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2023 CNDI Kritik
Links › Topic Links › Welfare

The welfare state coerces citizens into governmental compliance in exchange for basic needs.

Peeters, ’17 (Ronald Peeters is professor at the University of Otago. He obtained his PhD from Maastricht University in 2002, and has been working as assistant and associate professor at Maastricht University until he moved to the University of Otago in 2017. Main fields of interest are game theory and behavioural economics.) - Peeters, R. (2017). Manufacturing Responsibility: The Governmentality of Behavioural Power in Social Policies. Social Policy and Society, 1–15. doi:10.1017/s147474641700046x 

A first type of techniques is situated in the context of the development of the classic welfare state into a ‘social investment state’ (e.g. Giddens, 1998; Taylor-Gooby, 2008; Morel et al., 2012; Pintelon et al., 2013), which shifts attention from providing protection against externalities, such as poverty, to the way citizens use the opportunities the welfare state gives them. Through work incentives, life-long learning, training, and early childhood protection, governments try to activate citizens socially and improve their employability instead of merely providing a social safety net. Passive benefits such as cash transfers are cut back in favour of social investments that improve citizens’ opportunities rather than compensate them for harm (Brettschneider, 2008: 20).5 The social investment state’s discourse emphasises responsibility, active citizenship, participation, and self-efficacy – notions that make clear what kind of behaviour is expected from citizens. The state backs up this objective by making welfare state entitlements conditional on the behaviour of recipients. This ‘quid pro quo’ logic (Cantillon and Van Lancker, 2012) implies a form of reciprocity in exchange for access to social services: mandatory job applications in exchange for social security, commitment to behavioural change in exchange for family support, strict house rules in exchange for social housing, and financial responsibility in exchange for debt relief (e.g. Peeters, 2014). The key element of this technique is the introduction of both positive and negative incentives in welfare schemes to elicit different choices or different behavioural patterns. An example of a ‘socially useful reciprocity’ (Corra, 2013: 63; my translation) is volunteer work or community service, through which recipients of social security can prove themselves capable of taking responsibility and learn how to be a good citizen (Warburton and Smith, 2003). Failure to meet government-set conditions can lead to a partial or complete cut in benefits. Recent social assistance reforms in England and the Netherlands are imprinted with this logic. They are imbued with the notion that social support is, above all, the personal responsibility of citizens. This includes the responsibility of disabled and elderly people to arrange the necessary support they need from friends, family, and neighbours. Only if that proves insufficient, government and professional support enter the picture (Verhoeven and Tonkens, 2013). Across the OECD-countries, this contractual form of reciprocity is used in a variety of areas (Goodin, 2002): as a mandatory condition for access to professional support for problematic debts, substance abuse, domestic violence or parenting, people are required to alter the behavioural patterns that got them into trouble in the first place (Tonkens and Verplanke, 2013). If people fall back into their old habits, support may be terminated.

2023 CNDI Kritik
Links › Topic Links › Welfare

The welfare state is a form of biopolitical control that manipulates citizens to comply to the state.

Peeters, ’17 (Ronald Peeters is professor at the University of Otago. He obtained his PhD from Maastricht University in 2002, and has been working as assistant and associate professor at Maastricht University until he moved to the University of Otago in 2017. Main fields of interest are game theory and behavioural economics.) - Peeters, R. (2017). Manufacturing Responsibility: The Governmentality of Behavioural Power in Social Policies. Social Policy and Society, 1–15. doi:10.1017/s147474641700046x 

For instance, efforts to rehabilitate criminal offenders and support people with personal problems are pursued through techniques that carefully try to manufacture responsibility (e.g. Goddard, 2012; Peeters, 2013a; Phoenix and Kelly, 2013). Furthermore, the recent emergence of psychological-behavioural techniques such as nudging is based on the premise that people do not act rationally but are driven by psychological processes that can be manipulated through choice architecture (Thaler and Sunstein, 2009). And new welfare state policies introduce incentives for people to behave more responsibly: in exchange for access to welfare support, social security, or social housing, citizens are required to comply with certain conditions such as arranging social support, mandatory re-education, or house rules (e.g. Cantillon and Van Lancker, 2013). Responsibilisation is, therefore, not necessarily a simple transfer of tasks from state to social actors. It can also imply the construction of responsibility where it does not exist yet. This builds upon the idea that there are two sides to responsibilisation (Van Houdt and Schinkel, 2014). One the one hand, it assumes ‘a pre-existing autonomous citizen, a citizen already properly socialized, only to be mobilized and called into active service’ (ibid.: 61). On the other hand, there are citizens that require socialisation and the mobilisation of the state ‘to act-very-close in the homes, minds and bodies of 5 people’ (ibid.). This second form of responsibilisation can be defined as manufacturing attitudes and manipulating choices to make citizens assume responsibility for self-care in accordance with governmental objectives. Even though there is already a considerable amount of empirical studies on governmental efforts to construct responsibility, there is a lack of theory-building. By grouping both forms of responsibilisation together, our understanding of their fundamental differences is clouded. Responsibilisation as ‘the construction of civility’ is underdeveloped in terms of conceptualising the variety of techniques that governments use. In the following, I present the analysis of a literature review of contemporary welfare state policies that can be linked to this latter form of responsibilisation.4 The results are divided into three types of techniques to get a clearer understanding of how responsibility is manufactured in domains of health, welfare, and security.

2023 CNDI Kritik
Links › Topic Links › Welfare

Social insurance is just another form of biopolitical control over the individual.

Peeters, ’17 (Ronald Peeters is professor at the University of Otago. He obtained his PhD from Maastricht University in 2002, and has been working as assistant and associate professor at Maastricht University until he moved to the University of Otago in 2017. Main fields of interest are game theory and behavioural economics.) - Peeters, R. (2017). Manufacturing Responsibility: The Governmentality of Behavioural Power in Social Policies. Social Policy and Society, 1–15. doi:10.1017/s147474641700046x 

An analysis of techniques of government is, in Foucauldian terms, an analysis of governmentality (Foucault, 2007). We can understand responsibilisation as part of an advanced liberal governmentality, which seeks to work ‘upon the ways in which individuals regulate their own behavior to ensure this is consonant with the interests of the state’ (Pierson, 2004: 75).1 The objective is to make individuals conduct and evaluate themselves into alignment with political objectives (Rose, 1996b: 155). To this end, governmental techniques work on both the level of the individual and the level of the population. ‘Anatomic’ techniques focus on individuals and the individual body, as exemplified by the disciplinary power exerted over people in schools, prisons, hospitals, and factories. ‘Biological’ techniques treat humans as part of a population. Interventions take place on the level of the entire population, where humans are subject to regulations and policies that aim to mould them into productive elements of an economical order and manageable elements of a public order (comprising such topics as public health, crime, and welfare2). Through the two tiers of anatomo-politics and bio-politics, governments aim ‘to shape conduct by working through our desires, aspirations, interests and beliefs’ (Dean, 1999: 11) to be healthy, successful, and safe. Governmentality in liberal states emphasises voluntary obedience over coercion. Liberal governments are concerned with ‘getting people to act’ (ibid.: 119) in specific, productive ways, for instance by promoting an educated labour market and by providing social insurances against poverty (e.g. Ewald, 1991). Moreover, individuals must also come to recognise themselves as free and responsible individuals that shape their own lives through conscious choices about their future and their potential (Rose, 1999: 68). Liberal techniques are not limited to economic policies, but can be applied to any domain in which governments seek to use freedom as an instrument of political power. Instead of discipline, liberal governments pursue techniques of ‘security’ that allow ‘freedom of circulation’ (Foucault, 2007: 49) and stress prevention over correction. Instead of state control, they pursue mechanisms of self-regulation that make people act ‘responsibly’ of their own accord. Techniques to control and manipulate behaviour are built into people’s daily lives to mould their conduct, such as surveillance in the public domain, designing policies that ensure high levels of economic productivity (education, infrastructure, health care, etc.), and the implication of non-state experts and other actors (psychologists, planners, social workers, entrepreneurs) to manage social life. The idea of ‘individual responsibility’ is at the core of liberal government: ‘[ . . . ] a unitary, responsible self-agent must be supposed to exist because it is intellectually, juridically, and morally necessary’ (Douglas, 2005: 220). In its various conceptions, individual responsibility has been used as the prime mechanism for demarcating the role of government. In a liberal governmentality, the responsibility of the individual and the responsibility of the state are tightly linked. Changes in conceptions of individual responsibility legitimise changes in governmentality. Ewald’s (2002) historical analysis on shifting interpretations about individual responsibility provides a useful framework to understand how each interpretation is accompanied by a specific governmental intervention repertoire,3 as described below.

2023 CNDI Kritik
Links › Topic Links › UBI

UBI strengthens sovereign biopower by excluding the Other from the national community, reinforcing a permanent state of exception for non-citizens.

Knowles 21

Anthony Knowles (BA in Political Science & Sociology, MA in Sociology, PhD in Sociology @ University of Tennessee), 2021, "Universal Basic Income, Social Justice, and Marginality: A Critical Evaluation," Social Justice, https://www.proquest.com/docview/2807107598?pq-origsite=gscholar&fromopenview=true //MLT

