2022
Michigan
Kritik
Security K – BEJJ 2022 › Discourse Shapes Reality › 2NC---AT: Reality
Erik Ringmar, 14, a professor in the Department of Political Science and International Relations at İbn Haldun Üniversitesi, Istanbul, Turkey, 2014, “Performance, Not Performativity: An Embodied Critique of Post-Structural IR Theory,” Lund University, [ML]
This is what Jacques Derrida discussed as “deconstruction” ― the reversal of established hierarchies, the introduction of new oppositions, the attempt to expose repressed terms and to challenge the natural and inevitable status of seemingly dichotomous pairs.5 Applying the deconstructivist tools to the notion of the self we realize that there is no one there. Deconstruction reveals “the metaphysics of presence” ― the illusion that we are present to ourselves, as though, beneath all the empirical jetsam and emotional flotsam, there really were a person, ready and complete.6 There can be no “freedom” and no “authenticity,” as Judith Butler explains, since “the ascription of interiority is itself a publicly regulated and sanctioned form of essence fabrication.“7 The notion of the ever-present subject is one of the foundational myth of modern society ― as propounded by René Descartes, Immanuel Kant, and others ― and it is the metaphysical basis on which modern individuals make their often preposterous claims to power, rights and attention.8 When applied to the study of international politics, this position turns into a critique of the state, or rather, a critique of sovereignty. There is no state, say post-structural international relations scholars such as Cynthia Weber and David Campbell, at least if we take the state to constitute a pre-existing subject to which sovereignty can be attached as an attribute.9 Focusing on “institutions,“ the “people,“ or perhaps on the state as a transcendental idea, mainstream accounts always presuppose that which they intend to prove. Instead sovereignty must be understood as the process through which political subjects come to constitute themselves as such. “I suggest,“ says Weber, “that sovereign nation-states are not pre-given subjects but in process and that all subjects in process (be they individual or collective) are the ontological effects of practices which are performatively enacted.”10 Weber's idea of “performatively enacted practices” needs further elucidation.1 Even if we reject the idea of a pre-given self, there is certainly the illusion of such a being, and the question thus becomes how that illusion arose. According to poststructural theory, the self is created through reiterative linguistic practices. Language precedes the human subject, they explain; we are born into language, and language is best understood as a semiotic structure where the meaning of each word is constituted by its difference from other words. It is, as Ferdinand Saussure once argued, the structure as a whole that ultimately determines what things mean. According to performativity theorists, in other words, structure is to practice as langue is to parole; as the abstract rules that make possible the production of grammatical sentences, that is, are to the production of an actual sentence.12 A structure, like langue, is a complex of rules with a virtual existence whereas practice, like speech, is an enactment of these rules in space and time. But a semiotic structure is not yet a sovereign self. We move closer to the subject once we realize that words do not only mean things but also do things in the world. Words have what John Austin's in How to Do Things with Words, 1962, called a “perlocutionary force.”13 The proverbial example is the “I do” of the wedding ceremony. By speaking the words, you are not merely conveying meaning, you are also doing something, you are constituting a marriage. The words are performed and thereby enacted.14 Adding to Austin's conclusions, Derrida emphasizes what he calls the “citational” quality of even the most pragmatic forms of language use. That is, the texts we invoke always cite seemingly absent contexts from which they ultimately derive their meaning. “Could a performative utterance succeed,” Derrida asks, if its formulation did not repeat a “coded” or iterable utterance, or in other words, if the formula I pronounce in order to open a meeting, launch a ship or a marriage were not identifiable as conforming with an iterable model, if it were not then identifiable in some way as a “citation”?15 This is how the subject comes to constitute itself. “The subject is inscribed in language, is a 'function' of language, becomes a speaking subject only by making its speech conform … to the system of the rules of language as a system of differences.”16 The human subject is “a being devoid of Being until it is organized by a system of codes.”17 This is an argument further developed by Judith Butler.18 Our identities take shape, she says, through the perlocutionary force of the discourse we apply to ourselves. Talking about the being that we take our selves to be, we quote statements that connote normalcy and imply acceptance much as a lawyer might cite supporting precedents in a court of law. By making performative statements, and applying them to ourselves, a certain person comes into being; performativity is “a compulsory reiteration of those norms through which a subject is constituted”; “subjectivity is performatively constituted by the ritualized production or codified social behavior.”19 These statements, says Butler, are not only repetitive and ritualistic but also socially determined. If we misquote the established discourse and fail to construct an appropriate self for ourselves, we are punished through various, often surprisingly severe, social sanctions.20
2022
Michigan
Kritik
Security K – BEJJ 2022 › Discourse Shapes Reality › 2NC---AT: Security Doesn’t Shape Reality
Wilhelmsen 2017 (Julie Wilhelmsen, Senior fellow at the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs, “How does war become a legitimate undertaking? Re-engaging the post-structuralist foundation of securitization theory”, ) //sethlee
The core insight of Copenhagen School ST is that issues can become ‘securitized’ when ‘securitizing actors’, by means of rhetorical strategies, elevate them to the status of an existential threat to a referent object and when a significant audience accepts this representation of the issue (Buzan, 1997: 5–28). This process generates endorsement for emergency measures beyond rules that would otherwise bind (Wæver, 1995a). The general thrust of the argument underlying this description of the securitization process is in many respects in line with post-structuralist ideas of how policies are coconstituted by identities and rely on accounts that make sense of them and legitimize them as they are launched (Campbell, 1992; Hansen, 2006). The post-structuralist stance is that policies are not a given response to an external reality to which the state (or other social actors) relates objectively, but are co-constituted by ideas or identities. References to identities are necessary to represent and legitimize policies, but at the same time these identities are constituted and reproduced through the formulation of policies. This is why the term ‘co-constituted’ is used. When the production of politics is understood in this way the task for the analyst is to ‘embrace a logic of interpretation that acknowledges the improbability of cataloguing, calculating and specifying “real causes” and concerns itself with considering the manifest political consequences of adopting one mode of representation over another’ (Campbell, 1992: 4). Studying politics then involves studying how some representations of reality become dominant discourses, and how problems, subjects and objects are constituted in these discourses that simultaneously indicate relevant policies to pursue. The claim is not that such dominant representations cause certain policies or actions, but that they both open up and constrain the range of policies and actions that seem possible and legitimate to undertake (Hansen, 2006). This link between identity and policies can be conceptualized more explicitly as one of legitimation. Jackson (2006: 16) sees legitimation as: the process of drawing and (re)establishing boundaries, ruling some courses of action acceptable and others unacceptable. Out of the general morass of public political debate, legitimation contingently stabilizes the boundaries of acceptable action, making it possible for certain policies to be enacted. ‘The process of drawing and (re)establishing boundaries’ is here taken to be the continuous references to Self and Other that policy formulation implies and which, in turn, legitimates policy implementation. Based on this understanding of how policies are produced and legitimized, a poststructuralist approach would imply treating securitization as a process through which a representation of something as an existential threat becomes dominant at the expense of other representations and uncovering, in the course of research, the changing boundary between this identity and that given to the ‘referent object’. These changing representations would not determine emergency action, but would condition the range of emergency measures political actors could undertake legitimately. In turn, the undertaking of such emergency measures against the something that is said to be threatening and in defence of the referent object would confirm and reinforce the new identity boundaries that were drawn up and legitimize the undertaking of emergency measures. From a poststructuralist perspective the process of securitization is a fundamentally co-constitutive process and one that implies legitimizing concrete material security practices (see below). This reading suggests that securitization cannot be treated as a sequential, linear process from securitizing actor through audience acceptance and to emergency measures. Rather, it is a much more dynamic development; securitizing actors, referent object, threat objects as well as exceptional measures are co-constituted within the securitizing process.4
