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2022 Michigan Kritik
Links › Link – Drones

Drone technology able to give military superiority to Western States – justifies more violence by rhetoric of ‘efficiency’

Alex Harris, 3-7-2016, "Killing by Remote Control: Western Countries Relying on Technology in the Military," E-International Relations, https://www.e-ir.info/2016/03/07/killing-by-remote-control-western-countries-relying-on-technology-in-the-military//CDMoney

Upon President Obama’s inauguration into office in 2008, he pledged to end the ‘war on terror’, the public ‘call to arms’ that President Bush first issued following the events of 9/11. Instead of concluding the war, Obama placed it further within the private sphere, where combat was now fought ‘in the shadows’, through special operations and a substantial increase in the use of robotic and surveillance technology. This substantial increase can be demonstrated through empirical data collected by the New America Foundation. Within Pakistan, the height of Bush’s drone strike action reached 36 in 2008. By 2009, Obama had authorised 52 strikes in 2009, reaching an apex of 122 strikes in 2010, with 72 in 2011. From 2004-2015, of 401 total strikes, Obama has been responsible for authorising 353 strikes (88%) over Bush’s 48 strikes (12%). While I am doubtful that this represents the ‘real’ total of strikes that have been conducted (with the NAF stating that the data came from ‘credible news reports’), the empirical data is useful in demonstrating an increasing reliance on technological solutions[2]. It is my contention that the growing reliance on these technological advances highlight the Western requirement for precision, accountability and a reduction in collateral damage. While I will reference some of the criticisms concerning the ethics and morality of this ‘technological solution’, I will primarily be focusing on the tactical and strategic advantages that these weapon systems offer the West, in waging ‘humane’ and ‘hybrid warfare’. Firstly, I wish to discuss the role of technology within war. Is it fair to suggest that warfare now solely employs technological solutions to military problems? Has the use of drones changed the nature of warfare that is now fought by the Western countries? A warring state relying on technological solutions to gain strategic advantages in combat is an idea almost as old as war itself. Indeed, it is on the battlefields that these technologies are first “invented, exploited and then properly scrutinized by thinkers seeking to rightfully limit their use to morally justifiable purposes”[3]. From the creation of the long-bow to the repeating machine-gun, technological solutions have always played a vital role in warfare. As aptly described by Van Creveld, “every single element is either governed by or at least linked to it”[4]. When Van Creveld refers to a ‘single element’, he is not just referring to the act of battle itself but its elements in its entirety, such as communication, strategy and command. It’s convincing and I wish to speak of technology in the same way, recognizing its presence within all aspects of warfare. However, despite recognizing the omnipresence of technology within the elements of war, it cannot be its sole reliant. The use of technology in war, as concluded by Van Creveld, “often means there is a price to be paid in terms of deliberating diminishing efficiency”[5] – a line of argument I will later conclude as a warning against this ‘increasing reliance’, as a warning that true victory cannot yet be individually gained by ‘eyes in the sky’. Now, to turn to drones or UAV’s (Unmanned Aerial Vehicles), they are also by no means a recent invention. Their first reported battle-test was said to have occurred in 1849 when Austria sent unmanned balloon, loaded with explosives, to attack Venice. A pilotless aerial torpedo was tested during World War 1 and UAVs were actively used by the US during the Vietnam War. The War of Attrition, from 1967-1970, was the first recorded battlefield appearance of UAVs equipped with camera equipment, for the function of surveillance, a role of the drone that is certainly established within the popular consciousness today. Now that I have discussed the use of technology and, more specifically, the history of UAVs on the battlefield, I wish to briefly summarize the ethical arguments that are raised, in part due to the efficient lethality of these weapon systems, namely the ‘threshold’ argument. This argues that the effectiveness of their drones – both in cost and in deployment – lowers the threshold that normally limits violence within morally acceptable boundaries. If it is perceived as a safer and more politically safe option than deploying troops, critics are concerned that drones will serve to exacerbate violence, where the ‘fog of war’ is dispersed and the ease at which an insurgent can be surveilled and then neutralized, concerns critics of its legal and moral implications. However, this ease is praised as precise and efficient, indeed referenced in President Obama’s State of the Union Address, expressing his view in regards to Osama Bin Laden, where “if you have twenty minutes, you do it swiftly and surely”[6]. It is also suggested that these ‘strikes from the sky’ are serving to radicalize generation after generation in the Middle East, where ‘dishonourable’ killings from a faceless enemy, albeit one with superior technology associated with the ‘West’, is acting as a recruitment tool. However, under Just War theory, drones are deemed morally permissible. While it is accepted that they are capable of great damage, it is deemed permissible due to the improvements that they offer at the other end of the spectrum, in prevention and deterrence. Indeed, in 21st century hybrid warfare, where the enemies are no longer identified through uniforms or emblems, can technology such as drones be justified under this identification framework, under the support they can offer ground-troops and the targeting of the disguised guilty hiding among and behind the general population? Such questions of the morality and ethics of drone warfare are perhaps more suitable of a different paper but it is important to make reference to the prevailing narrative nonetheless.

2022 Michigan Kritik
Links › Link – Drones

Technological innovation allows cheaper and more effective warfare for Western countries, increasing security and justification for more “efficient” militaristic operations (conclusion is a maybe)

Alex Harris, 3-7-2016, "Killing by Remote Control: Western Countries Relying on Technology in the Military," E-International Relations, https://www.e-ir.info/2016/03/07/killing-by-remote-control-western-countries-relying-on-technology-in-the-military//CDMoney

In helping to explain the increasing reliance upon drones in Western warfare, I first wish to reference the economic and technological advantage that drones bring to the battlefield. Following Hallgarth’s argument, the West possesses a large quantity of resources with a clear technological superiority. However, what the West lacks is ‘available recruits’, where the redundancy of conscription and, perhaps, public opinion, leaves troop numbers lacking. However, this is a minor disadvantage, far surpassed by its very superiority in technology. This might be indicative of the West’s continued drive to improve and develop its technological capabilities within war. In relation to the economics of drones, for the resourceful West, the numbers are advantageous. Recent figures place the cost of a Reaper Drone at around $10.5 million dollars. In comparison, one F-22 Fighter Jet is priced at around $150 million dollars and that involves a human element on top of the cost. Looking at this statistic alone, it is not surprising that the drone has become an increasingly relied on weapon of war. Despite this relatively low cost, one where America is leading the ‘Drones Arms Race’, it has come under criticism. For Singer, wars are only morally permissible if public and legal channels have offered their approval, believing that “by making war costless, it takes the public out of the loop by giving it no reason to care about the decision to start a war”[7]. While I would suggest this statement is a little dramatic, it raises an interesting question; what are the implications if the West begins only relying on cheaper alternatives to conduct its warfare, if indeed, this is a key factor for the increased reliance on drones? If drones intervene on humanitarian grounds and save lives, Singer would still disregard such positive reports as ‘crude calculations’, where the West was ‘powerful ‘ enough to save those innocent civilians but “only at a time and place of its choosing and, more importantly, if the costs were low enough”[8]. It is clear that the cost-efficiency of these drones helps to explain the increasing Western reliance. While I disagree that this is the only element contributing to its use, citing their precision next as a factor, Singer’s argument is interesting. While war will clearly never be ‘costless’, it is an important warning from Singer, highlighting his concerns if this reliance upon drone strikes continued. Another clear advantage of the utilisation of drones lies in their precision, a mode of warfare that appeals to ‘humane’ western values, where human error is reduced and the risk of collateral is to be avoided. David Whetham described a scenario where a drone strike could be effectively utilised. An insurgent leader, moving from safe-house to safe-house in hostile territory, would be extremely difficult to apprehend. If the state could surgically ‘remove’ that person, with no allied human lives at risk and legal authorisation granted, this would be a case of a targeted killing. Troops on the ground would avoid that risk and the legality of the authorised strike would be undisputed. In our modern ‘information age’, political accountability is of importance. For every badly directed missile hitting a school or a hospital, there will be mobile recording devices on the ground sending such images around the world over social media platforms. The western world fights ‘humane’ wars, governed by rules and regulations. Western states believe that drones offer the best (current) technological advancement to fight these wars. They allow for precise targeting and they have to be approved through various legal-politico channels before being granted approval. A common criticism argues that civilian casualties are still present, dismissed by Christine Fair who characterised these strikes as “the product of meticulous planning among lawyers and intelligence officers”[9], usually “accomplished with minimal civilian deaths”[10]. An article released in 2010 reported that drones had now upgraded their weaponry from 100 pound Hellfire Missiles to 35 pound Scorpion Missiles, possessing smaller blast radiuses and thus more effective at reducing collateral damage[11]. There will always be civilian casualties within war – it’s a fact of war – but it seems convincing that a real advantage of this technology is in its reduction of collateral damage. In addition, the restrictions required for authorisation instil a degree of accountability and its precise form of attack suits the fourth-generation mode of warfare that the West fights. Consequently, the increased reliance upon drones by the West seems to represent the form of warfare that the West now wishes to fight – precise, accountable and a reduction in the loss of both innocent and allied lives.

