2022
SDI
Affirmative
SDI Starter Packet --- Cyber Info Sharing Aff › Aff Extensions / A2s --- Resilience › A2: Resilience Now
Conklin & Shoemaker 17 --- William Arthur Conklin, Associate Professor and Director of the Center for Information Security Research and Education in the College of Technology at the University of Houston, & Dan Shoemaker, Professor and Director of the Masters of Science in Cyber Security Program at the Center for Cyber Security and Intelligence Studies, a NSA Center of Academic Excellence, at the University of Detroit (313) Mercy, “Cyber-Resilience: Seven Steps for Institutional Survival”, EDPACS The EDP Audit, Control, and Security Newsletter Volume 55, 2017 - Issue 2, https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/07366981.2017.1289026?casa_token=YkLN2jNKIq4AAAAA%3AcCFCFoQdc7m6VLRsQUiXbuJ1GOnstIh5Tv2fiuAZwIDgWL4DCMehSsX_FX8t0z-nxVXENYjLorw
The point of this article is that the enterprise will never be 100% secure. There are simply too many threats to ensure that. Consequently, organizations should stop viewing security in access control enforcement terms and start treating it as a comprehensive, fully integrated, strategic management responsibility that is rooted in enterprise architecture. Thus, organizations need to approach the problem as a preparation, detection, response, and recovery challenge instead of viewing security in terms of classic walls and access control. That will require a change in culture to accomplish.
Cyber-resilience recognizes that people are the weakest link. It acknowledges that workers will make mistakes, and that intruders using advanced hacking tools will find cracks in even the most robust cybersecurity system (Lois, 2015). Accordingly, cyber-resilience needs to be integrated into the “bones” of the organization. That requires the organization to create a well-defined architecture and implement explicit control over the interdependencies among processes, including those that apply to every electronic, human and physical asset in the enterprise’s infrastructure.
2022
SDI
Affirmative
SDI Starter Packet --- Cyber Info Sharing Aff › Aff Extensions / A2s --- Resilience › Ext --- Info Sharing Insufficient Now
Faesen 22 --- Louk Faesen et al, Senior Strategic Analyst at the Cyber Policy and Resilience Program of the Hague Centre for Strategic Studies, “The Promises and Perils of a Minimum Cyber Deterrence Posture Considerations for Small and Middle Powers”, April 2022, https://hcss.nl/wp-content/uploads/2022/04/Promises-and-Perils-of-Minumum-Cyber-Deterrence-Posture-HCSS-2022.pdf
At an international level, the challenges are compounded even when the interdependence of cyberspace and a commonality of threats and interests makes the imperative to cooperate highly salient. The transatlantic alliance, broadly construed, has oftentimes struggled to arrive at a consensus around what constitutes acceptable behavior and appropriate responses in cyberspace. More directly pertinent from a deterrence perspective, there are operational limitations to meaningful cooperation between allies about intelligence-sharing around cyber threats and coordinating responses to malicious cyber behavior. The nexus between cyber and intelligence operations, and the deep ties between the cyber and signals intelligence worlds, creates significant impediments to sharing intelligence even among close allies that would enable timely and effective attribution, defense, and other responses. For offensive cyber operations in particular, the challenge is most delicate. Allies vary in terms of the level of maturity of offensive cyber programs (if at all); perspectives on the application of sovereignty to cyberspace and, by extension, how other states should approach maneuvering in others’ networks; and potential sources of mistrust about allies’ cyber activities. The latter is evident in debates about how new US cyber concepts, such as persistent engagement and defend forward, which were debuted in Cyber Command’s 2018 Command Vision and the 2018 Department of Defense Cyber Strategy, might affect US allies.181 Issues about the extent to which US cyber forces may be maneuvering in allied owned and operated networks, doctrinally defined as “gray space” by the US military, and appropriate mechanisms and timelines for notification about these operations, remain unresolved.182
2022
SDI
Affirmative
SDI Starter Packet --- Cyber Info Sharing Aff › 1AC › Solvency
Skopik et al 16 --- Florian Skopik Senior Scientist of the research program “IT Security”., Giuseppe Settanni joined AIT in 2013 as scientist and is currently working on national and European applied research projects regarding security in communication and information systems, Roman Fiedler is Scientist at the AIT Austrian Insititute of Technology and runs projects in the areas of telehealth and ICT security, “A problem shared is a problem halved: A survey on the dimensions of collective cyber defense through security information sharing”, Computers & Security Volume 60, July 2016, Pages 154-176,
International collaboration is of the utmost importance for effective response mechanisms. Indeed, digital boundaries are not clearly defined and do not correspond to national frontiers. Moreover, recent publications show that threats such as malware (and botnets, in particular) are no longer an issue that people should deal with individually, but are increasingly a social and civic responsibility that affects all sectors of the digital society (Anonymous, 2012, ENISA, 2013b).
