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2022 Michigan Kritik
Security K – BEJJ 2022 › Impacts/AT: Impact Turns › 2NC---Endless War

The colonial logic that underpins the security dilemma locks in endless wars.

Harnett 2022 (Liane Hartnett, Australian National University, , , , , , “Winning? The Politics of Victory in an Era of Endless War“ ) //sethlee

In his 1904 letter on the Russo–Japanese war, Leo Tolstoy—the literary figure turned prophet of peace—admonished against the possibility of endless war (Tolstoy 1904, 4; Moyn 2020). Tolstoy may have foretold of this era of endless war that has besieged us since the “war on terror” was first waged over twenty years ago, yet it is also written into the very logic that shapes the study of international relations and its approach to war and worlds. Implicit in the realist embrace of the tragic, contained in the Augustinian conviction that “to the end of history the peace of the world … must be gained by strife” (Niebuhr 2013, 256), promulgated by a liberal pursuit of perpetual peace that fails to interrogate how it propagates perpetual war, and contained in the constructivist doxa that war-making is world-making, the specter of endless war seems destined to haunt our horizons. The ubiquity of “victory” in war talk is coupled with an ambiguity of what it actually means to win a war, which only serves to exacerbate and inscribe war’s endlessness. Despite the burgeoning literatures on endless war (Wertheim 2020; Moyn 2021) and indeed victory (Martel 2011; Hom, O’Driscoll, and Mills 2018; O’Driscoll 2019), there is little substantive engagement with how these themes intersect when thinking ethically about the question of war and what passes for peace. This forum seeks to spark a conversation to address this gap. We ask: What might we render visible and redress by thinking critically of the politics of victory in an era of endless war? Further, to the extent that just-war theory has long offered a grammar for the ethics of war, how does it help or hinder this quest? Beyond the claim that engaging with these questions reveals something about the ethical elision of the tragedy (O’Driscoll 2019) or absurdity (Hartnett and O’Driscoll 2020) of war, this conversation aims to both unsettle the abstractions, which inhere in the ethics of war, and recover its promise to pay heed to the particularity and plurality of life and lived experience. This forum begins by revealing the ironic: endless wars are never won, yet the pursuit of victory perpetuates and perhaps even presupposes them. Lauren Wilcox, therefore, invites us to consider war as the ongoing practice of transforming injuring and killing into world-making. In their emphasis on the historic, Lauren Wilcox, Alex Bellamy, and Luke Glanville articulate how the moral categories of just war are predicated upon contradictory yet co-constituted conceptions of power and justice, and a flawed temporal and colonial logic. Focusing on practices of protection, reparation, and restitution, Alex Bellamy and Luke Glanville ask how to reconceive responsibility in an epoch of enmeshment, where it is no longer clear when war and its legacies begin or end. Finally, Brent Steele and Cian O’Driscoll seek to recuperate just-war theory, beyond war, traditionally conceived, and its canon. Brent Steele reimagines just war as a just struggle against the Covid-19 pandemic, while Cian O’Driscoll writes of an ethics of war that begins to theorize from our bare existence. Attentive to irony, the conversation, then, continues in hope: in its calls to interrogate the logics of victory and violence, to reckon with responsibility, to reimagine an ethics of war that centers on life, we collectively seek an ethics of war and peace tethered to the pursuit of justice.

2022 Michigan Kritik
Security K – BEJJ 2022 › Links › 2NC---Terrorism

Fear of terrorism is grounded in interventionist logics that propels military interventions and legitimizes state violence

Tina G. Patel 17, “It’s not about security, it’s about racism: counter-terror strategies, civilizing processes and the post-race fiction”, Humanities & Social Science Communications, p4-7 \\pairie

In combination, these and other counter-terror measures draw on somewhat normalized notions of the “Islamic terrorist” to justify and gather support for discriminatory practices. They continue to construct Muslims as suspicious bodies with criminal tendencies, in need of increased surveillance, control and regulation, and thus “legitimise a pre-emptive, interventionist and securitizing approach” (Coppock and McGovern, 2014: 242). As Ansari (2004: 31) notes, this then serves to “terrorize the Muslim community in Britain”. Each day, the Muslim community have their social, religious and political activities observed, interrogated and stigmatized, presented as suspect terror networks (Ansari, 2004: 31). Having “relegitimised state racism” (Bhattacharyya, 2008: 75), counter-terror measures have also “involved derogation from human rights provisions and established elements of due process” (Rowe, 2012: 160). Any negative impact that they may have on the Muslim population is considered to be relatively justified, almost as collateral damage in comparison to the perceived wider threat. In this sense, Muslims are not considered worthy of human rights, they are after all goes the civilizing logic, rejecting attempts to assimilate and be part of Western civil society. This logic is not unique or new to Muslims in post-colonial Britain. Recall for instance the use of this logic in the treatment of other BMEs around the world, for instance, Australia’s Aborigines, Native Americans, New Zealand’s Maori, and the African Slaves transported across the Atlantic. In all these cases, attempts were made to excuse and justify exploitative behaviour on the basis that the (exploited) subjects were naturally positioned, either biologically, intellectually or in accordance to (the Christian) God’s plan, as inferior. Thus, legitimized, morally at least, that the control of BME bodies was necessary and good for society as a whole.

Civilizing, consuming and controlling brown bodies

2022 Michigan Kritik
Security K – BEJJ 2022 › Links › 2NC---Space

Rhetoric of the “Chinese space threat” proves space threats are often constructed --- it was labeled “existential” but nothing happened

Cameron Hunter 18, PhD in philosophy from University of Bristol, 09/25/2018, “The Rise of China in Space: Technopolitical Threat Construction in American Public Policy Discourse”, University of Bristol, / lg

Almost every American source that cares to mention China’s space program agrees that its recent surge to prominence constitutes a grave threat to the national security of the United States of America. A streak of technological determinism was a recurring feature of within these debates, particularly after 2000 (see Parts 2 and 3). Chinese space technologies were instrumentalised as tools for the destruction of the US, contextualised with wider representations of China as a reckless and aggressive space power (see Chapter 6). Coupled with the instrumentalisation of American space technology as essential, in an ontological sense, to the nation, the “Chinese space threat” narrative became existential in scope. According to many of the proponents of this discourse, China’s rising space power would inevitably entail a mix of fear, conflict and space (arms) racing. Yet the irrefutability of the “Chinese space threat” in US public policy discourse conceals a multitude of tensions and inconsistencies.

Asking “how” the threat came to be has revealed its uneven construction, and thus by extension demonstrated how misguided technologically determinist arguments about the “rise” have been. Part 1 showed both how the “threat” has varied over time, in some instances becoming side-lined in favour of cooperation in space. It also demonstrated how space has inconsistently appeared in broader American debates about China’s “rise” more generally, sometimes cited as evidence of the “rise,” elsewhere obscured by other foreign policy concerns. Part 2 showed how advocates of the “Chinese space threat” differed in which aspects of American identity, and which corresponding technologies, they valued and portrated as imperilled by China’s “rise” in space. Finally, Part 3 underlined the appearance of unevenness by inquiring after the policies and procurements which were undertaken in the name of the “Chinese space threat.” Beyond the maintenance of the ITAR restrictions already in place at the start of the century and the limitations on NASA-China interaction imposed in 2011, no new policies were sanctioned in line with what by any other measure was an incredibly dominant discourse. This disjuncture is the most pressing evidence for the uneven construction of China’s “rise” in space, and sets up a puzzle for future research to address. Despite this puzzle, the lack of a technological response is itself is best understood as a part of technopolitical contestation within American public policy discourse. Viewed in this light, the determinism of the “Chinese space threat” remained unmanifested. In other words, the “Chinese space threat” was a kind of “dog that didn’t bark” where the omission of response is itself evidence worthy of consideration.

2022 Michigan Kritik
Security K – BEJJ 2022 › Links › 2NC---Space

Space infrastructure is securitized by European policymaking --- it’s viewed as essential for military defense and causes European agencies to feel threatened

Nina Klimburg-Witjes 21, Department of Science and Technology Studies at the University of Vienna and post-doc researcher at the Munich Center for Technology (MCTS), elected member of the Council of the European Association for the Study of Science and Technology (EASST), and member of the German Expert Network on Space and Security and founding member of the international Social Studies of Outer Space Network, 03/07/2021, “Shifting articulations of space and security: boundary work in European space policy making”, European Security, Vol. 30, Issue 4, p. 526-546 /lg

4.2. Boundary expansion I: Galileo merging science and politics

The first attempt of a jointly developed space infrastructure by both organisations was the navigation satellite constellation Galileo. For the EU, Galileo had been driven by worries that Europe would be overly dependent on the US American Global Positioning Systems (GPS), with user requirement standards and certification schemes for the security-relevant equipment being set outside of Europe (EC Communication ). EU policymakers had just made the experience of what techno-political dependence means for decision-making processes in conflict situations: During the Balkans conflicts in the 1990s, US authorities denied European actors access to US satellite data of conflict regions. As Darnis et al. () have argued, this was a “wake-up call for Europe” in many different ways: not only was an armed conflict taking place on European soil after decades of peace, but satellite capabilities for data gathering and communication could be easily disposed of by the US and Europe was lacking its own.

