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2022 Michigan Kritik
Aff --- Disability --- K lab › Queerness › 2AC --- Perm

Both queer and disabled communities have been forced to become “normal”, and this shared history makes the two intertwined in their suffering.

Sandahl 03 (Carrie Sandahl an associate professor in the Department of Disability and Human Development at the University of Illinois at Chicago, “QUEERING THE CRIP OR CRIPPING THE QUEER? Intersections of Queer and Crip Identities in Solo Autobiographical Performance” pg 26-27 04/10/03)

As academic corollaries of minority civil rights movements, queer theory and disability studies both have origins in and ongoing commitments to activism. Their primary constituencies, sexual minorities and people with disabilities, share a history of injustice: both have been pathologized by medicine; demonized by religion; discriminated against in housing, employment, and education; stereotyped in representation; victimized by hate groups; and isolated socially, often in their families of origin. Both constituencies are diverse in terms of race, class, gender, sexuality, religion, political affiliation, and other respects and therefore share many members (e.g., those who are disabled and gay), as well as allies. Both have self-consciously created their own enclaves and vibrant subcultural practices. Perhaps the most significant similarity between these disciplines, however, is their radical stance toward concepts of normalcy; both argue adamantly against the compulsion to observe norms of all kinds (corporeal, mental, sexual, social, cultural, subcultural, etc.). This stance may even be considered their raison d’être, since both emerged from critiques levied against the normalizing tendencies of their antecedents.4 Queer theorists critiqued feminist, gay and lesbian, and even gender studies for excluding various sexual constituents (transsexuals, bisexuals, transgendered people, S/M practitioners, nonheteronormative straights, etc.) and for advocating inclusion and representation in, rather than replacement of, existing social structures. Disability scholars critiqued the fact that disability had long been relegated to academic disciplines (primarily medicine, social sciences, and social services) that considered disabilities “problems” to be cured and the disabled “defectives” to be normalized, not a minority group with its own politics, culture, and history. Because of these similarities, it may seem that disability studies has little to add to queer theory, and vice versa; indeed, some may assume that disability studies is a subset of queer theory. Consider, for example, how the term queer has been defined by some of its proponents. In The Queer Renaissance Robert McRuer describes queer as a fluid designation for identities that “are shaped and reshaped across differences and that interrogate and disrupt dominant hierarchical understandings of not only sex, gender, and sexuality but also race and class.”5 I think that McRuer would agree to adding disability to that list. Michael Warner, in Fear of a Queer Planet, argues for an even broader definition: “The preference for ‘queer’ represents, among other things, an aggressive impulse of generalization; it rejects a minoritizing logic of toleration or simple political interest-representation in favor of a more thorough resistance to regimes of the normal.”6 Disability studies’ stance against “regimes of the normal” may appear to be more of the same; as Judith Butler argues in Bodies That Matter, the term queer, rather than describing a specific identity, can be considered “a site of collective contestation . . . the point of departure for a set of historical reflections and futural imaginings.” Thus it must “remain that which is, in the present, never fully owned, but always and only redeployed, twisted, queered from a prior usage and in the direction of urgent and expanding political purposes.”7 Because disability civil rights could be considered just such an urgent political purpose, one might assume that queer could be redeployed in its service. Moreover, the term cripple, like queer, is fluid and ever-changing, claimed by those whom it did not originally define. As a pejorative, the term queer was originally targeted at gays and lesbians, yet its rearticulation as a term of pride is currently claimed by those who may not consider themselves homosexual, such as the transgendered, transsexuals, heterosexual sex radicals, and others. The term crip has expanded to include not only those with physical impairments but those with sensory or mental impairments as well. Though I have never heard a nondisabled person seriously claim to be crip (as heterosexuals have claimed to be queer), I would not be surprised by this practice. The fluidity of both terms makes it likely that their boundaries will dissolve.

2022 Michigan Kritik
Aff --- Disability --- K lab › Fem › 2AC --- Fem IR

Only questions of disability in IR can draw the genealogies of war-spaces such as Afghanistan into the broader question of a racialized Fem IR

Alison Howell 22 [Feb 25 2022, Imagining Afghanistan in Post-colonial IR: Feminism, Disability and Imperial Warfare, , Society and Space, -ekh]

One clear starting point in apprehending the contributions of Imagining Afghanistan is to heed Manchanda’s alertness to the “co-optation of discourse [analysis] as a depoliticized study of language, semantics, and rhetoric” (2020: 17) that is, the pacification and de-barbing of discourse analysis as a methodology of (feminist) critique. Imagining Afghanistan instead develops its arguments concerning the racial-sexual nature - and violent material consequences - of Anglophone imperial knowledge production about Afghanistan by gathering an extensive and divergent archive of source material: the book eschews a sole focus on the ‘easy targets’ of George W Bush-era or military proclamations, to instead trace not only the production but the circulation of discourse, and in particular to consider the racial logics of Anglophone constructions of Afghanistan across the political spectrum. 

So, for instance, we find rich discussion of the production of imperial discourse by those strongly (even dynastically) associated with ‘the left’ and with (white) feminism, such as the longtime Guardian columnist Polly Toynbee (Manchanda 2020: 151). Yet the book also recognizes some potential limitations to an intellectual and political orientation of challenging Western/Anglophone constructions of Afghanistan, as it acknowledges the potential critique (via discussion of Zia 2017) that a “focus on Western constructions of Afghan women’s oppression” might “[make] it difficult for Afghan feminists to expose and arraign local forms of patriarchy and the curtailment of the rights and agency that these entail” (Manchanda 2020: 176; see also the Coda to the book).

2022 Michigan Kritik
Aff --- Disability --- K lab › Fem › 2AC --- Vulnerability

Hyper alertness creates a threadbare life representative of an unfinished psychic split that questions of vulnerability never resolve – the framing of violence as “resolvable” ignores the ontological nature of sexual violence

Alyson K. Spurgas 21 [Solidarity in Falling Apart: Toward a Crip, Collectivist, and Justice-Seeking Theory of Feminine Fracture, Cripistemologies of Crisis: Emergent Knowledges for the Present, Issue 10.1 (Spring 2021), , -ekh-]

Insofar as dissociation was often comorbid with a diagnosis of hysteria for early psychoanalysts like Freud and Josef Breuer, there is a long history (or hystery) of dissociation as feminized, or as part of a sequelae of feminine neuroses. But if we take seriously that women are more likely to dissociate, we must also follow the earliest Freud and remember that this occurs so often in women (and here, I will add femmes more broadly to update Freud’s argument) due to their disproportionate experiences of sexual violence and abuse. Today, women and femmes continue to be unduly violated, and trans women, particularly Black trans women and other femmes of color, are disproportionately likely to experience violence—including sexual violence—during their lives. Further, current research suggests that while 6.8% of the general adult population in the United States report symptoms of PTSD, prevalence estimates of trauma among trans folks range from 18% to 61%—and according to recent studies, discrimination and assault associated purely with being trans (rather than with exogenous experiences such as sexual abuse) significantly amplify PTSD symptoms among transgender folks. These symptoms are, of course, exacerbated when intersecting experiences of oppression are at play. Given these disparities in proximity to trauma, and because we are in an age of ever-present yet unspectacular harm, I argue that we are also in a moment in which it is imperative to rethink structures of gender, race, class, and nation as structures of feeling  which are ontologically shaped by closeness to supremacist state violence. It is time to reconceptualize sexual and gendered trauma, the logic of dissociation, and the affective structure of femininity itself.

If part of living as a femme-identified or femme-coded individual—and particularly as a Black woman or femme of color—involves living with apprehension, hyper-alertness, and the daily specter of anticipated violence, then how does this affect symptomology? What do symptoms look like when they are the result of banal, chronic, slow violence? If they follow from everyday, grey brutality and ordinary crises? What if there is a detachment, but it is not a full rupture, and instead . . . fragmentary? Always bubbling up, but never completely coming to the surface, an embodied-psychic stretching, to the point where the bodymind feels threadbare . . . never fully numb, but never fully (or hyper-) vigilant. Maybe the dissociative-adjacent symptom looks instead like anxiety, or it’s akin to brain fog—pervasive, yet partial—or it’s the perpetual feeling that you’re about to fall apart, to come unglued. Maybe it’s having a constant lump in your throat, a racing heartbeat, and radiating tension while also feeling utterly empty and dazed when you read the news, when you are out on the street. Maybe the psychic split is never finished—a fracture, fleshed-over . . . semi-sutured . . . but never fully severed? 

2022 Michigan Kritik
Aff --- Disability --- K lab › Fem › 2AC --- Vulnerability

Their analysis of vulnerability ignores the disabling nature of racial-sexual violence, an ontologically unspeakable moment – their model trades off with collective falling apart and fracturing, moments of dissociation that are necessary to enact a radical care

Alyson K. Spurgas 21 [Solidarity in Falling Apart: Toward a Crip, Collectivist, and Justice-Seeking Theory of Feminine Fracture, Cripistemologies of Crisis: Emergent Knowledges for the Present, Issue 10.1 (Spring 2021), , -ekh-]

In 1992, psychiatrist Judith Herman published Trauma and Recovery: The Aftermath of Violence—From Domestic Abuse to Political Terror. In this important intervention, Herman argued that the trauma that results from domestic violence and sexual assault, as part of patriarchal aggression, constitutes a type of political violence or even gendered terrorism. As it also tends to be quite commonplace yet simultaneously hidden from view (and thus complicated and insidious in its effects), Herman made the case that the traumatic symptomology that follows from domestic violence and sexual assault must be reconceptualized—thus heralding the shift from post-traumatic stress disorder, or PTSD (which had up to that point been reserved primarily for the “shell shock” experienced by soldiers in war), to complex post-traumatic stress disorder, or C-PTSD. C-PTSD was to be understood as distinct from PTSD in part because “the syndrome [or spectrum of conditions] that follows upon prolonged, repeated trauma needs its own name.” The most important aspects to note about the shift to C-PTSD include the following: 1) sexual trauma is most often gendered and specifically feminized as it is disproportionately experienced by women, 2) one of the most notable and common symptoms of this feminized trauma is dissociation, or the splitting of consciousness as a protective mechanism (as it has been since early Freudian formulations of hysteria and other feminine neuroses), and 3) the symptoms of dissociation and other traumatic sequelae may be ordinary, ongoing, and quite literally complex. In explicating this shift, Herman brought gendered and sexualized violence into mainstream psychological and therapeutic conversations and illuminated their inherently structural nature. C-PTSD arguably brought thinking on trauma closer to the chronic, as well, as it attended to the effects of prolonged exposure to violence. Herman staunchly advocated that the conceptual groundwork of trauma must account for the minutiae of the everyday life of domestic violence victims, which subsequently illuminated how so many forms of gendered trauma are “not outside the range” of normal human experience, and are not exceptional. For Herman, too much of what happens in the home, in the bedroom, and on the street might be seriously dangerous and traumatizing to women, in particular. The personal is political.

One of the most common symptoms of trauma, in Herman’s analysis as in others, is the dissociative silence that accompanies it. C-PTSD then still remains within the traditional psychoanalytic trauma theory framework, relegating trauma to that which cannot be narrated, categorically. So, although Herman placed trauma itself squarely within the sociopolitical, she did not question the ontological status of trauma’s unspeakability—understood to be the result of a temporal split and the subsequent need for psychic defense due to an experience that was quite literally unthinkable and thus also unsayable. In this essay, I question trauma’s fundamental inability to be spoken of or even adequately recounted by survivors. Is trauma unnarratable by nature, or are traumatized people instead just too often part of communities that are either ignored or actively silenced? To this end, I propose that trauma’s unnarratability is not fundamental nor ontological, but rather political and structural. And this may be particularly true for the feminized trauma that results from domestic violence, sexual assault, and other gendered—and, importantly here, racialized—aggressions.