2022
Michigan
Kritik
Security K – BEJJ 2022 › Discourse Shapes Reality › 2NC---AT: Security Doesn’t Shape Reality
Giovanni Ercolani 11, Ph.D., member of the “Centre for Energy and Environment Security” (Nottingham Trent University, UK), Thesis Adviser at the “Peace Operations Training Institute” (USA), 2011, “Keeping Security and Peace: Behind the Strategicalization of NATO's Critical Security Discourse,” Security Strategies Year: 7 Issue: 14 [ML]
I have based my methodological approach on the assumption that “’Security’ is the move that takes politics beyond the established rules of the game and frame the issue either as a special kind of politics or as above politics. Securitization can thus be seen as a more extreme version of politicization. In theory, any public issue can be located on the spectrum ranging from non-politicized (meaning the state does not deal with it and it is not in any other way made an issue of public debate and decision) through politicized (meaning the issue is part of public policy, requiring government decision and resource allocations or, more rarely, some other form of communal governance) to securitized (meaning the issue is presented as an existential threat, requiring emergency measures and justifying action outside the normal bounds of political procedure)” (Buzan, Waever, de Wilde, 1998, p.23-24). Then it is extremely clear how the process of securitization becomes a political process in which the narrative has its primary importance. “The process of securitization is what in language theory is called a speech act. It is not interesting as a sign referring to something more real; it is the utterance itself that is the act. By saying the words, something is done (like betting, giving a promise, naming a ship)” (Buzan, Weaver, de Wilde, 1998, p. 26). But whereas “by saying the words, something is done”, in this specific case of “securitization”, when we use the very word “security”, something more is done: an emotional element has been added to the narrative. Here I will use a discourse analysis lens because discourse analysis represents a general term for a number of approaches to analysing written, spoken, signed language use or any significant semiotic event. Indeed, I could say that like Don Quixote and Sancho Panza (the two fictional figures of the famous book of Miguel de Cervantes Saavedra) our condition is to be completely surrounded and immersed into stories. Stories which are told to us through the use of a language, images, media, etc... However, the story can be a language because “language itself conditions, limits, and predetermines what we see. Thus, all reality is constructed through language, so that nothing is simply ‘there’ in an unproblematic way – everything is a linguistic/textual construct. Language does not record reality; it shapes and creates it, so that the whole of our universe is textual” (Barry, 2002). Moreover, when we look at our capacity to memorize, neuroscience has proved that “the brain has two memory systems, one for ordinary facts and one for emotionally charged ones” (Goleman, 1996), and indeed our brain is formed by two opposite hemispheres, the right and the left one.
2022
Michigan
Kritik
Security K – BEJJ 2022 › Discourse Shapes Reality › 2NC---General
Dave Elder-Vass 12, a senior lecturer in sociology at Loughborough University. He is the author of The Causal Power of Social Structures (Cambridge University Press, 2010), 2012, “The Reality of Social Construction,” Cambridge University Press, [ML]
For a more radical version of the claim that reality itself is socially constructed, yet one that sometimes (but not always) seems consistent with an ontological framework of common sense realism, we can turn to the work of a number of social psychologists, notably the group known as discursive psychologists. 3 Within the discipline of psychology, this approach is marked by turning its attention away from the cognitive study of individual minds, which it sees as inaccessible, towards the study of our interactions with each other. As Jonathan Potter and Margaret Wetherell put it, “for research purposes we are inevitably faced with discourse … Given the essentially performative and indexical nature of language use how can researchers construe it as a neutral record of secondary phenomena, in this case cognitive or mental states?” (1987: 145). This is a kind of sceptical empiricism that takes talk as empirically accessible but radically questions claims that talk tells us anything about what lies behind it: not only whether it tells us anything about the individual or the mind that is taken by other psychologists to have produced it, but also whether it tells us anything about what it purports to be about. From this perspective, our sense of what is real is a product of discourse or of rhetoric. According to Potter, for example, “Reality enters into human practices by way of the categories and descriptions that are part of those practices. The world is not ready categorized by God or nature in ways that we are all forced to accept. It is constituted in one way or another as people talk it, write it and argue it” (1996: 98). From a critical realist perspective, it is surprising to find these statements juxtaposed in this way. As Chapter 7 argued, for example, it seems overwhelmingly likely that there are natural kinds in the world, but this is a separate question from the question of how we categorize the things of the world; the relation between natural kinds and linguistic categories is an open one and a fallible one. Potter’s last sentence, therefore, would be entirely acceptable to realists if it said that the world was categorized as people talk it, write it, and argue it. But for a critical realist there is a logical gap between his second sentence and the argument that the world is constituted in this way. The world is already constituted, and in the case of ordinary material objects (disregarding any physical part that humans may have had in their shaping) this is independent of our talking, writing, and arguing. But from the kind of perspective adopted by writers like Potter, it seems that there is nothing we can say about how the world is, independently of our talking, writing, and arguing, so in discussing how it is constituted we can only be discussing how our accounts of it are constituted. Nevertheless, there is still a sense in here of a basic realism, a sense that although the world is not ready categorized, it is nevertheless somehow there before we constitute our accounts of it. Potter explicitly distances himself from the view that our descriptions lead to the material world “literally springing in to existence as it is talked or written about” (1996: 98) in some kind of “mystical process” (Potter 1996: 177). As Laclau and Mouffe have put it, “What is denied is not that such objects exist externally to thought, but the rather different assertion that they could constitute themselves as objects outside any discursive conditions of emergence” (1985: 108). Burr suggests that Foucault thinks in similar terms: He does not deny the materiality of events, but says that our only way of apprehending reality is through discourse, which determines our perceptions of reality. In a sense, Foucault brackets off the question of reality. Since we can never have direct access to a reality beyond discourse we cannot concern ourselves with its nature. (2003: 90) This kind of thinking has been counterposed to realism most provocatively in Edwards, Ashmore, and Potter’s well-known paper ‘Death and Furniture’, which seeks to undermine classic realist responses to radical social constructionism by analysing the rhetoric that is used in them (1995).4 The paradigm case they examine is that of the realist seeking to demonstrate the existence of material reality by thumping on a table. But such thumping, they argue, is in itself a discursive act: The very act of producing a non-represented, unconstructed external world is inevitably representational, threatening, as soon as it is produced, to turn around upon and counter the very position it is meant to demonstrate. Furniture ‘arguments’ perform categorization and relevance via semiosis. (Edwards et al. 1995: 27) Realist arguments, they are suggesting, fail to prove that there is a world beyond discourse because they are themselves discursive acts, even in the case of thumping on a table.
