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2022 Michigan Kritik
Aff --- Disability --- K lab › 1AC › 1AC --- Mad Blackness

Emerging technologies create disinformation campaigns, expanding state influence to justify its mistreatment of racialized and disabled subjects through the weaponization of cognitive dissonance in algorithmic fashion

Zach Naqvi 21 [Department of Political Science, University of Alberta, Madness, Migration and Media in the Modern Digital Age, April 14th 2021, pg.2-7, -ekh-]

Citizenship, migration and international relations informing how we conceptualize policy get inextricably tied to sovereign states that determine the fate of refugees. The framework that facilitates this process has followed a chaotic trajectory in recent years. Understanding the rise of populist rhetoric emerging in North America and Europe, among others, points to recent developments in international relations requiring greater scrutiny, with specific practices necessitating a closer look by communities at home and abroad. I argue that we have fallen short of our collective humanitarian promise of dignity and fundamental human rights for everyone, regardless of race, gender, religion, class, or country of origin. Unsurprisingly, the sovereignty of the state and a universal humanitarian aim have had difficulties getting reconciled. In theory and practice, pragmatism and utopia and things related to realist necessity versus a more utopian idealism – international relations are plagued with a disconnect between what ought to be and what is. The reason is that states, unlike individuals, families and communities are not concerned primarily with such lofty ideals as human dignity, fraternity, equality, and the like. Instead, they get inseparably linked with the fundamental objective of consolidating, maintaining, and executing powers that we as individuals upon the grounds of elections, citizenship and birth or connection have authorized the state to have. Furthermore, many view frameworks of citizenship and migration from a privileged standpoint, concerned with realist undertones of security, sovereignty, and the success of their state above all else. The dire question here is whether those immigrating, seeking asylum or even completely stateless can reasonably expect to be accommodated by sovereign states.

First, alternative facts or the designation by some that we are entering a post-truth world, amplified by improvements in technology moving us collectively towards increasingly interconnected existence, lay bare for all to see a new power dynamic playing out over the past decade. The aim of alternative facts is “to establish power: they are lying to flaunt power. They are saying to us: ‘we know that you know that this is a lie, and we don’t care, because there is absolutely nothing you can do about it’ … over years, ceaseless propaganda and spectacle, exacerbated by corrections and retractions, can destroy your sense of reality. Time spirals forward and lurches backwards.” (Kendzior, 2020, p.18) Take Franz Fanon, for example. Despite his death decades ago, his lived experience then provides critical insight now. Fanon was a doctor and the acclaimed author of Black Skin, White Masks. Despite his subjective personhood being complex and multifaceted, not constrained simply to role or race, when practicing medicine, it is a mistake made as a black doctor if he made a mistake. Similarly, refugees, migrants, and asylum seekers are broadly categorized as if the totality of their being constitutes race – and nothing more. Other times, we simply view things based on monetary or pragmatic conditionality. As Fanon notes, it is society, unlike biochemical processes, that do not escape human influence. Yet, it is us that brings society into being. (Fanon, 2008, p. XV) We saw this media makeover take place in society with the portrayal of Muslims, migrants and more recently with the Chinese during COVID-19, among a myriad of other examples through the ages. Kendzior notes how, “a media makeover is a peculiar wound. It is a terrible feeling to be in pain and ignored – as a place, as a person. It is worse to be given a mask and told it’s your face.” (Kendzior, 2020, p. 22) In other words, alongside ordinary people behaving rationally according to human psychology, some behave pathologically according to inhuman psychology. (Fanon, 2008, p. 15) We have forgotten sense from nonsense and implemented it ubiquitously as if it held any semblance of truth.

2022 Michigan Kritik
Aff --- Disability --- K lab › 1AC › 1AC --- Definitions

Vitaltiy politics explanation

Knadler 19 - ( Stephen Knadler; Stephen Knadler is an associate professor of English at Spelman College, where he teaches US literature and cultural studies. He has been published in American Literature, American Literary History, American Quarterly, Minnesota Review, and Modern Fiction Studies.; Originally published: August 6, 2019; “Vitality politics : health, debility, and the limits of black emancipation”; http://link.umsl.edu/portal/Vitality-politics--health-debility-and-the/n6SXiAQq3ac) Dōgen

The term “vitality politics” in the chapters to follow, thus, identifies a post-Reconstruction politicization of biological health as an instrument for insisting on a racial state of exception in which African Americans’ own unhealthy habits and disease susceptibility justified their legitimate suspension from full rights to social justice, economic opportunity, political equality, and freedom. I use the term “vitality” deliberately because of its layered meanings: first to invoke the language widely cited in early twentieth-century discussions about racial destiny that debated the private bodily practices and life processes of African Americans to determine (allegedly on an objective scientific basis) the developmental tendencies of freedmen and women and to medicalize economic, social, and political discriminations (see chapter 1). But, second, vitality politics also registers the focus of African American reformers on hygienic behaviors and environments to rehabilitate African Americans into “vital” citizens practicing self-care and private risk management promoted within modern liberal (and now neoliberal) multicultural racial capitalism.14 Vitality Politics synthesizes multiple strands within the broad field of what is collectively identified as biopolitics, including theories of vulnerability, medicalization, disability studies, slow death, necropolitics, mad studies, and vital materialism to get at the complicated, and not always consistent, ways that both the literal physical and mental health—the matter of Black lives— and the semiotic meanings and larger discursive narratives attached to them functioned as key tactics shaping and controlling African Americans’ place as part of the shift toward modern liberal governmentality. These practices of vitality politics, as a consequence, require an attention to a complex notion of Black personhood, one which necessitates us as literary and cultural critics to avoid privileging representations over physicality or culture over biology, and to acknowledge how post-Reconstruction material Black personhood and its representation were being mutually transformed.15

2022 Michigan Kritik
Aff --- Disability --- K lab › 1AC › 1AC --- Definitions

Definition of mad blackness :: black madness

Pickens 19 [Therí Alyce Pickens, Professor of English, specializing in African American, Arab America and disability literatures and theories at Bates University, June 7, 2019 “Black Madness :: Mad Blackness”, Duke University Press, Durham and London, pgs. 4-5, JMH]

