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2022 Michigan Kritik
IMPACTS › 2NC/1NR Impact Ext – Protection Racket

Chivalric IR makes competitive militarism inevitable – they cannot reduce the probability of great power war within their framework

Sjoberg, 2010. (Laura, Assistant Professor of Political Science at U Florida, PhD in IR and Gender Studies and a law degree specializing in IR. “Gendering Power Transition Theory,” in Gender and International Security edited by Sjoberg, p. 93-95 - spp)

International system patriarchy, great state equality, and the risk of war: PTT has found empirical support for the prediction that war is more likely surrounding a power transition between two great states, and most likely when their capabilities are equally distributed. 110 A feminist approach suggests that states' resistance to equality comes from the patriarchal nature of the international system. In such a forum, the dominant masculinity wins by exposing the latent femininity in subordinate masculinities. In a system that values superiority and patriarchy, or a "war system," 111 violence is the norm and not the exception. The argument that international system patriarchy is a permissive and instigative cause of great power war is difficult to test because the international system has always been patriarchal. The hypothesis predicts the same result as power transition analysis. Still, the two theories' predictions can be distinguished in times when the challenger does not start a war with the hegemon. The feminist hypothesis places primary emphasis on states' jockeying for position in a hierarchical system. Since jockeying for position can occur without military conflict, the feminist hypothesis expects gendered competition between great powers even when they do not go to war. 112 The Cold War gives a good example of the distinction made above. It has been said that PTT could not predict the occurrence of the Cold War.113 PTT would have expected the Soviet Union, approaching equality with the US in the 1950s or 1960s, to start a war in order to reorganize the international system in its interests. The feminist reformulation (R3) suggests that the US and the Soviet Union would compete for the coveted position of apparent (masculine) dominance regardless of the organization of the international system or whether a war occurs. Anecdotal evidence for such a supposition can be found in Carol Cohn’s reports that a “well-known academic security adviser was quoted as saying that ‘under Jimmy Carter the United States is spreading its legs for the Soviet Union’” or in John F. Kennedy’s campaigns for office “promising to halt America’s decline into flabbiness and impotence against the threat of a ‘ruthless’ and expanding Soviet empire.” Cynthia Enloe links this competition not to immediate dissatisfaction with the international system, but instead to “the inherent nature of states… [and] the masculine character of the state elite” competing in a patriarchal international system. Additional evidence that the feminist explanations are more likely comes from how great states come into conflict when they do. The PTT scenario is one where the challenger’s dissatisfaction come from the international system being shaped by the hegemon against the interest of the challenger. The challenger, then, starts a conflict rationally in order to reshape the international system. A war caused by challenger dissatisfaction, then, should be anticipated, started rationally, and fought for goals stated in terms of advancement of national interests in the international system. The scenario that (R3) suggests, however, pictures very different genesis of conflict. The conflict brought about by position-jockeying in a patriarchal system could begin with a series of mistakes of miscommunications. It could be triggered by some insult to the nation’s status, capabilities, or masculinity. An example of such a scenario can be found in the genesis of World War I, which has been described as an accidental war which resulted from competitive national pride and (individual and state) jockeying for position in a hierarchy defined by hegemonic masculinity. Feminist scholars have also noted the relationship between the competition in the Spanish-American War and “US and European male codes of honour” including state “competitiveness, independence, and persistence.” These examples suggest the plausibility of the feminist supposition that the patriarchal atmosphere of the international system could have something to do with why states fight wars when the reach relative power parity. If (R3) is correct, then it is possible to envision great state equality without war in a non-patriarchal international system. In a system that values care and empathy, actors would be interested in the collective security of the world’s citizens. Such a system would prioritize understanding, communication, and community. A feminist perspective might imagine challenging great powers to engage in empathetic cooperation, and suggest that major powers take unilateral steps to transgress the cycle of violence in international politics. Each power would engage in purposive compromise of values and interests in order to create peace between them. In PTT's scenario of potential conflict between the US and China, then, the US should not fear a dissatisfied China or attempt co-option. Instead, it should attempt to understand the interests, values, and needs of those challengers. If challengers took a similar approach, they would not have to choose between unattainable satisfaction and perpetual dissatisfaction. Along these lines, feminists suggest that the US should include China in deliberative dialogues, treat the Chinese government and people with empathy and understanding, and show China and other potential challengers by example that the strong can defy international system patriarchy unilaterally and stop the cycle of violence. Feminists have argued that inclusive understanding is key to peaceful coexistence. Spike Peterson clarifies that "feminists argue that the domination of women, nature, and all who are constructed as 'other' is not a matter of 'essential,' atemporal qualities but of socially constructed, historically contingent." 122 In other words, the voices of marginalization could serve as a bridge between hostile and masculinized states. In these terms, a dialogue which promoted understanding between the US and China (and their differentiated citizens) would go a long way towards decreasing the potential for conflict between the two great states.

2022 Michigan Kritik
IMPACTS › 2NC/1NR Impact Ext – Protection Racket

Impact – Structural Patriarchy guarantees war – we must refuse to buy into Hegemonic Masculinity and the Protection Racket, because it will always find a threat to justify enlarging and improving the military industrial complex

Padmi, 2021 (Made Fitri Maya Padmi, IR Scholar, Lecturer at University Jakarta, Master of Science focused in International Security Studies from University of Bristol. “Redifining Gender Role During Wartime: Power Relations, Disparities and Impacts,” Global Insight Journal v. 6 no. 1, ; spp)