***To conclude, I wish to assert that, despite a growing reliance upon the presence of drones in the asymmetrical wars that are being fought by the Western powers, it would be dangerous to continue to solely rely on technological advances. To gain a lasting political settlement, territory needs to be held and controlled, with a ‘friendly’ government instilled and maintained. This cannot be achieved by technological advancements alone, an advantage that the West holds over those it seeks to restrict, but must be achieved by ‘boots on the ground’. States have always relied on technology to gain superiority on the battlefield and this move towards UAVs is no different. The West’s increasing reliance highlights the new precise, efficient and accountable form of warfare that it now seeks to wage, to distinguish itself from the lawless ‘other’ it holds in its sights. However, to truly gain total victory, a heavy human influence is still required on the ground.

2022 Michigan Kritik
Links › Link – NATO

NATO is THE largest force for militarization in the world today and is an obstacle to peace.

Ruiz 22 Pablo Ruiz is a Latin America Networks Coordinator for SOA watch, an advocacy organization founded by former Maryknoll Father Roy Bourgeois and a small group of supporters in 1990 to protest the training of mainly Latin American military officers, by the United States Department of Defense, at the School of the Americas (SOA). Prior to SOA Watch, Pablo worked in Chile with Amnesty International and the Ethical Committee Against Torture. “US-NATO: More Militarisation, Less Peace for the World”

In the context of a preparatory meeting last January, activists from various organisations gave their views and data on how bad the Atlantic Alliance, NATO, has been for the world. Jörg Kronauer, a German journalist, noted that “NATO has never been a good force at all. They talk about democracy and human rights, how can you say they stand for democracy and human rights and send aid to Saudi Arabia? The journalist recalls that “NATO was established when the Cold War began. The capitalist countries were against the Eastern countries and NATO wanted, through brutality and threats, to suppress these countries”. NATO was founded in 1949 with an alliance of 12 countries and today there are 30 member countries. Many believed that with the fall of the Soviet Union and the end of the Warsaw Pact (founded in 1955 and dissolved in 1991) NATO would disappear but this has not been the case as it continues to expand, fueled by narratives and justifications of supposed threats and the creation of enemies. It is true that in the early 1990s, the former USSR had a commitment that the US and NATO would not advance towards its borders: “Not one centimeter to the East” was the promise made by US Secretary of State James Baker, but the promise was not kept. Jörg Kronauer recalls that “in the decades of the Cold War, NATO was simply, and everyone knew it, an anti-communist organisation”. However, he points out, “if NATO were simply anti-communist, it would have been disbanded after the collapse of communist forces in the 1990s; but NATO is still used by Western countries to do their dirty work, to kill, to drop bombs”. Fiona Edwards of the “No Cold War” platform points out that “the US and NATO have left a trail of destruction. The current situation in Afghanistan, after twenty years of US-led war, is a great test. There are hundreds of thousands of people who have died in this war, killed by US forces, and what they have left there, in these 20 years of war: extreme poverty, it’s a humanitarian disaster”. The Aukus Alliance On the other hand, the activist denounces that “the military pact between the US, Britain and Australia against China is threatening stability. We are talking about a new Cold War and it is important to understand that the main priority of the US and US policy is to take down the Chinese government”. “If we look at the maps and the maps of military bases around China, we can compare them with the bases that China has in the rest of the world, and China has zero military bases in the rest of the world and China is surrounded by military bases around it. China has zero military assets around the US and Europe. We’re talking about zero versus hundreds of military bases,” says Fiona Edwards. The strategic alliance called AUKUS (an acronym for Australia, the United Kingdom and the United States) has been reported in the press as aiming to “defend the shared interests in the Indo-Pacific” of these governments. The AUKUS Alliance will enable the Royal Australian Navy to acquire nuclear-powered submarines. “What we have is a US war against China and China has made it clear that they don’t want a cold war. They don’t want a war, hot or cold, and they don’t want a nuclear war, which is a great threat to all of humanity,” says Fiona Edwards, adding that “China is asking for peace; and what we need now is for all the resources of humanity to be deployed against real threats, not imaginary threats. The big threat is pandemics, climate change is a big threat. Poverty is another real threat. And this cold war is against the interests of all humanity. NATO responsible for military spending Ludo De Brabander, a Belgian peace activist from Vrede, adds that “NATO is responsible for military spending”. He recalls that when the US and NATO launched their campaign in Bosnia, Afghanistan, Iraq and Libya, the arms budget went through the roof. “The combined arms sales of the world’s 100 largest military services companies and arms producers (SIPRI Top 100) were 531 billion in 2020 compared to 300 billion in 2001.” “NATO today accounts for more than half of global military spending, and that proportion will surely rise in the coming years, Russia’s military spending is 6%, of what NATO spends, only slightly higher than that of Germany or the UK, so the confrontational politics around Ukraine are driving NATO’s military budget even higher,” he points out. The activist recalls that “the coup in Kiev and Russia’s annexation of Crimea were used by NATO to agree at the Wales Summit (2014) that NATO member states should spend 2% of GDP on their military apparatus. Twenty per cent of their military expenditure should henceforth be spent on the purchase of military equipment. Since then, NATO’s military budget has risen from $896 billion to $1,049 billion by the middle of last year, an increase of 15%”, and that “NATO’s war industry also dominates the global market. According to CIPRI, the three NATO member states, Germany, France and the US increased their share of the arms market to more than 50 per cent”. “In recent years, NATO has increased tension with Russia and China whom it has called “systemic rivals” and this is how the war industry can make huge profits at the expense of real security and peace, and of human security and safety,” says the Belgian activist. Adding that there is not only increased spending and militarisation of NATO member countries but real acts of provocation against countries that are declared enemies. In recent years, NATO aircraft and warships, including nuclear-capable submarines, have conducted military manoeuvres near the borders of China, Russia, North Korea and Iran, and even attempted to penetrate the borders of these countries. Nuclear weapons Ludo De Brabander notes that “Rising international tensions are also driving new investment in nuclear weapons arsenals. According to ICAN, the nuclear powers invested $72.9 billion in maintaining and upgrading their nuclear weapons. The US accounts for half of that and, with France and the UK included, 67 per cent of nuclear weapons investment is on behalf of NATO countries”. For Britain’s Kate Hudson of the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament, “NATO is an alliance with nuclear weapons states. The US, France and the UK have an estimated 6,000 nuclear weapons in their nuclear arsenals. “NATO has continuously reiterated its commitment to being a nuclear alliance. Most recently, at the heads of state summit in Brussels last year. In addition to these nuclear arsenals, there are some 150 thermonuclear gravity bombs in Europe. Basically, these are nuclear weapons that are released from aeroplanes. They are located in 5 countries: Belgium, Germany, the Netherlands, Italy and Turkey. And, recently, the US announced that these weapons, under its nuclear umbrella, are going to be upgraded to be more usable,” Hudson points out. However, there is strong opposition to the existence of nuclear weapons from European social movements and also from the governments of the states that host them. “It is an issue that has been raised again recently under the new German government with some members of that government who have committed themselves to a nuclear-free Germany. Those weapons could be moved to Poland, which led to an immediate response from Lukashenko offering Russia to bring nuclear weapons into Belarus, which could potentially be an escalation,” says Kate Hudson, adding that “Russia has made a proposal that all nuclear weapons should be in the nuclear weapons state, which would mean removing US B 61 bombs from EU member states, and that is a long-standing demand of the Peace Movement. The activist recalls from the Non-Proliferation Treaty that “articles 1 and 2 prohibit the transfer of nuclear weapons to states that are not nuclear powers. But US nuclear weapons are located in countries without a nuclear force, making their presence there illegal”.

