter Russia’s aggression, including through continued diplomatic, economic, and military support for Ukraine. NATO pledged to further expand its military support for its vulnerable allies along the Russian frontier. In particular, the that it will establish a permanent headquarters for its V Corps in Poland. Most important was the eleventh-hour agreement that Turkey reached with Finland and Sweden, by which Ankara lifted its objections to their joining the alliance and allowed NATO to begin the accession process.
2022
Michigan
Counterplan
Neg › Internal Net Benefit › 2NC INB—UQ—European Defense Low
Braw ’22 (Elisabeth Braw, Senior fellow at the American Enterprise Institute, “Judy Asks: Is Europe Serious About Defense?”, ) //sethlee
However, really ambitious steps forward in EU defense are hampered by disagreement between states on how best to invest in it. Some see a future of large-scale collective investments in defense on a par with the union’s game-changing COVID-19 recovery plans, whereas others insist that defense spending should be a national affair only. The truth is that the EU and European NATO desperately need to ramp up production of capabilities and no single government can cope with this alone. It is time to think big. The EU should first of all strengthen its role as a security actor in non-defense related areas where it can play a substantial role that is accepted among all of the member states.
The union can use its economic power toward adversaries by imposing sanctions and shaping economic relations. It can play a supportive role in building resilience in the member states in areas such as critical infrastructure. It can also use, to a greater extent, its transformative power through and cooperation policy in the Western Balkans and Eastern Partnership countries.
2022
Michigan
Counterplan
Neg › External Net Benefits › 2NC AT: Links to Politics-- General
Aybet 20 (Gülnur Aybet is Senior Advisor to the President of the Republic of Turkey and Professor at the National Defence University. “TURKEY, NATO, AND THE FUTURE OF THE TRANSATLANTIC RELATIONSHIP IN A DECLINING LIBERAL ORDER” 9/4/20 http://turkishpolicy.com/article/1015/turkey-nato-and-the-future-of-the-transatlantic-relationship-in-a-declining-liberal-order)
Another area that NATO is perpetually adapting itself is a very old issue that has been around since the 1960s—that of burden sharing. The unequitable bearing of defense costs between European members and the US has for a long time been an issue of contention in American domestic politics. Burden sharing has been a bi-partisan issue of long standing in the US that has preceded the current Trump administration’s very vocal laments over the issue of late. European states have constantly promised to correct the inequitable balance in defense expenditure, but this response has been slow and sometimes very difficult to realize given public pressure and electorate sensitivities on the issue not to mention economic pressures. Yet an increasingly affluent Europe that has repeatedly been unable to provide for its own defense has been a constant source of resentment on the other side of the Atlantic. The Defence Investment Pledge agreed at the 2014 NATO Summit in Wales, has led to real increases in defense spending but many European allies are still beneath the 2 percent of GDP as promised.[7] Turkey is one of the NATO members close to achieving this target, with a defense expenditure of 1.89 percent of GDP.
2022
Michigan
Counterplan
Neg › External Net Benefits › 2NC AT: Links to Politics-- General
Kupchan 3-2-2021 (CHARLES A. KUPCHAN is Professor of International Affairs at Georgetown University and a Senior Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations “Colossus Constrained,” Foreign Affairs, )
Biden also faces economic constraints on foreign policy. The proposed $1.9 trillion pandemic relief package, along with the $900 billion approved by Congress in December, represents, according to former U.S. Treasury Secretary Larry Summers, “the boldest act of macroeconomic stabilization policy in U.S. history.” It is a drop in the bucket, however, compared to what Biden envisages for the next four years. The nonpartisan, nonprofit Committee for a Responsible Federal Budget estimates that the administration is poised to pour over $11 trillion into infrastructure, green technology, childcare and education, health and long-term care, social security and social welfare, and other domestic investments. Even with the added revenue from planned tax reform (and not including any further pandemic relief packages), these programs will add up to $8 trillion to U.S. debt over the coming ten years—potentially harming long-term growth. For now, deficit spending makes sense to get the economy back on its feet. But domestic expenditures on the scale envisaged will cut into the resources available for tasks abroad. It is a tall order to justify further stabilization efforts in Afghanistan amid an economic crisis at home and over 500,000 Americans dead from COVID-19—a death toll well beyond that from any of the nation’s foreign wars. Even if the roughly $750 billion defense budget stays more or less intact, the days of spending some $6 trillion on “forever wars” in the Middle East are long gone. Biden’s priority should therefore be to lighten the nation’s military burdens abroad and convince allies to pick up the geopolitical slack. Although his administration may adjust the timeline, Biden should continue Trump’s effort to withdraw U.S. troops from Afghanistan, Iraq, and Syria and downsize the United States’ military footprint in the Middle East. Avoiding unnecessary interventions and scaling back military commitments in peripheral conflicts will help Biden sustain a robust military presence where it matters most: namely, in Europe and the Asia-Pacific, where checking Russian and Chinese ambition remains a vital U.S. interest. Assuming Biden can convince allies to shoulder heavier defense burdens, he should be able to reconcile these core obligations with the need for more domestic investment.
