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2022 Michigan Counterplan
TURKEY PIC › 1NC’s › 1NC---No Kickout

The counterplan solves. It has 29 NATO states jointly cooperate. Excluding Turkey PICs out of the spoiler.

Bandow 21, Senior Fellow at the Cato Institute (Doug, “Eight reasons why the U.S. should ditch Turkey as a military partner,” Responsible Statecraft,

Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan has transformed his country and its relationship with America — but not for the better. President Donald Trump’s personal ties to Erdogan may have disguised the widening divergence in interests, but a chasm has now truly opened between the two governments, requiring a much tougher approach toward Ankara than in the past. The Republic of Turkey grew out of the ramshackle Ottoman Empire, which collapsed at the end of World War I. Ankara joined NATO in 1952, controlling access to the Black Sea and serving as the alliance’s southeast foundation. The Pentagon was always Ankara’s strongest booster, since Incirlik and Izmir Air Bases extended Washington’s military reach in the Middle East. Turkey also was presented as a model of Islamic democracy, despite the military’s ruthless intervention in the illiberal political system, staging soft and hard coups, and invading the Republic of Cyprus in 1974. For America, the Cold War was more important than human rights. Erdogan’s Justice and Development Party (AKP) won the 2002 election and began to transform Turkey. After a decade of modest reform and good press, Erdogan turned Turkey in an authoritarian, corrupt, and Islamist direction. Repression accelerated after a failed coup in July 2016, months before Trump was elected, provided Erdogan with a Turkish version of the Reichstag fire. Freedom House rates Turkey as not free, reporting that the government “has pursued a dramatic and wide-ranging crackdown on perceived opponents” since that attempted coup event. Based on scant evidence, Erdogan accused the Hizmet movement’s Fethullah Gulen of being behind the putsch. He has tried, but so far unsuccessfully, to have Gulen extradited from his exile in Pennsylvania. Erdogan then turned his country into a prison state. Even the slightest connection — teaching at a Hizmet school, or using a bank owned by a Hizmet member — resulted in dismissal, arrest, and/or imprisonment. Journalists and opposition politicians remain frequent targets, especially when Erdogan’s poll ratings dip. Reported Freedom House: Opposition gains and economic troubles “have given the government new incentives to suppress dissent and limit public discourse.” Moreover, Turkish foreign policy is increasingly at odds with U.S. policy. The challenge is not that Erdogan is taking independent positions, but rather is actively undermining U.S. policies. Among the problem areas: One: Treating another NATO ally, Greece, and a European Union member, Cyprus, as adversaries. Unhappy over Greece’s possession of islands near Turkey’s coast, Ankara refuses to recognize Greek airspace and territorial waters, leading to dangerous military confrontations. The Erdogan government continues to resist efforts to end the partition of Cyprus and interfere with efforts by the internationally recognized government of Cyprus to develop nearby hydrocarbons. Some observers fear a Turkish-Greco war. Two: Forging a military relationship with Russia. Ankara purchased Moscow’s S-400 air defense system, resulting in Turkey’s ouster from the F-35 program. The Erdogan government plans to buy additional S-400 missiles. Turkey also has reached accommodations with Moscow involving Syria and other regional issues, though the two governments’ alignment is not perfect. Erdogan has negatively contrasted his relationship with President Joe Biden to that with Putin. Ozgur Unluhisarcikli of the German Marshall Fund opined that Erdogan seeks “a counterbalancing alliance with Russia against the US.” If Ankara was forced to choose between NATO and Russia in a conflict, the allies could not be confident that Turkey would fulfill its alliance commitments. Three: Adopting an expansive, neo-Ottoman maritime doctrine known as Blue Homeland, which seeks to dominate the Mediterranean. Once stuck at the policymaking fringe, this strategy envisions controlling waters claimed by Greece, Cyprus, Egypt, and Israel. Clashes over contending territorial claims have increased chances of violent confrontation. Ankara’s desire to strengthen its maritime position spurred its intervention in Libya’s civil war. Four: Arming Azerbaijan and encouraging it to restart hostilities with Armenia over the disputed territory of Nagorno-Karabakh. The result was a bitter fight and abundant war crimes. There were unverified claims that Ankara shot down an Armenian aircraft and deployed Syrian mercenaries on Azerbaijan’s behalf. A side impact was to deepen Russia’s role. Five: Intervening in