War and conflict have been the main features of international relations study. History is full of heroic stories of men fighting for their nations’ security and dignity. In Ancient Greek mythology, for example, Homer through his poems told of the Trojan War, which was triggered by the abduction of Helen from Greece by the Trojan prince Paris. Helen’s enraged husband Agamemnon, King of Sparta, commanded the greatest warriors in Greece to wage war against Troy in the name of the nation’s pride. Thus, almost immediately, the aims of the war expanded well beyond Helen’s return. Its justifications became about restoring the honour of a nation and illustrating the bravery of his soldiers and his military power. Realism and neorealism approaches have dominated international security studies for decades. The core assumption of these approaches is states’ relations in anarchic realm. As a critique to these perspectives feminism has emerged to question the realist/neorealist concepts of power, rationality, and patriotism which are used often in security studies. Thus, both state and international systems are inclined to the characteristics of masculinity. Feminists have criticised the approach taken by Realist and Neo-Realist about state and international system which they consider gender-biased or tending to privilege one particular gender only. Feminists have tried to provide wider perspective in international security studies by adding gender characteristics into security phenomena, including war. This approach is not only about advocating women or adding women into a male-construction, but giving multiple gender-based perspectives to international security studies. Understanding gender is not simply based on the biological sex attached to every single human being. Gender is a socially constructed symbol given to describe the social characteristics of ‘male’ or ‘female’. While masculinity emphasises rationality, bravery, toughness, aggressiveness, and independence, femininity is associated with being irrational, interdependent, emotional, nurturing, vulnerable, and gentle. Elsthain (1987) described this polarisation between the sexes in the following terms: ‘Women are excluded from war talk and men excluded from baby talk’. Many approaches are used to explain the cause, conduct, and consequence of war; one of them is a gender approach. Considering again the Trojan War, a gender perspective allows for wider analysis of how masculinity and femininity play significant roles in the war. The abduction of a wife could be seen as a disgrace to the values of manhood. Using military capability to show the power of nation is the identic notion to prove masculinity which is thought to be tough, aggressive and confrontational. Meanwhile Helen, the woman caught in this war, was left and is seen as either the cause of war or the victim of war. Across time and culture, war and military attributes have been associated with masculinity. In social and political life, men are in the top position of the social hierarchy, and their position grants them the authority to become political decision makers. As stated by Dawson (1996, cited in Kennedy, 2007, p.119) in ancient Greece, some form of military training was regarded as a prerequisite to manhood. In the other words, if a man did not attend or even failed in military training, he would be classified as a ‘woman’ to highlight his weakness. Regarding the assumption of women’s weaknesses and vulnerability, women are usually made the victims of war; even when there is involvement of women soldiers, their participation remains invisible. Throughout history during wartime, women often experience sexual violence in the forms of rape, prostitution, and forced marriage. This paper argues that war is not a ‘gender-neutral’ phenomenon. Gender perspective plays a significant role not only in shaping and executing warfare, but also in giving the specific impact of war. Whitworth (2008) argued that ‘gender-neutral’ analyses of armed conflict regularly do not focus on people at all—conflict is conducted between states or armed groups, the specific impact on people’s lives is a marginal concern and instead the focus of analysis is on territory and resource gained (or lost) and the outcome (in terms of winners and losers) of battles and war. Through gender lenses, this paper tries to make correlation between war and people and endeavours to analyse the role of gender perspectives during wartime. The first part of paper describes how masculinity shapes state behaviour regarding the use of violence and war, as well as masculinity’s role in militarisation. Second, it describes the evolution of women’s involvement in conflicts, such as women as victims of war, as combatants, and peace-makers. Third, this paper discusses the use of gender categorisation in international humanitarian law which attempts to give more protection to women during times of conflict. Masculinity, Militarism and War In many cultures in the world, people determine social roles based on gender disparities. In social constructions, gender is used to differentiate roles, responsibilities, rights, abilities and limitations between men and women. Patriarchal systems can be seen as sets of social rules or norms based on maleness, where man is placed at the head of the family and is a property owner, protector, and decision maker. As Lauren Wilcox (2007, cited in Sjoberg. 2010, p.3) explains, ‘Gender symbolism describes the way in which masculine/feminine are assigned to various dichotomies that organize Western thought’ where ‘both men and women tend to place a higher value on the term which is associated with masculinity’. This vertical power relation creates a social hierarchy based on masculine and feminine characteristics, and many feminists refer to this as Hegemonic Masculinity. Women are portrayed as caring, nurturing, emotional, interdependent, and vulnerable; therefore, they are assigned to roles in domestic labour, nurturing children, and are considered objects of protection. On the other hand, men are seen as and expected to be rational, independent, tough, physically strong, and aggressive figures. The assumed roles of men are those of leaders, decision makers, and protectors of families and society.

2022 Michigan Kritik
LINKS › AT -- › AT: “We talk about women”

Talking about women isn’t the same as confronting structural gender violence

Collins 00 (Patricia Hill, Charles PHelps Taft PRofessor of Sociology and Chair of the Department of African-American STudies at the University of Cincinnati, Gender, Black Feminism, and Black Political Economy,"Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science , Vol. 568, The Study of African American Problems: W. E. B. Du Bois's Agenda, Then and Now (Mar., 2000), pp. 41-53))

Despite this important contribu- tion, one might ask, What about gen- der? On the one hand, it can be argued that Du Bois's work contains an incipient gender analysis (Gilkes 1996). Du Bois actually talked of African American women during a time when Black women were treated as objects of knowledge (Col- lins 1998a, 95-123). Some of his work does center on African American women and indicates his awareness of the distinctive experiences that characterized Black women's lives. For Du Bois, Black women carried a special burden-not only were they Black, poor, and second-class citi- zens, but they were female as well. Du Bois identified Black women's suffering as a "social fact that pro- vided an important and distinct angle of vision," and for Du Bois, three great revolutions were at work: those involving "women, labor, and black folk. In various writings, he observed that black women embod- ied all three of these revolutions in their historical roles in the family, the community, and the labor force" (Gilkes 1996, 112). Du Bois may have acknowledged African American women's central- ity within these three revolutions, but this does not mean that he afforded gender the same analytical importance as race and class in explaining them. For Du Bois, race and class constituted important sys- tems of power that explained Black political economy, yet gender far too often remained a personal identity category that described Black women's special circumstances in dealing with the more fundamental (and thereby more important) oppressions of race, class, and nation. As a result, Du Bois could be simultaneously progressive yet paternalistic-his intersectional analyses of race, class, and nation coupled with his recognition of Black women's special situation distanced him from avowedly sexist approaches yet did little to challenge masculine authority. His stance on gender was better than most but not as good as it could have been. This raises the question of whether interpretations of gender were available to Du Bois that afforded gender theoretical sig- nificance comparable to that afforded to race, class, and nation. Joy James (1996) argues that not only did such perspectives exist but that Du Bois ignored them. Thus, one can argue that Du Bois did have access to what we now call Black feminist analyses that view Black women's experiences as honed at the intersection of race, class, nation, and gender but that he rejected them. James suggests, for example, that Du Bois was familiar with the ideas of both Anna Julia Cooper and Ida B. Wells-Barnett, two prominent turn- of-the-century Black feminist think- ers. Both women used gendered analyses to explain important social issues. For example, Cooper'sA Voice from the South contends that only when Black women got their rights would African Americans as a collec- tivity be empowered (Cooper 1892). Similarly, Ida B. Wells-Barnett's analysis of lynching and institution- alized rape points to the significance of gender in explaining patterns of sexual violence confronting U.S. Black men and women (Wells- Barnett 1995). Neither Cooper nor Wells-Barnett elevated gender above other factors, but both clearly identi- fied its importance both for Black women and as a fundamental princi- ple of African American social organization. Why Du Bois failed to make use of these paradigms is a matter of specu- lation, but that he did not grant gen- der the same theoretical weight as that placed on race, class, and nation seems fairly straightforward. This has been a loss, because Du Bois did not incorporate into the corpus of his work two distinctive and important elements of U.S. Black feminism drawn upon by Gilkes and James, respectively, in their analyses of Du Bois. When read together, Gilkes and James identify two dimensions of Black feminist standpoint epistemol- ogy that might inform a gendered analysis of Black political economy.1

2022 Michigan Kritik
LINKS › AT -- › AT: Link Turn

Turn - Hegemonic masculinity discourages defensive strategies – the plan begets new offensive strategies to protect against new potentialities for war

Wilcox, 2010 (Lauren Wilcox, Lecturer in Gender Studies and the Deputy Director of the Centre for Gender Studies at the University of Cambridge, whose work is located at the intersections of international relations, political theory, and feminist theory in investigating the consequences of thinking about bodies and embodiment in the study of international practices of violence and security. “Gendering the Cult of the Offensive,” in Gender and International Security edited by Laura Sjoberg, p. 70-71- spp).

