Free beta access. 50 free AI tokens each week. Optional top-ups available. See what is included
Open evidence library

Search the archive.

Current and older evidence is free during beta. Sign in for unlimited card access and full source downloads.

Matching cards
2022 Michigan Counterplan
DEMOCRACY QPQ CP › solvency – say yes – general › 2nc – say yes – civil society

Even if the government drags their feet, US prioritization of democracy builds support for civil society and political opposition that guarantees say yes.

Carothers 21, senior vice president for studies at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and Benjamin Press, research assistant in the Democracy, Conflict, and Governance Program (Thomas, “Navigating the Democracy-Security Dilemma in U.S. Foreign Policy: Lessons from Egypt, India, and Turkey,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, )//BB

In addition, policymakers should not limit their expectations for positive change only to potential liberalizing actions by the partner government. They should also ask whether greater attention from the United States on democracy issues helps bolster the will and steadfastness of embattled leaders in civil society or the political opposition of the country in question. A common mistake is to think of the push on democracy and rights issues with a problematic security partner only in terms of effects on the government. But other parts of the political and civic communities are highly important and reactive to external signals. However, U.S. policymakers need to be careful of crossing the line between support and perceived (or real) interference in a foreign country’s domestic politics. For example, pushing the government hard on maintaining electoral integrity may be more effective than expressing direct support for opposition forces.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
DEMOCRACY QPQ CP › solvency – say yes – general › 2nc – say yes – civil society

Recipient-states say yes. The counterplan builds support through political pressure, even if the government is initially reluctant

Goldberg 21, master's degree in International Affairs from Columbia’s School of International and Public Affairs, et al, (Ilan, “A People-First U.S. Assistance Strategy for the Middle East,” Center for a New American Security,

Third, by creating a regional pool of funds the United States could generate competition among regional states that could incentivize reforms and better projects. Proposals for various projects could be judged across the region and given to the most compelling investments based on their impact on democracy and development objectives instead of starting with an assistance number for each country. Recent research demonstrates that introducing competition among the beneficiaries of foreign assistance and shifting aid toward successfully reforming countries raises the enticements for reform.26 Still, the leverage of U.S. assistance should not be overstated, particularly in the Middle East where Gulf countries provide significantly more assistance with no strings attached. However, as evidence from the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) shows, positive conditionality can provide that extra nudge to catalyze reform where there is already a willingness to do so. A recent Brookings Institution study found that this so-called MCC effect allows “‘sympathetic interlocutors’ in low- and lower-middle income countries who consider the prospect of receiving the MCC’s ‘good housekeeping seal of approval’—and access to hundreds of millions of dollars in flexible grant assistance from the U.S government—as an opportunity to rally domestic reform efforts and neutralize anti-reform opposition.”27

2022 Michigan Counterplan
DEMOCRACY QPQ CP › solvency – say yes – general › 2nc – say yes – pressure

That means that the affirmative’s “say yes” justifications apply to the counterplan as well

Tankel 17, assistant professor at American University and Melissa Dalton, senior fellow and the deputy director of the International Security Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (Stephen, “How to Improve Return on Investment for Security Assistance,” Lawfare, )//BB

Negative conditionality, which is what many people think of when the idea of conditioning assistance comes up, entails threatening to end, suspend, or reduce assistance if conditions are not met. Positive conditionality, which has been used for years in the development world, promises assistance in return for “good behavior” that is defined in advance. Rather than authorizing aid and then withholding it, the United States would identify positive actions that a recipient is considering—or at least open to taking—and then incentivize them. Critically, we argue the process of identifying these actions and benchmarks to measure them should be done in consultation with the recipient. This would help to reduce the potential for mismanaged expectations on either side and get the recipient more invested in the process, signaling that it is a partner and not merely a proxy benefiting from U.S. paternalism. It would also reduce the chances for caving by the United States. Positive conditionality may also be the most optimal route for cases where the United States has little leverage over a recipient, but where the recipient desires further U.S. engagement and investment. We envision at least three different ways to implement this approach.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
DEMOCRACY QPQ CP › solvency – say yes – general › 2nc – say yes – pressure

NATO says yes – allies see it as an opportunity to expand their sphere of influence, others rely on security assistance to counter Russia and China and face international pressure to cooperate

Larsen 22 – Henrik Larsen, Ph.D., senior researcher at the Center for Security Studies at the Swiss Federal Institute of Technology Zurich (“NATO Must Get Resilience Right to Withstand Russia and China, 5/22/2022, ) FGY