According to Helmbrecht et al. (2013), response mechanisms, containing numerous established policy initiatives, have been in place from the early days of ICT development. However, the deployment of ICT solutions used by citizens in their day-to-day lives is threatened by cyber attacks, targeting areas such as online payment, e-government services, and in general every critical infrastructure relying on computer networks. Finally, ICT is increasingly used in vandalism, terrorism, hacktivism, war and fraud that reduce the level of confidence citizens have in trustfully adopting such technology and exposes them to higher and higher danger.
2022
SDI
Affirmative
SDI Starter Packet --- Cyber Info Sharing Aff › 1AC › Solvency
Brown 19 --- Sarah Brown et al, Senior Scientist at the NATO Communications and Information (NCI) Agency where she works on cyber security capability development for NATO, with a particular interest in cyber threat intelligence, “Towards Mature Federated Cyber Incident Management and Information Sharing Capabilities in NATO and NATO Nations”, MILCOM 2019 - 2019 IEEE Military Communications Conference (MILCOM), https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/9020814
For the past decade, cyber security teams around the world have recognized the growing importance of sharing cyber security information. Data regarding recently discovered vulnerabilities, cyber threats, and even cyber incident information has been recognized as vital for cyber security teams to stay resilient in the face of the ever-changing threat landscape.
Nations and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) need to share information with each other and to work collaboratively in order to investigate potential cyber security incidents. Particularly in the course of joint missions, it is recognized as a key requirement to allow mission commanders to build situational awareness and to make more informed decisions in response to threats or vulnerabilities.
2022
SDI
Affirmative
SDI Starter Packet --- Cyber Info Sharing Aff › 1AC › Solvency
Arts 18 --- Sophie Arts, master's degree in American studies with a concentration in U.S. foreign policy and political communication from Humboldt University in Berlin, “Offense as the New Defense: New Life for NATO’s Cyber Policy”, German Marshall Fund, 2018 | No. 039, https://www.gmfus.org/sites/default/files/Offense%2520-%2520Arts.pdf
Related to this challenge, NATO’s constraints on information sharing could hurt strategic decisionmaking processes and cyber operations. While most experts acknowledge that intelligence capabilities within NATO are significant, these remain isolated and well-guarded by national intelligence communities.31 More advanced information sharing, among allies and with other partners such as the EU, is critical for situational awareness and NATO’s preparedness. Yet, due mostly to a lack of trust between allies, this process is far from being at an optimal level.32
When it comes to intelligence sharing, some allies fear that infiltration and attacks against countries with lower resilience could potentially compromise information shared by other member states. Pushback against greater transparency is especially strong on the part of the United States, which owns a large share of NATO’s intelligence capabilities, making it a critical player in alliance intelligence operations from a tactical as well as strategic perspective.33 Due to the country’s outsized role in this field, NATO’s intelligence adaptation is largely dependent on U.S. inclinations to share capabilities and information with other allies.34 Although efforts to protect intelligence by minimizing sharing may be justified, elevating the role of the United States in NATO’s cyber policy without increasing transparency could potentially limit tactical effectiveness.