Despite my academic and personal proclivity for politesse and rigorous specificity, I choose to rest in the vagueness and insult mad brings.8 I mobilize this word as part of my critical armature because this discussion requires a direct engagement with slippery and insulting language.9 Mad carries a lexical range that includes (in)sanity, cognitive disability, anger, and, for anyone who remembers the slang of the 1990s, excess (usually synonymous with too or really). In common parlance, it is used pejoratively and remains rather vague. However, mad studies takes up madness to “represent a critical alternative to ‘mental illness’ or ‘disorder’ as a way of naming and responding to emotional, spiritual, and neuro-diversity.”10 Mad studies perspectives mobilize activist and scholastic impulses in their refusal of the historical definitions of madness as “irrationality, a condition involving decline or even disappearance of the role of rational factor in the organization of human conduct and experience” and the equation of madness with lack or inability.11 In this field, the biopsychiatric definitions of madness that proceed from this historical definition—wedded to inability and irrationality—no longer hold since they disenfranchise the perspectives of those harmed by psy-disciplines. In this study, I take seriously the critical impulses of mad studies: I keep a tension between psychosocial definitions of madness (without attributing causality) and biomedical definitions (without attributing authority), while resisting an uncritical celebration of madness as experience or as metaphor. Even though this project focuses on those who would be labeled mad or embrace being mad, I also do not veer too far away from the critical possibilities of madness as a “slippery and unruly object.”12 When madness does not solely refer to the experience of a mad person but rather pans outward as a larger discourse, it challenges how “the psychic, cognitive, and affective dimensions of experience are parceled out into categories . . . all under the supposedly ‘empirical’ authority of medical science and psychiatric expertise as much as through the exercise of legal and juridical power.”13 In other words, it is everywhere and affects everything. Maddeningly so. In Black Madness :: Mad Blackness, Black functions as a racial category, cultural affiliation, and social position. I use Black for its lexical and sociocultural range. It includes a wide variety of people and experiences within the diaspora and does not limit the discussion to a specific geopolitical imaginative space. Unfortunately, my discussion is limited in scope to the parts of the diaspora that share an intellectual inheritance with North America and Europe. As Julie Livingston’s Debility and the Moral Imagination in Botswana (2005) and Nirmala Erevelles’s Disability and Difference in Global Contexts (2011) make clear, definitions of Blackness and disability cannot and should not be moved carelessly across transnational borders.14 Yet, given the vastness of colonial and imperial projects where race determines life and death, the study of Blackness emerges as a fecund space to think through how material consequences manifest. As I have claimed elsewhere, a turn to Blackness “authorizes a reconceptualization of history, culture, and politics” if the field is understood as “a set of traditions, reading practices, and valuation systems operating alongside, intertwined with, but also independent from those of whiteness.”15 Like madness, Blackness is also everywhere and affects everything. It is my hope that despite the necessary geopolitical limitations of my project, it later proves useful for those studying other Blacknesses. I choose to nominalize Black and mad by adding the suffix “ness” to attend to the two words as both description and category. I bring them together grammatically to theorize about the constellation of relationships that comprise the two. Nirmala Erevelles, in writing about the Middle Passage, rereads Hortense Spillers’s work to point out that the simplified causal relationship—slavery produces disability—does not fully encompass the way disability and Blackness function. Rather, “disability/impairment and race are neither merely biological nor wholly discursive, but rather are historical material constructs imbricated within the exploitative conditions of transnational capitalism.”16 My staged grammatical intervention in the title calls attention to how a revision of this sort works. It is at once a ref erence to the material conditions and consequences as well as a discursive attending to the categories’ imbrication. Nominalizing the two also staves off what Rachel Gorman argues is “the mad subject . . . constituted as the white subject at the horizon of whiteness”17: that is, the mad white subject who can be embraced by whiteness through a discourse of universality. In this formulation, Blackness modifies (and I use the grammatical term deliberately) who and what is mad. Madness as noun calls attention to what Sami Schalk insists is a useful slippage between materiality and metaphor in Black studies. She argues that within Black literature, disability takes on “concrete and metaphorical meanings” such that disability can “symbolize something other than disability while still being about disability.” In so doing, “disability metaphors therefore allow us to explore the historical and material connections between disability and other social systems of privilege and oppression.”18 As with Erevelles’s formulation, the two categories do not exist in a simple causal or analogic relationship; they inform each other such that madness modifies how we understand Blackness.19

2022 Michigan Counterplan
AT: UN Counterplan › No NB – Credibility

UN credibility is tanked – Russia vetos all effective action

Aishwarya Machani 22 — (Aishwarya Machani; U.N. Foundation Next Generation Fellow, Published: 3-1-2022; "The U.N. Is in Danger of Becoming Irrelevant"; No Publication; Accessed: 7-21-2022; https://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/30360/repeated-failures-call-into-question-the-united-nations-purpose)//Pen-SY

On Feb. 24, after years of tension and months of anxiety, Russia launched a full-scale invasion of Ukraine. With social media users sharing an almost blow-by-blow account of the conflict online, the world has looked on in horror as Ukrainian forces defend their democracy. The crisis has plunged the United Nations into chaos. Although the U.N. Security Council convened immediately after the invasion, Russia used its veto power to block a draft resolution that would have deplored the invasion as a violation of international law “in the strongest terms.” The Security Council then called an emergency special session of the General Assembly—the first in 40 years—to discuss another resolution condemning Russia. But here, too, reaching any kind of agreement is likely to be a cumbersome and sluggish process. And this, of course, is simply the most recent example of how the “scourge of war” continues to plague the world. With conflicts also raging in Yemen, Ethiopia and Afghanistan—to name just a few—the United Nations is clearly falling short of the high expectations set by its founders. With the U.N. seemingly ill-suited to both prevent and resolve conflict, it is no wonder that so many people around the world today feel that the organization is irrelevant and outdated. For instance, more than half of the young people surveyed by the U.N. in 2020 said they see it “as remote from their lives and don’t know much about it.” Adding to this sense of failure, this week saw the release of the second chapter of the International Panel on Climate Change’s sweeping climate assessment, which focuses on “Impacts, Adaptation, and Vulnerability.” U.N. Secretary-General Antonio Guterres was quick to summarize the report as “an atlas of human suffering” and a “damning indictment of failed leadership”—a criticism that encompasses the very organization over which he presides.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
AT: UN Counterplan › No Solvency – Spoilers

Chinese division with Taiwan divides up member states

Lucy Craymer 22 — (Lucy Craymer; reporter at Teuters Published: 6-27-2022; "Tuvalu minister pulls out of U.N. ocean conference after China blocks its Taiwanese delegates"; Reuters; Accessed: 7-21-2022; https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/tuvalu-minister-pulls-out-un-ocean-conference-after-china-blocks-its-taiwanese-2022-06-27/)//Pen-SY

WELLINGTON, June 27 (Reuters) - The foreign minister of Tuvalu pulled out of the United Nations Ocean Conference opening in Portugal on Monday after China blocked the participation of three Taiwanese included in the tiny Pacific island nation's delegation list, according to Radio New Zealand. Taiwan, which China claims as its own territory, is not a member of the United Nations and its citizens are unable to attend U.N. events as representatives of Taiwan. Tuvalu Foreign Minister Simon Kofe withdrew from the conference after China challenged the accreditation of three Taiwanese delegates included in Tuvalu's delegation, Radio New Zealand reported on Monday. The nation of 12,000 people has had diplomatic ties with Taiwan since 1979, and is one of 14 countries that continues to have diplomatic relations with Taiwan rather than China. Taiwan is largely excluded from international organisations that have China as a member. Taiwan's Foreign Ministry thanked Tuvalu for its support, and expressed condemnation of China. "China's arbitrary pressure on (U.N.) member states has only once again revealed its nasty nature," the ministry said. Chinese foreign ministry spokesman Zhao Lijian reiterated Beijing's stance that Taiwan is part of China.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
AT: UN Counterplan › No Solvency – Spoilers

China and Russia undermines UN legitimacy – Noko proves

Samantha Beech, 22 — (Samantha Beech; Senior News Editor at CNN International, Published: 5-27-2022; "China and Russia veto new UN sanctions on North Korea for first time since 2006"; CNN; Accessed: 7-21-2022; https://www.cnn.com/2022/05/26/asia/us-north-korea-united-nations-intl-hnk/index.html)//Pen-SY

