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Audenaert 20 (Didier Audenaert - Senior Associate Fellow at the Egmont Institute, “Report Part Title: NATO’s nuclear role sharing: US nuclear weapon carried by European DCA”, Egmont Institute, 2020, , MG)
Current warfare operating procedures are likely to prioritise the use of stand-off weapons above gravity bombs. Consideration could therefore be given for relying entirely on the powerful and modern weapons in the US’ vast nuclear arsenal30 in fulfilling the role of “the supreme guarantee of the security of the Allies”. Of course, the quantity and the quality of the US’ nuclear arsenal is more than sufficient to ensure deterrence and defence. But, again, there is no consensus among Allies to change the present nuclear sharing modus operandi and arrangements. Overreliance on the US’ vast nuclear territorial arsenal would erase the Allies’ “broadest participation in nuclear burden sharing” as well as their interest and involvement in nuclear consultations: transatlantic collective security would be diluted and European Allies would increasingly question American commitment to European security; some European Allies could even start looking for undesirable remedies. Furthermore, the European Allies will not accept a sole and direct dependence on the US’ vast nuclear arsenal without having access to a collective (albeit smaller) weapon on European soil or a political say in the decision-making process which should be multilateral; one should not forget that the use of such nuclear weapons would be on the European continent. NATO’s nuclear sharing at least provides European Allies with a decision-making capability in the worst case. Furthermore, while Europe is not ready or capable of assuring her own deterrence and defence, there would be a very high risk of decoupling European and American security as the US would be far less critically involved in European security: the European ‘supreme layer’ would be non-existent and European Allies could be more easily exposed to coercion. One should recall that, historically, the US has created the mechanism of nuclear burden sharing with American nuclear weapons on European soil in order to meet European security concerns and to prevent nuclear proliferation on the European continent: these objectives have not changed.
It is clear that the political benefits of nuclear role sharing in the NATO framework outweigh the military limitations.
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Trachtenberg 12 (David J. Trachtenberg - American national security advisor who served as principal deputy under secretary for policy in the United States Department of Defense, “US Extended Deterrence: How Much Strategic Force Is Too Little?”, Strategic Studies Quarterly Volume 6 Number 2, Summer 2012, , MG)
The issue of extended deterrence and the role of US nuclear forces in providing that deterrence to NATO is not without controversy. Nevertheless, it is clear a number of US, NATO, and non-NATO allies consider the US extended deterrent to be critical to their security.12 A group including former military chiefs of the United States, Britain, France, Germany, and the Netherlands reaffirmed the importance of the extended deterrent role of US nuclear forces and the credibility of nuclear escalatory threats by noting, “The first use of nuclear weapons must remain in the quiver of escalation as the ultimate instrument to prevent the use of weapons of mass destruction, in order to avoid truly existential dangers.”13
For some, the value of the extended deterrent lies in the deployment of American nuclear weapons on their territory and the demonstration of resolve these deployments convey. In these cases, additional US strategic offensive arms reductions may have less significance on allied perceptions of American credibility. For others, the value of extended deterrence lies more in the ability and willingness of the United States to maintain the effectiveness of its strategic nuclear arsenal. Therefore, additional strategic arms reductions may undermine the assurance value of American security guarantees.
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Trachtenberg 12 (David J. Trachtenberg - American national security advisor who served as principal deputy under secretary for policy in the United States Department of Defense, “US Extended Deterrence: How Much Strategic Force Is Too Little?”, Strategic Studies Quarterly Volume 6 Number 2, Summer 2012, , MG)
For a number of states, their own security rests on the viability and credibility of US nuclear assurances. Without the assurance—or reassurance—that this nuclear umbrella provides, these states may pursue their own nuclear weapons acquisition programs. As one observer noted, “For allies such as Japan, South Korea and Taiwan, and some NATO states, the stability both of the US deterrent and extended deterrence guarantees are a significant part of these countries’ own strategic calculus.”5 Indeed, there have been numerous studies in recent years suggesting “the credibility and reliability of US nuclear assurances are necessary to keep countries . . . from reconsidering their decisions to be nonnuclear states.”6
In a 2007 study that linked US extended deterrence with nonproliferation, the State Department’s International Security Advisory Board (ISAB) concluded, “Nuclear umbrella security agreements, whether unilateral or multilateral, have been, and are expected to continue to be, effective deterrents to proliferation.”7 The ISAB report stated, “There is clear evidence in diplomatic channels that US assurances to include the nuclear umbrella have been, and continue to be, the single most important reason many allies have foresworn nuclear weapons,” and further suggested that “a lessening of the US nuclear umbrella could very well trigger a [nuclear proliferation] cascade in East Asia and the Middle East.”8
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Trachtenberg 12 (David J. Trachtenberg - American national security advisor who served as principal deputy under secretary for policy in the United States Department of Defense, “US Extended Deterrence: How Much Strategic Force Is Too Little?”, Strategic Studies Quarterly Volume 6 Number 2, Summer 2012, , MG)
The Bush administration’s 2001 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) postulated a world of extant and emerging nuclear powers posing qualitatively different nuclear threats to the United States and its allies than existed during the Cold War. While deterrence of nuclear attack remained a central goal of US nuclear forces, its nuclear arsenal was considered to play a broader role in ensuring global security.
