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2022 Michigan Disadvantage
NUCLEAR CREDIBILITY DA › Aff › Norms Check

NPT and norms check prolif

McGlinchey 22 (Stephen McGlinchey PhD - Senior Lecturer in International Relations at the University of the West of England, “Nuclear Weapons and International Relations”, E-International Relations, 27 March 2022, , MG)

The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (1970) – often known as the Non-Proliferation Treaty – sought to channel nuclear technology into civilian uses and to recognise the destabilising effect of further nuclear proliferation. It was a triumph of diplomacy. The genius of the treaty was that it was aware of the realities of the international politics of the time. It was not a disarmament treaty as great powers would simply not give up their nuclear weapons, fearful their security would be diminished. So, instead of pursuing an impossible goal of eliminating nuclear weapons, the Treaty sought to freeze the number of nations that had nuclear weapons at the five states that already possessed them. Simultaneously, those five nations were encouraged to share non-military nuclear technology with other states – such as nuclear energy and nuclear medicine – so that others would not feel tempted to pursue nuclear weapons. In short, those who had nuclear weapons could keep them. Those who did not have them would be allowed to benefit from the non-military research and innovation of the existing nuclear powers.

Due to the well-considered design of the treaty and its enforcement, it has been highly successful. Following the end of the Cold War, the Non-Proliferation Treaty was permanently extended in 1995. Granted, it has not kept the number of nuclear nations to five, but there are still fewer than ten – which is far from the twenty or more projected before the treaty entered into force. States with nascent nuclear weapons programmes, such as Brazil and South Africa, gave them up due to international pressure. Today, only a small number of states are outside its bounds. India, Pakistan and Israel never joined as they (controversially in each case) had nuclear ambitions that they were not prepared to give up due to national security priorities. Underlining the weight of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, in 2003, when North Korea decided to rekindle earlier plans to develop nuclear weapons, they withdrew from the treaty rather than violate it. To date, North Korea remains the only state to withdraw from the Non-Proliferation Treaty.

2022 Michigan Disadvantage
NUCLEAR CREDIBILITY DA › Aff › No Deterrence !

Nuclear deterrence is academic, pundit, and logical garbage

Barash 18 (David P. Barash - professor of psychology emeritus at the University of Washington, “Nuclear deterrence is a myth. And a lethal one at that”, The Guardian, 14 January 2018, , MG)

Advocates of nuclear deterrence insist that we should thank it for the fact that a third world war has been avoided, even when tensions between the two superpowers – the US and the USSR – ran high.

Some supporters even maintain that deterrence set the stage for the fall of the Soviet Union and the defeat of Communism. In this telling, the West’s nuclear deterrent prevented the USSR from invading western Europe, and delivered the world from the threat of Communist tyranny.

2022 Michigan Disadvantage
NUCLEAR CREDIBILITY DA › Aff › No Prolif !

Studies prove nuclear prolif has either no effect on the risk of interstate conflict or reverses it

Suzuki 15 (Akisato Suzuki - Adjunct Research Fellow at the School of Politics and International Relations, University College Dublin, “Is more better or worse? New empirics on nuclear proliferation and interstate conflict by Random Forests”, Research and Politics, 2015, , MG)

The main findings reveal that the optimist expectation of the relationship between nuclear proliferation and interstate conflict is empirically supported:9 first, a larger number of nuclear states on average decreases the systemic propensity for interstate conflict; and second, there is no clear evidence that the emergence of new nuclear states increases the systemic propensity for interstate conflict. Gartzke and Jo (2009) argue that nuclear weapons themselves have no exogenous effect on the probability of conflict, because when a state is engaged in or expects to engage in conflict, it may develop nuclear weapons to keep fighting, or to prepare for, that conflict. If this selection effect existed, the analysis should overestimate the conflict-provoking effect of nuclear proliferation in the above model. Still, the results indicate that a larger number of nuclear states are associated with fewer disputes in the system.

This conclusion, however, raises questions about how to reconcile this study’s findings with those of a recent quantitative dyadic-level study (Bell and Miller, 2015). The current paper finds that nuclear proliferation decreases the systemic propensity for interstate conflict, while Bell and Miller (2015) find that nuclear symmetry has no significant effect on dyadic conflict, but that nuclear asymmetry is associated with a higher probability of dyadic conflict. It is possible that nuclear proliferation decreases conflict through the conflict-mitigating effects of extended nuclear deterrence and/or fear of nuclear states’ intervention, to the extent that these effects overwhelm the conflict-provoking effect of nuclear–asymmetrical dyads. Thus, dyadic-level empirics cannot solely be relied on to infer causal links between nuclear proliferation and a systemic propensity for conflict. The systemic-level empirics deserve attention.