The first critique of UBI focuses on how it interfaces with marginalized communities and the potential dangers of a neoliberal UBI. The next two critiques explain how an uncritically examined UBI program could reproduce marginality in how it handles distribution to immigrants and incarcerated people. UBI is often framed rhetorically as a birthright for citizens of a country. It is a program of redistribution so vast that it can only be run by the state, and therefore is characterized by both the pros and cons of being administered by the modern capitalist state. Even though a UBI is called universal, there are still inherent limits to who counts as part of this universal. UBI implemented in the United States would be universally given to citizens of any race, gender, or employment status, but would obviously not be given to citizens of, say, Germany or Indonesia, nor to temporary visitors or tourists. This is an inherent limitation due to the nature of jurisdiction in the modern nation-state framework. This framework was inherited from centuries of national identity formation processes (Anderson 1983) and was congealed and fortified by the state's legitimate monopoly of violence (Weber 1922/2013). This therefore means that states ultimately have the power to decide who is entitled to a basic income, which can be problematic for noncitizens living in the country or those with an ambiguous citizenship status. In other words, the state has the power to define who is entitled to UBI and who is not, which ultimately gives the state more power to choose life or death, economic security or precarity, for those at the margins of inclusion in the nation. Though a UBI would be given to those who are unambiguously citizens of that nation-state, those outside that circle, those misconstrued to be outside that circle, or those made to be outside that circle by the state could be legally denied access to UBI. The state would consider this justified and legitimate as would segments of the public. This exclusion for those at the margins would be a kind of slow violence (Deb 2019) that may be further exacerbated if future waves of automation and technological displacement make gainful employment increasingly scarce. It adds another means for the state to exercise biopower, choosing which lives to foster and which lives to "let die" (Foucault 1978, 144) based on the state's definition of imagined community (Anderson 1983). Those who are not considered part of the imagined community, especially immigrants and refugees, may be barred not only from citizenship, but the minimum income as well, further marginalizing immigrant enclaves while citizens enjoy the benefits of basic income. This problem can be exacerbated by xenophobic and racist social structures and ideologies, as these various Others are framed as unworthy of receiving UBI or as not sufficiently part of the imagined community to deserve its benefits. For example, Bay and Pedersen (2006, 427-28) find that in Norway, a country known for both its racial homogeneity and strong welfare state, two thirds of the total sample expressed a positive view toward basic income, but approval among those who initially favored UBI dropped by 34 percent when reminded in a follow-up question that noncitizens would also receive UBI. This demonstrates the ideological power of nationality and how xenophobia can potentially damper the attractiveness of UBI. By putting the power to distribute UBI in the hands of the state, the power of the sovereign to make exceptions (Agamben 1998) must be exercised to carve out eligibility requirements for immigrants, refugees, and the stateless with various legal statuses. Such exceptions are already made in the US welfare system, as immigrants are barred from accessing welfare programs during their first five years in the United States and undocumented immigrants are banned from accessing them entirely (Fortuny & Chaundry 2011, Howard 2006). It should not be difficult to imagine that more restrictive admission requirements may be enacted to conditionalize the so-called universal program. A narrow focus on the domestic benefits of UBI leaves these considerations unexamined, allowing the universal in UBI to be uncritically accepted when the universal is in fact a particular that only has universal validity within a reified nation-state framework based around the imagined community (Anderson 1983). It is for this reason, among others, that Susskind (2020, 183-85) recommends a conditional basic income where the admissions policy for receiving it is clearly delineated. Such delineates are inevitable, making it vital for immigrants and immigrant advocacy groups to be wary of the eligibility requirements for any UBI proposal. This dilemma could also be described as part of the broader issue of border imperialism among modern capitalist states. As Walia (2013) explains, border imperialism is an alternative way of viewing state borders; rather than conceptualizing borders as protection from outside threats, border imperialism, disrupts the myth of Western benevolence toward migrants. In fact, it wholly flips the script on borders; as journalist Dawn Paley aptly expresses it, "far from preventing violence, the border is in fact the reason it occurs." Border imperialism depicts the processes by which the violences and precarities of displacement and migration are structurally created as well as maintained. (Walia 2013, 2) In this case, border imperialism defines who is in and who is out, who can access UBI and who cannot. Considering the immigration and border policies of the United States-under both Democratic and Republican administrations-and the European response to the Syrian refugee crisis, border imperialism remains the modus operandi of countries in the global north. This reality forces UBI advocates to ask whether the capitalist state, armed with the power to include and exclude, can really be trusted to implement UBI without reproducing precarity on the margins of society, especially for immigrants and others without full citizenship. The stakes for the millions of migrants, refugees, and stateless people of the world are too great to avoid responsibility. As the so-called third wave of UBI discourse continues among scholars, politicians, and citizens, it is important to confront such issues head on and seriously grapple with the implications of UBI for migration, inclusion, and social solidarity.

2023 CNDI Kritik
Links › Topic Links › UBI

UBI reifies commodification and social atomization by hindering critical examination of market logic.

Harris 23 Neal Harris (Senior Lecturer in Sociology @ Oxford Brookes, Editorial Board member @ European Journal of Social Theory), 3-10-2023, "Critical Theory and Universal Basic Income," Critical Sociology, https://doi.org/10.1177/08969205231151562 //MLT

Adorno and Horkheimer (1997) united insights from Weber and Marx, and crucially, from Lukács, in their seminal work on reification. For Lukács (1972), reification chiefly refers to the artificial distanciation between the subject and their external world which is induced by capitalism. The capitalist subject views the world in a disengaged manner, abstracted from their surroundings, viewing others people, and their wider environment, as mere ‘things’, as ‘dead matter’ (Horkheimer, 1993: 81). For Lukács (1972), reification derives from ‘the fetish character of commodities’ and is ‘the subjective stance corresponding to it’ (p. 84). In a world which is governed by the exchange of commodities, a pathological form of consciousness comes to dominate. Reification is furthered by the market’s dependence on logics of false equivalence, what Lukács (1972) calls a ‘phantom objectivity’ (p. 6). The capitalist subject is encouraged to reduce their external world to exchangeable, purposeless matter which can be swapped for equivalent capital. The exchange value of a human liver is now commensurate with the exchange value of a certain weight of turnips, or of plutonium. The qualitative difference between the aforementioned objects is ‘written off as literature’ by the reifying logics of the market (Adorno and Horkheimer, 1997: 7). For critical theorists, the hegemony of such reified consciousness is a crucial obstacle to progressive transformation as it prevents the development of critical reason. A fundamental concern for critical theorists, when assessing UBI, therefore, is will it help ameliorate reified consciousness? In this regard, the answer is a resounding negative. Rather than furthering a co-operative approach to all social relations, ever more domains of social life will become controlled by the market. As Van Parijs and Vanderborght (2017: 12) argue, it is ‘fundamental to the concept of a basic income . . . that it is paid in cash’. We would then see an attendant expansion of the commodity form, because we will see an attendant expansion of market actors. The capital relation will now become more, rather than less dominant, as more actors become ‘consumers’, regardless of how their capital is ‘earned’. While the ‘hidden abodes’ of capitalism (Fraser, 2014) were undeniably irrational and inequitable in past social formations, they remained substantially immune from the reifying power of the market. For example, love, esteem and respect can be earned in a manner not mediated by wage-labour (Honneth, 1995). The introduction of a UBI would see ‘recognition’ taking the universal form of capital. Recall that for Van der Veen and Van Parijs (1986) UBI could displace the socialist stage of production in the route to communism as it would enable the development of a community who are socially conditioned to more readily embrace communistic values. However, when viewed through a critical theoretical lens, UBI serves to further entrench and embed reification and false equivalence. By expanding the field of consumers, and reaffirming capital as the fundamental method of affirming social recognition, UBI serves to reinforce a reified atomistic consciousness, rather than serving to enable the transition to a more communistic form of thought and sociality. Critical theory thus offers a warning against the implementation of a UBI: by expanding the market-mediated domains of the social world, the deeply pathological reified form of consciousness associated with capitalistic societies would further proliferate, rather than recede (see Delanty, 2020). This would serve to retard prospects for qualitative socialistic transition as the reified form of thought associated with commodification and the capitalistic relation will be further enshrined, rather than challenged. Money and Real Abstraction. While the discussion of reification may seem abstruse in the applied context of the discussion of UBI, Alfred Sohn-Rethel’s (1978) increasingly popular work focusses explicitly on the relationship between money and cognition. In summary, the argument presented by Sohn-Rethel is that a society which is organised around money will inevitably reproduce logics of domination and bondage because money is at core a manifestation of petrified, abstracted labour time (Sohn-Rethel, 1978). While Adorno and Horkheimer’s work focussed on the market and its relationship to instrumental rationality, Sohn-Rethel’s insights enable us to focus explicitly on the relationship between money and impeded cognition. This is of real value to a critical theoretical investigation of UBI, which, as Van Parijs and Vanderborght (2017: 12) argue, must be paid in the form of money. For Sohn-Rethel (1978: 18–23), there is a fundamental pathology embedded within the logics of exchange which are connected to the transfer and holding of money. Importantly, this is not solely a psychological pathology, but a social pathology (see Harris, 2022). As Sohn-Rethel (1978: 20) argues the ‘economic conception of value is a real one’; while it lives only in the ‘human mind . . . it does not spring from it’. Rather, our actions, such as the everyday buying of selling of commodities with money represents a very real ‘social formation’ which induces a particular social synthetic form of cognition (Sohn-Rethel, 1978: 2). The ‘conceptual foundations of the cognitive faculty’ (Sohn-Rethel, 1978: 5) are shaped by the concrete forms of activity we take part in through our quotidian behaviour, such as buying bread or paying for petrol, whenever we hand over a note, or type in our pin. Crucially, the moulding of our cognition to that which is ‘socially necessary’ for capitalism occurs without subjects even ‘being aware of it’ (Sohn-Rethel, 1978: 20). Our use of money naturalises reductive ways of thinking and being, which are fundamentally in keeping with the structurally necessary logics of capitalism (SohnRethel, 1978). Expressed more formally, this means that money (the means through which UBI is to be administered) pathologically shapes the ‘dimensions of private consciousness’ (1978: 26) in a manner that denigrates the individual’s critical-epistemic and phenomenological capacities (see Thompson, 2022). As Sohn-Rethel (1978: 59) words it, ‘[a]nyone who carries coins in his pocket and understands their functions . . . bears in his mind, whether or not he is aware of it, ideas which, no matter how hazily, reflect the postulates of the exchange abstraction’. When we live in a society based on exchange we are forced to acquiesce unknowingly to forms of thought which reinscribe the abstract value of expropriated labour as the base equivalence of all social life. This occurs through cognitive processes that are connected to quotidian material acts, inescapable when living within a money-based economy. Such ‘real abstractions’ not merely serve to naturalise the capitalist system, but serve to impede efforts to disclose its contradictions. UBI is definitionally based around money; having real, accessible money in liquid form. It cannot be operationalised in any form other than through money, and it cannot be presented through extended services, or progressive tax rates. There thus seems no way around Sohn-Rethel’s position; progressive advocates of UBI are forced to either find grounds to reject his claim, relativise it or accept a foundational weakness to the UBI approach. There is no way for UBI to be implemented without recourse to money. Indeed, advocates of UBI have claimed it is a positive that more people are awarded more money; feminists in particular have expressed support that care labour could be rewarded by money through UBI (see Flanigan, 2018). As such, through the implementation of UBI, a dominating and oppressive feature of capitalistic society, money, would not merely be reinforced, but its domain would be expanded (see Martinelli, 2017). Indeed, this expansion itself is heralded as a cause for celebration by some feminist advocates of UBI (see Flanigan, 2018). When viewed through the lens of ‘real abstraction’, the dependence of UBI on money can be seen to further a form of domination which supports the capitalistic ‘social synthesis’ at the cost of the subject’s capacity to truly comprehend their relation to the external world (Sohn and Rethel, 1978: 60). The capitalist subject’s relationship to nature, to the Other, is hidden behind the veil of false equivalences, deeply connected to the money form. In short, UBI would further enforce an impeded cognitive capacity, which would defer the possibility of meaningful qualitative transformation.