Fourth, NATO should revisit its partnership policy, which allows the alliance to delegate certain aspects of resilience to third countries and actors that are better placed. The partnership policy has not been reformed since 2011, when the alliance was experimenting with the idea of “going global.” NATO presently comprises 30 allied countries—soon 32, when Sweden and Finland expectedly join. However, it also has as many as 43 partners in Europe and around the world, from Columbia to Mauritania, with little idea of what their partnerships are supposed to add. NATO needs to better  among its partners as it engages competition with illiberal contenders; given the fault lines of the conflict, technologically advanced and like-minded liberal partners should . This primarily concerns NATO’s partnership with the European Union and Switzerland due to their shared resilience across technologically advanced and highly integrated countries that share the same values. NATO partners in the Western Balkans, Georgia and obviously Ukraine need the resilience assistance that NATO can provide them to defend against Russian and Chinese subversion. Additionally, the Asia-Pacific partners—Japan, South Korea, Australia and New Zealand—are gaining prominence due to the values they share with NATO and their advanced experience with technological and economic decoupling from China in sectors sensitive for national security.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
DEMOCRACY QPQ CP › solvency – say yes – general › 2nc – say yes

Security Cooperation provides sufficient leverage

Tecott 21, PhD in Political Science @ MIT (Rachel, “The Cult of the Persuasive: The U.S. Military’s Aversion to Coercion in Security Assistance,” Proquest Dissertations)

Recipients are more likely to follow U.S. direction when the United States combines teaching and persuasion with bargaining and/or direct command. Bargaining is well suited to the context of SFA [Security Force Assistance]. Bargaining is in a sense a much simpler, less ambitious influence strategy than persuasion. This study argues that the United States has ample bargaining power in most cases of security assistance, and is therefore well-positioned to wield carrots and sticks to shape recipient decision-making. Bargaining power, in Glenn Snyder’s framework, varies as a function of the 54 two sides’ relative dependence, commitment, and interest in the object of bargaining.59 Lumpy (each variable could be further subdivided into many constituent pieces), subjective, and consequently hard to measure as those variables are, the argument that recipients of United States SFA, particularly in the context of severe internal threats, have more bargaining power than the United States, does not hold up to scrutiny. Recipients of SFA [Security Force Assistance] may not always depend for their survival on the United States, but they are almost always far more dependent on the United States than the United States is on them. With respect to relative commitment, SFA [Security Force Assistance] recipients often view the U.S. commitment to an SFA [Security Force Assistance] partnership, or to the leaders themselves, as fickle. In such cases, the United States’ relative lack of commitment should be a bargaining asset, because it should help increase the credibility of its threats to withdraw support or to replace the leadership. Moreover, SFA [Security Force Assistance] is as conducive to the establishment of credibility with respect to promises of carrots and threats of sticks as any international partnership can be. Providers need not rely on the nuclear threats of complete support or total abandonment. Rather, SFA [Security Force Assistance] relationships create myriad opportunities for the application of calibrated carrots ranging from the provision of additional ammunition to a particular unit, to a dramatic increase in the scale of U.S. assistance to the recipient military as a whole, and calibrated sticks ranging from the disbanding of a particular unit, to a dramatic decrease in assistance, to the ouster of the civilian leader. SFA [Security Force Assistance] relationships are also typically long-term, and involve iterated interactions between provider and recipient. There is, therefore, an extended shadow of the future,60 and opportunities for the United States to demonstrate the credibility of its promises and threats through consistent follow-through. These two features of SFA [Security Force Assistance] relationships—the opportunities for calibrated carrots and sticks, and the shadow of the future—should help to resolve the credibility problem that plagues, for instance, the challenge of extended nuclear deterrence. In the context of SFA, threats to decrease support to a unit or increase support to a unit, or even to support or oust a civilian leader, are far less difficult than the challenge the United States faced in its efforts to convince the Soviet Union that it would trade New York for Paris. SFA [Security Force Assistance] is the United States trying to convince brigade commanders that their interests are better served following U.S. direction to remove a corrupt battalion commander than ignoring that direction. It may not be an easy task, but the United States certainly has the carrots and sticks to do it, and the context of SFA [Security Force Assistance] is more conducive than most

2022 Michigan Counterplan
DEMOCRACY QPQ CP › solvency – say yes – general › 2nc – say yes

Bargaining is effective, even with countries who aren’t currently aligned with US interests – furthers their economic and political stability

Sullivan et. Al 11 – Patricia L. Sullivan, associate professor in the Department of Public Policy and the Curriculum in Peace, War, and Defense at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, director of the Triangle Institute for Security Studies, Ph.D. in political science from the University of California, Davis with a concentration in international relations, comparative politics, and research methodology (“US Military Aid and Recipient State Cooperation”, Foreign Policy Analysis, July 2011, Vol. 7, No. 3, ) FGY