2022 Michigan Kritik
Security K – BEJJ 2022 › Links › 2NC---Space

Modern, post-apocalyptic governments are forced to counteract imagined threats like solar storms --- citizens expect to be sheltered from unimportant or unlikely scenarios

Beatrice de Graaf 16, Chair of History of International Relations & Global Governance at Utrecht University and 2019 Distinguished Professor at Utrecht University with a PhD from Utrecht University, 2016, “An End to Evil: An Eschatological Approach to Security”, Philosophia reformata, Vol. 81, Issue 1, p. 70-88 /lg

Those who, with Beck, Adam, and others, consider our present-day timescape to be a secular apocalyptic one, also have to acknowledge the fact that today’s security policies are completely imbued with this way of thinking and living (Beck 1986, 1999, 2002; Adam and Van Loon 2000; Mythen and Walklate 2006). Governments and international institutions have to deal on a daily basis with the control paradox that calls for human and technological resources to solve problems that are themselves caused by new scientific discoveries and techno- logical innovations or at least come to us via that route. Terrorist organizations, such as isis, which inundate the world ‘24/7’ on YouTube and Twitter with images of death and destruction, quickly appropriate new technologies to fur- ther their cause. These wreakers of havoc and horror are, of course, themselves products of modern times: they use the most modern weapons and means of communication and they are, as in the case of isis, sometimes the product of human intervention and military mismanagement in the Middle East.

An important characteristic of contemporary safety thinking is the expan- sion of security in time and space into the realm of the imaginary. Security is a linear concept. Old-fashioned security policy assumes a concrete threat, somewhere on the horizon, the harm of which can be assessed using all kinds of calculation and planning resources. How long will it take before the hostile army is at the gates, the rocket has reached its goal, the water level has risen so high that the dam will break those kinds of calculations. A risk relates to probability and imagination. A risk cannot always be calculated, or the risk is so small that it is statistically insignificant, yet bad enough that it must surely be included in the plan, such as a terrorist attack or a solar storm. The current safety culture is more a risk culture in which imagined futures and worst-case scenarios are visualized, using the latest computer simulation techniques. This then leads to all kinds of exaggerated expectations that governments need to respond to with equally comprehensive and proactive measures because before you know it, ...3

2022 Michigan Kritik
Security K – BEJJ 2022 › Links › 2NC---Space

Satellite images can be used by presidents to define reality in a way that makes it impossible for the public to critique or question the notion of a threat --- causes threat construction and pre-emptive action

Avery Henry 16, Assistant Professor of Public Address/Debate in the Communication Studies department at Southeast Missouri State University, 1/1/2016, “Interactive Security: The Rhetorical Constitution Of Algorithmic Citizenship In War On Terror Discourse”, Wayne State University, /lg

Presidential definition. The last function or technique of presidential public address that I examine in this chapter is the use of definition. President Bush’s attempts to shape public memory highlights the fluidity of social reality. In a postmodern sense, social reality is fluid, pliable, and full of potential. It is not a given, natural, or predetermined state of affairs. Instead, it is chosen from a multiplicity of possibilities. Zarefsky (2004) contends that political actors contribute to the production of social reality and that people actively participate in shaping and giving meaning to the world around them. The primary way that people constitute their social reality is through naming the world around them. By naming a situation, people shape the context for understanding social reality and determine the parameters for engagement. Therefore, the ability to define and name is rhetorically very powerful. Defining is the power to identify, name, and bring forth or allow something new to emerge into a field of signification. In addition to allowing new meanings and signs to be constituted and emerge, definitions also frame how something should be understood. It dictates what something is, what value it has, and the meaning that it signifies.

Zarefsky (2004) argues that the office of the president has a sustainable ability to define political reality. The president has unique access and authority to communicate with a wide range of audiences. For instance, the president can address the nation through an electronic broadcast, communicate with the press and shape the context in which the public encounter specific events, and speak directly with policy-makers in Congress. By choosing to define political situations in specific ways with these audiences, the president is able to frame reality as if it were natural and uncontestable rather than selected and open to critique or discussion. Furthermore, through framing, the president can dictate what constitutes credible and worthy arguments, data, and proof (Zarefsky, 2004). Take for example, the evidence offered by the Bush administration to prove that Iraq had weapons of mass destruction. The Administration provided satellite images of what it considered to be proof that Iraq possessed WMDs. However, the satellite data could only be analyzed and understood by technical experts. Consequently, Bush was able to define Iraq as a threat to U.S. national security by controlling what counted as sufficient evidence. This control of what constituted data prevented the public from challenging the presidential definition of WMD threat because it was incapable of analyzing the evidence that was being presented to them and contesting was it was ample proof. Therefore, the way that the American public understood the situation in Iraq was framed in terms of threat construction that foreclosed or discredited any discussion about whether or not Iraq posed an actual threat to national security. 

2022 Michigan Kritik
Security K – BEJJ 2022 › Links › 2NC---Space

Discourse surrounding the threat of China’s cyberattacks on satellites and space assets is based on a realist sense of security --- empirics

Francois Lachapelle 22, PhD in Department of Sociology at the University of British Columbia and research fellow with the Center for Chinese Research (CCR) at the Institute of Asian Research (UBC) and the Higher Education Research Group (UBC), 04/07/2022, “Media Securitizer and the Racist “China-Threat” Discourse — Ascension, Peak, and Downfall”, University of British Columbia, /lg

During this period, the theme of China’s cyber-technology dominated American print media. This focus reflected two related changes in U.S. foreign policy. Both Washington and Beijing grew increasingly worried about their each other’s cyber-capabilities (Lindsay, Cheung, and Reveron, 2015; Reveron, 2012), and the newspapers captured a clear securitization of the U.S.-China relationship. In February 2010, less than a month after the Google attack, in another front-cover, the media explained the Obama administration’s decision to “explicitly [accuse] China’s military of mounting attacks on American government computer systems and defense contractors” to map “military capabilities that could be exploited during a crisis.”41 Washington’s accusation that Beijing had a “deliberate, government-developed strategy to steal intellectual property and gain strategic advantage”42 was based on an annual Pentagon report indicating that 90% of cyber-attacks against the U.S. came from China. The China-Threat discourse was taking hold not merely in the political field, but in the White House as well. In 2011, with China in mind, President Obama wrote that “the cyber threat to our nation is one of the most serious economic and national security challenges we face” (in Lindsay, 2015:2). The same article citing the Pentagon’s report includes several securitizers’ views describing a typically alarmist offensive-realism worst-case scenario in which China’s increased military power (e.g., drones, air flights, icebreakers, satellites) was equated with imminent belligerent behavior. Consider the following example: “China […] has now leapt into the first ranks of offensive cybertechnologies […] in an effort to blind American satellites and other space assets, and […] push the United States military presence into the mid-Pacific nearly 2,000 miles from China’s coast.”43  

2022 Michigan Kritik
Security K – BEJJ 2022 › Links › 2NC---Security Cooperation

The discourse of Western notions of security cooperation enables continued construction of identities that seeks to maintain power

Gunther Hellmann et. al, 2017; Benjamin Herborthb , Gabi Schlagc and Christian Weberd a Goethe University Frankfurt, Campus Westend - PEG-Geba¨ude, Hauspostfach 24, Gru¨neburgplatz 1, D-60323, Frankfurt am Main, Germany. University of Groningen, Faculty of Arts, Oude Kijk in ’t Jatstraat 26, 9712 EK Groningen, The Netherlands. Otto-von-Guericke University Magdeburg, Faculty of Human Sciences, Zschokkestr. 32 (G-40), 39104 Magdeburg, Germany. d Goethe-University Frankfurt, Faculty of Social Sciences, “The West: a securitizing community?” Journal of International Relations, Volume 20, Issue Number 2//ekc

How political relations among European and North American states have developed and how they have contributed to shaping global politics more broadly has been at the centre of IR debates for several decades. Taking issue with both realist and institutionalist scholarship on the origins and mechanisms of inter-state alliances, the literature on security communities (Adler and Barnett 1998) has highlighted the constructivist bedrock argument that political order can be conceived of only as the result of ongoing processes of social interaction. Hence, at least two reasons as to why the security community literature provides an instructive starting point come to mind. First, the security community approach originated as a perspective attempting to transcend the state-centric perspective of IR and, in particular, security studies. It thereby allows us, second, to conceive of ‘the West’ as a political space characterised by transnational processes of political association and integration. Political entities such as security communities are not perceived as just being ‘out there’, but are seen as the result of transformative processes such as the formation of collective identities through social learning. Hence, as we share these premises, choosing the security community literature as a foil to develop our own argument means to engage relatively close kin. We can thus not only deliberately refrain from restaging the arguments vis-a`-vis realist, liberal, and institutionalist accounts, we can also focus more specifically on the dynamics by means of which ‘the West’ is invoked, reproduced, and eventually transformed, for this is precisely where we beg to differ with the storyline conventionally presented by proponents of a security community approach. In a nutshell, we argue that the literature on security communities simply does not go far enough in stepping outside of the imaginative geographies characterized above.