Conceptions of gender that are concerned with symbolic structure of gender, rather than the appropriate roles of men and women, argue that ‘offense’ has been gendered masculine, while ''defense" has been gendered feminine. This is due to the associations of "the offensive" with activity, aggression, strength, and boldness (concepts considered masculine in Western culture) as well as the association of "defensive" with passivity, weakness, and victimhood (considered feminine). "Offensive" strategies are preferred because of the association with positive, masculine attributes, while defensive strategies are considered "wimpy" and unmanly. Carol Cohn describes the importance of "the wimp factor" in her experiences at working with defense intellectuals in the 1980s. When certain strategic actions such as withdrawal from territory, are interpreted as "wimpy," no matter how' "rational," they are delegitimized. Playing a simulated war game with a group of defense intellectuals, Cohn's team "lost" by withdrawing troops from some areas and refusing to retaliate from a nuclear strike, even though her "homeland" and its civilian population had remained safe. Such actions become "unthinkable" in the discourse of international security even though they may be strategically beneficial and consistent with other value systems. In this way, aggression and "offense" in the international arena are legitimized through gendered discourses. Gender as a discourse defines the boundaries of acceptable options and serves as a "preemptive deterrent" to certain strategic options. Gender thus constitutes offense/defense by assigning values more value to the offensive posture than the defensive posture. This is one way in which feminists would attempt to explain the puzzle of why decision-makers have the propensity to overestimate the strategic advantages of the offensive; there is a heavy "gender deterrent" against the passive, weak, "defensive" position, even if, as military balance theorists allow, the defense usually has the objective advantage in war, and disasters like World War I can occur if the balance is misinterpreted. The militarization that is linked to offensive policies is closely connected to nationalism. The literature on offense-defense balance indicates that nationalism can affect the balance by making people more willing to fight. Nationalism is also a source of militarism and offensive strategies, as it usually entails perception by elites and military planners that conquest will be easier because of the superiority of their own soldiers. Van Evera lists nationalism as a mechanism through which the cult of the offensive can be developed, but does not explore how it is possible for nationalistic sentiment to be shaped in the direction of favoring the offensive. Though offense-defense theorists note that belligerents tend to attribute a more coherent, grand and evil scheme to their enemies than is often the case, to believe that their adversaries are more unified than is the case, and to assume that opponents' policy inconsistency is a result of duplicity or treachery rather than confusion, they do not provide a way for scholars to understand these consistent misperceptions as a matter of the gendered practices of identity and nationalism. Feminist analyses would argue that nationalism and militarism are constituted by gender discourses in both the processes of "othering" other nations as well as in the presentation of national identity and chauvinism that exist by promoting particular ideologies about gender roles.

2022 Michigan Kritik
LINKS › AT -- › AT: Link Turn

Short-term solutions to avoid war foreclose critical analysis of underlying systemic causes.

Pankhurst 3 (Donna-, May 1, Development in Practice, “The 'sex war' and other wars: towards a feminist approach to peace building”, Vol. 13 # 2&3, Infomaworld)

Turning to the meanings of the term ‘peace’, Galtung’s (1985) conception of negative peace has come into widespread use, and is probably the most common meaning given to the word, i.e. the end or absence of widespread violent conflict associated with war. A ‘peaceful’ society in this sense may therefore include a society in which social violence (against women, for instance) and/or structural violence (in situations of extreme inequality, for example) are prevalent. Moreover, this limited ‘peace goal’, of an absence of specific forms of violence associated with war, can and often does lead to a strategy in which all other goals become secondary. The absence of analysis of the deeper (social) causes of violence also paves the way for peace agreements that leave major causes of violent conflict completely unresolved. Negative peace may therefore be achieved by accepting a worse state of affairs than that which motivated the outburst of violence in the first place, for the sake of (perhaps short-term) ending organised violence. Galtung’s alternative vision, that of positive peace, requires not only that all types of violence be minimal or non-existent, but also that the major potential causes of future conflict be removed. In other words, major conflicts of interest, as well as their violent manifestation, need to be resolved. Positive peace encompasses an ideal of how society should be, but the details of such a vision often remain implicit, and are rarely discussed. Some ideal characteristics of a society experiencing positive peace would include: an active and egalitarian civil society; inclusive democratic political structures and processes; and open and accountable government. Working towards these objectives opens up the field of peace building far more widely, to include the promotion and encouragement of new forms of citizenship and political participation to develop active democracies. It also opens up the fundamental question of how an economy is to be managed, with what kind of state intervention, and in whose interests. But more often than not discussion of these important issues tends to be closed off, for the sake of ‘ending the violence’, leaving major causes of violence and war unresolved—including not only economic inequalities, but also major social divisions and the social celebration of violent masculinities.

2022 Michigan Kritik
LINKS › AT -- › AT: Link Turn

The AFF’s pragmatic reform cannot disrupt the structural patriarchal ordering – the link outweighs the turn

Howell, 2018 (Alison, PhD in PoliSci@YorkUniversity, AsstProfPoliSci@Rutgers, Forget “militarization”: race, disability and the “martial politics” of the police and of the university, International Feminist Journal of Politics, Volume 20, Issue 2) BW

Feminist praxis can benefit from questioning the concept of “militarization” so as to more fully excavate the violence of liberal order. In particular, the methodological primacy of examining “women’s lives” (or militarized masculinities) risks subsuming analyses of race, Indigeneity, disability and coloniality under gender. The result is an incomplete accounting of the ways in which war-like relations and systems that are “of war” are symbiotically and thoroughly part of liberal order, and not an exceptional aberration from it. To capture these dynamics, I have proposed an alternate concept, “martial politics,” which seeks to illuminate the histories of our present imbrication with war – a move made possible by shifting to an analysis that foregrounds historical relations of race, Indigeneity and disability alongside sexuality and gender. Yet what is at stake here is not only feminist methodology and theory, but also our activism. So, what of expediency? Do we lose too much if we can no longer demand demilitarization? In the 1980s when sex-negative radical feminists engaged in anti-porn activism, they found themselves with strange bed- fellows in the Christian right. This should have served as ample evidence that it was time to reconsider their perspective, and it is a lesson for the present day. Feminist scholars and activists should be similarly concerned that the concept of “militarization” is popular amongst small-state, right-wing libertarians associated, for example, with the Cato Institute (see Balko 2013). With this lesson in mind, I argue the concept of (de)militarization guides us in asking for too little of the wrong things. From the perspective of “demilitarization,” Obama’s 2015 cancellation of the federal government program of granting local police forces military equipment seems like a significant victory, but to be satisfied with this fails to address how policing imposes order through laws that criminalize Blackness, Indigeneity, disability and gender deviance or queerness. We must demand more. By recognizing that we are steeped in martial forms of politics, feminist anti-war praxis could work not (just) towards demilitarization; it could also more consistently align with anti-racist and disability organizing for prison abolition and deinstitutionalization by recognizing these institutions as central to “martial politics” – that is, because they are war-like and “of war.” This kind of resistance is already robust, not only in Black Lives Matter and prison abolition activism in relation to policing, but also in relation to the colonial foundations of universities. Recent student movements from South Africa to the UK, from India to the US and beyond, have been calling into question the Whiteness of universities and their founding in, and continuing celebration of, (settler) colonialism. For instance, students have contested the continued celebration of brutal colonist Cecil Rhodes on the University of Cape Town and Oxford University’s campuses, and slave owner Isaac Royall Jr.’s family crest at Harvard, tying these histories into contemporary racial inequalities in admissions and campus life. They have demonstrated that diversity is insufficient, and that the university must be decolonized. Similarly, disability and anti-racist student activists have drawn attention to the continued legacies of eugenics in universities. If we are to understand the martial politics of the university, the police, or of any other institution, we would do well to pay attention to this activism. The concept of “militarization” is, at this point, an easy out. In a time when academics are under increasing pressure to produce articles and books at breakneck speed, it may seem expedient to apply the framework of “militarization,” especially when the concept is reduced to the surface analysis of military aesthetics in so-called civilian life. The careful historical work for which I am calling in order to specify expressions of “martial politics” is not fast or easy, but what is at stake is too important. If we are to grapple with the violence of liberal orders in a more robust way, if we are to attend not only to the gendered dynamics of military power but also to race, ableism, (settler) colonialism and other forms of injustice, we need to do better and do more.

