2022
Georgetown
Affirmative
Wave 1 – Aff Compiled › Adv 2 - Cohesion › I/L - Deterrence
University of Exeter 20. “Should NATO Adopt a Joint Offensive Cyber Capability?” September 2020. . //AN
First, NATO’s cyber-deterrence would be more credible because a joint cyber capability would facilitate knowledge transfer between member states. For deterrence to be successful, NATO has to convince aggressors that it can retaliate against the right aggressor in a manner that imposes unacceptable costs. However, state and non-state actors, like the Fancy Bear cyber-espionage group likely associated with the Russian security services, know that the disaggregation of member states’ cyber assets makes this harder to achieve.89 The primary reason for this separation of effort is that intelligence on adversaries’ cyber vulnerabilities is closely guarded by national intelligence agencies.90 This intelligence is absolutely critical for effective cyber attacks, since it is necessary to understand the targeted systems in great detail.91 The CyOC will not go far enough in fostering intelligence sharing, even though it aims to ‘integrate cyber capabilities into NATO planning and operations’.92 It is certainly a step forward, but of those states that have offered their cyber effects to NATO, France and America have clearly stated they will retain full control of their operations and capabilities.93 This lack of joint operational authority poses a significant challenge, as it appears the centre will serve to coordinate rather than oversee operations.94 It will prove very hard to achieve even this when members’ capabilities vary greatly in their maturity and development. Whereas Germany is said to have thousands of ‘information and cyber officers’, other European states have hardly any.95 Overall, NATO in its current state is not optimised for deterrence-by-punishment and the CyOC will do little to improve this.
Instead, pooling members’ cyber-intelligence and cyber-sabotage expertise would encourage intra-alliance knowledge transfer. Knowledge transfer in organisations is the process through which one unit, like a department or division, is affected by the experience of another.96 Empirical evidence suggests that interconnected organisations like franchises and chains hold comparative advantages over their autonomous counterparts, due to the ability to transfer knowledge between their constituent elements.97
2022
Georgetown
Affirmative
Wave 1 – Aff Compiled › Adv 2 - Cohesion › I/L – AT OCOs Bad
University of Exeter 20. “Should NATO Adopt a Joint Offensive Cyber Capability?” September 2020. . //AN
A third criticism is that retaliatory cyberattacks can easily cause collateral damage and are dangerously escalatory. Since the distinction between internal and external networks is often blurred, attacks directed at a defender’s network may spill over into external networks.138 Adopting a persistent engagement approach will also pose increasing risks for escalation.139 This is aggravated by the absence of international agreements determining unacceptable behaviour in cyberspace.140 This dissertation does not dispute these criticisms; on the contrary, they strengthen the case for a joint-NATO offensive cyber capability. This is because one of the main solutions to these problems is increased control of cyber operations.141 A joint capability would increase NATO members’ control, because it would facilitate agreement on how to integrate offensive cyber effects into a Flexible Deterrent Options (FDO) package.142 FDOs are meant to allow for a gradual increase of pressure in response to threats, limiting the chance of uncontrolled escalation.143 Chapter 5 outlines how offensive cyber could be integrated into an FDO package in more detail. Leaving members to adhere to their own FDOs undermines the unity of NATO’s response to an attack. Similarly, the extra control that centralised C2 offers would allow NATO to reduce the risk of cyberattacks causing collateral damage.144 Though this risk cannot be eliminated entirely, joint C2 and standardised offensive cyber doctrine could add extra controls that seem unlikely to appear at the CyOC. For instance, doctrine could dictate that large attacks should only be launched against military networks; air defence systems are unlikely to be on the same network as hospitals, mitigating the chance of collateral damage.