2023 CNDI Kritik
Links › Topic Links › UBI

The attempt to control the disease of unemployment through the mandatory experiment of UBI is a form of biopower that only exacerbates the states ability to control life

Mannevuo ‘19

(Mona Mannevuo postdoctoral researcher Contemporary History, Philosophy and Political Science, "Neuroliberalism in Action: The Finnish Experiment with Basic Income," Sage Journals, 3-6-2019 https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/0263276419834066) //oc

The randomised controlled trials used in experimental behaviour-change policies convey a powerful image of hard science. These imaginaries can be explained by the history of randomised trials as powerful and authoritative experiments in which the constructed evidence enjoys considerable rhetorical power (Edwards, 2007). Randomised trials were originally designed for medical drug research, so a trial begins with the selection of a target population, which is then divided into two groups: the treatment group and the untreated control group. Those in the first group, chosen at random, receive a placebo, and the clinical outcomes of the randomly-treated group and the control group are compared and analysed (Edwards, 2007: 10). This methodological setting forms the basis for the basic income trial, but in this experiment the ‘disease’ is unemployment, and the medicine is the basic income received by the 2000 people in the randomly-selected treatment group. The Behavioural Insight Team (2012) and the European Commission (2013) recommend randomised controlled trials for use in public policymaking due to their objectivity. According to the European Commission’s behavioural research team, this experimental setting ensures accuracy by observing people ‘in their natural environment without any interference from observers’ (Van Bavel et al., 2013: 14). Similarly, Ta¨nk (2014) recommends randomised controlled trials in its first proposal for trialling with basic income. Considering the trial’s experimental setting, however, it is worth asking whether the ‘coercion through implication’ (Whitehead et al., 2018: 126) in randomised trials targeted at the most vulnerable members of society can be seen as objective in any way. Recent interviews of the consultants and Kela’s responsible researchers on the trial further complicate this question. In The Guardian, a researcher from Kela hints that Kela hopes [that] additional data that is being collected as part of the trial from healthcare records will provide useful information on whether the security of a guaranteed unconditional income [...] might have a positive impact on anxiety, prescription drug consumption or doctor’s visits. (Henley, 2018) This is an interpretation by the journalist, but documents on the trial vaguely describe the strategy to get information on the participants’ behavioural changes from the data collected by the National Social Insurance Institution (Kangas, 2016a). It seems that the availability of big data allows researchers to observe first and ask questions later (Davies, 2016: 234). The logic of experimentation thus neatly dovetails with the biopolitics of behaviourism. Indeed, the uses of randomised trials are deeply rooted in practical biopolitical imaginaries. The method was developed in the early 20th century when industrialisation subjected workers to scientific management and at the same time turned the working population into objects of statistical research used to calculate and prevent risks. Soon, trials were used to identify at-risk subjects by conducting behavioural and healthcare analyses of selected target groups, such as mental patients and prisoners (Edwards, 2007: 16–17). In the 21st century, these trials are increasingly used to evaluate public policy, blurring the boundaries between clinical medicine and policy-making processes, as in the Finnish experimental study with basic income. However, this is not the only boundary these trials cross: they also circumvent the hard methodological questions of medical and social research. The experimental reasoning wrapped in seemingly benign intentions and naı¨ve optimism about the use of big data allows for introducing various state-led nudge policies ‘which would otherwise seem entirely unreasonable, or even illegal’ (Davies, 2016: 235). Experimenting with basic income promises to increase well-being and health but it also normalises and enlarges the huge apparatuses of power used by the state to conduct the experiment. Whereas voluntary participation, a common method in empirical and sociological research, is considered to cause discrepancies in the data, randomised controlled trials are considered to yield hard, factual knowledge, building a valid basis for reforms and legislation (Haynes et al., 2012; Van Bavel et al., 2013). As Olli Kangas (2016b), a research director at the National Social Insurance Institution, states in his blog post: It would certainly be possible to carry out the experiment on the basis of voluntary participation, but such a design includes so many potential sources of error that we decided against it. A voluntary experiment is only the second-best experiment! Given these problematised uses of randomised controlled trial methods, the basic income experiment offers a window into how behaviourism merges with law and experimental economics, creating a channel to disseminate neuroliberal rationality to constitutive elements of democratic life (cf. Brown, 2015: 151; Foucault, 2008: 163). To conduct the trial, the Finnish Constitutional Law Committee had to bypass Article 7 of United Nations Document A/2929 (1955), prohibiting states from conducting medical and scientific experiments without the free consent of the individuals involved. Planners dismissed Article 7 as irrelevant as it is intended to prevent abuses in medical experiments, and this particular experiment with basic income is intended to increase well-being (Kangas and Pulkka, 2016: 84–6). Hard ethical questions regarding mandatory, state-led experiments on the unemployed thus were avoided with the rhetoric of good intentions and the technocratic emphasis on the importance of learning ‘what works’ in fast-policy interventions (see also Peck et al., 2012: 278–83). In randomised controlled trials, the powerful, dynamic word controlled serves as a rhetorical device to reduce criticism as it creates the impression of a solution-driven method to organise the disorganised in complex environments (Edwards, 2007). These trials thus rise above politics, although, as in the Finnish case, they are strategically used to support political aims. In so doing, the culture of experimental policy-making is believed to overcome governments’ social challenges with juridicaleconomic instruments and the naïve belief that behavioural economics offers technical solutions to structural problems. In the next section, I show how these technical and behavioural interventions utilise nudge politics to push individuals towards cost-effective, healthier paths.

2023 CNDI Kritik
Links › Topic Links › UBI

A UBI will allow the state to exert more control over its citizens

Bailey, ’16 (https://www.independent.co.uk/voices/the-basic-income-is-a-dangerous-idea-that-gives-the-state-power-to-control-every-penny-their-citizens-spend-a7030391.html)

From Canada to Switzerland, the idea of universal basic income (UBI) is gaining popularity. The Swiss are due to vote on the idea on 5 June this year. In the UK, the Green Party has flirted with the idea and Shadow Chancellor John McDonnell has expressed an interest, too. It sounds great – but the basic income changes the relationship between people and government in frightening ways. The benefits of a basic income appear straightforward: it allows us to fell our bloated welfare state in an instant. Rather than the tangle of different means-tested benefits and entitlements available today, everyone will be paid a basic income by the state, which should cover – or almost cover - the basic cost of living. Work, therefore, becomes an activity pursued to increase personal income. And yet the UBI actually expands the remit of the state. Replacing the welfare system will perhaps reduce the vast armies of bureaucrats recruited to administer the benefits system, but while the state – in bald terms of its size and cost – may shrink, the role of the state will expand. This is troubling. The impact of welfare cuts: With UBI, ever citizen will rely, at least in part, on his or her income being handed out by the state. Rather than there existing pockets of state dependency, all of us will become (albeit to differing degrees) dependent. The state will now have a role in topping up everyone’s pay packet. Instead of the state playing a role within society and the economy, where private action is inadequate (for schooling and healthcare, for example), and as a safety net of last resort (as the welfare state was originally conceived,) it becomes an manager and provider for all. It will become a constant fixture of the financial lives of us all, a sort of lifetime employer. The implications are huge. At a time where the way we live our lives and our consumption habits have become the constant, nagging concern of the state – from minimum prices for alcohol to the ‘sugar tax’ – there the worrying potential for a basic income to be used to enforce a change in people’s spending habits and lifestyle. Universal basic income goes to public vote in Switzerland Observe how commentators observe that someone claiming social benefits may be spending a portion of this income on cigarettes, alcohol or gambling. In the US, for example, welfare payments are often made in food stamps, redeemable only for items the state considers essential. In an age of increasing lifestyle regulation, a basic income would open the door to increased state diktat. At the same time, the state will essentially step into the role of subsidising business. To a lesser extent, this already happens today. There are already low-income jobs in the US where workers rely on food stamps to supplement their incomes. In the UK, many low-paid workers require housing benefit to keep a roof over their heads. UBI would not eliminate this problem but extend it: the primary role of the state will be to top up its citizens’ pay packets and pensions. Now Canada is trying a basic income, Britain can ignore it no longer. Many economists observe that when it comes to wages, the floor price is often determined by the cost of the workers' ability to survive from day-to-day. That is, that they must pay at least the bare minimum in order for the workers to seek out some sort of shelter, and acquire at least some sustenance in order for them to return to work the next day. Not anymore: with a basic income, the state will guarantee everyone’s basic ability to survive from one day to the next. And so work, however skilled, will potentially pay less. If workers are able to to survive on lower wages, with business now rely on wage subsidy by the state, then businesses will expand their profit margins thanks to the intervention of the state. Is that what we want? It may appear utopian, but the basic income will change the relationship between the citizen and the state significantly – and not in the ways we might hope.

2023 CNDI Kritik
Links › Topic Links › Tax

Taxing is an expansion of the state with threatens individual freedom

Rosembuj 23 (Tulio Rosembuj, University of Barcelona, Department of Public Economy, Political Economy and Spanish Economy, 4-29-2023, "Foucault and Fiscal Governmentality," No Publication, https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=4433233, 13-15) @HA?

II.2. From the Police State to the State Police. The tax is a direct expression of the supremacy of the State, be it police or heir to the liberal sovereignist continuity. The tax manifests political power and the continuous and regular subjection of the citizen to the reason of State, to acts of authority. The standard contribution is essential for maintaining the armed forces, security, and administrative expenses. The tax administration is statistical capital of privileged information. It supposes the accounting, the verification of private wealth, the file, the evaluation of the assets, the resolution of disputes, and, as P. Bourdieu points out, the accumulation of an immense capital of information (statistics) because there is no tax without knowledge of social wealth and the force that sustains it and makes it effective. A secret knowledge that confers more power to the one who obtains it and uses it either for his preservation or as a direction against the adversaries.25 The fiscal laws are qualified as observation police laws necessary for safeguarding the country's political organization. They are considered a manifestation of State sovereignty and of actual application to whoever is in the territory. 14 The tax power is considered analogous to police power and with strictly unilateral effects. It is a public order benefit to satisfy the financial needs of the public administration.26 The expected contributions are necessary resources to subsidize the reason of State in diplomatic, military, or police matters. Tax collection grew exponentially starting in the 18th century. The Administration perfects the coercive power of the State that does not resent the privatization of its rustic, industrial, and commercial property. Fiscal power is like police power, and its effect is strictly unilateral. The general duty to contribute to public spending is the taxpayer's pure public order duty. Civic misconduct, including non-payment of the tax or resistance, was identified as a disturbance of public order. The fiscal power of the authority had no effective legal limitation and regularly exercised the regulatory coup d'état(Foucault). The law is the theoretical domain of the patrimonial and personal security freedoms, and its development and performance remain the domain of the Administration. "L'impôt is necessairement lié a la forcé qui le fonde et qui le rend possible. Ces opérations inévitables de violence n´avaient de chance de succès qu´autant that le pouvoir contributeur and engageait clearly are prestige et sa légitimé".27 The administrative power pervades the performance of the tax. And it is no coincidence that its legal interpretation is based on the Administration's right to its application, ignoring any configuration of the legal relationship that obliges it with the generic protection of the taxpayer. The legality principle during the liberal autocracy runs into internal obstacles, firstly, the elitist democracy resulting from the restriction of the electoral census and the vote and, secondly, the exclusive rights to ownership of legislative representation. The form of the tax law prevails over the acceptance, approval, and surveillance of public contribution (consent). The reason of State, the tax, is an unforeseen threat in the liberal autocracy, not so much because of democratic legislation, which does not exist, but much due to the expansion of administrative, fiscal power as a threat to the guarantee of patrimonial freedom. It is the moment when the bureaucracies and judiciary elites (state nobility) develop their interests and influence throughout the State. 15 Fiscal power is part of the reason of State, and, like penal punitive power, it is on the verge of threatening individual freedom in a broad sense.