2022 Michigan Kritik
Aff --- Disability --- K lab › Fem › 2AC --- Root Cause

Analysis of debility is key to understand the ways in which Black Women are coded as “angry, restless” and in need of “healing”.

Knadler 19 - ( Stephen Knadler; Stephen Knadler is an associate professor of English at Spelman College, where he teaches US literature and cultural studies. He has been published in American Literature, American Literary History, American Quarterly, Minnesota Review, and Modern Fiction Studies.; Originally published: August 6, 2019; “Vitality politics : health, debility, and the limits of black emancipation”; http://link.umsl.edu/portal/Vitality-politics--health-debility-and-the/n6SXiAQq3ac) Dōgen

Most of the action in The Chinaberry Tree occurs in the past time of the novel and is over when the story opens as the characters struggle to move beyond its traumatic consequences. The novel’s recovery plot, thus, builds its suspense on the question of the “redemption,” or, in the medicalized terms of the novel, “healing” and rehabilitation, of the two main protagonists: Laurentine Strange and her cousin Melissa Paul. In the backstory of the novel Sal Strange, Laurentine’s mother, had a scandalous affair with a white man, Colonel Halloway, who moved her from Alabama to set her up in a beautiful house with a chinaberry tree in Red Brook, New Jersey. Although Sal and Colonel Halloway’s sexual union recalls the familiar story of the plantation master’s sexual exploitation of his kept slave mistress, Aunt Sal insists that her relation with the now deceased Colonel Halloway was a “love story” and “she to this day still loves him” (2). After the birth of Laurentine, “Aunt Sal,” as she is generally called, remains a “maladjusted,” overly sensitive, tragic mulatta, ostracized from both the white and Black communities of the town who condemn her as having “vicious” or “bad blood,” thus seeing her moral impropriety as resulting, as an earlier race psychology maintained, from hereditary character defects. When Laurentine was a young girl, however, her mother’s sister Judy came to stay in Red Brook and temporarily relieved the family’s isolation. During Judy’s visit to Red Brook, she has an affair with the husband of one of her friends, Sylvester Forten, which results in the birth of another “illegitimate” daughter, Melissa Paul, who later, in the present time of the novel, falls in love and plans to wed unwittingly her half brother Malory Forten. Like Maggie in There Is Confusion, Melissa is a class outsider who has a “morbid” and restless ambition to be part of “larger and more brilliant settings” within the exclusive circles of the town’s Black bourgeois elite (71), and, as a consequence, she initially declines marriage with the “essentially sound” southerner Asshur Lane because she insists on wedding a wealthy and socially prominent man, Malory Forten (337). In the novel’s denouement, the “secrets” of the past are finally revealed, including that Maggie and Malory are half brothers and sisters. But if such a tragic disclosure of possible incest might have permanently broken the “strange” women, both Laurentine and Melissa are “adjusted” to a “healthy wellbeing” (medical language that Fauset herself uses) by the men in their lives (120): first, Dr. Denleigh, a former head of the National Medical Association, who heals Laurentine of her “melancholy” (113), and, second, Asshur Lane, whose “fine, sweet sanity, a strength,” in the novel’s final tableau under the chinaberry tree ensures Melissa’s recovery from her own feverish “morbid” desires that nearly caused her to break unwittingly one of the most fundamental taboos (336). Although Fauset’s The Chinaberry Tree follows once again the medicalized recovery narrative of social psychology that we saw in There Is Confusion, in which the restless, angry Black woman (Melissa) must be cured by the good Black man’s “sweet sanity,” I want to focus on the rehabilitation storyline of the novel’s other main female protagonist, Laurentine Strange, for what it reveals about the complex biopolitics of Black women’s depression in the Jim Crow United States. Throughout the novel Laurentine is depicted variously as “melancholy” (113), as having an “irregular” life (69), as highly sensitive and “withdrawn to herself ” (19), as full of “restlessness” and “hopeless brooding” (98), and “sick” with “hopelessness.” Although the plot traces out how she learns to become “more normal” (98) once she is taken under the wing of Dr. and Mrs. Ismay (herself a trained nurse from Boston) and is courted by Dr. Denleigh, once again Fauset creates a contradictory novel in which there is more meaning in the “disorder” than in the cure, and indeed the novel blurs the boundaries between social psychology’s distinctions between maladjustment and integration, disorder and rehabilitation. Laurentine’s cure, Fauset implies, is forced, artificial, and silencing of the way that Black women like Laurentine speak and witness through their mental distress and pain. As Fauset demonstrates, Black women’s depression, whatever biochemical (or blood) roots may be behind it, is embedded within the unequal gendered and racial relations that Black women daily “weather” and which define their proper, “good” feminine identity. I want to look for a moment at Fauset’s description of Laurentine’s “bitter and futile life” before she is rescued by Dr. Denleigh for what it says about Laurentine’s “strange” character, and for what it says about Black women’s “strange” or “mad politics” of mental distress: But she [Laurentine] was sick. Sick not only with wounded pride and bewilderment, but with something far worse than that— hopelessness. For what could she expect? She would live like this always, seeing herself ripen, ripen—she was twenty-four, there were many years of cruel, burning, unsatisfied life still before her. Yes, she would ripen—some poet had said it—“ripen, fall and cease.” It would be exactly as though she had never been; like a leaf that had fallen too early; like a flower that someone had picked and deliberately thrown away,—no worse, had carelessly dropped to be trampled on, withered. So had her mother and Colonel Halloway dropped her and she was being trampled on, withered. (61–62) In the language describing Laurentine’s depression, Fauset indicates that her “pathology” is her body’s way of speaking, doubting, and trying to repress feelings and thoughts that are at odds with the “healthy” “sane” forms of respectable Black womanhood. Although Laurentine does not acknowledge the source of the poetic refrain that organizes her meditation, the line “ripen, fall, and cease” comes from Alfred Lord Tennyson’s “The Lotus Eaters” and refers to the temptation of the sailors to renounce the hard life of the sea to remain in the seductive tranquility of the home of the “lotus.” The irony here is that Fauset/Laurentine correlates the futile “numbing” life to the domestic scene (not the sea) and to the respectability expected of “good” race women. In contrast to this “good” and “unsensational/unfelt” life, however, is the “unsatisfied burning” (willed, angry, sexual) that Laurentine cannot act on due to codes of gender, race, and class imposed on Black women. Instead, she feels as if she can only ripen unfulfilled and “cease.” Thus, Laurentine’s depression, social withdrawal, and fatigue are, Fauset implies, both a sign of mental distress and a complex expression of insight: an anxiety and hopelessness voicing her frustration and inability to act in the face of systematic oppressions (whether those oppression are the everyday nerve-wrecking psychological maimings imposed by white supremacism, or the codes of respectability placed on Black women). As a result, Laurentine turns her anger inward. In this scene, Fauset traces out a new language of Black women’s depression that identifies it not as emptiness within, but as a violence imposed from without on Black women’s vitality, or their flowering into themselves.

2022 Michigan Kritik
Aff --- Disability --- K lab › Topicality › 2AC --- TVA

Narratives of vitality and health create the preconditions necessary for the growth of bio-political governance and the intentional debilitation of Black flesh.

Knadler 19 - ( Stephen Knadler; Stephen Knadler is an associate professor of English at Spelman College, where he teaches US literature and cultural studies. He has been published in American Literature, American Literary History, American Quarterly, Minnesota Review, and Modern Fiction Studies.; Originally published: August 6, 2019; “Vitality politics : health, debility, and the limits of black emancipation”; http://link.umsl.edu/portal/Vitality-politics--health-debility-and-the/n6SXiAQq3ac) Dōgen *Modified for harsh language

In Booker T. Washington’s famous 1895 Atlanta Cotton States and International Exhibition Address, he identifies that a post-Reconstruction backlash depended on the biopolitical production of a lived experience of Black health precarity and tactical debilitation. In this “compromise” speech, Washington repeatedly asserts, as most commentators note, the important role that African Americans ought to play as the laboring race in the industrial development of a New South.48 But Washington’s selling of African Americans as the “most patient, faithful, law-abiding, and unresentful” workforce that mill owners and manufacturers might hire is accompanied by an appeal as well to postemancipation myths about a disabled African American race and, in turn, to the region’s fears about biosecurity.49 As part of his “pragmatism,” it is frequently noted, Washington targets—and appeases—white self-interest, but Washington also taps into white (as well as Black) fears and anxieties about African American productive vitality. After assuring white southerners that African Americans do not seek social equality—willing to remain separate as fingers, but work as one hand in “all things essential to mutual progress”— Washington adds a thinly veiled threat that most in the audience would have hardly failed to detect: the “nearly sixteen millions of hands will aid you in pulling your load upward,” Washington warns, or, switching suddenly from the synecdoche of “hands” to the first person, as if to call attention to his own embodied presence, “we shall prove a veritable body of death, stagnating, depressing, retarding every effort to advance the body politic” (222). In his language that African Americans excluded from participation in the New Southern economy will “[slow down]” and not advance the “body politic,” and indeed they will putrefy as a “veritable body of death,” Washington invokes a highly contentious and statistically driven public debate prompted by African America post–Civil War health inequalities: since emancipation, it was widely publicized, African Americans were a diseased, debilitated, and even, as Washington notes here, dying race in the absence of their masters’ care and protection (see chapters 1 and 2).50 But what does it mean, we need to ask, that Washington frames African American progress—the question of African American citizenship— around an opposition between Black capacity and debility? What does it mean that commentators have erased this line in their remembering of Washington’s speech and in the repeated criticism of his failure to demand immediate civil or political rights, or both? Washington’s compromise speech talks back, as we will see in chapter 1, to postemancipation debates over the contagious, disabled, and dying African American by reframing and placing these health disparities in the larger context of a post Reconstruction vitality politics. In his promotion of Black labor in the New Southern economy Washington pinpoints that postemancipation antiblackness revolved around not just the denial of rights—to work, to public access, to opportunity—but that antiblackness in the afterlife of slavery functions through the creating of cycles of debilitation and recovery that keep African Americans always on the edge of health and, thus, as the surplus laborers in racial capitalism. As Washington implies in his address, conserving the “wages of whiteness” (to borrow David Roediger’s famous phrase) means neglecting and debilitating black bodies and minds to naturalize their comparative inadequacy.51 In tracing out the diverse techniques grouped under the idea of biopower, or the way politics intervenes into the vital characteristics of biological and mental life, Michel Foucault distinguished between two general technologies: although much of Foucault’s early work focused on the production of individual discipline or the individual’s internalizing of the surveillance, control, and norms implemented in the factory, the schoolhouse, the asylum, and the prison, Foucault’s later work focused on a biopolitics that operated on the level of populations.52 As part of this biopolitics in mass, social scientists, public health officials, reformers, politicians, and race activists sought to track, survey, and regulate various demographics’ births, life expectancy, mortality, and general level of health. As Washington’s often redacted appeal to the debilitated Black body reveals, as part of the post-Reconstruction racial reordering, biopolitics broadened and shifted from tactics of direct exclusion to a dialectical regime of imposed Black debility followed by surveillance, recovery, and assistance toward optimized capacity, or what post-Reconstruction commentators called vitality, according to the demands of an industrial labor market.53 As part of U.S. national fantasies of liberal meritocracy, all citizens had to learn to monitor, assess, and “conserve” their vital resources for their personal success as well as the conservation of the race. However, a post Reconstruction politics of Black debility worked through an environmentally produced corporeal and mental enervation to render freedmen and women as a contrasting disposable population of decapacitated life incapable of achieving the aspirational promises of self-perfectibility, opportunity, economic productivity, material success, and mobility. As a result, “New [Blacks]” in racial uplift’s politics of respectability were not simply “policed” according to the norms of middle-class propriety.54 They were debilitated, and, as a result, the post-Reconstruction period saw a shift toward data gathering and actuarial assessments by insurance companies and public health officials that broke down the African American “citizen-patient” into an assemblage of risks, statistics, and biomedical predictions that created new networked forms of surveillance and control. Race leaders’ rehabilitative program and their invocation of a language of recovery and cure, however, sought to regulate particularly the behavior of Black women and the poor. I want to end this initial brief historical contextualization of early twentieth-century vitality politics by looking at National [Black] Health Week, and, especially, one health week bulletin from 1927.