2022
SDI
Affirmative
SDI Starter Packet --- Cyber Info Sharing Aff › 1AC › Solvency
Housen-Couriel 22 --- Deborah Housen-Couriel, Chief Legal Officer and Vice-President Regulation for Konfidas Digital Ltd., a cyber and data protection consulting firm, She currently serves on the Advisory Board of the Hebrew University Law School’s Cyber Security Research Center and as a research fellow with the Reichman University’s Interdisciplinary Center Herzliya’s Institute for CounterTerrorism, Chapter 3 “Information Sharing as a Critical Best Practice for the Sustainability of Cyber Peace” in “Cyber Peace Charting a Path Toward a Sustainable, Stable, and Secure Cyberspace”, edited by Scott J Schakelford et al, published in 2022 by Cambridge Univ Press, Pages 39-41
The concept of cyber peace brings a much-needed, innovative perspective to discussions of the governance of cyberspace. The ambiguity, conflicting terminology, and lack of transparency with respect to activities by state and nonstate actors have characterized efforts to conceptualize and analyze this new area of human endeavor at least since John Perry Barlow’s 1996 Declaration of the Independence of Cyberspace. Barlow’s (1996) proclamation that claimed cyberspace as a home for the “civilization of the Mind” and a “global social space” that must be kept free of governments, state sovereignty, and legal constructs – in effect, exempt from any type of governance – marked early on in the life of online activities the challenges and tensions that remain today for the global collective action problem of cyberspace governance. Thus, the distinctive perspective of cyber peace has the potential to set our analytical sights anew and to provide a framework for moving ahead with the normative projects connected to the aspects of cyberspace governance, including the ongoing elucidation of binding rules of international and domestic law that are applicable to cyberspace activities of state and nonstate actors.
Building on previous chapters that treat the concept of cyber peace in depth, the following definition focuses on four specific elements:
2022
SDI
Affirmative
SDI Starter Packet --- Cyber Info Sharing Aff › 1AC › Contention 2: Attribution
Larry Diamond 19. PhD in Sociology, professor of Sociology and Political Science at Stanford University. “Ill Winds: Saving Democracy from Russian Rage, Chinese Ambition and American Complacency,” Kindle Edition
In such a near future, my fellow experts would no longer talk of “democratic erosion.” We would be spiraling downward into a time of democratic despair, recalling Daniel Patrick Moynihan’s grim observation from the 1970s that liberal democracy “is where the world was, not where it is going.” 5 The world pulled out of that downward spiral—but it took new, more purposeful American leadership. The planet was not so lucky in the 1930s, when the global implosion of democracy led to a catastrophic world war, between a rising axis of emboldened dictatorships and a shaken and economically depressed collection of selfdoubting democracies. These are the stakes. Expanding democracy—with its liberal norms and constitutional commitments—is a crucial foundation for world peace and security. Knock that away, and our most basic hopes and assumptions will be imperiled. The problem is not just that the ground is slipping. It is that we are perched on a global precipice. That ledge has been gradually giving way for a decade. If the erosion continues, we may well reach a tipping point where democracy goes bankrupt suddenly—plunging the world into depths of oppression and aggression that we have not seen since the end of World War II. As a political scientist, I know that our theories and tools are not nearly good enough to tell us just how close we are getting to that point—until it happens.
2022
SDI
Affirmative
SDI Starter Packet --- Cyber Info Sharing Aff › 1AC › Contention 2: Attribution
Wigell 21 --- Mikael Wigell, Research Director at the Finnish Institute of International Affairs, “Democratic Deterrence: How to Dissuade Hybrid Interference”, The Washington Quarterly Volume 44, 2021 - Issue 1, https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/0163660X.2021.1893027
Much of the debate on new “hybrid” threats has revolved around “little green men” and other grey zone military tactics, or hybrid warfare, essentially a military approach to conducting “indirect war” under special circumstances.4 The more pressing challenges from a Western perspective are the more subtle, non-military activities deployed by authoritarian regimes to penetrate democratic society. “Hybrid interference” is a concept developed to capture non-military practices for the mostly covert manipulation of other states’ strategic interests.5 As such, it bears resemblance to what was referred to as “active measures” during the Cold War and, more recently, in Russian strategic debate as gibridnaya voyna.
The idea of gibridnaya voyna is to avoid the traditional battlefield with the aim of destroying “the political cohesion of an adversary from the inside by employing a carefully crafted hybrid of non-military means and methods that amplify political, ideological, economic and other social polarisations within an adversary’s society, thus leading to its internal collapse.”6 While keeping diplomatic relations intact, and thus not breaking any official threshold of war, the aggressor mobilizes oppositionists and radicals within the target state through a host of means ranging from disinformation campaigns to corrupting political actors and financing subversive movements, carefully synchronized to compound the effect.