2022 Michigan Kritik
Links › Link – NATO

NATO’s rhetoric of a dangerous Russia creates a security feedback loop of military modernization and unintended consequences leading to conflict

Julie Wilhelmsen, 9-30-2020, "Spiraling toward a New Cold War in the North? The Effect of Mutual and Multifaceted Securitization," OUP Academic, https://academic.oup.com/jogss/article/6/3/ogaa044/5916402//CDMoney

For example, a securitization of NATO as different and dangerous to Russia creates both inner cohesion in the Russian polity and makes possible a policy of “military modernization” and a posture of “defensive deterrence,” but it can have unintended consequences. It can be taken as a rejection of NATO's self-constituted identity as a legitimate, reliable, security-seeking actor and elicit a string of representations of Russia as different and dangerous on the NATO side.8 Failure to be recognized by the other on one's own preferred terms might not necessarily result in feelings of inferiority and shame, triggering efforts to reconstruct one's own identity, as Bially Mattern has suggested (2004, 12–13) or “progressive change” of self to become like the other, as Ringmar (2014) holds. As Lupovici (2012, 818) notes a collective actor that experiences ontological threat can “redefine the situation in order to protect identity.” “Avoidance,” he says, building on Giddens (1991, 188) “allows an actor facing an ontological dissonance to revalidate its identity rather than to change it or to change its behaviour.” Lupovici explores the strategy of avoidance in situations where dissonance is created endogenously, between conflicting self-identifications and the responses undertaken to offset threats to these self-identifications within one political entity. Avoidance may play out differently when the ontological dissonance emerges exogenously in a dyad of political entities. To reduce the dissonance between the understanding of self and the explicit identification of one's own political entity by the other as being something different and dangerous, revalidation of own identity can be achieved through externalization, by simply returning the negative identification. This strategy is manifest as a clear pattern in the texts by Norwegian/Western and Russian leaders studied below. It is hardly surprising that a collective actor would respond to the non-recognition implicit in being securitized with externalization in the form of talking and hitting back instead of undertaking some form of internal revision. Responding by mirroring the securitization of your group by the other party can be rewarding in terms of delineating and maintaining self-identity, particularly in a time of crisis. To restate and return to the case in focus: the non-recognition implicit in Russia's securitization of NATO can elicit highly antagonistic representations of Russia from the NATO side, triggering another round of representations and accusations from the Russian side, and so on. Such a negative spiral of mutual representations and accusations can be driven further when the different non-military issue-areas in which collective political entities engage also become subject to securitization. While relations between such entities usually take place on different international arenas addressing different issue-areas and exhibit a mixed pattern of friendly and hostile interaction (Jervis 2001, 37; Bially Mattern 2004), they may become subject to patterned all-encompassing friendly or hostile interaction. The latter, I propose, can happen when security concerns take center-stage in relations, through a spillover from mutual securitization in the military sphere into other arenas of potentially neutral or friendly interaction, such as trade, culture, or even diplomacy.

2022 Michigan Kritik
Links › Link – NATO

NATO’s militarization reduced trust and security in nations around the world

Naidu 00’ M.V. Naidu is an Indian politician serving as the 13th and current vice president of India since 2017. Previously, he served as the minister of Housing and Urban Poverty Alleviation, Urban development and Information and Broadcasting in the Modi Cabinet. THE UN, NATO AND REGIONAL CONFLICTS; A LEGAL AND POLITICAL ANALYSIS on JSTOR, Canadian Mennonite University, Feb. 2000, (https://www.jstor.org/stable/23607681?read-now=1&refreqid=excelsior%3A1bc59f1a6cf97e6336f75f45d0907055&seq=4)//BNB

By setting up antagonistic blocs, NATO undermined the UN principle of international co operation. By emphasizing military preparation and militarism, NATO did not pave the path for peaceful settlement of differences. of deterrence, the military alliances generated distrust and insecurity among the nations of the world. In legal terms NATO is claimed to be a system of collective self-defense permitted under Article 51 of the UN Charter. The NATO Treaty does not invoke Chapter VII; nor is collective self-defense specified under that chapter. In political terms, NATO was created as an anti-Communist alliance inspired by the Truman Doctrine of communist containment through military deterrence and means. However, certain provisions in the NATO Treaty satisfy some of the criteria of a regional arrangement under Chapter VII. The NATO Treaty promises to uphold the purposes and the principles of the UN. Under Article 1, NATO pledges to settle all disputes peacefully as required under Article 52 of the UN Charter. NATO acknowledges the primacy of the Security Council in matters of international peace and security. If the NATO members were sincere in their commitment to peaceful solutions, they would not have needed an alliance that is heavily loaded with militarization and militarism. IF the NATO states were honest about their dedication to international peace and security, they could have also created the UN collective security system envisaged in Chapter VII, instead of the sectarian NATO. NATO was patterned on the model of the Rio de Janero Treaty of 1947, which is called a regional arrangement. Articles 5, 6, 10, and 12 and paragraph 3 in the Preamble of the NATO treaty define the region as the “North Atlantic area.” But then the NATO members Greece and Turkey are not in the North Atlantic region; besides, Italy and Portugal were not even members of the UN in 1949, as was pointed out by the U.S.S.R. on 31 March 1949. A main argument against NATO being a regional arrangement in the fact that NATO has been claimed to be a scheme of collective self-defense, but according to Chapter VII of the Charter, self-defense is not a subject of regional arrangement. Legally, a collective self-defense scheme has certain fundamental differences from a collective security scheme of regional arrangements. self-defense by definition is protection of, by and for a particular state or states, and not an enforcement action to protect international peace and security. As an inherent right , self-defense is subjectively determined by the concerned state, whereas enforcement action under regional arrangement is based on objective determination by the Security Council. Self-defense, triggered off as soon as an armed attack on the victim state occurs, is unilateral. Collective enforcement by regional arrangement is to the based on the consent of authorization of the Security Council. Under Article 51 self-defense is strictly after-the-fact, i.e., after an armed attack has occurred. This prohibits aggression rationalized as self defense. But enforcement action by regional arrangement can be both anticipatory and after-the-fact. Under a regional arrangement enforcement can be intra-regional, but collective self-defense is organized against external forces, not against a member state of the regional alliance. Thus the collective self-defense scheme of NATO cannot make NATO a regional arrangement. Nor can NATO be legitimized under Article 51 as an approach to collective self-defense, because NATO’s scheme is anticipatory while Article 51 provides for defense only after an armed attack has occurred. Even is defense preparation is considered allowable under Article 51, predetermination of a potential enemy is not envisaged or permitted by Article 51. Further, Articles 3, 4, 5, and 6 of the NATO Treaty imply self-defense against an aggression from outside the NATO membership. Article 5 of the NATO Treaty refers to threats to “the territorial integrity, political independence or sovereignty” of the member states; Articles 5 and 6 mention “armed attack.” And Article 3 talks of resistance to armed attack from outside the NATO alliance.

2022 Michigan Kritik
Links › Cyber

Militaristic Offensive Cyber Operations are both epistemologically and practically flawed, they are prone to be misused due to systemic bias towards offense and crushing the enemy and they result in escalation and fear regardless.

Valeriano and Jensen 19 Brandon Valeriano is a senior fellow at the Cato Institute. He is also the Bren Chair of Military Innovation at the Marine Corps University and serves as senior adviser for the Cyber Solarium Commission. Benjamin Jensen holds a dual appointment as a Donald L. Bren Chair of Creative Problem Solving at Marine Corps University and as a Scholar-in-Residence at the American University, School of International Service.

“The Myth of the Cyber Offense: The Case for Restraint”