The initial work on security communities that was conducted in the 1950s by Deutsch et al. (1957/1968) was driven by an interest in identifying the complex processes and mechanisms which enabled the permanent elimination of war between states, in particular in the ‘North Atlantic area’. They focused on ‘integration’ as a complex process by which security communities might come about. Most importantly they were interested in examining how a ‘sense of community’, central to their account of ‘integration’, could take shape in diverse and unique historical circumstances.

2022 Michigan Kritik
Security K – BEJJ 2022 › Links › 2NC---Russia/China

Securitization of Russia and China is a natural biproduct of American geopolitical culture---the inherent desire for power recreates the security dilemmas of the 1AC

Ambrosio, 19 --- (Thomas Ambrosio- professor of political science in the Criminal Justice and Political Science Department at North Dakota State University. He teaches courses in international relations and international law, "The American securitization of China and Russia: U.S. geopolitical culture and declining unipolarity", 5-13-2019, Taylor & Francis, https://www-tandfonline-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/doi/full/10.1080/15387216.2019.1702566)//mishelle

This article used a consistent set of primary sources, an explicit methodology, and both qualitative and quantitative data to account for the evolution of the current securitization process which portrays great power competition, in the form of Russia’s and China’s open challenge to America’s position in the international system, as an existential threat to America’s place in the international system. While at some level the specific elements of this new narrative – revisionism, the democracy-autocracy binary, and spheres of influence – are revivals of Cold War tropes, this analysis allowed for a better understanding of the broader issues involved in how this narrative shift reflects U.S. geopolitical culture, how it believes this challenge has occurred, and how it perceives America’s role in the changing international system. From these, the likely future of American grand strategy and geopolitical culture is coming into clearer focus. It is the open recognition that the geopolitical status quo is actually slipping, a situation which some IRT scholars have been saying for some time (Schweller and Pu 2011; Layne 2012; Mearsheimer 2019), which has precipitated this narrative shift. This demonstrates exactly how closely tied U.S. self-identity and geopolitical culture are to the preservation of primacy, unipolarity, and the liberal-democratic world order. Should one or more of these conditions fully collapse, then we are likely to see a dramatic rupture in American geopolitical culture – with a difficult redefinition of its place in the world, a popular backlash, and unpredictable results. Moreover, the quantitative data reveal that this narrative shift has had less to do with the growing capabilities of Russia/China than their ultimate goal to promote a new global architecture based upon multipolarity. The ability of Russia’s and China’s nuclear programs to end the physical existence of the U.S. has remained virtually the same since the end of the Cold War, and while these states have begun closing the military and technical gap between themselves and the U.S., this new geopolitical narrative more closely corresponds to a notable rise in references to their intentions, rather than capabilities. This is seen most clearly by the fact that Russia’s more overt challenge has resulted in it being singled out as the more significant threat over China, which, based upon raw current and future capabilities, is objectively a far larger danger. This raises important theoretical questions about threat perceptions and securitization processes which seemingly have more to do with perceptions about current and future aggressiveness than capabilities. This invites further study. Finally, LeGreco and Tracy (2009) noted that an equally important aspect of discourse/narrative tracing is to track what is not said. There was little acknowledgment from the American side that it had a substantive hand in precipitating these changes by either promoting a security dilemma between itself, on the one hand, and China/Russia, on the other, or that it has engaged in a grand strategy which has led to overextension and imperial decline. Therefore, according to this (self-)limited understanding on Washington’s part, there appears little that it can do to ameliorate the situation, and no course correction is seen as necessary except for confronting these states when their actions run contrary to U.S. interests. If the pattern leading up to the 2019 threat assessment is any indication, we are likely to see a closer alignment between this intensified threat narrative and a reinvigorated mission to preserve the status quo, without any self-awareness that this policy may be self-defeating. America appears to be firmly in the “’Try Harder!’” phase of strategic thinking, to use Legro’s (2005, 37) formulation. This is reflected in the Trump administration’s National Security Strategy (NSS), which appears to double down on the strategy of pursuing American primacy, even to the point of direct confrontation (Clarke and Ricketts 2017). By doing so, these officials are neither preparing American foreign policy nor its citizens for a revised geopolitical culture better suited to ensure a soft-landing of unipolarity. Consequently, it is likely that the United States “won’t see [the end] coming until it’s too late,” as Schweller (2011) speculated. Thus, a full accounting of why this broader structural change is occurring will likely elude American policymakers for the foreseeable future, leading to an even weaker United States and more fraught great power relations as the defining features of the international system and America’s place within it.

2022 Michigan Kritik
Security K – BEJJ 2022 › Links › Liberalism

Liberal uses of nuclear deterrence are an effort to otherize non-western regions – the west uses ‘liberalism’ and ‘freedom’ as a cover of for asserting their superiority over the ‘south’

Alex H. Chung 14, MA in IR, PhD Candidate at the Department of Occupational Therapy, Social Work and Social Policy, November 2014, http://web.isanet.org/Web/Conferences/ISSS%20Austin%202014/Archive/253053b8-52cd-4251-8a5d-1dd0163cb460.pdf\\iris

Unlike neorealists, liberals do not entirely disregard the existence of ‘weak’ states, but they are merely of interest, “primarily as bearers of rights and objects of emancipation…for their normative value in Western political theoretic terms,” (Barkawi & Laffey 2006, p. 333). Whereas “realist approaches to security studies are Eurocentric in that they locate agency and history with the great powers,” liberal approaches are equally Eurocentric, in addition to defining the West “in ethical and progressive terms,” (Barkawi & Laffey 2006, p. 340). In the Western imagination, discourse on nuclear proliferation is deeply entrenched in relation to the Third World, dividing the world into states that can be trusted with nuclear weapons and those that cannot (Gusterson 1999, p. 113). Liberals and conservatives alike hold the following orthodox belief: “the proliferation of nuclear weapons to nuclear-threshold states in the Third World, especially the Islamic world, would be enormously dangerous,” (Gusterson 1999, p. 112). Nuclear apartheid is justified in the liberal mindset, since western democracies have the moral imperative and ethical superiority to impose their will for the good of the ‘other’.

Edward Said asserts that Orientalist discourse demarcates the world in a binary opposition that presents the ‘Orient’ as the mirror image of the West, “where ‘we’ are rational and disciplined; ‘they are impulsive and emotional; where ‘we’ are modern and flexible, ‘they’ are slaves to ancient passions and routines; where ‘we’ are honest and compassionate, ‘they’ are treacherous and uncultivated,” (Gusterson 1999, p. 114). This Orientalist process has an effect of creating an immense sense of ‘Otherness’ separating the Third World from liberal Western democracies, thereby rationalising and internalising a sense of liberal ‘superiority’ (Gusterson 1999, p. 114). Empirically, this construct of ethical superiority in the liberal West requires Orwellian self-delusion. As purported by Barkawi & Laffey (2006, p. 341), the Holocaust presents a challenge to the liberal faith in the “Western myths of progress and ethical superiority.” To maintain the Western belief in liberal superiority, the “sins of Western civilisation” are displaced “onto an intrusive non-European Other…Germany, that quintessentially Western society, somehow becomes not Western,” (Barkawi & Laffey 2006, p. 341). Furthermore, the brutal and barbaric slaughter and loss of life amongst ‘natives’ was a normative feature of European colonisation and expansion into the non-European world (Barkawi & Laffey 2006, p. 343). As observed by Sven Lindqvist, “the Holocaust was unique – in Europe. But the history of Western expansion in other parts of the world shows many examples of total extermination of whole peoples,” (Barkwai & Laffey 2006, p. 343).