2022
Georgetown
Affirmative
Wave 1 – Aff Compiled › Adv 2 - Cohesion › I/L – Intrusions
Max Smeets 19. Senior Researcher at the Center for Security Studies (CSS) at ETH Zurich, Director of the European Cyber Conflict Research Initiative, and Author of “No Shortcuts: Why States Struggle to Develop a Military Cyber-Force.” “Cyber Command’s Strategy Risks Friction With Allies”. Lawfare. 5-28-2019. https://www.lawfareblog.com/cyber-commands-strategy-risks-friction-allies. //AN
Much has been written about the fundamental changes in U.S. cyber strategy. U.S. Cyber Command’s vision of “persistent engagement” and the Department of Defense’s new strategy of “defend forward” have, in particular, led to numerous critical remarks about the risks of escalation between the U.S. and its main adversaries in cyberspace.
These debates are worth continuing, including about what the change in strategy means for establishing norms in cyberspace. But commentators have so far ignored a key dimension: The strategy’s main implications may not reside in how it changes the dynamics between the U.S. and its adversaries but, instead, in how it affects broader alliance relationships, especially beyond the Five Eyes (Australia, Canada, the U.K., the U.S. and New Zealand). U.S. Cyber Command’s mission to cause friction in adversaries’ freedom of maneuver in cyberspace may end up causing significant friction in allies’ trust and confidence—and adversaries may be able to exploit that.
2022
Georgetown
Affirmative
Wave 1 – Aff Compiled › Adv 2 - Cohesion › I/L – AT Defense [Attribution]
University of Exeter 20. “Should NATO Adopt a Joint Offensive Cyber Capability?” September 2020. . //AN
The main critique of deterrence-by-punishment is that it is hard to attribute cyberattacks. This reduces the credibility of deterrence because it is too difficult to tell which systems to retaliate against.122 Nevertheless, though attribution is costly and time-consuming, it is possible.123 On a technical level, malware’s source code and programming style can be mapped against previous incidents.124 In Iran, these forensics revealed similarities between Stuxnet and another virus developed by the NSA called Flame, intensifying accusations against US involvement in both tools.125
Furthermore, anonymity in cyberspace is not as pervasive as critics make out, because attackers do make mistakes. For instance, the Chinese hacker group APT1 is recognisable for its sloppy re-use of social engineering tactics and specific infrastructure.126 Additionally, attribution is facilitated by examining the history and politics surrounding an attack; in the case of Stuxnet, the tense relations between America, Israel and Iran narrowed down the list of likely sources.127 What’s more, Russia is increasingly likely to use its state security services to conduct attacks, instead of more anonymous but lower skilled non-state hackers.128 This suggests that attacks from NATO’s main adversary in cyberspace may become more traceable.
2022
Georgetown
Affirmative
Wave 1 – Aff Compiled › Adv 2 - Cohesion › UQ – Now Key
Lonergan and Moller 4/27 (ERICA D. LONERGAN and SARA B. MOLLER, Erica D. Lonergan is an assistant professor in the Army Cyber Institute and a research scholar at the Saltzman Institute of War and Peace Studies at Columbia University. Sara B. Moller is a former Eisenhower Fellow at the NATO Defense College and will be joining the Center for Security Studies at Georgetown University later this year, “NATO’s Credibility Is on the Line with its Cyber Defense Pledge. That’s a Bad Idea,” POLITICO, 4/27/2022, ) -lh
With little chance of improved NATO-Russian relations any time soon, time is of the essence to get this right. The allies should begin the hard political legwork now to ensure members get on the same page before NATO’s June summit, if not sooner. Achieving consensus on significant cyber issues has previously taken time. NATO’s attribution of the Microsoft Exchange hack last summer to China was an important step for the alliance and sent a strong signal to our adversaries. But it took months to reach agreement on the statement; the hack was uncovered in March 2021 and the NATO statement was not made public until July. In the current crisis, the alliance will not have the luxury of waiting four (or more) months to agree on a response. To avoid incurring damaging costs to NATO’s credibility and its deterrent powers, the allies should refine their cyber policy, now.