2022
SDI
Affirmative
SDI Starter Packet --- Cyber Info Sharing Aff › 1AC › Contention 2: Attribution
Beaulieu & Salvo 18 --- Brittany Beaulieu, fellow and program officer for GMF's Alliance for Securing Democracy, and David Salvo, deputy director of the Alliance for Securing Democracy (ASD) and a senior fellow at the German Marshall Fund, German Marshall Fund of the United States (2018), “NATO and Asymmetric Threats:: A Blueprint for Defense and Deterrence”, https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/resrep18856.pdf
While NATO and the EU have pledged to improve their information sharing and coordination of responses across the asymmetric toolkit, these efforts are under-funded and lack high-level coordination. Moreover, the absence of a mechanism to share NATO classified information with the EU, an old problem, prevents both organizations from more systematic cooperation in responding jointly to the hybrid challenge. The lack of information sharing among allies at NATO is another challenge. For example, the United States did not share much information about the Russian operation against the 2016 presidential election as it unfolded and only a meager amount afterward. In the lead up to the French and German elections, information was shared on a bilateral basis, rather than through the NAC. The reservations of some allies to discuss their own vulnerabilities to interference operations only exacerbate NATO’s organizational impediments to addressing hybrid threats in a timely and coordinated manner. A formalized information sharing or early warning mechanism could help to rectify this problem, as would decisions in allied capitals to elevate discussion on hybrid threats at the NAC and share more threat information and intelligence.
2022
SDI
Affirmative
SDI Starter Packet --- Cyber Info Sharing Aff › 1AC › Contention 2: Attribution
Underwood et al 22 --- Andrew Underwood et al, Major Underwood is Executive Assistant to the Deputy Director for Strategy, Plans, and Policy (J5), Europe, NATO, Russia, “All Quiet on the Eastern Front: NATO Civil-Military Deterrence of Russian Hybrid Warfare” April 14, 2022, National Defense university Press, https://ndupress.ndu.edu/Media/News/News-Article-View/Article/2999367/all-quiet-on-the-eastern-front-nato-civil-military-deterrence-of-russian-hybrid/
Information Operations. Another critical aspect of imposing costs and limiting options available through Russia’s hybrid warfare approach is effective IO attribution and response. IO is substantive enough a factor in Russian hybrid warfare to be considered beyond comprehensive defense. Staying abreast of Russian hybrid objectives, methods, and tools prevents Allies and partners from being caught [unprepared] flat-footed. It also enables a better understanding of Russian intent and options for hybrid activity, both in traditional spheres and within the gaps and seams of 21st-century technology as an information platform. This analysis focuses on the intelligence- and information-gathering and strategic communication aspects of IO. Intelligence- and information-gathering are critical to identify Russia’s hybrid options and intent and to mobilize NATO member states toward the activity. Conversely, strategic communication is a proactive, comprehensive defense measure to specifically limit Russian hybrid options and to broadcast the costs Russia would incur if it moved forward with them.
For intelligence-gathering to be effective in today’s operating environment, countries must be willing to break down stovepipes and widely share information within their own government structures as well as with Allies and partners. The coordinated actions of hybrid warfare allow Russia to exploit regional, national, and international seams. Building intelligence-sharing apparatuses both within and without ministries among and across countries helps to close those seams. Effective intelligence-sharing could occur at levels ranging from joint/multinational collection teams to finished intelligence analysis at ministerial or national levels. In other words, information-sharing does not always have to be top-down driven; sometimes bottom-up is effective.
2022
SDI
Affirmative
SDI Starter Packet --- Cyber Info Sharing Aff › 1AC › Contention 2: Attribution
The Economist 22 --- “In Ukraine, Biden must relearn Truman’s lessons from the cold war”, March 26th 2022,
America once again seeks to curb Russia and China without blowing up the world
Joe biden entered the White House last year styling himself on Franklin Roosevelt. The better model today might be Harry Truman. His words to Congress 75 years ago this month—“It must be the policy of the United States to support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures”—girded America for the cold war. Those words have a new resonance as Ukraine, helped by the West, battles to resist Russia’s month-old invasion.