Along with traditional deterrence, the 2001 NPR articulated a role for nuclear weapons in “assurance, dissuasion, and defeat”—concepts previously posited in the 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review. In other words, the NPR acknowledged that US nuclear forces play a major role in providing security guarantees to friends and allies who lack their own nuclear weapons and face challenges from hostile neighbors or adversaries (i.e., assurance). The US nuclear potential was also seen as having a dissuasive effect on adversaries who might contemplate actions contrary to American interests. And, of course, should deterrence fail—an increasingly plausible prospect in a world of rogue states and terrorist actors—US nuclear forces must have the capacity to defeat any aggressor. Without this capacity, the credibility of the US nuclear deterrent might be called into question, undermining the central deterrence goal of its nuclear forces.
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Wheeler 10 (Michael O. Wheeler – Colonel and Staff Secretary to the National Security Council, “The Changing Requirements of Assurance and Extended Deterrence”, Institute for Defense Analysis, July 2010, , MG)
Background. When this project began in 2007, it was not common practice to encounter American officials publicly discussing assurance and extended deterrence. In fact, as nuclear security became less of a central feature of great power relations after the Cold War, it was unusual to encounter much discussion of any nuclear deterrence issues at high levels of government. Today, however, the nuclear dimension of extended deterrence is a much more highly visible part of the security debate, and figures prominently in statements by cabinet officials and, indeed, by the Vice President and President. The following elements of the evolving policy environment since the project began are especially relevant to this paper.
The Schlesinger Task Force. An unauthorized transfer of nuclear weapons by the Air Force in 2007 and the subsequent discovery that intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) components had been shipped to Taiwan by mistake a year earlier, triggered a series of investigations and reports. In June 2008, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates appointed the Task Force on Nuclear Weapons Management chaired by James R. Schlesinger to recommend improvements and measures to enhance deterrence and international confidence in the U.S. nuclear deterrent.
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Anderson et al. 13 (Justin V. Anderson PhD - Senior Policy Fellow at National Defense University's Center for the Study of Weapons of Mass Destruction, Jeffrey A. Larsen PhD - Research Professor in the Department of National Security Affairs, US Naval Postgraduate School, Polly M. Holdorf - Program Support Specialist at the United States Air Force Academy , “Extended Deterrence and Allied Assurance: Key Concepts and Current Challenges for U.S. Policy”, INSS Occasional Paper, , September 2013, MG)
Extending deterrence against regional risk-taking states in possession of limited nuclear arsenals – or determined to develop these weapons – requires the United States to clearly demonstrate it possesses nuclear forces capable of imposing “unacceptable costs” against any actor contemplating a nuclear attack against a U.S. ally or partner.64 While each leg of the U.S. nuclear triad possesses this capability, nuclear-capable aircraft (bombers and dual-capable aircraft (DCA)) are particularly important to extended deterrence against this type of opponent. In response to nuclear saber-rattling by a risk-taking state with a limited nuclear arsenal, the United States can rapidly fly these delivery systems into the region in question, showing this state – and local U.S. allies – that it can immediately respond to any provocation with superior nuclear capabilities.65
U.S. nuclear forces are also essential to the assurance of allies and partners. Other than the United Kingdom and France, no U.S. ally or partner openly possesses their own nuclear arsenal. As a result, many allies and partners are entirely dependent upon the United States for the provision of a nuclear deterrent against potential adversaries armed with nuclear weapons. The importance of this fact – which is a day-to-day reality for many U.S. friends abroad – cannot be overemphasized; for these states, the only weapon they view as fully effective against nuclear coercion or attack is not in their possession.66 This highlights the importance of the U.S. “nuclear umbrella” to nuclear nonproliferation efforts; it is vital for the United States to convince allies and partners they have no need to consider developing their own, independent nuclear deterrent.67
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Mehta 20 (Rupal N. Mehta PhD - Associate Professor in the Department of Political Science at the University of Nebraska-Lincoln, “Delaying Doomsday”, Bridging the Gap, Page 53-54, 2020, MG)