2022
Georgetown
Affirmative
Wave 1 – Aff Compiled › Adv 2 - Cohesion › UQ – AT Squo Solves [Deterrence by Denial]
University of Exeter 20. “Should NATO Adopt a Joint Offensive Cyber Capability?” September 2020. . //AN
Joint Offensive Cyber Capabilities and Cyber Deterrence-by-Punishment
It is necessary to explain the limitations of NATO’s current deterrence-by-denial policy to contextualise cyber deterrence-by-punishment. After all, one may ask: why not just bolster NATO’s cyber defences? While defensive measures are absolutely essential for stopping attacks that have already launched, they are severely limited at deterring potential attacks. This probably explains why NATO does not mention ‘cyber deterrence-by-denial’ in its policy documents, but rather cyber- deterrence more broadly.74 The main problem with deterrence-by-denial is that cyberattacks are very low cost for an aggressor, both in terms of the effort expended to launch an attack and the cost of penalties.75 The existence of a huge black market offering everything from zero-day exploits to off-the-shelf services to conduct DDoS attacks facilitates the ease with which cyberattack technology can be acquired.76 Meanwhile, the lack of an inspection regime and the infancy of international legal frameworks reduces the risk of penalties.77 This gives aggressors little incentive to stop attacking, even in the face of strong defences.
2022
Georgetown
Affirmative
Wave 1 – Aff Compiled › Adv 1 – OCOs › !! - Meltdown
Jeremy Straub 19, Assistant Professor of Computer Science, North Dakota State University, Ph.D. in Scientific Computing, M.S., M.B.A., and two B.S degrees, “A Cyberattack Could Wreak Destruction Comparable to a Nuclear Weapon,” The Conversation, 8/16/2019, http://theconversation.com/a-cyberattack-could-wreak-destruction-comparable-to-a-nuclear-weapon-112173, Accessed 24 June 22
People around the world may be worried about nuclear tensions rising, but I think they’re missing the fact that a major cyberattack could be just as damaging – and hackers are already laying the groundwork.
With the U.S. and Russia pulling out of a key nuclear weapons pact – and beginning to develop new nuclear weapons – plus Iran tensions and North Korea again test-launching missiles, the global threat to civilization is high. Some fear a new nuclear arms race.
2022
Georgetown
Affirmative
Wave 1 – Aff Compiled › Adv 1 – OCOs › !! - Meltdown
Dr. Page Stoutland 18, Consultant of Scientific and Technical Affairs to the Nuclear Threat Initiative, B.S. from St. Olaf College, Ph.D in Chemistry from University of California Berkeley, “Cyberattacks on Nuclear Power Plants”, The Nuclear Threat Initiative, 3/19/2018, https://www.nti.org/atomic-pulse/cyberattacks-nuclear-power-plants-how-worried-should-we-be/ Accessed 24 June 22
The New York Times reported last week on a U.S. government report accusing Russia of conducting a series of cyberattacks aimed at U.S. and European nuclear power plants and water and electric systems from 2015 through 2017. In addition to attacks on water and electric plants, publicly available evidence suggests that Russia infiltrated the business systems of the Burlington, Kan., Wolf Creek nuclear plant but not the plant’s control systems. It was not clear whether the goal of the attack was to conduct reconnaissance or, more seriously, some type of sabotage.
Needless to say, any type of attack on a nuclear plant is very concerning. An attack that allows hackers to manipulate the systems that control a nuclear reactor, while very difficult, could have very serious consequences, including potentially nuclear reactor core damage and off-site release of radiation.