2022
SDI
Affirmative
SDI Starter Packet --- Cyber Info Sharing Aff › 1AC › Contention 2: Attribution
Christian 20 --- Joshua D. Christian, M.A. in Strategic Studies from Naval Postgraduate School, “RUSSIAN CYBER OPERATIONS TO DESTABILIZE NATO”, Thesis Paper, June 2020, https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/AD1114628.pdf
Russia’s apparent interest in destabilizing NATO at the strategic level likely entails degrading relationships not only within the Alliance but also within individual states of the Alliance. Karlsen notes that promoting division within the Alliance is what Western security institutions believe to be a key goal of Russian cyber operations.323 Due to this, cyber attribution is a critical aspect of responding to a cyber operation and NATO needs to denounce and openly attribute blame to the provocateur of a cyber operation. Open attribution places the aggressor state in the international spotlight which works to deter that state from future operations. It is the recommendation of this author that NATO adjust its posture and demonstrate a willingness to denounce any cyber activity that experts believe is from Russia. The case studies demonstrate the significant challenge to investigate and accurately attribute responsibility for cyberattacks. It is the recommendation for policy makers to conduct ongoing research and analyze findings to guide countermeasures and training.
Currently, not all NATO states are as willing as the United States to attribute blame for a cyber operation. The French presidential election provided documented evidence that resulted in the U.S. government’s willingness to blame Russia; in contrast, the French government refrained from directly attributing the cyber operation to Russia.324 In order to strengthen the Alliance and its position as a leading institution, NATO leaders are encouraged to evaluate future events and require collective recognition and responses to Russian cyber operations. A collective response and agreement from all of the NATO states, in response to a cyber operation against one member, displays a unity within the Alliance that further strengthens NATO. A unified NATO response demonstrates a strong Alliance that will minimize Russia’s ability to create division within the states and an Alliance that is prepared to respond to any threat.
2022
SDI
Affirmative
SDI Starter Packet --- Cyber Info Sharing Aff › 1AC › Contention 2: Attribution
Porter & Jordan 19 --- Christopher Porter is the chief intelligence strategist of cybersecurity company FireEye and a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council, Klara Jordan is director of the Cyber Statecraft Initiative at the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security, “Don’t Let Cyber Attribution Debates Tear Apart the NATO Alliance”, Lawfare, February 14, 2019 https://www.lawfareblog.com/dont-let-cyber-attribution-debates-tear-apart-nato-alliance
The United States still struggles to find effective policies for deterring cyberattacks. Suggestions run the gamut from more widespread use of indictments and economic sanctions, despite their lackluster record of success, to less traditional but more risky policies that emphasize the asymmetric advantage America has in conventional military power.
Most of the discussion of cyber deterrence focuses on preventing a single catastrophic or cascading cyberattack that would threaten lives (like disruptions to electricity transmission or clean water)—or our way of life—altering election outcomes or grinding global finance to a halt. Yet the reality is that in the event of such an attack, the response would likely not come from the U.S. alone but from the NATO alliance in concert.
2022
SDI
Affirmative
SDI Starter Packet --- Cyber Info Sharing Aff › 1AC › Contention 1: Resilience
Balson 20 --- David Balson et al, Director of Intelligence, Ripjar Technologies, Lead author of “Cyber Information Sharing: Building Collective Security”, World Economic Forum, INSIGHT REPORT OCTOBER 2020, https://www3.weforum.org/docs/WEF_Cyber_Information_Sharing_2020.pdf
Knowledge is power. Intelligence, carefully curated from the collection, evaluation and assessment of data from many sources is fundamental to understanding the complex and dynamic threats that exist in the information age. Once only the preserve of government departments and military agencies, intelligence now helps businesses and global institutions make better, data‑driven decisions. It gives them the edge in formulating new plans and strategies to manage risk, and to perform efficiently and effectively.
Such is the scale and complexity of the challenge, cyberthreats and risks must be understood in detail if organizations want to prevent breaches and prosper in the age Fourth Industrial revolution. Cybersecurity is defined by its multistakeholder ecosystem and needs to be seen from a holistic viewpoint. All participants in that ecosystem need to be able to participate in building the systemic resilience of the collective infrastructure on which those stakeholders rely.