Libya’s civil war. Ankara backed the Islamist Tripoli-based Government of National Accord, violating the United Nations weapons embargo. Turkish vessels confronted French and German ships tasked with preventing arms smuggling. In return the Tripoli authorities accepted a maritime boundary agreement privileging Ankara in waters also claimed by Greece and Cyprus. Six: Treating the Islamic State and other radical groups operating in Syria as co-belligerents if not allies. Ankara brazenly facilitated ISIS border crossings and oil sales; charges of corruption tainted Erdogan’s family. Even Vice President Joe Biden inconveniently acknowledged Ankara’s role. Seven: Targeting the Kurdish-dominated People’s Defense Units, or YPG, in Syria. The Erdogan government twice invaded Syrian Kurdish territory, utilizing U.S.-supplied weapons and employing jihadist forces previously active elsewhere in Syria. Amnesty International cited “a shameful disregard for civilian life, carrying out serious violations and war crimes, including summary killings and unlawful attacks that have killed and injured civilians, during the offensive into northeast Syria.” The YPG was Washington’s main ally fighting ISIS on the ground, yet Ankara is threatening to invade again. Eight: Using Syrian fighters as mercenaries via private military companies, in particular, the SADAT International Defense Consultancy, to meddle in conflicts abroad, including Libya and the Caucasus. These forces are essentially accountable to no one. Despite this terrible record, Ankara’s ambassador to the US, Hasan Murat Mercan, recently argued that “Turkey stands as a reliable ally that can deliver at the moment of crisis — a friend in need.” However, policy differences have been exacerbated by Erdogan’s personal hostility. He recently went before the Turkish National Assembly to denounce “those who ignored our country in the region for years — and confronted us with maps and demands that would imprison us into our coasts — irst tried the language of threat and blackmail after the steps we took.” Moreover, Erdogan’s ambitions have grown increasingly radical. As he told the National Assembly: “There is no chance left for this distorted order, in which the entire globe is encumbered by a handful of greedy people, to continue to exist the way it currently does.” There was little doubt about who he meant. The greater his domestic political problems, the more aggressive his foreign policy is likely to become. Which is dangerous to the US. In 2015 the Erdogan government recklessly downed a Russian warplane that briefly entered Turkish airspace. Had Russia’s Vladimir Putin responded with force America and Europe could have ended up at war. Today Moscow’s and Ankara’s respective proxies, the Syrian government, and Idlib-area insurgents, also could spark a conflict. So could Ankara’s increasingly aggressive activities elsewhere — North Africa, Mediterranean, Mideast, and Central Asia — which often are at variance with NATO’s interest. Turkey’s band of American friends is diminishing. Some are stuck in the past, remembering the ally Ankara once was. Other analysts prefer to wait for Erdogan’s passage across the River Styx, given rumors about his health. However, in two decades he would still be younger than Joe Biden. The political waters at home have grown rougher, but so far he has surmounted every challenge with increasing force. Nor would a new president and parliamentary majority necessarily transform Ankara’s policies. Turkish public opinion is nationalistic, conspiracy-minded, and ever more hostile toward the U.S. Indeed, a recent poll found that six of ten Turks viewed America as the greatest threat to Turkey, compared to just 19 percent who fingered Russia. Today Ankara could not enter the transatlantic alliance. Washington should minimize its reliance on Turkey and the latter’s threat to U.S. interests. The U.S. should remove its nuclear weapons stored at Incirlik Air Base, and downgrade use of the facility, access to which remains under Erdogan’s erratic control. If Washington intervened in the Mideast less often, the base would matter less. In any case, there are alternatives: In response to Ankara’s policies U.S.-Greek military ties have recently expanded. The Pentagon should limit arm sales, building on the F-35 sales ban. Finally, the Biden administration should begin NATO discussions on options ranging from limiting Turkey’s role in decision-making to ousting Ankara from the transatlantic alliance. Two months ago Erdogan admitted: “I cannot say that a healthy process is running in Turkish-American ties.” Yet Washington’s policy reflects the continuing illusion that Turkey remains a loyal and reliable U.S. ally, European partner, and NATO member. None of these are true. A change in policy is long overdue.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
TURKEY PIC › 1NC’s › 1NC---No Kickout