2022
Michigan
Counterplan
Neg › External Net Benefits › 2NC AT: Links to Politics—BBB
Kupchan 3-2-2021 (CHARLES A. KUPCHAN is Professor of International Affairs at Georgetown University and a Senior Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations “Colossus Constrained,” Foreign Affairs, )
BUILDING BACK BETTER After Trump and the COVID-19 pandemic, Biden has no choice but to concentrate his presidency on domestic renewal. Repairs at home are essential not just for preventing a return to the angry and self-destructive illiberalism of the last four years but for rebuilding the political foundations of steady U.S. statecraft. Only if the United States gets its own house in order will it have the political and economic wherewithal to provide purposeful leadership beyond its shores. The demands of renewal at home require that Biden be forthright with the American people about the powerful domestic and international constraints he faces on foreign policy. After Trump’s trashing of U.S. credibility and his willful divorce of rhetoric from reality, truth in advertising will be vital to restoring trust in the U.S. presidency, both in the United States and around the world. Washington should still lead, but with a lighter touch that reflects the profound changes that have transpired at home and abroad since the United States arrived on the global stage during the 1940s. In the years after World War II, the U.S. economy was singularly dominant and its international engagement rested on bipartisan agreement. Today, the United States contributes less than 25 percent of global GDP, and Democrats and Republicans share almost no common ground on either domestic or foreign policy. As Biden embarks on an urgent effort to repair the nation, he is right to reject much of Trump’s errant statecraft—reorienting U.S. foreign policy toward international teamwork, diplomatic reengagement, and the defense of the nation’s core democratic principles. But Biden must not throw out the baby with the bathwater. Instead, he should continue Trump’s effort to rectify the overmilitarization of U.S. engagement abroad, trim the nation’s foreign commitments, choose its fights more carefully, and press allies to do much more. The justifiable ambition of Biden’s domestic agenda needs to be matched with judicious modesty in his foreign policy. That’s the formula for “building back better,” both at home and abroad.
2022
Michigan
Counterplan
Neg › External Net Benefits › 2NC AT: Links to Entrapment
Porter and Shifrinson 20, *Joshua R. Itzkowitz Shifrinson, an Assistant Professor of International Relations, Boston University, *Patrick Porter, Professor of International Security and Strategy at the University of Birmingham, also Senior Associate Fellow at the Royal United Services Institute, London and a Fellow of the Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft, “Why We Can’t Be Friends with Our Allies”, https://www.politico.com/news/magazine/2020/10/22/why-we-cant-be-friends-with-our-allies-431015)
By falsely equating alliances with friendships, Biden and his team run serious risks. The rhetoric of friendship obscures the reality of U.S. foreign policy to the American people. For a campaign that prides itself on restoring the public’s trust in government, this is a serious problem, risking public backlash if Biden is elected while forgoing an opportunity to improve the quality of policy discussions.
Equally important, the approach risks undermining international stability by giving U.S. partners ill-placed faith in U.S. commitments. After four years of the Trump administration’s bullying, allies from Canada to Germany to South Korea worry about American reliability and seek a course correction. In pledging fidelity to its “friends,” however, the Biden approach risks going too far in the opposite direction. It could create a false expectation among allies of a restored friendship with Washington without conditions. It could even tempt allies to take U.S. support for granted and behave recklessly.