2022 Michigan Kritik
Security K – BEJJ 2022 › Links › Realism/Neo-Realism

The AFF’s realist understanding of nuclear proliferation and deterrence relies on a Cold War Era use of ‘rationality’ that otherizes non-Western states as ‘irrational’, putting the ‘West’ on a pedestal that is isolated from the realness of conflict

Alex H. Chung 14, MA in IR, PhD Candidate at the Department of Occupational Therapy, Social Work and Social Policy, November 2014, http://web.isanet.org/Web/Conferences/ISSS%20Austin%202014/Archive/253053b8-52cd-4251-8a5d-1dd0163cb460.pdf\\iris

The traditional neo-realist security paradigm perceives nuclear weapons as either “deterrents against overwhelming conventional military threats or as coercive tools to compel changes in the status quo,” (Sagan 1997, p. 57). Realist and neo-realist nuclear perspectives were underpinned by the MAD (Mutually Assured Destruction) doctrine – wherein state actors maximise their security by behaving ‘rationally’, given the anarchic nature of the world (Seliktar 2011, p. 190). For neorealists, the end of the ‘Cold War’ marked the end of the bipolar distribution of power that was considered to be more stable than the introduction of the post-Cold War multipolar arrangement of power. This resulted in the acceleration of nuclear proliferation (Chafetz 1993, p. 127). Anxiety over proliferation persisted after the Cold War due to the fact that those considered ‘rogue states’ were among those hoping to join the ‘nuclear club’, thus igniting serious debate on ‘rationality’ (Seliktar 2011, p. 191). Promoters of ‘planned’ or ‘managed’ proliferation such as Waltz see the proliferation of nuclear weapons as both inevitable and not a cause for alarm, given the overwhelming power of nuclear deterrence; “the ability of a state, not to defend itself, but to threaten an adversary with unacceptable damage if attacked,” (Gavin 2012, p. 574). Many neorealist political scientists, including Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, William Riker, and John Mearsheimer have promoted the ‘managed’ or ‘planned’ proliferation argument, advocating for the spread of nuclear weapons into key areas, such as Ukraine and Germany, where non-nuclear states face nuclear armed enemies, based on the belief that “the chance of bilateral conflict becoming nuclear decreases to zero when all nations are nuclear armed,” (Sagan 1994, p. 66). The basis for the neorealists’ confidence in deterrence is the ‘long peace’ maintained between the United States and the Soviet Union during the ‘Cold War’ (Sagan 1994, p. 66). However, even supporters of ‘managed’ or ‘planned’ proliferation in the neorealist school do not agree with uncontrolled nuclear proliferation (Frankel 1993, p. 39). In the debate surrounding deterrence and its applicability to ‘rogue states’, Mearsheimer stated that the “logic of controlled proliferation might not extend to Third World dictatorships,” (Seliktar 2011, p. 192).

For realists, IR theory is based on great power politics (Barkawi & Laffey 2006, p. 331). Neorealist and realist perspectives on nuclear proliferation are based on ‘rationality’ constructed via Western dominated narratives of World War II and the ‘Cold War’ (Biswas, forthcoming 2012; Frankel 1993, p. 40). The Eurocentric IR paradigm regards the weak and powerless as “marginal or derivative elements of world politics,” (Barkawi & Laffey 2006, p. 332). Rationality and objectivity are firmly attributed to ‘great powers’ as demonstrated by the scholarly analysis of the ‘Cuban Missile Crisis’. Cubans were depicted as politicised, whereas Americans and Soviets were characterised as apolitical (Barkawi & Laffey 2006, p. 338). Agency rests on the ‘great powers’, while the security interests and actions of ‘weak’ states in the ‘Global South’, such as Cuba, are conveniently ignored or disregarded (Barkawi & Laffey 2006, p. 329; Biswas, forthcoming 2012). The one-sided and Eurocentric logic of ‘planned’ proliferation, which promotes horizontal proliferation to those states that neorealists deem ‘rational’ and ‘objective’ is merely a reproduction of the superpower-based ‘Cold War’ era thinking. These ideologies disregarded the agency of the ‘weak’ and ‘powerless’, and the importance of the Global South or ‘Third World’ in affecting international affairs, and arbitrarily assigned rationality and objectivity to the great powers.

2022 Michigan Kritik
Security K – BEJJ 2022 › Links › General

The Aff’s prolif impact constructs the world in imperialist terms – Western analysts obsess over the danger that nations in East Asia and the Global South pose to global security while owning triple the nuclear weapons. This double standard condemns the global South to constant violent intervention

Andreas Behnke 2k, International Politics Professor at the Political Science Department, Stockholm University. His research interests include Theories of International Relations, Critical Security Studies and Political Geography, January 2000, “Inscriptions of the Imperial Order”, The International Journal of Peace Studies Vol. 5 No. 1, https://www3.gmu.edu/programs/icar/ijps/vol5_1/behnke.htm\\iris

David Mutimer (1997) has argued that the use of the metaphor 'proliferation' carries certain entailments. That is to say, it structures our understanding and handling of the problem. In particular, he refers to the "image of a spread outward from a point or source", and the "technological bias" introduced in the discourse (Mutimer 1997:201-2). As concerns the first point, 'proliferation' presupposes a center at which WMD are to be held and controlled, and from which these weapons disseminate into the body of the international society. To the extent that this process gets out of the center's control, certain measures have to be taken to 'suffocate', limit, or curb the 'spread' of these weapons. As concerns the second point, Mutimer (1997:203) points out the peculiar agency implied in the concept: "Notice that the weapons themselves spread; they are not spread by an external agent of some form - say, a human being or political institution". The fact that a large number of these weapons were actually 'spread' by Western states is consequently hidden through this discursive structure. These points are also relevant for the Mediterranean Initiative. We can add a third entailment to the list which appears through a critical reading of the NATO/RAND narrative. As the RAND authors (1998:15) observe, "The mere existence of ballistic missile technology with ranges in excess of 1,000 km on world markets and available to proliferators around the Mediterranean basin would not necessarily pose serious strategic dilemmas for Europe."

In fact, we might even agree with the neorealist proposition that 'more might be better', above all in terms of nuclear weapons. This is certainly the preferred solution of John Mearsheimer (1990) for the stabilization of European political order after the end of the cold war. After all, conventional wisdom has it that nuclear weapons and the threat of mutually assured destruction preserved stability and peace during the Cold War. The RAND authors, however, fail to grasp the irony in their identification of WMD proliferation, which ends up denying this central tenet of cold war strategy. According to them, "the WMD and ballistic missile threat will acquire more serious dimensions where it is coupled with a proliferator's revolutionary orientation. Today, this is the case with regard to Iran, Iraq, Libya, and arguably Syria" (RAND, 1998:16).

2022 Michigan Kritik
Security K – BEJJ 2022 › Links › 2NC---NATO

NATO forms its alliances by securitizing for its own selfish protection—results in the threat generation and allying with powerful states

Schlag 15--- (Gabi Schlag- Associate and Research Fellow at the Otto von Guericke University Magdeburg, Germany, and holds a PhD from the Goethe University, "Securitisation theory and the evolution of NATO", 2015, Taylor & Francis,