2022 Michigan Disadvantage
NUCLEAR CREDIBILITY DA › Aff › No Prolif !

Statistical modelling proves no nuke prolif impact

Cohen 16 (Michael D. Cohen PhD - convenor of the National Security College’s PhD program and Senior Lecturer at the Crawford School of Public Policy, “How nuclear proliferation causes conflict: the case for optimistic pessimism”, The Nonproliferation Review, 2016, , MG)

University of Pennsylvania’s Michael Horowitz conducted a statistical analysis and found that the probability of new nuclear states reciprocating disputes quickly increases and then decreases over time.

The probability that a nuclear state will reciprocate a dispute with a non-nuclear state drops from .53 one year after developing nuclear weapons to .23 in year 56. Two new nuclear powers are 67 percent more likely to reciprocate a dispute than two average non-nuclear states. Two experienced nuclear powers are 65 percent less likely to reciprocate than two average non-nuclear states. The probability of dispute reciprocation between an experienced and new nuclear power is 26 percent greater than two non-nuclear states, and the probability of a very experienced state and a somewhat experienced state reciprocating is 42 percent less than two non-nuclear states.86

2022 Michigan Disadvantage
NUCLEAR CREDIBILITY DA › Aff › No I/L

Nuclear extended deterrence does nothing to prevent nuke prolif – Turkey and Germany prove

Sauer and van der Zwaan 12 (Tom Sauer - Assistant Professor in International Politics at the University of Antwerp , Bob van der Zwaan - Senior Scientist at the Energy Research Centre of the Netherlands in Amsterdam, “US Tactical Nuclear Weapons in Europe after NATO’s Lisbon Summit: Why their Withdrawal is Desirable and Feasible”, International Relations, 2012, , MG)

Extended deterrence as a brake against further nuclear proliferation Some experts claim that thanks to US nuclear weapons stationed in Europe some host nations have agreed not to develop their own nuclear weapons.53 The states most cited are Turkey and, to a lesser extent, Germany. This argument, however, is flawed. In NATO there is no proof that it was extended deterrence that prevented nuclear proliferation. Germany is legally bound not to develop nuclear weapons because of its constitution, and German public opinion has always been very much anti-nuclear. According to Harald Müller, observers regularly underestimate how deeply rooted Germany’s non-nuclear status is in its political culture:

Any German government that sought to effect a change in the country’s nuclear status would risk public protest ranging all the way up to civil-war-style conditions compared to which the events surrounding the shifting of Castor [civilian nuclear spent fuel] containers would probably appear trivial.54

2022 Michigan Disadvantage
NUCLEAR CREDIBILITY DA › Aff › No I/L

Nuclear is dead – everyone moved on

Chalmers and Lunn 10 (Malcolm Chalmers - Professorial Fellow in British Security Policy at the Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies, Simon Lunn - Associate Fellow of the Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies, “NATO’s Tactical Nuclear Dilemma”, RUSI, March 2010, , MG)

Since the Cold War ended, however, the role of these weapons in NATO strategy has been dramatically reduced, as have their numbers. Unofficial estimates suggest that only around 150-250 US warheads remain in Europe, all free-fall gravity bombs designed for use with US and allied tactical aircraft. This reduction has largely taken place away from the public spotlight, with little interest beyond the specialist defence and arms control communities.

Yet the prospect that this protracted drawdown might soon lead to their final elimination has now triggered a major debate on the role of nuclear weapons in NATO strategy. This is between those who believe that elimination could be a relatively cost-free approach to taking forward the disarmament agenda set out in President Obama’s April 2009 Prague speech; and those who fear it could do serious damage to the credibility of US extended nuclear deterrence. As a result, reducing from 200 weapons to zero looks set to be much more controversial than the 90 per cent reduction (from 2,500 to 200) that has taken place since 1991. What these weapons lack in operational utility (given their short range and location, together with the continuing availability of larger and more powerful strategic arsenals) is now greatly outweighed by their symbolic significance.