The rationale behind persistent action—that the best defense is a good offense—is deeply flawed. In fact, most military and strategic theory holds that the defense is the superior posture. For example, Sun Tzu describes controlling an adversary to make their actions more predictable, and hence easy to undermine, by baiting them to attack strong points. The stronger form of war is a deception-driven defense: confusing an attacker so that they waste resources attacking strong points that appear weak. This parallels cybersecurity scholars Erik Gartzke and Jon Lindsay’s claim that cyberspace is not offense dominant, but deception dominant. Rather than persistent action and preemptive strikes on adversary networks, the United States needs persistent deception and defensive counterstrikes optimized to undermine adversary planning and capabilities. Fear and the Security Dilemma New policy options proposed by Cyber Command and the Trump administration risk exacerbating fear in other countries and creating a self-reinforcing spiral of tit-for-tat escalations that risk war even though each actor feels he is acting defensively—or, as it is called in the scholarly literature, a security dilemma. As shown above, most cyber operations to date have not resulted in escalation. The cyber domain has been a world of spies collecting valuable information and engaging in limited disruptions that substitute for, as well as complement, more conventional options. Shifting to a policy of preemptive offensive cyber warfare risks provoking fear and overreaction in other states and possibly producing conflict spirals. Even limited-objective cyber offensive action defined as “defending forward” can be misinterpreted and lead to inadvertent escalation. As the historian Cathal Nolan puts it, “intrusions into a state’s strategically important networks pose serious risks and are therefore inherently threatening.” More worryingly, with a more offensive posture, it will be increasingly difficult for states to differentiate between cyber espionage and more damaging degradation operations. What the United States calls defending forward, China and Russia will call preemptive strikes. Worse still, this posture will likely lead great powers to assume all network intrusions, including espionage, are preparing the environment for follow-on offensive strikes. According to cybersecurity scholar Ben Buchanan, “in the [aggressor] state’s own view, such moves are clearly defensive, merely ensuring that its military will have the strength and flexibility to meet whatever comes its way. Yet potential adversaries are unlikely to share this perspective.” The new strategy risks producing a “forever cyber war” prone to inadvertent escalation because it implies all cyber operations should be interpreted as escalatory by adversaries. The Myth of Decisive Cyber Victory There is a tendency in the military profession, at least in the United States and Europe, to uphold the concept of decisive battle as central to the Western way of war. Often, disruptive technologies—from strategic bombers in the mid-20th century to cyber operations in the 21st century—are seen as providing decisive offensive advantages in crises. In the interwar period between the world wars, airpower enthusiasts argued that bombers would reliably reach their targets, forcing political leaders to end hostilities or face the prospect of destroyed cities and economic collapse. Yet the search for decisive battle is often an elusive, if not dangerous, temptation for military planners and policymakers. In a comparative historical treatment of major 19th- and 20th-century battles, Nolan argues that “often, war results in something clouded, neither triumph nor defeat. It is an arena of grey outcomes, partial and ambiguous resolution of disputes and causes that led to the choice of force as an instrument of policy in the first place.” Decisive victories in any one battle are rare. Adversaries can refuse to fight. They can even signal resolve through demonstrating their ability to endure pain. Planning and Assessment Pathologies The new policy framework for offensive cyber operations risks compounding common pathologies associated with strategic assessments and planning. Removing interagency checks increases the risks that an operation will backfire on the attacker or compromise ongoing operations. Misperception is pervasive in insulated decisionmaking processes for several reasons. First, small groups unchecked by bureaucracy tend to produce narrow plans prone to escalation during crises. Second, leaders often give guidance to planners during crises that reflects their political bias or personality traits rather than a rational assessment of threats and options. Third, offensive bias in planning may have little to do with the actual threat and more to do with a cult of the offensive and the desire of officers to ensure their autonomy and resources. Removing interagency checks therefore risks compounding fundamental attribution errors and other implicit biases. Cyber operations are too important to be left to the generals at Cyber Command alone.

2022 Michigan Kritik
Links › Cyber

Foreign Adversaries are only motivated to develop offensive cyber capabilities because the US did so first.

Carroll 12/20 Ben Carroll is a writer for Workers World and serves on the advisory board of the Durham Solidarity Center. “After massive cyberattack, imperialist U.S. blames Russia — and China” https://www.workers.org/2020/12/53520/

The U.S. government is quick to cry foul when targeted by cyberattacks. But the reality is that the Pentagon and the U.S. government have pioneered and carried out some of the most vicious and extensive cyberattacks across the globe. In 2010, the U.S. government conducted a cyber attack against an Iranian nuclear facility, using malware called Stuxnet, which damaged or destroyed upwards of 1,000 nuclear centrifuges, by some estimates. Iran has long maintained that its nuclear program is strictly for peaceful purposes of economic development, not for weapons. In 2013, Chinese research institutions, technology companies and mobile phone carriers were targeted by a U.S. hack that mined extensive information from millions of Chinese people and from higher-level targets. This attack came to light in a trove of documents from the U.S. National Security Agency released by whistleblower Edward Snowden. And in 2019, the Russian electrical grid came under a cyberattack led by the U.S. Cyber Command, as reported by the New York Times. (June 15, 2019) These are but a few of the numerous instances of cyberattacks carried out by the U.S. government in recent years, not to mention many other ways that the Pentagon has employed technology — namely by the extensive use of drone warfare — to rain terror and destruction down on people around the world in the quest by the U.S. ruling class to hold onto power and profit. Continuing to prop up U.S. militarism, on Dec. 8, 2020, Congress passed a $740 billion budget for the Pentagon. Despite it being vetoed by Trump, Congress is expected to easily override that veto and authorize this staggering budget. Congress passed the military budget with near unanimous consensus from both the Democratic and Republican parties. But for months they refused to pass meager economic assistance for the tens of millions of workers and oppressed people struggling to survive in the current staggering economic crisis. Many millions have lost their jobs and healthcare, and are now experiencing hunger, the threat of eviction and loss of their homes, and other severe hardships during the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic. The goal of the U.S. government is to maximize the profits of the ruling class, whatever the human cost. It refuses to respond comprehensively to the desperate needs of people living and dying within its borders. Whether the recent hacking came from its imperialist rivals or others, it is clear that U.S. attacks for profit on people around the world – through direct military war and indirect economic war by sanction – have created more than enough reasons for the recent historic cyberattack on U.S. government and corporate entities.

2022 Michigan Kritik
Links › Link – Diseases

Governments and militaries routinely militarize against disease, offering unique consequences and justifying use of violence to contain it

Christopher Watterson and Adam Kamradt-Scott 2015 Fighting Flu: Securitization and the Military Role in Combating Influenza https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/pdf/10.1177/0095327X14567364//CDMoney

Militaries also stand to make significant contributions to pandemic response measures, where their capacity to marshal resources and expertise can ameliorate civil efforts to contain outbreaks. The onset of pandemics can rapidly overwhelm medical facilities, upset logistics and supply chains, interrupt essential services, and in severe cases lead to the breakdown of public order.123 The operational self-sufficiency, capacity to rapidly mobilize, and independent medical capabilities that are essential to armed forces will also make them preferred agents for emergency relief in the event of an influenza pandemic,124 particularly where the requirements of the emergency go beyond the standing capabilities of the public health sector, or fall outside the usual remit of such actors, for example in mollifying civil disobedience. In addition to their potential contributions to civil society, militaries also have an interest in building internal capacity to combat influenza. Historically, influenza has depleted military readiness through the incapacitation of soldiers, overwhelming of medical facilities, and disruption of military operations and logistics. Although advancements in preventative and palliative medicine have, to a large extent, reduced the threat that infectious disease poses to modern armies, the contingency of an influenza pandemic still presents a significant challenge to global military 158 Armed Forces & Society 42(1) readiness, given the ongoing threat of novel antigenic shifts and the low rates of influenza vaccination programs in national armed forces.125 Militaries therefore have a strong imperative to bring influenza into their planning and applied medicine regimes such that seasonal and pandemic incidents of influenza are to the greatest extent managed through existing mechanisms of military health without presenting an unacceptable burden to readiness. Beyond the more pragmatic concerns of military readiness, there also exists an ethical obligation on militaries to ensure that the health care needs of their armed forces are met, whether in times of peace or conflict. As Harrison observes, ‘‘service-people have come to demand health care as a right: as part of an implicit bargain between themselves and the military authorities.’’126 Inasmuch as influenza poses a threat to the personal well-being of soldiers, there is likely to be an expectation that militaries remain engaged in activities that will confer a superior measure of protection to those that they have enlisted into service. Recognizing the stake that modern militaries have in the fight against pandemic influenza, how then do we reconcile competing agendas regarding military involvement in public health for the greatest collective benefit of pandemic influenza preparedness and response? Arguably an important first step is to acknowledge the long and distinguished history of military involvement in influenza-related activities, a small proportion of which this article has sought to convey. In the context of the United States, where civil–military cooperation is deep rooted,127 the contribution of the military to both domestic and international influenza surveillance and control efforts appears to be well recognized. Beyond this, however, broader acceptance of the fact that militaries can make substantive contributions to national, regional, or global public health is often lacking—not only with public health communities but also by military forces themselves. There is also a genuine need to increase dialog between the public health and military communities, at both the national level and the international level. More than this though, the dialog must be of a particular type—namely, it must enable a greater understanding and appreciation of the goals and objectives of each respective group, where they compliment each other, and where they stand in contrast. Tension between these camps routinely arises from a perceived lack of neutrality of militaries, particularly in international engagements where broader geopolitical concerns can become entangled in the business of providing public health. Discordant expectations about the remit and chains of command in preparedness and response measures can also diminish the efficacy of civil–military responses to disasters, particularly when such arrangements are constructed on an ad hoc basis.128 Highlevel joint planning and a mutual recognition of respective operational strengths will provide some basis for reducing tensions and identifying which particular public health objectives of the state will benefit from the engagement of one or both parties. Concurrent with these efforts, there must also be a concerted attempt to extract military participation in health efforts from the broader debate surrounding the securitization of health issues. Securitization is, in many respects, merely a Watterson and Kamradt-Scott 159 discursive tool that policy makers may seek to employ in an attempt to elevate specific issues, thereby granting them greater importance and (ideally) obtaining additional resources that may not otherwise materialize. Importantly, however, as acknowledged by the Copenhagen School’s founders, securitization also has several associated dangers including closing down or severely constraining public debate, justifying extreme measures, even legitimizing the use of force.129 By way of contrast, as this article has sought to evidence, military participation in health is a legitimate—even necessary—intervention with a long and distinguished pedigree that has been repeatedly demonstrated to benefit public health and society more generally. Therefore, to facilitate a more balanced assessment of the contributions that militaries can bring to public health, the distinction between the practice and implications of the ‘‘militarization’’ and ‘‘securitization’’ of health needs to be recognized.