2022
Georgetown
Affirmative
Wave 1 – Aff Compiled › Adv 1 – OCOs › !! – Hybrid War
Underwood et. al. 22 (Major Andrew Underwood, USA, is Executive Assistant to the Deputy Director for Strategy, Plans, and Policy (J5), Europe, NATO, Russia. Colonel Andrew Emery, USAF, is the Space and Missile Defense Planner in the U.S. Military Delegation to the NATO Military Committee (JCS) at NATO Headquarters, Brussels, Belgium. Lieutenant Colonel Paul Haynsworth, USA, is currently serving in the Commander’s Action Group in the NATO Special Operations Headquarters at Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe, Mons, Belgium. Commander Jennifer Barnes, USN, most recently served in the Commander’s Action Group at U.S. Africa Command Headquarters in Stuttgart, Germany), 4/14/22, accessed 6/24/22, “All Quiet in the Eastern Front: NATO Civil-Military Deterrence of Russian Hybrid Warfare”, (JB)
As Russia has evolved to increasingly rely on hybrid warfare as a major component of its strategy, NATO must adapt accordingly. NATO’s model must shift from a reliance on traditional military deterrence and expand to incorporate political, economic, and social spheres to counter aggression below the level of armed conflict. Since NATO’s structure does not readily support innovation or active (versus passive) deterrence measures, new ideas and emphases are needed to address these challenges.
Pursuing activities to deter hybrid warfare certainly poses risks and challenges to NATO and its member states and partners. Activities in these spheres might risk further blurring lines between military and nonmilitary responsibilities. Individual member laws and EU regulations might complicate these efforts. Civil institutions could be at risk of being identified as military targets in the event of a linear war.
2022
Georgetown
Affirmative
Wave 1 – Aff Compiled › Adv 1 – OCOs › !! – Hybrid War
Polyakova & Boulègue (Alina Polyakova President and CEO of CEPA, Mathieu Boulègue Senior Research Fellow Russia & Eurasia Programme at Chatham House), 1/29/21, accessed 6/24/22, “THe Evolution of Russian Hybrid Warfare: Executive Summary”, (JB)
Russia’s military interventions in Syria, Venezuela, and, more recently, Libya raise the question whether the Kremlin is still being opportunistic or whether it has revised its military strategy to better project force around the globe based on a single playbook. These interventions have taken advantage of preexisting chaos and weakness that Russia did not directly cause. Together with its growing conventional power, Russia is now far more confident about using hard power in the hybrid mix.
The aforementioned changes in Russian military thinking reflect a reinvigorated confidence in the efficacy of chaos as a competitive strategy. If anything, the Kremlin leadership feels vindicated about the usefulness of hard power options, while categorizing nonmilitary means as a tool to prepare conflict environments and make the use of force more effective. This is best exemplified by Kalev Stoicescu’s chapter on Estonia, where the threat of Russia’s military action cannot be dissociated from hybrid tools aimed at testing the country’s resolve below the threshold of Article V of NATO’s founding treaty, which commits the Alliance to collective defense.
2022
Georgetown
Affirmative
Wave 1 – Aff Compiled › Adv 1 – OCOs › !! - Nuke War
Lynas 22 British author and journalist who has written multiple books on the environment and climate change, Mark Lynas, 03/10/2022, “What Science Says: Could Humans Survive a Nuclear War Between NATO and Russia?”, (JB)
If global nuclear famine could result from just 100 nuclear detonations, what might be the result of a fuller exchange of the several thousand warheads held in current inventories by the US and Russia?
looked at a Russia-US nuclear war scenario, where Russia would target 2,200 weapons on Western countries and the US would target 1,100 weapons each on China and Russia. In total, therefore, 4,400 warheads detonate, equivalent to roughly half the current inventories held each by Russia and the US.
2022
Georgetown
Affirmative
Wave 1 – Aff Compiled › Adv 1 – OCOs › I/L – Deterrence
University of Exeter 20. “Should NATO Adopt a Joint Offensive Cyber Capability?” September 2020. . //AN
With this established, it is possible to set out this chapter’s main argument: that a joint offensive cyber capability would enhance the Alliance’s cyber-deterrent posture. There are three reasons for this. It would: improve intra-alliance knowledge transfer of cyber-intelligence gathering and cyber-sabotage techniques; help coordinate attacks and mitigate fratricide; accelerate decision-making and streamline response scenario planning.