2022 Michigan Disadvantage
NUCLEAR CREDIBILITY DA › Aff › I/L Turn

Relying on nuclear doesn’t reassure allies but encourages nuke prolif – enhanced conventional deterrence solves

Blechman and Rumbaugh 15 (Barry Blechman PhD - co-founder and a Distinguished Fellow of the Stimson Center, Russell Rumbaugh - American defense policy advisor and retired military officer who was the nominee to serve as assistant secretary of the Navy, “Protecting US Security by Minimizing the Role of Nuclear Weapons: A NEW US NUCLEAR POLICY”, Stimson, May 2015, , MG)

Maintaining allies’ confidence in US commitments requires frequent consultations, political reassurances, high-level meetings, and cooperation in military planning. US conventional forces also provide a global, visible, flexible, and credible means of reassuring allies — particularly when they are deployed on the ally’s territory or conduct temporary deployments to exercise jointly with allied forces. Though nuclear guarantees are an important component of US security commitments, allies doubt them more than they doubt US conventional commitments because of the greater risk they pose to the US homeland. If an adversary in fact attacked a US ally with conventional forces, the adversary would have already discounted the US commitment to defend the ally. And if US credibility had already been discounted, the potentially graver consequences of a nuclear response would make nuclear guarantees even less credible in the eyes of the adversary. Consequently, the US should make clear repeatedly that it will fulfill all of its treaty obligations and would respond conventionally to conventional attacks against allies, and with nuclear weapons in the event of nuclear attacks. The long history of US security commitments, and the sacrifices in blood and money which the American people have repeatedly made in defense of these commitments, provide ample evidence that US security guarantees are credible.

Although the US should pursue all feasible conventional and diplomatic means to assure allies, there is no level of force deployment, whether conventional or nuclear, that can guarantee allies’ confidence in American security commitments. Some allies have expressed concerns about American security commitments despite the presence of tens-of-thousands of permanently based US forces, underscoring the dependence of allied confidence on factors beyond military presence. Joint command and control of tactical nuclear weapons under NATO nuclear sharing arrangements has apparently failed to reassure some NATO members, which demonstrates that the forward deployment of nuclear weapons may also be insufficient to assure allies. Furthermore, though it is undiplomatic to acknowledge, allies often express grave concerns about potential threats and worry about US security commitments, but then fail to take steps to significantly increase their own defense capabilities, raising questions about the seriousness of their concerns. And the frank truth is that the alternatives to dependence on US security guarantees are even less palatable for most US allies. Allying with Russia or China is not a reasonable alternative to a US alliance, attempting to balance Russian or Chinese military capabilities unilaterally or in combination with neighboring states would be a difficult and unnecessary choice, and developing nuclear weapons of their own is in most cases too far a stretch financially or politically.

2022 Michigan Disadvantage
NUCLEAR CREDIBILITY DA › Aff › Link Turn

No link or we turn – policy makers think nuclear deterrence is eternal and AND think emerging tech makes nuclear deterrence better

Onderco and Zutt 21 (Michal Onderco PhD - Max Weber Fellow at the European University Institute, Madeline Zutt - research associate at Erasmus University Rotterdam, “Emerging technology and nuclear security: What does the wisdom of the crowd tell us?”, Contemporary Security Policy, 23 May 2021, , MG)

We have studied the views that experts and decision-makers have when it comes to the impact of emerging technologies on nuclear deterrence and disarmament. Beyond the substantial findings, discussed below, our article also demonstrates that expert surveys might be a suitable measure to map the views of epistemic community when faced with future, unpredictable developments. Regardless of a particular approach one uses, using multiple expert insights is a promising way to deal with uncertainty about the future. This is not related only to the field of security policy or international relations. As DeWees and Minson (2018) note, “the combination of multiple, independent judgments is often more accurate than even an expert’s individual judgment.” While there are possible risks (as DeWees andMinson make clear, once experts make up their mind, it is difficult to persuade them otherwise), faced with uncertainty the wisdom of the crowd offers an attractive option.

Our respondents noted that the destabilizing impacts of emerging technologies in the nuclear realm come from the fact that these technologies compound the risks of close calls, mishaps and misunderstandings. They were concerned about the potentials for future close calls and misinterpretation and therefore thought that as emerging technologies become more ubiquitous, they also make nuclear deterrence more unstable.