2022
Michigan
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Security K – BEJJ 2022 › Discourse Shapes Reality › 2NC---General
Judith Kreuter 21, research associate at the chair for “International Relations” headed by Prof. Dr. Markus Lederer. She was associated doctoral student at the DFG Priority Programme 1689 “Climate Engineering: Risks, Challenges, Opportunities?” between 2013 and 2019. In her PhD project, she addresses the potential impact of framing in academic publication on political decision-making concerning Climate Engineering, 2021, “Chapter 3: Ideas and Objects, Meaning and Causation—Frame Analysis from a Modernist Social Constructivism Perspective,” Springer, DOI: 10.1007/978-3-030-60340-3_3 [ML]
Discourses play a significant role in this process of construction of meaning: “The world is not objectively accessible, but instead is imparted through language through discursive processes and symbolic interpretations” (Uther 2014: 60).2 This means that much of the meaning-construction of social reality, which the brand of social constructivism espoused here relies upon, is done through what many authors call discourse. The frames that are studied in this analysis are considered as elements in discourse. Discourse, here, is understood, following Maarten Hajer, as “an ensemble of ideas, concepts, and categories through which meaning is given to social and physical phenomena, and which is produced and reproduced through an identifiable set of practices” (Hajer 2006: 67). This captures the simultaneous constructedness and constructiveness of the social meaning of material objects: Through language and practice humans both capture the meaning material objects have, and change or reproduce this meaning. Similarly, Dryzek defines discourse as “a shared way of apprehending the world. Embedded in language, it enables those who subscribe to it to interpret bits of information and put them together into coherent stories or accounts” (Dryzek 2005: 9). This means that meaning is constructed in discourses in “supra-individual and rather unconscious” ways (Methmann et al. 2013a: 6). At the same time, human actors, in this study, will not be considered as entities subordinate to a super-human structural power of discourse. Actors, according to Uther’s discussion, are both constructed and constructing (see Uther 2014: 55). Following her approach, actors are considered to be the central active agents in any meaning-making situation, and thus not helpless pawns in the flow of discourse: “The actor is not passively subdued to the discourse, as, for example, the subject of Foucault, but it actively participates in shaping the discourse through its own interpretive achievements” (Uther 2014: 66).3 This two-fold characterization of actors as both constructed and constructing is captured by practice theory. The terms ‘practice’ and ‘discourse’ are considered to not be antithetical to each other: Practices are “meaningful patterns of action, which, in being performed more or less competently, simultaneously embody, act out, and possibly reify background knowledge and discourse in and around the material world” (Adler and Pouliot 2011: 4). Thus, (non-linguistic) practices are understood to interact with (linguistic) discourses and in this interaction construct or deconstruct meanings. Other authors reconcile linguistic and non-linguistic elements of meaning-construction by subsuming both under the term ‘discourse’(see Anshelm and Hultman 2015: 11; Methmann et al. 2013a: 6) As Dryzek (2006: 3) argues, “discourses are a matter of practice as well as words, for actions in the social realm are always accompanied by language that establishes the meaning of action” (see also Adler 2008: 198). I assume, in line with these authors, that meaningful action—or practice—and meaningful talk—or discourse—construct or deconstruct the ideational meaning of an object. Further, I assume that practice is meaningful action which acts out certain meanings about the world, thus making it causally relevant.