Many scholars would probably state that much has changed since the early 1990s. Eastern enlargement has made NATO’s membership and strategic discourse more diverse, disputes over the Iraq war in 2003 were regarded as the most serious crisis in NATO’s history and the conflict in Ukraine and the progress of ISIS in Syria and Iraq symbolise the sorts of challenge the Alliance will have to face in years to come. Statements that NATO is in crisis, the ‘alliance crisis syndrome’ as Thiess (2009: 2) has aptly named it, are nothing new but do direct our attention to more substantial questions: what is NATO (for) – and why has it endured for so long despite its history of crisis? ST’s examination of NATO’s past provides some helpful insights in these regards. In a strictly positivist sense, ST does not explain the foundation, transformation and/or continuity of the Alliance where norms, interests or common threat assessments might be described as the major causes of cooperation. What STdoes, however, is provide a conceptual toolbox for describing causal mechanisms (Guzzini 2011) – what happens, in other words, when actors speak security and move political questions on (re-securitisation) and off (de-securitisation) the security agenda. It shows the specific regional patterns of de-/securitization in the transatlantic regional security complex with its unique and overlapping institutions (NATO, EU, OSCE). Thus, ST might be a critical resource for (neo)realist accounts of NATO. Alliance formation, as Walt (1985: 4) has prominently argued, can be regarded ‘as a response to threats’, either in terms of balancing the source of danger or allying with the most powerful state. As simple as this argument may sound, it leaves open the question of who poses a danger to whom, and how and why insecurities might change over time. ST is able to give an empirically grounded answer to these questions. Accordingly, a comparative study on patterns of securitisation/de-securitisation across time and institutions would be highly valuable in order to understand how different NATO is. Threats and insecurities have not ceased to exist even if North America and Europe are zones of peace(ful change) among states. The main puzzle, then, is not the continuity of the Alliance after the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact, but rather its ability to invoke and often hegemonise what security means while consolidating non-violent relations internally. Addressing NATO’s future, ST also suggests some conclusions. Although reliable predictions are always difficult and risky (as neo-realist claims of NATO survival show),13 it is possible to argue that the Alliance will endure as long as actors (member states as well as NATO officials) succeed in articulating insecurities of different kinds and thus legitimise NATO as the central institution where these problems are negotiated and dealt with. The example of NATO’s post–Cold War re-orientation through its 1991 Strategic Concept and subsequent strategic discourse illustrates how the Alliance has navigated this challenge. At the Cold War’s end, the Alliance seemingly confronted a situation of de-securitisation as its erstwhile Soviet adversary disappeared from the stage. Indeed, de-securitisation was the premise of policy as NATO embraced former Warsaw Pact states through enlargement and embarked upon a structured partnership with Russia. But in parallel, NATO securitised other issues by widening its remit of responsibility, an act given authoritative expression in the Strategic Concept and then extended in successor documents in 1999 and 2010. These strategic articulations were manifest in a wholesale shift of mission evidenced most obviously in interventions in the Balkans in the 1990s, as well as later in Afghanistan and Libya. The culmination of this process is the re-securitisation of Russia which has occurred as a consequence of the crisis in Ukraine. As for the question what is NATO (for), an answer here is more complicated and might contradict assumptions that the Alliance has retained its relevance through securitising (or, indeed, de-securitising and re-securitising) specific threats. NATO has been more than a military alliance from its very beginning, symbolising a special bond between Europe and North America. Continuous articulations of threat assessments make NATO members work and even fight together but they are not the foundation of the Alliance as such: it is, rather, the invocation of a community of like-minded states (and societies) which share something important (democracy, human rights and a market economy) in common and deemed worthy of protection. Thus, Thomas Risse-Kappen (1996: 4) has argued that the Alliance is not based primarily on common interests and threat perceptions, but on a collective democratic identity symbolising an ‘alliance of democracies’. His claim is persuasive but it needs qualifying (Sjursen 2004). Since the foundation of NATO, its members have invoked the Alliance as the cornerstone of Western security cooperation based on common symbolic values. Whenever these values have been endangered, the allies have been able to mobilise and legitimise new policies in order to (re-) affirm NATO’s unity, including a lasting institutional structure of political and military cooperation, coordination and even integration. It is the capacity of the members to articulate the values they stand for as universal and the alliance they form as legitimised to defend them at home and, if necessary, to realise them abroad, which attaches true value to NATO. In other words, the presumed ‘democratic identity’ of each member and of NATO itself cannot be taken for granted but is the performative effect of a shared security discourse which changes its content over time. As Behnke (2013: 1) has argued ‘the continued existence and political relevance of the Alliance rests on its ability to repro-duce “the West” as a geo-cultural space that serves as its security referent object’. Processes of securitisation and de-securitisation are the symbolic, yet powerful expression of this community.

2022 Michigan Kritik
Security K – BEJJ 2022 › Links › 2NC---NATO

Here's that study.

H. Akın Ünver 22, Department of International Relations Özyeğin University İstanbul, Turkey, and Ahmet Kurnaz, Department of Public Administration and Political Science, Çanakkale Onsekiz Mart University, Çanakkale, Turkey, February 21st, 2022, “Securitization of Disinformation in NATO Lexicon: A Computational Text Analysis,” https://ssrn.com/abstract=4040148 [ML]

In order to explore how NATO has securitized disinformation in recent years, we have scraped 238,452 tweets from NATO and official affiliated accounts from January 2014 to February 2021 and extracted more than 2000 speeches, press releases, reviews, official texts, archival documents and publications from the NATO e-library (?). Out of this sample, we have extracted documents and content that contained the keywords ‘disinformation’, ‘misinformation’, ‘fake news’, ‘propaganda’, ‘hybrid warfare’ and ‘information warfare’, and logged the number of their occurrences within these texts by date. Since this study doesn’t focus on the semantic differences between these keywords and consider them as different references to disinformation as a discursive strategy, we code and merge them singularly as variable ‘disinfo’. Our preliminary analysis shows that NATO has used these keywords most frequently in tweets, followed by speeches, reviews and publications. However, when analyzed proportionally, NATO publications focus on disinformation most frequently (75% of all documents), followed by tweets (40%), reviews (36.97%) and official texts (21.05%). In this study, we employ structural topic modeling (STM) - a text analysis approach that finds ‘topics’ in an unstructured corpus based on covariate information (Roberts et al., 2019). It follows a statistical logic that measures co-occurrence likelihoods of keywords and terms that are more likely to appear with each other and derives topical meanings out of those likelihoods. Topic modeling is increasingly used in the study of large volumes of text in social sciences such as large archival documents, or social media text datasets by producing “each word on the basis of some number of preceding words or word classes,” and “generate[ing] words based on latent topic variables inferred from word correlations independent of the order in which the words appear” (Wallach, 2006). In recent years topic modeling has become a widely-used method to study large Twitter datasets, and political discussions that happen on other social media platforms (Giles, 2012; Hong, Davison, 2010; Liang, Fu, 2015).

2022 Michigan Kritik
Security K – BEJJ 2022 › Links › 2NC---NATO

In-depth meta-analysis of NATO’s public and official discourse show a distinct securitization of Russian disinformation.

H. Akın Ünver 22, Department of International Relations Özyeğin University İstanbul, Turkey, and Ahmet Kurnaz, Department of Public Administration and Political Science, Çanakkale Onsekiz Mart University, Çanakkale, Turkey, February 21st, 2022, “Securitization of Disinformation in NATO Lexicon: A Computational Text Analysis,” https://ssrn.com/abstract=4040148 [ML]

Our analysis has shown that NATO has developed two disinformation-related communication strategies for two outlets: a more up-to-date and faster-developing threat discourse for its Twitter presence, and a more traditional, slow-moving threat presence visible in its official documents. This is particularly interesting and acutely visible in more 20th century military topics like command and control cohesion, missile defense, air defense architecture, naval defense, satellites and military intelligence-related topics that are more frequently mentioned in official documents, and much less referenced on Twitter. However, the overwhelming majority of disinformation, misinformation, hybrid war, information warfare and fake news-related communication topics are securitized on Twitter. This shows the emergence of two NATO discourses: one for its official documents, and one for its social media presence and messaging. The advent of digital communication technologies and social media has been significant for the evolution of securitization. Since securitization entails production and dissemination of insecurity frames through discursive networks, a more dynamic, interconnected information ecosystem is more conducive for collective meaning-making. On social media, the formation of insecurity processes are more rapid and interactive, and are able to influence and alter traditional, boring securitizing acts of elites. To that end, media outlets like Twitter provide a more interactive and fast-paced securitizing environment where elites and non-elites can set the security agenda and mobilize masses. The most clear expression of this novel medium, as demonstrated in our results, is that NATO’s Twitter securitization efforts change much faster, and spread more widely than traditional outlets like official speeches, texts and reports. This could be interpreted in two ways: first, that NATO may prefer securitizing disinformation exclusively on Twitter, since such threats are generally more visible and debated on social media platforms. The second interpretation is that NATO’s official statements and documents could largely be focusing on macrolevel doctrinal issues that pose a direct military security threat to its members, rather than disinformation, which is a nuisance, but poses no direct military threat. Since disinformation is being discussed in contemporary policy debates within the context of electoral integrity and social polarization, their actual military relevance may be less relevant to be taken into account in formal NATO documents. In either case, our study of the NATO lexicon demonstrated that disinformation and related terms are constructed as uniquely ‘Russian’ nuisances. This isn’t surprising since most of these terms - at least their digital interpretations - have entered the NATO lexicon after the Russian military involvement in eastern Ukraine and Crimea. However, since then, Russia remained the only country against which NATO has constructed its disinformation narratives, indicating that Russia is NATO’s sole disinformation concern. Although very recently China has emerged as a runner-up country within the context of COVID-related disinformation concerns, Russia is largely the main threat in NATO’s lexicon. This could be counterproductive to long-term NATO efforts to combat disinformation, given the global prevalence of fake news and information meddling. While Russian disinformation efforts are observably valid, cornering a universal problem like disinformation into the limited space of NATO’s interactions with a single country may lead to conceptual contraction. This in turn, may prevent NATO from mobilizing full alliance resources against disinformation, defined as a global and universal problem.