The counterplan competes. The plan increases security cooperation with all of NATO, the counterplan only works with discrete parts

For reference, the resolution says “the North Atlantic Treaty Organization” [The United States federal government should substantially increase its security cooperation with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization in one or more of the following areas: artificial intelligence, biotechnology, cybersecurity.]

Supreme Court of Kentucky 3 (“Kotila v. Commonwealth,” 2000-SC-0341-MR, Lexis)//BB

Whether a conviction under this statute requires possession of all (as opposed to any) of the chemicals or equipment necessary to manufacture [**24] methamphetamine under some manufacturing process is a matter of statutory construction. First, we examine the language of the statute, itself. United States v. Health Possibilities, P.S.C., 207 F.3d 335, 338-39 (6th Cir. 2000) HN9 ("The starting point in a statutory interpretation case is the language of the statute itself."). Obviously, the multiple manufacturing methods and the availability of a broad range of readily available chemicals and equipment necessary for each manufacturing process militates against itemizing within the statute all of the possible chemical and equipment combinations by which methamphetamine could be manufactured. Nevertheless, KRS 218A.1432(1)(b) does not read "[p]ossesses chemicals or equipment," or "[p]ossesses some of the chemicals or equipment," or "[p]ossesses any of the chemicals or equipment." It reads "[p]ossesses the chemicals or equipment for the manufacture of methamphetamine." The presence of the article "the" is significant because, grammatically speaking, possession of some but not all of the chemicals or equipment does not satisfy the statutory language.

2022 Michigan Counterplan

Random

This card flows for the K: The ontology debate isn’t as simple as proving progress is possible.

George Weddington 19, PhD candidate with research interests in social movement studies, Black studies, and organizational sociology, 7-20-2018, “Political Ontology and Race Research: A Response to ‘Critical Race Theory, Afro-Pessimism, and Racial Progress Narratives.’” Sociology of Race and Ethnicity, 5(2), pp. 278–288, doi:10.1177/2332649218785921, kav

Sabine Broeck (2017) provided an exquisite point to the criticism, such that it is not only that the distancing of the humanity of slavery was permitted by a dispassionate approach to the accounting of the slaves but that such distancing also erases the legacy of slavery as formative to “European thought, as well as on social, political and cultural practices, including academia’s self-sustaining discourses” (p. 139). Indeed, other thinkers, such as Denise Ferreira da Silva (2011), Hartman and Wilderson (2003), and Alexander Weheliye (2014), have argued that the formulation of key themes and concepts central to European thought have often omitted racial difference or occurred against the backdrop of slavery. Essentially, one of Afro-pessimism’s most relevant criticisms for sociology is the need to historically and critically trace seemingly commonplace sociological concepts in their legacy of slavery. Although it is uncontroversial to assume that slavery is of tremendous importance to the contemporary social conditions of black populations, slavery also implicates the epistemological foundations of sociology. Ray et al. provide only a glimpse of the full breadth of this criticism by focusing on Sexton’s arguments against the popular concept of “people of color.” Instead, as Broeck (2016) stated, citing Christina Sharpe (2016), Afro-pessimism demands “a white agonistic practice vis-à-vis the humanist legacy of one’s own training, which needs not the spectacular one-time-jump into disloyalty, but a fidelity to laboring on said protocol of white enslavist power, ongoing” (p. 140). Such a demand points to a wholesale interrogation of sociology’s epistemic relationship to slavery.