2022
Michigan
Kritik
Security K – BEJJ 2022 › Discourse Shapes Reality › 2NC---General
Jessica M. Williams 20, Postdoctoral Research Fellow at The University of Hong Kong, 2020, “Discourse inertia and the governance of transboundary rivers in Asia,” Earth System Governance, [ML]
Institutional and governance approaches and theories have been widely utilised in the study of governance issues. However, it is argued that such approaches would be strengthened if greater attention is given to the ideational dimension (i.e., the ability to influence the perceptions and beliefs of others regarding specific issues (Mirumachi, 2015)). This is because discursive factors tend to be eclipsed by more formal and prominent governance and institutional perspectives. This is due to the predominance of positivist and neopositivist approaches towards international relations and political studies (Fischer, 1998; Phillips et al., 2004). Therefore, a discourse-centric approach that highlights the role of discourse and allows a focus on the interactive and dynamic processes that are determinative of policy is proposed. Discourse comprises the group of ideas, concepts and categories that are produced, reproduced and transformed in a certain nexus of practices. Social and physical relations are given meaning in this manner. Discourses are context dependent and cannot be separated from the social practices within which they are fashioned (Jӓgerskog, 2002; Mirumachi, 2015). To create material change, social agents first need to work on a discursive level by creating significant and stable meanings to the territory within which they are competing (Rear and Jones, 2013). Discourses can become sanctioned. This essentially means that they become unquestioned and dominant. With resources such as water, issues such as nationalism can become intertwined in the sanctioned discourse. As a result, decision makers may not always implement the most seemingly rational policies (Jӓgerskog, 2002). Assumptions that dominate the sanctioned discourse will act to constrain the options available to policymakers and in doing so signal policy outcomes (Dayton, 2000; Gerlak and Schmeier, 2014). Thus, changes in the sanctioned discourse can indicate changes in policy direction. However, identifying discourse change is difficult. Change can occur slowly, over a long time period, or be sudden and dramatic. What initially appears to be change may just be a continuation of a larger story or the same discourse in an alternative form. Thereby, discourse can appear to change when in reality it has co-opted elements from another discourse. Normative concepts, such as ‘sustainable development’, are particularly susceptible to being co-opted (Christoff, 2013). Exogenous events or crises that confront the sanctioned discourse can effect a change in discourse. Pressure from foreign governments or financial/donor institutions may incentivise a shift in discourse to align with a certain perspective. Actors may also intentionally try and effect change through discursive strategies. Such strategies include constructing narratives and counternarratives, exclusion strategies, as well as employing normative power and delegitimising tactics. The success and extent of change is dependent on the power, position and resources of those seeking to effect the change, and the level of change being sought (Leipold and Winkel, 2013). Discourse can be used to consider how issues reach and stay on the political agenda and become policy. Discourse can show how broader interests underlying policies are shaped into physical consequences, which then indicates policy direction. The way discourse is formulated shapes how the problem or issues around which it is constructed are framed, interpreted, discussed and analysed. Therefore, it implies the favoured solutions, how policies are to be implemented and their potential success (Crow-Miller, 2015). Policy documents also instruct what needs to be done, what stands to reason and what is unquestionable (Apthorpe and Gasper, 2014; Bacchi, 2000). Issues are not seen as political problems unless they are constructed as such by influential actors or society (Hajer, 1995). The framing of policies can immediately close off some responses while making others seem self-evident. It is also rare for a problem to be ‘solved’. Instead it can be removed from the discourse or discussed as if it were a different problem. Policies may be utilised to this effect to constrain the impact of reform initiatives (Bacchi, 2000). The argumentative approach to discourse holds that policymaking reflects competition over meaning. Therefore, policies are the result of competing interests that strategically utilise discourse and is, therefore, a social phenomenon (Taylor, 2004). Policy discourse is thus the group of ideas, concepts, frames and definitions that provide meaning to a real-world phenomenon and structure it as a policy problem (Hajer, 1995, 2006). Policy creation, change and continuation are held as an interactive process of discursive struggle between actors. Policymaking is considered the competition over meaning, with policies being the result of competing interests that employ discourse strategically (Taylor, 2004). Policy creation, change and continuation are interactive processes of discursive struggle between actors. Through argument, actors position themselves or try to impose their views on to others during negotiations (Fischer and Forester, 1993). Institutions can be mobilised and solutions sought once a problem definition is established (Hajer, 1995). Within policymaking, discourses are essential in finding settlements between conflicting interests and this assists in regulating underlying social conflicts (Taylor, 2004; Hajer, 1995). Here, discourse is concerned with redefining a social phenomenon in a manner that allows a solution to be identified (Hajer, 1995). Discourse can move policies up or down the political agenda through depoliticising or securitising moves (Zeitoun et al., 2011). Depoliticising the policy process acts to distance policy makers from the policy's impacts thereby removing responsibility for the policy's outcome. Foucault (2009) utilises the concept of ‘political technology’ to illustrate how issues that are essentially political are removed from policy discourse and reframed in neutral scientific language. The role of expert knowledge in designing institutional procedures is essential to this process (Shore and Wright, 1997). When policies become highly politicised, they become securitised and are regarded as high priority issues that constitute an issue of national interest and essential to state sovereignty. As a result, exceptional measures are, or may be, legitimised (Buzan et al., 1998; Allan and Mirumachi, 2010). The securitising actor's ability to convince the audience and elicit a certain action/reaction is decisive to the securitisation process (Mirumachi, 2015). Once a common understanding of a threat is formed between the securitising actor and the audience, securitisation is held as successful (Trombetta, 2011). The main objective of a securitising discourse is to allow potential violations of rules that would not otherwise be accepted. Threats do not have to be real or in existence for a securitising act to occur (Stritzel, 2007; Mirumachi, 2015).
2022
Michigan
Kritik
Security K – BEJJ 2022 › Framework
Judith Kreuter ’21 [Research associate at the chair for International Relations, PhD thesis, Technische Universität Darmstadt; “Chapter 3: Ideas and Objects, Meaning and Causation—Frame Analysis from a Modernist Social Constructivism Perspective”; 2021; Springer; Climate Engineering as an Instance of Politicization: Talking Tomorrow’s Technology—Framing Political Choice?; Accessed 7/14/21]
Discourses play a significant role in this process of construction of meaning: “The world is not objectively accessible, but instead is imparted through language through discursive processes and symbolic interpretations” (Uther 2014: 60).2 This means that much of the meaning-construction of social reality, which the brand of social constructivism espoused here relies upon, is done through what many authors call discourse. The frames that are studied in this analysis are considered as elements in discourse. Discourse, here, is understood, following Maarten Hajer, as “an ensemble of ideas, concepts, and categories through which meaning is given to social and physical phenomena, and which is produced and reproduced through an identifiable set of practices” (Hajer 2006: 67). This captures the simultaneous constructedness and constructiveness of the social meaning of material objects: Through language and practice humans both capture the meaning material objects have, and change or reproduce this meaning. Similarly, Dryzek defines discourse as “a shared way of apprehending the world. Embedded in language, it enables those who subscribe to it to interpret bits of information and put them together into coherent stories or accounts” (Dryzek 2005: 9). This means that meaning is constructed in discourses in “supra-individual and rather unconscious” ways (Methmann et al. 2013a: 6).