Second, questions of credibility and reputation have resurged in the modern geo-strategic era.60 Decline in U.S. reputation in the twenty-first century has been exacerbated after a series of foreign policy failures (e.g., the Iraq War in 2003, the creation of failed redlines in Syria in 2013), and potentially worse, the idiosyncratic “America First” foreign policy of the Trump Administration that even extols the benefits of nuclear proliferation. If adversaries and allies alike mistrust the United States and its commitment to both the nonproliferation regime and existing alliances, concerns will continue to escalate about whether the U.S. would be willing to actually abide by a nuclear agreement and provide the promised inducements from negotiations or forgo threats of military force if the proliferator actually complies. If proliferators or other actors in the international community doubt the United States’ credibility, proliferators on the cusp of nuclear reversal may question whether they should proceed with their planned denuclearization. Future research may choose to relax these assumptions and assess whether the same theoretical mechanisms are as salient in a new geopolitical environment where state (and specifically leader) credibility is up to debate.
Role of Non-U.S. Actors: Other Superpowers and Regional Adversaries
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Hagel et al. 21 (Chuck Hagel - former US Secretary of Defense, Malcolm Rifkind - former UK Foreign Secretary and Secretary of Defense, Kevin Rudd - former Australian Prime Minister and Foreign Minister, “Preventing Nuclear Proliferation and Reassuring America’s Allies”, The Chicago Council on Global Affairs, 8 February 2021, , MG)
All security partnerships between unequal partners are characterized by a dual dynamic of deterrence and reassurance. The dominant ally needs to take actions that deter the adversary and reassure its weaker ally. Of the two, reassurance is often more difficult than deterrence, especially when the dynamic plays out in the nuclear realm. For while the adversary may be deterred by even a small chance that conflict escalates to nuclear confrontation, the ally will be reassured only if it believes there is a high likelihood that the stronger partner will come to its defense. In other words, because its security is dependent on the actions of another power, an ally will always worry about its possible abandonment in time of need.
The changing security environment characterized by Russia’s return, China’s rise, North Korea’s advance, and America’s retreat accentuates the deterrence-reassurance dilemma in a new form for America’s European and Asian allies. For the first time in decades, it raises new challenges for the long-ignored nuclear dimension of their security relationships. Although renewed discussions about nuclear deterrence and reassurance have so far played out largely beyond public view inmost allied countries, the issue is becoming increasingly salient as the perceived threats to security have increased. The United States and its allies cannot ignore that reality. For if we are to prevent new nuclear proliferation among these allies, it is essential to acknowledge that what has long been unthinkable is becoming thinkable once more.
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Matthew Kroenig, Deputy Director, Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security, September 23, 2021
“The special role of US nuclear weapons,” The Atlantic Council, , (accessed 5-17-2022)
US nuclear weapons play a special role in underpinning international peace, global security, and the US-led, rules-based international system. The nuclear threat to the United States and its democratic allies is growing: nuclear-armed, revisionist, autocratic powers (Russia, China, and North Korea) are relying more on nuclear weapons in their strategies, and they are modernizing and expanding their arsenals. In this new issue brief, the Scowcroft Center’s Matthew Kroenig explains why the United States needs to retain a robust, flexible, and modernized nuclear force to meet its national security objectives. US nuclear weapons are special for three reasons US nuclear weapons are unique for three reasons. First, the United States extends nuclear deterrence to more than thirty formal treaty allies in Europe and the Indo-Pacific, a central pillar of US alliances and the rules-based international system. Second, US counterforce targeting keeps the United States in compliance with the Law of Armed Conflict and potentially allows the United States to limit the damage from nuclear war and save millions of lives. Finally, the United States has enjoyed the economic capacity to field a robust nuclear force at a reasonable cost. In sum, the United States demands more of its nuclear weapons than other countries and requires a more robust force. The international security environment is deteriorating The United States’ three nuclear-armed adversaries—Russia, China, and North Korea—are all modernizing and expanding their nuclear arsenals while consistently relying more on nuclear weapons in their defense strategies. Even as it complies with the letter of the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START), the Kremlin is building new, exotic and battlefield weapons not covered in the Treaty’s text. China’s rise has paved the way for its assertive and revisionist foreign policy, which poses the greatest threat to US national security and the US-led, rules-based international system. China’s nuclear forces may double within the next decade, or even triple or quadruple. North Korea has become the third US adversary with the ability to hold the US homeland at risk with the threat of nuclear war.