2022 Michigan Counterplan

AT: African Nation Link

Racism and colonialism were recreated by black settlers in Liberia – they carried over violent structures with them. That disproves any link to African nations.

José Sanchez 22, PhD student in history at Duke University, 6-13-2022, "Against Afro-Pessimism," Jacobin, , kav

The histories of Liberia and Israel, like the histories of African and Jewish Americans, are not perfectly analogous. But key similarities are there. Liberia and Israel were founded by the descendants of oppressed peoples whose self-conceptions were strongly tied to being an oppressed and dehumanized people. These are nation-states conceived as refuges from ancient and lethal hatreds in faraway lands.

2022 Michigan Counterplan

Solvency

Afropess drains historical perspectives; forecloses alternatives of liberation; and fails without political resistance.

R.L. Stephens 17, organizer in Chicago, founding editor of Orchestrated Pulse, A. Philip Randolph Fellow at Jacobin, 5/17/2017, "The Birthmark of Damnation: Ta-Nehisi Coates and the Black Body," Viewpoint Magazine, , kav

One of Liza’s daughters, Ella Townsend, was born after emancipation, but remained in the bondage of sharecropping in rural Mississippi. As an adult, she carried a pistol with her in the fields, determined to protect herself and the surrounding children. One day, a white man on horseback rode into the fields. He had come to abduct a young black girl.

2022 Michigan Counterplan

Wilderson Indicts

Wilderson equates everything to antiblackness – homogenizing millions off of personal encounters.

José Sanchez 22, PhD student in history at Duke University, 6-13-2022, "Against Afro-Pessimism," Jacobin, , kav

The exact meaning of Afro-pessimism as a philosophy is still being teased out in academia and on social media. At its center is Frank Wilderson III, especially after the 2020 publication of his half-memoir, half-treatise work of what he calls “auto-theory,” Afropessimism. In it, Wilderson narrates stories from his life, especially episodes between him and his coworkers, partners, friends, and others, in which his blackness is made to be painfully visible and repelled. His conclusion is that “at every scale of abstraction, violence saturates black life,” consigning blacks to perpetual enslavement.

2022 Michigan Counterplan

AT: Social Death

Social death is disproven by thousands of Black-African revolts – prefer empirics that contest the thesis of the K.

Greg Thomas 18, teaches global Black Studies texts out of the English Department at Tufts University, founding editor of PROUD FLESH, January 2018, "Afro-Blue Notes:The Death of Afro-pessimism (2.0)?" Theory & Event, 21(1), p. 303-306, muse.jhu.edu/article/685979, kav

The Death of "Social Death" and Its Death?

2022 Michigan Counterplan

Cap K

Afropess is anti-capitalist – it homogenizes those who want to change the world and leaves them as vulnerable. Anti-capitalist politics include the struggle of afropess. Alone, afropess becomes a tool for the neoliberal state.

Nino Brown 21, assistant professor of education studies at DePauw University – where he teaches and researches at the nexus of pedagogy and political movements, author of six books, lead editor of Liberation School’s podcast series, 9-29-2021, "Teaching Politically and the Problem of Afropessimism — Hampton Institute," Hampton Institute, , kav

THE HAPPY MARRIAGE OF CAPITALISM, AFROPESSIMISM, AND LIBERAL IDENTITY POLITICS

2022 Michigan Counterplan

Essentialism DA

Afropess oversimplifies history into a struggle between Humans versus Slaves – that forecloses any possibility for change and ignores all other oppression.

José Sanchez 22, PhD student in history at Duke University, 6-13-2022, "Against Afro-Pessimism," Jacobin, , kav

But the rise of “Afro-pessimism” as a philosophy in academic and intellectual spaces threatens to undermine a politics rooted in such a sense of solidarity, in favor of one that essentializes black identity and exceptionalizes black suffering as intrinsically unanalogous to the oppression of other people. Afro-pessimism argues that “anti-blackness” trumps all other systems of oppression and exploitation, whether the racism that faces nonblack people of color such as Palestinians or indigenous Americans, antisemitism, capitalism, sexism, or transphobia.

