In recent years, there has been renewed interest among International Relations (IR) scholars in the ability of the Western security community to protect itself from a variety of threats and challenges. In this context, longstanding debates concerning the role played by the organization that is widely regarded as the institutional expression of that community—NATO—have recently taken on new dimensions. Scholars and policymakers often disagree in their interpretations of the relative strength of NATO, but many agree that the alliance needs to play a central role in protecting the West from a mix of conventional and non-conventional dangers, ranging from an increasingly assertive Russia to transnational terrorism. One of the key assumptions underpinning many analyses is that NATO constitutes the institutional expression of a pre-existing Western security community united around liberal-democratic norms and values. However, a close reading of the alliance’s history shows that, far from simply representing a pre-given community, NATO has always been involved in constructing “the West.” At the heart of that process of social construction lie practices of collective (re)imagining of the Western world in specific ways, as well as the representation—and management of—internal tensions as feuds within a community united by shared liberal values. Today, the task of managing internal differences has been rendered particularly difficult by the rise of radical conservative political forces in several allied states. This has translated into a clash between liberal and illiberal interpretations of the Western security community, which has the potential to seriously complicate inter-allied relations in the foreseeable future. As this paper shows, contrary to conventional wisdom, middle powers have always played important roles in the constitution of the Western security community. More recently, they have also played significant roles in contesting liberal interpretations of the security community, and articulating an alternative, radical conservative vision of the West. Recent developments in allied countries such as Turkey and Poland are a potent reminder that not all middle powers are alike; on the contrary, based on their socially constructed, historically specific definitions of identity, they can perform a diversity of international roles—in support of, or, conversely, as obstacles to liberal internationalism. The narrative of Western unity and the politics of collective forgetting during the Cold War One of the most influential narratives of international security put forward by liberal IR scholars and practitioners centres on the Euro-Atlantic security community, consisting of a group of countries united around a set of key liberal norms and institutions that generate “dependable expectations” of peaceful resolution of conflicts that might arise among them.1 From that perspective, NATO is an institution that was created in the context of the Cold War to protect the pre-existing security community from the threats posed by the West’s dangerous other: the communist bloc. Yet, as a series of constructivist scholars have persuasively argued, there is nothing natural about the Western security community.2 In Emanuel Adler’s words, “security communities are socially constructed and rest on shared practical knowledge of the peaceful resolution of conflicts.”3 Furthermore, the absence of violence should not lead us to conclude that the construction of security communities in general and the Western community in particular were power-free processes. On the contrary, as Adler and Barnett explain, central to the establishment of a security community is the dialectic between power—primarily symbolic power—and knowledge.4 Thus, in the physically non-violent context of security communities, power is primarily “the authority to determine the shared meanings that embody the identities, interests and practices of states, as well as the conditions that confer, defer or deny access to goods and benefits.”5 Applying this logic to the specific case of NATO, we can see the alliance not as the institutional expression of a pre-given community, but, rather, as an organization that has been deeply involved in power-filled practices of construction and reproduction of that community.6 Historical evidence indicates that the founders of NATO—policymaking elites from the United Kingdom, Canada, the United States, France, and the Benelux states—did not take the Western security community for granted. Instead, they engaged in a systematic set of practices aimed at constructing a sense of community around a shared set of liberal-democratic norms in the Euro-Atlantic area, and placed the newly created North Atlantic Treaty Organization at the heart of those practices. In the intergovernmental debates leading up to the establishment of NATO, the threat of military confrontation with the Soviet Union was regarded as less worrisome than the danger of communist subversion within the weakened societies of Western European states.7 In that context, as Louis St. Laurent—then Canadian Secretary of State for External Affairs—argued, the best way to prevent a third world war was by confronting “the forces of communist expansion with an overwhelming preponderance of moral, economic and military force on the side of freedom.”8 At the level of top Western political elites, the fear of communism inspired a collective (re)definition of political identity in the Euro-Atlantic area. The “spectre of Communism” provided the defining other against which decision-makers on both sides of the Atlantic were able to subordinate their differences to a