Russia and China on Thursday vetoed a US-drafted United Nations Security Council resolution to strengthen sanctions on North Korea in a vote the US ambassador to the UN called dangerous, disappointing and likely to fuel Pyongyang's program to develop nuclear-capable missile systems. The move comes after more than a dozen North Korean ballistic missile tests this year, all of which violated previous UN resolutions and which US officials argued necessitated another international response. A resolution needs nine "yes" votes and no vetoes by the permanent members of Russia, China, France, the United Kingdom or the United States to be adopted by the UN Security Council. The 13 other members of the Security Council voted to adopt the resolution. US Ambassador to the UN Linda Thomas-Greenfield blasted the vetoes from Russia and China, which hadn't blocked any of the nine previous sanction votes made since 2006, saying the gravity of the threat from North Korea's weapons program has not changed. "For the first time in 15 years, a UN Security Council member has used a veto to stop the council from fulfilling its responsibility to hold the DPRK (North Korea) accountable for its unlawful proliferation," the US envoy said in a statement made on behalf of the US, Japan and South Korea. "The vetoes today are dangerous. Those members today have taken a stance that not only undermines the Security Council's previous action to which they have committed but also undermines our collective security." Speaking in a session at UN headquarters, Thomas-Greenfield added: "These council members have decided to shield a proliferator from facing the consequences of its actions and they have demonstrated the worthlessness of their word by giving an explicit nod of approval to the DPRK." North Korea has tested missiles on at least 16 occasions this year, the latest on Wednesday, when it fired three missiles. At least one of North Korea's tests this year was believed to be of an intercontinental ballistic missile that could hit the US mainland. China's ambassador to the UN argued new sanctions on North Korea would not stop its weapons program and may instead increase its level of testing. New sanctions could also put further pressure on the humanitarian situation in North Korea as it grapples with the effects of the Covid-19 pandemic, Ambassador Zhang Jun said. Russia's envoy also cited the Covid situation in North Korea as a reason for its veto. "The strengthening of the sanctions pressure on Pyongyang is not only useless but it's extremely dangerous from the humanitarian consequences of such measures," Russian Ambassador to the UN Vasily Alekseevich Nebenzya said in translated comments after the vote. Nebenzya said the past 15 years of sanctions pressure on North Korea had not worked. "Starting in 2006, many restrictive resolutions were adopted against Pyongyang, however as history has shown us, the paradigm of sanctions has still not been able to guarantee security in the region or resolve issues of missile and nuclear non-proliferation," the Russian envoy said. Leading up to the vote, both China and Russia had urged Washington to issue a presidential statement instead of introducing the draft Security Council resolution. But Thomas-Greenfield, the US ambassador, said China and Russia were not even open to discussion of new sanctions on Pyongyang. "We have been circulating a draft of this resolution for nine weeks. In that time, the countries vetoing this resolution have refused to engage on the text, despite our commitment to inclusivity and flexibility during consultations," she said.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
AT: UN Counterplan › No Solvency – Cyber

UN’s identity as a political institution undermines effective cyber policy

Christopher Painter 21 — (Christopher Painter; President, The Global Forum on Cyber Expertise Foundation; Associate Fellow, Chatham House, Published: 12-18-2021; "The United Nations’ cyberstability processes: surprising progress but much left to do"; Taylor & Francis; Accessed: 7-20-2022; https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/23738871.2021.2014920)//Pen-SY

Despite the laudable, if somewhat unexpected, success of the OEWG and the GGE, a number of substantive and procedural issues remain unresolved. First, the path towards greater discussion, much less agreement, on how international law applies to cyberspace is unclear. Although the compendium of national views on the application of international law called for in the GGE is helpful, given the political sensitivities of this topic, further progress in the UN setting is unlikely in the near term. That is unfortunate as greater understanding and agreement on the application of international law can be beneficial to both restraining disruptive state conduct and accountability for transgressors. As more countries articulate their own views, however, there may be some room for discussion, if not agreement, in the UN in the future. Second, although the two reports help further articulate cyber norms or rules of the road, there is little if any discussion in either report on accountability. Rules of the road and even international law are little more than words on paper if there is no way to hold violators accountable or dissuade them from engaging in such conduct in the future. The increase in cyberthreats over the last several years, including the penchant of some states to continue to turn a blind eye to malicious conduct emanating from their territory, is a testament that rules and other pronouncements are not enough in the absence of reasonable consequences. Like international law, however, the issue of accountability is a politically charged one and there are unlikely to be major developments in the United Nations. Although there is good language in the reports on the peaceful settlement of disputes and the use of UN mechanisms, these mechanisms may have limited effect when the aggressor and/or victim state are members of the Security Council and can veto any action. Third, although the focus on cyber capacity building in both reports is welcome, as is the exhortation that states and other stakeholders should support these efforts, cyber capacity building remains under resourced and under prioritised. Cyberstability is not just the province of a few developed countries but requires the participation of countries and other stakeholders around the globe. Capacity building is the key to this greater participation. Here, the UN can do more and go beyond the language of the two reports – including expressly stating at a high level that cyber capacity building is foundational to achieving the Sustainable Development Goals and leveraging existing multistakeholder platforms outside the UN, such as the Global Forum on Cyber Expertise whose mission is to promote and help coordinate cyber capacity building efforts.

2022 Michigan Kritik
Answers to Security K › Framework › 2AC – AT: Securitizing structural violence bad

Securitization is morally permissible if the threat is objectively existential --- proven by justified responses to white supremacy’s existential risk

Jessica Wolfendale 22, professor of Philosophy at Marquette University, 03/08/2022, “White Supremacy as an Existential Threat: A Response to Rita Floyd’s The Morality of Security: A Theory of Just Securitization”, European Journal of International Security /lg

Rita Floyd’s The Morality of Security: A Theory of Just Securitization is an important and insightful book that delineates a theory of just securitisation (modified from the jus ad bellum and jus in bello criteria in just war theory) involving three sets of principles governing the just initiation of securitisation, just conduct of securitisation, and just desecuritisation. This book is a much needed addition to the security studies and just war scholarship. 

Here, I explore the potential of Floyd’s just securitisation theory (JST) to provide insights into the moral justifiability of non-state groups that are not political entities engaging in resistance against forms of structural violence that pose an existential threat to those groups. Using the case study of the Black Lives Matter (BLM) movement and the threat of white supremacy to African Americans as an illustrative example, I argue that structural forms of violence can meet Floyd’s definition of an objective existential threat, justifying the resort to securitisation by groups such as BLM. As Floyd writes in chapter 5: 

2022 Michigan Kritik
Answers to Security K › Framework › 2AC---Security Discourse Good

Security Discourse within the debate space does shape reality, but also shapes specific policy solutions which are critical to decision making.