2022 Michigan Disadvantage
NUCLEAR CREDIBILITY DA › Impact › AO – Turkish Arms Race

That causes a nuclear daisy chain – escalation and miscalc are likely

Kahl et al. 13 (Colin H. Kahl - Senior Fellow at the Center for a New American Security and an associate professor in the Security Studies Program at Georgetown University’s Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service, Melissa G. Dalton - Visiting Fellow at the Center for a New American Security, Matthew Irvine - Research Associate at the Center for a New American Security, “Atomic Kingdom: If Iran Builds the Bomb, Will Saudi Arabia Be Next?”, Center for a New American Security, February 2013, , MG)

The bad news is that low probability is not the same as no probability, and all of the possible Saudi responses entail significant risks and costs. In the near term, it is technically impossible for Saudi Arabia to indigenously develop nuclear weapons; the risk of Pakistan transferring nuclear weapons to the Kingdom is also overstated. Nevertheless, the risk of the latter scenario is not zero. Moreover, even if Riyadh fails to acquire its own nuclear weapons shortly after Iran does, a Saudi hedging strategy could still produce such a capability over the long run. Either the low-probability Pakistani option or the higher-probability hedging path could lead to the emergence of a poly-nuclear Middle East, with profound consequences for the region. The basic principles of nuclear deterrence that held during the Cold War, and that continue to hold in South and East Asia today, would likely hold if there were multiple nuclear powers in the Middle East. However, tensions and crises would probably increase. And even if all the relevant actors were assumed to be rational, various factors – the absence of secure second-strike capabilities (at least for some period of time), unreliable early warning and command-and-control systems, close geographic proximity and deep mutual distrust – could still inadvertently produce a regional nuclear war via miscalculations, accidents or unauthorized use.183

It is also good news that the Saudis are less likely to be attracted to a Pakistani extended deterrence guarantee (and Islamabad is less likely to offer one) than is commonly assumed. But should this moderate-probability scenario emerge, it would extend the South Asian geopolitical competition directly into the Middle East, thereby connecting two of the world’s most crisis- and conflict-prone regions into a nuclear daisy chain.

2022 Michigan Disadvantage
NUCLEAR CREDIBILITY DA › Impact › AO – Turkish Arms Race

Turkey pursuing nuclear weapons triggers Middle East nuclear arms races and destroys Euro-Atlantic alliance cohesion

Apostolou-Katsaros 21 (Konstantinos Apostolou-Katsaros PhD – Lecturer and Research Associate at the University of Brighton, “Turkey’s Nuclear Dreams are a Nightmare for the International Community”, Greek City Times, 13 September 2021, , MG)

Russia has every reason to provide the know-how for the construction of Turkey’s Akkuyu Nuclear Power Plant in an attempt to hinder NATO’s unity. However, the Russian-Turkish  cooperation will not feed the latter’s ambition in attaining nuclear weapons. Their competing interests  in many cases. Russia wouldn’t want to see a nuclear arsenal in such close proximity to its borders. The leader of the Liberal Democratic Party of Russia Vladimir Zhirinovsky is : if Iran and especially Turkey have nuclear weapons, they will turn against Russia. This does not suggest that Turkey will not achieve its aim. On the contrary it means that Turkey will have to overcome many obstacles set by important states with interests in the wider region, such as , , ,  and the . Above all, Turkey will have to face the growing conflict of interest with the US. There are many reasons upon which Turkey will not be tolerated as nuclear-weapon state. As abovementioned, this will instigate its geostrategic autonomy, causing the existing Euro-Atlantic security architecture to disintegrate. In addition, it will trigger a nuclear arms race in the wider region. All of these destabilization fears have long been  by the US.

Consequently Turkey’s alleged choice to approach the co-religionist (and less pro-Western under the leadership of Imran Khan) and willing Pakistanis for supporting its nuclear-weapons program ( ,  ,  and ), does not come as a surprise, since it has little or no other option in this venture. The two Sunni forces share the same strategic goals in the Mediterranean and India which derive from their close  and  ties. Their defense cooperation agreements ( ,  ,  ,  ,  ,  and ) are already expanding as a result of the events in Afghanistan which contributed to further strengthen their relations ( ,  and ). The director of the , Jonathan Speyer,  that “Ankara’s strong and burgeoning strategic ties to Pakistan are causing international concern regarding the possibility of a transfer of nuclear weapons knowledge between the two countries. Turkey already has the will and the raw materials. This knowledge is the factor it currently lacks.”