2022 Michigan Counterplan

Framework

Change in the debate space can only emerge from collective movements that are centered around intersectionality and relationships. Afro-pess works against movements to change the space – its nihilistic and individualized approach forecloses the possibility for change.

Thuli Gamedze and Asher Gamedze 19, MA in Education, Gender, and International Development from Michaelis, member of iQhiya(art collective); MA in African studies from University of Cape Town, 1-1-2019, "Anxiety, Afropessimism, and the University Shutdown," South Atlantic Quarterly, 118 (1), pp. 215-225, , kav

gamEdze: Just to clarify, “shutdown,” as we refer to it, was (or is) a tactic used by Black students at South African universities that emerged mainly during #feesmustfall in October 2015 and has been used since then in 2016 and 2017. The plan was to stop the university from operating and make it impossible for it to continue with business as usual. Arrest its academic program, hold it ransom, and pressure the management to agree to certain demands that were part of a much larger call for decolonization, which I suppose is what we are dealing with in this collection of texts. The end of outsourced labor and the call for free education have been the main material demands that somewhat unify the national shutdown periods, but the nature of the campaign and the broader demands depended a lot on students’ educational and political processes at the various campuses.

2022 Michigan Evidence
AT: Russia War Good › 1AR – No Decline – Economics

ECONOMICS. GDP doesn’t assume purchasing parity.

Andrea Kendall-Taylor 21, Senior Fellow and Director of the Transatlantic Security Program at the Center for a New American Security; Michael Kofman, Director of the Russia Studies Program at CNA and a Senior Fellow at the Center for a New American Security, 11/1/2021, "The Myth of Russian Decline," https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/ukraine/2021-10-19/myth-russian-decline, sg

The problem is that the case for Russian decline is overstated. Much of the evidence for it, such as Russia’s shrinking population and its resource-dependent economy, is not as consequential for the Kremlin as many in Washington assume. Nor should the United States expect that Russia will automatically abandon its course of confrontation once President Vladimir Putin leaves office. Putin’s foreign policy enjoys widespread support among the country’s ruling elite, and his legacy will include a thicket of unresolved disputes, chief among them that over the annexation of Crimea. Any disagreements with the United States are here to stay.

Put simply, Washington cannot afford to fixate on China while hoping to simply wait Russia out. Rather than viewing Russia as a declining power, U.S. leaders should see it as a persistent one—and have a frank conversation about the country’s true capabilities and vulnerabilities. Rethinking American assumptions about Russian power would allow policymakers to address what will be a period of prolonged confrontation with a capable adversary.

2022 Michigan Evidence
AT: Russia War Good › 2AC – Not Declining

Russia is unambiguously stable.

Andrew Latham 21, professor of international relations at Macalester College, 12/26/2021, "Reports of Russia’s decline are greatly exaggerated," https://thehill.com/opinion/international/587281-reports-of-russias-decline-are-greatly-exaggerated/, sg

Tales of Russia’s demise have circulated with remarkable consistency since the fall of the Soviet Union on Dec. 25 exactly three decades ago. Having fallen from its superpower pedestal, the Soviet Union’s successor state was routinely characterized as a “declining power,” a “has-been power” and a “downshift power.”

In recent years, the more dire prophesies of Russian collapse that circulated in the 1990s having gone unfulfilled, such characterizations have given way to a recognition that Russia is in fact a “persistent power.” Fundamentally, though, nothing has changed. Whether rebranded as a mere “nuisance power” or as a perpetually “disruptive” power, Russia is viewed now as it has been since it emerged out of the wreckage of the Soviet Union in December 1991 — as a broken, if sometimes petulant, vestige of a once-mighty superpower.

2022 Michigan Evidence
AT: Russia War Good › 2AC – Not Declining

Russia isn’t declining BUT won’t be a threat regardless.