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Bryan Bender, staff at Politico, January 12, 2022
“Biden team weighs killing Trump’s new nuclear weapons: Officials are considering canceling weapons that were backed by the last administration.,” Politico, , (accessed 4-26-2022)
But national security officials are debating whether to jettison a new nuclear-armed cruise missile now in the research phase, retire a Cold War-era thermonuclear bomb, and possibly even remove a new “low-yield” warhead that the previous administration deployed on submarines, the current and former officials said. Most spoke on condition they not be identified in order to discuss internal deliberations and private conversations. Such changes would fall short of the overhaul of nuclear policy and programs that President Joe Biden has long argued would help blunt a nuclear arms race, namely a declaration that the United States would not be the first to strike an adversary using atomic weapons. Yet halting the Trump-era “add-ons,” as they are called, are considered the most likely cuts if Biden wants to reverse the previous administration’s elevation of nuclear weapons in U.S. strategy, due to resistance from military leaders to big changes as Russia and China build up their arsenals. “The Biden administration’s problem or challenge, of course, is how can it show that it is doing something on reductions or reforms without undercutting the modernization program that was set in motion by [former President Barack] Obama,” said Hans Kristensen, director of the Nuclear Information Project at the Federation of American Scientists. He said some of the newer weapons approved by former President Donald Trump are “the low-hanging fruit,” particularly a new nuclear-armed cruise missile for the Navy.
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Peter Munson, senior vice president for preventive services and global crisis management for a private sector corporation and a retired U.S. Marine Corps officer, 2013
“The Limits of Security Cooperation,” War on the Rocks, , (accessed 5-16-2022)
SC does work to build capacity in certain, relatively elite units that perceive a real need for improvement and hard training. Likewise, it works to build interoperability between already-capable partner forces and U.S. and coalition militaries. SC in the right doses can be a good way of showing solidarity with allies against other regional threats. But SC [Security Cooperation] is not a panacea and must be applied with significantly more discernment than the usual some-is-good-more-is-better logic of U.S. military spending. Planners should go to great lengths to ensure that SC is seen as a tool for a specific purpose, not a reward to condition behaviors. SC-as-a-conditioning-tool becomes bribery with diminishing returns. If policymakers want a quid pro quo, they need to admit as much and use much more precisely targeted incentives: paying a fee for access or head-of-the-line transit privileges for example. This becomes a much more predictable business transaction than trying to use SC funds, winks, and nudges to get one’s way. Finally, in the land of perverse incentives, SC is often seen as a means to drive defense business to U.S. contractors. This is true. By creating arms races and supplying prestige weapons, however useless, to unstable areas of the world, they are creating U.S. jobs. But wouldn’t taxpayer money and efforts be better spent if officials more precisely targeted domestic concerns with taxpayer funds rather than hoping that efforts trickle down predictably from collaboration with corpulent and unsavory foreign generals? In the land of perverse incentives, SC funding is one of the most egregious—and in the post-9/11 era, many officials see SC as a critical tool of strategic positioning. However, the premises of SC must be reconsidered before the U.S. military squanders more resources on white elephant projects.