2022 Michigan Disadvantage
NUCLEAR CREDIBILITY DA › Impact › AO – Turkish Arms Race

Concerns over nuclear credibility push Turkey to pursue nukes

Fitzpatrick 11 (Mark Fitzpatrick - director of the nonproliferation and disarmament program at the International Institute for Strategic Studies and former US diplomat serving inter alia as Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for NonProliferation, “How Europeans view tactical nuclear weapons on their continent”, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 2011, , MG)

In Turkey’s case, the US nuclear weapons stationed at Incirlik Air Force base are seen as playing an important security role, providing reassurance of American assistance in the event of an emergency and a “hook” tethering Turkey to the European mainland. The nuclear weapons also appear to perform a nonproliferation function: As long as Turkey has access to US nuclear weapons it can turn to in extremis, there is no need for Ankara to consider developing its own nuclear weapons option. Given that the whole of Turkey falls within range of Iranian nuclear-capable ballistic missiles, the nuclear weapons may be more relevant now than they were in the past two decades. Turkish officials say they do not feel directly threatened by Iran, but they do feel a strong need to maintain power parity with the other non-Arab Muslim regional power. If Iran acquires nuclear weapons, Turkey’s relative power in the region will weaken and its sense of security will diminish if the US arsenal is withdrawn precipitously. If US nuclear weapons were to be withdrawn from other NATO countries, Turkey would have reason to feel exposed and to question the fundamental principles of alliance solidarity and burdensharing that have been the basis of Turkey’s nuclear hosting arrangements (Kibaroglu, 2010).

For Ankara, the deterrent role of the US nuclear weapons in Turkey has shifted focus from the Soviet Union to Turkey’s regional neighbors Iraq, Syria, and Iran-all of which have at some point acquired unconventional weapons systems and ballistic missiles (Kibaroglu, 2010). Given Turkey’s recent and ongoing rapprochement with these countries, however, the deterrence rationale for the nuclear stationing has eroded. Efforts to bring about a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East may also undermine the viability of the deployments. In addition, many Turks have a lingering skepticism about NATO security guarantees, which they did not feel were forthcoming in the first and second Gulf Wars.

2022 Michigan Disadvantage
NUCLEAR CREDIBILITY DA › Impact › T/C – NATO

The US clarifying their retaliation posture encourages warfare, alienates allies, and destroys NATO unity – turns case

Robertson 21 (George Robertson - a former UK defence secretary and was the 10th secretary-general of Nato, “US nuclear arms shift could raise risk of inadvertent conflict”, Financial Times, 14 November 2021, , MG) Biden has already hinted that he is considering a “sole purpose” policy, a pledge that the US would use nuclear weapons only in a narrowly prescribed set of circumstances. “I believe that the sole purpose of the US nuclear arsenal should be deterring — and, if necessary, retaliating against — a nuclear attack,” he wrote in March 2020. “As president, I will work to put that belief into practice.” A number of other influential voices are now encouraging a move in this direction, or even a shift to a policy of “no first use” of nuclear weapons. For the sake of Nato unity, these ideas must be resisted.

“No first use” sounds appealing, and its advocates argue that the US can set an example to other nuclear powers that would, in time, reduce the threat of nuclear conflict. They are wrong. There are three reasons why both this and “sole purpose” would undermine deterrence, divide Nato and increase the risk of conflict.

First, a US declaration would be treated with scepticism by potential adversaries — because authoritarian regimes are likely to judge others by their own standards — and could even encourage them towards military aggression if the threat of nuclear reprisals is lifted. Paradoxically, changing the present definition of nuclear deterrence would increase the risk of a major conventional conflict that could return us to the era of mass civilian casualties last seen in the 20th century. Second, Nato as a nuclear alliance is deliberately ambiguous about the circumstances in which it might authorise the deployment of nuclear weapons to deter attacks on the territory or interests of its members. In the aftermath of the cold war, when there was no credible conventional threat to Nato’s European allies, the alliance reduced its emphasis on nuclear deterrence. But Russia’s invasions of Georgia in 2008 and Ukraine in 2014, and the massive boost to Moscow’s conventional and nuclear capabilities in the past few years, have necessarily raised the profile of nuclear weapons in Nato’s defence posture.

2022 Michigan Disadvantage
NUCLEAR CREDIBILITY DA › Impact › ! – Prolif O/W Climate

Tests prove nuclear proliferation outweighs and turns climate change

Toon et al. 21 (Owen B. Toon PhD - Professor in the Department of Atmospheric and Oceanic Sciences at the University of Colorado, Alan Robock PhD - American climatologist and currently a Distinguished Professor in the Department of Environmental Sciences at Rutgers University , Richard P. Turco - American atmospheric scientist, and Professor at the Institute of the Environment, Department of Atmospheric and Oceanic Sciences, University of California, “Modelling Armageddon: The effects of nuclear weapons on climate”, Open Access Government, 11 May 2021, , MG)

Obviously, all of these factors could never be determined precisely beforehand. Even so, enough work has been done – exhaustively in many areas – to define the boundaries of the problem. For example, the damages inflicted by a nuclear blast and prompt radiation are relatively well understood from more than 500 above-ground weapons tests conducted from the 1940s through the 1960s. Also known are the incendiary effects of nuclear bursts, but these are less well known partly because testing was not as focused on this aspect of nuclear weapons. Understanding the climate changes that might result from smoke produced by nuclear fires requires knowledge of the types and amounts of fuel consumed, the quantities and forms of black carbon (the highly absorbing component of smoke) generated, and the fraction of that black carbon deposited in the upper atmosphere, where it could reside for years.