2022 Michigan Kritik
Aff --- Disability --- K lab › Topicality › 2AC --- Debate is a game

Even if debate is a game, you should transform it into a mad game challenges projections of ableist violence into the space

Cecilia Rodéhn 22 Aassociate professor and a senior lecturer at the Centre for Gender Research and Department of Game Design, Uppsala University, 2022, Introducing Mad Studies and Mad Reading to Game Studies, -ekh-]

A mad reading of games seeks to identify the workings of normative ableist discourses in texts and how sanism is conflated with other oppressive regimes. The purpose is to interrupt and resist sanism. Investigating representations of sanism is also a good starting point for the exploration of madness. The reason for this is that many representations of madness in games are sanist. This means that madness often appears through the lens of sanism, and sanism is seen through madness in games. However, there isn’t just one kind of sanism in games, which I shall now discuss.

In many games, mental illness is embodied by male characters (cf. Shapiro and Rotter, 2016, p. 1594). This is perhaps no surprise, seeing that men are overall overrepresented in games at large (cf. Taylor & Voorhees, 2018). Male characters with mental illness are often portrayed as violent, psychotic, and homicidal maniacs (Shapiro & Rotter, 2016, p. 1594; Ferrari et al., 2019, p. 6). Violent behaviour is often associated with masculinity in games, but games portray a kind of masculinity where violence is expressed as controlled by an often emotionally stoic character. Male characters with mental illness are often contrasted with this stoic masculinity. For instance, Scarecrow in the action-adventure game Batman: Arkham Knight (Rocksteady Studios, 2015) exhibits erratic, emotional, and unpredictable behaviour, and the patients in Mount Massive Asylum in the first-person survival horror game Outlast (Red Barrells, 2013) are represented as both catatonic and scared or as butchering the staff and raping corpses.

2022 Michigan Kritik
Aff --- Disability --- K lab › Topicality › 2AC --- Litigation DA

Litigation DA- the deployment of topicality operates as a litmus test in which debaters must prove they are productive enough for the white debate community.

Pickens 19 [Therí Alyce Pickens, Professor of English, specializing in African American, Arab America and disability literatures and theories at Bates University, June 7, 2019 “Black Madness :: Mad Blackness”, Duke University Press, Durham and London, pgs. 54-57, JMH]

Narratives about people of color with cognitive disabilities are difficult to come by, generally speaking.9 The largest stumbling block is the issue of representation: who represents whom, and where those representations occur. There have been some popular representations of Black people with cognitive disabilities, most recently celebrity mothers of autistic children. This cadre of mothers includes famed R&B chanteuse Toni Braxton, actress Holly Robinson Peete, and actress and singer Tisha Campbell-Martin. Their work largely focuses on advocacy for their children. On the occasions when their children do speak (usually within the context of reality television), they tend to voice overcoming narratives. Largely, these tellings rely on the idea that the cognitive disability is an invisible one, which poses trouble because it is not readily understood as disability. The resulting misunderstandings, bullying, or trauma stems from the unrecognizability of these illnesses. These narratives fall in line, culturally speaking, with the arguments of those of Nirmala Erevelles, Allison Carey, and Michael Bérubé, who all agree that the repercussion of announcing oneself or being identified as cognitively disabled is a loss of citizenship rights. Here, the rights are not merely material but can also include cultural capital. Invisibility surfaces as a long-standing component of stories about Blacks with cognitive disabilities. During the antebellum period, slaveholders could demand compensation for supposedly unfit slaves. Within the critical literature, the understanding of physical and mental fitness are combined not only because slaves were not thought to be particularly intelligent but also because mental fitness was a necessary component in some assessments of physical labor. So-called soundness of mind was determined by a confluence of physical and mental conditions such as “skin color, gender, character, vice, health, body, and emotional state.”10 One of the characteristics of fitness was a degree of mental acuity (which slavers were likely to miss upon initial inspection of the human property) and a characteristic for which slavers could demand compensation. Successful litigation often depended on the slaver’s ability to prove that the human property was unable to perform the duties for which it was purchased. Most important for these discussions is that the litigation occurred after sales were made, indicating that slavers were expected to have recourse to legal action for impairments that were not visible at the time of purchase. In this paradigm, one’s worth as a Black person with a cognitive impairment—no matter its imaginary quality—is determined by one’s production. Such possibilities for legal action created a link between the mental acuity of enslaved persons, invisibility, and profit. This connection appears in the discourse regarding rehabilitation in the early twentieth century as well. The historical record conflates physical ability and mental ability as a way to disenfranchise Blacks economically. Here, I mine the gaps in critical literature similarly to my earlier discussion of Rosemarie Garland Thomson. Black World War I veterans contended with rehabilitation policies that “devalued, deskilled, and institutionalized [them] and dismissed their claims to rehabilitation as spurious attempts to unjustly profit from their ‘natural inferiority.’”11 Rather than review their claims as disabilities acquired during military service, officials delegitimized Black veterans’ need for rehabilitation by ascribing their disabilities to venereal disease and tuberculosis, which were, again according to officials, endemic to the race. This rhetoric built upon the idea of Blackness itself as a congenital, cognitive defect (further conflating physical ailment with cognitive impairment). The result was the removal of some veterans from the communities to which they may have contributed and of which they were definitely a part. When these veterans were denied rehabilitation, they were also denied the opportunity to earn a living in the postwar labor economy. Here, the connection between mental acuity, invisibility, and profit arises again. This time, the putative defect of Blackness gives rise to an imagined and invisible cognitive impairment that circumscribes the availability of economic self-determination. Though cognitive impairment is not, strictly speaking, emblazoned on the flesh, it nevertheless subtends interaction as a structuring presence. The conception about worth, particularly related to capitalist profit and economic viability, becomes imbricated in the narratives about cognitive disability. Entangled here, enfolded here, are legibility, visibility, economic viability, and cognitive disability. On the one hand, cognitive disability and the rhetoric thereof are marshaled as a way to justify exclusion from resources. On the other hand, cognitive disability becomes visible when one cannot prove one’s worth or value to the labor economy. In either case, cognitive disability remains wedded to its legibility as an identity category, regardless of whether it is linked to other categories (Blackness itself). One reads cognitive disability based on interaction within a community regardless of whether that cognitive disability has a diagnosis attached. Such a reading may be complicated by the shifting terrain of legibility, determined as it is by cultural expectation, social convention, and medical narratives about cognition. Of interest to this conversation is how observation and visibility rests at the crux of these ideas: namely, one believes that one can judge, ascertain, and observe cognitive disability at work. The stare, despite its interrogative heft, is incomplete.12 The problem is that these understandings operate with ocularity as the central sensory praxis despite the fact that legibility is not determined by sight, neither singularly nor primarily. Cognitive disability disrupts sight as having exclusive critical purchase over interpretation.

2022 Michigan Kritik
Aff --- Disability --- K lab › Topicality › 2AC --- Promise DA

Promise DA – Their model invests in the false promise of policymaking that sees its engagement as the conclusion of their project. Only DisCrit creates a place where white supremacy “can’t hide”.

Johnson 21 -  works for a Washington, DC-based international NGO focused on global worker rights. He resides in Johannesburg, South Africa. His work has been published in the Small Wars Journal, International Policy Digest, E-International Relations, the Journal of Black Studies, the Journal of Pan-African Studies, and Sahara Reporters. He earned his Ph.D. from Temple University, an MSc from the University of Birmingham, an M.A. from the  University at Albany, SUNY, and a B.A. from Elizabeth City State University. (Christopher Keith Johnson, “Using Disability Critical Race Theory in American Special Education Classrooms”, E-International Relations, 2 December 2021, ) || PZ

Definitions DisCrit builds upon the legal activism embedded within Critical Legal Studies (CLS), CRT, and DS. Its voice is as inclusive as CRT’s, with change agents approaching its strictly theoretical elements in an expansive and interdisciplinary manner. It interrogates and engages history, sexuality, gender, the whole person (body and mind), organizational development, conflict resolution, family studies, and personal and community agency. DisCrit places the disabled child in the center as a subject rather than an object of their liberation. The last element places it squarely within an African-centered approach to change that predates even CRT in the 1970s. One of CRTs founders, Kimberley Crenshaw, declares that it “is not a noun, but a verb. It cannot be confined to a static and narrow definition but is considered to be an evolving and malleable practice” (George, 2021). DisCrit is inspired and driven by the spirit of its theoretical predecessor. Raush et al. (2019) capture the definition of DisCrit as a theory and the possibilities of its application in practice: Consider the marginalization that Children of Color with dis/abilities and their families experience due to the intersection of power and privilege around race and dis/ability[…] the DisCrit framework can be used to understand how a difference in power (e.g., between administrators/teachers/schools and families) can lead to the exclusion of very young children with dis/abilities and other social identities and their families […] (Raush et al., 2019 p. 45). In America, it is dangerous to praise an unfinished project. The passage of a law, the change of a policy, and the adoption of an inclusive curriculum are often seen as the conclusion of engagement rather than its start. What DisCrit does is challenge/interrogate well-meaning law/theory/policy to agitate for action and function as a reminder of the centuries of broken promises America has made to its most vulnerable citizens and residents. With DisCrit, there is no sacred space for white supremacy to hide. Furthermore, there is no faith in a system that has proven repeatedly that it is willing to view the codification of best wishes as satisfactory for a population that should be grateful even to be acknowledged. Disability Law, Policy and Implementation Those resistant to further reform of special education in American classrooms point to the existence of disability law and well-meaning child-focused policy as positive proof that America has changed for the better in its treatment of all children with special needs. The Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, and Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), if applied equitably, would bring America closer to its stated aim of inclusion and protection for students with disabilities (ADA National Network, 2018). Further, the policy created by the Division for Early Childhood and the National Association for Education of Young Children, on the surface, acknowledge there are a multiplicity of innovative ways to educate children in the American classroom. However, applying the most positive standards will be limited without an interrogation of race and white supremacy. If the default from which all changes occur is whiteness, then what of those who are not white? If whiteness is the standard, then the beneficiary of these gifts would need to be white or white adjacent to be worthy of receiving anything meaningful from the system. With this in mind, education of special needs children of African descent would first be an exercise in diminishing their blackness to make them deserving of the assistance on offer. DisCrit is forced to involve itself in pushing against the othering of Black students and questioning the utility of an exercise in whitening black spaces through pacification and policing of Black bodies—students, parents, administrators, teachers—any Black body.