2022
Michigan
Counterplan
Neg › External Net Benefits › 2NC AT: Links to Entrapment
Lanoszka ’17 [Alexander Lanoszka; Assistant Professor of International Relations at the University of Waterloo; 12-18-2017; "Tangled up in rose? Theories of alliance entrapment and the 2008 Russo-Georgian War"; Taylor & Francis; https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/13523260.2017.1392102; Accessed 7-11-2022; AW]
Entrapment risks may be a function of the commitment that the defender supplies to its ally. As Snyder (1997, p. 44) argues, if the defender offers too strong of a commitment, then the benefiting ally might become so confident of its support as to pursue a much more aggressive than it otherwise would. Strong alliance commitments entail a moral hazard problem insofar as they might shield the ally from the true costs of its actions, thus making it more reckless (Benson, 2012, pp. 43–70; see also Benson, Bentley, & Ray, 2013). One exemplary case is arguably Germany’s blank check to Austria in July 1914 during the latter’s crisis with Serbia. By failing to condition its military support, Berlin might have encouraged Vienna to behave more aggressively towards Serbia than it would have otherwise. Some argue that German leaders subsequently found themselves entrapped by Austria since they did not wish to fight a major power war at that time (North, 1967, p. 107; for an alternative view, see Fischer, 1974). Institutionalist explanations of entrapment, therefore, imply that entrapment fears should not exist if the arrangements undergirding the military alliance are loose and flexible. Entrapment is far less likely with informal, unwritten alliances because the defender can always disclaim responsibility for its ally. The solutions for mitigating entrapment risks thus tend to be institutional. Snyder (1997, p. 185) posits that one option involves weakening the commitment itself, though this remedy might engender fears of abandonment on the part of the ally instead. Another solution is to demand consultations with the ally or access to exchanges between it and the adversary. Defenders can use greater conditionality in outlining the obligations that characterize the alliance commitment (Kim, 2011, pp. 358–359). Conditionality can also mitigate entrapment risks (Benson, 2012, pp. 90–127). The United States added a secret clause in its 1955 defense treaty with Taiwan, asserting that it would aid Taiwan only if it was attacked (Christensen, 2011, p. 239). Common in these proposed solutions is that the defender can adjust its commitments to signal varying levels of support and to minimize risk.
2022
Michigan
Counterplan
Neg › External Net Benefits › 2NC AT: Links to Entrapment
Zannella, 20 [Anthony Zannella Seton Hall University, majored in Political Science and Philosophy, 4-7-2020 "An Analysis of Burden Sharing in NATO and the Problem of Free Riding," Political Analysis: Vol. 21 , Article 5, /alundy]
Discussions of free riding within NATO on the American side argue that the United States is simply being fooled into providing defense. They believe the U.S. should be wary of supporting wealthy European nations that don’t want to spend as much on their militaries. Alan Tonelson’s early 2000s article highlighted this mood as he explored how changes in international geo-politics appear to be putting the U.S. at greater risk. Tonelson conveyed the risk associated with NATO through both material and non-material causes. He argued that U.S. actions leave the country exposed to more precarious situations. Tonelson mentioned that there is a greater risk that the U.S. can be dragged into “non-article 5” conflicts even though America’s original objective was to keep the power of Russia in check through its military presence. Tonelson pointed to the example that U.S. troops stationed in European countries are at risk of injury in an attack (particularly from terrorists or irregular forces) and could be stuck in the middle of an unnecessary conflict. Tonelson also pointed to Kosovo as an example: the U.S. was influenced to become involved simply to strengthen NATO’s credibility even though its European member nations were contributing far less to the alliance operations in comparison to those of the U.S. (Tonelson 2000). From a financial perspective, an earlier article written by Jyonni Khana and others indicates that alliance members in NATO, and in the U.N., are in fact free riding on larger nations such as the United States. The authors concluded that there is a wide gap in the equity of burden sharing. Their analysis focused heavily on peace keeping expenditures between 1976 and 1996. Jointproduct models and collective action theory were employed to study the financial contributions of the various countries. The level of fiscal support from the larger countries far outweighed those of the smaller nations and indicated a great level of free riding (Jyonni Khanna et al 1998). More recent studies have tried to take a more mixed methods approach; this is apparent in Jo Jakobson’s article. Jakobson attempted to draw on the collective action approach and the risk-responsibility sharing school. Jakobsen ultimately factored in the different variables both schools use, but he comes to differing conclusions. He started the study with the standard input measure, (where one looks at what countries put into the alliance alone) and it became obvious that European NATO free rides from this analytical perspective. Furthermore, Jakobsen found that non-material free riding can occur when a U.S. presence in the country of operations is significant as compared to its allies. A further observation demonstrated that other allied countries showed a low willingness to fight. He also mentioned that the importance of United States military spending has to do with other variables. The United States was engaged in various operations throughout the world, especially in Europe. The United States’ projection of power could essentially outweigh the lessened spending of European NATO allies. Jakobsen’s conclusion is to remain cautious when attempting to decipher whether European NATO in fact free rides (Jakobsen 2018).