According to this model, a powerful state can use military assistance as leverage to compel recipient state cooperation. In this straightforward model, military aid is a source of bargaining power because donors can link benefits to desired behavior by recipients. This theory builds on early work on asymmetrical influence. Keohane and Nye. (1977) argue, for example, that dominant states can influence the foreign policy of dependent states using aid allocations to reward or punish past behavior and to act as an incentive that encourages future compliance. More recently, Palmer, Wohlander, and Clifton Morgan (2002) contend that "Foreign aid, at the most general level, is a tool of influence—states give it because they believe it encourages recipients to take desired actions". Similarly, Bueno de Mesquita and Smith (2007) propose a model in which donors give foreign aid to purchase policy support from recipients. States are most likely to give aid to "countries whose leaders do not inherently support the policies of a prospective donor but are willing to back those policies in exchange for aid sufficient to improve their political and economic welfare" (254). If military aid gives the US bargaining power, recipient states that receive larger amounts of aid and those that have a greater need for assistance should be more willing to accommodate their foreign policy to US preferences. While Derouen and Heo (2004) suggest that aid is more often used as an ex post reward than as an ex ante inducement, we suspect that the relationship is circular; a state's level of cooperation with the United States influences the amount of aid it receives and the amount of aid a state receives influences subsequent levels of cooperation with the United States. The example of US military aid to Georgia is consistent with the expectations of the Arms for Influence model. US military aid to Georgia spiked from an average of $2.76 million per year from 1991-2001 to $92 million in 2002 and then aver aged $13.9 million per year between 2003 and 2006 (USAJD 2006). Most aid was directed toward the 2002-2003 Georgia Train and Equip Program (GTEP) (Shan ker 2002). As part of GTEP, about 2,000 Georgian soldiers were trained by US military personnel and equipped with American weapons and technology in order to better prepare Georgia to help the United States counter global terrorism (United States Department of Defense 2002). One year after the initiation of the GTEP, Georgia was a dedicated member of the "coalition of the willing" that sup ported the US war in Iraq. In the years after the Rose Revolution of 2003, new President Mikheil Saakashvili sent a total of 2,000 soldiers to support US opera tions in Iraq, making it the third largest contributor of forces by 2007. Aiding the United States in Iraq was part of a larger pattern of cooperative behavior by Geor gia; our events data indicate that Georgia's overall level of cooperation with the United States more than tripled after 2002 (King and Lowe 2003a,b)

2022 Michigan Counterplan
DEMOCRACY QPQ CP › solvency – t/l › 2nc – at: squo safeguards solve

Current safeguards are insufficient – ensuring flexibility for potential curtailment is key

Lewis 19 – Dr. Larry Lewis, head of the CNA’s Center for Autonomy and AI, previous Senior Advisor to the Assistant Secretary of State responsible for human rights, lead analyst and co-author for the Joint Civilian Casualty Study in support of GEN Patraeus, subject matter expert on the subjects of joint and coalition interoperability, combat identification, and fratricide, Ph.D. in physical chemistry from Rice University (“Promoting Civilian Protection during Security Assistance: Learning from Yemen”, May 2019, ) FGY

Filling the policy gap: civilian protection and security assistance

The absence of a comprehensive US strategy in Yemen between 2015–2018 is a symptom of a larger problem: Although the US is the world’s largest dealer of military arms, it does not have a policy addressing civilian protection challenges that come when the recipient of military assistance uses force in armed conflict. The only safeguards are the Leahy law and a basic requirement that partner military forces comply with IHL.41 For example, DOD provides basic training regarding IHL through institutions such as Defense Institute of International Legal Studies (DIILS). Previous analysis shows that these safeguards are necessary but not sufficient for avoiding significant harm to civilians in armed conflict: many civilians can be harmed, and medical facilities and critical infrastructure can be damaged, even when military forces do not violate international law.42 Given this policy gap, how can the US manage differing interests and risks with respect to civilian protection? The overall construct in the Leahy law is instructive here; it includes two types of activities: 1. Improving operational effectiveness: general security assistance that can include military equipment and weapons, tactical training, and operational support 2. Promoting responsible behavior: training and education on IHL and human rights law to avoid gross violations of human rights, and working with the partner military and their justice system to promote accountability. When specific concerns arise with a partner, the first (improving operational effectiveness) can be curtailed or paused while the second is continued, or even intensified, with the intent of remediation and restoring the security assistance relationship. This overall approach can also be taken with civilian protection. The specific tools for promoting responsible behavior will differ, but the overall approach helps promote the interest of both the US and the partner force, and the security of civilians. This approach to managing risk in security assistance is shown in Figure 2.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
DEMOCRACY QPQ CP › solvency – t/l › 2nc – solvency – aff fails/comparative

Aff alone fails – guarantees circumvention, fails to spread US norms, and wastes resources