2022 Michigan Kritik
LINKS › AT -- › AT: Link of Omission

The body is not passively omitted in IR, it’s a structural disavowal that is a necessary precondition for neo-imperial control

Wilcox 15 – (Lauren, prof of gender studies @ Cambridge, Bodies of Violence: Theorizing Embodied Subjects in International Relations, pp. 41)

Some of the most profound contributions to interrogating bodies as an absent presence in IR have come from feminists who perceive the lack of attention to bodies and embodiment as a sign of the devaluing of the feminine: while IR attempts to provide abstract forms of knowledge in order to provide a measure of control or management of international violence, it disengages with the bodily nature of war. Feminists have tried to correct theories of violence and war that work to obscure the reality of bodily violence while focusing on political, strategic, and tactical maneuverings. No one has demonstrated how strategic thought in IR ignores and, in fact, necessarily obscures the gruesome realities of war and its impact on the human body more powerfully than Carol Cohn. Cohn’s work is a valuable deconstruction of the abstract discourses of war and violence that are so prevalent in IR. In her landmark essay, “Sex and Death in the Rational World of Defense Intellectuals” (1987), Carol (p.41) Cohn insists that this neglect of bodily harm is not an oversight, but rather is a pre-condition for the existence of the theory and the strategic apparatus underpinning it. The language of the nuclear defense specialists in her participant-observation not only euphemized the violent potential of nuclear weapons in terms of “collateral damage,” “clean bombs,” and assorted acronyms, but served to limit what could be thought and said. In the discourse of nuclear strategists, human suffering and death were invisible; rather, the survival of the weapons themselves was the focus. “Technostrategic” discourse has no room for imagining oneself as vulnerable to violence. Cohn’s work is an example of feminist theorizing about violence: violence in its bodily, all-too-real manifestation cannot be seen in certain types of theorizing about international war and security. Not only is bodily violence invisible, but it is necessarily invisible if such theorizing is to proceed. Cohn does more than expose the erasure of injured and destroyed bodies in discourses of nuclear strategy. Her work is a powerful explanation of how such bodies come to be erased in the practices of nuclear strategy, and how this erasure makes it possible for the field of nuclear strategy to function as it does.

2022 Michigan Kritik
LINKS › Econ/Competitiveness Link

Economic competition is based in hegemonic masculinity

Elias and Beasley 09 [Elias, Juanita associate professor in international political economy and Beasley, Christine professor of politics at University of Adelaide. “Hegemonic Masculinity and Globalization: “Transnational Business Masculinities” and Beyond”. Globalizations, 6(2). 2009.]

For key critical masculinity scholars it is globalization—specifically a multinational-led neoliberal globalization—that is recognised as ‘the most obviously important’ issue in the future of the field researching masculinity. Specifically, this is understood in terms of ‘the relation of masculinities to those emerging dominant powers in the global capitalist economy, the transnational corporations’ (Connell et al., 2005, p. 9). Connell’s particular contribution to this field is that globalization, in creating what has been termed a ‘world’ or ‘global gender order’, involves the re-articulation of national hegemonic masculinities into the global arena. Specifically he refers here to ‘transnational business masculinity’, which he describes as definitively taking the leading role as the emergent gendered world order, an order associated with the dominant institutions of the world economy and the globalization of the neo-liberal market agenda. The leading role of transnational business masculinity re-articulates older and more locally based bourgeois managerial hegemonic masculinities (Connell, 2005b, pp. 84, 76-7; Connell, 2005a, p. 263; Connell and Wood, 2005). In this account transnational business masculinity is seen to occupy the position of hegemonic masculinity on a world scale—that is to say, a dominant form of masculinity that embodies, organizes, and legitimates men’s domination in the world gender order as a whole (Connell, 2000, p. 46). This notion of hegemonic masculinity is, however, understood as embodying more that just a Gramscian-style mechanism for gaining consent. Rather, the political legitimating meaning of hegemonic masculinity quickly slides towards its meaning as the ‘dominant’ masculinity and how an actual group of men ‘embodies’ this dominant positioning, including how this group exhibits particular personality traits. Connell asserts that ‘world politics is now more and more organized around the needs of transnational capital’, placing ‘strategic power in the hands of particular groups of men—managers and entrepreneurs’—who self-consciously manage their bodies and emotions as well as money, and are increasingly detached from older loyalties to nation, business organisation, family and marital partners (Connell, 2005a, p. xxiii; Connell and Wood, 2005, p. 359). Drawing upon Connell’s work the sociologist Joan Acker endorses this view that hegemonic masculinities are embodied in the specific characteristics of multinational business-men suggesting that we think of ‘Rupert Murdoch, Phil Knight or Bill Gates’. Adding ‘[t]his masculinity is supported and reinforced by the ethos of the free-market, competition and a “win or die” environment. This is the masculine image of those who organize and lead the drive to global control and the opening of markets to international competition’ (Acker 2004, p. 29). These men are, in Connell’s account, dispositionally highly atomistic—competitive and largely distanced from social or personal commitments. They embody a neo-liberal version of an emphasized traditional masculinity, without any requirement to direct bodily strength (Connell, 2005a, pp. xxiii, 255-6; Connell, 2005b, p. 77).

2022 Michigan Kritik
LINKS › Econ/Competitiveness Link

Economic preservation strategies rely on gendered hierarchies

Griffin, 2015. (Penny, Senior Lecturer in International Relations at the University of New South Wales, Australia. “crisis, austerity and gendered governance: a feminist perspective,” in feminist review 109: 49-72, spp)

This paper draws upon, and seeks to extend, existing feminist analyses of the causes, constitution and effects of financial crisis to argue that crisis, governance and austerity are best understood by interpreting the discursive reproduction of crisis governance discourses and their feminist Frankenstein creation, what this paper refers to as ‘crisis governance feminism’. Existing feminist scholarship has, at length, detailed how capitalism, in all its forms and at macro, micro, local, regional and global levels, is gendered. Feminists have contested the seductively clean and unified agenda of ‘one world’ future prosperity lovingly perpetuated by neo-liberalism and its advocates and have highlighted instead ‘the messy, contradictory and disjointed processes of global restructuring that have monopolised the politics of development in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries’ (Griffin, 2010a: 91). Feminists have analysed and campaigned on economic crises extensively, interrogating the gendered impacts of the 1980s debt crisis (see, e.g., Sen and Grown, 1987; Benería, 2003), the East Asian crisis (Truong, 1999; Ling, 2004; Floro et al., 2009; Seguino, 2009) and the Argentine crisis (Chrabolowsky, 2003; De Cicco, 2011). Feminist discussions of global finance and crisis have displayed in stark relief the gendered injustices and inequalities created and sustained by various crises, the ‘retrogression of individual capabilities’ (Fukuda- Parr et al., 2013: 24), particularly those of women, created by financial crises, the social costs to women of austerity and the organisational manipulations of gender rhetoric that reaffirm existent and unequal economic policies and power relations (see, e.g., Montgomerie and Young, 2010; Roberts and Soederberg, 2012; Fukuda- Parr et al., 2013). As feminist analyses have so convincingly argued, ignorance of the local and social constitution of global processes leads only to flawed scholarship and ignorant policy-making that further exacerbate, or even create, hierarchies and inequalities of labour, class, gender and sexual relations. For feminists, regimes of capitalist production and consumption are always gendered. The reproduction of assumptions of individualism, market economics and democracy, perpetuated by neo-liberal governance mechanisms as pre-given and beyond question, mean, in particular, that neo-liberalism and its advocates have often failed to recognise that ‘the commercialisation of everyday life and of all sectors of the economy generates social dynamics that many individuals and cultures across the globe might find repulsive’ (Benería, 2003: 73).