2022 Michigan Kritik
Aff --- Disability --- K lab › Topicality › 2AC --- Cruel Optimism DA

Cruel optimism DA- There framework reproduces ideas of cruel optimism by ignoring most the role of critical disability studies.

Kolářová 14( Kolářová, Kateřina. “The Inarticulate Post-Socialist Crip: On the Cruel Optimism of Neoliberal Transformations in the Czech Republic.” Journal of Literary; Cultural Disability Studies, vol. 8, no. 3, September 1, 2014, Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, pp. 257–74, doi:10.3828/jlcds.2014.22)// RB

Echoing Sara Ahmed’s understanding of the future as “a question [that] unfolds […] in the present” (Promise, 164), I want to come back to the questions that opened this article in order to ruminate on what it means to cruise a geopolitical time and place that apparently no longer exists. I want to ask what the vantage point crafted from the specific historical experience of socialism and the post-socialist transition offers to critiques of neoliberalism—more specifically, to critiques formulated from cripistemological perspectives and what we might perceive as reorientations toward crip futures. specifically, to critiques formulated from cripistemological perspectives and what we might perceive as reorientations toward crip futures. In engaging with these questions, I come back to Berlant’s concept of cruel optimism, which has been extremely helpful as I identify structural attachments to promises of better futures that created the ideological base of the project of transition. The engagement with post-socialist material also shows, however, that Berlant’s brilliant discussion of the toxicity of the neoliberal version of the promise of a good life needs, as I implied earlier, to be reformulated not only to correspond to the specificity of the particular experience of post-socialism, but also to reveal how such a confrontation brings forth more general challenges and lines of critique. There is a strange incongruity in and around Berlant’s book. Disability is literally on its cover, as the crip artist Riva Lehrer provided the cover image, If Body: Riva and Zora in Middle Age. It is embedded in the title of the book, as “cruel optimism” could in fact be a very appropriate name for the violent, recuperative, and compulsory optimism of the cultural logic of rehabilitation to which “the disabled” are permanently subjected. The book’s discussions are haunted by disability, and at times it is even evoked directly, yet only through the clinical and medicalized language of “disease,” “depression,” “obesity,” “spina bifida,” rather than through the transformative and politicized vocabulary of cripness. In this sense, Berlant’s book replicates the failing of the majority of critical work that exposes the neoliberal debasement of the values of solidarity, social justice, and equity. This lack of discussion is startling. Indeed, how is it possible that the bulk of critiques of neoliberalism and neoliberal governmentality provides such engaging and incisive insights into the politics of maximizing vitality, capitalizing on the very act of living, or exposing the morbid utilization of “slow death” and the necropolitical distribution of death, yet does so without including disability/cripness in its analytical instrumentarium? How can a discussion of “the politics of life” itself do without a category that is integral to modern definitions of life and vitality? Taking up the one crip lead from the book, I speak to the image of If Body (approaching it differently to Berlant herself in her closing “Note on the cover image” [265–67]) and ask what a critique of cruel optimism would look like if it thought of crip bodies, if it thought of crip bodies elsewhere from the Western context, and if it thought of crip existence in the context of post-socialist, neoliberal promises.6

In formulating the crip reading of cruel optimism, in cripping cruel optimism, we need to address the different affective structures of post-socialist promises. We also need to read those affective structures along with and perhaps against the relationality of cruel optimism Berlant first identified. Most importantly, the concept needs to be expanded so that its more capacious definition would account for the pressures of compulsory able-bodiedness and for the specific experiences of disabled people and crips. In other words, Berlant’s concept of toxic and hurtful promises and her repertoire of critical analysis of fantasies of the good life call for encounters with crip versions of “life” as well as for a cripping of the notion ofcr the “good life.” They need to be read more carefully and closely along with the realities of lives that were never promised (let alone lived through) by this liberal fantasy, lives that are appropriated and colonized by images of “life not worth living,” or lives that are at times not even granted the recognition of life itself. The transition into neoliberalism produced forms of affective citizenship based on what Berlant calls “aspirational normativity” (164). In the post-socialist context, the aspiration promising the utopia of the “good life” was not expressed in the imperative to keep going; the moral aspiration of the post-socialist transition was by definition that of rehabilitation, overcoming the failure and shame of the bad past. It was not the “nearly utopian” (163–64) desire for a prolonged present, but the “nearly utopian” desire for a recuperative future. The cruelty of the post-socialist moment lies—as I hope my analysis above unmasks—in conditioning forms of social belonging through an “affectivity of debt,” discourses of overcoming, and fantasies of cure. The cultural grammar of rehabilitation saturated the political and the social so fully that claims to social equity could be disavowed and turned into a chimera, the crip monstrous ghost haunting the post-socialist redefinition of sociality and community, where any form of social belonging for crips other than under the rubrics of paternalizingly charitable humanism was (and remains) virtually impossible (see also Kolářová). Registering the temporal coincidence of different structures of compulsory optimism also emphasizes their cruel irony. The project of rehabilitating the post-socialist crip virtually overlaps with the moment when, in the West, states started to retract their social welfare commitments. Even more specifically, the countries in “transition” served to uphold the fantasies of success, health, and the general “good life” made possible by capitalism. For instance, with the claims that it was living the “post-communist dream” (qtd. in Weiner 53), the Czech Republic was in the early 1990s (before the myth of smooth, straightforward, and successful transition was ruptured by the first crisis in 1994) put forth as the model for the countries of the former Eastern Bloc. The “teleology of ‘transition’” (Hann 9) of the post-socialist countries along the same path the West followed decades earlier (see also Verdery) also served, however, as an important projection space for the “West,” where the apparent rehabilitative capacity of capitalism in the East was utilized to bolster the “secular faith” (Duggan xiii) in (neoliberal) capitalism as the only possibility for human history. This did not go completely unnoticed, as the key figure of the Czech transformation, Václav Klaus, himself notes: “It is nearly paradoxical that the speeches of some of us [sic] delivered in the West are perceived not only as signs of the vital renaissance of thought in the East, but are also sought after as a support in their own ideological skirmishes” (Klaus, “Síla,” 1). Yet, in his ego-centrism, Klaus did not draw the conclusions at hand: that the project of rehabilitation/transformation in the “East” and its shock method helped to sustain the “West”—and at the same time inhibited the development of a critical crip consciousness in both locations.

2022 Michigan Kritik
Aff --- Disability --- K lab › Topicality › 2AC --- Resolved ::

Resolved :: as a model of black disruption unsettles contemporary academics, finding company in vast finitude

Therí Alyce Pickens 19 [Black Madness :: Mad Blackness, https://doi.org/10.1215/9781478005506, 2019, author of New Body Politics: Narrating Arab and Black Identity in the Contemporary United States, and editor of Arab American Aesthetics: Literature, Material Culture, Film, and Theatre., accessed 7/11/22, -ekh-]

The third putative word of the title, the double colon, teases and disrupts. The title signals that there are differences between Black madness and mad Blackness but one is not an analogy for the other, nor does one explain the other, nor does one cause the other. A

lthough the double colon tends to stand for analogy, the use of it here does not affirm that the two are such, but rather questions the grammars and assumptions that lie dormant in thinking of them as analogous (a query I highlight by calling the double colon a word above). I toy with the double colon as a convention of the academic project specifically because what typically follows the colon is supposed to explicate or clarify. In this case, the so-called clarification is meant to unsettle. The double colon also nods to the tradition of Black speculative fiction on which this project focuses. In the introduction to Afro-Future Females: Black Writers Chart Science Fiction’s Newest New-Wave Trajectory (2008), Marleen Barr claims, “A period printed on a page resembles a planet backgrounded by white space vastness.”20 Whereas Barr usefully thinks of the period as a manifestation of Black/white encounter in science fiction authorship, I find the period-as-planet evocative for how it forces a more expansive understanding of that which we once thought of as finite. Again, the causal, analogic, and explicative relationships do not fully capture how Black and mad function together. Instead, the four period/planets of the double colon invite us to think of them as more vast in scope than heretofore imagined.21

2022 Michigan Kritik
Aff --- Disability --- K lab › Topicality › 2AC --- C/I Dis Crit

The C/I usage of DisCrit is a necessary resistance strategy to modes of education that are unaware of racial bias.

Johnson 21 -  works for a Washington, DC-based international NGO focused on global worker rights. He resides in Johannesburg, South Africa. His work has been published in the Small Wars Journal, International Policy Digest, E-International Relations, the Journal of Black Studies, the Journal of Pan-African Studies, and Sahara Reporters. He earned his Ph.D. from Temple University, an MSc from the University of Birmingham, an M.A. from the  University at Albany, SUNY, and a B.A. from Elizabeth City State University. (Christopher Keith Johnson, “Using Disability Critical Race Theory in American Special Education Classrooms”, E-International Relations, 2 December 2021, ) || PZ