2022 Michigan Kritik
Security K – BEJJ 2022 › Links › 2NC---NATO

NATO’s security discourse delegitimizes alternative governance and solidifies liberalism in Western identity.

Alexandra Gheciu 19, Professor at Graduate School Of Public and International Affairs, University Of Ottawa, Ottawa, Ontario, Canadacorresponding Author, 3-19-2019, "NATO, liberal internationalism, and the politics of imagining the Western security community", SAGE Journals, https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/0020702019834645 //AW

In recent years, there has been renewed interest among International Relations (IR) scholars in the ability of the Western security community to protect itself from a variety of threats and challenges. In this context, longstanding debates concerning the role played by the organization that is widely regarded as the institutional expression of that community—NATO—have recently taken on new dimensions. Scholars and policymakers often disagree in their interpretations of the relative strength of NATO, but many agree that the alliance needs to play a central role in protecting the West from a mix of conventional and non-conventional dangers, ranging from an increasingly assertive Russia to transnational terrorism. One of the key assumptions underpinning many analyses is that NATO constitutes the institutional expression of a pre-existing Western security community united around liberal-democratic norms and values. However, a close reading of the alliance’s history shows that, far from simply representing a pre-given community, NATO has always been involved in constructing “the West.” At the heart of that process of social construction lie practices of collective (re)imagining of the Western world in specific ways, as well as the representation—and management of—internal tensions as feuds within a community united by shared liberal values. Today, the task of managing internal differences has been rendered particularly difficult by the rise of radical conservative political forces in several allied states. This has translated into a clash between liberal and illiberal interpretations of the Western security community, which has the potential to seriously complicate inter-allied relations in the foreseeable future. As this paper shows, contrary to conventional wisdom, middle powers have always played important roles in the constitution of the Western security community. More recently, they have also played significant roles in contesting liberal interpretations of the security community, and articulating an alternative, radical conservative vision of the West. Recent developments in allied countries such as Turkey and Poland are a potent reminder that not all middle powers are alike; on the contrary, based on their socially constructed, historically specific definitions of identity, they can perform a diversity of international roles—in support of, or, conversely, as obstacles to liberal internationalism. The narrative of Western unity and the politics of collective forgetting during the Cold War One of the most influential narratives of international security put forward by liberal IR scholars and practitioners centres on the Euro-Atlantic security community, consisting of a group of countries united around a set of key liberal norms and institutions that generate “dependable expectations” of peaceful resolution of conflicts that might arise among them.1 From that perspective, NATO is an institution that was created in the context of the Cold War to protect the pre-existing security community from the threats posed by the West’s dangerous other: the communist bloc. Yet, as a series of constructivist scholars have persuasively argued, there is nothing natural about the Western security community.2 In Emanuel Adler’s words, “security communities are socially constructed and rest on shared practical knowledge of the peaceful resolution of conflicts.”3 Furthermore, the absence of violence should not lead us to conclude that the construction of security communities in general and the Western community in particular were power-free processes. On the contrary, as Adler and Barnett explain, central to the establishment of a security community is the dialectic between power—primarily symbolic power—and knowledge.4 Thus, in the physically non-violent context of security communities, power is primarily “the authority to determine the shared meanings that embody the identities, interests and practices of states, as well as the conditions that confer, defer or deny access to goods and benefits.”5 Applying this logic to the specific case of NATO, we can see the alliance not as the institutional expression of a pre-given community, but, rather, as an organization that has been deeply involved in power-filled practices of construction and reproduction of that community.6 Historical evidence indicates that the founders of NATO—policymaking elites from the United Kingdom, Canada, the United States, France, and the Benelux states—did not take the Western security community for granted. Instead, they engaged in a systematic set of practices aimed at constructing a sense of community around a shared set of liberal-democratic norms in the Euro-Atlantic area, and placed the newly created North Atlantic Treaty Organization at the heart of those practices. In the intergovernmental debates leading up to the establishment of NATO, the threat of military confrontation with the Soviet Union was regarded as less worrisome than the danger of communist subversion within the weakened societies of Western European states.7 In that context, as Louis St. Laurent—then Canadian Secretary of State for External Affairs—argued, the best way to prevent a third world war was by confronting “the forces of communist expansion with an overwhelming preponderance of moral, economic and military force on the side of freedom.”8 At the level of top Western political elites, the fear of communism inspired a collective (re)definition of political identity in the Euro-Atlantic area. The “spectre of Communism” provided the defining other against which decision-makers on both sides of the Atlantic were able to subordinate their differences to a collective definition of a Western community. That community was seen as based on the common heritage of political and cultural ideas of member states; its defining mark was the set of shared values of individual liberal freedoms, the rule of law, and democracy.9 This view is clearly reflected in the preamble to the Washington Treaty (NATO’s foundational treaty), which stipulates that the alliance is based on principles of democracy, individual liberty, and law. Contrary to what conventional (realist) wisdom suggests, NATO was not simply set up as the hegemonic instrument of the US. On the contrary, political actors from other states—most notably Canada—played key roles in driving the process of establishing NATO and defining its key foundational principles.10 In fact, one of the key articles in the Washington Treaty is informally known as the “Canadian” article, precisely in recognition of the influential role played by Canadian policymakers in its formulation.11 Article 2 clearly shows that NATO was expected to play a role that went far beyond that of a conventional military alliance. That article succinctly summarizes the precepts of the Kantian-inspired democratic peace theory, as it stipulates: “The Parties will contribute toward the further development of peaceful and friendly international relations by strengthening their free institutions, by bringing about a better understanding of the principles upon which these institutions are founded, and by promoting conditions of stability and well-being.” To decision-makers locked in a competition with forces regarded as representing communist otherness, it was imperative that countries of Western Europe, Canada, and the US cultivate a sense of shared liberal-democratic identity—set in opposition to communism—among their peoples. In that context, they sought to articulate a narrative of Western unity, and disseminate it as widely as possible in the countries of the Atlantic Alliance. As Erik Ringmar has argued, identities are constructed, maintained, and transformed via the telling of “constitutive” narratives.12 Narratives provide a set of meanings within which an actor’s identity, the situation within which they are located and the actions deemed appropriate are brought together.13 The process of telling constitutive narratives is especially important during periods of fundamental transformation, when new identities are being formed and old ones are being pressured to evolve.14 In the eyes of Western leaders, the narrative of unity among NATO members had to not only cultivate a sense of shared identity, but also to delegitimize—by casting them as inconsistent with Western identity—communist forces that were becoming increasingly powerful in many allied states. Once again, some of the most influential voices in favour of disseminating a narrative of Western unity and using that to legitimize community-building practices within NATO were its middle powers—particularly Canada. For instance, the Canadian Foreign Minister, Lester Pearson, repeatedly argued in the early 1950s that NATO’s long-term goal had to be the creation of a community of free nations in the Atlantic area. More broadly, Canadian officials, together with NATO supporters from Norway, the Netherlands, Denmark, and the UK, were acutely aware of the fact that, in order for the alliance to be able to help build “a community of free nations” united around liberal values, it had to find a way to help publics from allied states transcend recent memories of war among Western states. What was required, in other words, was a collective reinterpretation—and a selective forgetting—of the recent past.15 After all, the newly identified enemy, communist Soviet Union, had emerged from the war as a hero in the eyes of many in the West. The view of the “West as one” became central to a collective (re)reading of Western history following the establishment of the alliance.16 Collective efforts at history (re)writing found expression not only within the public discourse articulated by NATO, but also in confidential documents. Recently declassified documents from the 1950s reveal a set of shared understandings among NATO’s decision-makers regarding the way in which the history of member states should be interpreted in order to foster a sense of Western community. In addition, NATO mobilized its substantial material and symbolic power to widely disseminate the discourse on Western unity in all the allied states and, simultaneously, to delegitimize alternative readings of history—especially those that focused on ideas of solidarity—and memories of friendship—with the Soviet Union.17 In particular, as Patrick Jackson has demonstrated, the discourse of Western civilization played a key role in orchestrating the collective (re)reading of Germany as a member of the Western community, and on this basis legitimating its incorporation into NATO. This is not to suggest that the West was an essential entity that objectively determined a field of outcomes. Rather, “Western civilization” needs to be understood as “rhetorical commonplace,” used by allied policymakers as a discursive resource for de-legitimating policy options opposed to Germany’s incorporation into American-led institutions.18 In the official NATO discourse, Germany was interpreted as a member of the Western family that, under the Nazi regime, had temporarily deviated from its core values. Following the end of that regime, however, (West) Germany—acting under the close supervision of allied states—could and should be reintegrated into the Euro-Atlantic community. Against the background of the constitutive discourse on Western unity, disagreements and tensions that continued to occur among member states could be represented as “family” feuds, and managed within the framework of shared norms and a persisting sense of community. A full analysis of inter-allied disagreements during the Cold War is beyond the scope of this paper. However, it is worthwhile to briefly examine what could be seen as one of the most significant set of disagreements within NATO: arguments concerning the accession to the alliance of states that did not comply with the liberal-democratic norms and values around which the Western community defined itself. Particularly interesting were arguments over the inclusion of Portugal in 1949, as well as the accession of Greece and especially Turkey (completed in 1952). In that context, middle powers like Canada and Norway emerged as strong proponents of the view that countries which did not respect basic liberal-democratic values did not belong—and should not be included—in the alliance which represented the Western community.19 In the end, however, all the allies were persuaded to support the inclusion of those “problem” countries. Several factors were crucial to the emergence of that consensus: a shared recognition among the allies of the geostrategic importance of those countries in the context of growing confrontation with the Soviet Union, and a sense that, in that particular context, the inclusion of strategically vital but normatively deviant states was an acceptable compromise in the name of protecting the community of liberal values. The prevailing view came to be that the integration of states like Portugal and Turkey could be managed in a way that would not necessarily endanger the core values of the West. Furthermore, inclusion into the Western community was seen by some allied policymakers as a course of action that could help those countries evolve into stable liberal democracies. It is revealing, in fact, that a normative compromise that was eventually seen as reasonable in the cases of Portugal and Turkey was regarded as inappropriate in the case of a country whose political regime was perceived as an active threat to liberal-democratic values: Franco’s Spain.20 As Mark Smith put it, “Turkey could be accommodated, and Portugal’s dictatorship had less Fascistic origins than Spain’s. Significantly, neither had a history of active antagonism toward Western European liberalism. Admitting Franco would be admitting a regime of the very sort that had overturned European democracy in the 1930s and 1940s, and as such was wholly unacceptable.”21 The “triumph” of the West and the spread of the liberal security community in the early post-Cold War period The end of the Cold War was accompanied by a sense of triumph by the West over its defining other, and, as a corollary to this, a shared view among allied decision-makers that a new security environment was emerging in Europe. In a context marked by the breakdown of the Soviet bloc and the eruption of violence linked to ethnic conflict and the breakdown of states (most notably in the former Yugoslavia), there was a shift away from definitions of security focused on military power, and toward a heavy emphasis on “good governance” within states. In essence, security came to be associated with the liberal-democratic norms and institutions; negatively, risks came to be seen as emerging from the absence of liberal-democratic structures.22 In a situation in which there was no clearly identified enemy state, but in which developments within the transient former communist countries threatened to undermine international security, a consensus emerged that the promotion of “good” liberal-democratic norms and institutions within those states would be vital for European and international security in the new era. In that context, the project of disseminating liberal-democratic norms into the former Eastern bloc also became central to NATO efforts to redefine its mission—and thus demonstrate its continued relevance in the new era.23 In essence, NATO became deeply involved in reconstituting Central and Eastern European polities through systematic practices of socializing military and political elites as well as next generations of leaders into liberal-democratic norms and institutions.24 In other words, the alliance engaged in performing its liberal-democratic narrative via practices of disseminating liberal-democratic dispositions and institutions of “self-restraint” into the former communist bloc.25 The idea was to provide the Central/East European political and military elites with Western, liberal-democratic scripts for rebuilding their societies, and to turn those elites into “responsible,” self-disciplined actors, who would take Western-prescribed liberal-democratic norms for granted.26 Special emphasis was placed on socialising Central/Eastern Europeans into Western-defined norms in the area of security, including norms governing the relationships among different branches of the state involved in the formulation and implementation of defence policies, and the relationship between the state and civil society.27 NATO’s ability to provide authoritative definitions of the legitimate meaning of liberal-democratic identity, and more specifically, guidance on how to correctly enact norms of security provision that corresponded to that definition, was a reflection of the substantial symbolic power exercised by NATO vis-a-vis the pro-West elites of Central and Eastern Europe.28 That power was grounded in the latter’s recognition of NATO not just as a military alliance but as a key institution of the Western community with which Central/Eastern European reformers identified.29