2022 Michigan Kritik
LINKS › Climate Tech Link

The solution is the problem – deploying tech to solve a problem rooted in the unsustainability of tech is symptomatic of phallic humanism

Jenner, 2019 (Joseph, Lecturer in Film Studies, PhD (ABD) at King’s College in London. “Gendering the Anthropocene: Female Astronauts, Failed Motherhood and the Overview Effect,” Science Fiction Film and Television 12.1 (2019), 103–25, spp)

Geostorm is a narrative of homo faber – man the maker. The white, male astronaut Lawson looking back at Earth from his satellite wields control over the nonhuman through his technological mastery. It is through the human’s use of tools that Anthropocene phenomena will be overcome. Theoretical innovations in geoengineering, for example, represent one strain of scientific discourse that illustrates how technology is projected to overcome these inimical Anthropocene effects. The use of solar shields to deflect heat away from the Earth’s surface, the sequestration of CO2 in underground storage containers, or the fertilisation of the ocean by scattering iron powder throughout the world’s seas represent technological solutions to global warming (Anon. n.p.). Through the technological apparatus of, for example, the industrial revolution and mass migration humans have caused the problem called the Anthropocene, and through technology these problems will be solved. Others, though, have pointed out the gendered implications of a techno- normative Anthropocene. In her 2016 book Staying with the Trouble, Donna J. Haraway draws attention to the patriarchal inflection of the term. For Haraway, proclamations of the Anthropocene within the scientific community, and the resolutions suggested by, for example, geoengineering, have led to efforts not to rethink politics but if anything to speed up the ‘Big thing called Globalization’ (45). The inability or unwillingness to think outside the fossil burning necessities of capitalism leads Anthropocene discourse towards ‘cynicism, defeatism, and self-certain and self-fulfilling predictions’ (56). Haraway, ultimately, sees the negative turn of the Anthropocene aligned with the patriarchal discourse of homo faber, ‘the story of Species Man as the agent of the Anthropocene’ as a ‘rerun of the great phallic humanizing and modernizing Adventure’ (47).

2022 Michigan Kritik
LINKS › Environment Link

Environmental security fails – only the alt can solve the impacts

Detraz, 2010 (Nicole, Assistant Professor in political science at U Memphis, “the genders of environmental security,” in Gender and International Security edited by Laura Sjoberg, p. 106-107; spp)

The environmental security approach is concerned with the negative impacts of environmental degradation for human beings. While environmental conflict can still directly be linked to military security, environmental security is much more closely linked to notions of “human security.” In other words, environmental security is a broader notion than environmental conflict, because it is concerned not only with those directly susceptible to environmental conflict, but instead with all of humanity. In environmental security, the security referent is people and threat is located in negative consequences of environmental damage. Some of the main themes in this body of work include the environmental impact of accelerating globalization, concerns over population increases, the spread of disease, and the potentials for sustainable development. There is much more conceptual affinity between feminist approaches to security and the environmental security approach. Like feminist approaches, it argues for a much broader definition of security. Still, while the environmental security approach takes account of many of the complexities of the relationship between humans and their environment, it omits both the gendered nature of making that dichotomy to begin with and many of the gendered impacts of its key constitutive factors. First, the environmental security approach fails to take note of gendered content of human/nature dichotomy. A caution from ecofeminists would be the potential to de-link humans and the nonhuman environment in this approach. Merchant recognizes that humans have a degree of control over nature through human behaviors; however, nature also has the power to destroy and evolve with or without humans in many cases. She therefore calls for "an earthcare ethic, which is premised on this dynamic relationship, [and] is generated by humans, but is enacted by listening to, hearing, and responding to the voice of nature." Second, environmental security authors typically fail to recognize the gender dynamics that would transform their analyses. For example, environmental security scholars pay substantial attention to sustainable development as a way to combat environmental degradation and human insecurity simultaneously. Feminists have pointed out that many sustainable development programs have not been gender-sensitive. Since different paths to development often have survival implications for its population, a gender-sensitive approach to sustainable development that takes into account the needs of women, the ecosystem, and future generations within a particular setting appears necessary to ensure security. This means that if sustainable development or sustainability are advocated as providing security, then the specific needs of women also need to be addressed within that framework. Feminist have also expressed concern that advocates of sustainable development remain entrenched in current (gender-subordinating) social and political structures. Feminists have expressed concern that a sustainable development approach to environmental security maintains the state-centric and top-down foci of the environmental conflict approach, masking it under a broader definition of who merits security.

2022 Michigan Kritik
LINKS › Environment Link

Crisis-based environmental threat construction is incompatible with the alternative

Detraz, 2010. (Nicole, Assistant Professor in political science at U Memphis, “the genders of environmental security,” in Gender and International Security edited by Laura Sjoberg, p. 104-106; spp)

The environmental conflict perspective is the approach that most clearly links traditional -security concerns to the environment. Most authors who examine environmental conflict focus on the possibility that groups within society will engage in violent conflict as natural resource stocks diminish due to environmental degradation. These conflicts are understood to threaten the stability of the state. There are several broad trends that are identified as increasing the likelihood of environmentally induced conflicts, "including: expanding and migrating human populations; water, arable land and other resource and environmental scarcities; ... globalisation which brings people (and disease) into closer proximity; and increasing recognition of the injustice of Northern-induced underdevelopment of the South."6 Central to these discussions is the concept of scarcity. Thomas Homer-Dixon identifies resource scarcities as being potentially so severe that they can seriously undermine human well-being. He identifies three types of scarcities: supply-induced scarcity, demand-induced scarcity, and structural scarcity. 7 The main argument is that some types of scarcity, coupled with other factors, can contribute to violent conflict. 8 Given the similarities between the environmental conflict approach and "mainstream" security, a number of feminist criticisms of the environmental conflict approach can be read into the core feminist work in Security Studies. Specifically, feminist theories would criticize the environmental conflict approach's narrow definition of security, its state-centrism, its focus on scarcity, and its neglect of gender as a possible cause for environmental conflict. First, feminists argue that the environmental conflict approach holds an inadequate understanding of what security is. Environmental conflict scholars are focused on the potential for environmental degradation and scarcity to cause violent conflict, rather than looking at what happens to people and their environment during wars. To term something a "security" issue and then to leave important elements of insecurity untouched is problematic. Including gender means including the assessment of potential insecurities during wartime as well, given that women often face particular security risks during times of conflict. A second problematic element of the environmental conflict literature from a gendered perspective is its state-centrism. Feminists often engage in a multilevel analysis, with particular attention paid to individuals and groups within societies. Environmental conflict scholars typically restrict their attention to the level of the state, again demonstrating the close links between this approach and traditional Security Studies. 11 Feminists contend that it is necessary to pay attention to security at levels above and below the state in order to understand how women participate in and are affected by international security issues. Third, ecofeminists will take issue with the assertion of a link between environmental conflict and scarcity because they see that treatments of scarcity in this literature are largely anthropocentric, suggesting that the environment is made up of resources for human consumption. Authors like Carolyn Merchant call for the acknowledgement of a dynamic relationship between human and nonhuman nature, with each having a, degree of power over the other. 12 To use terms like "scarcity" implies that the environment is something of a stockroom of resources for humans that may become depleted, which disregards the deeper relationship between the two entities. Finally, feminists, in their concern for the gender-differential impacts of proposed cases of conflict are themselves gendered. The factors often put forward as potentially contributing to resource scarcity and conflict in environmental conflict literatures include population growth, human migration, globalization, and unequal resource distribution. Each of these topics has particular implications for gender analysis that are largely unaddressed within this literature. For example, environmental conflict scholars argue that increases in human populations can directly contribute to both supply-induced and demand-induced scarcities, which could result in violent conflict. This tells us very little if we do not consider where these populations are located and who they are made up of. Also, the issue of population has specific gendered implications. Impacts may be different if populations have “youth bulges” typically made up of young males. This group disproportionately engages in crime, commits suicide, or join militias, all of which are important security concerns. Additionally, by identifying populations increase as a contributor to environment conflict, these authors are automatically making women the potential target of “solutions” because of their role as child bearers. When issues are securitized, certain actions are seen as justifiable – and it is likely that men and women will experience these actions differently. Similar arguments can be made for a number of the other causal factors privileged in the environmental conflict approach. These instances of male/female differential impacts have implications for the security of particular individuals.