The Need for Systemic Overhaul Hancock et al. (2021) describe DisCrit resistance in childhood education as an exercise that transforms theory into praxis. It moves with an awareness of educator bias and racism, is an asset rather than deficit-focused, dismisses whiteness as a default entry point for learning, embraces resistance by parents and students as an opportunity to reflect on systemic white supremacy, rather than a marker for punitive action. Respect for the value of the student must be reflected in curriculum, pedagogy, and solidarity with the community of learners and parents that are purportedly the focus of special education efforts (p. 49). The above is not an exercise that is workshopped into an educator after they are hired. It is something that, at minimum, begins during teacher education. It assumes that what has been absorbed by the educator before this engagement is a product of white supremacy. It matters not whether the teacher is a woman of color or even a person with disabilities herself. One can be taught to hate themselves and, at times, are more kinetic in disciplinary measures against members of their self-identified group than someone from outside of it. In a system that identifies a Black student with disabilities as a liability or, worse, a threat, it takes a mighty indoctrination process to view anyone with a Black body as a decision maker rather than a body to be acted upon. American policy of all types sees Blackness as threatening—all forms of Blackness. Khalil Muhammad (2011) zeroes in on this reality by positing that the fear of Blackness defines the American cityscape itself. Urban America is defined not by greater access to education, commercial space, advancement in technology, employment, or any other factor. Instead, the presence of Black people and their association with crime frame the value of the American city. With rapid de-industrialization and re-segregation of many of these spaces on the one hand and equally aggressive gentrification on the other, the American city is on some level fighting against itself whether it is rising or falling, based almost exclusively on the number of Black people within it. Therefore, among the blackest, legitimate spaces where progress should occur, the American school system is deemed worthy only by how prevalent (or not) Blackness is within it. Community resistance to pity and fear is an essential aspect of DisCrit. Studies show that parental involvement in their children’s education is vital in a program for young people with special needs. DisCrit sees resistance to racism as capital rather than a deterrent to education. Monique Matute-Chavarria (2021) defines cultural community wealth as consisting of “six forms of capital: aspirational, linguistic, familial, social, navigational, and resistance” (2). An educator allied with white supremacy would have difficulty even speaking to a parent whose every move, inflection of voice, and lived experience is different from their own. One false move could result in punitive action towards the child, no different than a police officer who misinterprets African American cultural norms as something that must be countered with brute force. Remember that we are speaking of systems. White supremacy’s umbrella is large enough to cover both the criminal justice system and the education system – with the school to prison pipeline being in itself a journey of progressive discipline leading to the control of the Black body. DisCrit sees African-American ways of being as a strength through which the curriculum and pedagogy should be informed rather than something to be, at times, violently resisted by the education system. Labeling Black students with disabilities as “at-risk” has led to their isolation and opened the door for re-segregation of the American public school system in direct opposition to earlier hard-fought legal victories against the practice (Love & Baneke 2021, p.37). Underneath this desire to help Black disabled children is another reason for the labeling and othering of Blackness in white-controlled spaces – protection of white children through re-segregation (Love & Baneke 2021, p. 35). It is one thing for a white female educator to be exposed/subjected to the grotesquery of Black disabled bodies. It is another to put her children among them. DisCrit identifies individual bias and racism but sees the bigger picture in challenging white supremacist fueled rollbacks of civil rights policy that further disadvantage already marginalized and underserved communities. White supremacy is ever-shifting with the times. Policy and law in disability have led to confusion as to who is considered disabled. It is now widely accepted that special education is not isolated to the physical. It must also address the mind through new learning methods for those who do not process what is widely offered. What is considered normal? The fact that Blackness is not considered acceptable or malleable makes many different learning methods within the community special. Practitioners often do not understand cultural differences and the need for new teaching methods. They instead see their purpose as an opportunity to segregate Black students in special classrooms, ghettoizing special education and transforming it into an exclusively black space in some school districts. The dilemma here is that progressive white educators reject special education opportunities for Black students not to appear racist (Connor et al., 2019). While this may seem commendable, it then locks out students who might genuinely benefit from innovative new learning strategies. There is a better approach than obsessing about the over-representation of Black students in special education. A more comprehensive, truthful curriculum that acknowledges the existence of white supremacy would be a commendable starting point. DisCrit in Practice The section above navigates theory but less so practice. How would an educator apply DisCrit in the classroom and interactions with Black parents? An understanding that the school itself is not always a place filled with pleasant childhood memories might be of value as the teacher prepares to engage with Black families in that space. Accepting that what is (at times) difficult for the educator to see does not mean that it does not exist. This is an appropriate starting point, especially as it relates to issues of race. For a teacher of any race, to see all forms of resistance from parents and students as defiance, pushback, oppositional behavior, and overall unreasonable diversions from learning is an error. To expect lockstep compliance within a system that has often failed Black families means that there needs to be a more nuanced interpretation of what is being observed in the classroom or parent-teacher interactions. As noted by this DisCrit tenet, children of Color with dis/abilities and their families intentionally act in the face of marginalization, and such actions should be respected as necessary communication to support justice efforts rather than simply targets for intervention. For example, Collins (2011) described how a Black child with perceived challenging behaviors engaged in literacy moves to confront deficit positioning and capitalize on self-identified strengths. Acknowledging such behaviors as intentional forms of participation, rather than disruptions, encourages innovative practice and counters deficit assumptions that hinder inclusive education. Similarly, families of Color often resist deficit positioning of their children by engaging in behaviors that are not traditionally recognized as parent involvement, such as refusing disability labeling and enacting culturally meaningful parenting (Kaomea, 2005; Lalvani, 2014; Waters, 2016). Understanding such acts as necessary family advocacy and engagement creates new avenues for family–professional partnerships supporting young children (Love & Baneke 2021, p.40). The school should not in any way resemble a prison. Parents have a right to question what is being taught to their children, and the children themselves have to be their genuine selves to process what is being provided by the educator. DisCrit advocates are not asking for special treatment of Black students with disabilities, but that they are given the room to learn in an environment that values their existence and recognizes their humanity. It’s not too much for an educator to engage parents as equals and children as young people who explore possibilities and at times test boundaries. DisCrit advocates demand the above. None of which is too much to require of the education system.

2022 Michigan Kritik
Aff --- Disability --- K lab › Topicality › 2AC --- C/I Dis Crit

C/I – The resolution through Dis Crit Studies. Only the C/I is a necessary interrogation of a system that attempt to uphold normalcy.

Johnson 21 -  works for a Washington, DC-based international NGO focused on global worker rights. He resides in Johannesburg, South Africa. His work has been published in the Small Wars Journal, International Policy Digest, E-International Relations, the Journal of Black Studies, the Journal of Pan-African Studies, and Sahara Reporters. He earned his Ph.D. from Temple University, an MSc from the University of Birmingham, an M.A. from the  University at Albany, SUNY, and a B.A. from Elizabeth City State University. (Christopher Keith Johnson, “Using Disability Critical Race Theory in American Special Education Classrooms”, E-International Relations, 2 December 2021, ) || PZ

Disability Critical Race Theory (DisCrit) is a tool that, if implemented, can give voice to Black children with disabilities in a system that cares little about either. Its merger of disability studies (DS) and Critical Race Theory (CRT), if applied, would provide the necessary shock to the system to racist policymakers who would rather pity, at best, than support the empowerment of visible Black disabled bodies. DisCrit “calls for activism and resistance that ‘removes the policing and enforcement of normality’ rooted in ableism and racism[…] (Park et al., 2021, p. 59) DisCrit is a fight for ownership of the Black bodies, minds, and aspirations of an underserved population as partners rather than clients/beneficiaries of the kindness of a white-controlled system that has not interrogated its own bias and hatred of Blackness in all its forms. Through it, a holiday, passage of disability laws that lack enforcement, and other feel-good measures would no longer be the extent of meaningful change. DisCrit is the most effective tool to center the study of power in the hands of the oppressed. In particular, it offers a kinetic response to injustice within the sector, focusing on the education of Black students with special needs. Its interrogation of a system that devalues the very humanity of the subject provides arguably the most comprehensive reading of the oppressor, forcefully turning the gaze of whiteness on black back onto itself where its systems rather than the Black body become what must be analyzed and acted upon. To examine the utility of DisCrit in the American classroom, one must first define the critical barrier to realizing a truly inclusive experience in that space – white supremacy. In the popular American imagination, the term conjures images of villainous white men spewing hate and threatening or carrying out violence akin to the antagonists in Norman Jewison’s film In the Heat of the Night or Alan Parker’s Mississippi Burning. If only it were that simple. As celebrated as these two motion pictures are, the reality is far more complex and nuanced. White supremacy is less about a white individual’s raw hatred of people of color and their unshakeable belief in that group’s inferiority. It is systemic. It seeps into every crevice of the American project. White supremacy is at times easy to see, but it is invisible to the average American—it being so much a part of the country’s history and mission. A highly effective explanation/definition/navigation of white supremacy is offered by Vann R. Newkirk II who references critical race theorists while cutting to the heart of the term: The school of critical race theory, championed by scholars such as bell hooks, has been around in academic circles for at least 30 years, and its definition of white supremacy has long animated black activism. To quote scholar Frances Lee Ansley (taken here from a passage from David Gillborn, also, a critical-race-theory scholar): By “white supremacy” I do not mean to allude only to the self-conscious racism of white supremacist hate groups. I refer instead to a political, economic and cultural system in which whites overwhelmingly control power and material resources, conscious and unconscious ideas of white superiority and entitlement are widespread, and relations of white dominance and non-white subordination are daily reenacted across a broad array of institutions and social settings (Newkirk II, 2017). For most African-Americans, a white person not liking them has minimal impact on their lived experience. But being shut out of educational opportunities, the professions, healthcare, housing, freedom of movement, and all manner of fundamental rights is far more than a trivial vexation. It reduces their quality of life or may even result in their death. This all-encompassing aspect of white supremacy would require surgical excision to separate it from the history of the American project. It is so embedded in the mission and purpose of America that white people seldom realize that they benefit from it. Is there a difference between a well-meaning, progressive white teacher in an urban school system serving Black students and a card-carrying member of the Ku Klux Klan or activist in the alt-right movement? Sure, there is. But do they both exist in the same system that provides them privilege while reducing people of color to second-class status? There’s no doubt that this is also true. Not being conscious of the impact of white supremacy on themselves and those around them makes them both unhelpful at best and at worst equally dangerous to African-American youth’s life and life chances. This article will interrogate, in an admittedly modest fashion, the history of white supremacy that has led to a need for an intersectional tool, not just a theory, but a tool to counter the American education system’s desire to control Black, disabled children, no different than it has any other category of Blackness in America. It will focus on how DisCrit can function as an education and awareness tool for educators, parents, and children who view formal spaces of learning as necessary for the liberation of people of African descent rather than an institution to isolate and imprison both the minds and bodies of disabled children in service of white supremacy. It will engage a brief history, leaning more on recent events, current definitions, explore the limits of disability law without implementation, and the steps necessary to reform special education as applied to Black people in America. DisCrit Interrogates the American Desire to Control Black Bodies From the political violence that led to the murder of Crispus Attucks before the American revolution, the mutilation of Emmet Till, and the forced sterilization of Black women in the South, until this moment, the destruction of Black bodies has catalyzed opening democratic space in America. The filmed torture and murder of George Floyd by police in Minneapolis resulted in the most significant moment of collective reflection on the evils of white supremacy since the end of the American civil rights movement. Floyd was incapacitated, lost control of his bodily functions, cried for help, and was exterminated as the world watched. Americans observed in both fascination and disgust as the full power of systemic anti-Black racism was captured so visibly that even conservatives were temporarily aghast at its horror. What would usually go no further than a hashtag on social media became a moment for corporate philanthropy, study circles on race, and even a national holiday marking the end of America’s original sin—the enslavement and forced labor of African people in the formation of America itself. Shortly after this rare moment of handholding and togetherness, the political and social space transformed into yet another battle in America’s culture wars. Legislative attacks against Critical Race Theory (CRT) were launched only days after celebrating the nation’s supposed reckoning on race (Sawo & Banerjee, 2021). The quick pivot from compassion and a need to understand each other across racial lines turned to self-serving claims by numerous state and national legislative bodies that enough had been done to placate African-Americans. Nothing more was needed. The current legislative position in numerous American statehouses calls for progressive disability advocates and, more importantly, those with disabilities themselves to forcefully approach and engage struggle in an intersectional manner that challenges systems rather than individuals and institutions. America was built on the backs of Black bodies. The fierce pushback required for Black people to be seen and heard in America necessitates, as it always has, the inclusion of its children, including those with disabilities. Black children within special education classrooms are no less feared than George Floyd was by the police officer who murdered him. The resistance to subjugation that DisCrit offers is informed by the historical legislative, scholastic, and criminal justice-backed aims to control Black bodies.

2022 Michigan Kritik
Aff --- Disability --- K lab › Topicality › 2AC --- C/I Schizz the Rezzzzz

Let’s schizz this shit up! The process of schizzing is a commitment to the quality of sociality toward alter-economic postcapitalist futures. We’ll term this schizoeconomics. The schizz cuts subjectivity as we know it liberating the neurodiverse from the grips of capitalism.