As each of these questions is slowly being resolved, the overall uncertainty in the outcome of nuclear war is steadily being reduced. New evidence, for example, from large forest fires in Canada (2017) and Australia (2020) reveals that smoke from intense fires is readily lofted into the stratosphere. There, without rain to remove it, smoke can be tracked by satellites over many months, and its distribution analysed using the same models employed to predict global changes following a nuclear war, including nuclear winter. The behaviour of the wildfire smoke mimics that predicted for massive smoke injections expected from nuclear-ignited firestorms, including alterations in wind patterns and air temperatures3. Moreover, newer simulations of historical volcanic eruptions also indicate similar effects – such as the “year without a summer” that followed the Tambora eruption of 1815 – and which was noted by Ronald Reagan as a reason to fear a nuclear winter.

2022 Michigan Disadvantage
NUCLEAR CREDIBILITY DA › Impact › ! – Nuke Prolif – AT: Feasibility

Declassified government documents say it became feasible 30 YEARS AGO

O’Shei 91 (Donald M. O’Shei – U.S. Army General that represented the US in SALT talks with Russia, “IMPLICATIONS OF NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION”, Department of State, Revised 1991 [Eighteenth Session of the Senior Seminar in Foreign Policy for the Department of State Originally], , MG)

There is a school of thought that any concentration of Pu-240 or Pu-242 in a fuel of over 1-2% renders the fuel unsuitable for weapons manufacture. Since the enriched uranium reactor produces such a waste, and since isotopes of plutonium cannot be separated chemically, this is equivalent to saying that only the plutonium produced by a natural uranium reactor is of weapons quality. This view is subject to question. It is conceded that a great power interested in only very high quality and control standards in weapons would avoid such fuel. This would not necessarily follow for a nuclear aspirant. If high Pu-240 content, say up to 8-10%, plutonium were the only available material, a country might accept the unreliability and fabrication complexities associated with such fuels in preference to having no weapons at all. While there is no evidence that this has ever been done, it should not be ruled out as a possibility.

Recapitulation

2022 Michigan Disadvantage
NUCLEAR CREDIBILITY DA › Impact › ! – Nuke Prolif – AT: Feasibility

It’s completely feasible by literally everyone – coming from the person presidentially appointed to deal with nuclear threats

Rosenthal and Stern 19 (Michael D. Rosenthal PhD - served in the United States Department of State and the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA) as a member of the Senior Executive Service as well as in the Department of Safeguards at the International Atomic Energy Agency and also held positions at Brookhaven National Laboratory and the Domestic Nuclear Detection Office, Warren Stern - internationally recognized leader and manager in the area of nuclear safeguards, safety and security. He is currently a senior advisor in Brookhaven Lab's Nonproliferation and National Security Department (NNSD). Stern has held leadership positions at the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), Department of State, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). President Barack Obama appointed him to lead DHS's Domestic Nuclear Detection Office as well, “Deterring Nuclear Proliferation: The Importance of IAEA Safeguards”, Brookhaven National Laboratory, April 2019, , MG)

Dealing with the second problem with reactor-grade plutonium, the heat generated by Pu-238 and Pu-240, requires careful management of the heat in the device. There are well developed means for addressing these problems and they are not considered a significant hurdle to the production of nuclear weapons, even for developing states or sub-national groups. The radiation from Americium-241 means that more shielding and greater precautions to protect personnel might be necessary when building and handling nuclear explosives made from reactor-grade plutonium. But these difficulties are not prohibitive. While reactor-grade plutonium has a slightly larger critical mass than weapon-grade plutonium (meaning that somewhat more material would be needed for a bomb), this would not be a major impediment for design of either crude or sophisticated nuclear weapons.