“security assistance” and “security cooperation” used interchangeably

Gwinn 22 – Jeremy Gwinn, director of Army and Special Missions Team at OSC-I at the United States Department of Defense, Ph.D. in international law from the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University, B.A. in military science from Penn State University (“Sweeter Carrots and Harder Sticks: Rethinking US Security Assistance”, 4/19/2022, ) FGY

Daily news coverage of burned-out Russian armor, as well as Russia’s eastward retreat, serves as tangible evidence that U.S. weapons and other military supplies being delivered to Ukraine — about $3.5 billion authorized so far this year — are having real effects. Less clear, however, are the results of the roughly $20 billion in military aid which the United States provides to other partners around the world annually. When evaluated in terms of U.S. national interests and partner-nation outcomes, a great deal of this security assistance fails to meet the mark.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
DEMOCRACY QPQ CP › solvency – t/l › 2nc – solvency – domestic political support

The counterplan ensures sustained domestic political support for SC by minimizing justifications for aid-reduction

Dalton et. Al 18 – Melissa Griffin Dalton, assistance secretary of defense for homeland defense and America’s security affairs in the Biden Administration, senior fellow and deputy director of the Center for Strategic and International Studies, manager of the Nuclear Posture Review, M.A. in international relations from the Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies at Johns Hopkins University, B.A. in foreign affairs from the University of Virginia (“The Protection of Civilians in U.S. Partnered Operations”, CSIS, 10/30/2018, https://www.csis.org/analysis/protection-civilians-us-partnered-operations) FGY

The experience of policymakers and practitioners in security and humanitarian fields provide significant lessons about the best ways to mitigate harm and protect civilians in the context of security partnerships. The following are key emerging themes from select discussions facilitated by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), the Center for Civilians in Conflict (CIVIC), and InterAction about practitioner experiences.

Reconciling Geopolitical Dynamics

2022 Michigan Counterplan
DEMOCRACY QPQ CP › solvency – t/l › 2nc – solvency – advocate general

SC should be conditional

Young 20, Senior Lecturer at the Naval Postgraduate School (Thomas-Durell, “The "Politics" of Security Cooperation and Security Assistance,” DASA Dec Military Documents,

A final but important point is a desperate need for policy that makes the provision of SC and SA conditional. All too often, SC events and programs are programmed years in advance (as if they were an exercise or a training event) and are effectively immune from the political commitment of the partner nation’s senior leadership to make needed changes to enable the implementation in the defense institution of SC efforts. Again, Karlin is quite prescient in making this case: The biggest problem with Washington’s efforts to build foreign militaries is its reluctance to weigh in on higher-order questions of mission, organizational structure, and personnel—issues that profoundly affect a military’s capacity but are often considered too sensitive to touch. Instead, both parties tend to focus exclusively on training and equipment, thus undercutting the effectiveness of U.S. assistance.36

2022 Michigan Counterplan
DEMOCRACY QPQ CP › solvency – t/l › 2nc – solvency – monitoring

Specificity in conditions is key to ensuring robust oversight, misuse of tech, and perception of US commitment to human rights

Mahanty 21 – Daniel Mahanty, director of the US Program for the Center for Civilians in Conflict, founder and former head of the Office of Security and Human Rights at the United States Department of State, adjunct professor at the Kansas University Center for Global and International Studies, non-resident Senior Associate at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, M.A. in national security policy from Georgetown University, B.A. in economics from George Mason University (“Human Rights and Civilian Harm in Security Cooperation: A Framework of Analysis”, 2/16/2021, https://www.e-ir.info/2021/02/16/human-rights-and-civilian-harm-in-security-cooperation-a-framework-of-analysis/ ) FGY

A Framework of Analysis for Civilian Harm and Human Rights Risks in Security Cooperation

To establish a more suitable approach to managing the different kinds of risks associated with different kinds of security cooperation, policymakers, program managers and those who evaluate government practices from the outside, might look toward a new framework of analysis that establishes the basis for designing programs with adequate controls and safeguards in place. A well-designed framework would 1) align with the emerging policy consensus about the necessary components of effective and sustainable security cooperation programs; 2) identify the variables within several categories of analysis (e.g. political, legal, and operational) that correspond with the risks most worthy of attention; 3) allow for customised application to a specific security cooperation activity; 4) consider the risks that derive both from the ‘partner’ as well as from the ‘acts of partnership’, and 5) lend itself to relatively clear policy prescriptions that flow from the diagnosis it presents.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
DEMOCRACY QPQ CP › solvency – t/l › 2nc – solvency – general

The counterplan’s incentive gives allies the political will cooperate

Morcos 21 – Pierre Morcos, visiting fellow at the Europe, Russia, and Eurasia program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, career diplomat with the French Foreign Service and Deputy Head of the Strategic Affairs and Cybersecurity Division focusing on NATO and European Defense Issues, B.A. and M.P.A. from the Paris Institute of Political Studies (“’Lifting Up Our Values at Home’: How to Revitalize NATO’s Political Cohesion”, CSIS, 3/12/2021, ) FGY