Manning 20 [Erin Manning, she received her Ph. D in Political Philosophy from University of Hawaii in 2000. She currently teaches in the Concordia University Fine Arts Faculty, “For a Pragmatics of the Useless” (pgs 289-297) published in November 2020 by accessed on July 13, 2022 by AP]

Schizoanalysis is an alter-economic practice: its work is to unmoor the financialization of the individual as metric of preexisting value. The schizz cuts through the middle, neurodiverse in its call for the more-than. “No more normopaths!” it howls. How-else-with-and? The schizz of the schizoanalytic practice must never be reindividualized by setting up the figure of the lone schizophrenic, or any figure, as its cipher. Contrary to some interpretations of Anti-Oedipus, nowhere do Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari idealize psychosis or schizophrenia. As everywhere in their philosophy, the aim is not to moralize but to couple the pragmatic with the speculative, asking how processes unfold and what immanent valuations run through them. The differentiation they make between schizophrenia as process and schizophrenia as entity is vital in this regard. The schizophrenic entity “can only be defined in relation to the arrests, the continuations in the void, or the finalist illusions that repression imposes on the process itself” (Deleuze and Guattari 1983, 379). The schizophrenic process, or what they call the schizoid pole, refers to the manner in which desire invests itself in sociality. At the schizoid pole, knowledge schizophrenizes, passing beyond its own axiomatics, creating new operations. “Figureschizzes” are produced “that are no longer either figurative or structured” (371). These two operations, the schizophrenic entity and the schizophrenic process, are in continuous co-composition, the schizoid pole always also in proximity with the threat of the pathological. Desire schizzes, uncoupling pathology Cephalopod Dreams Finance at the Limit 8 290 Chapter 8 from process. Desire, the impersonal force that activates socialities in germ, is the revolutionary activity through which new lifeways are produced, schizzing all the while. What distinguishes the schizophrenic from the neurotic is psychosis. What is of interest to Deleuze and Guattari is that psychosis cannot be oedipalized. The neurotic is the one on whom the Oedipal imprints take, whereas the psychotic is the one incapable of being oedipalized, even and especially by psychoanalysis. The first task of the revolutionary . . . is to learn from the psychotic how to shake off the Oedipal yoke and the effects of power, in order to initiate a radical politics of desire freed from all beliefs. Such apolitics dissolves the mystifications of power through the kindling, on all levels, of anti-oedipal forces—the schizzes-flows-forces that escape coding, scramble the codes, and flee in all directions: orphans (no daddymommy-me), atheists (no beliefs), and nomads (no habits, no territories). (Mark Seem, in Deleuze and Guattari 1983, xxi) The schizz must always be considered in terms of what it can do, not in terms of what it defines. It is from this vantage point that the figure of the schizophrenic must be understood in the account of capitalism and schizophrenia, with Oedipus always as the overdetermining pull to the neurotic replaying, in all pathologies, of what holds them to the narration of a preexisting structure. Oedipus should not be considered an actual formation, however. The Oedipus complex is a tendency in potentia: “it must be actualized in a neurotic formation as a derived effect of the actual factor” (Deleuze and Guattari 1983, 129). Psychosis schizzes Oedipus. This is why Freud disliked schizophrenics: “For we must not delude ourselves: Freud doesn’t like schizophrenics. He doesn’t like their resistance to being oedipalized, and tends to treat them more or less as animals. They mistake words for things, he says. They are apathetic, narcissistic, cut off from reality, incapable of achieving transference; they resemble philosophers— ‘an undesirable resemblance’” (Deleuze and Guattari 1983, 23).1 In schizzing the “neurotic territoriality of Oedipus,” psychosis produces new circuits (136). There is no promise attached to these circuits. They could just as well fold back on themselves, returning to all the forms of neuroticization that reduce psychotics to the apparently unmoored, disjointed paranoid figure psychiatric institutions lock up. “Perhaps there is only one illness, neurosis, the Oedipal decay against which all the pathogenic interruptions of the process should be measured” (319). In pushing up against what can be extracted from the schizophrenic experience that resists the neuroticization imposed on it, Deleuze and Guattari pursue the question that most troubled Jean Oury and was central to the work at Cephalopod Dreams 291 the La Borde clinic: “How does one avoid the institution’s re-forming an asylum structure, or constituting perverse and reformist artificial societies, or residual paternalistic or mothering pseudo families?” (319). What techniques can be put in place to schizz the institution’s penchant for all that retriangulates? Urgently necessary is the decoupling of experience from the pathological valuations of the deficit model. As in the wider field of neurodiversity, the aim is not cure but a commitment to the singular ways difference expresses itself and the qualities of desire, knowledge, and creation it produces. “A true politics of psychiatry, or antipsychiatry, would consist therefore in the following praxis: (1) undoing all the reterritorializations that transform madness into mental illness; (2) liberating the schizoid movement of deterritorialization in all the flows, in such a way that this characteristic can no longer qualify a particular residue as a flow of madness, but affects just as well the flows of labor and desire, of production, knowledge, and creation in their most profound tendency” (Deleuze and Guattari 1983, 321). Against normopathy, schizoanalysis never does its work from outside the event. Sensitive to the schizz, it moves with it, following its tendencies. “Foucault announced an age when madness would disappear, not because it would be lodged within the controlled space of mental illness (‘great tepid aquariums’), but on the contrary because the exterior limit designated by madness would be overcome by means of other flows escaping control on all sides, and carrying us along” (321). From this vantage point, schizophrenia shifts from entity to force, desiringproduction its motor. “Like love: there is no specifically schizophrenic phenomenon or entity; schizophrenia is the universe of productive and reproductive desiring-machines” (5). There is no longer “a specific, identifiable schizophrenic entity” (6). What there is instead is a practice of the schizz that attunes to the multiplicity of “I, Antonin Artaud, am my son, my father, my mother, and myself” (15). Multiplicity in differential, the schizoid pole explodes the great tepid aquariums of our pathological imaginations. Beyond pathology, there are no criteria. “It might be said that the schizophrenic passes from one code to the other, that he deliberately scrambles all the codes, by quickly shifting from one to another, according to the questions asked him, never giving the same explanation from one day to the next, never invoking the same genealogy, never recording the same event in the same way” (15). Is this madness? Or is the psychosis to be found in the imposed adherence of systems on worlds too differential, too multiple to tame? The schizophrenic is the limit case of existence that troubles our certainties as regards the stability of subjectivity. To repeat the mantra that drives chapter 5: “A schizoanalysis schizophrenizes in order to break the holds of power and 292 Chapter 8 institute research into a new collective subjectivity and a revolutionary healing of mankind. For we are sick, so sick, of our selves!” (Mark Seem, in Deleuze and Guattari 1983, xxi).2 Schizoanalysis is not a practice of the individual. It is not a practice of pathologization, of singling out the one whose neurology will invariably be considered a deficit. Schizoanalysis is a practice of the event where I, even schizo-I, is not yet. That the schizophrenic refutes the limited envelope of the individual is certainly part of the story. But the work of schizoanalysis is not done on the body (of the schizophrenic) per se. The work is done in the relation where the phonic leaves its resonant traces. The schizz, the effect of the schizophrenizing of experience, cuts subjectivity as we know it, subjectivity as the claim to the human (the category that excludes the neurodiverse, and all qualities and forces of life-yet-tobe-invented that threaten the I as white, colonial, neurotypical being. Capitalism breaks bodies, its devaluation of qualitative difference at the level of aesthetic sociality so complete that bodies barely hold up. Exhaustion, anxiety, depression, and all their offshoots are everywhere palpable. Capitalism breeds paranoia, the ground so uneven, our bearings so unsteady, that we fold into a selfpossession that leaves no room for what exceeds us. Limited by the hardening of our edges, we become more enclosed in our-selves, less turned to an outside that would revivify the more-than that courses through us. This is what Deleuze and Guattari are referring to when they talk about how capitalism produces the neurotic, and, at the extreme, the “sick schizo” (1983, 362). A schizoeconomics is committed to the schizzing of capitalism. Its challenge is to work in careful attunement to capital’s own infinite appetite for circulation and deviation.3 Flows, processes, detours are, after all, what capital is made of, its movements faster, more mad, and often more creative than we would like to admit. To compose with capital is to coincide with its movements to schizz the more-than that runs through them, connecting to the speculative share of its own decidedly more-than human process. The cutting edge of capitalism is in the financial markets, which have evolved forms of abstract capital so abstruse, contingent, and objectively undecidable that it is impossible to get an effective grip on them. They run according to their own process, and sometimes run away with themselves, periodically crashing and burning. The financialized economy is beyond the human pale: beyond full human comprehension and beyond effective Cephalopod Dreams 293 human control. It is a self-driving machine, operating more and more abstractly, with no one in particular at the steering wheel. It was created by the human, but not in its own image, emerging rather as a monstrous offspring that turns back to engulf its maker and drive away with it. (Massumi 2017c, 9) To schizz capitalism is to develop an account of quality that can discern the difference between cuts that breed the count of assets, and cuts that revalue value. In its infinite capacity for deviation, capital is a powerful adversary. The aim of finance at the limit is always alter-capitalist, but it in no way purports that there is an outside of capital as we know it. To schizz capital is to watch another limb begin to grow elsewhere. Alter-capitalist futures will be built of more than the schizzing of capital: they will be led by the development of practices that exert the force of other ways of living in a logic that refuses the tenets that undergird capitalism—the relentless drive to quantitative increase, inexorable growth and inequality, the capture of life intensities for profit. Practicing the schizz begins there, in the midst, asking what kinds of techniques can be crafted for those other logics, logics that sidle, in approximation of proximity, an aesthetic sociality of blackness, experimenting with the minor that runs through a sociality born in the being of relation. This is to say that the practice of the schizz is never structural, never aimed at a totality, as though something as stable as capital-as-structure existed and could directly be taken down. The practice is transversal, operating in the circulation of flows themselves. This modest aim may seem useless. Indeed, it is: an ethos of the pragmatics of the useless runs through it. It claims nothing as regards grand schemes of productivity. Its proposition: to practice the art of life-living at the differential of minor socialities in a livingloving that angles toward the instauration of new modes of (merest) existence. Schizoeconomies will not come into themselves once and for all. They will always need to be (re)invented, at every turn bringing with themselves new techniques for practice unlimited. Capital is crossed by lines of escape, and this is what finance at the limit exploits. “Capitalism is continually cutting off the circulation of flows, breaking them and deferring the break, but these same flows are continually overflowing, and intersecting one another according to schizzes that turn against capitalism and slash into it” (Deleuze and Guattari 1983, 376). Cleaving capitalism from within, the schizz produces social fields that may operate only for an instant, but nonetheless provoke the seeding of a different mode of investment, and with it different operations of value. Paranoia will always be around the corner, counting its coins, but as Saidiya Hartman’s Wayward Lives, Beautiful Experiments 294 Chapter 8 demonstrates, minor practices of the art of life-living have always existed, even under the worst conditions: “The wild idea that animates this book is that young black women were radical thinkers who tirelessly imagined other ways to live and never failed to consider how the world might be otherwise” (2019, xv). “The revolutionary investment of desire” schizzes worlds into otherwise-living (Deleuze and Guattari 1983, 378). Desiring-production is the force against which capitalism has no power: unquantifiable, in a logic of the relation of nonrelation, desire as force too impersonal to claim bends the pathways toward intensities for which no preexisting code, no count, exists. This is why the schizophrenic as conceptual persona is vital to the project of schizzing capital for Deleuze and Guattari: the schizoid pole is the pole of desiring-production and, as such, “is revolutionary, in the very sense that the paranoiac method is reactionary and fascist; and it is not these psychiatric categories, freed of all familialism, that will allow us to understand the politico-economic determinations, but exactly the opposite” (1983, 379–80). Revolutionary desire is a practice, not a tool. It does its work transversally, moving waywardly where we might least expect it. Writing of Mattie, a young laundress, Hartman culls from the anarchival force of the photographs that nourish her critical fabulation the force of what desire can do in the face of racial capital’s devaluations: Mattie has been credited with nothing, deemed unfit for every role except servility, condemned in advance of wrongdoing, and destined to be a minor figure even in her own verified history. To esteem her acts, to regard rather than vilify Mattie’s restive longing, is to embrace the anarchy—the complete program of disorder, the abiding desire to change the world, the tumult, upheaval, open rebellion—attributed to wayward girls. It is to attend to other forms of social life, which cannot be reduced to transgression or to nothing at all, and which emerge in the world marked by negation, but exceed it. (2019, 62) Mobilizing the schizz, inventing schizoanalytic techniques for practices of the event, requires diligence as regards capital’s (de)valuation of existence. Techniques must be invented to learn to attune to the difference between finance unlimited (neoliberal capital) and finance at the limit (schizoeconomy), to become sensitized to what sanctions the extreme deterritorialization of capital on one end of the spectrum and empowers the infrathin registering of the ineffable on the other. Deleuze and Guattari speak of capitalism’s process of production as unleashing “an awesome schizophrenic accumulation of energy or charge against which it brings all its vast powers of repression to bear, but which nonetheless contin- Cephalopod Dreams 295 ues to act as capitalism’s limit” (1983, 34). Capitalism is a movement that skirts the limit, continuously coming up against the dangers of crossing the threshold: “it continually seeks to avoid reaching its limit while simultaneously tending toward that limit” (34). This is even more clearly the case today than when Deleuze and Guattari underscored it in the late 1960s. Neoliberal capital is the flow of all flows. As Brian Massumi writes: “The ‘capitalist process’ is how the capitalist system dips into its own immanent outside to draw out new potentials for its becoming, or continuing self-constitution” (2018, 11). How to invent platforms for schizoeconomic finance at the limit that do not simply facilitate capital’s seemingly infinite capacity to capitalize on process for monetary gain? Precapitalist marginal economies may give us a clue. For their operations, unlike those of capital, are rich with emergent sociality. The notion of the penultimate is vital to understanding how limit and threshold are mobilized to engender the being of relation in these early economies. “Take two abstract groups, one of which (A) gives seeds and receives axes, while the other (B) does the opposite. What is the collective evaluation of the objects based on? It is based on the idea of the last objects received, or rather receivable, on each side” (Deleuze and Guattari 1987, 437). The receivability of the objects in the account above refers not to the last object received but to “the penultimate, the next to the last, in other words, the last one before the apparent exchange loses its appeal for the exchangers, or forces them to modify their respective assemblages, to enter another assemblage” (437). The seriality refers to the cycle the exchange produces. “The last as the object of a collective evaluation determines the value of the entire series. It marks the exact point at which the assemblage must reproduce itself, begin a new operation period or a new cycle, lodge itself on another territory, and beyond which the assemblage could not continue as such. This is indeed a next-to-the-last, a penultimate, since it comes before the ultimate” (438). The ultimate changes the assemblage and, with that change, produces a new series. The limit is here understood as “marking a necessary rebeginning,” while the threshold marks “an inevitable change” (438). “What counts is the existence of a spontaneous marginal criteria and marginalist evaluation determining the value of the entire series” (438). In the marginal economy, exchange creates the conditions for an encounter that, each time anew, establishes an emergent valuation. “There is neither exchange value nor use value but rather an evaluation of the last by both parties (a calculation of the risk involved in crossing the limit), an anticipation-evaluation that takes into account the ritual character as well as the utilitarian, the serial character as well as the exchangist” (439). The immanent limit sets the stage for “a collective feeling out” that cannot be done in advance of the event (439). Both sides are altered not 296 Chapter 8 only by the actual exchange but by their collective retuning to the limit. What has been “exchanged” is more than an object. A sociality has been invented that accompanies the object, supplementing it with the allure of the event through which it came to value. The economic cannot be reduced to the exchange itself. It is a platform for relation that facilitates a process of collective feeling-out that intuitively responds to the intensifying approach of the penultimate. Deviations in the process will cause punctual redirection, but an immanent choreography is in place to assist the process in not tipping into a new assemblage. The potency of the penultimate is the sociality it carries through the system. Consider an argument between a couple. No matter how angry they are, the couple will argue with a collective feeling-out of a limit, intuitively aware that to cross the limit might very well untether the bonds that hold the relationship together. The argument might sidle that limit, but the couple will be careful not to allow the threshold to be breached. They will do this by holding back certain thoughts, by attuning to the texture not only of what is said but how it is said, listening for what might crack their collective carapace, exposing them to what they cannot bear to hear. If they do cross that limit, everything will be up for renegotiation, and their relationship might end. The penultimate is of course never precisely knowable in advance—it is best known in retrospect from the perspective of the ultimate (after the assemblage has tipped into a new one). Attending to the penultimate means being sensitive to the field of relation in composition. Holding the process to the internal texture of its schizz is a way of attuning to the quality of a limit, collectively composing the relation in relation. When the schizz does the work of attending to the penultimate, what it does is value the pulse of duration’s serial rhythm as minor sociality. An exchange happens but it is not here that the value is located. The value is operative in the collective feeling-out that attends to the event’s composition. This can look like nothing. It can look like a simple exchange between seeds and axes. But it’s much more than that: it is the staying-with of the complexity of a seriality lived not as a transaction but as a proposition for life-living itself. Practicing the schizz toward alter-economic postcapitalist futures is a commitment to the quality of sociality highlighted in Deleuze and Guattari’s account of marginalist economies and sidelined by contemporary capitalism’s way of tending toward the limit. For capital too, as mentioned above, flirts with the limit, pulling back before it goes over the threshold. The difference is that capitalism remakes itself through quantification, in the generation of profit. What is being collectively affirmed in the marginalist economies is a mode of existence. When there is a pull back from the limit, it reflects a collective desire to remain within a field of relation. In capitalism at the limit, quantification runs wild. Cephalopod Dreams 297 When there is a push to the limit, the qualitative stakes are masked by the quantitative drive. This has devastating effects whose runoffs create a deviation of limit conditions that become capital’s new field of creative potential, the limits reset within the bounds of its own domain. This can be seen in the cyclic crises through which capitalism lurches, catching itself each time before it tips over (up to now). Schizoeconomics attunes to the quality of sociality in the collective feelingout of aneconomic fields of relation where finance at the limit revalues value.