2022 Michigan Kritik
Links › Link – China Cyberattacks

Securitization against Chinese cyberattacks based on techno-orientalism treating Chinese cyber as an extension to the “Chinese virus”

Siu and Chun 20 (Lok, Associate Professor Asian American and Asian Diaspora Studies at UC Berkley ** PHD in Anthropology from Stanford University, “Yellow Peril and Techno-orientalism in the Time of Covid-19: Racialized Contagion, Scientific Espionage, and Techno-Economic Warfare”, October 2020, Journal of Asian American Studies, Volume 23, Number 3, October 2020, pp. 421-440, DOI: 10.1353) // Ilake LT

The exemplary case of Huawei brings our discussion of yellow peril into the explicit terrain of techno-Orientalism where the idea of the Chinese techno-virus—emerging at the nexus of technology, international trade, and cyber-security—is articulated through the racialized fear of Chinese technological domination achieved purportedly by stealing trade secrets, engaging unfair trade practices, and enabling Chinese state surveillance. What the case of Huawei illustrates is the extension of the “Chinese virus” trope that already exists in the domains of public health (as biological pathogen) and research institutions (scientist-spy) into the realm of everyday consumer technologies. Our point in discussing Huawei is not to defend it or to judge its activities. Rather, we want to call attention to the increasing significance of media/communications technologies as sites of interstate techno-economic-security struggles (in addition to already existing corporate surveillance). Toward that end, the Huawei example clearly shows the entwined issues and discourses of technology, international trade, and cybersecurity, all of which are filtered through and constitutive of the racializing techniques of the “Chinese virus.” Between January 2019 and February 2020, the U.S. Department of Justice filed three indictments against Huawei and its subsidiaries. That Huawei is the first foreign company of recent memory that is singled out by the United States for charges related to sanctions violations, conspiracy to steal trade secrets from American companies (including source code and wireless technology manuals), and federal racketeering (including fraud, obstruction of justice, money laundering) is noteworthy in itself. This last charge of racketeering is used historically to address organized crime (i.e. mafias) and points to the U.S. government’s intended juridical delegitimization of Huawei as an irrational institution mired in secrecy and an unlawful global corporation that cannot be trusted. In response to these allegations, Huawei accused the Department of Justice of exercising a form of political persecution and asserted that “[the charges] are based largely on resolved civil disputes from the last twenty years that have been previously settled, litigated, and in some cases, rejected by federal judges and juries.”31 The case will likely take years to resolve, but its function will become apparent by the ensuing interstate trade and diplomatic negotiations between China and the United States. Meanwhile, the White House and various U.S. state departments have begun to exert pressure on both domestic institutions and allied nation-states to end contracts and research collaborations with Huawei. For instance, the U.S. Department of Commerce in 2019 blacklisted the firm on charges of intellectual property theft and barred U.S. companies from selling products to Huawei without federal authorization.32 Also, as discussed in the above section, the FBI has placed pressure on universities to increase oversight of Chinese American researchers and to divest from research collaborations funded by Huawei and other Chinese firms. Multiple universities, including MIT, Stanford University, and the University of Illinois, have terminated research partnerships with Huawei.33 In addition to these domestic pressures, U.S. officials have asked allied nation-states to cancel any existing contracts with Huawei, especially ones that involve using the firm’s equipment for developing 5G wireless networks. Cybersecurity serves as the stated rationale, conjuring the potential of the Chinese Communist Party through its ties to the firm to engage in cyber surveillance/espionage by intercepting individual, corporate, and government data flowing through the 5G wireless networks. According to this logic, the “Chinese/Asian contagion” manifest as “Chinese/Asian espionage” can now be hardwired into the infrastructural fabric of our telecommunications systems through which data will travel from our phones, computers, online accounts, and other kinds of technologies to Chinese companies and, potentially, the Chinese state. The assertion is that the use of Huawei’s equipment will create massive security vulnerabilities not just to U.S. intelligence but also to American individuals whose personal information can be captured and used for endless possibilities of commoditization. It is also argued that Chinese technology integration into any Western cyber infrastructure project “would give China the upper hand in any potential cyber war.”34

2022 Michigan Kritik
Links › 1033 = racist

1033 is used to target black and brown communities – perpetuates racism and white supremacy

Singhvi 21 (Sahil, Root-Tilden-Kern scholar at NYU Law, Studies Economics and Sociology at Wesleyan University, Research and Program Associate at Brennan Center for Justice, “Demilitarize the Police,” Brennan Center For Justice, https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/analysis-opinion/demilitarize-police)

Last summer, the Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD) became the latest police department to take violent action against peaceful protesters.  shows LAPD officers acting less like protectors of the peace and more like an occupying force in a theater of war as they beat already subdued individuals with batons, shot noncombative people with so-called “less-than-lethal” munitions, and  protesters before arresting them en masse.

To those familiar with the history of policing in the United States, this behavior did not come entirely as a surprise. Some of the earliest  of policing are found in patrols and Night Watches that hunted down runaway slaves,  in the South and around the country. And law enforcement has a long and shameful history of , particularly when expressed by communities of color. Nonetheless, it would be a mistake to ignore the ways in which the more recent phenomenon of police militarization has played into the hostility that some police officers exhibit toward the communities they are intended to serve.

2022 Michigan Kritik
Links › 1033

Aff plan leaves surplus weapons that ends in the hand of police officers through the 1033 program

Barrett (Brian, executive editor, news at WIRED, and editor of chief of Gizmodo, “The Pentagon’s Hand-Me-Downs Helped Militarize Police. Here’s How,” June 2nd 2020, https://www.wired.com/story/pentagon-hand-me-downs-militarize-police-1033-program/

THE IMAGES OF this past week are both inescapable and indelible:  of cities across the United States, met by police forces equipped with full body armor and tactical vehicles that vaguely resemble tanks. The local law enforcement responding to even nonviolent protests has often looked more like the US Armed Forces—and that was before President Donald Trump deployed an actual  against peaceably assembled US citizens in the nation's capitol Monday. That’s no accident.

It’s easy enough to buy tactical gear in the US, and the Homeland Security Grant Program has  billions of dollars to law enforcement agencies to acquire military-grade equipment. But for decades, a primary driver for why it can be so hard to tell a National Guard troop from a local cop has been the Department of Defense itself, through a program that has parceled out everything from bayonets to grenade launchers to precincts across the country.

2022 Michigan Kritik
Links › S/O

US international actions militarized law enforcements domestically

Mack 21 ( Marvin, journalist for Business Insider, Yahoo News, “How America’s State Police Got Military Weapons”, Insider, April 28 2021, https://www.businessinsider.com/how-did-local-police-acquire-surplus-military-weapons-2020-8

Narrator: After the death of George Floyd in Minneapolis on May 25, people protested in at least 140 cities across the nation. Here in Indiana, a protestor lost an eye from a tear gas container hitting him in the face.

In North Carolina, protesters were trapped by a cloud of tear gas on both ends of a street. In Kentucky, an officer attacked a newscaster and camera crew with pepper bullets.