First, NATO’s cyber-deterrence would be more credible because a joint cyber capability would facilitate knowledge transfer between member states. For deterrence to be successful, NATO has to convince aggressors that it can retaliate against the right aggressor in a manner that imposes unacceptable costs. However, state and non-state actors, like the Fancy Bear cyber-espionage group likely associated with the Russian security services, know that the disaggregation of member states’ cyber assets makes this harder to achieve.89 The primary reason for this separation of effort is that intelligence on adversaries’ cyber vulnerabilities is closely guarded by national intelligence agencies.90 This intelligence is absolutely critical for effective cyber attacks, since it is necessary to understand the targeted systems in great detail.91 The CyOC will not go far enough in fostering intelligence sharing, even though it aims to ‘integrate cyber capabilities into NATO planning and operations’.92 It is certainly a step forward, but of those states that have offered their cyber effects to NATO, France and America have clearly stated they will retain full control of their operations and capabilities.93 This lack of joint operational authority poses a significant challenge, as it appears the centre will serve to coordinate rather than oversee operations.94 It will prove very hard to achieve even this when members’ capabilities vary greatly in their maturity and development. Whereas Germany is said to have thousands of ‘information and cyber officers’, other European states have hardly any.95 Overall, NATO in its current state is not optimised for deterrence-by-punishment and the CyOC will do little to improve this.
2022
Georgetown
Affirmative
Wave 1 – Aff Compiled › Adv 1 – OCOs › I/L – Defending Forward Key
Erica D. Lonergan 20, Assistant Professor in the Army Cyber Institute, PhD in Political Science from Columbia University, “Operationalizing Defend Forward”, Lawfare, 03/12/2020, , accessed 6/24/2022.
Defend forward is a crucial component of the Cyberspace Solarium Commission’s strategic concept of layered cyber deterrence, particularly in terms of defend forward’s role in creating costs for adversaries conducting malicious behavior in cyberspace. The commission reimagines defend forward, originally articulated in the 2018 Department of Defense Cyber Strategy, as a whole-of-nation concept. That said, here I will focus on the logic of defend forward in its military application and detail how the concept should be operationalized. Defend forward, as defined by the commission, entails the proactive observing, pursuing, and countering of adversary operations and imposing costs in day-to-day competition to disrupt and defeat ongoing malicious adversary cyber campaigns, deter future campaigns, and reinforce favorable international norms of behavior, using all the instruments of national power. This piece traces the emergence of the logic of defend forward and describes how the commission built on existing concepts to more fully articulate defend forward’s theory of victory and how defend forward seeks to accomplish desired end states.
Defend forward, as a strategic concept, grew out of a number of related realizations about the strategic environment in cyberspace. First, Defense Department entities governed under Title 10 of the U.S. Code have to be able to more routinely operate outside of the department’s own networks, known as the Department of Defense Information Network. Adversary operations span global cyberspace because the environment is not defined by geographic boundaries or even shared understandings about how sovereignty applies in this domain. If the Defense Department’s ability to operate outside of its own networks was more limited and circumscribed, as envisioned in the 2015 Department of Defense Cyber Strategy, the department would be giving free reign to adversary actors that traverse global networks constrained only by capabilities.
2022
Georgetown
Affirmative
Wave 1 – Aff Compiled › Adv 1 – OCOs › I/L – Intel Sharing Key
Maigre 22 (Merle Maigre is a Non-resident Senior Fellow with CEPA's Transatlantic Leadership Program and CEPA's Digital Innovation Initiative, 4/6/22, accessed 6/24/22, “NATO’s Role In Global CyberSecurity”,
(JB)
Four sets of actions for NATO are proposed. First, denying covertness by attribution: NATO should persuade opponents that they cannot be clandestine in their cyber actions. NATO and its members need to demonstrate that it is difficult or impossible to act covertly and be clear about attributing responsibility for cyberattacks.