Kronfeld 2018 (Melissa Jane Kronfeld, PhD Candidate at Rutgers University in Global Affairs, “The Construction and Prioritization of Threats in the Post-Cold War Era and the Evolution of American National Security Policy”, /sethlee

A crisis is defined as an unstable or crucial time period, or state of affairs, in which a decisive change is impending, or a time when a difficult or important decision must be made. Discourse is defined, in its most basic form, as a written or spoken form of communication. In the context of culture, discourse is defined as a mode of organizing knowledge, ideas, or experience that is rooted in language and its concrete contexts. Balzacq notes that using discourse, or discursive action is, “compelling power to cause a receiver or the audience to perform a deed.” He adds, “through mutual knowledge, discourse shapes social relations and builds their form and content… [and] on the causative sides, as vehicle of ideas, discourse targets and creates the instantiation of a particular communicative action. For the purposes of this research, crisis discourse is defined by the rhetorical practices employed in order to construct threats as clear and present, and requiring immediate action or resolution. In the tradition of frame analysis, advanced by David Snow and Robert Benford, or in the tradition of William Sewell’s “schemas” and Swidler’s “tool kit”, crisis discourse provides the behavioral rules and linguistic structure, as well as the repertoire of social and political practices that enables an agent or actor to act upon structures to manifest transformation. Borrowing from Snow et al. and Goffman, I define a frame as a, “‘schemata of interpretation’ that enable individuals to ‘locate, perceive, identify, and label’ occurrences within their life space and the world at large. By rending events or occurrences meaningful, frames function to organize experience and guide action.” Robert Entman adds that framing denotes the selection or emphasis on, “some facets of events or issues and making connections among them so as to promote a particular interpretation, evaluation and/or solution.” It is therefore necessary for prioritization. I define crisis discourse as characterized by 1) the identification of a threat as a hazard to the current state of affairs, or existence of a group of individuals (i.e. community, state, or way of life); 2) constructing a threat as the cause, or existing as a critical part, of a given situation in which change is impending and will significantly impact the future course of events; and 3) the framing of a solution(s) in response to the threat, as a byproduct of the identification and construction of the threat. This is particularly important when threats are clear or present because, Daniel Kahneman and Jonathan Renshon note, hawkish biases are more persuasive where conflict is, or perceived as being, more likely. Crisis discourse is critical because political culture, and its effects on institutional decision making, are best exemplified by the discourse used to frame a threat. As Deva Woodly notes, “communication matters, because changing public discourse, changes power relations, and altered power relations change politics – the principles and policy that are at stake in the struggle over who shall govern and how.” She add the “critical battleground” for change is political discourse, where “political issues take on popular meaning and affect the common-sense understanding.” Discourse can, “advance particular interests [and] to actually change politics itself, rewriting the common understandings present in the discursive field upon which political possibilities are considered and wherein binding decision are made.” As Holland notes, “9/11 generated a discursive void as the events could not be subsumed into existing foreign policy discourse. However, 9/11, in and of itself, was not a crisis. Initially unregulated but discourse, the ‘events’ did not mean anything for certain. Instead 9/11 became a crisis through a process of discursive construction, which reinstated ‘politics’ over ‘the political.’ Crises… are constructed.”

2022 Michigan Kritik
Answers to Security K › Framework › 2AC---Security Discourse Good

If our impacts are true, Securitization is justified

Floyd 2019 (Rita Floyd, Security Studies at the University of Birmingham, “The Morality of Security” ) //sethlee

In the process I have set forth eight principles determining just securitization. These principles are supposed to hold regardless of the origin of the threat, the nature of the referent object (i.e. the entity threatened and to be made safe by securitization) and the provider of security. In more detail I have argued that securitization is morally permissible only in the presence of a just cause which in turn is made up of an objective existential threat to a just referent object of security. Referent objects are just provided they satisfy basic human needs, specifically autonomy and physical health. I further insisted on a sincerity of intention condition, whereby the right intention for securitization is the just cause. Just initiation of securitization was complemented by a criterion specifying macroproportionality, which held that the expected good gained from securitization must be judged greater than expected harm from securitization. I further specified that just securitization needs to take account of the probable consequences of treating an issue in security mode. Specifically, securitization has to have a reasonable (i.e. greater than that of nonsecuritization alternatives) chance of succeeding in achieving the just cause. The second of the two research questions was discussed as part of the development of the principles designating just conduct during securitization. I argued that the security measures used must be appropriate for dealing with the threat in question, and not serve some ulterior motive. A second criterion was concerned with reducing harm as much as possible; I argued that while the nature of the security measures differs according to the source of the threat, as well as the nature of the referent object, securitizing actors must consider the harm caused by the measures, and aim to choose the least overall harmful option available. In addition, I argued that securitization is unjust if the measures used are more harmful to the referent object than the threat they seek to solve. A third and final criterion specified just conduct of executors of securitization, including security professionals. I argued that although securitization necessarily involves the infringement of some human rights, executors of securitization should when they – as part of securitization – harm people be appropriately constraint those people’s rights to life, freedom from torture and arbitrary detention. Like recent versions of the just war theory, JST goes beyond theorizing simply the moral permissibility of securitization. Instead, it also considers the issue of just termination of securitization. In JST, desecuritization is conceptualized as a process (not an outcome) that occurs (in time) after securitization. This has meant that unlike securitization, which in JST remains a political choice decided by securitizing actors, not scholars, desecuritization is obligatory for actors who are remedially responsible for unmaking the preceding securitization, either on the basis of outcome responsibility or by connection. Although securitization and desecuritization are then interrelated processes, in JST the justice of one is judged independently of the justice of the other. In other words, an unjust desecuritization does not render a just securitization unjust and vice versa. JST specifies three principles of just desecuritization, concerning 1) the timing when desecuritization must ensue (notably, I have argued that a securitization can remain just only for as long as there is a just cause); 2) the dismantling of the security measures taken, as well as the reversal of security language; and 3) a series of restorative measures aimed at reducing the possibility of renewed and/or reactionary securitization. In addition to providing criteria determining the justice of securitization and desecuritization, the wider research argument also revealed a number of difficult issues such as that of the moral culpability of executors of securitization who have followed the rules of just securitization, but who have acted in securitizations that were unjustly initiated (Chapter 6, section 6.6). Or the question of whether just desecuritizing actors who played no part in securitization have fewer restorative responsibilities than desecuritizing actors culpable of unjust preceding securitization (Chapter 7, section 7.9), or the issue of whether securitization and a relevant counter-securitization can be just at the same time (Chapter 6, section 6.7). I have in this book advanced answers to these and other difficult questions, but I recognize that more can and needs to be said on all of them, as well as on all of the substantive principles advanced. Beyond contributing to security studies, this book also contributes to the just war tradition. This is especially the case because some just war theorists are increasingly interested in wars that do not involve kinetic force, and as such, phenomena that may be called securitization. By thinking about what the just war tradition’s criteria mean for securitization, JST speaks to just war theorists interested in these softer versions of war. I have mentioned on more than one occasion on the preceding pages that the argument is conceived as very much a first word on just securitization. I hope that other scholars will devise theories of just securitization of their own volition. This is important because I believe that research on the principles of just securitization has more than just the potential to impact positively on the scholarly study of security and/or on the decisions and actions of practitioners. Beyond that it could – provided the idea of just securitization becomes widely known, which, in turn, is likely to happen only if just securitization becomes a research area in its own right – equip the public with tools to question the ethics of the decision to securitize including the security measures used and thus hold security practitioners accountable. In other words, the long-desired (in some parts of critical security studies) goal of emancipation can quite conceivably be achieved through just securitization. The room for competing theories of just securitization is vast. One reason for this is that my interpretation of securitization is only one among many possible interpretations of the concept. For example, a theory of just securitization that theorizes securitization as an intersubjective process and focuses on audience acceptance of the speech act as pivotal would look quite different to the principles proposed as part of JST. Among other things, such a theory of just securitization would have to focus on ethical language, that is, on what kind of things securitizing actors are allowed to utter when it comes to securitizing speech acts, while they would also have to focus on what kind of audiences make ideal ethical adjudicators of the speech act and other new issues besides. Another reason for the open-endedness of just securitization research is that JST focuses only on the circumstances when securitization is morally permissible, when it is equally valid and important to ask: when, if ever, is securitization morally required? A theory of just securitization that prioritizes the obligation to securitize is bound to be quite different from JST. Unlike JST, its objective would not be to reduce the number of securitizations in the world, but to use the mobilization power inherent to securitization to achieve security as a state of being. With this in mind, potential advocates of such a theory might utilize a scalar as opposed to a categorical approach to principles of just securitization (e.g. one where not all principles advanced as part of such a theory have to be met all of the time), largely to facilitate the ease with which securitization can take place. Theories of just securitization that focus on moral obligation could differ widely from one another depending on whether their proponents broadly concurred with cosmopolitan/global or communitarian/statist ethics. Moreover, theories of just securitization could also derive their inspiration from virtue ethics, and, for example, devise principles that determine what makes for a virtuous securitizing actor. Theories of just securitization could supposedly also take a permissive view of the justice of securitization and seek to develop principles that specify the circumstances when securitization is forbidden. In future, just securitization research also needs to engage with the issue of what can reasonably be expected of security practitioners when it comes to the issue of ethics and security.1 These concluding remarks show that there is huge potential for research in the area of just securitization. In fact the diversity and thus potential for just securitization research is such that it could become a meta-theoretical framework organizing thinking on ethics and security in general, in the same way as thinking about the morality of war is systematized by the just war tradition. Whatever happens in terms of just securitization research from here on in, this book has shown not only that questions concerning the morality of security ought to be taken seriously by anyone interested in the study and/or practice of security but also that clear and systematic answers are possible.