2022 Michigan Kritik
Aff --- Disability --- K lab › Case › 2AC --- State Engagement

The 1AC is a prerequisite to engagement with progress narratives that ignores how mad blackness goes beyond their linear conception of time.

Pickens 19 [Therí Alyce Pickens, Professor of English, specializing in African American, Arab America and disability literatures and theories at Bates University, June 7, 2019 “Black Madness :: Mad Blackness”, Duke University Press, Durham and London, pgs. 112-113, JMH]

What of the linear progressive narrative that attempts to discipline Black madness and mad Blackness into being valuable but meaningless? At first blush, it appears to propose a more just world. It suggests that we are moving toward a historical moment that recognizes difference but does not attach abrogated meaning to it: at the end of time, we will shed the meanings of our bodies. Yet, the repercussions for such a world, even the desires for that world, require willful incursions into an ideological territory that demands anti-Blackness and ableism as its governing principles. Making meaning is not merely an intellectual exercise. It rightfully establishes Blackness and madness as integral parts of history, clarifying that their existence as abject has been crucial to creating and sustaining the violent fictions of whiteness and ability as normal. And that their objection to abjection has been and remains disruptive.

It is in the nature of a conclusion to wrap up or sum up a story already told, but in the story of madness and Blackness, we’ve already seen that Black madness :: mad Blackness exceeds the boundaries of a text. It then becomes impossible to create an apt conclusion for this kind of work. Consider this veritable lack of conclusion a mark of this project’s own mad Blackness. Each conversation in this volume unpacks the various meanings and critical interpretive strategies available when madness and Blackness intersect. As I mentioned before, the conversations here take for granted that critics and creatives speak to each other, complicate one another’s ideas. For that reason, I read the gaps each leaves open in their conversations with one another. I mine the tensions and deferrals, the mercurial and the transformative possibilities of the fold and the flesh. What appears in this volume attends to how Black madness :: mad Blackness upends, destabilizes. My wayward project demonstrates that an exploration of this sort often raises more questions than it answers, or, as was often the case in the previous discussions, does not allow a direct answer at all. How do we push the two fields together if mutual constitution is not altogether useful? What occurs when madness is a Black thang but eschews culturally nationalist leanings? Why might it be impossible to get outside the confines of the human? How does the venerable Black novel tradition offer a challenge to linear progressive temporal understanding? What becomes clear is that one cannot get beyond either madness or Blackness but rather must find the spaces where excess, unknowability, and insanity do not account for them in all their complexity. The only way out is through.

2022 Michigan Kritik
Aff --- Disability --- K lab › Case › 2AC --- Realism

Western rationality frames disability as incompatible with the “reality” of its logics, excusing the worst structural violences while focusing on the “opaque" image of the disabled

Elizabeth J White Vidarte 21 [Disability, Dependency, and the Mind: Representations of Care-Giving and Receiving,. Temple University ProQuest Dissertations Publishing, 2021. 28542354, , -ekh-]

The AMA’s code of ethics did more than prescribe obedience for patients and tender deportment for doctors; it emphasized the intimately personal connection between a doctor and the ethics of his practice: “A Physician should not only be ever ready to obey the calls of the sick, but his mind ought also to be imbued with the greatness of his mission, and the responsibility he habitually incurs in its discharge. Those obligations are the more deep and enduring, because there is no tribunal other than his own conscience, to adjudge penalties for carelessness or neglect” (np, emphasis mine).

The weight of this ethical charge lies heavily on Dr. Trescott, the protagonist of Stephen Crane’s61 1892 novella, The Monster. The novella frames the medical conundrum at the heart of the story as a question of morality. Dr. Trescott has saved the life of his black servant, Henry, badly burned after having attempted to save Trescott’s own son from a fire. Yet Henry is left “without a face” and apparently with little mind; he has become “the monster.” In the eyes of the town, Henry has transformed into a gothic horror trope, terrorizing children and the infantilized black residents of the town; the second half of the novella shows “the monster” repeating scenes from the first half — asking the doctor about his horses, walking through town, and courting his fiancée at her mother’s house, though this time he is met with screams and stones instead of affectionate ridicule, in part because Henry “the monster” shows no awareness of his transformation. Eventually a mob forms to demand his removal from their collective sight, and when the doctor refuses to send him to the state hospital, he and his wife are socially ostracized. The town’s venerated judge had himself suggested, when Henry was in limbo between life and death, that the most ethical decision Trescott could make was to let Henry die.

2022 Michigan Kritik
Aff --- Disability --- K lab › Case › 2AC --- Scholarship Good

Challenging the current norms surrounding disability in modern literature allows for the stigma surrounding disability to be dissolved so it can be seen in a better light

Schalk 18 (Sami Schalk, Associate Professor in the Department of Gender & Women's Studies at the University of Wisconsin – Madison, (2018) Bodyminds Reimagined: (Dis)ability, Race, and Gender in Black Women's Speculative Fiction 133-134 http://library.lol/main/2C8F7A1D8C5F5DC42089719EDD904C24)

The defamiliarization of race, gender, and sexuality in black women’s speculative fiction is important because it demonstrates that (dis)ability is not an exceptional category in these texts and is therefore not merely metaphoric or symbolic. Instead, (dis)ability represents an integral part of the collective defamiliarization of multiple social categories of privilege and oppression, which encourages readers to imagine each of them differently. The defamiliarization of (dis)ability, race, gender, and sexuality encourages us to question our assumptions about the definitions, meanings, and boundaries of these categories. Not all speculative fiction, however, works to explore and question social systems of privilege and oppression. As feminist and critical race scholars of speculative fiction have demonstrated, some texts reify social categories and their related stereotypes, even in nonhuman contexts. This is most apparent in representations of the racialized Other through the figure of the alien, robot, or cyborg.14 It is important then that these contemporary black women writers challenge readers to think about the social construction of (dis)ability, race, gender, and sexuality through defamiliarization. This creative destabilization and challenging of the norms and stereotypes of multiple social categories is influenced by black feminist theory, which insists on the intersectional and mutually constitutive nature of social categories and oppressions. Defamiliarization in these texts also demonstrate Barbara Christian’s argument that creative texts can be a form of theorizing about world. While authors do not need to identify their political positions or personal identities in order for critics to interpret the political implications of their texts, it is nonetheless useful to note that Hopkinson has explicitly identified as both feminist and queer, while Jemisin’s blog certainly suggests strong antiracist, feminist politics (Batty 189; N. Johnston 204). While politicized creative work is clearly not exclusive to black women, Madison’s, Jemisin’s, and Hopkinson’s defamiliarization of major social categories are examples of black feminist theorizing through speculative fiction. All three authors, in different ways, refuse certain expectations of (dis)ability, race, gender, and sexuality while still prioritizing those who are multiply marginalized. These texts therefore provide new and creative ways for readers to question such social categories, not only within these fantastical worlds, but also in their own realist contexts.