2022
Michigan
Counterplan
Neg › External Net Benefits › 2NC AT: Links to Entrapment
Porter 19, Professor of International Security and Strategy at the University of Birmingham. He is also Senior Associate Fellow at the Royal United Services Institute, London and a Fellow of the Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft. (Patrick Porter (2019) “Advice for a Dark Age: Managing Great Power Competition”, The Washington Quarterly, 42:1, 7-25, )
To make alliances work for its interests, the United States should restore what used to be part of its repertoire as a great power —the imposition of conditions on its protection, and the credible threat of abandonment. In other words, contrary to the standard orthodoxy often invoked by Trump’s critics, a critical ingredient in an effective patron-client relationship is the cultivation of a reputation for limited reliability, if not unreliability. Thus, the United States should make clear that it is willing to walk away and that its alliance commitments are conditional on its ally’s prudent behavior. In a world of worsening rivalries, the U.S. ability to control escalation and limit inadvertent spirals depends partly on its capacity to restrain third parties and keep its initiative. To make this threat credible, it may require the United States occasionally to terminate an alliance relationship.
There are fine lines to be walked here. The United States has alliances for the most basic purpose of augmenting its power, its reach and the totality of its presence. From this perspective, it is in Washington’s interests to have militarily proficient friends. But its alliances have other rationales that cut against that simple desire. Another central historical purpose of American alliances in the postwar period is to contain its allies. By providing security, Washington in theory removes incentives for its allies to rearm and reassert themselves as challengers. This imperative, to depress allies’ defense expenditure, requires in turn that Washington must establish a reputation for being a reliable security provider. Failure to maintain that baseline of confidence could lead the client to pursue belligerent self-help, or even other allies in lieu of the United States. Yet, establishing a reputation for reliable security provision can and does have a perverse result—it creates a moral hazard. Allies’ confidence in American backing can embolden them to behave recklessly in ways that Washington dislikes. Conversely, the dependency Washington forms on the alliance, as an indispensable platform for its power projection, creates reverse leverage, making Washington reluctant to attempt to impose itself with threats of abandonment or even public criticism.33
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Counterplan
Neg › AT: Perm and Theory › 2NC AT: Perm Do the CP
Black’s Law 91 (Dictionary, p. 1024)
Substantially - means essentially; without material qualification.
2022
Michigan
Counterplan
Neg › AT: Perm and Theory › 2NC AT: Perm Do the CP
Nieto 9 — Henry H. Nieto, Judge on the Colorado Court of Appeals, 2009 (“People v. Munoz — The People of the State of Colorado, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Raymond Munoz, Defendant-Appellant,” Colorado Court of Appeals Number 07CA0697, August 20th, Available Online at , Accessed 04-05-2017)
“Should” is “used to express duty, obligation, propriety, or expediency.” Webster's Third New International Dictionary 2104 (2002). Courts interpreting the word in various contexts have drawn conflicting conclusions, although the weight of authority appears to favor interpreting “should” in an imperative, obligatory sense. A number of courts, confronted with the question of whether using the word “should” in jury instructions conforms with the Fifth and Sixth Amendment protections governing the reasonable doubt standard, have upheld instructions using the word. In the courts of other states in which a defendant has argued that the word “should” in the reasonable doubt instruction does not sufficiently inform the jury that it is bound to find the defendant not guilty if insufficient proof is submitted at trial, the courts have squarely rejected the argument. They reasoned that the word “conveys a sense of duty and obligation and could not be misunderstood by a jury.” See State v. McCloud, 257 Kan. 1, 891 P.2d 324, 335 (Kan.1995); see also Tyson v. State, 217 Ga.App. 428, 457 S.E.2d 690, 691-92 (Ga.Ct.App.1995) (finding argument that “should” is directional but not instructional to be without merit); Commonwealth v. Hammond, 350 Pa.Super. 477, 504 A.2d 940, 941-42 (Pa.Super.Ct.1986).
Notably, courts interpreting the word “should” in other types of jury instructions have also found that the word conveys to the jury a sense of duty or obligation and not discretion. In Little v. State, 261 Ark. 859, 554 S.W.2d 312, 324 (Ark.1977), the Arkansas Supreme Court interpreted the word “should” in an instruction on circumstantial evidence as synonymous with the word “must” and rejected the defendant's argument that the jury may have been misled by the court's use of the word in the instruction. Similarly, the Missouri Supreme Court rejected a defendant's argument that the court erred by not using the word “should” in an instruction on witness credibility which used the word “must” because the two words have the same meaning. State v. Rack, 318 S.W.2d 211, 215 (Mo.1958).
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Neg › AT: Perm and Theory › 2NC AT: Perm Do the CP
OED 89 — Oxford English Dictionary, 1989 (“Resolved,” Volume 13, p. 725)
a. of the mind, etc.: Freed from doubt or uncertainty, fixed, settled. Obs.