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Answers to Security K › Framework › 2AC – AT: Discourse

Discourse cannot explain sensory experience.

Dave Elder-Vass 12, a senior lecturer in sociology at Loughborough University. He is the author of The Causal Power of Social Structures (Cambridge University Press, 2010), 2012, “The Reality of Social Construction,” Cambridge University Press, [ML]

At one level, Edwards et al. are right. Realists cannot prove there is a world beyond discourse if by prove we mean ‘demonstrate with absolute certainty’ as analytical philosophers have traditionally demanded. No one can absolutely prove, for example, that the world is not a figment of the imagination of some disembodied consciousness (that would have to be my consciousness of course, not yours, since I know that I can imagine the world!) But there would be something rather ironic about a group of self-proclaimed relativists who disown notions of absolute truth demanding that other people’s claims can only be justified by that standard. Nor does the argument work as an immanent critique of critical realists, as it might if we were ourselves committed to such a standard, because critical realists insist on the fallibility of all knowledge claims: the possibility that they might be wrong (e.g. Bhaskar 1986: 15). What we claim is that it is so overwhelmingly likely that the world ‘out there’ exists that we can take this as a firm working assumption. As Bruno Latour, a very different kind of realist, has said: “why burden this solitary mind with the impossible task of finding absolute certainty instead of plugging it into the connections that would provide it with all the relative certainties it needed to know and to act?” (1999: 12). To come to this conclusion, however, we must question the assertion that our only access to reality is through discourse. Banging on a table, for example, may well be an act that is given discursive employment, but it is not only a discursive act. The person striking the table feels its resistance, its solidity, and those present hear the thump. Although our ability to label or interpret that solidity or that noise as such depends on the possession of language and a personal history of discursive interaction, there is nevertheless a sensory experience that also occurs. If the realist were to try to bang on an illusion of a table, no such solidity would be experienced, and no such noise would occur to demonstrate the point.5 It is only because humans have some access to a sensory experience of reality that we can make the realists’ point by banging on a table, although making that point also requires a shared linguistic and discursive environment. And of course, we can move one step further away from the discursive case, as Harry Collins does, for example, when he discusses the case of stumbling accidentally against a rock. When such events occur, the experience of the rock’s solidity is not a discursive act at all, yet it is a sensory experience that gives us good evidence for the belief that there is a real material world in which we move. Edwards, Ashmore, and Potter reject such claims on the grounds that in making the claim we switch between the stumbling event to a discursive account (1995: 30). But this response is viable only if we accept the constructionist argument that language cannot refer beyond itself. This argument was criticised in Chapters 5 and 7, and also by John O’Neill in his reply to these authors: “That the argument is in language doesn’t entail that it is ‘trapped’ in language” (1995: 101). Furthermore (and this is a point to which I shall return in discussing neo-Kantianism), our conversations, our speech acts, our rhetoric themselves depend on such sensory experience. Speaking is transmitted as sound waves through the air; journal articles like ‘Death and Furniture’ only succeed in communicating to us if we can sense them as patterns on pieces of paper or computer screens (whether as patterns of black and white, or as raised marks). While it is not true that we can experience the material world only through discourse, it is the case that we can experience discourse only through the material world!

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Answers to Security K › Alt Answers › 2AC---Realism

Realism is a logically sound theory that explains and analyzes past behavior.

John J. Mearsheimer 06 an American political scientist and international relations scholar, who belongs to the realist school of thought. He is the R. Wendell Harrison Distinguished Service Professor at the University of Chicago. He has been described as the most influential realist of his generation, 2006, “China’s Unpeaceful Rise,” Current History 105, no. 690 (April 2006): 160–2. [ML]

Can China rise peacefully? My answer is no. If China continues its impressive economic growth over the next few decades, the United States and China are likely to engage in an intense security competition with considerable potential for war. Most of China’s neighbors—including India, Japan, Singapore, South Korea, Russia, and Vietnam—will join with the United States to contain China’s power.

To predict the future in Asia, one needs a theory of international politics that explains how rising great powers are likely to act and how other states in the system will react to them. That theory must be logically sound and it must account for the past behavior of rising great powers.

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Answers to Security K › Alt Answers › 2AC---Realism

Realism evolves to accommodate the international order and explains the factors of war.

Julian Korab-Karpowicz 10, a full Professor at the Department of Interdisciplinary Studies of Zayed University and University Professor at the Department of International Relations of Lazarski University. He specializes in Political Philosophy. He has taught at departments of philosophy and international relations at a number of universities around the world, 2010, "Political Realism in International Relations", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2020 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), [ML]

An unintended and unfortunate consequence of the debate about neorealism is that neorealism and a large part of its critique (with the notable exception of the English School) has been expressed in abstract scientific and philosophical terms. This has made the theory of international politics almost inaccessible to a layperson and has divided the discipline of international relations into incompatible parts. Whereas classical realism was a theory aimed at supporting diplomatic practice and providing a guide to be followed by those seeking to understand and deal with potential threats, today’s theories, concerned with various grand pictures and projects, are ill-suited to perform this task. This is perhaps the main reason why there has been a renewed interest in classical realism, and particularly in the ideas of Morgenthau. Rather than being seen as an obsolete form of pre-scientific realist thought, superseded by neorealist theory, his thinking is now considered to be more complex and of greater contemporary relevance than was earlier recognized (Williams 2007, 1–9). It fits uneasily in the orthodox picture of realism he is usually associated with.