At the same time, human actors, in this study, will not be considered as entities subordinate to a super-human structural power of discourse. Actors, according to Uther’s discussion, are both constructed and constructing (see Uther 2014: 55). Following her approach, actors are considered to be the central active agents in any meaning-making situation, and thus not helpless pawns in the flow of discourse: “The actor is not passively subdued to the discourse, as, for example, the subject of Foucault, but it actively participates in shaping the discourse through its own interpretive achievements” (Uther 2014: 66).3 This two-fold characterization of actors as both constructed and constructing is captured by practice theory. The terms ‘practice’ and ‘discourse’ are considered to not be antithetical to each other: Practices are “meaningful patterns of action, which, in being performed more or less competently, simultaneously embody, act out, and possibly reify background knowledge and discourse in and around the material world” (Adler and Pouliot 2011: 4). Thus, (non-linguistic) practices are understood to interact with (linguistic) discourses and in this interaction construct or deconstruct meanings. Other authors reconcile linguistic and non-linguistic elements of meaning-construction by subsuming both under the term ‘discourse’(see Anshelm and Hultman 2015: 11; Methmann et al. 2013a: 6) As Dryzek (2006: 3) argues, “discourses are a matter of practice as well as words, for actions in the social realm are always accompanied by language that establishes the meaning of action” (see also Adler 2008: 198). I assume, in line with these authors, that meaningful action—or practice—and meaningful talk—or discourse—construct or deconstruct the ideational meaning of an object. Further, I assume that practice is meaningful action which acts out certain meanings about the world, thus making it causally relevant.
2022
Michigan
Kritik
Security K – BEJJ 2022 › Framework
Jessica M Williams ’20 [Post-doctoral fellow at the Centre for Civil Society and Governance, Faculty of Social Science, The University of Hong Kong. LLB in Law from the University of Exeter, Master of Science (International Relations) from Cardiff University, Ph.D. in Social Sciences from the University of Hong Kong.; “Discourse inertia and the governance of transboundary rivers in Asia”; March 2020; Volume 3; Earth System Governance; ; Accessed 7/19/21]
In the present paper elements of institutional theory, policy networks and analytical governance are used to complement discourse theory. This leads us to propose the conceptualisation of discourse inertia. In terms of discourse, inertia is considered to represent the persistent promotion and dominance of a perception of reality. This leads to the continuous reproduction of certain storylines and elements of a discourse. Sanctioned discourses, often ones that are institutionalised, are thought more likely to achieve or display inertia due to the involvement of path dependent tendencies and powerful entrenched interests.
Discourse is considered to be dynamic, even where discourse inertia is present, as discourses must constantly be represented and reinforced. Once an actor's, or a group's, discourse becomes dominant, it is fiercely defended. Subsequently, dominant discourses are constantly reinforced and embedded. This can lead to certain narratives becoming entrenched within both institutions and political and social practices, thus reaching an ideational status. These privileged narratives become taken for granted and self-reinforcing, making them prone to discourse inertia. More shallow narratives can function over privileged narratives to achieve an interest or align with an outside commitment. These narratives are more fluid and flexible and are, therefore, easily manipulated.
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Kritik
Security K – BEJJ 2022 › Framework
Federico Campagna, 18, PhD from Royal College of Art, London; MSc and BSc in economics and Management of the Arts from Bocconi University, Milan; MA in Cultural Studies from Goldsmiths University, London; Technic And Magic: The Reconstruction of Reality, Technic’s Cosmogony “First Hypostasis: Absolute Language” pg. 65-67//ekc
Since we are investigating the underlying principles that give rise to a specific kind of world, we shall look at language through the lens of what language does, that is, what it produces when it is used. Any time we put forward a linguistic statement, every time we express a linguistic unit, we are suggesting to our interlocutors that a certain figure (an object, property or relation) be admitted as legitimately present in the world. The interlocutors' acceptance of our linguistic utterance as meaningful, grants legitimate presence in the word to the suggested figure- thus making it available to be employed in the larger game of linguistic exchange and recombination. The same happens in a soliloquy or at the level of one's conscious thinking - though the rapidity with which we accept our own linguistic proposal as plausibly present in the world, tends to obfuscate this questioning process. And of course, the same also applies to cases in which the utterer or interlocutor is not a human, but a machine.
In this sense, language's production is fundamentally ontological, consisting in a continuous negotiation on which figures could or should be included in the catalogue of the world. Every linguistic unit thus takes on the form of a candidature and of a proposition. Equally, the world becomes the negotiating table onto which the figures of our daily experience are alternatively granted or denied legitimate ontological status as ‘present’. In this sense, language functions as a way to manage what entities make it onto the catalogue of the communicable and operable layer of reality.
2022
Michigan
Kritik
Security K – BEJJ 2022 › 1NC
Wilhelmsen 2017 (Julie Wilhelmsen, Senior fellow at the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs, “How does war become a legitimate undertaking? Re-engaging the post-structuralist foundation of securitization theory”, ) //sethlee
Moreover, alternative articulations of the Self/Other boundary which attach a lower level of threat to the Other can emerge and render emergency measures illegitimate. This would be a process of de-securitization. A first step towards such a re-interpretation would be to substitute Austinian speech act with post-structuralist discourse as the core concept in the theory. Discourse, not Austinian speech act: According to Copenhagen School ST, threats and security are determined through the speech act. Understood as a speech act, ‘security’ means that the very identification, the articulation of words that describe something as a security threat, is an act (Wæver, 1995b: 55). The weight given to words in this explication seems to match post-structuralists’ foregrounding of language, but it is still not useful to theorize securitization as a speech act. It is an impossible attempt at reconciling relationalism with actor-centric understandings of social change. The initial focus on actors implicit in Copenhagen School ST is amplified with the adoption of speech act in the Austinian ‘once said, then done’ way. Not only is the securitizing actor projected as the driving force in the process, but also his words are accorded status as final and decisive. Thus, the audience is certainly not significant and the intersubjective process is lost (for a similar critique see Balzacq, 2005: 182–183; Stritzel, 2014: 20–24; Taureck, 2006: 52– 61). By adhering firmly to relationalism and placing agency not in an actor, but in the discursive practices that comprise a securitization, a post-structuralist approach offers a less contradictory theoretical framework and one that gives priority to intersubjectivity. Discourses are seen as structures of signification which construct social realities. The understanding of significative construction which informs most post-structuralist work is taken from the structuralist linguistics of