2022 Michigan Kritik
Aff --- Disability --- K lab › Case › 2AC --- Fatness (Mollow)

Black, disabled people are forced into a double bind that, especially when they are fat, images them as unvictimizable. This ideology gives an excuse for the state to enact violence and disguise it as them protecting civilians from “dangerous people”

Mollow 17 (Anna Mollow, Doctor of Philosophy in English in the Graduate Division of the University of California, Berkeley (2017). Unvictimizable: Toward a Fat Black Disability Studies. African American Review, 50(2), 115-116. doi:10.1353/afa.2017.0016)

Fatphobia reinforces these tropes of black bodies as inherently dangerous. Consider, for example, public remarks by Steve Loomis, the president of Cleveland’s police union, who defended Loehmann’s decision to shoot Tamir: Tamir Rice is in the wrong. He’s menacing. He’s 5-feet-7, 191 pounds. He wasn’t that little kid you’re seeing in pictures. He’s a 12-year-old in an adult body. Tamir looks to his left and sees a police car. He puts his gun in his waistband. Those people—ninety-nine percent of the time those people run away from us. (Schultz) In keeping with the new racism, Loomis never mentions that Tamir is black. Yet it would be difficult to miss the unspoken racism that saturates his words. The repetition of the phrase “those people,” the denial of Tamir’s vulnerability, and the description of an unarmed preteen boy as “menacing” call up longstanding images of black bodies as too dangerously powerful ever to be considered victims. Interestingly, although Loomis knows better than to speak directly about Tamir’s race, he does offer detailed information about his size. Immediately after describing Tamir as “menacing,” Loomis gives his exact height and weight. Why must the public know that Tamir was precisely “191 pounds”? Presumably, it was Tamir’s weight, not his height, that one was supposed to take as evidence that he was “wrong”; since five feet, seven inches is shorter than the average American man, Loomis’s mention of Tamir’s height serves no discernible purpose other than to make it clear that Tamir was fat. Functioning as a proxy for racism, fatphobia enables Loomis to reduce the child victim of a police killing to a set of dehumanizing antiblack stereotypes, yet without ever directly mentioning race. Antifat prejudice shores up cultural conceptions of black children as lacking innocence, authorizing Loehmann’s assertion that Tamir was a “12-year-old in an adult body.” A fat black child, it seems, cannot really be a child. Nor, it seems, can an African American person of any age be perceived as a genuine victim of state-sanctioned violence. In a culture that relentlessly depicts black bodies as unvictimizable, dominant cultural representations of blackness impede recognition of suffering, injury, and loss experienced by African Americans. As we have seen, this erasure is effected in part through an ideological double bind that contradictorily images black people as inherently disabled but also as invulnerable to pain, disability, and suffering. We have also seen that antifat prejudice augments this double bind: from depictions of Tamir Rice as “menacing” to insinuations that Barbara Dawson posed a threat to other patients in the hospital from which she was evicted, one side of this double bind represents black bodies as dangerous. The other side, which suggests that it is fatness and not violence that causes injuries and deaths of fat African Americans, relies on inaccurate assertions such as the claims that Eric Garner’s “diet killed him” and that Barbara Dawson died because she was “overweight.” As I have demonstrated, this double bind has lethal consequences in a wide range of institutional contexts, including the healthcare system, policing, and environmental policy.

2022 Michigan Kritik
Aff --- Disability --- K lab › Case › 2AC --- Fatness (Mollow)

Environmental racism that black neighborhoods enforces the idea that fat people are disabled and ignores the fact that the location the neighborhoods are in subjects the residents to toxins that create health issues

Mollow 17 (Anna Mollow, Doctor of Philosophy in English in the Graduate Division of the University of California, Berkeley (2017). Unvictimizable: Toward a Fat Black Disability Studies. African American Review, 50(2), 115-116. doi:10.1353/afa.2017.0016)

Failures to punish perpetrators of antiblack violence send the disturbing message that black lives do not matter to the state. Much the same message is conveyed by the U.S. government’s long standing refusal to adequately address the lead poisoning crisis in African American neighborhoods. Although the use of lead paint was banned decades ago, the paint remains on the walls of many low-income black people’s homes, and laws stipulating that landlords inspect rental housing for lead paint are seldom enforced (Wheeler and Broadwater). In Gray’s home state of Maryland, almost five thousand children, the vast majority of whom are African American, have experienced lead poisoning in the past decade (Wheeler and Broadwater). Lead poisoning is only one of many examples of racialized environmental injustice. Historically and contemporarily, black neighborhoods have been used as dumping grounds for toxins that white people have the political and economic clout to keep out of their communities. People of color are far more likely than whites to have little choice but to live near landfills, hazardous waste facilities, coal-fired plants, and chemical factories; they also face disproportionate levels of water contamination and pollution (Bell; Covert). Here, Black Lives Matter’s reference to the ways in which black people “are intentionally left powerless at the hands of the state” is germane: despite the pervasiveness of racialized environmental injustice, the Environmental Protection Agency has never made a formal finding of a civil rights violation against people of color (“Did the EPA''; Covert). Since its effects on the bodies of people of color are damaging and sometimes deadly, environmental racism as a form of violence. Yet fatphobia masks this violence: while news about a supposed “obesity crisis” makes daily headlines, the press all but ignores environmental racism. This omission is particularly troubling when one considers that food activists who blame fast food restaurants and snack foods for illnesses and disabilities focus intense attention on the poorest African American neighborhoods, where the effect of environmental racism the most extreme. What if the public resources that are now being used to fight a “war on obesity” in communities of color were instead directed to the task of eliminating environmental racism? One of many toxins to which people of color are disproportionately exposed is nitrogen dioxide, a chemical that has been identified as a potential causative agent in asthma and heart disease (Swift). As previously noted, Eric Garner had both of these conditions, and defenders of the police who killed him blamed his death on these disabilities, alleging that they were the result of fatness. Their comments crystallized the ways in which antifat prejudice, racialized police brutality, and environmental racism interlock and reinforce each other. While fatness has not been shown to cause asthma, heart disease, or any other medical condition, the pollution that proliferates in African American neighborhoods likely does increase the risk of acquiring these disabilities. Thus, the inaccurate claims about body size and health that were circulated by those who blamed Garner for his own death had effect not only of legitimizing anti black state violence but also of obscuring the violence of environmental racism. Like police brutality, environmental racism is often justified through dehumanizing rhetoric that depicts black people as unvictimizable, suggesting that the injuries black people sustain are of their own doing. In the mid-twentieth century, when scientific evidence implicating lead paint in neurological and cognitive disabilities became overwhelming, the lead industry claimed that lead poisoning resulted from “uneducable Negro and Puerto Rican families” who could not stop their children from eating paint (Black).33 Note the striking similarities to contemporary discourses about body size: much as proponents of lead paint maintained that black people would not get sick if they would only stop putting the wrong things in their mouths, modern-day medical “experts” blame health problems in African American communities on “obesity” and portray black people as lacking the requisite “education” to make appropriate choices about what to eat.

2022 Michigan Kritik
Aff --- Disability --- K lab › Case › 2AC --- Fatness (Mollow)

The stigma that fatness inherently equals disability allows the media to perpetuate that fat, black people fall victim to the violence that they experience is due to a fault of their own and not the oppressive systems built against them

Mollow 17 (Anna Mollow, Doctor of Philosophy in English in the Graduate Division of the University of California, Berkeley (2017). Unvictimizable: Toward a Fat Black Disability Studies. African American Review, 50(2), 105–061. doi:10.1353/afa.2017.0016)

Those who defended Garner’s killers added another source of blame to an already familiar mix: Garner was fat. According to the New York Republican congressman Peter King, the chokehold was necessary because Garner was a “350- pound person who was resisting arrest.” Furthermore, King asserted, if Garner “had not had asthma and a heart condition and was[n’t] so obese, almost definitely he would not have died” (qtd. In Henderson). Here, fatphobia and ableism function as weapons of antiblack violence, allowing Garner to be blamed for his own death at the hands of police. In this essay, I argue that fatphobia is routinely deployed in ways that exacerbate the problem of state-sanctioned violence against African Americans. As we shall see, antifat prejudice, racism, and ableism intersect to create a double bind in which black people are depicted as unvictimizable for two contradictory reasons: black people—of all sizes, but fat black people in particular—are figured as innately disabled but also as invulnerable to disability, injury, or suffering. For example, defenders of the officers who killed Garner reproduced stereotypes of black bodies as inherently disabled when they insisted that fatness-induced disabilities—rather than a deadly police chokehold—caused Garner’s death. At the same time, Garner was portrayed as almost superhumanly invulnerable when Congressman King described him as a “350-pound person who was resisting arrest,” the implication being that Garner’s size made him so dangerous that deadly force was necessary to defuse the threat that he presented. In this and other tragic incidents that I discuss in this essay, fatphobia and ableism work in conjunction with racism to construct an ideological double bind that rhetorically positions black bodies as incapable of being victimized. One side of this double bind renders violence against black people inconsequential by suggesting that fatness is the real cause of any injuries inflicted upon them, while its other side depicts violence as a necessary response to the excessive physical power that black people, especially those who are fat, are imagined to embody.

This racialized double bind is not a new invention. In the U.S., it dates back to the era of slavery, when slave owners and their supporters contended that black people were so prone to physical and mental disabilities that they could not survive without the “protection” of their white owners—while at the same time maintaining that people of African descent possessed such inordinate strength that they did not suffer from the abuses that their enslavers imposed upon them.2 Today, discussions about race are less likely to explicitly invoke biological theories equating blackness with disability. More common is a discursive formation that some scholars call the “new racism,” which blames the social disadvantages that black people experience 105 African American Review 50.2 (Summer 2017): 105-121 © 2017 Saint Louis University and Johns Hopkins University Press not on biological impairments but instead on alleged moral failings, such as “laziness” and lack of “personal responsibility” (Collins).3 What is important is that the new racism has not replaced the old racism; instead, it repackages longstanding racist stereotypes to make them more palatable in a neoliberal, ostensibly “postracial” era (Collins 32-33). Fatphobia functions efficiently as a weapon of the new racism by enabling the adaptation of old ideas about black people’s supposed inborn physical deficiencies to a modern context, attributing the putative bodily pathology of “obesity” to moral shortcomings that are coded in racialized terms. Tellingly, the behaviors to which fatness is commonly attributed replicate stereotypes of black people as undisciplined and unable to control their appetites (Williams-Forson).