collective definition of a Western community. That community was seen as based on the common heritage of political and cultural ideas of member states; its defining mark was the set of shared values of individual liberal freedoms, the rule of law, and democracy.9 This view is clearly reflected in the preamble to the Washington Treaty (NATO’s foundational treaty), which stipulates that the alliance is based on principles of democracy, individual liberty, and law. Contrary to what conventional (realist) wisdom suggests, NATO was not simply set up as the hegemonic instrument of the US. On the contrary, political actors from other states—most notably Canada—played key roles in driving the process of establishing NATO and defining its key foundational principles.10 In fact, one of the key articles in the Washington Treaty is informally known as the “Canadian” article, precisely in recognition of the influential role played by Canadian policymakers in its formulation.11 Article 2 clearly shows that NATO was expected to play a role that went far beyond that of a conventional military alliance. That article succinctly summarizes the precepts of the Kantian-inspired democratic peace theory, as it stipulates: “The Parties will contribute toward the further development of peaceful and friendly international relations by strengthening their free institutions, by bringing about a better understanding of the principles upon which these institutions are founded, and by promoting conditions of stability and well-being.” To decision-makers locked in a competition with forces regarded as representing communist otherness, it was imperative that countries of Western Europe, Canada, and the US cultivate a sense of shared liberal-democratic identity—set in opposition to communism—among their peoples. In that context, they sought to articulate a narrative of Western unity, and disseminate it as widely as possible in the countries of the Atlantic Alliance. As Erik Ringmar has argued, identities are constructed, maintained, and transformed via the telling of “constitutive” narratives.12 Narratives provide a set of meanings within which an actor’s identity, the situation within which they are located and the actions deemed appropriate are brought together.13 The process of telling constitutive narratives is especially important during periods of fundamental transformation, when new identities are being formed and old ones are being pressured to evolve.14 In the eyes of Western leaders, the narrative of unity among NATO members had to not only cultivate a sense of shared identity, but also to delegitimize—by casting them as inconsistent with Western identity—communist forces that were becoming increasingly powerful in many allied states. Once again, some of the most influential voices in favour of disseminating a narrative of Western unity and using that to legitimize community-building practices within NATO were its middle powers—particularly Canada. For instance, the Canadian Foreign Minister, Lester Pearson, repeatedly argued in the early 1950s that NATO’s long-term goal had to be the creation of a community of free nations in the Atlantic area. More broadly, Canadian officials, together with NATO supporters from Norway, the Netherlands, Denmark, and the UK, were acutely aware of the fact that, in order for the alliance to be able to help build “a community of free nations” united around liberal values, it had to find a way to help publics from allied states transcend recent memories of war among Western states. What was required, in other words, was a collective reinterpretation—and a selective forgetting—of the recent past.15 After all, the newly identified enemy, communist Soviet Union, had emerged from the war as a hero in the eyes of many in the West. The view of the “West as one” became central to a collective (re)reading of Western history following the establishment of the alliance.16 Collective efforts at history (re)writing found expression not only within the public discourse articulated by NATO, but also in confidential documents. Recently declassified documents from the 1950s reveal a set of shared understandings among NATO’s decision-makers regarding the way in which the history of member states should be interpreted in order to foster a sense of Western community. In addition, NATO mobilized its substantial material and symbolic power to widely disseminate the discourse on Western unity in all the allied states and, simultaneously, to delegitimize alternative readings of history—especially those that focused on ideas of solidarity—and memories of friendship—with the Soviet Union.17 In particular, as Patrick Jackson has demonstrated, the discourse of Western civilization played a key role in orchestrating the collective (re)reading of Germany as a member of the Western community, and on this basis legitimating its incorporation into NATO. This is not to suggest that the West was an essential entity that objectively determined a field of outcomes. Rather, “Western civilization” needs to be understood as “rhetorical commonplace,” used by allied policymakers as a discursive resource for de-legitimating policy options opposed to Germany’s incorporation into American-led institutions.18 In the official NATO discourse, Germany was interpreted as a member of the Western family that, under the Nazi regime, had temporarily deviated from its core values. Following the end of that regime, however, (West) Germany—acting under the close supervision of allied states—could and should be reintegrated into the Euro-Atlantic community. Against the background of the constitutive discourse on Western unity, disagreements