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Bryan Bender, staff at Politico, January 12, 2022
“Biden team weighs killing Trump’s new nuclear weapons: Officials are considering canceling weapons that were backed by the last administration.,” Politico, , (accessed 4-26-2022)
But the final deliberations are coming into view. “I think we’ll probably see, certainly, a shift back towards the tone and tenor of the 2010 NPR,” said retired Air Force Lt. Gen. Frank Klotz, who co-authored a new study on the nuclear triad for the government-funded RAND Corp. But that also likely means sticking to the major overhaul of the nuclear triad that was underwritten in the Obama administration and is estimated to cost $634 billion over the next decade. The Trump administration added to that modernization push by authorizing at least three new weapon systems and upgraded warheads, including a cruise missile and a smaller warhead for subs. Critics argue such less destructive weapons are more destabilizing because they are more likely to be used in a conflict than weapons that can obliterate entire cities. Biden, however, has been under pressure from some Democrats in Congress to reconsider the development of the Ground Based Strategic Deterrent, which is set to replace the Minuteman III ICBMs that are located in underground silos across five Western states. The administration decided to forgo a request from the offices of Sens. Jeff Merkley (D-Ore.) and Elizabeth Warren (D-Mass.) to study whether the current missiles could be operated longer, according to a pair of congressional staffers. A Pentagon-ordered unclassified study on the future of the ICBM force commissioned by the Pentagon last month isn’t expected to recommend major changes to the missile replacement program, which was awarded to Northrop Grumman in 2020. “I don’t think it’s going to be Earth-shattering in any way,” said George Perkovich, vice president for studies at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and the lead author of the study. The Biden nuclear review is also not expected to propose changes to the development of a new fleet of Columbia-class ballistic missile submarines under construction by General Dynamics, or the B-21 stealth bomber also being built by Northrop Grumman. “Many of the same programs, many of the same policies will remain the same,” predicted Klotz, who ran the National Nuclear Security Administration at the Department of Energy, which builds the nuclear warheads, from 2014 to 2018. He said he expects “some changes on the margin to indicate they have looked seriously at [potential reforms], but I expect the fundamental tenets of the nuclear modernization program to continue pretty much as they have since they were first conceived in the Obama administration.”
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Alexander Lanoszka 19, assistant professor of international relations at the University of Waterloo and an honorary fellow at City, University of London, 6-11-2019, "False Alarm? Donald Trump, Alliances and Nuclear Proliferation," East West, https://www.eastwest.ngo/idea/false-alarm-donald-trump-alliances-and-nuclear-proliferation
Some observers argue the prospects for nuclear proliferation among U.S. allies appear to have heightened in recent years. Superficially, U.S. President Donald Trump may be responsible. During his 2016 presidential campaign, he made statements suggesting he might tolerate efforts by Japan and South Korea to acquire nuclear weapons. His criticisms of NATO and some of its members have fueled debate in Germany on the desirability and feasibility of the “nuclear option.” Looking more broadly, since the 2008 financial crisis, the U.S. has had to grapple with the management of its security ties abroad amid mounting budgetary deficits and growing public weariness of so-called “forever wars.” And yet, over two years into the Trump administration, little nuclear proliferation-related activity seems to be taking place among U.S. allies. In fact, some of the most powerful U.S. allies—Japan and Germany—have largely moved away from nuclear energy. What lies behind this current scenario? Perhaps one answer is that the U.S military deployments that underscore U.S. security commitments remain strong. But how do security guarantees relate to nuclear proliferation? Presidential rhetoric may be important for evaluating the strength of a treaty pledge by the U.S. to defend an ally in the event of attack by a potential adversary like Russia, North Korea or China. However, whether it is more important than other considerations is debatable, since presidential rhetoric may simply be just that: rhetoric. A verbally cited promise to follow through on any pledges recorded in print is simply hard to believe. No country wants to risk the safety of his or her country’s cities for an ally, if they can help it. How can a state, therefore, have any sort of confidence in its alliances? Thankfully, there is a way. The U.S. deploys a wide range of military forces to shore up local defense and deterrence measures to augment the security of its allies and to advance its own national security interests. U.S. forces stationed in South Korea and Japan, for example, are there for regional contingency if North Korea and/or China were to commit an act of aggression—not to serve as potential targets to trigger wider retaliation by Washington, per the logic of trip-wires. They are also there to kill, making it hard for any potential aggressor to go successfully on the attack without incurring unacceptable costs. So long as the U.S. has such forces on its ally’s territory, or in the theater of operations where a potential war would be fought, the security guarantee is sufficiently strong to have the confidence of its beneficiaries. It is when the U.S. has unilaterally reduced its forward deployments that its allies become so alarmed they are tempted to acquire nuclear weapons to ensure their own security. A case in point is South Korea in the 1970s. As it does now, South Korea benefited from a treaty promising that Washington would defend it against external aggression. But when President Richard Nixon came into office in 1969, he spoke of how partners in East Asia and elsewhere would need to bear more of the collective defense burden, especially in light of its failures in Vietnam, rising anti-war sentiment at home and the downturn in the U.S. economy. Yet, the South Korean President at the time—Park Chung-hee—was unfazed by Nixon’s rhetoric. He believed that the United States would reward his country for its contributions in the Vietnam War by retaining its large military presence on the Korean Peninsula. President Park’s optimism was misplaced. In July 1970, Nixon announced that the U.S. would unilaterally withdraw 20,000 of its military personnel