2023 CNDI Kritik
Links › Topic Links › Tax

Tax is a manifestation of state control and subjugation

Rosembuj 23 (Tulio Rosembuj, University of Barcelona, Department of Public Economy, Political Economy and Spanish Economy, 4-29-2023, "Foucault and Fiscal Governmentality," No Publication, https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=4433233, 14-15) @HA?

II.2. From the Police State to the State Police. The tax is a direct expression of the supremacy of the State, be it police or heir to the liberal sovereignist continuity. The tax manifests political power and the continuous and regular subjection of the citizen to the reason of State, to acts of authority. The standard contribution is essential for maintaining the armed forces, security, and administrative expenses. The tax administration is statistical capital of privileged information. It supposes the accounting, the verification of private wealth, the file, the evaluation of the assets, the resolution of disputes, and, as P. Bourdieu points out, the accumulation of an immense capital of information (statistics) because there is no tax without knowledge of social wealth and the force that sustains it and makes it effective. A secret knowledge that confers more power to the one who obtains it and uses it either for his preservation or as a direction against the adversaries.25 The fiscal laws are qualified as observation police laws necessary for safeguarding the country's political organization. They are considered a manifestation of State sovereignty and of actual application to whoever is in the territory. 14 The tax power is considered analogous to police power and with strictly unilateral effects. It is a public order benefit to satisfy the financial needs of the public administration.26 The expected contributions are necessary resources to subsidize the reason of State in diplomatic, military, or police matters. Tax collection grew exponentially starting in the 18th century. The Administration perfects the coercive power of the State that does not resent the privatization of its rustic, industrial, and commercial property. Fiscal power is like police power, and its effect is strictly unilateral. The general duty to contribute to public spending is the taxpayer's pure public order duty. Civic misconduct, including non-payment of the tax or resistance, was identified as a disturbance of public order. The fiscal power of the authority had no effective legal limitation and regularly exercised the regulatory coup d'état(Foucault). The law is the theoretical domain of the patrimonial and personal security freedoms, and its development and performance remain the domain of the Administration. "L'impôt is necessairement lié a la forcé qui le fonde et qui le rend possible. Ces opérations inévitables de violence n´avaient de chance de succès qu´autant that le pouvoir contributeur and engageait clearly are prestige et sa légitimé".27 The administrative power pervades the performance of the tax. And it is no coincidence that its legal interpretation is based on the Administration's right to its application, ignoring any configuration of the legal relationship that obliges it with the generic protection of the taxpayer. The legality principle during the liberal autocracy runs into internal obstacles, firstly, the elitist democracy resulting from the restriction of the electoral census and the vote and, secondly, the exclusive rights to ownership of legislative representation. The form of the tax law prevails over the acceptance, approval, and surveillance of public contribution (consent). The reason of State, the tax, is an unforeseen threat in the liberal autocracy, not so much because of democratic legislation, which does not exist, but much due to the expansion of administrative, fiscal power as a threat to the guarantee of patrimonial freedom. It is the moment when the bureaucracies and judiciary elites (state nobility) develop their interests and influence throughout the State. 15 Fiscal power is part of the reason of State, and, like penal punitive power, it is on the verge of threatening individual freedom in a broad sense

2023 CNDI Kritik
Links › Topic Links › Tax

Double bind: Either progressive taxes don’t have the revenue to pay for the aff or states implement regressive taxes that don’t solve for inequality.

Kiser and Karceski 17 (Edgar Kiser and Steven M. Karceski, Professors of Sociology at the University of Washington, “Political Economy of Taxation,” Annual Review of Political Science, Vol. 20, May 2017, https://www.annualreviews.org/doi/10.1146/annurev-polisci-052615-025442) SM

The trend toward declining progressivity, which began in Northern European social democracies and is now spreading, is caused by several factors. First, progressivity causes increasing administrative problems in the globalized economy. The rich have opportunities to avoid and evade taxes by moving assets across national borders in ways that working-class taxpayers cannot, so countries that rely more on taxing the rich receive less net tax revenue (Lockhart 2003, Prasad 2012, p. 170). Second, highly progressive tax systems promote and reinforce adversarial class relations, which result in lower revenue (Beramendi & Rueda 2007, Prasad 2006), so states interested in increasing their tax revenue (in this era of high state debt that is becoming increasingly necessary) are forced to use more regressive taxes. Third, and part of this adversarial fiscal culture, Martin (2013) has shown that policy proposals to increase progressivity are often met by resistance from the rich and that these “rich people's movements” are often successful in blocking progressivity. Finally, Scheve & Stasavage (2016) note that the causal mechanism responsible for the initial rise of progressivity, mass conscription for war, is unlikely to occur again in the era of drone warfare. For all of these reasons, the decline of progressive taxation is likely to continue.

2023 CNDI Kritik
Links › Topic Links › Tax

“Fair” taxation only distracts from state control over citizens’ lives

Spornik et al 21 (Alexander P. Spornik, Maksim V. Ilichev, Sergey A. Malenko, Andrey G. Nekita, “Biopolitical Framework For Socially Fair And Effective Taxation,” “Perishable and Eternal: Mythologies and Social Technologies of a Digital Civilization,” 12/3/21, https://www.europeanproceedings.com/article/10.15405/epsbs.2021.12.03.35) SM

Taxation, for all its necessity and usefulness for the economy, will always remain another instrument of violence on the part of the state, even if the payment of taxes by all participants in social relations ceases to be understood as an inevitable evil. Modern social trends, on the one hand, require minimizing violence from the state, which has set a course for democratic values, ensuring the rule of law and respecting the rule of law in all spheres. On the other hand, the demand is growing not only for economic efficiency, but also for social justice, including in the area of ​​taxes. The tax policy of the state, therefore, should be based on the idea of a fair redistribution of income. Taking into account the principles of fairness in the formation of the tax policy of the state will create a situation in which citizens will be satisfied (since the tax burden is reduced) and become more tolerant of public policy in general. In these conditions, the overall productivity should also increase: if you create the necessary working conditions for the employee, this will increase his motivation, and, consequently, the return and productivity. Those in power remain in a double win: firstly, the growth of tax revenues to the state budget allows them to expand their ability to influence citizens (fewer financial constraints, which means more flexible management is possible); secondly, the image of managers as “fair government” has been created and maintained, although in fact, they are pursuing their own interests. Thus, a situation arises when both parties to the social contract win, striving for different (and to some extent even opposite) goals.

2023 CNDI Kritik
Links › Topic Links › Tax

Taxes serve to normalize governmentality, creating economic subjects while masking exploitation and inequality

Rosembuj 23 (Tulio Rosembuj, University of Barcelona, Department of Public Economy, Political Economy and Spanish Economy, 4-29-2023, "Foucault and Fiscal Governmentality," No Publication, https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=4433233, 22-) @HA?