2022 Michigan Kritik
Security K – BEJJ 2022 › Links › 2NC---Liberalism

Individual autonomy reproduces the securitization of structural dynamics that creates a cycle of Western dynamics

Lazell 16- (Lazell, Melita- political economist with diverse research interests traversing the fields of security, development and aid, and international relations, "Liberalism(s) and the critical securitization of development debate", 2016, University of Portsmouth, https://researchportal.port.ac.uk/en/publications/liberalisms-and-the-critical-securitization-of-development-debate)//mishelle

Through demarcating the multiple meanings of liberalism salient to the securitization of development debate, this article has proposed a number of additions and amendments to move the debate forward. Understanding liberalism as a coherent philosophy, as do a number of contributions to the debate, draws attention to the liberal political discourse of global governance. However, depicting global governance as unified through a liberal consensus endows a greater coherence to these discourses than they warrant. In doing so, internal contradiction, contestation and contingency is obscured. An approach to these related discourses which makes visible the ‘messy actualities’ (Larner, 2006) of global governance may reveal potential and spaces for specific emancipatory change. This would include acknowledging the different narratives linking security and development, which would engender a more robust understanding of this discourse. Utilising the idea of liberalism as a technology of governance gives insight into how development involves the production of freedom and entails limitations and coercion. It highlights liberal societal transformation as a key rationale of global governance and offers a salient theoretical tool for understanding ‘ownership’ and ‘participation’ within the global development agenda. However there is a need to establish greater clarity regarding the drivers of liberal societal transformation in the South and deeper engagement with the wider literature concerned with liberal societal transformation (Harrison, 2004) Applying neoliberalism as governmentality to the debate sheds light upon how the non-liberal practices of development intervention become acceptable to a global governance network that is essentially liberal. Finally, a theory of the securitization of development needs to pay greater attention to the structural dynamics of the global economy, including how these are linked to the production of discourse. The (important) focus on liberalism(s) as a coherent philosophy or technique of power, should not exclude an analysis of the underlying structures of global capital accumulation that perpetuate the very global inequalities that are currently framed as security issues by global governance networks. The security-development nexus reinforces the delinking of development assistance from the principle of solidarity and the redistribution of wealth. Instead, development interventions are understood as a tool of Western security. It is this that the securitization of development debate is seeking to critique. In delineating the three strands of liberalism this paper contributes to the debate by providing greater clarity and further tools through which to reveal the ‘underlying cartographies of power’ that inform the nexus. Furthermore, in demonstrating that complexity rather than coherence characterises networks of global governance, it also has implications for critical global governance studies that lean towards conceptualising global governance as a knowable, coherent unit.

2022 Michigan Kritik
Security K – BEJJ 2022 › Links › 2NC---Hegemony

Discourse articulates the scope of hegemonic interests—securitization legitimizes interests to construct new political structures

Eva Herschinger, 11, research associate and lecturer in the Department of Political Science at the Universität der Bunderswehr, MÃ1⁄4nchen, Germany. Constructing Global Enemies: Hegemony and Identity in International Discourses on Terrorism and Drug Prohibition, Taylor & Francis Group, 2011. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/umichigan/detail.action?docID=604159.

Language and articulation, discourse and practice. For positivism, language works as a transparent medium for the indexing of data giving us a clear view on reality while the interpretation of reality can rely on correlations and facts. In contrast, poststructuralism conceives of language as ontologically significant and productive. Such an understanding situates the study within theories that comply with the ‘linguistic turn’ in the social sciences: they refuse to conceptualize language as a means of representation, as a transparent medium or key for the researcher to investigate an objective perception of reality. ‘Reality’ cannot be objectively perceived; hence, there is no objective or ‘true’ meaning behind or beyond linguistic representations. The discourse functions as the theoretical horizon on which objects are constituted: all objects are objects of discourse, as their meaning depends on a socially constructed system of rules and significant differences (Howarth and Stavrakakis 2000: 3). This is the tragedy of the old man: the productivity of language allowed him to turn the table in a rug and the bed into a painting; it allowed him to construct a world of his own full of things and objects with new meanings. But language is also a socially constructed and collectively shared system of rules, codes and conventions to which individuals have to comply in order to be understood and to participate in societal life, language can never be a private property – there is no private language exclusively for the old man (Wittgenstein 2001: 75/243).