2022
SDI
Affirmative
SDI Starter Packet --- Cyber Info Sharing Aff › 1AC › Contention 1: Resilience
Liu 18 --- Qian Liu is an economist based in China, The next economic crisis could cause a global conflict. Here's why, https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2018/11/the-next-economic-crisis-could-cause-a-global-conflict-heres-why/
The response to the 2008 economic crisis has relied far too much on monetary stimulus, in the form of quantitative easing and near-zero (or even negative) interest rates, and included far too little structural reform. This means that the next crisis could come soon – and pave the way for a large-scale military conflict.
The next economic crisis is closer than you think. But what you should really worry about is what comes after: in the current social, political, and technological landscape, a prolonged economic crisis, combined with rising income inequality, could well escalate into a major global military conflict.
2022
SDI
Affirmative
SDI Starter Packet --- Cyber Info Sharing Aff › 1AC › Contention 1: Resilience
Sincai 21 --- Avital co-founded and heads as the COO in Cydome, Maritime Cyber Attacks Are Among the Greatest Unknown Threats to the Global Economy, June 28, https://www.cpomagazine.com/cyber-security/maritime-cyber-attacks-are-among-the-greatest-unknown-threats-to-the-global-economy/
The fact is, if the maritime industry suddenly disappeared without a trace, the economic, social, and political impacts would be devastating. Billions of tons of vital products like food, medicine and oil are shipped around the world every year, and if these goods stopped flowing, billions of people would suffer the consequences. We saw a taste of this devastation early this year, when a ship lodged itself in the Suez Canal, blocking other ships from getting through. The incident cost the world nearly $10 billion in trade each day it was stuck.
This is only a fraction of the damage that could be caused by cyber attacks in the maritime industry.
2022
SDI
Affirmative
SDI Starter Packet --- Cyber Info Sharing Aff › 1AC › Contention 1: Resilience
Muncaster 22 --- Phil Muncaster UK / EMEA News Reporter, Infosecurity Magazine, “Cyber-Attacks Hobble Some of Europe's Largest Ports”, Feb 4th 2022, https://www.infosecurity-magazine.com/news/cyberattacks-hobble-europe-ports/
Oil terminals in some of Europe’s biggest ports appear to have been disrupted by ransomware, according to reports.
A broker in the region told AFP that the attacks are disrupting the oil supply chain.
2022
SDI
Affirmative
SDI Starter Packet --- Cyber Info Sharing Aff › 1AC › Contention 1: Resilience
Ben Farah et al 22 --- Mohamed Amine Ben Farah et al, Department of Networks and Cyber Security, Birmingham City University, “Cyber Security in the Maritime Industry: A Systematic Survey of Recent Advances and Future Trends”, Information 2022, 13, 22, https://www.mdpi.com/2078-2489/13/1/22/pdf
Maritime transportation is central to the economic sustainability of many regions throughout the world. The growth in global population, improvements in living standards and investment and elimination of trade barriers all contribute to driving an ever-increasing reliance on the industry. In geographies with navigable rivers or comprising a cluster of islands, maritime transportation is the spine to both domestic and international trading. Moreover, in markets that demand sustainable development, low cost, efficiency and, recently of growing importance, ecofriendly operations, the maritime sector is responsible for 90% of the transportation of all goods [1,2]. Recent developments in the Internet of Things (IoT), Big Data and Artificial Intelligence have enabled the migration to more digitalised maritime infrastructures and, consequently, have necessitated a renewed assessment of the cyber-security provision [3]. Furthermore, connectivity and reliance on intelligent devices play a pivotal role in motivating cyber criminality such as social engineering, identity theft and spam emails. The protection of the integrity of next generation maritime infrastructures is a pressing need [4–7].