The core of normalization is the economization of life, including the intimate and particular spheres of each one. There is no other reason for government than that of the market. The commodification turns into metaphysics any moral imposition of justice, social equality, and solidarity. The entrepreneur finds his motivation in his selfish interest, and his selfesteem grows with the satisfaction of his interest, with no more economic rationale than his own decision. Thus, his throne of interest leads him to the throne of sacrifice because he perceives as disadvantages the protection of public presence, cooperation or solidarity with others, or the legal regulation of the toxic competition of extreme powers of multinationals, digital, financial banking system (oligopolies, concentration, globalization). The tax must be per the market economy and companies. The mass taxpayers with fewer resources, consumers, workers, or small owners are outside the circuit. The tax system not only preserves the game from gamers who avoid or evade it but also causes the fiscal impoverishment of low-income people. Ultimately, they end up supporting taxes higher than they receive from the Public Treasury. The poor pay taxes over the transfers they receive, often taking them below the poverty line. The paradox of the belief in the universality and homogeneity of the tax system explains the lack of knowledge that those who barely demonstrate the ability to pay to contribute more than those who have more. Fiscal impoverishment arises when people experiencing poverty are poorer because of the taxes charged to them over the tax benefits they receive. This is the experience on salaries or sales tax. A. Jurow Kleiman is right when she argues that fiscal impoverishment violates human dignity because it damages people's physical and emotional wellbeing and worsens their social exclusion.37 The tax becomes a price for the enjoyment of public goods or services that only those who use or enjoy them pay. The tax is not a tax on the ability to pay off those who have the most, but the use and enjoyment of public goods of those with less power of disposal. The security devices, the practical reason of the government, set the limits to preaching freedom and controls or sanctions to its application without risks or dangers. Individual freedom cannot exist without orderly and consented intervention, and democracy is a danger as long as it is not limited to the regulatory form of prices. The most significant risk is the security device of the sovereign state of exception that creates its order without right: the illegality of the law. "When (Foucault ) speaks to us of illegalisms, he indicates that every legislative device has contemplated some reserved spaces in which the law can be violated, others in which it can be ignored and finally, still others in which infractions can be punished. " 38 Tax evasion is the first sign of violation of the law, and avoidance or aggressive tax planning is the second sign of law refusal that can be without consequences. The legal tax system transfers the tax burden on third parties, consumers, or workers. The tax is redistributive in the opposite direction to what is declared and hides its effects to avoid debate among those affected. The impact of the tax burden is a legal and economic privilege of the enterprise and owner, and 37 its transfer is a sophisticated instrument of difference between the types of nominal taxes and the effective ones. The art of neoliberal government makes an art of the culture of danger. The culture of danger depends on the success or failure of each one, their ambition in the market, and the cultivation of their economic interests. The greatest threat is those who do not even pass the property, wealth, or orderly behavior test in the social system and throw normalized society into disorder. The danger comes from the poor, not the de facto inequality supporting those who enjoy economic, social, and political power. Inequality results from the lack of each individual and the natural order of the market. Competition demands its maximum guarantee to avoid the overreach of democracy and the arbitrary interference of the State. The liberal order is the victim of a crisis of governmentality (social, economic, and political turmoil) when the economic cost of liberties is higher than its results and the safety devices of the life of the population break. The crisis of governmentality imposes a return to the defense at all costs of sovereignty as a last resort against "dangerous accidents", the return to legal absolutism, through or despite the law, and, in the end, the alternative to urgency and the exception of the rule of law. Autocracy, exception, and urgency inspire discipline, not normalization, without the adherence and consensus of the population and the east shore of coercion. Neoliberal power stems from the patronage of the center of political information that allows it to disseminate its purposes on the social group, distant and different, from exercising its totalizing control over the population. Its principles convert ideology into a diffuse, dispersed social practice covering all community segments. The internalization of freedom as possible for all equally is the great triumph of liberal rationality. At its feet are the ruins of the redistribution of wealth, fiscal progressivity, taxation, and public spending resulting from justice. They are indirect government mechanisms that make up a scenario subject to acceptance, not necessarily linked to coercion or force. Neoliberal success is consummated in social consensus as inevitable from its statements that indicate its conceptual construction as reality.39 Foucault's project is an anticipatory statement of what will come later. The normalization society turns government techniques into social practices: the individual is an effect of power. Normalization prevents what happens now with digitalization. And if the crisis comes, as the Covid pandemic teaches, the resource is directed to the sovereign exception. 39 PThe security device is the flexible and punctual attention of governmentality to what it does or does not do and its effects on its own conduct and the conduct of others. "The device is this: a set of strategies of power relations that condition certain types of knowledge and are conditioned by them".40 The device is the establishment of the rules of information, calculation, evaluation, and file, which express the will of the government of power, as an examination of the risks that face and the solutions that it proposes to have social acceptance. The keys have no other cause than the conservation and maintenance of the power of the government over the population. The mass taxpayer complies with the tax obligation for which he is responsible because he thinks in terms of the general interest; that is how he is taught and is educated, even though his contribution to public spending replaces those of those who have a more remarkable ability to pay and receive the most relevant public expenditure to preserve and increase their wealth. And he thinks about it because he does not develop a convincing systemic alternative that would persuade him of the opposite. The device describes the plot of power, the political reasonableness of the government decision, and the achievement of its purposes. And it conceals the explicit political will when appropriate or makes it appear otherwise. Its elements are not evident or textual; they can be hidden or mute and extend to every one of the activities that it undertakes. Income from work, consumers, small business people, or owners is the compliance network under a tax discourse that covers non-compliance with income from capital, from the company, from tax erosion, large estates and companies, and the privileged attribution of tax benefits and public expenditure. Technologies of power and strategies constitute the core of networks of security devices. The disciplines do not produce coercion but disciplinary normalization, modes of subjectivization aimed at creating individuals according to the aspirations of those who dictate them, that is, individuals who think that what they do is the work of their effort, not of others that guide and lead them, techniques and procedures to direct human behavior. Statistics was the first link in the knowledge of the population by the government (biopolitics), followed by its programs, calculations, devices, documents, and processes; the practices of private experts and professional corporations in budgets, audits, accounting practices, references of conduct in business activities, profession, trades, inspection. The technical norms that benefit market agents and that later spread as a mandatory stain on all taxpayers; balance sheets, accounting statements, 40 profit and loss, and deductions. Reference tax guides (benchmarks) are an invaluable learning mechanism for the worker, the consumer, and the farmer explaining they are the object of fiscal extraction, not shared by the taxpayers with more significant resources. However, they use their language, syntax, lexicon without discussion. Governmentality reaches all social domains and facilitates the governmentality of people. Liberalism manages to transport its values at a distance over others according to its schemes and norms, thus becoming selfambitions or own judgments of the recipients as if there were no other truth. The sovereignty of the police State adds a technology of power and a development strategy that has as its center social normalization, disciplines, and the order of coexistence, founded on a discourse of power that is present everywhere and the highest governmentality police sovereignty to their safety. "Each practice for the conduct of conduct implies authorities, aspirations, strategies, the invention or new techniques or technologies."41 There is no technology of power nor a power relationship without a truthful discourse. Without truth, power remains naked as a mere relationship of force, dominance, and submission. The new economy of power seeks the growth of the forces subjected and the strength and effectiveness of those who submit to them. The truth is the market and the production of liberties under security devices that prevent its uncontrolled and disorderly growth or threaten established power and force relations.

2023 CNDI Kritik
Links › Topic Links › Social Security

Social security is an extension of neoliberal control that renders its participants in a state of bare life where they are merely a unit of labour to be used by the government

Garrett ‘18

(Paul Michael Garrett, Senior Lecturer Dept. of Pol. Science & Soc. Galway University Affiliation, 9-17-2018, "Revisiting ‘The Birth of Biopolitics’: Foucault's Account of Neoliberalism and the Remaking of Social Policy," Cambridge Core, https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/journal-of-social-policy/article/abs/revisiting-the-birth-of-biopolitics-foucaults-account-of-neoliberalism-and-the-remaking-of-social-policy/7DF99E21282AA855D0541D470A02B46D, accessed 7-12-2023) //OC

This form of neoliberalism was not – as some were subsequently to argue – a project aiming to ‘roll back the state’ leaving people entirely to the whims of an unregulated market (Garrett, 2009). Neoliberal ‘governmental intervention is no less dense, frequent, active, and continuous than in any other system’ (p. 145). What occurs, however, is a reconstitution or remaking of the state, which becomes more vigilant and active in promoting the market economy. Neoliberalism departs not only from the classical liberalism of the nineteenth century but is also at odds with what Foucault terms ‘contemporary American anarcho-capitalism’ (p. 133). As advocated by its West German and Austrian proponents, neoliberalism is a ‘positive’ and ‘intervening liberalism’ (p. 133): an evolving form in which ‘economic processes and institutional framework call on each other, modify and shape each other in ceaseless reciprocity’ (p. 164). The transformations willed by these neoliberals are associated with a novel ‘governmental style’ (p. 133) entailing different kinds of regulatory and ‘organizing’ actions (p. 138). Setting themselves firmly against Keynesianism, the promulgators of this new form of liberalism argued that there are instances where the state should emphatically not intervene: namely, there should be no substantial state intervention to respond to, and alleviate hardships prompted by, unemployment. Within this perspective, an unemployed person should never be perceived as a ‘social victim’ (p. 139). Foreshadowing the later lexicon on so-called ‘jobseekers’, the unemployed person was better understood as merely a ‘worker in transit . . . in transit between an unprofitable activity and more profitable activity’ (p. 139; see also GOV.UK, 2014). Relatedly, social policy should not ‘function like a compensatory mechanism for absorbing or nullifying the possible destructive effects of the market’ (p. 160). Rather, the role of social policy should be one of facilitating market processes. As Foucault remarks: there must be those who work and those who don’t, there must be big salaries and small salaries, and also prices must rise and fall. Consequently, a social policy with the objective of even relative equalization, even a relative evening out, can only be anti-economic. Social policy cannot have equality as its objective. On the contrary, it must let inequality function (p. 143). Social transfers – social security benefits – should be available, but only to provide a very basic ‘minimum’ for those who are not ‘able to ensure their own existence’ (p. 143). Central here is the ‘idea that the economy is a game’ with the state merely aspiring to safeguard ‘players from being excluded from the game’ (p. 202). Above this threshold, ‘everyone will have to be an enterprise for himself and his family’ (p. 206). More pervasively, this will be a society ‘formalized on the model’ of ‘competitive enterprise’ (p. 206). Echoing Marxist analysis, Foucault asserts, however, that there will continue to exist a ‘kind of infra- and supraliminal floating population, a liminal population which, for an economy that has abandoned the objective of full employment, will be a constant reserve of manpower which can be drawn on if need be, but which can also be returned to its assisted status if necessary’ (p. 206); see also Marx (1990 [1867]): 794). This ‘floating population’ will be enabled ‘to live, after a fashion, and to live in such a way’ that it can ‘always be available for possible work, if market conditions require it’ (p. 207): an articulation, which describes the predicament of those now often referred to as the ‘precariat’ (Gill and Pratt, 2008). Governments must not, therefore, ‘form a counterpoint or a screen . . . between society and economic processes’ (p. 145). Neither must they seek to ‘correct the destructive effects of the market on society’ (p.145). The core function of governments, according to this radical neoliberal analysis, is ‘to intervene on society so that competitive mechanisms can play a regulatory role at every moment and every point in society’ thus ensuring ‘a general regulation of society by the market’ (p. 145). As the quintessential anti-Beveridge blueprint, neoliberal society is unencumbered from the responsibility of ‘guarantee[ing] individuals against risks, whether these are individual risks, like illness or accidents, or collective risks, like damage, for example’ (p. 144). The only task for the ‘society, or rather the economy’, will be to maintain the rule of law and to ensure that every ‘individual has sufficient income to be able, either directly or as an individual, or through the collective means of mutual benefit organizations, to insure himself against existing risks, or the risks of life, the inevitability of old age and death, on the basis of his private reserves’ (p. 144, emphasis added).

2023 CNDI Kritik
Links › Topic Links › Social Security

Social Security seeks to re-entrench state control and maintain insecurity

Koch 21 (Insa Koch, Associate Professor and Director of Anthropology and Law Program at London School of Economics, Aaron Reeves, Associate Professor in the Department of Social Policy and Intervention at the University of Oxford, 3-25-2021, "From social security to state-sanctioned insecurity: How welfare reform mimics the commodification of labour through greater state intervention," Economy and Society, 50:3, Taylor & Francis, https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/03085147.2020.1844936, 449-450) @HA?