First, allies should recommit to abide by the principles of the North Atlantic Treaty. These principles are often mentioned in NATO’s official communiqués in a cursory way, reflecting the limited attention given to them within the alliance. Allies should, as a first step, adopt at the highest level a declaration reaffirming the spirit and letter of the Washington Treaty. This could happen in conjunction with or, ideally, be imbedded in the new Strategic Concept that NATO is likely to launch later this year. While this declaration is not an end in itself, it is a first step to focus member countries and remind them what they will be held accountable for. Regarding the substance of such a pledge, the recent Reflection Group provides a good template with its proposed . This includes the North Atlantic Treaty articles and two new tenets focused on good behavior.

Second, NATO should monitor individual Allies’ compliance with these principles. To have a meaningful effect, such declaration needs to be complemented by an evaluation of its actual implementation, on the basis of an annual report prepared by the International Secretariat under the authority of the assistant secretary general for political affairs or the deputy secretary general. Building on existing metrics and findings (from  or other international organizations such as the  or ), this report would provide a basis for a periodic discussion on the political health of the alliance. Ideally, the assessment would be linked to NATO’s resilience metrics, in effect underscoring their link with external security threats. In addition to this cyclical process, an “emergency brake” mechanism, similar to what the European Union has established under its rule of law mechanism, could be put in place to allow an ally, or group of allies, to request a discussion at the North Atlantic Council or ministerial level when a serious violation of the declaration by an individual ally occurs. Such discussion would shed light on the problematic behavior of the ally in question and create political pressure in itself.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
DEMOCRACY QPQ CP › solvency – t/l › 2nc – solvency – general

The counterplan’s assessments guarantee compliance and prevent misuse of aid

Dalton et. Al 18 – Melissa Griffin Dalton, assistance secretary of defense for homeland defense and America’s security affairs in the Biden Administration, senior fellow and deputy director of the Center for Strategic and International Studies, manager of the Nuclear Posture Review, M.A. in international relations from the Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies at Johns Hopkins University, B.A. in foreign affairs from the University of Virginia (“The Protection of Civilians in U.S. Partnered Operations”, CSIS, 10/30/2018, https://www.csis.org/analysis/protection-civilians-us-partnered-operations) FGY

TOOLS FOR INFLUENCING PARTNER BEHAVIOR The U.S. and other actors can use a range of tools to encourage changes in conduct by state and non-state partner forces: ▪ Conditioning Support. By setting antecedent conditions of compliance with human rights and international humanitarian law (such as implementation of the Leahy laws), the United States defines basic parameters for itself and its partners: a form of conditionality on security assistance. This approach establishes up-front expectations that certain activities—such as training for specific units or other types of assistance— will be discontinued if items are misused or diverted, or if partners otherwise fail to fulfill their legal obligations. But “ultimatum” conditionality, where the United States publicly or privately threatens to end all support due to partner conduct, seldom occurs for several reasons, including the possibility that U.S. policymakers view the partnership as too critical to U.S. interests. Attempts to use the threat of deprivation as leverage are often thwarted by the reality that the U.S. government is more invested in a partnership than the partner, or driven by fears of peer competition over economics or influence.6 The United States can, however, creatively augment existing conditionality by calibrating and sequencing assistance based on an honest and transparent assessment of risks and the capabilities realistically needed to maintain the relationship. This process might entail requirements for specific training based on past incidents or gaps that create vulnerabilities, adding or strengthening terms for arms transfers and purchases, limiting certain kinds of assistance or materiel, or setting clearer expectations through diplomatic engagement in response to patterns of behavior that result in civilian harm. However, conditionality may not be the most effective approach when issues primarily result from legitimate capacity gaps. In these cases, the United States could also place the sale of defense items, such as munitions or aircraft, within a sequence that requires pre-assessment; robust, upfront, and continuous training and technical assistance; and indirect operational oversight or access following the transfer to ensure appropriate use of the equipment.7 Follow through on unacceptable behavior—in the form of cutting off support to some security partners—may ultimately be necessary to prevent U.S. government liability for criminal conduct and to send a powerful political message to a capable but abusive security force

2022 Michigan Counterplan
DEMOCRACY QPQ CP › solvency – t/l › 2nc – solvency – general

Conditional SC incentives are more strategically valuable than the aff

“security assistance” and “security cooperation” used interchangeably

Gwinn 22 – Jeremy Gwinn, director of Army and Special Missions Team at OSC-I at the United States Department of Defense, Ph.D. in international law from the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University, B.A. in military science from Penn State University (“Sweeter Carrots and Harder Sticks: Rethinking US Security Assistance”, 4/19/2022, ) FGY