Connectivity through navigation systems such as Automatic Identification System (AIS, see Abbreviations), Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS) and Radio Detection and Ranging (RADAR) impacts negatively on the security level of infrastructures. Moreover, shipping companies have been subjected to highly complex and new classes of cyber attacks targeting in-port information systems and inflicting damage on on-vessel core equipment [8,9]. The reliance on the Internet, operating with unprotected computers, and the fact that crews do not receive appropriate security training increase further the probability of a successful cyber breach. There is clear evidence that the absence of structured security awareness training for employees across the supply chain is a major source of vulnerabilities; as a result, hackers can use classical approaches such as spam emails or Denial-of-Service (DoS) attacks to achieve successful breaches [10,11]. A security plan providing recommendations to protect the maritime supply chain and a co-coordinated strategy with international marine organizations is a near-term necessity [12]. The update of software through removable media increases the risk of stealing identities and in-port data and the sharing of information in real time using new technologies—such as IoT—exacerbates the risk due to insecure network services or weak authentication.
2022
SDI
Affirmative
SDI Starter Packet --- Cyber Info Sharing Aff › 1AC › Contention 1: Resilience
Monarch 20 --- Benjamin Monarch, University of Kentucky College of Law, J.D. May 2015, LLM in Energy, Natural Resources, and Environmental Law and Policy from the University of Denver Sturm College of Law, Deputy District Attorney at Colorado Judicial Branch, and Term Member at the Council on Foreign Relations, “Black Start: The Risk of Grid Failure from a Cyber Attack and the Policies Needed to Prepare for It,” Journal of Energy & Natural Resources Law, vol. 38, no. 2, https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/02646811.2020.1744368?journalCode=rnrl20
In the industrial world, when a switch is flipped, we take for granted that it will produce light, boot a computer, illuminate a stadium or activate a power plant. We know, of course, that power losses can and do occur. Many of us have lit candles during a thunderstorm or brought out extra blankets when a blizzard takes down transmission lines. As of this writing, the most populated state in the United States, California, is experiencing rolling blackouts.1 Yet even in prolonged power outages, we expect that electricity will be restored and, consequently, life will return to normal. Perhaps we need ask, however, what if power cannot be restored in a timely manner? Concern is growing that in the not-too-distant future our electricity supply could be irreparably compromised by a cyber attack. The issue when considering a systemic grid failure of this nature is twofold: how did we reach a point where something so critical to routine life now presents an existential threat, and what can we do to mitigate the risk of a catastrophic grid attack?
This article posits that the emergence of cyber attacks on industrial control systems, as a means of war or criminal menace, have reached a level of sophistication capable of crippling [destroying] those systems. This article argues that a new grid security policy paradigm is required to thwart catastrophic grid failure – a paradigm that recognises the inextricable link between commercial power generation and national security. In section 5, seven policy recommendations are outlined that may, in part, mitigate a future where grid attacks pose existential risk to nations and their citizenry. Those recommendations are: first, develop a comprehensive insurance programme to minimise the financial risk of grid disruption; second, train more cybersecurity professionals with particular expertise in industrial control systems; third, institute a federally mandated information-sharing programme that is centralised under United States Cyber Command; fourth, subsidise and/or incentivise cybersecurity protections for small to mid-size utilities; fifth, provide university grants for grid security research; sixth, integrate new technologies with an eye towards securing the grid; and, lastly, formulate clear rules of engagement for a military response to grid disruption.
2022
SDI
Affirmative
SDI Starter Packet --- Cyber Info Sharing Aff › 1AC › Contention 1: Resilience
Yan et al 21 --- Weili Yan et al, Research Scientist at Advanced Digital Sciences Center, established by the University of Illinois at Urbana Champaign (UIUC) in Singapore, “A Stealthier False Data Injection Attack against the Power Grid”, 2021 IEEE International Conference on Communications, Control, and Computing Technologies for Smart Grids, IEEE 2021, https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/abstract/document/9632337
False data injection (FDI) is a broad class of cyberattacks that target the digital communications and control of a cyberphysical system (CPS). Well-known real-world incidents such as Stuxnet [1] and Dragonfly [2], [3] demonstrate the effectiveness of FDI attacks. For example, a malware-infected PLC in the power grid may send falsified sensor measurements that bypass standard methods of bad data detection (BDD) [4], thus compromising the grid’s state estimation. FDI attacks against the grid’s automatic generation control (AGC) [5] are especially dangerous. AGC adapts generators’ output to dynamic system conditions in real time [6], to regulate the grid’s frequency within a safe range. Breach of this range constitutes a frequency excursion that may damage generators if they are not quickly disconnected from the grid; both disconnection and damage can cause widespread and prolonged blackouts.