The organizing logic of social security systems is currently marked by a tension. On the one hand, unlike the ‘classical’ arrangements of high-income post-war welfare states, social security policy is no longer framed primarily in terms of decommodifying labour and collectivizing the risks associated with capitalism (Esping-Andersen, 1990). Instead, it is predominantly seen through its potential to create unsustainable public spending and high levels of public debt, or its unintended impact on welfare dependency (Hills, 2014). This discursive shift toward welfare state retrenchment is manifest in reforms which have reduced government spending, recommodified labour, and privatized risks by reconfiguring the conditions of entitlements and the structure of financial support (Hills, 2011; Pierson, 1994; Timmins, 2017). On the other hand, however, implementing welfare state retrenchment has been far from easy (Hacker, 2004). Indeed, in many ways the basic contours of the social policy landscape remain relatively unchanged. This is particularly true if we look at overall public expenditure on social policies for most high-income countries, even those considered to be more liberal (or more commodified), such as the United Kingdom. This is because cuts are difficult to implement, as harms are typically concentrated on vulnerable groups, whereas the benefits politicians accrue by implementing such cuts are diffuse (Pierson, 1994). In this paper, we analyse the design and implementation of Universal Credit (UC) in the United Kingdom to illustrate how this tension – between the resistance to privatizing risks and the costs associated with welfare dependency – gets instantiated. UC has been described as ‘one of the boldest and most radical reforms since Beveridge’ because it streamlines the system of existing benefits, bringing together six different forms of social security into a single form of welfare (Timmins, 2017). This streamlining was intended to ‘activate’ citizens (moving them into employment) by making it easier to move between out-ofwork and in-work benefits (Hills, 2014). But UC does not merely institutionalize a mantra of ‘active citizenship’ (Reeves & Loopstra, 2017). On the contrary, we show the uneven, chaotic and at times outright disastrous effects of the rollout of this most recent wave of welfare reforms. As people become unable to meet its requirements, they fall foul of the system of conditionality and sanctions, which is ultimately pushing many away from the labour market, while at the same time communities that have already been harshly hit by a decade of austerity are further destabilized by the individualizing effects of a new digital welfare state. Drawing upon a mixed-methods analysis that brings together existing quantitative research with original qualitative fieldwork, we argue that the efforts of politicians and policymakers to place ‘active citizenship’ more squarely at the heart of welfare states has fostered the kinds of insecurities commonly associated with commodifying labour, all while leaving the state’s involvement in the lives of those affected largely intact. Unable to simply reduce welfare spending or recommodify labour entirely, policymakers have engaged in a process Thelen (2003) calls ‘conversion’, whereby the purposes of a policy or an institution are remade. In the context of UC, this means existing systems of social security are being reconstituted with the consequence that the machinery of the state is now assuming an ever more central role in creating uncertainty. Welfare conversion is not merely ‘privatising risks’, however, by exposing citizens to the insecurities associated with the market. Rather, we argue that these reforms are turning the state itself into the creator of certain risks by converting (whether intentionally or not) social security into a form of state-sanctioned social insecurity. This happens as particular state interventions – including those relating to work-related conditionality, sanctions, and the digitalization of the welfare state – have disproportionately affected some of the most vulnerable members of the population and further weakened the capacities for collective resistance in communities that have been most severely affected by welfare reforms.

2023 CNDI Kritik
Links › Topic Links › Social Security

Social Security is part of a system of mass compliance which excuses the rich in favor of controlling the poor

Rosembuj 23 (Tulio Rosembuj, University of Barcelona, Department of Public Economy, Political Economy and Spanish Economy, 4-29-2023, "Foucault and Fiscal Governmentality," No Publication, https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=4433233, 20-22) @HA?

The rationality of the liberal government. The truth of liberal power, from its origin, orders superiority over the public monopolies of physical and fiscal violence to preserve its preeminence in the market and of the market, in the configuration of the legal apparatus and the dispersion of the statements that mask it. Its concrete expression follows the course of the predominance of private monopolies in the rise and influence of the economic system and technological innovations. The winners of each Schumpeterian creative destruction gain supremacy over the others and lose it in the next one, from the steam engine, transportation, heavy industry, and financial system, to current digitization. The political question says Foucault is not accidental; it is the truth itself. Political rationality is a genetic discourse of markets, laws, jurisprudence, and nake population. Liberal rationality is a synthesis of the economization of power, extended to people around the market's interest and individuals, which adjusts according to new technological circumstances. The enterprise is the binder of governmentality because it brings together the concept of unlimited freedom of economic initiative of maximum benefit in the shortest time. The bourgeoisie, in a general sense and some of its parts, in particular, do not have a high understanding of social compliance: the ruling class, says M.Duverger, manages to escape the tax, not as much as before with the nobility, but quite widely. This evasion seeks the satisfaction of certain social classes with political power while pretending to subject them to the same laws as other citizens, which is untrue.34 The sociological law formulated by G. Jeze describes that the ruling class, in all regimes, tends to evade the tax burden and pass on its commitment to society. Failure to comply with tax duties, social obligations, labor, environmental, and social security responsibility is the counterpart of mass compliance, supported by the standardization society, remote action, security devices, and power technology. A country's political system is neither neutral nor impartial to the class that economically predominates, which determines the structure and scope of the fiscal system and is causally unpredictable in the face of the emergence of new private monopolies and the disappearance of the old ones. A. Puviani maintains that: "The State reveals itself in its intimate composition as an aggregate of forces aimed at the defense and development of a part of society, against the rest of it; The Public Treasury is a process of political activity aimed at removing from society the necessary means for the triumph of the interests of a part of it." 35 B.Griziotti establishes that financial activity has a political character, not an economic one in the strict sense, and its purposes are political, a fact that derives from the very nature of the public subject. Public purposes are not subsidiary to the interests of dominant groups, classes, or individuals. The State has autonomy, and its time is longer than anyone aspires to its perpetual control. In other words, the State is independent of the classes even when it may be a transitory victim of their parasitism or deviation from general interests in favor of those who govern: "The purposes of the State are not those of the dominant person or caste that seizes the government or the coercive power of the State to defend their particular interests, even if this happens… that go beyond the specific purposes of their rulers. "36 The purpose of the State is political, not exclusively economic. In the development of the Public Treasury, interfere with the game of the social forces that aspire to the hegemony of their means and ends over those of other interests that they judge less than their own of their particular interests, above the collective good. The democratic transformation has its first challenge in the tax system, taxes, procedures, and the application of resources and in the pre-distribution through the private law of property and contracts, and the second challenge is to transform social needs into public goods. That is a progressive tax system.

2023 CNDI Kritik
Links › Topic Links › Public Health

The aff’s expansion of Medicare is an example of the state’s investment in the individual’s health in order to maximize revenue streams based in human capital.

Kenny ’15 [Katherine Kenny is currently finishing her PhD in Sociology and Science Studies at the University of California, San Diego. She studies the politics of knowledge production in policy relevant science, “The biopolitics of global health: Life and death in neoliberal time,” Journal of Sociology, August 2015, https://sci-hub.live/10.1177/1440783314562313] [A.G]

Becker (1962: 9) defined human capital as those ‘activities that influence future real income through the imbedding of resources in people’ including the2 knowledge, skills, dispositions and health that are embodied in people that make them economically productive. Some of the ways to invest in one’s human capital, Becker argued ‘include schooling, on-the-job training, medical care, vitamin consumption, and acquiring information about the economic system’ (1962: 9). These investments vary in their relative effects on earnings, that is, in their relative return on investment. ‘But all improve the physical and mental abilities of people and thereby raise real income prospects’ (Becker, 1962: 9). The epistemic underpinnings of human capital theory, then, inevitably invoke a neoliberal political rationality in which an economic lens is applied across the entirety of human existence and, importantly, practices of individual self-investment are privileged over welfare state provision. While Becker acknowledged the importance of health as a form of human capital, the concept was more fully theorized by Becker’s student Michael Grossman (1972, 2004). He conceptualized health as something consumers demand for two reasons. First, as a consumption commodity it ‘enters into their preference functions’, that is, people prefer a state of health over a state of ill health. Second, and importantly for the argument here, health is conceptualized as an investment commodity because it ‘determines the total amount of time available for market and nonmarket activities … [such that] an increase in the stock of health reduces the time lost from these activities’ (i.e. time away from market and non-market activities) (Grossman, 1972: 225). Health as a site of investment yields life, here configured as a form of time. The return on investment in health as human capital is an increased dividend of time. The monetary value of increased life-astime, or, conversely, the ‘monetary value of the reduction [of lost productive time]’ Grossman continued, ‘is an index of the return to an investment in health’ (1972: 225). Investing in one’s health extends the duration of possible participation in market and non-market activity, and maximizes the term over which investment in one’s human capital can be realized. Premature death represents the foreshortening of the term of investment. Health, on the other hand, extends life. But figuring health as a form of human capital results in the reconceptualization of life a revenue stream. With health as human capital, and lifetimes disaggregated into life/time, life is reassembled as a revenue stream. But perhaps more worryingly, premature death becomes not just a foreshortening of time, but a form of failed investment, or, more accurately, a failure to self-invest. Grossman explains: “[I]t is assumed that individuals inherit an initial stock of health that depreciates over time – at an increasing rate, at least after some stage in the life cycle – and can be increased by investment. Death occurs when the stock falls below a certain level, and one of the novel features of the model is that individuals ‘choose’ their length of life.” (Grossman, 1972: 225) With health imagined as a form of human capital, the length of one’s life becomes the result of investing, or failing to invest, in one’s own health. Death is no longer a disease outcome, it is rendered a decision outcome; a decision outcome that the future-oriented, risk-minimizing economically maximizing rational actor should, obviously, avoid through self-optimizing practices of investing in one’s own health. This rendering of health as human capital, the disaggregation of lifetimes into life/time and reassembly of life as a revenue stream presupposes a neoliberal homo oeconomicus who must optimize their own health in the present in order secure future life/time. This conceptualization of the length of life as a consumer choice can be seen in the DALY metric’s use of a standard life expectancy table. Despite the egalitarian principle behind the standard life expectancy, when the duration of life is conceptualized as resulting from individual investment choices, entire high-mortality populations are recast as failed investors; as having failed to invest adequately in their own stock of health capital. Of course, individuals choose their length of life to approximately the same degree that they choose where they are born. Any rational actor would choose to be born amidst a low mortality population; every homo oeconomicus should invest in their own health so as to ensure maximal life expectancy. But recasting life expectancy as an investment choice locates it firmly within the territory of individual agency, with the result that individuals born amidst high-mortality populations are immediately rendered failed investors. When cast in the light of human capital theory, the ‘egalitarian principle’ involved in the DALY metric’s use of a standard life table starts to look far less egalitarian. The DALY metric was conceived in a broadly egalitarian spirit and designed for the purposes of carrying out cost–benefit analyses of potential health interventions so as to design emerging health systems according to a logic of economic optimization. But more than just facilitating cost–benefit analyses, the DALY metric accomplishes an economization of life itself by disaggregating lifetimes into component units of life-as-time and reassembling life as revenue stream to be maximized through practices of self- investment in one’s own health, configured here as human capital. Death, on the other hand, results from a failure to self-invest appropriately; it is not a disease outcome but rather a decision outcome. Death, on the logic of the DALY metric, results from the unsuccessful entrepreneurial management of the self, the ultimate failure of neoliberal homo oeconomicus. Conclusion The World Bank’s World Development Report 1993: Investing in Health, is frequently identified as a key moment in the transition from international to global health. In this article, I located the epistemological origins of this historical shift in a less-known aspect of the Investing in Health report: its introduction of the DALY metric. But to engage with the epistemological side of this history is not to eschew its material effects: the introduction of the DALY metric has profoundly shaped the terrain of global health over the past 25 years. For example, it was upon reading the World Development Report 1993: Investing in Health that Bill Gates decided to invest his philanthropic billions in the cause of global health (Norheim, 2014). And it was according to the logic of DALY calculations that the Gates Foundation has prioritized its own global health spending. Upon her election to the post of Director General of the WHO in 1998, Dr Gro Harlem Brundtland adopted Investing in Health as her ‘roadmap’ to reforming the WHO in order to reassert its central place within the new neoliberal global health landscape (Chorev, 2012). The priorities of the WHO in the intervening period have been shaped by the global burden of disease, calculated in DALYs, as well as the availability of cost–effective interventions. Examples include the creation of the WHO’s Framework Convention on Tobacco Control, the world’s first legally binding public health treaty, and increased attention to the burden of non-communicable diseases more generally (Kenny, forthcoming). The DALY metric was initially conceived as a new summary measure of population health that could incorporate both mortality and morbidity into a single unit of analysis and facilitate cost–benefit analyses for the purposes of designing health systems according to a logic of economic maximization. But, as I have argued here, the DALY metric accomplishes an economization of life by disaggregating lifetimes into component units of time and reassembling life as a revenue stream to be maximized through practices of self-investment in one’s own health – configured here as human capital. Life is reimagined as time and the individual as a neoliberal homo oeconomicus, as an entrepreneur of the self. Death is recast from a disease outcome to a decision outcome and represents the personal failure of a neoliberal homo oeconomicus. In contrast to its seemingly objective simple presentation, I have argue that the DALY metric is best conceived as a biopolitical technology of power that underpins the contemporary neoliberal global health regime.