2022
Georgetown
Affirmative
Wave 1 – Aff Compiled › Adv 1 – OCOs › I/L – US Key
Sanakli 20 (Angelo Sanakli, Angelo Sanakli is a Master’s Candidate in Security Policy Studies at the Elliott School of International Affairs at The George Washington University. His focus is on cybersecurity and international law, “America Should Engage Like-Minded Partners for a Safer Cyberspace,” The International Affairs Review, April 30 2020, lh
The last set of norms came in 2015 during a previous GGE. It set out that nations should not carry out cyber acts that seek to intentionally damage other nations’ critical infrastructure, such as power grids, water supplies, and financial services. The GGE process came to an abrupt end in 2017 owing to considerable push back from China, Russia, and Cuba. They opposed majority positions on the right to self-defense and the application of international humanitarian law, which regulates the humanitarian aspects of armed conflict. Conflicting interests on rules on, or related to, “free internet” and “cyber sovereignty” will continue to play out in both GGE and OEWG talks. Future push-back will only continue to stifle progress on norm-building. So what does this mean for the United States?
The United States needs to engage like-minded partners. They not only share like interests but play a vital role in projecting American interest abroad. Take for example how the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) broadened its collective defense commitment to include provisions for “cyber attacks” in 2014, or how the United States and Japan similarly broadened their mutual defense commitment in 2019. Here’s what the United States and like-minded partners should do next:
2022
Georgetown
Affirmative
Wave 1 – Aff Compiled › Adv 1 – OCOs › UQ – Integration
Marrone and Sabatino 21 – Alessandro Marrone is the Head of the Defense Program at the Istituto Affari Internazionali in Rome and Ester Sabatino is Research Analyst for Defence and Military Analysis at the The International Institute for Strategic Studies. “Cyber Defence in NATO Countries: Comparing Models” Published 2021. // DG
The analysis of five national case studies has resulted in the identification of different approaches towards cyber defence, as proof of how much has yet to be accomplished in defining shared doctrines and procedures. Among the countries taken into consideration, a substantial divide can be traced between states that envisage the possibility of carrying out exclusively defensive actions, and those that count on the ability to perform offensive operations also in the absence of a cyber-attack.
Among the first group are Germany and Spain, which envision cyber deterrence as the country’s ability to promptly and adequately respond to a cyber-attack, enacting what is defined as hack-back. Additional differences between Berlin and Madrid concern the possibility of deploying the armed forces on national territory in the event of an attack, which would need prior authorisation by Parliament in Germany. It is important to note, however, that this procedure poorly matches the speed of reaction necessary to limit or avoid the damage of a cyber-attack: parliamentary timeframes, in cases that require rapid and tailored actions, could mean the state’s inability to protect its primary interests and thus hinder national defence.
2022
Georgetown
Counterplan
aff › at: nato unsustainable
Erlanger 22. Steven, chief diplomatic correspondent in Europe for The New York Times, a position he assumed in 2017. He is based in Brussels. “Fear of Russia Brings New Purpose and Unity to NATO, Once Again” JH-NCP
The talks allowed Mr. Putin to revisit Russian grievances over how the Cold War ended, in hopes of placing them back on the table for renegotiation 30 years later. His deputy foreign minister, Aleksandr V. Grushko, even warned the alliance off a “policy of containment” of Russia and insisted that “free choice does not exist in international relations” — suggesting that Ukraine would have to bow to Russian wishes.
But the more the discussion evoked the Cold War — with its firm dividing line through Europe, and its competing Russian and Western systems and spheres of influence — the more it reminded European and American allies of NATO’s purpose.