2022 Michigan Kritik
LINKS › Space Policy/Coop Link

Space Programs are masculine projects that normalize male and masculine bodies – women’s bodies are considered deviant and excluded

Casper and Moore, 1995. (Monica J Caspar and Lisa Jean Moore, PhDs in Sociology from UC Berkeley. “Inscribing Bodies, Inscribing the Future: Gender, Sex, and Reproduction in Outer Space,” Sociological Perspectives, v 38, no 2, SPP)

Feminist studies of science and technology include theoretical and substantive work on the construction of gendered difference(s), including sexed and gendered bodies (Laqueur 1990; Terry 1990), reproductive theories (Tuana 1989), skeletons (Schiebinger 1987), sex hormones(Oudshoorn and Van Den Wijngaard 1991), and a range of other sites. In all of these examples, differences become reified through scientific representations and practices and are subsequently linked to gender(ed) inequities. We suggest that gender differences are also constructed assiduously across multiple sites in the space domain. This occurs through a process of inscription, in which genders and gendered sexualities are constructed through material and symbolic practices centered on women's bodies. Female bodies are constructed against a backdrop in which male bodies are accepted as the norm, an inscription process shaped by the masculine context of space travel. More explicitly, space travel can be interpreted as a historically masculine project in that rocket design has in some ways modeled male anatomy. Space flight, in our reading, becomes the realization of penetration and colonization fantasies about the future. This spirit of masculinity permeates almost all aspects of the space program including long-term political goals, engineering designs, assumptions about crew behavior, and life-sciences research protocols. The masculine "nature" of space flight creates an institutional and ideological framework within which women not only are excluded but also are configured as highly problematic by virtue of their gender, bodies, sexualities, and reproductive capacities. Female bodies thus become the target of a range of practices within NASA aimed at reconfiguring women to fit into the space program. Below, we point to some specific ways in which women's bodies are inscribed through discourses of sexual difference.

2022 Michigan Kritik
LINKS › Space Policy/Coop Link

International Space Coop hinges upon the presumption of US paternalism – the aff relies on heteronormative and hierarchical tropes of masculinization and feminization

Griffin, 2009 (Penny, PhD and professor in the dept of politics and IR, Univ New South Wales, “The spaces between us: the gendered politics of outer space,” in Securing Outer Space, Routledge, p. 67-68, SPP)

The US is, of course, heavily reliant on its satellite-based systems, and to this end works (to a certain extent) within a regime framework of international space ‘law’ (Brearly 2005: 14). This is not to suggest that US discourse in not constructed around the imbedded belief that the US itself represents the global hegemon, and the only viable, indeed legitimate keeper of global ‘order’. The US may be challenged ‘regionally’, but considers itself ‘unlikely to be challenged by a global peer competitor’ (US Space Command, ‘Vision for 2020’), control of space assures the US ‘access to space, freedom of operations within the space medium, and an ability to deny others the use of space, if required’, with the US casting itself in a classic ‘warfighter role’. Sexing US Outer Space Discourse[:] The gendered assumptions that underlie this rhetoric are tacit but striking, and depend on two distinct, heteronormative, tropes of masculinization and feminization. First, the US’s ability to control ‘space capabilities’ depends upon assumptions of dominance and inherent superiority that revolve around the (gendered) signifier of the US’s role as ‘classic’ or ‘active warfighter’: assumptions including the need for speed and watchfulness (‘real time space surveillance’), agility and technical superiority (‘timely and responsive spacelift’), ‘enhanced protection’ (of ‘military and commercial systems’), robustness and efficient repelling capabilities (‘robust negation systems’), ‘precision force’ and ‘enhanced “sensor-to-shooter” capabilities. Just as Presidents Kennedy and Johnson summoned the spectre of an active, robust, potent American with the ‘Pilgrim and Pioneer spirit of initiative and independence’ (Kennedy, quoted in Dean 2001: 180), so George W. Bush calls to those able to show ‘daring, discipline, ingenuity, and unity in the pursuit of great goals’, the ‘risk takers’ and ‘visionaries’ of who America is so ‘proud’ (Bush 2004). Second, in establishing its (heterosexually masculine) credentials, the US’s techno-strategic discourse reconfigures all other space-able nations as subordinate, constructing a binary, heterosexual relationship of masculine hegemony/feminine subordination. Tellingly, US Space Command cites the forging of ‘global partnerships’ as essential to protecting US national interests and investments, where such partnerships are at the behest of the US, with those that partner the US ‘warfighter’ little more than passive conduits for US ‘opportunity’ and ‘commerce’ (‘Joint Vision 2020’).

2022 Michigan Kritik
LINKS › Prolif Link

Anti-prolif discourse makes proliferation more likely – creates excitement and identification with the weapons and dominant regime while masking the deadly risks of militarism

Claire Duncanson & Catherine Eschle (2008), University of Edinburgh and University of Strathclyde, “Gender and the Nuclear Weapons State: A Feminist Critique of the UK Government's White Paper on Trident , New Political Science, 30:4, 545-563, DOI: 10.1080/07393140802518120

We begin by looking at the way the White Paper talks about nuclear weapons¶ technology. There are three strands to the feminist critique of the way in whichstates in general talk about nuclear weapons technology: first, the deployment ofsexualised, phallic imagery; second, a tendency to abstraction; and, third, areliance on gendered axioms. On the first point, feminists have long highlightedthat the political and military power associated with nuclear weapons is linkedmetaphorically with sexual potency and masculinity. This linkage is neitherarbitrary nor trivial: sexual metaphors are a way of mobilising genderedassociations in order to create excitement about, support for and identificationwith both the weapons and the political regime possessing them.15 Thus feministhistories of the development of the nuclear arms race in the decades after WorldWar Two demonstrate the extent to which it was a race to prove masculineprowess, fuelled by “missile” envy,16 with the nuclear weapons of the Cold Warsuperpowers “wheeled out like monumental phalluses” on parade.17 Suchimagery has proved seductive to many governments across time and space. Thus¶ when India exploded five nuclear devices in May 1998, Hindu nationalist leaderBalashaheb Thakeray argued that “[w]e have to prove that we are not eunuchs”and Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee was portrayed in a newspaper cartoon as¶ propping up his coalition with a nuclear bomb, captioned “Made with Viagra.”18¶ Indeed, as Indian novelist Arundhati Roy has commented:Reading the papers, it was often hard to tell when people were referring to Viagra(which was competing for second place on the front pages) and when they weretalking about the bomb—“We have superior strength and potency.”19Similar language has permeated the nuclear discourse of the military anddefence industry. In her ground-breaking study of the discourse of Americandefence intellectuals who formulated nuclear weapons policy during the Cold¶ War, Cohn noted that sexualised metaphors, phallic imagery and the promise ofsexual domination thrived.20 Lectures were dominated by discussion of:vertical erector launchers, thrust-to-weight ratios, soft lay downs, deep penetration,and the comparative advantages of protracted versus spasm attacks—or what one¶ military adviser to the National Security Council has called “releasing 70 to 80percent of our megatonnage in one orgasmic whump.”21¶ Cohn suggests that such sexual imagery serves not only to underline theconnections between masculine sexuality and nuclear weapons but also tominimise the seriousness of militarist endeavours.22 It makes the nuclear armsrace seem the stuff of jocular locker-room rivalry, denying its deadlyconsequences. Perhaps most importantly, sexualised metaphors are one of thereasons that talk of nuclear disarmament is so readily dismissed: “If disarmamentis emasculation, how could any real man even consider it?”23

2022 Michigan Kritik
LINKS › Arms Control Link

Arms control justification is not distinct from militarizing logic and alliance maintenance which only increases war fighting capability