Hard Is Not Impossible

2022 Michigan Counterplan
DEMOCRACY QPQ CP › NEGATIVE › 1nc

LIO solves nuclear war, climate change and tech disruption – all existential

Harari 18, Professor of History at Hebrew University of Jerusalem (Yuval Noah, “We need a post-liberal order now,” The Economist, )

The second thing to note about this vision of friendly fortresses is that it has been tried—and it failed spectacularly. All attempts to divide the world into clear-cut nations have so far resulted in war and genocide. When the heirs of Garibaldi, Mazzini and Mickiewicz managed to overthrow the multi-ethnic Habsburg Empire, it proved impossible to find a clear line dividing Italians from Slovenes or Poles from Ukrainians. This had set the stage for the second world war. The key problem with the network of fortresses is that each national fortress wants a bit more land, security and prosperity for itself at the expense of the neighbors, and without the help of universal values and global organisations, rival fortresses cannot agree on any common rules. Walled fortresses are seldom friendly. But if you happen to live inside a particularly strong fortress, such as America or Russia, why should you care? Some nationalists indeed adopt a more extreme isolationist position. They don’t believe in either a global empire or in a global network of fortresses. Instead, they deny the necessity of any global order whatsoever. “Our fortress should just raise the drawbridges,” they say, “and the rest of the world can go to hell. We should refuse entry to foreign people, foreign ideas and foreign goods, and as long as our walls are stout and the guards are loyal, who cares what happens to the foreigners?” Such extreme isolationism, however, is completely divorced from economic realities. Without a global trade network, all existing national economies will collapse—including that of North Korea. Many countries will not be able even to feed themselves without imports, and prices of almost all products will skyrocket. The made-in-China shirt I am wearing cost me about $5. If it had been produced by Israeli workers from Israeli-grown cotton using Israeli-made machines powered by non-existing Israeli oil, it may well have cost ten times as much. Nationalist leaders from Donald Trump to Vladimir Putin may therefore heap abuse on the global trade network, but none thinks seriously of taking their country completely out of that network. And we cannot have a global trade network without some global order that sets the rules of the game. Even more importantly, whether people like it or not, humankind today faces three common problems that make a mockery of all national borders, and that can only be solved through global cooperation. These are nuclear war, climate change and technological disruption. You cannot build a wall against nuclear winter or against global warming, and no nation can regulate artificial intelligence (AI) or bioengineering single-handedly. It won’t be enough if only the European Union forbids producing killer robots or only America bans genetically-engineering human babies. Due to the immense potential of such disruptive technologies, if even one country decides to pursue these high-risk high-gain paths, other countries will be forced to follow its dangerous lead for fear of being left behind. An AI arms race or a biotechnological arms race almost guarantees the worst outcome. Whoever wins the arms race, the loser will likely be humanity itself. For in an arms race, all regulations will collapse. Consider, for example, conducting genetic-engineering experiments on human babies. Every country will say: “We don’t want to conduct such experiments—we are the good guys. But how do we know our rivals are not doing it? We cannot afford to remain behind. So we must do it before them.” Similarly, consider developing autonomous-weapon systems, that can decide for themselves whether to shoot and kill people. Again, every country will say: “This is a very dangerous technology, and it should be regulated carefully. But we don’t trust our rivals to regulate it, so we must develop it first”. The only thing that can prevent such destructive arms races is greater trust between countries. This is not an impossible mission. If today the Germans promise the French: “Trust us, we aren’t developing killer robots in a secret laboratory under the Bavarian Alps,” the French are likely to believe the Germans, despite the terrible history of these two countries. We need to build such trust globally. We need to reach a point when Americans and Chinese can trust one another like the French and Germans. Similarly, we need to create a global safety-net to protect humans against the economic shocks that AI is likely to cause. Automation will create immense new wealth in high-tech hubs such as Silicon Valley, while the worst effects will be felt in developing countries whose economies depend on cheap manual labor. There will be more jobs to software engineers in California, but fewer jobs to Mexican factory workers and truck drivers. We now have a global economy, but politics is still very national. Unless we find solutions on a global level to the disruptions caused by AI, entire countries might collapse, and the resulting chaos, violence and waves of immigration will destabilise the entire world. This is the proper perspective to look at recent developments such as Brexit. In itself, Brexit isn’t necessarily a bad idea. But is this what Britain and the EU should be dealing with right now? How does Brexit help prevent nuclear war? How does Brexit help prevent climate change? How does Brexit help regulate artificial intelligence and bioengineering? Instead of helping, Brexit makes it harder to solve all of these problems. Every minute that Britain and the EU spend on Brexit is one less minute they spend on preventing climate change and on regulating AI. In order to survive and flourish in the 21st century, humankind needs effective global cooperation, and so far the only viable blueprint for such cooperation is offered by liberalism. Nevertheless, governments all over the world are undermining the foundations of the liberal order, and the world is turning into a network of fortresses. The first to feel the impact are the weakest members of humanity, who find themselves without any fortress willing to protect them: refugees, illegal migrants, persecuted minorities. But if the walls keep rising, eventually the whole of humankind will feel the squeeze.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
DEMOCRACY QPQ CP › NEGATIVE › 1nc

That saves the LIO. AND illiberalism shreds all NATO initiatives.