In recent years, scholars have questioned prevailing narratives about clear theoretical traditions in the discipline of international relations. Thucydides, Machiavelli, Hobbes and other thinkers have become subject to re-examination as a means of challenging prevailing uses of their legacies in the discipline and exploring other lineages and orientations. Morgenthau has undergone a similar process of reinterpretation. A number of scholars (Hartmut Behr, Muriel Cozette, Amelia Heath, Sean Molloy) have endorsed the importance of his thought as a source of change for the standard interpretation of realism. Murielle Cozette stresses Morgenthau’s critical dimension of realism expressed in his commitment to “speak truth to power” and to “unmask power’s claims to truth and morality,” and in his tendency to assert different claims at different times (Cozette 10–12). She writes: “The protection of human life and freedom are given central importance by Morgenthau, and constitute a ‘transcendent standard of ethics’ which should always animate scientific enquiries” (19). This shows the flexibility of his classical realism and reveals his normative assumptions based on the promotion of universal moral values. While Morgenthau assumes that states are power-oriented actors, he at the same time acknowledges that international politics would be more pernicious than it actually is were it not for moral restraints and the work of international law(Behr and Heath 333).

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Answers to Security K › Alt Answers › 2AC---Realism

Realism is the only theory that correctly structures the world.

Marcelo de Araujo 14, Universidade Federal do Rio de Janeiro, 2014, “Moral Enhancement and Political Realism.” Journal of Ethics and Emerging Technologies. Vol 24. No. 2 [ML]

It might be objected now that if this account of political realism is correct, then we would have to admit that structural realists, too, have to take for granted a specific conception of human nature, namely that human beings naturally strive for security and survival. Waltz himself admits that there is a basic “wish for survival” common to all states (Waltz 2001, 203). Yet, if there is a conception of human nature at issue here, it is a very modest one. This is, actually, the assumption that makes intelligible a wide range of human activities. We strive to make safer cars, better medicines, and earthquake-resistant buildings on the assumption that people will generally prefer security and survival rather than danger and death. Human institutions, just like cars, medicines and buildings, can also be designed to promote the basic goals of security and survival. Both positive law, in the context of domestic politics, and the system of states as a whole, are institutions that clearly reflect the human quest for security and survival. Positive laws can certainly make our lives more secure in the context of states, where a powerful institution is in a position to enforce them. But in the context of interaction among states, the absence of such an institution means that states will have to rely upon themselves in order to promote the basic goals of security and survival.

Once we have understood how the structure of international relations often constrains actors operating within the structure to prefer war over peace, as well as conflict over cooperation and mistrust over trust, in situations in which everyone would be better-off by acting otherwise, we can ask more pertinent questions. In particular, we can ask ourselves whether, given the goals of security and survival in a world in which weapons of mass destructions are becoming so readily available, we would not have reasons to radically change this structure or even get rid of it. My intention here is not to propose a blueprint for the implementation of radical change in world politics. I simply intend to explain why this option is not incompatible with the realist approach, nor with the project of the moral enhancement of human beings. Quite the opposite: the idea of a “world state,” devoid of state borders and ruled by “supra-national institutions,” was perfectly in line with the original project of some human nature realists, although it eventually disappeared in the works of the so-called “neo-realists,” such as Waltz and Mearsheimer.

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Answers to Security K › Alt Answers › 2AC---Realism

Realism is true and not immoral or unethical

Sumantra Maitra 6/18, Sumantra is a national-security fellow at the Center for the National Interest and an elected associate fellow at the Royal Historical Society, “Hatred for Realism Is an Elite Afflicition,” The National Interest,

Why do people hate realism so much? It’s a thoughtful question asked by Stephen Walt in Foreign Policy. Walt is a card-carrying foreign policy realist, his work on alliances and his theory of balance of threat influenced the theoretical framework of much such research with major explanatory power. Walt argues that at the time of realism’s triumph, as the theory predicted a conflict in Ukraine, we’re observing a withering attack on the worldview. “Much of this ire has been directed at my colleague and occasional co-author John J. Mearsheimer, based in part on the bizarre claim that his views on the West’s role in helping to cause the Russia-Ukraine crisis somehow make him ‘pro-Putin’ and in part on some serious misreadings of his theory of offensive realism,” Walt writes, adding that “another obvious target is former U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, whose recent comments urging peace talks with Moscow, a territorial compromise in Ukraine, and the need to avoid a permanent rupture with Russia were seen as a revealing demonstration of realism’s moral bankruptcy.”

Walt concludes that there are several reasons people dislike realism. Primary among them is the idea that realism is pessimistic. “It’s not hard to understand why many people are reluctant to embrace such a pessimistic view of the human condition, especially when it appears to offer no clear escape from it.” Second, realism is “indifferent or hostile” to ethical considerations, being an amoral framework where power is the chief determinant. “There is a grain of truth in this charge, insofar as realism’s theoretical framework does not incorporate values or ideals in any explicit way,” Walt writes, “for realists, noble aims and good intentions are not enough if the resulting choices lead to greater insecurity or human suffering.” Realists do not consider any country exceptional, as their worldview argues that every country, every power will usually act in a certain way, facing a certain set of variables. That also rubs most people the wrong way, as most people tend to think in group dynamic, and any criticism of their own country’s behavior or dissent and nonconformity to the “current thing” or conventional wisdom, are considered unpatriotic.

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Answers to Security K › Alt Answers › 2AC---Realism

Realism isn’t unethical or a promotion of war

Kevin Blachford 22, Kevin is a lEcturer of IR at the Baltic Defence College, “Realism After the War in Ukraine,” The National Interest, 06/24/2022,

The war in Ukraine has opened up a renewed debate on the merits of realist foreign policies and the realist paradigm. The invasion has challenged assumptions of the post-Cold War era and both critics and proponents of realism seek to prescribe a response to the crisis. Much of the debate has centered on John Mearsheimer’s provocative 2014 Foreign Affairs article “Why the Ukraine Crisis Is the West’s Fault.” While supporters may celebrate Mearsheimer’s prescience, for critics, the invasion of Ukraine merely shows realists’ callous disregard for morality and a lack of concern for the values of the liberal international order. One recent critic complained that realists “have very little to say about” the “evil” of Putin’s actions and that the offensive realism promoted by Mearsheimer is not just “morally slimy” but “plain offensive.” To question NATO expansion, as Mearsheimer did, is to be on the “wrong side of history” and realism has therefore become a “bogeyman” for polite society. But Mearsheimer’s realism is not a thin theoretical veneer for a morally bankrupt policy of power politics. During his long career, he has repeatedly warned against hubris, unnecessary wars, and the dangers of escalation. Indeed, Mearsheimer’s realism follows a long American tradition of republican realism.