Michael Kofman 20, senior research scientist at the Center for Naval Analyses and a fellow at the Wilson Center’s Kennan Institute, 12/18/2020, "Bad Idea: Dismissing Russia as a Declining Power in U.S. Strategy," https://defense360.csis.org/bad-idea-dismissing-russia-as-a-declining-power-in-u-s-strategy/, sg

Russia is not a rising power, but it will not decline as a threat to the United States in any appreciable way in the near- or medium-term. Moreover, the declining power mantra is puzzling as a basis for defense prioritization since declining powers can be more dangerous than rising ones. The United States must not let its desire to focus efforts on China result in strategic malpractice by failing to account for a world with multiple competitors, including one in which Moscow and Beijing may collaborate to the detriment of U.S. efforts. Consequently, the United States needs to take Russia seriously. Moscow is an enduring great power and should continue to be a major factor in U.S. strategy.

Russia retains the power to challenge or violently upend the security architecture of Europe. In military terms, it has the conventional military power to deter the United States, take on any coalition of lesser states, and use force successfully outside of its region to deny U.S. foreign policy prerogatives elsewhere (as Syria aptly illustrates). As a nuclear power, Russia is in a league only with the United States, with a much larger non-strategic nuclear arsenal to boot. Together the United States and Russia account for over 90 percent of the world’s nuclear weapons. Moscow also has a seat at the table in the world’s most significant international institutions like the United Nations Security Council. A conflict between the United States and Russia — or between Russia and an American ally — could have existential implications for the prevailing international order.

2022 Michigan Disadvantage

1ar --- at: Japan and China Relations

No Japan-China relations

Schweller 18 — Randall Schweller is Professor of Political Science and a Social and Behavioral Sciences Joan N. Huber Faculty Fellow, The Ohio State University. The Chinese Journal of International Politics, 2018, 23–48 doi: 10.1093/cjip/poy003 Advance Access Publication Date: 8 February 2018 WMK

As Japan and China recognize the altered dynamics around the Pacific Rim, some observers believe that they may inch toward a possible reconciliation. Such a Sino-Japanese rapprochement is unlikely, however, given their long-standing historical enmity. Negative attitudes toward Japan are widespread among main- land Chinese. According to a recent Pew survey, less than 10% of Chinese think that Japan can be trusted—and the feeling is mutual. Young Chinese, who did not personally experience the war, express surprisingly vehement anti-Japanese feelings—sentiments that are due in no small part to state propaganda and patri- otic education in schools that make criticism of Japan politically correct.92 Moreover, the Chinese see themselves as the natural hegemon, and in their— worldview, the Japanese should be subordinate to them—in other words, Chinese elites refuse to accept Japan’s legitimacy as a major Asian state. Neither Shinzo Abe nor his successors will tolerate such a future for Japan, which is why Japan is offering maritime and development assistance to countries like Vietnam and the Philippines. Ultimately, however, China’s rise and America’s retreat to a more offshore posture will force into existence a military alliance between Japan and India (and, perhaps, Russia as well) to restore a regional balance of power to counter growing Chinese power.

2022 Michigan Disadvantage

2ac/1ar --- AT: China War

China can’t fight – imperial overstretch

Blumenthal, 17 - Daniel Blumenthal is director of Asian Studies at the American Enterprise Institute (“A Strategy for China’s Imperial Overstretch” The American Interest, 3/1,

2022 Michigan Disadvantage

1ar --- AT: China is Benevolent

China’s not a benevolent hegemon – refusal to open national market, rejects free trade and island building

Danner and Martin 19 - Research Associate at the Miami-Florida Jean Monnet European Center of Excellence, Florida International University (FIU), USA, and Honorary Research Fellow at the East Asia Security Centre, Bond University, Australia, Ph.D., is Associate Professor in the Department of Politics & International Relations at Florida International University (Lukas K. and Félix E., “China's hegemonic intentions and trajectory: Will it opt for benevolent, coercive, or Dutch-style hegemony?,” Wiley Online Library, 4-18-19, , Accessed 7-1-22, LASA-AH)