To further understand language as political not only makes it a site of social interaction but also a space for producing and denouncing specific subjectivities within the political realm – language is a site of exclusion and inclusion. For instance, the understanding of drug use in the nineteenth century was radically different from today: drug use was a tolerated behaviour, people in various societal strata consumed drugs for pleasure, recreation or for medical reasons, and states even promoted the drug trade by claiming the monopoly on, for example, the trade with opium. Such a stance is inconceivable today, since the political nature of these formerly accepted practices became subject of contestations and, eventually, exclusions: states would not act as trader of drugs anymore and consuming drugs is considered as deviant, sick and illegal behaviour. Thus, drug prohibition (and equally terrorism) are not a mere liguistic reflection of processes or patterns of behaviour one can discover in the world ‘out there’ and described ‘as they are’. They are as much in need of interpretation as they open up space for interpretation. How they are interpreted and why some interpretations dominate and others do not is – as this book argues – a question of hegemonic orders.

2022 Michigan Kritik
Security K – BEJJ 2022 › Links › 2NC---Hegemony

The attempt to return to the liberal order is harmful—the rhetoric functions as a continued driver for American primacy

Patrick Porter, 18, is Chair in International Security and Strategy at the University of Birmingham. He is a Fellow at the Royal United Services Institute, “A World Imagined: Nostalgia and Liberal Order,” Cato Institute, Policy Analysis No. 843, June 5th https://www.cato.org/policy-analysis/world-imagined-nostalgia-liberal-order /ekc

According to a view popular in Washington, D.C., and other capitals around the world, the United States used its power and idealism for more than 70 years to create a security and economic order that transformed the world. This world order was liberal because the United States was liberal. “Liberal” in this context means the pursuit of security both through the spread of liberty, in the form of free markets and democratic constitutions, and the rule of law, in the form of rule‐​based international institutions. Today, defenders of that order fear that President Trump and a set of regressive forces are laying waste to it. They claim the consequences are grave: we are witnessing the “end of the West as we know it,”1 the abandonment of “global leadership” by its “long‐​time champion,”2 and a “coming Dark Age.”3 Foreign Affairs, the house organ of the foreign policy establishment, recently asked 32 experts whether the “liberal order is in peril.” Most agreed it is, with 26 respondents registering a confidence level of 7 out of 10.4 Alarmed by the political tumult of our time, nostalgists recall the post‐​1945 moment of institution building and benign internationalism and call for its reclamation.

They are, however, in the grip of a fiction. Liberalism and liberal projects abounded in the past 70 years. But the dream of a unitary, integrated global system organized around liberalism is ahistorical. In truth, the pre‐​Trump world was a more brutal and messy place than the nostalgia allows. To be sure, there was liberalism, and it did help define postwar international relations. Broadly speaking, the post‐​1945 period was, on many measures, more prosperous, less violent, and more collaborative than what came before. One defect of “liberal order” nostalgia is that it exaggerates these qualities and simply leaves out too many contrary historical realities. Other critics have already noted the gap between nostalgia and history and that the postwar world was never “whole.” At times the liberal order was neither very liberal nor very orderly. There may be “islands of liberal order, but they are floating in a sea of something quite different.”5

2022 Michigan Kritik
Security K – BEJJ 2022 › Links › 2NC---Hegemony

The desire to perpetuate the hegemonic identity seeks to construct false threats for the justification of retalitatory and pre-emptive action

Yuan and Fu, 20, Zhengqing Yuan, Senior Fellow at the Institute of World Economics and Politics, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences and Qiang Fu, Associate Professor at the School of Foreign Studies of Central University of Finance and Economics.“ Narrative Framing and the United States’ Threat Construction of Rivals” The Chinese Journal of International Politics, 2020, 419–453 doi: 10.1093/cjip/poaa008 Advance Access Publication Date: 10 July 2020/ekc

Rather than the rationalist approach to national security, we adopt a narrative approach to unravelling the narrative process whereby national threats are constructed. Having encountered three successive national rivals since WWII, the United States has constructed three distinctive threat stories to safeguard its hegemonic identity. The Soviet threat consists in the story of two ideologically opposed rivals competing for world domination; the Japan-bashing narrative tells a victimhood story stemming from Japan’s unfair competition. China threat stories, however, are now more complex, conflating a story of US victimhood at the hands of China’s unfair competition, advocated by President Trump, with a widely embedded but malleable epic tale of power competition between a rising power and the ruling power, and a new, ‘deep state’ defence community-propagated Cold War script. All these threat stories have framed what is perceived and what should be done, but they are merely those from among other alternative narratives that eventually gained a dominant position at critical junctures. These so called national threats are hence no more than narrative constructs in a self-other manner of articulation rather than one of objective existence. Upon examining the narrative templates of US threat stories, we find striking differences among them. The Soviet threat spectrum ranges from the ideological to the political and military domains, and economic challenge is the focus of the Japan threat. But China represents the full spectrum of threats that previously featured in both the Soviet threat story and the Japan-bashing narrative. Upon zooming in, we further find that an ideological conflict constitutes the main thread of the Soviet threat storyline, but that the economic challenge of the China threat outweighs the ideological and political ones. On the political front, the Soviet Union’s totalitarian dictatorship is the polar opposite of liberal democracy, while China is often styled as an authoritarian state—a far less antagonistic wording. As to military threats, the Soviet threat is urgent and global, but the China threat is only a rising and regional one. To counter the economic challenge emanating first from Japan and then from China, the United States adopted different strategies to construct its victimhood story, namely, coining new concepts for Japan, and cashing in on stereotypes for China. In spite of the above-marked differences, however, we can also clearly discern continuity in the United States’ national threat stories. This is reflected not only in the United States’ consistently resorting to the victimhood narrative to counter economic challenges from both Japan and China, and unremittingly cashing in on its widely-shared mythologies and images regarding the Self and Others to achieve resonance, but also, more revealingly, in the underlying logic of US national threat-making. The United States will invariably adopt a zero-sum mindset in making a diametrical self-other story for any country—be it a formidable power with an antagonistic ideology like the Soviet Union, an ally like Japan, or a rising peer competitor like China—that might threaten its hegemonic identity. According to this logic, the American Self is always superior to Others, and articulating the threat confirms its superiority. Not surprisingly, when Others, like Japan or China, challenge its economic primacy, the United States, rather than examining its own problems, will always blame such others for playing an ‘unfair game’. This paper also provides us with a vantage point to appreciate the current debate on Sino–US relations. Clearly, we are in the second half of the critical juncture wherein the question is not whether the United States and China will compete with each other but in which way the competition will unfold, for the bankruptcy of the liberal international order discourse makes it unlikely to revert to yesteryear’s policy of engagement. As the three narrative threads of the China threat stories all point to competition and conflict, and can be self-fulfilling, we may witness increasing tensions between them. Specifically, the Japan-bashing victimhood story can shed considerable light on our understanding of Trump’s China policy. We find that the story President Trump advocates to a large extent matches the victimhood story that the revisionists concocted to deal with Japan in the 1980s. Trump’s rhetoric regarding unfair trade and industry targeting, slapping of trade tariffs amounting to blackmail on both China and US allies, results oriented approach to trade negotiation, and the US high-tech stranglehold that curbs or bars investment in the industry by US competitors can all be found in the Japan threat story toolbox. Having pivoted China policy towards conflict, however, there are few indications that Trump wants to act out a Cold War script. In accordance with the storytelling logic, should Trump retain his presidency in the coming election, the trade war will probably not end in a ‘fair’ trade agreement until such time as the US economy far outperforms China’s, because US superiority entails outperformance, failing which the blame must go on unfair play. That is what happened to Japan, that is to say, successive rounds of sanctions and negotiations until Japan drifted into the Lost Decade. China may, moreover, face even greater US hostility to its high-tech industry and investment, as happened in 1980s. These are issues that China’s political nature and growing military may further complicate. But it should be noted that China is not Japan and will neither give in easily as Japan did nor pose a solely economic challenge to the United States.