2023 CNDI Kritik
Links › Topic Links › Infrastructure

Infrastructure is more than just pipes and cables, it must be seen in a sociotechnical view.

Olbertreis et al 16 [Julia, Timothy Moss, Peter P. Mollinga, Christine Bichsel, “Water, Infrastructure and Political Rule: Introduction to the Special Issue,” https://www.water-alternatives.org/index.php/alldoc/articles/vol9/v9issue2/311-a9-2-1/file?auid=132, Ing]

Our understanding of what infrastructure is and does has undergone radical change since Wittfogel’s days. The most significant shift is that infrastructures, today, are generally viewed as being sociotechnical, rather than merely technical. Building on insight from science and technology studies, social scientists and historians are in wide agreement that an infrastructure system for, say, water irrigation or supply cannot be reduced to its material/physical components alone. Instead, it needs to be seen as a combination of technical artefacts, regulatory frameworks, cultural norms, environmental flows, funding mechanisms, governance forms, etc. that get configured in particular ways in particular places at particular times. The significance of this socio-technical understanding is not simply that infrastructure systems are more complex than previously conceived, but that they co-evolve in myriad relations between society, nature and technology. This relational understanding of infrastructure as being part of broader societal and environmental structures and processes but also itself consisting of social and ecological dimensions has opened up new avenues for understanding the societal constitution and workings of infrastructure. Of particular interest to this special issue is the attention paid by research to the ways in which infrastructures simultaneously shape and are shaped by social and political forces (Coutard et al., 2005; Edwards, 2003). Terminologies of co-construction, coevolution and co-production are used to highlight and investigate the interdependence between components of what some have called the 'seamless web' of a socio-technical system (Star, 1999). Within the burgeoning literature on infrastructure by historians and sociologists of technology, political scientists, economists and human geographers, three aspects are especially relevant to the relationship between water, infrastructure and political rule: the obduracy, the politics and the ecologies of sociotechnical systems.

2023 CNDI Kritik
Links › Topic Links › Infrastructure

Infrastructure is used by the state to feed representations as facts to its citizens in order to serve its own purposes.

Larkin ’13, (Brian Larkin Brian Larkin is the Director of Graduate Studies and a Professor of Anthropology at Barnard College, Columbia University, “The Politics and Poetics of Infrastructure,” Annual Anthropological Review, 8-21-2013, https://www.annualreviews.org/doi/pdf/10.1146/annurev-anthro-092412-155522) @ehatt + [A.G]

In the case of infrastructures, the poetic mode means that form is loosened from technical function. Infrastructures are the means by which a state proffers these representations to its citizens and asks them to take those representations as social facts. It creates a politics of “as if ” (Wedeen 1999; see also Apter 2005). The budget must act as if it were a realist representation, and those issuing and receiving it act as if it were a consequential document. In their poetic mode, budgets become “arbitrary symbolic acts” (Mbembe & Roitman 1995, p. 337) as much as techniques of governance. This notion is true anywhere but takes on particular intensity in many parts of Africa, where the gap between the public dissemination of a calculative order (e.g., size of a population, gross domestic product, etc.) is widely believed to be arbitrary. There, as Mbembe has pointed out, official job descriptions do not correspond to actual powers, positions are awarded for reasons unrelated to professional qualification, and budgets are drawn up but their execution bears little relation to them. At these moments the state is simultaneously both present and absent. Lea & Pholeros (2010), in their essay “When is a Pipe not a Pipe,” describe exactly this process in their discussion of aboriginal housing, which looks like housing but is not, in fact, housing. These are houses with pipes that do not connect to sewers and rooms that are only partially complete, “composite deceptions” as they term it (p. 191) that generate an “aesthetic order.” Pipes, in this sense, turn out not to be about pipes but about their production as a representational form that allows reports to be written, budgets to be satisfied, and sponsors to be mollified. A pipe may not be attached to an effluent disposal system, but it is attached to techniques of regulation, audit, and administration. Its material form is transposed from a hollow tube to digits on a budget and words on a page, and all these forms—as hollow tube, as number, as series of letters—are pipes. All are material embodiments of a pipe in differing forms that allow them to move in differing circulatory regimes. Pipes turn out to be documents. Recent research on Soviet rule has examined precisely the ways that rule operated as an aesthetic as well as a political project, one that constituted citizens through modes of address (Groys 2011). “Communism created ultimately effective aesthetic structures and defective economic ones,” argues the art historian Vladimir Todorov (1994; see also Humphrey 2005). He refers thus to the fact that the technical effectivity of Soviet factories to produce goods was limited, but its political power to train subjects in a particular relationship to state power, to organize management structures that preserved that power, and to represent it to the people through the object of the factory itself was extensive. Under communism, Todorov (1994) argues, “factories are not built to produce commodities [but] symbolic meanings. ... They result in a deficit of goods but an overproduction of symbolic meanings” (p. 10). Todorov here captures something that needs to be addressed. Infrastructures operate on multiple levels concurrently. They execute technical functions (they move traffic, water, or electricity) by mediating exchange over distance and binding people and things into complex heterogeneous systems and by operating as entextualized forms that have relative autonomy from their technical function. To conceive of this operation as a form of poetics in the Jakobsonian sense is to rearrange the hierarchy of functions so that the aesthetic dimension of infrastructure (rather than its technical one) is dominant. Thus many studies that begin by stating how infrastructures are invisible until they break down are fundamentally inaccurate. Infrastructures are metapragmatic objects, signs of themselves deployed in particular circulatory regimes to establish sets of effects. It is commonplace, seemingly obligatory, for almost any study of infrastructure to repeat Star’s (1999) assertion that infrastructures are “by definition invisible,” taken for granted, and that they only “become visible on breakdown” (p. 380; see also Collier 2011, Elyachar 2010, Graham & Marvin 2001, Larkin 2008). But this assertion is a partial truth and, as a way of describing infrastructure as a whole, flatly untenable. Invisibility is certainly one aspect of infrastructure, but it is only one and at the extreme edge of a range of visibilities that move from unseen to grand spectacles and everything in between. The anthropological literature traces out an enormous range of ways infrastructure is often anything but invisible. Sneath (2009) argues that electricity was such a central symbol of state modernity in Mongolia that it was referred to as “Lenin’s light.” This view is not too dissimilar from that of Anand to whom one slum activist in Mumbai could usefully narrate a history of water supply, betraying an impressive technical knowledge; in fact, the slum’s two pipes (and their sizes) were also known by the names of the politicians who supplied them (i.e., Congress Party two-inch-diameter pipe, Shiv Sena nine-inch-diameter pipe). For this system of patronage to work or for Lenin’s staging of infrastructural modernity to be successful, visibility was necessary to continually renew its political effect. Winther (2008) notes that rural Zanzibari had a highly sophisticated knowledge of the electricity consumption of each appliance they owned, and Von Schnitzler cites municipal engineers referring to Sowetan residents as technological experts for their ability to disassemble, reassemble, and hack water meters. The widely acknowledged depth and sophistication of technical knowledge indicate the impossibility of these technologies fading into the background; indeed, as Carse (2012) argues, all visibility is situated and what is background for one person is a daily object of concern for another. The point is not to assert one or another status as an inherent condition of infrastructures but to examine how (in)visibility is mobilized and why. Generic statements about the invisibility of infrastructure cannot be supported. Perhaps the most striking example of this hypervisibility is Barker’s (2005) description of Suharto’s ceremony surrounding the launch of the Palapa satellite. Suharto held a kris, a ceremonial dagger used by Javanese monarchs as a symbol of their rule. The dagger was encrusted with 17 jewels (17 referring to the date of Indonesia’s independence), and the button to launch the satellite was embedded as one of the jewels. Barker (2005) argues Suharto used the “satellite as a kind of modern kris, a ceremonial dagger to unify the archipelago under his rule” (p. 706). It is difficult to conceive of an infrastructure more richly symbolic and vividly present than this.

2023 CNDI Kritik
Links › Topic Links › Infrastructure

Infrastructure is a means to control and organize life through far-reaching technological systems.