Ferdinand de Saussure (1974). He held that language is not determined by the reality to which it refers – it should be understood as a system of signs, with the meaning of each sign determined by its relation to other signs. A sign is thus part of a structure together with other signs that it differs from, and it gains its specific value precisely from being different from other signs. The assumption, prevalent in most post-structuralist international relations (IR) work, that discourses are structured largely in terms of binary oppositions draws on the work of Jacques Derrida. According to Derrida (1981), language is a system of differential signs and meaning is established not by the essence of a thing itself but through a series of juxtapositions, where one element is valued over its opposite. Binary oppositions are not neutral, they establish a relation of power such that one element in the binary is privileged. Discourses are seen as made in a process of social practical interaction and are always textually interconnected; as such, they are a set of collectively articulated codes and are intersubjectively embedded at the outset. Moreover, they are continuously conditioned by intersubjectivity – because, despite being highly structured, they are seen not as stable grids, but as open-ended, changeable and historically contingent (Milliken, 1999: 230). This aspect of discourse implies that there is a play of practice, or struggles over which discourses should prevail. Some fixations of meaning become so conventionalized that we think of them as natural. Other fixations are always possible, but may become temporarily excluded by these hegemonic discourses (Laclau and Mouffe, 1985). The first argument for replacing Austinian ‘speech act’ with post-structuralist ‘discourse’ is, therefore, that it enables us to move from a self-contained and definite core concept in the theory to an inherently intersubjective and process-oriented concept. But also, if we consider what a securitization would look like in the empirical world, a more reasonable understanding would be that a ‘securitizing attempt’ consists of a series of utterances. Nothing can be constituted as an existential threat on a political arena through a ‘speech act’ in the ‘once said, then done’ sense. As Butler (1993) points out, the power of speech acts (not to be confused with Austinian illocutionary speech acts) lie in their iterability; that is, they can be cited, recited and changed through such citation. It is only through iterability that utterances have transformative potential.9 This makes it more appropriate to explicate ‘securitizing moves’ as the onset or strengthening of a discourse that constructs something as an existential threat. Finally, as regards the application of securitization to understand how war becomes acceptable, a discursive approach simply seems to have greater explicatory clout. The Second Chechen War and the acceptance of this violent undertaking in the wider Russian public cannot be thought of as a single authoritative act: it is better grasped as an evolving intersubjective process. The purpose of an enquiry informed by post-structuralist ST is to study how this intersubjective process of securitization unfolds.
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Kritik
Security K – BEJJ 2022 › 1NC
Benjamin Herborth and Gunther Hellman 17, Professors at the University of Groningen and Goethe-Universitat Frankfurt am Main, 1-2017, "(PDF) Uses of the West: Security and the Politics of Order", ResearchGate, https://www.researchgate.net/publication/314217000_Uses_of_the_West_Security_and_the_Politics_of_Order //AW
Debates over the future of NATO easily transform into debates about whether ‘Western civilization’ and ‘the West’ as a whole might be in decline or whether they are the winner of the Cold War’s ideological battles (cf. Huntington, 1993; Fukuyama, 1989). Compared to NATO, however, a Western security community seems to be quite prosperous despite continuing conflicts between NATO members (Cox, 2005; Pouliot, 2006). In this chapter I have tried to show that a transatlantic alliance was (re-)constituted via the mobilization and re-articulation of foundational narratives by the allies in order to justify the existence, continuity, and transformation of NATO. Foundational narratives, then, direct our attention exactly to the politics of security and identity where political subjects are formed in the first place and help to understand how security communities are constituted instead of postulating that they are already existing (Adler and Barnett 1998, p. 3; contrary: Deutsch et al., 1969). In conclusion, I want to highlight how NATO’s re-constitution relates to the overall theme of this volume, ‘the West’. It is not surprising that NATO allies often referred to ‘democracy’, ‘individual liberty’, or ‘the rule of law’ in order to justify NATO as a geo-political community of solidarity with defensive and peaceful intentions. Accordingly, it is not surprising that the Soviet Union was repeatedly accused of modernizing its military capacities, harboring expansionist intentions, and being an aggressive opponent in an ideological struggle between ‘freedom’ and ‘communism’. This rather plain self/other construction, however, was quickly modified in the early 1990s by declaring an ‘end of the Cold War’, invoking the CEE as a distinct political subject, and by focusing on new risks and challenges different from the past focus on territorial defense. Moreover, NATO had ‘gone global’ in order to ‘bring stability to other parts of the world’ (Daalder and Goldgeier, 2006, p. 105; Brzezinski, 2009). While this global NATO is depicted as a result of changing security politics, in particular as a consequence of globalized terrorist threat, it is short-sighted to argue that these transformations are merely a reaction to external pressures. Grand narratives about a ‘Cold War’ and a ‘War on Terrorism’ are as much produced by a transatlantic security discourse intended to make sense of the world as they serve to justify political decisions. It is a moot question whether the global projection of power by ‘the West’ caused violent opposition around the globe or whether ‘new wars’ and terror networks caused a transformation of NATO. It is puzzling, though, that NATO has managed to secure its survival and to transform. I have argued that the creation and repetition of foundational narratives – in particular the invention of a geopolitical community of solidarity and a political community according to Article 4 of the Washington Treaty – made sucha two-sided re-constitution of continuity and transformation possible. This also implies that NATO will persist and at once change as long as the allies carry on re-articulating this foundational narrative. Such a foundational narrative serves its integrating function only against the background of ‘the West’ as a shared yet unspecified signifier, which is implicitly represented as a threatened referent object of security. ‘Europe’, the ‘transatlantic area’, respectively ‘the West’ are the endangered subjects of NATO’s strategic discourse justifying a durable and institutionally dense military cooperation of its member states and a nuclearizaiton of its defense strategy. Whenever allies pursued ( national) security policies without consultation, conflicts and crisis within the alliance were foreseeable. It was only through NATO that ‘the West’ could utilize its power position through a specific form of self-authorization. NATO< respectively Western states, presented ‘democracy’, ‘human rights’, the ‘rule of law’, and ‘market economy’ as normatively unquestioned principles they had already realized. Others had only one choice: to comply or to resist. The normative attractiveness of ‘the West’, thus, also implies the temptations of self-authorizing and securitizing practices where a culture of legal formalism is marginalized (Wæver, 1995; Koskenniemi, 2001). Yet ‘Others’ might only be known as defectors to a Western project of modernization and democracy.