Tome 21, Professor at the Universidade Autónoma de Lisboa where he is currently Director of the Department of International Relations (Luis, “Future of NATO: Significant Insights from 2021 Meeting of NATO Ministries of Foreign Affairs,”

Question: Rising rightist or leftist populist political groups in Europe and the US indicate that they would be quite influential in their own national politics in the near future. Do you think that this could complicate NATO’s stance regarding democracy and freedom?

Luis Tome: Of course it can. The spread of nationalism, populism, authoritarianism and extremisms threatens the liberal international order and the security environment. And if national egoisms, populisms, autocratic tendencies and “illiberal democracies” flourish in NATO member countries, as is already happening, then it makes it very complicated for the transatlantic Alliance to be the bulwark for the defence and promotion of freedom, democracy and liberal order. Fortunately, there seems to be a sense of urgency within NATO today to put democratic values back at the heart of the transatlantic Alliance’s action. But we must recognise that the virus of nationalism and populism is difficult to fight even within NATO countries.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
DEMOCRACY QPQ CP › NEGATIVE › 1nc

Allies say yes

Lee 19, graduated with a Master in Public Policy degree from the Harvard Kennedy School of Government, et al, 2019 (Martha, “Partnering to Protect: Reforming US Security Assistance to Reduce Civilian Harm,” Belfer Center, https://www.belfercenter.org/publication/partnering-protect-reforming-us-security-assistance-reduce-civilian-harm)//BB

Others argue that the “total package” approach of US security assistance does provide the United States with real influence over partners, and thus a real opportunity to enforce conditions. Partners are dependent on American expertise to operate, maintain, and modernize weapons systems throughout their entire life-cycles. This dependency should give US officials leverage, but one expert noted that the US government is often “constitutionally incapable or unwilling to use that leverage” for fear of disrupting the bilateral relationship.256 Given this mixed record, policymakers might try to identify opportunities to implement positive conditionality: a conditions-based framework where partners are incentivized to demonstrate good behavior over time in exchange for security assistance. Rather than authorizing aid and then withholding it when confronted with undesirable behavior, the United States could identify specific positive actions the partner is open to taking, and the specific incentives the United States would provide if benchmarks were met. To implement this, the State Department could negotiate a memorandum of understanding (MOU) between the United States and the partner. It should reflect the elements, including civilian protection measures, that would govern security assistance between the two countries over a certain period of time. Milestones should be built over the course of the MOU such that when the partner meets a goal, they are rewarded. If the partner fails to meet the milestone, they do not receive the agreed-upon security assistance. The implementation of this framework would have a real impact by lending predictability to the relationship and limit the potential for mismanaged expectations on both sides.257 One major hurdles would be overcoming entrenched bureaucratic tendencies to “shovel security assistance out the door,” as one expert put it.258 However, if tackled in a piecemeal fashion – for example, starting with a few “easy” partnerships and building on momentum and success – this approach could feasibly be implemented at either State or DoD.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
Future Gens CP › Aff › Fourth Branch Fails

(Don’t Read) Yes modelling & it disproportionately impacts the most marginalized

--SRHR = sexual and reproductive health and rights

Pugh 19 – PhD in International Development and Political Science, Research Fellow with the Centre for International and Comparative Politics at Stellenbosch University. Based in Cape Town, South Africa, Sarah comes from a background of international development, migration, gender and health (Sarah, “Politics, power, and sexual and reproductive health and rights: impacts and opportunities,” Sexual and Reproductive Health Matters, 2)