2022
Georgetown
Counterplan
aff › at: nato unsustainable
Boot 5/17/22. Max, historian, best-selling author and foreign-policy analyst who has been called one of the “world’s leading authorities on armed conflict” by the International Institute for Strategic Studies. He is the Jeane J. Kirkpatrick senior fellow for national security studies at the Council on Foreign Relations and a columnist for The Washington Post. “Opinion | Thanks, Vladimir Putin, for greatly strengthening NATO” JH-NCP
Less than three years ago, while President Donald Trump was threatening not to defend allies who didn’t pay enough for the privilege, French President Emmanuel Macron was lamenting the “brain death of NATO.” Things hardly seemed to improve when President Biden pulled U.S. troops out of Afghanistan (a NATO mission) after scant consultation with allies. As Kabul was falling, the Wall Street Journal ran an editorial headlined, “How Biden broke NATO.”
It turns out NATO is neither brain dead nor broken. The unprovoked Russian invasion of Ukraine has given the alliance a new lease on life, making it more politically united and militarily formidable than at any time since the end of the Cold War.
2022
Georgetown
Counterplan
aff › at: nato unsustainable
Seçkin 22. Barış, Anadolu Agency şirketinde Rome Bureau Chief, Experienced Foreign Correspondent with a demonstrated history of working in the media production industry. Skilled in Photography, Politics, Turkish, Italian, and Communication. Strong media and communication professional with a Master's degree focused in Cultural Heritage communication from Università degli Studi di Firenze. “Cohesion of NATO reinforced by Russian president: Defense College commandant” https://www.aa.com.tr/en/russia-ukraine-crisis/cohesion-of-nato-reinforced-by-russian-president-defense-college-commandant/2524426 JH-NCP
The commandant of NATO Defense College said the cohesion of the alliance has been even reinforced by Russian President Vladimir Putin's recent actions, now that the region sees the Russian threat.
Lt. Gen. Olivier Rittimann told Anadolu Agency in an interview that Ukraine was a partner of NATO and so there is a difference between a partner and an ally.
2022
Georgetown
Counterplan
aff › at: eu
Meijer and Brooks 21 -- Hugo Meijer is CNRS Research Fellow at Sciences Po, Center for International Studies and the Founding Director of the European Initiative for Security Studies, and Stephen Gallup Brooks is a Professor of Government in the Department of Government at Dartmouth College. Published 2021. “Illusions of autonomy: Why Europe cannot provide for its security if the United States pulls back” DG
The European ambition to seek strategic autonomy amid rising concerns over U.S. commitments to the continent and over Russia’s revisionist behavior raises an important counterfactual question: Could Europeans develop an autonomous defense capacity if there were a complete U.S. withdrawal from Europe? Although a U.S. withdrawal from Europe is unlikely in the short term, it is hardly a far-fetched scenario for the longer term. Examining this counterfactual is useful for two key reasons. First, a complete U.S. withdrawal—one entailing an exit from NATO and the withdrawal of all U.S. conventional and nuclear forces from the continent—is the strongest possible incentive that could drive the Europeans to pursue strategic autonomy, and is therefore the best way to assess their capacity to do so. Second, examination of this counterfactual advances the U.S. grand strategy debate in light of the prominent theoretical argument from U.S. “restraint” scholars such as Barry Posen, who argue that a U.S. withdrawal is warranted on the grounds that Europe can quickly and easily create an effective deterrent to Russia.9 As we explain, Europe is the key fulcrum in the grand strategy debate between these restraint scholars and “deep engagement” scholars, who favor maintaining current U.S. security commitments in Europe and elsewhere.10
Determining whether Europeans could achieve strategic autonomy anytime soon if the United States were to pull back from Europe requires an examination of the historical trajectory and the current and likely future state of European interests and defense capacity. Although existing studies have analyzed important elements of each, a more systematic analysis is needed.11 Regarding interests, this article provides the most comprehensive and thorough coding of national threat perceptions across all of Europe, showing where each country falls across a set of defined categories of threat prioritization. Concerning defense capacity, it adds to existing understandings of Europe’s deficiency by providing novel longitudinal data on European conventional defense capabilities over the past three decades and by outlining a series of four interwoven challenges that would greatly complicate the pursuit of strategic autonomy.