There can be no doubt that the invasion of Ukraine is unjustifiable. The conflict in Ukraine has resulted in shocking images of innocent people under attack in their cities and homes. This has understandably created a moralistic urge to “do something” and an emotional appeal to make “Putin pay”. Yet, this does not necessarily mean that realism as a theoretical perspective can be disregarded for being ambiguous about moral issues. The celebrated economist Adam Tooze launched one of the most thoughtful recent critiques of realism in the British political magazine New Statesman by arguing that realism is based on the “naturalization of war.” One of his most challenging critiques of realism is aimed directly at what he sees as realism’s support for military force and aggression. As Tooze argued:

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Answers to Security K › Alt Answers › 2AC---AT: Cosmopolitanism Alt

The Cosmopolitanism alt is vague and full of contradictions, providing no basis to actualize a cosmopolitan utopia

Chen 2019 (Xunwu Chen, PhD in philosophy at University of Texas at San Antonio, “Beyond Kant’s Political Cosmopolitanism in advance: Thinking a World Constitution without a World State”, )

Now, Kant has bequeathed an enduring, daunting question to the present discourse of cosmopolitanism: how is a global order under the rule of cosmopolitan law without a global state possible? Kant wanted a constitutionalized global order, but not a world state. As he claimed, “the proposal for a universal cosmopolitan nation, to whose power all individual nations should voluntarily submit, and whose laws they should obey, may sound ever so nice in the theory of the Abbe St. Pierre or of a Rousseau, yet it is of no practical use” (Kant 1972: 89). Also, “the idea of international right presupposes the existence of many separate, independent, adjoining nations” (Kant 1972: 124). As Kant saw it, the concept of international right contradicts the idea of a world state. “If there were such a global political body, there would strictly speaking be only one state, and then international right would not be applicable” (Kant 1972: 60). How can a global order under the rule of law without a world state be possible? The key challenge here is to locate a legitimate public authority as the necessary enactor of cosmopolitan sovereignty. Kant did find one but his choice leaves much to be desired. He proposed the mechanism of a world congress or federation as the candidate: “This would be a federation of nations, but it must not be a nation consisting of nations” (Kant 1972: 115). In spite of his confidence, Kant’s world federation may not be competent to be the enactor of cosmopolitan sovereignty. Some problems with it are inherent and irradicable. This can be seen as follows: (1) The proposed cosmopolitan order is one under the rule of law; (2) the rule of law calls for a sovereign power that defines and enforces laws and that is the necessary enacting agent and condition for the rule of law; that is to say, the rule of law calls for a government of sovereignty as the necessary enacting agent and condition; (3) in our time, a sovereign government is associated with the sovereignty of a state; (4) therefore, how can we talk about the sovereignty of cosmopolitan laws as civil laws without a world state? In his misgiving about global justice, Thomas Nagel raises a similar question. As he indicates, global justice calls for the rule of law; the rule of law calls for government as the necessary enacting conditions for justice; no wonder, “the nation-state is the primary locus of political legitimacy and the pursuit of justice”; “justice as a property of the relations among human beings (and also injustice, for the most part) requires government as an enacting condition” (Nagel 2005: 114). Thus, Kant has bequeathed a defining, enduring question to the present discourse of cosmopolitanism: how can we have sovereign global laws without a global state-power?

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Answers to Security K › Alt Answers › 2AC---Cosmopolitanism Perm

Perm Do Both – Policy can utilize technology towards security concerns while maintaining cosmopolitan ethics

Schmidt 2022 (Nikola Schmidt, factuly at the institute of political science in Charles University, “Space Community as an Enabler of Cosmopolitan Ideas Through Large Technical Systems” ) //sethlee

The traditional approach to socio-technical interactions is anchored in post-WW2 technological determinism. While positive technological determinism entails a conviction that technology can solve many social problems and bring good to society, negative technological determinism understands the role of technology in a society in the exactly opposite way [77]. However, the argument that technology impacts the way we live is undisputable, as current studies within the sociology of technology focus mainly on perspectives on how to study that relation in terms of evolution or dissolution of LTS and how they influence sociotechnical change [78]. We argued previously “that large technical systems have constitutive power to shape global governance system, because of their mere existence. This can be turned to humanity’s advantage if we develop a normative framework for them, before they influence our lives in an undesirable way” [74]. Each technology not only has potential to influence the way we live, but is designed to do so. A well-considered normative framework is the way to ensure that such positive potential is realized in society. The normative framework should be read as a desirable direction, desirable design of intended technological use, or desirable state of the future in general. This dynamic is even more interesting in an age in which states are continuously unable to govern technological inventions [79]. Nation states were crucial in shaping undertakings such as the Manhattan Project, CERN, and ISS. All these ideas would have never materialized without a direct political interest and direct investment by the government that had some larger picture of the future behind its rationalization; however, today’s technological inventions, and even the development of LTS, influencing the way we live are in the hands of private persons (Facebook). What the nation states could do is to encourage scientists and engineers towards certain unanswered questions, which is actually done through financial instruments of research projects, or draw more specific contours of long-term projects and include cosmopolitan ethics, as the political explanation of why it is worth pursuing. Cosmopolitan ethics should play a role in shaping policy intentions before creating LTS, which could influence how engineers and scientists approach their task to build LTS and how politicians understand their role in keeping the project in line with possible national security concerns. In other terms, the design of the project should have practical objective-solving problems (debris, asteroids, propulsion) but also a normative objective to enable responsible cosmopolitan politics. In our understanding of pragmatism as (re)introduced by Jonna Nyman reflecting both is the pragmatic approach to practical politics. One single example of such a policy approach is CERN. Scientists wanted a particle accelerator that did not exist at that time, while politicians wanted a united Europe around civilian nuclear physics research [80]. CERN was unique due to the historical circumstances. ITER is unique due to very specific research that is not affordable by a single global actor, and as a research project it will last almost or even more than a hundred years from the first ideas to the development of tokamak that would test all the technologies. The result will be a developed high-end international science in fusion physics with practical impact on humanity in general – electricity from a fusion reactor. Fusion reactors can be key to climate change, they will enable completely new possibilities in space, and the whole scientific megaproject already united countries around a critical scientific task. Striving for such global cooperation should be a central interest of any responsible cosmopolitan state – it is practical, nurtures international security, unites humanity, and yields breakthrough scientific discoveries solving key problems on the planet.

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Answers to Security K › Alt Answers › 2AC---Perm Do Both + Alt Fails

Desecuritization fails to protect vulnerable groups or prevent war, so legal methods are the best alternative --- they complement desecuritization while maintaining constitutionality by checking sovereign powers --- only the perm solves

Tine Hanrieder & Christian Kreuder-Sonnen 14, Assistant Professor at the Department of International Development at the London School of Economics and Political Science, Research group leader at WZB Berlin Social Science Center, and Research and teaching associate at the Ludwig-Maximilians-University of Munich & Research Fellow and Chair for Global Governance at the Geschwister-Scholl-Department for Political Science of LMU München, August 2014, “WHO decides on the exception? Securitization and emergency governance in global health”, Security Dialogue, Vol. 45, No. 4, p. 331-348 /lg

Given the spectre of exceptionalism that comes with security, research in the tradition of the Copenhagen School has focused mostly on averting securitizations that facilitate emergency measures (see Roe, 2008; Wæver, 2000: 253–254). It has been claimed that a securitizing move that shifts an issue from normal politics into the realm of the exception needs to be countered by an explicit desecuritizing move that shifts the issue back to the normal by discursively undermining the threat construction (Hansen, 2012: 542–545; Huysmans, 1995: 65–67; 1998; Roe, 2004: 285–287).8 Such a conception of securitization and desecuritization presents several ways back to normal politics. However, it also reproduces the categorical belief that there are only two possible political forms: ‘non-security’ (associated with normal politics) and ‘security’ (associated with the logic of war) (see Figure 1). This perspective is conceptually constraining because non-security is not always an option: on one hand, desecuritizing moves may simply not be successful because desecuritizers lack discursive authority or because their discursive strategies do not resonate with the relevant audiences (see Buzan et al., 1998: 26). On the other hand, non-security may be undesirable owing to the negative side-effects that desecuritization can produce – for example, by undermining legitimate claims to protect vulnerable groups (Roe, 2004). Without an alternative to desecuritization, this would mean letting the logic of war unfold.