Krause, PhD, 12 (Keith, IR@Geneva, Leashing the Dogs of War: Arms Control from Sovereignty to Governmentality in Reconceptualising Arms Control: Controlling the Means of Violence, ed. Cooper & Mutimer)

So what remains is a set of formal arms control agreements, mostly bilateral, but also a few that were multilateral, designed to manage the potentially most dangerous and destabilizing aspects of inter-state conflict dynamics. They channeled the confrontation between the superpowers into a technical and problem-solving logic that would facilitate decision making about what kinds of weapons to produce and deploy, and under what circumstances to use them. In addition, after some of the conceptual confusions of early nuclear strategy (such as Massive Retaliation), arms control became part of the logic by which decisions over appropriate (rational) strategies could be designed. In the 1960s and 1970s, in context of the East-West conflict and nuclear proliferation, maintaining the conditions of stable deterrence and reducing the risk of war was perhaps a politically and normatively laudable goal. But arms control was thus also linked to deterrence theory and practice, and to the entire functioning of the so-called military-industrial complex, and not something distinct and in opposition to it. This vision would not necessarily be accepted by those – such as researchers at the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) and other think-tanks – who saw themselves as growing out of the peace and anti-nuclear weapons movements, but I think the policy acceptability of SIPRI’s work (for example) came precisely from its progressive acceptance of the underlying rules of the game.19 What were these rules of the game? There are four elements of the Cold War practice of arms control that warrant a deeper exploration in order to illustrate the normalizing and sovereign logic of arms control. The first element was the attempt by proponents of arms control to distinguish it from advocacy of disarmament in any form. Disarmament was associated with the failed attempts to negotiate reductions in armaments during the interwar period. In the 1950s and 1960s, it was associated with the peace and anti-nuclear movements, and was seen as the preserve of impractical idealist efforts – at best politically naïve; at worst politically suspect. As Jeffrey Larsen notes, ‘in the early 1960s international security specialists began using the term arms control in place of the term disarmament, which they believed lacked precision and smacked of utopianism. The seminal books on arms control published in that era all referred to this semantic problem’.20 So arms control was presented by its practitioners as directed towards controlling or regulating the numbers, types, deployment or use of certain types or quantities of arms, and disarmament was defined as involving the reduction or the elimination of particular weapons and weapons systems, and/or foreswearing of acquisition of new weapons.21 Although occasionally agreements were signed that did eliminate weapons systems or particular classes of weapons, most notably the 1987 Intermediate Nuclear Forces (INF) treaty that eliminated an entire class of nuclear weapons, when seen as part of the broader spectrum of nuclear capabilities, such restrictions were tilted more towards the control side of the equation.22 Overall, arms control reinforced, not undermined, sovereign state power. The second, related, element was the technocratic or problem-solving orientation of arms control practices. Its political acceptability came from its claim to operate within the same policy frame as other forms of military-strategic thinking, including of course deterrence theory and strategy, alliance-building, and the entire military-industrial logic that shaped Western (and arguably Eastern) security policy. More importantly, however, it provided legitimacy to a counter-intuitive set of policy prescriptions (such as leaving your own civilian population vulnerable to nuclear attack, or revealing the equivalent of state secrets as part of confidence-building measures). And finally, the technocratic approach also was, in its strongest version, opposed to the irrational and uncontrollable prescriptions of what, as early as President Eisenhower, was called the military-industrial complex. High level proponents of arms control (Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara, for example, as well perhaps as Secretary of State Henry Kissinger), regarded the defence establishment as unable to set limits on its threat assessment and concomitant arms acquisitions. They wished to subject security policy to rational managerial techniques, including such ideas as diminishing marginal returns to investments in new weapons, cost-benefit analysis for weapons systems, and trade offs between competing goals (the guns-versus-butter debate).23 As Henry Kissinger is once purported to have said, ‘What in the name of God is strategic superiority? What is the significance of it, politically, militarily, operationally, at these levels of numbers? What do you do with it?’ thus expressing his frustration with the inability of the nuclear defense establishment to provide a rationale for its weapons acquisition plans.24 Even more hawkish arms controllers subscribed to the rational calculus, with, for example, Paul Nitze arguing, with respect to ballistic missile defense (Star Wars), that it had to be cost effective on the margin in order to make strategic sense.25 Arms control was thus more rational – and promised to achieve the same national security goals (including war-fighting dominance) at lower cost. But the actual achievements of arms control negotiations, treaties and agreements are difficult to assess, even if we use some counter-factual analysis. As noted above, arms control failed to stem the technological arms race, failed to reduce spending on weapons, and perhaps played only a marginal role in preventing a violent superpower confrontation. In all of its forms, arms control was not a transformative paradigm – but a techno-managerial project. The transformation of inter-state relations via either nuclear disarmament or nuclear holocaust was to be avoided at all costs, and the management of the superpower arms race was a sort of via media between these two Manichean visions. Parenthetically, some prominent advocates, such as Robert McNamara, or President Barack Obama, who have argued prominently for the complete abolition of nuclear weapons, claim implicitly or explicitly that there is a seamless conceptual thread that goes from arms control to nuclear disarmament, and that all that distinguishes one from the other is the relative time horizon or degree of pragmatism of the advocates.26 But this is both conceptually and practically unlikely – if arms control is a set of techno-managerial practices fully integrated into the Cold War logic of national security strategy, then it is unable to make the leap to disarmament – which involves an entirely different idea about the place of violence in social and political life. Recent debates around the ratification of the New START treaty in late 2010 illustrated how it hardly represented a step towards deeper nuclear reductions. The third core element of the arms control paradigm was that the Weberian state’s monopoly over the use of lethal force could not only be used to impose order domestically and to create social peace but that it could also be projected outwards to create a form of international order that reduced the risk of violence. Just as the domestic form of the Weberian monopoly renders the population vulnerable to the predatory state (so much so that scholars such as Rudolph Rummel could argue that democide – state-sanctioned killing of citizens – was a greater risk than war);27 the international form also involved rendering entire populations totally vulnerable to nuclear holocaust. In the name of national security the very survival of the entire population could be put at risk, through policies such as Mutual Assured Destruction or treaties such as the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) treaty. It is difficult to find a better example of techno-managerial logic, instrumental rationality and the assertion of sovereign power at work. Although perhaps an extreme example, this faith in the ability of states to exercise restraint over the use of force, also underlay the entire edifice of nuclear deterrence policy and strategy. The final element was that the arms control paradigm, like the much older balance of power system, was not a mechanism for maintaining order that eliminated war or the use of force from the international system. It assumed that the main risk to be prevented was that of large-scale inter-state war between great powers or the superpowers, and that a trade-off between this risk, and the risk of (or fact of) small and large wars, especially in the postcolonial world, was an acceptable one. The use of violence was either to be part of the logic of so-called limited (nuclear) war or to be confined to the periphery, to such places as Indochina, Angola, and Afghanistan (although this was hardly peripheral to the Soviet Union). This was analogous to the operation of the 19th century balance of power system, which sanctioned the partitions of Poland, the Crimean War, and so forth in the name of maintaining systemic stability. Similarly, the logic of limited nuclear war, as presented by scholars such as Henry Kissinger, rested upon the assumption that the use of force could be carefully calibrated and controlled.28 The neo-colonialist and political implications of pushing the problem of war to the periphery are of course clear, and one could argue that the arms control paradigm sketched above, especially the treaties that stabilized the nuclear confrontation between East and West (SALT I and II), made certain kinds of proxy wars more possible or acceptable by creating escalatory fire-breaks that facilitated the relatively risk-free provision of military assistance to client states and movements. These fire breaks were easier to create in the global South, where American and Russian troops managed to avoid confronting each other directly, but less easy to create in Europe. The history of attempts to achieve mutual and balanced force reductions (the 1975 name for what in the late 1980s became the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE Treaty), and of debates over the necessity for intermediate range and tactical nuclear weapons in Europe, and the problem of extended deterrence (or the nuclear umbrella) all point towards a set of tensions or contradictions within the logic of arms control. (23-6)