Larkin ’13, (Brian Larkin Brian Larkin is the Director of Graduate Studies and a Professor of Anthropology at Barnard College, Columbia University, “The Politics and Poetics of Infrastructure,” Annual Anthropological Review, 8-21-2013, https://www.annualreviews.org/doi/pdf/10.1146/annurev-anthro-092412-155522) @ehatt + [A.G]

For some time now, scholars in science and technology studies and geography have analyzed how infrastructures mediate exchange over distance, bringing different people, objects, and spaces into interaction and forming the base on which to operate modern economic and social systems (Graham & Marvin 1996, 2001; Lefebvre 1991). Graham & Marvin (1996) have written a series of influential works examining how new systems of telecommunications are reconfiguring urban space and how infrastructures bundle together water, energy, people, and streets into a series of networked infrastructures that define modern life (2001). The emphasis here is on the formation of what Hughes (1987, 1993) terms large-scale technical systems, the massive infrastructural networks that have come to organize everyday life. Hughes (1987, 1993) and those coming in his wake (Bijker 1997; Bijker et al. 1987; Bowker & Star 2000; Edwards 1997, 2003; Edwards et al. 2009; Hecht 2011; Jackson et al. 2007; Star & Ruhleder 1996; Yates 1993) argue that infrastructures typically begin as a series of small, independent technologies with widely varying technical standards. They become infrastructures when either one technological system comes to dominate over others or when independent systems converge into a network. For Hughes, as a systems thinker, the ontology of a technology is composed of elements internal to the object itself but is formed as part of a system. The invention of the Edison light bulb, for instance, simultaneously involved the invention of the Edison Jumbo Generator and the Edison Main and Feeder. It innovated financial instruments and management structures necessary to accommodate a rapidly expanding corporation. The light bulb in this conception does not develop from an unfolding of elements internal to the technology itself—an assemblage of glass, filament, and vacuum—as some theories of technics would have it. Rather, as an infrastructure it is an amalgam of technical, administrative, and financial techniques. Two major insights that emerge from this work are of central importance to anthropology. Placing the system at the center of analysis decenters a focus on technology and offers a more synthetic perspective, bringing into our conception of machines all sorts of nontechnological elements. For Hughes, a holding company or an accounting practice is as much a technical invention as is a dynamo or a telephone, and all are essential to producing an infrastructural system. Second, the focus is on system building. A technical system originates in one place, growing in response to particular ecological, legal, political, and industrial techniques native to that area. But as it grows into a networked infrastructure, it must move to other places with differing conditions, technological standards, and legal regulations, elaborating techniques of adaptation and translation. This conception places focus on practices of routinization and extension, requiring an account of translation (which can be technical, but also managerial and financial) as a process inherent to system building. It is no surprise that the scholars coming after Hughes (Bowker & Star 2000, Edwards et al. 2009) drew heavily on actor-network theory and its emphasis on tracing associations between heterogeneous networks (Latour 1996, 2007) and on the necessity of accounting for how translation occurs (Callon 1986, 1998; Latour 1993). This work has been extremely productive for recent anthropological research (Appel 2012a,b; Anand 2011, 2012; Carse 2012; Collier 2011; Collier & Lakoff 2008; Von Schnitzler 2008), as one can see in two excellent recent studies on water supply in Mumbai (Anand 2011, 2012) and Soweto (Von Schnitzler 2008). Anand’s ethnography draws together engineers, political fixers, slum dwellers, politicians, activists, and bureaucrats into a single system through the technical operation of water supply (see also Gandy 2008, Graham et al. 2013). In Mumbai, the density of the population causes water supply to be scarce and periodic. Municipal engineers account for this limitation in technical terms (locating slums on a hilltop, the pressure required to move water great distances), but for slum residents it is an issue of political mobilization. Slums without water engage dadas, powerful patrons who use their connections to pressure elected officials to provide infrastructural connection. In return, the dada rewards those representatives by delivering electoral support. In Anand’s analysis, essentially two infrastructural systems interact: water delivery, with its systems of pipes, engineers, and bureaucracy that make up the technical end of water provision (the aspect of infrastructural supply that constitutes the entire large-scale system for Hughes and others); and the social networks, forms of patron-clientship, and “phatic labor” (Elyachar 2010) that are as important to water delivery as are pumps and pipes. Infrastructure in this sense is a kind of mentality and way of living in the world (Hansen & Verkaaik 2009, Simmel 1972, Simone 2001), and Anand (2011) brings together these two differing conceptions of infrastructure not, in the final instance, to analyze water supply but to reveal the production of what he terms “hydraulic citizenship, a form of belonging to the city enabled by social and material claims made to the city’s water infrastructure” (p. 545). Von Schnitzler (2008), like Anand, sees water supply as revealing a larger logic of citizenship in the postapartheid state in South Africa. But her approach differs by focusing analysis on a specific technology, the water meter, which was introduced as a technical device to monitor water usage and end the problem of wastage in townships. Von Schnitzler traces the technical history of the water meter back to its invention in Britain but then examines how its introduction to South Africa was intended not just to regulate water use but to produce a new sort of citizen. This citizen was one who was responsible, self-monitored his or her own actions, and engaged in practices of calculation. Taking a more biopolitical turn, Von Schnitzler argues that meters do not just regulate water provision; they reveal a strategy of government and, ultimately, produce an ethics. “[C]ouched in a moral-pedagogical language” (Von Schnitzler 2008, p. 906) city officials aimed to reform the culture of township residents (who wasted water) by producing a “calculating subject,” one who switches the tap off when brushing teeth or reuses bath water when flushing the toilet (see also Fennell 2011). The meter, Von Schnitzler argues, delivered moral behavior as well as water. Both Von Schnitzler and Anand demonstrate how the operation of technologies, ostensibly a neutral practice, becomes the grounds around which forms of citizenship are contested (Barry 2001; Joyce 2003; Mitchell 2002, 2011; Otter 2008) and where technological systems are entangled with other religious and political domains. Collier (2011) adds a twist to this literature by organizing his analysis of infrastructures entirely around the question of the biopolitical (Foucault 2010, 2011). Infrastructures, for Collier, are a mixture of political rationality, administrative techniques, and material systems, and his interest is not in infrastructure per se but in what it tells us about practices of government. Soviet electricity provision, through this lens, is analyzed for how it reveals a system of total planning in a command economy rather than for what it tells us about the effects of electricity on users in Russia. Unlike in the West, electricity supply in Soviet Russia was not regulated by user demand but was an allocation to a particular area decided in advance by technocrats as part of a total system of electricity planning. The post-Soviet transition required a dismantling of this idea of government and a reconceptualizing of society as organized around an individual consumer and his or her demands rather than around a collective assigned a fixed amount of units.

2023 CNDI Kritik
Links › Topic Links › Human Capital

Investment in human capital is the core tenant of the neoliberal drive to escape the inherent contradictions within capitalism

Garrett ‘18

(Paul Michael Garrett, Senior Lecturer Dept. of Pol. Science & Soc. Galway University Affiliation, 9-17-2018, "Revisiting ‘The Birth of Biopolitics’: Foucault's Account of Neoliberalism and the Remaking of Social Policy," Cambridge Core, https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/journal-of-social-policy/article/abs/revisiting-the-birth-of-biopolitics-foucaults-account-of-neoliberalism-and-the-remaking-of-social-policy/7DF99E21282AA855D0541D470A02B46D, accessed 7-12-2023) //OC

In the second part of the ‘Birth of Biopolitics’ lecture series, Foucault turns his attention to US neoliberalism. Whilst sharing some of the characteristics of the ‘German model’, this variant originates from a markedly different national and cultural milieu. US neoliberalism is more encompassing than in the FRG and saturates the ‘whole way of being and thinking’ (p. 219). Foucault also acknowledges how US neoliberalism contains potent, popular components and a ‘sort of utopian focus which is always being revived’ (p. 218). It would, therefore, be misguided to merely perceive it as a ‘technical alternative for government’ since that would fail to grasp the project’s powerful affective dimensions (p. 219). Indeed, this aspect was reflected in the subsequent presidential campaigns of Ronald Reagan, epitomised by his famous ‘Morning in America’ TV commercial from 1984. Two years into the faltering one-term presidency of Jimmy Carter, Foucault identifies US neoliberalism as a ‘widespread movement of political opposition within American society’ (p. 193). He regards the 1930s as a crucial period and highlights the contributions of, for example, Henry Calvert Simons, an economist at the University of Chicago. The emerging corpus of US neoliberal ideas were further shaped in opposition to President Roosevelt’s New Deal measures, Keynesian economic policy and a perceived inflation in the size of the federal government administration. Subsequently, the theorisation of human capital was to become pivotal in emphasising the assets (or lack thereof) of individual agents within a competitive society. Human capital ‘represents two processes, one that we could call the extension of economic analysis into a previously unexplored domain, and second, on the basis of this, the possibility of giving a strictly economic interpretation of a whole domain previously thought to be non-economic’ (p. 219). In short, everything ‘for which human beings attempt to realize their ends, from marriage, to crime, to expenditures on children, can be understood “economically” according to a particular calculation of cost for benefit’ (Read, 2009: 28). Primary definers include the University of Chicago economists, Theodore Schultz (1961) and Gary Becker (Becker et al., 2012). According to these theorists, human capital is comprised of two elements: one ‘innate’ or ‘hereditary’ and the other, ‘acquired’ (p. 227). In terms of the first type, Foucault asserts that we ‘do not have to pay to have the body we have’ or for our ‘genetic make-up’ (p. 227). However, he invites us to engage in a bit of ‘science fiction’ and imagine how genetic risk profiling, and the related genetic matching of parents might boost or enhance the ‘innate’ capital of their offspring (p. 228). In later years, pre-birth screening has, in fact, become associated with greater calculation in this respect and more advanced forms of genetic engineering have multiplied these possibilities (Cooper, 2008). On another level, the increase in recourse to cosmetic surgery to alter and enhance given appearances has also occurred. Turning to acquired human capital, Foucault suggests this is the form that most interests US neoliberals and this is reflected in their preoccupation with ‘the more or less voluntary formation of human capital in the course of individual lives’ (p. 229). How do individuals evolve into ‘abilities-machines’ to enhance their incomes? (p. 229). What in the ‘child’s family life will produce human capital? What type of stimuli, form of life, and relationship with parents, adults and others can be crystallized into human capital?’ (p. 230). This is a grid of intelligibility in which ‘all the problems of health care and public hygiene must, or at any rate can, be rethought as elements which may or may not improve human capital’ (p. 230). Important here, therefore, are ‘educational investments’ which are ‘much broader than simple schooling or professional training’ (p. 229). This might include, for example, the ‘time parents devote to their children outside of simple educational activities’ (p. 229). The entire set of cultural stimuli received by the child will collectively contribute to the formation of acquired human capital. In this context, ‘more educated parents will form a higher human capital than parents with less education’ (p. 229). However, with a ‘whole environmental analysis’ of the child’s life, it will be ‘possible to calculate, and to a certain extent to quantify, or at any rate measure’ the ‘possibilities of investment in human capital’ (pp. 229–30; see also Gudmand-Høyer and Hjorth, 2009). Foucault takes child attachment discourse and situates it within his articulation of neoliberal ideas on human capital (pp. 243–44). He is not interested in the gendered dimension inherent in this arrangement (Thornton, 2014). Nor does he draw any, arguably relevant, parallels with contemporary theorisations developed by the Italian Marxist Autonomists, around the idea of the ‘social factory’ or ‘factory without walls’ in which the whole of society is placed at the disposal of profit (Negri, 2005: 102–115: see also Garrett, 2014). On occasions, Foucault does refer to a Marxist framework, linking human capital to the work of Rosa Luxemburg. More specifically, the cultivation of human capital is interpreted as an attempt to counter the problem historically haunting capitalism – namely the threat of falling rates of profit – by dint of ‘innovation’ and investments ‘made at the level of man himself’ (p. 231). As people are turned into ‘abilities machines’, the honing of new skills, and not imperialism as suggested by Luxemburg, might be the vital new platform for capital accumulation.