The alternative we propose here is based on the assumption that there is little reason to accept that speaking about security concerns necessarily leads to the use of full emergency measures. Paul Roe (2004: 292–293) has argued convincingly that securitized issues can be managed. While the language of security remains present, its effects can be mitigated (see also Tjalve, 2011). As the debate on the state of exception among legal theorists shows, there are different ways of constitutionally dealing with emergencies that foresee particularly the taming of sovereign power through constitutional containment (see Dyzenhaus, 2006; Ferejohn and Pasquino, 2004; Gross, 2003; Scheuermann, 2006). For example, what has been termed the ‘accommodation model’ of exceptionalism is based on the understanding that it would be unrealistic to think that the existing constitutional order could remain completely untouched during times of crisis. Nevertheless, the basic pillars of the constitution need to be protected and the legal order should therefore have mechanisms ready to keep an emergency within these constitutional confines (Ackermann, 2004; Gross, 2003: 1043–1044; Tushnet, 2005). Thus, from a legal theory perspective, one important alternative and complement to desecuritization is constitutional accommodation (see Figure 1). It is an alternative insofar as it mitigates the effects of securitizations that cannot be avoided. However, it is also complementary to discursive desecuritization because it counteracts the tendencies of the emergency trap outlined earlier – in other words, it removes or mitigates a precondition for further securitizations (see also White, 2013: 14–15 for the inverse approach).

2022 Michigan Kritik
Answers to Security K › Impact Turns › 2AC---Reps of Russia-NATO War Good

Representations of Russia-NATO war are real – necessary to avoid war

Wilhelmsen and Hjermann, 22 --- (Julie Wilhelmsen- senior research fellow at the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs. She holds a PhD in political science and conducts research and Anni Roth Hiiermann- Norwegian Institute of International Affairs (NUPI), Norway , "Russian Certainty of NATO Hostility: Repercussions in the Arctic", March 2022, Arctic Review on Law and Politics, https://arcticreview.no/index.php/arctic/article/view/3378/6336)//mishelle

Our empirical analysis in 3.1-3.4 shows that Russian official discourse in the years following the conflict in Ukraine construes NATO as “genetically” set on grabbing ever more geopolitical space while claiming to seek security for all states. Russia generally represents NATO as a two-faced actor, hiding its true agenda of incessant expansion behind the “invented” “thesis” of Russian threat and distractions like “instrumentalized” universal values. This idea of a false West hiding the real reasons for its value agenda has deep roots in Russian thinking.184 Our analysis shows that this view fundamentally structures Russia’s interpretation of NATO, in turn illustrating how discursive change – the making of hostility through intense securitization and naturalization – takes place on the background of continued, long-nurtured rhetorical tropes. Our analysis has also shown how all spheres and actions are entangled, seen as part of NATO’s war-like campaign targeting Russia. The Russian leadership conflates Russia-critical statements and conventional military build-up into a single package of hostility. We conclude that MOD and MFA representations post-Crimea attach a near-total level of danger to NATO and associated Western others. Here we wish to emphasize the extreme density and repetitive nature of these representations in our material. They confirm previous scholarly claims that the entrenched worldview in the Kremlin is that the West with NATO is threatening to destroy Russia.185 Our study has shown how such a worldview is constructed through official statements on a day-to-day basis, becoming naturalized. Further, the overall impression is that Russia deems conspiracy as the signature tune of both NATO and the USA. The “lesson learned” as per official speech post-Crimea thus seems to be that Russia should never trust NATO promises again – anywhere. From our analysis of texts on NATO in the Arctic we find that the dramatically heightened level of securitization of this Western antagonist is almost fully replicated in this polar region. We cannot ignore the pattern of representation of NATO as hostile by nature, with its every move in the Arctic as the next step in a planned offensive against Russia. This image is achieved through use of predicates, juxtapositions of selves and others (Russia embodies cooperative Arctic in the face of NATO threat), the recirculation of rhetorical tropes of enmity and discursive merger of social entities that might have been framed as distinct and “friendly”. By these mechanisms, relations with individual Arctic NATO states are increasingly rephrased through the prism of NATO hostility, with Norway as a prime example. Although our findings may indicate the impossibility of compartmentalizing the Arctic away from rising Russia–NATO enmity, our material also shows Russian resistance to the securitization of relations in this region – as when interactions and institutions in the Arctic are recirculated as benign encounters and arenas or when official language invokes dual identifications of NATO countries, using historical tropes or predicates of amity. Indeed, the discursive lumping together of different Western political entities into one hostile agent is not complete in the Arctic context. Entering these findings into the framework and debate about the securitization dilemma, locating them as part of a broader Russia–West interaction pattern, addresses several questions. As to how misplaced certainty about the other party’s intent emerges, we suggest that Russia creates certainty about NATO’s hostility through the way it repeatedly and with increasing fervour speaks of this political entity. Moreover, with NATO’s growing European presence and concerns over the “Russian threat”, Russian leaders increasingly indicate that the West’s previously hidden agenda is now out in the open. This “uncovering” cements the view of NATO’s intent as undeniably hostile. As to the question of distrust, so often said to be the driver of security dilemma dynamics, we hold that the power of spoken words is underrated.186 Although assessing such emotional qualities is beyond the reach of our methodology, we would highlight the contingent nature of trust – thus rejecting distrust between Russia and NATO as something given and unchanging. The historical animosity between Russia and NATO does matter for the growing securitization dilemma in the Arctic and elsewhere in Europe, because political speakers make it matter – for example, by repeatedly re-inserting Cold War references into the debate and re-phrasing Cold War relations as sheer hostility. Also, trust can be rebuilt, by imagining and giving voice to positive identifications of and cooperative experiences with the Western Others. Here the Arctic has a clear potential, but that can be realised only if political actors decide to act. As our study has shown, the constant invoking of NATO activity as hostile in contrast to Russia’s alledgedly reactive and defensive posture serves as the core legitimizing argument for the upgrading and modernization of the Russian military – already a practical reality. However, in facing this practical reality it will be up to NATO, not Russia, to judge the underlying intentions. Here emerges the larger picture of a downwards spiralling of mutual securitization between two actors who both claim to be seeking security only. On this background, we feel that holding back the rhetorical trench war is a necessary step toward mitigating tragedy (in the security dilemma sense). For these representations matter beyond the nuisance of a loud and aggressive Russia–West conversation – they matter in order to avoid a military conflict that neither side wants.