from South Korea within a year, cutting the total U.S. military presence on the peninsula by one-third. The balance of power implications were potentially significant. Since more troop reductions were now conceivable, South Korea would become newly vulnerable to North Korea—an adversary that, at the time, was relatively more industrialized, enjoyed Chinese and Soviet patronage, had a stronger conventional military and had engaged in highly provocative but low-level military activities across the Demilitarized Zone against the South since 1966. Against this backdrop, President Park put South Korea on the path towards acquiring nuclear weapons. This project failed partly because South Korea needed outside sources for credit and access to reprocessing and enrichment facilities—a vulnerability that the United States used to its advantage to get its ally to curb its activities and to make nonproliferation commitments. Still, South Korea has had persistent interest in fissile materials since the 1970s and continues to undertake continued pyroprocessing activities. Today, South Korea may not be on an aggressive path to acquiring nuclear weapons, but its apparent desire to seek some advantage demonstrates that security guarantees—once broken—can be very difficult to repair, thus prompting countries to reconsider the nuclear option. The South Korean case illuminates why we are seeing no new efforts to get nuclear weapons, at least by U.S. treaty allies, in the age of Trump. When one looks beyond the rhetoric, actions speak volumes. The Trump administration has reinforced U.S. force posture with additional deployments to Germany. It is seriously considering a permanent military presence in neighboring Poland. Present relations with South Korea have been rocky, but the Trump administration did sign an updated free trade agreement, as well as a temporary agreement, to help cover the costs of 28,500 military personnel stationed there. The U.S. military presence in Japan has remained steady. Indeed, if Trump is serious about containing China, the U.S. military presence will likely increase in East Asia over the long-term. Dramatic, unilateral troop withdrawals under the Trump administration are still possible, but the historical record indicates that such attempts are generally made early in a presidency rather than later. Nixon, for instance, announced his troop withdrawal out of Vietnam within eighteen months of coming into office. Putting all rhetoric aside, if the military foundations of U.S. security guarantees remain strong, nuclear proliferation among allies remains unlikely.
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Bushey 17, J.D., SUNY Buffalo Law School, Buffalo, New York, 2007 (Adam, “GOVERNANCE: THE MISSING INGREDIENT IN SECURITY COOPERATION,”
It is a U.S. government held position that SC/SA programs reduce the need for U.S. boots on the ground during conflicts.28 After host nation forces are trained, U.S. partners have greater capacity and independence, which reduces the need for the presence of U.S. soldiers. During the Cold War, there were “over half a million U.S. personnel assigned in the European theater.”29 Today, the U.S. commitment has been reduced by more than 85 percent. 30 This is, in part, due to the existence of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the military posture of allied forces in the region, thereby reducing the need for a massive U.S. force. As Congress enacts end-strength reductions for all of the services, the goal is to build partner capacity to “operate alongside or instead of U.S. military forces.”31
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Mehta 19 (Rupal N. Mehta PhD - Associate Professor in the Department of Political Science at the University of Nebraska-Lincoln, “Extended deterrence and assurance in an emerging technology environment”, Journal of Strategic Studies, 3 June 2019, , MG)
However, in considering Hypothesis 2 – the potential benefit of emerging technology in deterring large-scale conflict but potentially inviting small-scale disputes – the emergence of hypersonic glide vehicles gets somewhat more complex. Despite the rhetoric and posture aimed at third parties (such as North Korea) that pose threats to its allies, the US’s two primary adversaries, Russia and China, view the development of CPGS and hypersonic weaponry as destabilising, prone to miscalculation, and potential escalation. This emerging technology may produce more risk than deterrent value and increase both the likelihood of smaller-scale crises, as well as large-scale conflicts.62
Importantly, it is this concern that highlights why allies may be less assured by the inclusion of this capability in the broader extended deterrent arsenal. Worried about being caught as collateral damage in a fight between major powers such as Russia and China against the United States, allies may fear that even conventional-only hypersonic vehicles may increase the risk of conflict to unacceptable levels – producing uncertainty about whether they would actually be used in combat. This concern about the actual likelihood of use mirrors that in the conversations over nuclear use. Most allies are uncertain as to whether the United States would actually invoke nuclear weapons in their defence for fear of escalation.63 If hypersonic glide vehicles produce the same cycles of miscalculation, strategic instability and uncertainty, they are unlikely to serve as useful complements to extended deterrence.64
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Mehta 19 (Rupal N. Mehta PhD - Associate Professor in the Department of Political Science at the University of Nebraska-Lincoln, “Extended deterrence and assurance in an emerging technology environment”, Journal of Strategic Studies, 3 June 2019, , MG)
Despite these potential benefits, it is not immediately clear how allies are likely to respond to the incorporation of unmanned systems to their defence. Due in part of these characteristics (seen as advantageous to the US), allies may be less convinced of their utility. Unlike military personnel or hard forward-deployed assets which are much harder to redeploy, drones can be shifted to counter more prescient threats and potentially produce uncertainty among allies about US commitment. Second, as drones reduce the risk to US personnel, allies may, potentially incorrectly, view this as a reduction in the US’s willingness to experience risk in defence of its allies and partners. As concerns over ‘risking Tokyo for New York’ persisted in the nuclear age, perceptions of risk and commitment as shifted by unmanned weapons systems may similarly exacerbate questions of assurance. From the allied perspective, the strength of the US commitment may increasingly be in doubt. Thus, we may find limited support for Hypothesis 3.