The degree to which these obstacles can be overcome depends on the sophistication of the state or group attempting to produce a nuclear weapon. At the lowest level of sophistication, a potential proliferating state or subnational group using designs and technologies no more sophisticated than those used in first-generation nuclear weapons could build a nuclear weapon from reactorgrade plutonium that would have an assured, reliable yield of one or a few kilotons (and a probable yield significantly higher than that). At the other end of the spectrum, advanced nuclear weapon states such as the United States and Russia, using modern designs, could produce weapons from reactor-grade plutonium having reliable explosive yields, weight, and other characteristics generally comparable to those of weapons made from weapon-grade plutonium. The greater radioactivity would mean increased radiation doses to workers fabricating such weapons, and military personnel spending long periods of time in close proximity to them, and the greater heat and radiation generated from reactor-grade plutonium might result in a need to replace certain weapon components more frequently. Proliferating states using designs of intermediate sophistication could produce weapons with assured yields substantially higher than the kilotonrange possible with a simple, first-generation nuclear device. *

2022 Michigan Disadvantage
NUCLEAR CREDIBILITY DA › Impact › ! – Nuclear Proliferation

Empirics prove nuclear proliferation increases risk of nuclear war

Quek 16 (Kai Quek PhD – Associate Professor of Politics at the University of Hong Kong, “Nuclear Proliferation and the Use of Nuclear Options: Experimental Tests”, Political Research Quarterly, June 2016, , MG)

Does nuclear proliferation affect the risk that nuclear weapons will be used in a crisis? The question implicates human survival but is difficult to study, as observations of nuclear war do not actually exist. Our empirical knowl- edge is thus limited. I use experimental games with nuclear options to circumvent the observational con- straint and construct empirical tests. I find that decisions are mostly peaceful at N = 2 despite the existence of nuclear options with a relative first-strike advantage. This finding is especially relevant as most nuclear-state con- frontations in history had been bilateral crises. More gen- erally, I find that one is less likely to choose the nuclear option when it is known that the number of nuclear actors in the crisis is small, and more likely to choose the nuclear option when it is known that the number of nuclear actors is large. In particular, a jump in the number of nuclear actors in crisis beyond N = 2 significantly increases the chance of choosing the nuclear option. Preliminary probes also suggest that players in inter-alliance crises are more peaceful when they have second-strike counter- value capabilities, and that nuclear framing has no sig- nificant effect on the use of the nuclear option

2022 Michigan Disadvantage
NUCLEAR CREDIBILITY DA › Impact › ! – Nuclear Proliferation

Allied prolif triggers collapses the arms control architecture

Chunsi 6/16 (Wu Chunsi – Senior Fellow and Director at the Institute for International Strategic Studies at SIIS, “Russia-Ukraine Conflict: Ramifications for Arms Control and Nuclear Disarmament”, ChinaUSFocus, 16 June 2022, , MG)

Third, the growing risk of more countries choosing to cross the nuclear threshold. Ukrainians have now come to regret their decision to give up the nuclear weapons on their soil—then the world’s third-largest arsenal—in the aftermath of the collapse of the Soviet Union. The pervasive sense of betrayal in Ukraine is prompting a defense policy rethink in many non-nuclear weapon states. Of special note is the fact that the latest list of nuclear aspirants now includes America’s leading allies in East Asia, Japan and South Korea, which are seriously contemplating the deployment of nuclear weapons on their soil.[2] It reminds the world that the risk of nuclear proliferation is not confined to Washington’s sworn enemies like Iran and North Korea. In retrospect, during the Cold War the United States either acquiesced to allies’ nuclear ambitions or simply rolled over when a country it wanted to court crossed the nuclear threshold. Nuclear proliferation among U.S. allies and partners will send a shock wave through the global arms control architecture.

2022 Michigan Disadvantage
NUCLEAR CREDIBILITY DA › Impact › ! – Nuclear Proliferation

It’s likely - encourages nuclear preemptive strikes and breaks down alliances

Sokolski 18 (Henry D. Sokolski - executive director of the Nonproliferation Policy Education Center and served as a member of the Central Intelligence Agency’s Senior Advisory Grou on two Congressional nuclear proliferation commissions, “Underestimated: Our Not So Peaceful Nuclear Future”, Strategic Studies Institute, August 2018, , MG)

Moreover, what the two skeptical academic camps agree on—that the dangers associated with nuclear weapons proliferation are exaggerated—is rebuttable. First, they gloss over the serious military risks faced by nations acquiring nuclear weapons. One can see this most clearly by their inattention to the numerous historical cases of preventive military actions taken against states attempting to build their first bomb and to serious plans countries have made to knock out the nuclear capabilities of new nuclear weapons states.