This article attempted to decipher and explain China's rise and its future direction as a significant leader in the international system. First, consistent with the benevolent-hegemon type, we observed how China's active involvement in the management of the global environment and the UN PKMs indicate this possibility. Nonetheless, these are mainly political activities rather than economic. The benevolent-hegemon type would suggest proactive and liberal sociopolitical and economic practices. Thus far, China does not appear willing and able to implement these in the immediate future. First, it refuses to open its national market fully to the foreign competitor. Second, it maintains a very tight grip on its currency value and fluctuation for narrow, selfish, national interests. Third, it rejects promoting freer and fairer trade among all actors, irrespective of their level of reciprocity. To be sure, China is a hugely wealthy actor, but one that practices a type of neomercantilist approach in the international market as evidenced by its business practices in the global economy. Second, we also observed China's island-building policy and its drive for the establishment of a Sino-Russian Entente to neutralise a potential regional and systemic enemy. These are actions that we categorise as consistent with the coercive-hegemon type, similar to the cases of Wilhelmine Germany and Imperial Japan and in the 19th and 20th centuries, respectively.

2022 Michigan Disadvantage

2ac/1ar --- China is Aggressive

Island Building

Danner and Martin 19 - Research Associate at the Miami-Florida Jean Monnet European Center of Excellence, Florida International University (FIU), USA, and Honorary Research Fellow at the East Asia Security Centre, Bond University, Australia, Ph.D., is Associate Professor in the Department of Politics & International Relations at Florida International University (Lukas K. and Félix E., “China's hegemonic intentions and trajectory: Will it opt for benevolent, coercive, or Dutch-style hegemony?,” Wiley Online Library, 4-18-19, , Accessed 7-1-22, LASA-AH)

6.1 Model Case 1: Island building in the South China Sea as a form of Coercive hegemony China continued to pursue through 2018 an aggressive strategy to expand and maintain a foothold in the South China Sea. It claimed rocks, islets, and archipelagos in this body of water to enlarge its maritime territory and reach deep into Southeast Asia, close to the Malacca Strait. China achieved this objective at the expense of several Southeast Asian states who also claim jurisprudence in this area. These are Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia, Brunei, and Taiwan. These states' claims clash with China's in the area that the Chinese refer to as the “Nine-Dash-Line.” China bases its territorial claim on historical maps, albeit they are not entirely conclusive. A 2016 verdict by an International Tribunal based in The Hague ruled negatively against China: In a case where the Philippines filed a complaint against Chinese conduct disregarding its maritime borders, the verdict ruled against China and in favour of the Philippines. China, of course, ignored and disavowed the ruling, as well as making clear that the tribunal did not have jurisdiction over the matter (Phillips, Holmes, & Bowcott, 2016). China has gone beyond publicly announcing its territorial claim. Instead, it has actively started to produce real and tangible facts by engaging in the process of “island building.” The construction process begins by China taking an islet, which sometimes is not larger than a rock, and transferring building materials via ship to create helipads, harbours, and airstrips. Some have compared these artificial islands with sort of China's stationary aircraft carriers. China wants to send a loud and clear signal to regional neighbours and the rest of the world, particularly to other great powers. It wants to underscore its maritime territorial claims, with absolute and full vigour and unwavering resolve. Hence, rather than leaving unperturbed uninhabited and partially submerged islands, rocks, and islets, without any physical signs of territorial claim and sovereignty, China builds this new-aged military bases. These are all projections of China's geostrategic reach. China's fortification drive and island-building program in the South China Sea is consistent with revisionist and coercive policies. It deliberately revises borders. This trend is reminiscent of the violent rising by other great powers in history. France, Germany, and Imperial Japan in the 18th and 20th centuries, respectively, pursued such territorial expansion and aggressive practice. This aggressive territorial expansion constitutes the type of evidence that many analysts will cease on to conclude that China is on a collision course with other great powers and neighbours. The policy will lead to diplomatic and possibly military conflict over these territories. In this sense, it will be a harbinger of China's violent rise.