Further, uncertainty in the US commitment, as a result of emerging technology, has the opportunity to encourage riskier behaviour among allies. Concerns over moral hazard and agency loss persist in discussions of the nuclear umbrella and while generally seen to be lower than hypothesised, these concerns may grow in a new emerging technology environment where US credibility is seen to waver.56 Consider then how allies are likely to respond in this strategic engagement. Allies may invest in more offensive capabilities that could have important implications for conflict dynamics. Allies may seek to engage or deter adversaries on their own, potentially in contravention to broader alliance principles, and have the ability to involve or entrap the United States in undesirable conflicts.
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Guillot 19 (W. Michael Guillot - retired USAF Colonel with experience in Strategic Air Command, “Why De-escalation Is Bad Policy”, Strategic Studies Quarterly, Volume 13 Number 3, Pages 3-4, Fall 2019, MG)
When leaders profess their desire to perpetually de-escalate provocations and crises, the message received by our adversaries is that the United States lacks credibility and fears confrontation. During the Korean and Vietnam Wars, the United States appeared too concerned about or fearful of escalation rather than showing conviction to solve a conflict on terms aligned with democratic interests and values. Recently, in response to Iran’s provocation, a senior US lawmaker stated that we must “do everything in our power to de-escalate.” The same sentiment was evident in former secretary of state John Kerry’s response to Russian actions in Syria. This fear of escalation is also seen in interactions between US Navy ships in the South China Sea and the so-called China maritime fleet, which signals weakness in “respect based” cultures. Another example is the US reaction to the situation in Ukraine. While this scenario continues to unfold, our initial response was to limit assistance to nonlethal aid for fear of escalation. In each of these examples, and many others, adversaries have learned to prey on US de-escalatory tendencies and rely on our timid reactions.
The result is a slow, insidious decline in perceived US credibility and resolve when it is confronted with clear violations of international law and threats of direct aggression. Some scholars argue that states should avoid confrontations that attempt to preserve their credibility while others argue in favor of it, particularly during noncrises. A policy of escalation helps preserve credibility to avoid fighting wars. But US credibility is not the only casualty of de-escalation as policy; it also affects US alliances.
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Herr and Schneider 18, visiting fellow at the Hoover Institution, ** an assistant professor and affiliate faculty at the Center for Cyber Conflict Studies at the U.S. Naval War College (Trey and Jacquelyn, “Sharing is Caring: The United States’ New Cyber Commitment for NATO,” Council on Foreign Relations, https://www.cfr.org/blog/sharing-caring-united-states-new-cyber-commitment-nato)//BB
Treating cybersecurity capabilities more like conventional arms and less like national assets also helps drive the integration of cyber operations into the planning and execution of a broader array of conventional military missions. Early cyber operations were largely conventional espionage and surveillance activities supercharged by the spread of computing and the internet. In the United States, this led to the creation of large and complex software tools, carefully guarded by the intelligence community as national assets (sometimes unsuccessfully). The DoD’s announcement indicates a move towards treating at least some of these capabilities, along with their supporting infrastructure, more like conventional armaments and making them available for broader use; a model closer to Central or Special Operations Command and less like the National Security Agency. The Pentagon’s new commitment also reflects changes in how Europe talks about cybersecurity and characterizes the Russian threat. The last two years have seen a trend toward more open discussion of offensive cyber operations and the possibility of the alliance adopting more assertive postures to counter cyber operations against its members. After years of devastating ransomware attacks and cyber-enabled information attacks, NATO members are more willing to explore cyber triggers to Article 5. They have also been more willing to articulate the cyber threat against the alliance. In addition to last week’s denunciation by Dutch, UK, and U.S. authorities, Russian state actors are widely suggested to be responsible for an increasingly brazen series of operations, including targeting German government ministries, French and British TV stations, and more. Sharing offensive cyber capabilities raises the question of whether cyber operations can extend effective deterrence to NATO partners. There seems to be little focus on using these operations to deter conventional or nuclear attacks on NATO countries, but this may evolve. The United States seems to want NATO to use cyber operations to deter other cyber operations, particularly those falling under the threshold of armed conflict. Cyber operations have all sorts of problems for deterrence: signaling is difficult, they can be perceived as a cheap threat, and their effects are largely uncertain. By contrast, moving new military forces in Eastern Europe or conducting ground exercises are credible signals of extended deterrence, but are costly and time consuming. Cyber capabilities aren’t free, nor are they necessarily cheap, but the promise to use them can add new credibility to a deterrent threat without the same investment and delay as conventional alternatives. Sharing cyber capabilities may be a cheaper way to signal alliance commitment than other options and might signal a further maturation, and acceptance, of cybersecurity into geopolitics.