In the first category are: the British campaign against the Nazi-operated heavy water plant in Norway; Iran’s air strike against Iraq’s Osirak reactor in 1980; Israel’s attack of the same reactor in 1981; Iraq’s repeated strikes against Bushehr between 1984 and 1988; America’s air strike against Iraq’s nuclear facilities and Saddam’s failed Scud missile strike against Israel’s Dimona reactor in 1991; an American Tomahawk missile strike against Iraq’s uranium enrichment plant at Zaafaraniyah; British and American strikes against a variety of suspect Iraqi nuclear sites in 1998; Israel’s air strike against Syria’s covert nuclear reactor in 2007; and U.S. and Israeli covert and cyber attacks against Iran’s nuclear program from 2006 to 2010.

2022 Michigan Disadvantage
NUCLEAR CREDIBILITY DA › Mechanics › I/L – AT: Norms Check

History proves norms don’t resolve proliferation

Green 18 (Matthew Green – Journalism Teacher at Fremont High School, “How to Stop a Nuclear War: The Non-Proliferation Treaty, Explained”, KQED, 21 March 2018, , MG)

Despite the broad legal coverage of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), a string of failures since the early 1990s have highlighted the limitations of existing nonproliferation instruments to deter would-be nuclear weapon states. In theory, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) can refer countries that do not comply with the NPT to the UN Security Council (UNSC), which in turn can impose sanctions or other punitive measures. In practice, however, political calculations have often caused deadlock at the UNSC, enabling nuclear rogues such as Iran and North Korea to defy successive, fairly weak UN sanctions resolutions with virtual impunity. Multiple UNSC resolutions condemning these countries’ nuclear programs, including several that imposed sanctions, have done little to stem their nuclear ambitions. The outcome of the P5+1 negotiations to stem Iran’s nuclear program represents a major test for the nonproliferation regime’s ability to stop proliferation by states.

Another problem is the lack of adequate verification and enforcement mechanisms available to the IAEA, whose access, budget, personnel resources and technological resources fall far short of what would be needed to detect every NPT violation. In 2014, the IAEA’s overall budget was approximately $345 million, but an advisory panel determined that the IAEA’s budget would need to double by 2020 in order to meet future demands on its capabilities. Even discounting nuclear facilities that the IAEA does not have access to, such as those in North Korea, nuclear materials have reached the black market from facilities under IAEA safeguards, namely, from several in Pakistan. One positive step has been the widespread adoption of the IAEA Additional Protocol, which strengthens the agency’s inspections mandate and is in force in 124 countries, including all five recognized nuclear weapon states and, as of 2014, India. Nonetheless, more than half of all NPT member states—including Syria and Iran (which has ratified but not implemented the protocol)—have yet to agree to the additional safeguards and inspections capabilities allowed under the Additional Protocol. And despite U.S. efforts, the 2010 NPT Review Conference failed to achieve consensus to make the Additional Protocol mandatory for all member states.

2022 Michigan Disadvantage
NUCLEAR CREDIBILITY DA › Mechanics › I/L – AT: Norms Check

Norms don’t check – newest ev

Schepers 22 (Névine Schepers - a Senior Researcher in the Swiss and Euro-Atlantic Security Team at the Center for Security Studies (CSS) at ETH Zurich, “Russia’s War and the Global Nuclear Order”, Volume 10 of Policy Perspectives, June 2022, , MG)

The global nuclear order is entering a phase of high volatility and increasing nuclear risks. An increased reliance on nuclear deterrence – not only by Russia but also by other nuclear powers – may not lead to expected proliferation cascades in the near future as long as US security guarantees remain credible to its allies. However, diminishing disarmament prospects and a loss of credibility of negative security assurances risk polarizing the NPT regime further between nuclear weapon states and states that benefit from their security guarantees on the one hand and non-nuclear weapon states on the other. Russia’s shift from a leading state within the global nuclear order to one that actively seeks to undermine its norms and principles will be difficult to manage in a context in which the NPT is already reeling from ongoing crises and a lack of consensus.

An absence of arms control dialogue between the United States and Russia for the foreseeable future also implies there will likely be no successor to the New START treaty by 2026. This would result in reduced transparency and predictability in terms of current strategic arsenals and no pathway for further reductions or addressing other issues affecting strategic stability. With less visibility into decision-making processes or force postures, and little to no dialogue occurring between Russia and the US or between Russia and NATO, transatlantic coordination will remain key in order to manage an increasingly unpredictable security environment through enhanced deterrence.