and tensions that continued to occur among member states could be represented as “family” feuds, and managed within the framework of shared norms and a persisting sense of community. A full analysis of inter-allied disagreements during the Cold War is beyond the scope of this paper. However, it is worthwhile to briefly examine what could be seen as one of the most significant set of disagreements within NATO: arguments concerning the accession to the alliance of states that did not comply with the liberal-democratic norms and values around which the Western community defined itself. Particularly interesting were arguments over the inclusion of Portugal in 1949, as well as the accession of Greece and especially Turkey (completed in 1952). In that context, middle powers like Canada and Norway emerged as strong proponents of the view that countries which did not respect basic liberal-democratic values did not belong—and should not be included—in the alliance which represented the Western community.19 In the end, however, all the allies were persuaded to support the inclusion of those “problem” countries. Several factors were crucial to the emergence of that consensus: a shared recognition among the allies of the geostrategic importance of those countries in the context of growing confrontation with the Soviet Union, and a sense that, in that particular context, the inclusion of strategically vital but normatively deviant states was an acceptable compromise in the name of protecting the community of liberal values. The prevailing view came to be that the integration of states like Portugal and Turkey could be managed in a way that would not necessarily endanger the core values of the West. Furthermore, inclusion into the Western community was seen by some allied policymakers as a course of action that could help those countries evolve into stable liberal democracies. It is revealing, in fact, that a normative compromise that was eventually seen as reasonable in the cases of Portugal and Turkey was regarded as inappropriate in the case of a country whose political regime was perceived as an active threat to liberal-democratic values: Franco’s Spain.20 As Mark Smith put it, “Turkey could be accommodated, and Portugal’s dictatorship had less Fascistic origins than Spain’s. Significantly, neither had a history of active antagonism toward Western European liberalism. Admitting Franco would be admitting a regime of the very sort that had overturned European democracy in the 1930s and 1940s, and as such was wholly unacceptable.”21 The “triumph” of the West and the spread of the liberal security community in the early post-Cold War period The end of the Cold War was accompanied by a sense of triumph by the West over its defining other, and, as a corollary to this, a shared view among allied decision-makers that a new security environment was emerging in Europe. In a context marked by the breakdown of the Soviet bloc and the eruption of violence linked to ethnic conflict and the breakdown of states (most notably in the former Yugoslavia), there was a shift away from definitions of security focused on military power, and toward a heavy emphasis on “good governance” within states. In essence, security came to be associated with the liberal-democratic norms and institutions; negatively, risks came to be seen as emerging from the absence of liberal-democratic structures.22 In a situation in which there was no clearly identified enemy state, but in which developments within the transient former communist countries threatened to undermine international security, a consensus emerged that the promotion of “good” liberal-democratic norms and institutions within those states would be vital for European and international security in the new era. In that context, the project of disseminating liberal-democratic norms into the former Eastern bloc also became central to NATO efforts to redefine its mission—and thus demonstrate its continued relevance in the new era.23 In essence, NATO became deeply involved in reconstituting Central and Eastern European polities through systematic practices of socializing military and political elites as well as next generations of leaders into liberal-democratic norms and institutions.24 In other words, the alliance engaged in performing its liberal-democratic narrative via practices of disseminating liberal-democratic dispositions and institutions of “self-restraint” into the former communist bloc.25 The idea was to provide the Central/East European political and military elites with Western, liberal-democratic scripts for rebuilding their societies, and to turn those elites into “responsible,” self-disciplined actors, who would take Western-prescribed liberal-democratic norms for granted.26 Special emphasis was placed on socialising Central/Eastern Europeans into Western-defined norms in the area of security, including norms governing the relationships among different branches of the state involved in the formulation and implementation of defence policies, and the relationship between the state and civil society.27 NATO’s ability to provide authoritative definitions of the legitimate meaning of liberal-democratic identity, and more specifically, guidance on how to correctly enact norms of security provision that corresponded to that definition, was a reflection of the substantial symbolic power exercised by NATO vis-a-vis the pro-West elites of Central and Eastern Europe.28 That power was grounded in the latter’s recognition of NATO not just as a military alliance but as a key institution of the Western community with which Central/Eastern European reformers identified.29