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Counterplan
AT: Cease CP › 2AC – France
White House, 11-29 (White House, 1-29-21, “United States-Fra ce Joint Statement,” //mahimahi)
The Presidents resolve to maintain our collective defense and security, cultivate our resilience, enhance their solidarity, and ensure international stability in response to the full range of modern threats. The United States and France share the goal of continuing to bolster deterrence as a core element of our collective defense and to contribute to the indivisible security of the NATO Alliance.
The fundamental purpose of NATO’s nuclear capability is to preserve peace, prevent coercion, and deter aggression. Given the deteriorating security environment in Europe, we reaffirm that a credible and united nuclear Alliance is essential. In light of this security environment, allies should continue close consultations on nuclear and arms control matters, particularly within NATO. We will work together to strengthen arms control, disarmament, and non-proliferation, as a key element of Euro-Atlantic security.
As noted in the September 22 Joint Statement between the two Presidents, the United States recognizes the importance of a stronger and more capable European defense that contributes positively to global and transatlantic security and is complementary to NATO. The United States supports European Allies’ and Partners’ growing investments in the military capabilities that enable our shared defense, given the benefit to transatlantic security of stronger European military capabilities and more committed European partners. European-led missions and operations such as in the Sahel and in Bosnia are positively contributing to transatlantic security.
The Presidents reaffirm their support for strengthening the NATO-EU strategic partnership, which is unique and essential for the security and prosperity of our nations and of the Euro-Atlantic area. They support the invitation of the EU and other partners to the upcoming NATO Leaders’ Summit in Madrid in 2022. The Presidents also reaffirm support for a U.S.-EU dialogue on security and defense and work towards an Administrative Arrangement for the United States with the European Defense Agency, as decided at the U.S.-EU Summit in June.
The Presidents affirm the importance of stronger and interoperable defense industrial bases in Europe and in the United States, which will deliver better military capabilities, to the benefit of the Alliance. The Presidents intend to launch a U.S.-France defense trade strategic dialogue to foster a shared view on defense market access and export issues. In this context, the two governments will identify steps to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of defense export authorizations.
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Counterplan
AT: Cease CP › 2AC – France
Pannier, 2-4 (Alice Pannier, 2-4-22, assistant professor of European studies and international relations at Johns Hopkins University's School of Advanced International Studies,
French-US relations are a key factor in determining the French attitude towards NATO, even if the Alliance is not the primary vehicle for defence and security cooperation between Paris and Washington. Two factors matter in particular: the extent to which Paris perceives that Washington takes into account the security concerns of Europeans, not least in the Middle East and Africa; and the towards European defence initiatives.
On the former, French authorities are concerned about the gradual US disengagement from unstable regions, not least the Sahel and the Middle East. Seen from Paris, a US disengagement from the Middle East and Africa would hurt European interests by harming their counter-terrorist efforts, which could potentially lead to the emergence of new havens for terrorist networks and organised crime, and/or would let other powers fill the vacuum and gain influence in Europe’s vicinity. Thus, the French government expressed a particularly strong reaction in 2019 when the US announced its intention of without prior consultation with its European allies. In the view of French diplomats, the discrepancy between US and European security interests, which has led the US to be unwilling to take military or political risks in the MENA region, was not the result of Trump’s election but of a longer-term shift in US foreign policy priorities. The incoming was seen as a hopeful sign for transatlantic cooperation in a increasingly degraded strategic environment. The messy disengagement from Afghanistan in August 2021 and the ‘blundering’ lack of consultation ahead of the AUKUS alliance announcement in September 2021 illustrate that effective foreign policy coordination should be at the heart of NATO’s role in the coming years.
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Michigan
Counterplan
AT: Cease CP › 2AC – Baltics – Turn
Sally A. Painter, 20; Co-Founder and Chief Operating Officer of Blue Star Strategies, LLC, Atlantic Council board director, and a senior adviser to the Atlantic Council’s Future Europe Initiative; “US must remain committed to NATO and the Baltic States” Sept. 8, 2020 https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/us-must-remain-committed-to-nato-and-the-baltic-states//ekc
The three Baltic countries of Northern Europe have long been allies of the United States and valued members of the NATO community. In the 20th century, the United States refused to recognize the Soviet Union’s claim on Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia and supported the restoration of their independence in 1991. Our Baltic friends never forgot this important solidarity, and since then have promoted democracy and stability in their corner of Europe and worked diligently to attain membership in NATO and the EU community through systemic reforms to their economy, governance, and security. Rightfully so, the Baltics saw their integration into Euro-Atlantic institutions as an important deterrent to Russian influence, which continues to loom as a regional threat to their sovereignty and national security.
These threats have only escalated since Russia’s invasion of Georgia in 2008 and the annexation of Crimea from Ukraine in 2014. In this context, it is vital that the United States firmly recommit to NATO and increase its support of the Baltic countries to ensure the continuation of strong bilateral relations and the effective partnerships that have strengthened the entire transatlantic community.
2022
Michigan
Counterplan
AT: Cease CP › 2AC – Baltics – No UQ
Matthew, Lee, 03/07/2022; Diplomatic Writer for The Associated Press, covering the State Department and U.S. foreign policy since 1999. He has traveled with every secretary of state since Madeleine Albright, reporting from more than 120 countries on America’s evolving international interests and priorities. Lee joined the AP in 2007 after 12 years with the French news agency AFP where he covered the State Department, served as the Kenya-based deputy bureau chief for East Africa and bureau chief in Phnom Penh, Cambodia and recipient of the Arthur Ross Media Award for Reporting in 2019; “US assures nervous Baltics of NATO protection against Russia” //ekc
RIGA, Latvia (AP) — U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken on Monday assured Lithuania and Latvia of NATO protection and American support as he made quick visits to two of the three Baltic states that are increasingly on edge as Russia presses ahead with its invasion of Ukraine.
Along with Estonia, which Blinken will visit on Tuesday, the former Soviet republics are NATO members, and the Biden administration is aiming to calm any fears they have about their security in the event Russia chooses to expand its military operations.