2022
Michigan
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NUCLEAR CREDIBILITY DA › Links › L - Cyber
Onderco and Zutt 21 (Michal Onderco PhD - Max Weber Fellow at the European University Institute, Madeline Zutt - research associate at Erasmus University Rotterdam, “Emerging technology and nuclear security: What does the wisdom of the crowd tell us?”, Contemporary Security Policy, 23 May 2021, , MG)
We were principally concerned with whether technologies that improve the discriminate and precise application of smart conventional weapons could decrease reliance on nuclear weapons for strategic tasks and even, perhaps, make the substitution of nuclear weapons (by conventional capabilities) more feasible. Experts and policymakers generally agreed that it is not likely that emerging technologies will substitute nuclear weapons in carrying out strategic tasks. However, among the experts whom we surveyed there was a slight variation depending on their region. Experts who were the most skeptical of cyber supplanting nuclear weapons in carrying out strategic tasks came from the United States, followed by those in Europe. By contrast, around 60% of those experts belonging to the category “Other” seemed to believe that cyber capabilities are likely to replace nuclear weapons in carrying out strategic tasks (see Table 2).
Decision-makers whom we interviewed tended to agree with experts from the United States and Europe. One interviewee reasoned that when it comes to trying to guarantee a strategic outcome, cyber is not the best capability because it is still far too complex and there is still much we do not know (Interviewee A). Another interviewee agreed saying that cyber is “not designed to be a strategic weapon” (Interviewee F). Other respondents agreed that new technologies are not likely to supplant nuclear weapons in carrying out strategic tasks simply because nuclear weapons have such a significant place in international politics and play such a pivotal, central role in deterrence. On this point, one interviewee remarked that the very debate that we have over nuclear weapons “is a vindication of the importance of nuclear weapons in politics and society” (Interviewee K). Another interviewee stated that the “horrifying stigma” around nuclear weapons evokes a certain respectability for the weapons as an effective deterrent (Interviewee L). This is particularly true when it comes to the role of nuclear weapons in deterrence by punishment, which elevates the costs of attack (Mazarr, 2018). Moreover, another policymaker stated that there is a conservative, doctrinal and institutional vision in their country that sees nuclear weapons as essential in the country’s strategic thinking, making it very difficult to “relativize their importance” (Interviewee D).
2022
Michigan
Disadvantage
NUCLEAR CREDIBILITY DA › Links › L - Cyber
Vizier 21 (Soléne Vizier - holds a double Master's degree in Strategic Studies from the University of Paris and in Cybersecurity, Cyberterrorism and Cyberwarfare from the INISEG (Spain), “New Technologies and Nuclear Strategy”, IDN, November 2021, , MG)
States’ cyber capabilities are changing the composition of conventional and nuclear weapons systems, and challenging the principle of "nuclear deterrence".
While new technologies support system functionality, real-time decision-making and data processing, new computers and complex codes also make systems less secure, more difficult to protect and therefore easier to compromise. Increased reliance on increasingly complex information systems for nuclear operations increases the possibility of errors, failures and accidents. Similarly, the increasing use of commercial technologies creates significant risks. For example, several nuclear-weapon states rely on commercial technologies and components procured abroad for sensitive nuclear operations, because they are unable to manufacture high-tech components and computer chips.