2022 Michigan Kritik
Links › LIO

Aff’s discourse of pacification is inseparable with the logic of militarism which entrenches colonialism

McMichael 16 (Christopher, PhD in Politics from Rhodes University, research include organized crime, Libertarian Marxism, and Fascism, “Pacification and Police: A critique of the Police Militarization Thesis,” November 29 2016, https://journals-sagepub-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/doi/full/10.1177/0309816816678569)

The inability of the militarization argument to acknowledge how a patrol officer with a nightstick may be as much of a cause of terror and fear as the machine gun waving SWAT team unit, is further indicator of its liberal bent. Moreover, the popular lexicon of police militarization doesn’t offer any ability to critique the police officer reading books to children at a public school, or passing out candy during a parade, or holding ‘public forums’, press conferences and ‘community meetings’. Hence, instead of thinking about the police/war assemblage through the notion of militarization, it might be best to think of this through the idea of pacification. Although pacification most commonly evokes US counter-insurgency efforts in Vietnam, the concept has a much longer history, emerging first in the Edicts of Pacification of the mid to late 1500s, where these laws were said to be aimed at the ending of strife and to make populations submit to state rule primarily through peaceful methods. Drawing on , Neocleous reminds us that, in 1573, Philip II ordered that ‘conquests’ be renamed ‘pacification’, so as to help build consent among the colonized. As  states,

The dates are important, since they are deep into the period of global accumulation and the history of capital, or, in other words, the point of departure for the period in which the insecurity of bourgeois order had to be secured. (p. 199)

2022 Michigan Kritik
Links › LIO

Liberty is only an excuse to continue to extend war and police power

McMichael 16 (Christopher, PhD in Politics from Rhodes University, research include organized crime, Libertarian Marxism, and Fascism, “Pacification and Police: A critique of the Police Militarization Thesis,” November 29 2016, https://journals-sagepub-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/doi/full/10.1177/0309816816678569)

Historically, liberals have praised the spontaneity of the market, in contrast with the ‘artificial, violent constructivism’ of other societies, and presented this as a virtuous cycle where economic freedom regulates and reduces the need for state intervention (: 283). On one level, liberalism is a political philosophy in which peace and freedom are seen to be the end historical goals of the extension of market order. But this discourse of emancipation has been historically tangled with dis-emancipation in which violent policing operations to contain the dangerous classes and foreign barbarians are the mechanisms for extending peace (: 286, 342). Therefore, the precondition for liberty and the pursuit of rational self-interest is the extension of police and war power. Rather than being primarily focused on liberty, liberalism is thus a politics of security, concerned with reshaping individuals, groups and territories in the image of capital (: 5). It is in this pursuit of security in the name of liberty that the most authoritarian tendencies of liberalism become apparent, from police killings to the revival of torture and indefinite detention. The danger is not therefore that liberal states can become more like fascist ones through ‘police militarization’, but rather that security politics reveal the fascist or authoritarian tendencies within liberal democracy already (: 9). In turn, this entails a particular situation where the continual expansion of intrusive police powers has historically been justified in terms of protecting individual freedom, while in practise encouraging despotic power in the protection of economic interests. For example, during the Cold War, the US government provided training and financial support to repressive police forces throughout the world, many which regularly engaged in torture and murder, in the name of fighting totalitarianism (). A similar process can be observed today when anti-democratic extensions in police and military power are legitimated as measures against anti-democratic extremism.

Recent scholarship has focused on the idea of ‘war: police assemblages’ evident in ‘contemporary liberal interventionism’, such as in the combination of clandestine drone attacks and special force interventions, full scale military invasions and counter-insurgency which have characterised recent wars in the Middle East and beyond (). But as : 441) points out the history of policing indicates that these current assemblages are not a recent phenomenon – ‘policing arrives once the condition for order have been violently established by the military so that reason of state can be implemented. Policing is the continuation of military actions by other means’. Viewed as continuum or assemblage, even a cursory survey highlights the extent to which the police have been central to the disciplining and oppression of the domestic enemies of liberal states. To give just a few examples, by the end of the 18th century, police forces in Europe were engaged in regular manhunts to round up beggars and vagrants (: 81), while across the Atlantic, the millions of Africans forced into bondage in the Americas were kept in line with slave patrols, which scholars are now increasingly viewing as one of the key forerunners of modern US policing (). The police were also at the forefront of state efforts to control ‘free labour’ through the suppression of strikes and revolts in the workplace. To give the example of just one country, the police were key agents in the ‘strikes (which moved) towards miniature civil wars between workers and the state’ during periods of intense labour militancy in the United States (: 236). However, this history is regularly omitted in contemporary discussions of police militarization. An illustrative quote, worth citing in full is from an interview conducted with  by the popular Vice website during which he details a version of (US) police history, in which

2022 Michigan Kritik
Links › LIO

Preserving the LIO is only an excuse for both external and internal war

McMichael 16 (Christopher, PhD in Politics from Rhodes University, research include organized crime, Libertarian Marxism, and Fascism, “Pacification and Police: A critique of the Police Militarization Thesis,” November 29 2016, https://journals-sagepub-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/doi/full/10.1177/0309816816678569)

The militarization thesis is also haunted by the spectre of the police state in both the past and the future. On one hand, this is accompanied by nostalgic descriptions of ‘real’ policing – as  rhetorically asks,

How did we go from a system in which laws were enforced by the citizens … to one in which order is preserved by armed governments agents too often conditioned to see streets and neighbourhoods as battlefields and the citizens they serve as enemy?

2022 Michigan Kritik
Links › War Discourse

Aff’s framing of countries as aggressive justifies violence abroad and ignores the internal warfare at home

McMichael 16 (Christopher, PhD in Politics from Rhodes University, research include organized crime, Libertarian Marxism, and Fascism, “Pacification and Police: A critique of the Police Militarization Thesis,” November 29 2016, https://journals-sagepub-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/doi/full/10.1177/0309816816678569)

But what is it at stake is not just the definition of police, but of war. Since at least the end of the Cold War, the concept of militarization has been taken on-board across many disciplines. We read of everything from the ‘militarization of urban space’ () to the ‘militarization of entertainment’ (). This literature generally portrays the sense that war has become more expansive than conflicts among nation-states, with security and surveillance becoming increasingly central to areas of social life, which appear distinct from formal military engagements. Our argument is not with the merits or the validity of this work but rather with its assumption of there being a traditional form of warfare – most generally defined as a geographically bounded and declared Clausewitzian struggle between states for power and territory. The most far reaching critique of such narrow definitions comes from , , , , ) work on security and pacification. The liberal definition of war as a confrontation between formally opposed states both ignores ‘the transnational nature of a great deal of warfare’ and ‘obscure the structural and systematic violence through which liberal order has been constituted’ (: 9). This ideological blurring goes back to European imperialism where, from the 16th century onwards, complex legal and philosophical arguments were used to present wars of colonial expansion as police actions to ensure peace and security – often referred to as ‘small wars’. The military campaigns at the forefront of conquest and violent accumulation were philosophically and ideologically rationalized as necessary to pacify ‘savage’ populations and to liberate their bodies and resources for the benefit of civilization (: 14). A key point of liberal thought is conceptualizing the military as an institution solely for foreign policy and the ‘over there’ and the police as a domestic institution only deployed ‘here’ for law enforcement and keeping the peace. Through this logic, the liberal state set itself up as different from feudal power and later what would become known as the totalitarian or ‘police state’, in which warfare against citizens is said to be unbound. Therefore, the notion that police powers and war powers come from different logics and mandates is a relatively recent notion that largely emerges out of liberal doctrines on state power (i.e. separation of powers and rule of law), which of course also merged with a nascent capitalist modernity (which was contingent on mass state and private violence against the indigenous, slaves and poor people). What is deliberately obscured is how civil society under capitalism is already at war. As described by Marx in Volume One of Capital the history of liberalism is also of the ‘logic of war, exercised in a permanent fashion against rebellious slaves, antagonistic Indians, wayward workers, and criminals with something unsocial in mind’ (: 15). Two centuries later, we see ‘semi-permanent wars against the enemy within and without – such as the war on drugs and the war on terror’ (: 16). The dominant thrust of the liberal tradition is thus to simplify the complexity of political power into dichotomies with policing and war treated as separate endeavours, represented by different institutions and practised within separate territories. However, even left theorists across different disciplines have accepted these distinctions, leading to work which focuses on the ‘overlaps’ and ‘blurring’ between the police and military, rather than on war and police as ‘processes working in conjunction as state power’ (: 587). From this standpoint, the question is not then about how the police resemble militaries, but rather the role that the police play in the liberal war for peace and pacification. In order to understand this, we first need to understand the liberal arguments, which are at the centre of the police militarization concept.

2022 Michigan Kritik
Links › Link – General

NATO’s continued existence results in military adventurism—it is a vital enabler of intervention.

Daniel Larison, Contributing Editor at The American Conservative, holds a Ph.D. in History from the University of Chicago, 10-06-2010 (“The case against NATO,” The Week, October 6th, Available Online at http://theweek.com/bullpen/column/207838/the-case-against-nato, Accessed 10-07-2010)

The goal of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization used to be, as its first secretary general, Lord Ismay, phrased it, "to keep the Russians out, the Americans in, and the Germans down." Today, the only reason to keep NATO going seems to be to give Americans a reason to be "in" Europe when there is no longer any need for American military involvement in European affairs. Putting the alarmism of the past few years aside, Europe is under no threat from Russia, which the Europeans seem to understand far better than Americans do. And since its reunification, Germany has become the economic and political heart of a peaceful project of European union. Sixty years since its founding and nearly 20 years since the end of the Cold War, it is well past time to dismantle NATO.