The capacity of people to access and realise their sexual and reproductive health and rights (SRHR) has long been influenced by the shifting tides of politics and the various configurations of political power that hold sway in specific times and specific places. As the articles in this issue make clear, pronounced shifts towards far right-wing and conservative politics are threatening hard-won progress in SRHR [sexual and reproductive health and rights]. This is happening globally, regionally, nationally and locally, affecting progress in many areas, such as access to safe abortion, access to contraception, the protection of the sexual and reproductive rights of migrants and refugees including those in humanitarian settings, and the advancement of the rights of LGBTI+ individuals. Taken together, the articles paint a compelling picture of how governments, political leaders, activists, non-governmental organisations (NGOs), lawyers, and others are all engaging in the politics of SRHR, with profound impacts, both positive and negative, on the everyday lived realities of people around the world. As these articles illustrate, the impacts of politics on SRHR are often the greatest for the most vulnerable or marginalised populations, who themselves may have limited opportunity to influence political outcomes on their own behalf. The embodied consequences of SRHR politics Political decisions have embodied consequences. Decisions made in the corridors of power in one part of the world can reverberate across the globe, with very real implications for the lives and health of individuals in other parts of the world. It is the bodies and lives of women and girls that are most often impacted by domestic and international political decisions related to SRHR. For example, in the 2017 reinstatement and expansion of the Mexico City Policy, or Global Gag Rule, under US President Trump, we are witness to the devastating international impacts of a political decision taken in the US to prohibit any foreign NGO that receives US global health funds from engaging in “certain abortion-related activities, including providing abortion services, information, counselling and referrals, and advocating to expand access to safe abortion services.”1 Against public health evidence, such politics and politically-driven decisions restrict the life choices and undermine the fundamental human rights of some of the most marginalised people in the world. For many women, such as those forced in the circumstances to seek unsafe abortions, they are also a matter of life and death.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
Future Gens CP › Aff › Fourth Branch Fails

Specifically supreme court precedent creates a framework that gets modelled

Elster 16 (Naomi, writer and scientist with a PhD in cancer medicine at the Royal College of Surgeons, Ireland, supported by the Irish Cancer Society, "How U.S. Policies Shape Abortion Rights Around The World," http://www.theestablishment.co/2016/09/19/how-u-s-policies-shape-abortion-rights-around-the-world/)

It’s no secret that the United States has a massive global influence on politics—but too often, we forget how this influence extends to women’s rights. Around the world, countries make decisions on abortion and reproductive health that can be traced, at least in part, to precedents set in the U.S. “The U.S. can be quite isolationist; it doesn’t often look outside of its borders. But a lot of other countries do look to the U.S. and will cite U.S. Supreme Court proceedings in their own court proceedings,” explains Grace Wilentz, a human rights activist and policy expert based in Dublin, Ireland, who has over 10 years of experience working in the sexual and reproductive rights arena and consulting for multiple international NGOs and UN agencies on these issues. With the election approaching, it’s a particularly valuable time to look at the ways that U.S. policies shape those around the world—and how this affects even more than the crucial issue of abortion access. Roe v. Wade Not surprisingly, one of the most influential U.S. decisions on other countries has been Roe v. Wade. Decided in 1973, the ruling was of its time, heavily influenced by abortion liberalization happening globally, particularly in Western Europe. And it, in turn, has had significant global significance. By grounding the right to choose in a solid constitutional argument about privacy and individual liberty, the United States created a framework that could be applied by other countries. And applied it has been; since Roe was decided, more than 40 countries have adopted laws to permit abortion under certain circumstances.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
Future Gens CP › Aff › Fourth Branch Fails

Just like “horse-trading” could be the link to an agenda politics DA- it could also work for amendments

Gilbert 17 (Michael, Sullivan & Cromwell Professor of Law, University of Virginia, Virginia Law Review, Vol. 103, No. 4 (June 2017), pp. 631-671, )

In addition to constitutional failure, these ideas cast light on an important question of constitutional evolution: When to amend and when to convene? Article V authorizes two methods for changing the text of the Constitution: amendments and conventions.146 Other constitutions offer the same basic choice.147 Amendments are more likely to fit the spatial models, which assume decisions happen on one issue at a time. Thus, changing law through amendment will more likely produce the incrementalism and instability described above. Conventions, on the other hand, often involve bargaining across multiple issues. Such bargaining can generate meaningful change. Returning to Figure 5, voter l will not, without more, approve replacing SQ with a law at m. She might, however, support such a change if she gets a change on another issue in ex change. Suppose the dimension in Figure 5 reflects rights for religious minorities, and another unpictured dimension reflects the right to educa tion. Voter l opposes moving rights for religious minorities further from her ideal point—which going from SQ to m would do—but she would nevertheless support it as part of a deal that simultaneously moves the right to education closer to her ideal point. Thus, bargaining can produce large change even when law is entrenched and the incrementalism and pace principles operate. In short, the solution to the constitutional predicament described above is a convention. Voters or their representatives must bargain across issues, not vote individually on each one. Returning to the case of France, after the constitution collapsed in 1958, General de Gaulle's government drafted a new one. Voters cast one vote on the complete package; they did not vote on each provision. According to a key parliamentarian, the new constitution "embodied] the reforms envisaged earlier," meaning the amendments considered but rejected during the Fourth Republic.148 Revision accomplished what amendment could not. France's Fifth Republic endures to this day