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Michigan
Evidence
Neg › AT: Nuclear Winter › 2NC – No Radiation
Ladish, 20 – (Jeffrey Ladish- Cybersecurity and biosecurity consultant assisting Dr. Megan Palmer's group in research on the management of dual use technologies "Nuclear war is unlikely to cause human extinction", 11-7-2020, Leswrong,
Radiation won't kill everyone because there aren't enough weapons, and radiation from them would be concentrated in some areas and wholly absent from other areas. Even in the worst affected areas, lethal radiation from fallout would drop to survivable levels within weeks. Here it's worth noting that there is an inherent tradeoff between length of halflife and energy released by radionuclides. The shorter the half life the more energy will be released, and the longer the half life the less energy. The fallout products from modern nuclear weapons are very lethal, but only for days to several weeks. Let's try the same calculation we used with kinetic damage, and see if an attack aimed at optimizing fallout for killing everyone could succeed. Using Nukemap again, I'll go with the fallout contour for 100 rads per hour. 400 rads is thought too be enough to kill 50% of people, so 100 rads per hour is likely to kill most all people not in some kind of shelter. We need to switch to using a groundburst detonation rather than an airburst detonation, because groundbursts create far more fallout. A 1mt ground burst would create an area of about 8,000 km² of >100 rads per hour. Okay, multiple that by 14,000 warheads, and we get 112 million km². That's a lot! It's still less than the 510.1 million km² of earth's land mass, but it's a lot more than the ~10.2 million km² of urban space. Presumably this is enough to cover every human habitation, so in principle, it might be possible to kill everyone with radiation from existing nuclear weapons. n practice, it would be almost impossible to kill every human via radiation with the existing nuclear arsenals, even if they were targeted explicitly for this purpose. The first reason is that fallout patterns are very uneven. After a ground burst, fallout is carried by the wind. Some areas will be hit bad and some areas will be hardly affected by fallout. Even if most human population centers were covered, a few areas would almost certainly escape. Two other things make extinction by radiation unlikely. Many countries, especially in the southern hemisphere, are unlikely to be affected by fallout much at all. Since most of these countries are likely to be neutral in a conflict, and not near combatant countries, they should be relatively safe from fallout. While fallout might travel hundreds of kms, it still won't reach places separated by greater distances. Fallout that reaches the upper atmosphere will eventually fall back down, but usually after the period of lethal radioactivity. The other mitigating factor is that in typical nuclear war plans, ground bursts are usually restricted to hardened targets, and air bursts are favored for population and industry centers. This is because air bursts maximize the size of the destructive pressure wave. Air burst detonations result in little lethal fallout reaching the ground, so populations not downwind of military targets would likely be safe from the worst of the radiological effects in a war scenario.
2022
Michigan
Evidence
Neg › AT: Nuclear Winter › 2NC – No Winter
Jon Reisner et al 18, scientist at Los Alamos National Laboratory, with Gennaro D'Angelo, Eunmo Koo, Wesley Even, Matthew Hecht, Elizabeth Hunke, Darin Comeau, Randall Bos, James Cooley, February 13, 2018, “Climate Impact of a Regional Nuclear Weapons Exchange: An Improved Assessment Based On Detailed Source Calculations,” JGR Atmospheres Volume 123, Issue 5, https://agupubs.onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.1002/2017JD027331
There have recently been new simulations of a limited nuclear exchange in the India-Pakistan region using modern climate models (e.g., Mills et al., 2014; Stenke et al., 2013) that suggest devastating impacts on climate over a decadal time scale, although somewhat less extreme consequences have also been suggested (Pausata et al., 2016). Our team has taken a careful look at some of the assumptions that were used in those studies, using an end-to-end modeling sequence. Our series of simulations started with a nuclear weapon explosion followed by a simulation of the fireball and cloud rise. The key improvement in this study is our simulation of fire spread and soot transport in the environment that results from fires initiated by the fireball.
Due to the heat of the fire and of the BC particles that are produced, some of the particles are lofted into the stratosphere. However, our comprehensive urban fire simulations indicate that the bulk of the carbon mass remains in the troposphere, where it is quickly removed from the atmosphere. In most previous work, for example, that of Stenke et al. (2013) and Mills et al. (2014), all of the soot produced by the urban fires is directly injected near the top of the troposphere, and therefore much of it rises into the stratosphere, where it shades and cools the Earth. In contrast, if we use a realistic vertical profile for the BC aerosols as input to the climate model, the long-term global impacts on climate are much less severe than predicted by previous studies. This was true even with conservative, worst case assumptions regarding BC production.
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Michigan
Evidence
Neg › AT: Draw In › 2NC – Russia – Military
F24 22, France 24 News, an independent news agency, “Russia's nuclear force, the world's biggest,” , cy
The Russian constitution gives the president control over nuclear weapons, but the transmission of any order to use them, and the authentification of that order, also involve the defence minister and the armed forces' chief-of-staff.
How such a scenario would play out exactly "we don't know", said Pavel Podvig, a Russian independent military expert.
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Michigan
Evidence
Neg › AT: Draw In › 2NC – Russia – Overstretch
Sam Ashworth-Hayes 3/9, former director of studies at the Henry Jackson Society, “In defence of mutually assured destruction,” , cy
The slow return of the 1980s has reached its logical conclusion. The prospect of nuclear annihilation is haunting our nightmares once again. Vladimir Putin’s invasion of Ukraine has been marked by a willingness to engage in blatant nuclear sabre-rattling of a sort not seen since the end of the Cold War.
From his statement that anyone 'interfering from outside' would 'face consequences greater than any you have faced in history' to his placing Russia’s nuclear forces on 'a special combat duty regime', Putin’s strategy has been to threaten nuclear war to keep the West out of what he sees as his business.
2022
Michigan
Evidence
Neg › AT: Draw In › 2NC – Russia – Overstretch
Philip Wasielewski 22, Fellow at the Foreign Policy Research Institute, “The Evolving Political-Military aims in the War in Ukraine After Ukraine,” , cy
Russian war aims have contracted from conquering Ukraine to simply expanding the territory of the statelets it supposedly went to war to protect. By contrast, Ukraine’s war aims have grown from survival to the recovery of all territory lost to Russia since 2014. These uncompromising objectives lock Russia and Ukraine into a war of attrition with little hope of a negotiated settlement. The ongoing battle in Donbas could provide Russia with some tactical successes and a propaganda victory but probably not a strategic one. In fact, further losses could weaken the Russian army to the point that it enables later Ukrainian counterattacks or even causes the Russian army to fracture. Leaders in Moscow may find that a depleted army leaves them few options for victory and that even their superiority in nuclear weapons may not be as useful as supposed.
Introduction