In the end, the main argument for perpetuating the NATO relic is that it provides the support structure for projecting power into remote parts of the globe where American interests are even less clearly defined. In other words, what once was a purely defensive alliance dedicated to European security now has little to do with either defense or Europe. The Alliance is not only outdated for America’s European allies, who increasingly see no reason to participate in "out-of-area" missions, but also functions as a potential enabler of American involvement in parts of Asia and Africa where no vital American interests are at stake. By keeping NATO in existence, Washington leaves itself open to the temptation to meddle in far-flung parts of the globe, even as it provides the superficial "multilateral" cover to make U.S. military intervention overseas more politically palatable.

2022 Michigan Kritik
Links › Link – General

NATO has transcended into a militarist state that’s sole goal is colonizing the Global South.

Acheson 22 – Ray Acheson, researcher from the Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom, leads the disarmament program Reaching Critical Will, 2022 (“Militarism Cannot Prevent War: An urgent call for de-escalation, demilitarisation, and disarmament in relation to Ukraine and beyond,” NATO Watch, February 14th, Available Online at , Accessed 07/15/2022)

Behind this current crisis lies a history of militarised and economic violence. Both Russia and the United States are settler colonial states, forging their countries by expanding their “frontiers” and killing and repressing Indigenous populations. Both engage in imperialist actions outside of their now-established borders, interfering, through military and economic action, in countries they deem to be within their “spheres of influence”. Both use militarism, aggression, and forced economic ties to guide their conduct in international relations, and both deal with domestic inequality, poverty, and resistance through policing and punishment.

The governments of both countries critique each other for the same type of behaviour. Russia criticises US imperialism, yet invades and occupies its neighbours, bombs civilians, and engages in cyber-attacks against critical infrastructure that harm ordinary people. The United States criticises Russia as an autocracy yet overthrows democratically elected governments if they threaten US interests, builds military bases and engages in wars and military operations in hundreds of countries around the world, and spends billions of dollars a year on militarism while so many of its citizens live without health care, housing, or food security.

2022 Michigan Kritik
1NC core › 1nc

The alt is feasible and can be implemented through a three-part plan that involves the defunding of the military, the conversion of the economy and the aiding of veterans in their transition to civilian life.

Burke 22, Matthew, a research associate at the University of Vermont who holds a PhD in Renewable Resources from McGill University; and Nina Smolyar, a Gund Graduate Fellow from the Rubenstein School of Environment and Natural Resources with a BA from the University of Pennsylvania and an MA from Goddard College|Demilitarize for a Just Transition. In: Dunlap, A., Brock, A. (eds) Enforcing Ecocide. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-99646-8_11

This set of deeply intertwined issues underscores the need for converting the U.S. military to civilian purposes and control. This section turns to the specific options and opportunities for a just transition of the U.S. military.

This transition requires nothing less than a complete dismantling and restructuring of this institution of war, firmly rooted under civilian control, toward the goal of creating an equitable and ecological society. There are three broad strategies to pursue as part of this just transition: spending reductions and reallocation; economic conversion to a peace economy; and assistance, retraining, and civilian repurposing for workers and veterans (D’Agostino and Rynn, 2019). Spending Reductions and Reallocation Demilitarization and just transition require decreases in military spending and a green fiscal shift toward meeting urgent social and environmental needs. Often it is a budget reduction that catalyzes deeper, more abiding conversions, yet such a curtailment must be combined with targeted reinvestments (Pemberton and Hartung, 2020). Military spending creates many fewer jobs than if those same funds were spent on healthcare, education, and clean energy and infrastructure, and jobs in these other sectors are on average equally well or better compensated (Peltier, 2019; Pollin and Garrett-Peltier, 2011). Shifting military spending to green manufacturing can support a just transition for regions of the U.S. experiencing declines in manufacturing, while scaling up lower-carbon energy infrastructure and public transportation, better preparing communities for impacts of climate change, and improving and expanding jobs in care work (Steichen and Koshgarian, 2020). A growing consensus is emerging around proposals to cut military spending. For example, a Defense Spending Reduction Caucus has been formed in the U.S. Congress, while an amendment was further introduced in 2020 to cut the Pentagon budget by 10% (Lee, 2020). This reduction is especially urgent in view of the need for and popularity of Covid-19 economic relief payments, and changes in rules to allow significant cuts to the DoD independently of non-defense spending. Even at just 10%, this reinvestment could achieve significant benefits across any number of priorities: housing half a million people, dramatically expanding coronavirus testing, bridging the funding deficit for majority non-white school districts, providing renewable energy to nearly every U.S. household, transitioning nearly every worker in conventional coal, oil, and gas sectors, hiring close to a million public school elementary educators, and so on (Steichen and Koshgarian, 2020). At a global level, the opportunities for shifting funding become even greater, given $2 trillion annually in global expenditures (half from the U.S.) on war and war preparations. Small percentages of this amount could end starvation or provide drinking water worldwide, reducing unrest, and improving well-being (World Beyond War, 2020). Economic Conversion In coordination with these shifts in budgetary priorities, a just transition requires converting from a military to a peace economy, including especially industrial planning and restructuring. Economic conversion refers to “political, economic and technical measures for ensuring the orderly transformation of labor, machinery and other economic resources now being used for military purposes to alternative civilian uses” (Melman and Dumas, 1990). Such efforts have been proposed and tested for decades, emphasizing the use of sector- and community-based planning for workers and communities dependent on defense and defense industries (D’Agostino and Rynn, 2019). Beginning with moves toward nuclear disarmament and the end of the Cold War in the 1980s and 90s, advocates and organizers seriously examined the necessary elements of conversion to a peace economy (Melman and Dumas, 1990; Pemberton and Hartung, 2020). In addition to spending reductions and reinvestment, successful economic conversion depends upon several key conditions. These conditions include availability of technical and financial assistance to firms, workers, and communities; supportive civil society measures including research, education, and legislation; and well-designed industrial policies and planning. Many examples of successful conversion can be traced at the level of firms, communities, bases, laboratories, and sectors since the end of the second world war. However, the size and complexity of the network of militarism in the U.S. now require a largescale industrial policy to achieve full disarmament and demilitarization (Pemberton and Hartung, 2020). Much has already been learned about scaling up economic conversions. Especially since the end of the Cold War, the work of Seymour Melman and colleagues, along with efforts of labor and trade unions, has provided a foundation for this comprehensive approach to economic conversion and industrial planning. These lessons reflect the fact that for decades, military priorities have served as the de facto plan for the U.S. economy, and markets are incapable of making the needed shift to peaceful economies (Eisenscher, 2014; Melman and Dumas, 1990). Supportive legislation nearly passed as early as 1963, while legislation such as the Defense Economic Adjustment Act has been introduced in various forms since the early 1990s (Swanson, 2010). More recently, Miriam Pemberton and others have put forward comprehensive strategies for defense transition that operate at all levels and are federally funded and resourced, and state- and locally coordinated and implemented (Pemberton, 2018). The scale and pace of change needed now demand new models for economic conversion. Demilitarization and conversion to a peace economy will require explicit industrial planning in public and private sectors, a challenge in the U.S. context to say the least. Nevertheless, several tools may provide a starting point if applied to the purpose of a just transition. One obvious measure is to implement new rounds of base closures through the Base Realignment and Closure process, especially including closures of overseas bases, and to shift the savings to just transition and civilian priorities. Closed bases and installations could serve as new sites for restored ecosystems and alternative energy generation (Crawford, 2019). Another measure would be to shift the focus of the Defense Production Act, which provides presidential authority to expedite and expand materials and services from U.S. industries, toward emergency preparedness. A specific focus would be to minimize hazards and impacts of climate change and protect and restore critical infrastructure—both built and natural—as needed for a just transition. In the context of climate emergency, a more direct approach to large-scale industrial planning could effectively reverse the function of the War Production Board, which was active during the wartime period. This mode of planning would instead convert factories from manufacture of weapons and military equipment to peacetime industries under public control, while conserving high-priority materials and limiting waste and luxury items. It is important to emphasize in the context of emergency preparedness and climate resilience, the point is not to extend military control but rather to unequivocally transfer resources and responsibility of the existing military apparatus to civilian control (Barber and Bennis, 2020). For example, civilian organizations such as the U.S. Public Health Service or the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention would assume responsibility for medical staff, equipment, and facilities. All these methods and more will need to be integrated over time within a broad strategy of demilitarized industrial planning for conversion to a peace economy. Assistance, Retraining, and Civilian Repurposing The third general strategy for a just transition of the U.S. military centers on the contribution of the workers and their communities toward minimizing ecological catastrophe and providing for basic needs. This strategy therefore involves coordinating targeted assistance, retraining, and transitioning current military service members and contractors toward peace economy sectors, industries, and services. Ensuring social assistance and retraining provides the baseline for a demilitarized just transition. Here again, experience offers many examples, including the various GI Bills, Vocational Rehabilitation and Employment Assistance, the Veterans Retraining Assistance Program and Transition Assistance Program, and so on. Often under the charge of the Department of Veterans Affairs, these programs have demonstrated their ability to make a meaningful difference to people transitioning from military to civilian life by providing assistance and benefits for education, housing, business support, counseling, jobs training, and monthly subsistence payments. Funds could be reallocated from the DoD to the VA including the Office of Transition and Economic Development to dramatically scale up financial and logistical support for these transitions. This process must also involve redirecting economic activity and livelihoods. This would involve retraining public employees displaced by the phase out of military programs and offering them meaningful work in other federal, state, or local agencies, as engineers and mechanics, electricians, public health workers, accountants, and so on (D’Agostino and Rynn, 2019). Many of these programs, historically and presently, emphasize private sector employment in anticipation that the market can supply the needed work. Here again, the present context requires a more targeted system of transition that aims to rectify existing social inequities and minimize ecological catastrophe. This means providing high-quality jobs to build and repair public infrastructure, construct public water and wastewater systems, clean up toxic and nuclear waste sites, restore ecological habitats, provide national and international disaster preparedness and relief, and build new and retrofit existing housing, libraries, and schools. Alongside these priorities, a just transition also calls for creating new opportunities for local manufacturing and production and worker-owned businesses and cooperatives, and providing technical and administrative assistance to communities facing these converging crises (D’Agostino and Rynn, 2019; Melman and Dumas, 1990). An especially relevant opportunity follows from the growing calls for a re-envisioned and permanent Civilian Conservation Corps (CCC), or a Civilian Climate Corps as proposed in the first days of the Biden Administration. The original CCC, sometimes known as Roosevelt’s Tree Army, operated from 1933 to 1942 as a New Deal public work relief program. The CCC was highly popular, employing millions, and completing a vast number of projects including planting trees, building parks and trails, fighting fires, and protecting soils. The CCC helped influence environmental programs and attitudes that continue to this day. Yet this program did not provide long-term, high-quality jobs, reinforced racial and gender inequities, and became militarized and subsumed under the war effort (Alexander, 2018; Heller, 2009; Maher, 2008). The just transition needed now would function differently. A reimagined CCC would create high-value work especially in ecological restoration and climate resilience, rectify inequities, and set a clear path for workers and communities to demilitarize in a way that is responsive to present and future needs (Aronoff et al., 2019). Boosted by funds reallocated from the military budget, a new Civilian Climate Corps could provide transitioning workers with well-paid union jobs as “conservation and resilience workers” who restore lands and waters, build green infrastructure, install solar panels and wind towers, sequester carbon in soils, protect biodiversity, clean up toxic waste, and much more (The White House, 2021). To align this initiative more closely with principles for a just transition, the program must center on the needs and priorities among Black, Indigenous, and People of Color (BIPOC), while providing skills needed for lifelong work in a demilitarized, post-fossil-fuel economy (Collier, 2021). Just as the military now serves as the nation’s largest federal employer, this repurposed program could further serve as a key element of a federal public jobs guarantee program, thus ensuring a viable transition for military workers, families, and communities.