2022 Michigan Disadvantage

2ac/1ar --- No Mindset Shift

Ceding to China destroys US influence AND no mindset shift – policymakers are locked in

Layne 18 - professor at Texas A&M University's. George H. W. Bush School of Government and Public Service (Christopher, “The US–Chinese power shift and the end of the Pax Americana,” 2018, , Accessed 6-30-22, LASA-AH)

The lock-in strategy also assumes that if the Pax Americana’s institutions are reformed, Beijing (and other non-western emerging powers) will find it more attractive to remain in the post-1945 international order than to overturn it. That assumption, however, is logically flawed: achieving lock-in by reforming the existing international order presumes that the United States can have its cake (preserving the Pax Americana) and eat it too (reforming the current international system’s legacy institutions). But, as we all know, when the cake is eaten, it’s gone. Reform—at least, any kind of reform that would appeal to China—would mean the United States yielding significant power in international institutions to accommodate Beijing. However, doing so would reduce US ability to shape outcomes, diminish Washington’s voice in international institutions, and impose constraints on US autonomy in foreign and domestic policy.79 As University of Birmingham lecturer Sevasti-Eleni Vezirgiannidou observes with respect to insti- tutional reform: ‘It is questionable whether this will really preserve US influence or rather, on the contrary, diminish it, as the United States will have to share power in a reformed order and thus will be restricted in its ability to act unilaterally.’80 The US foreign policy establishment may talk the talk of reforming the interna- tional order (and the institutions that underpin it), but it is doubtful it will walk the walk with respect to reform, because that would mean accepting a downsized American role in international politics. On the contrary, Washington’s opposition to the AIIB indicates that the United States is not prepared to see its influence in the international order diminished. And, with respect to reforming the post-1945 international order to accommodate the reality of a risen China, this is the nub of the problem: instead of preserving the Pax Americana, reform would lead to changes in the international order that would undermine it. Of course, regardless of whether there is institutional reform, the coming decades are likely to witness major changes in the international order irrespective of America’s preferences.

2022 Michigan Disadvantage

2ac/1ar --- Deterrence Works

The perception of resolve is a greater predictor of how war starts than any other factor – China prioritizes it over capabilities

Mastro 15-an assistant professor of security studies at the Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University, “Why Chinese Assertiveness is Here to Stay”, The Washington Quarterly, 21 Jan 2015, italics in original

These efforts are commendable—the United States rightly works to preserve its military superiority and retain its ability to project power in the region. During the Cold War, when the greatest pacing threats were land conflicts, forward deploying U.S. forces in Europe and Asia were sufficient to demonstrate the credibility of the U.S. commitment to peace in those regions. But China is currently testing the waters not because its leaders are uncertain about the balance of power, but because they are probing the balance of resolve. This means that staying ahead in terms of military might is insufficient in contemporary East Asia.

2022 Michigan Disadvantage

2ac/1ar --- China Leadership Fails

Chinese leadership fails – the US is successful

Zhao, 18 – Suisheng Zhao is professor and director of the Center for China-US Cooperation at Josef Korbel School of International Studies, University of Denver (“A Revisionist Stakeholder: China and the Post-World War II World Order” Journal of Contemporary China, DOI: 10.1080/10670564.2018.1458029

But China is not ready. First, as one Chinese scholar admitted, ‘China does not have the comprehensive national strength to change the current global order led by the US and other Western countries for more than 70 years’.41 A fragile rising power much weaker than most outsiders think, China is a middle-income country, facing immense internal hurdles, such as the environmental destruction, rampant corruption, inequality, and huge local government debt, all of which have the potential to derail its rise. Preoccupied by mounting challenges, Chinese leaders have to fight an uphill battle to mobilize resources and internal support for the global leadership role. China is far from achieving the donor status of many OECD countries. For one prominent Chinese scholar, the most dangerous challenge is the extreme-leftist policy-line and ‘the false-large-empty’ (假大空) slogans, making international promises and setting strategic objectives beyond the reach of China’s national strength.42 China’s international initiatives do not play a critical role in China’s rise but are the consequences of its rise.