2022 Michigan Kritik
1NC core › 1nc

The 1AC’s language perpetuates and normalizes militarism as a cultural system

Gusterson and Besteman 19 (Hugh, Professor in the Department of Anthropology and Elliott School of International Affairs of George Washington University, Catherine, Professor in the Department of Anthropology of Colby College, “Cultures of Militarism: An Introduction to Supplement 19”, February 2019, “Current Anthropology Volume 60, Supplement 19”) // Ilake LT

In contrast, anthropologists’ interest in militarism has taken shape in the context of post–cold war transformations in the management of violence. These years have seen the violent reorganization of some cold war client states; the proliferation of militia-led insurgencies; the interpenetration of organized crime and drug trafficking with insurgency and counter in-surgency in parts of the global south; the articulation of coun-ter insurgency abroad with domestic policing at home in many Western countries; the reformulation of the United Nations into an institution of militarized peacekeeping and occupation; the increasing use of military labor to perform civil, humanitarian, policing, and development activities; and a growing awareness of the ways in which militarism as a set of cultural practices and ideologies pervades all domains of social life. The anthropologists in this volume see militarism as a cultural system; it is shaped through ideology and rhetoric, effected through bodies and technologies, made visible and invisible through campaigns of imagery and knowledge production, and it colonizes aspects of social life including reproduction, self-image, and notions of community. We interrogate militarism in its established and emergent forms, probing its genealogies, its facility at colonizing daily life, and its ability to present itself as a response to insecurities it has itself provoked.4This collection of papers draws on the rich discussions at the symposium from which this volume emerged to capture some of the distinctive features of cultures of militarism. The papers emphasize militarization as a contingent process over militarism as a measurable object;5decenter the state as the core locus of such processes; probe the relationship between militarism, experience, and identity, with a special focus on the body; examine connections between militarism and social injustice; and evince a commitment to critique and under-mine militarism while, at the same time, respecting the force of its appeal. The New Anthropology of Militarism: Four Features Threat Constructions These papers understand militarism as a process rather than as a bounded, measurable thing enmeshed in deterministic relationships with other reified variables. Militarism as an in-flective force or bundle of processes acts upon society in pow-erful and expansive but uneven and contingent ways. Although militarism carves its way deep into social structures, it is also shaped and reshaped in the dialectical interaction between in-grained structures on the one hand and human agency and contingency on the other. It is capillary, shape-shifting, always in motion as it constructs threats, enrolls constituencies, colonizes cultural life, and generates new loci of resistance. As Michel Foucault (2007:44) writes, security apparatuses “have the con-stant tendency to expand; they are centrifugal. New elements are constantly being integrated....Security therefore involves or-ganizing, or anyway allowing the development of ever-wider circuits.” And there is no domain of social life it does not touch. Just as contemporary wars seem to have no clearly demarcated end, so militarism has no discernible edge; it increasingly seeps into every corner of the world, every aspect of social life, in someway. Military/intelligence logics and personnel are now being directed to manage arenas of life formerly understood as outside the purview of the military, like development projects in Africa, humanitarian aid, and responses to environmental catastrophes, black markets, and the hacking of political parties’ computers. In the words of Catherine Lutz, one of the foremost anthropological theorists and observers of militarism, the process of militariza-tion“ has reshaped almost every element of global social life over the 20th century.” It involves an intensification of the labor and resources allocated to military purposes, including the shaping of other institu-tions in synchrony with military goals. Militarization is simul-taneously a discursive process, involving a shift in general societal beliefs and values in ways necessary to legitimate the use of force, the organization of large standing armies and their leaders, and the higher taxes or tribute used to pay for them. Militarization is intimately connected not only to the obvious increase in the size of armies and resurgence of mil-itant nationalisms and militant fundamentalisms but also to the less visible deformation of human potentials into the hierarchies of race, class, gender, and sexuality, and to the shaping of national histories in ways that glorify and legiti-mate military action. (Lutz 2002:723)As Lutz’s comment indicates, the material base of militarism is connected with ideologies and discourses through which proliferating militarized infrastructures and rationalities are normalized, naturalized, and legitimized. Such ideologies and discourses valorize the ethos of the warrior (Gibson 1994; Orr2004; Webb 2018) and construct threats in such a way as to validate military spending, military interventions, and the mil-itarization of formerly nonmilitary arenas of life. To say that threats are “constructed” does not mean that they are imaginary or unreal. But threats can be figured through different narratives and addressed in different ways, and the choice of narrative figuration may have enormous material consequences. The So-viet missiles deployed to Cuba in 1962 were quite real and, if used, would have inflicted crushing damage on the United States. But the United States could have chosen to regard them as a reasonable counterweight to its own Jupiter nuclear-tipped mis-siles in Turkey, on the Soviet Union’s doorstep, rather than pro-voking a global crisis by narrating them as an existential threat (Weldes 1999). Likewise, based on the evidence of the last 2 de-cades of US-Vietnamese relations, the United States could plausibly have decided in the 1960s that its vital interests would have suffered little if a small country on the other side of the planet were allowed to “go Communist. “Instead, it fruitlessly expended the lives of over 50,000 Americans and 2–3 million Vietnamese in what American national security elites wrongly perceived, thanks to the consensually accepted domino theory, as a struggle it could not afford to lose. Or, as discussed in this volume, Turkey in the early twentieth century could have constructed Armenians as constituency to be accommodated, not exterminated, and Guatemalan and Colombian elites could have constructed rural challenges against inequality and injustice as a social problem to address through development and land reform, not a military threat that demanded counterinsurgency. In these cases, the preferred threat constructions militarized the problems at hand, mobilizing more resources for military projects and saturating the social field with militarized violence.