2022 Michigan Kritik
LINKS › Arms Control Link

Arms control is used to dominate other nations and encourages WMD build-up in the name of protection

Wright, 2010. (Susan, Research scientist in history of science and IR in the Institute for research on Women and Gender at the University of Michigan, former research fellow at the UN institute for Disarmament Research in Geneva, “Feminist theory and arms control,” in Gender and International Security edited by Laura Sjoberg, p. 205-209 - spp)

A feminist deconstruction of arms control: In the second section of this chapter, I argued that despite differences in their conceptual frameworks, arms control played a similar role in Schelling’s and Bull’s theories of International Relations. For Bull, arms control, like war, was a means for “preserv[ing] and buttres[ing] the balance of power” and “it could not be shaped by any such principle as the indiscriminate reduction of armaments.” For Schelling, arms control was an integral part of strategy, another tool in strategic bargaining, like limited war. For both, arms control was “war by other means.” In this section, I use feminist theory to analyze major dimensions of the Bull-Schelling conception of arms control and its application by the British government. At the fundamental epistemological level, Bull and Schellng wrote in an Olympian voice that assumes absolute and universal standards of truth and objectivity, and that claims to rise above the chaos of International Relations (even while being obviously rooted in it). That Olympian voice was pervasive in academic work in the 1960s, even though change was in the air. Peter Novick has described the voices of the civil rights movement, the anti-war movement, the feminist movement, and the labor movement that were being raised in the 1960s and the challenges to dominant empiricist and rationalist epistemology that would eventually deeply affect academic fields of all kinds. The Olympian epistemology was directly associated with the ontologies of the Bull and Schelling models of the international system. Schelling’s model of the state system was almost Newtonian in conception: states were like mass points that interacted by exerting forces on each other. In this case, the forces were those of military power and the ideal state of the system was “stability” achieved through deterrence and arms control to avoid an “imbalance” that would result in nuclear war. For Bull, similarly, the state was taken as an entity that required no further deconstruction and the goal was order in the state system achieved through “balance of power” exerted through diplomacy and arms control or if necessary through war. In each framework, arms control was depicted merely as an adjunct to the military machinery of deterrence and war. A further fundamental concept used by Bull and Schelling is that of power in the voluntarist sense of “power over,” achieved primarily by force or through threat of force. The basic assumption in both views of arms control is that military power can be used to force another state – usually one seen as hostile-to do something it might not otherwise do. Military power vested in nuclear weapons was used by the United States and its nuclear-armed allies to deter the Soviet Union from contemplating any kind of attack on or incursion into the capitalist world. After the Soviet Union acquired nuclear weapons, the power game shifted to ensuring that neither state would attack the other, through each assuring the other of nuclear destruction. This was a stereotypically masculine form of power-power exerted over the behavior of the Other, linked in this case to an extreme form of violence in the form of a nuclear wrestling match. "Power over" can also be expressed in 'Foucauldian terms. According to Foucault, power is expressed in the discursive practices of social institutions from the prison to the clinic to the school-and he could easily have added military and foreign policy institutions to that list. Foucault saw power as a "productive network which runs through the whole social body." No doubt in the present context, he would have argued that the state exerts its power through the practices and specific discourses that are linked to those practices. In Foucault's words: Truth isn't outside power or lacking in power ... truth isn't the reward of free spirits, the child of protracted solitude, nor the privilege of those who have succeeded in liberating themselves. Truth is a thing of this world. It is produced only by virtue of multiple forms of constraint. In Foucauldian terms, Bull and Schelling produced forms of "truth" that were readily incorporated by the "great powers" into the twin aspects of military strategy: weaponry and military training to use weapons on the one hand and arms control on the other. In their strategic discourses, the full complexity of the state with its factions, interests, processes, traditions, ethnicities, genders, and linkages across the world is reduced to a point source moved, primarily, by threats and coercion. Human beings appear in this picture as a passive, nameless mass protected by the armory of the state. Bull and Schelling justify the use of "power over" states that are treated as adversaries, or potential adversaries, in several ways. First, violence in the state system, and therefore the need to defend against it, are taken as given. As Bull wrote: It is time that strategists take the fact of military force as their starting point ... The capacity for organized violence between states is inherent in the nature of man and the environment. The most that can be expected from a total disarmament agreement is that it might make armaments and armed forces fewer-and more primitive. This claim of the inevitability of violence and the consequent need for military protection have been extensively analyzed by feminist theorists. If violence is inevitable, then someone or something is required to defend against it. Jean Elshtain, Laura Sjoberg, and other feminist theorists have demonstrated that the pervasive tradition of western political thought that claims that the inevitability of violence calls for the services of a Just Warrior (representing variously the state military apparatus or the soldier) who is "engaged in the regrettable but sometimes necessary task of collective violence in order to prevent some greater wrong" to the Beautiful Soul, representing variously patria or the homeland or innocent civilians. Bull’s political philosophy falls completely within this tradition. A second feature that legitimates a state's exercise of "power over" another is the focus in both strategy and arms control on ends rather than means. Schelling and Bull are silent about the nature of the means used to exercise power over other states. The horrific effects of nuclear, chemical, biological, or of war in any form receive no attention except to dismiss those who focus on them. The ends, on the other hand-the security and survival of the state - are all important. As Bull commented: There is a sense in which strategic thinking does and should leave morality out of the account ... if what is being said is that strategic judgments should be coloured by moral considerations or that strategic inquiry should be restricted by moral taboos, this is something that the strategist is bound to reject. This moral silence is related to a further major feature of Bull and Schelling's work: the "psychic numbing" concealing the weapons assumed to guarantee the state's security. As Robert Jay Lifton and Richard Falk argue, human beings develop powerful psychic walls to protect them from contemplating the effects of extreme violence. 78 "Psychic numbing" is a defense mechanism that represses, denies and excludes contemplation of massive death and destruction. In their analysis of nuclear strategy and arms control, Bull and Schelling enlist this psychological mechanism by focusing on reassuring ends rather than on the weapons providing the means to get there. As Lifton, Falk and Carol Cohn have described in detail, the nuclear strategists' locus on ends is powerfully reinforced by their "domestication" of the weaponry through the use of abstract, familial, religious, or sexual language-radically different metaphors that have a single function: distracting the user and the listener from the reality of the subject matter. Bull used this type of legitimation in his Foreign Office report through an exclusive focus on the strategic features of chemical and biological weapons and complete silence on their effects. A third feature of Bull and Schelling's view of arms control is the distancing of states from each other, with the primary relationship being an adversarial one. Schelling might have argued that his model of strategy in International Relations was politically neutral, that he was concerned only with achieving strategic balance. Bull, on the other hand, explicitly identified with "strategists' greater sense of the moral stature of American and Western political objectives for which war and the risk of war must be undertaken."

2022 Michigan Kritik
LINKS › Middle East Conflict Link

Orientalism relies on the feminization of a racialized “other”

Said, 1979 (Edward Said was a Palestinian literary theoretician, professor of English, history and comparative literature at Columbia University, and a public intellectual. Orientalism: 25th Anniversary Edition, Vintage Books 2004 [1979], pp. 207-209 (SPP).

But there were other uses for latent Orientalism. If that group of ideas allowed one to separate Orientals from advanced, civilizing powers, and if the "classical" Orient served to justify both the Orientalist and his disregard of modern Orientals, latent Orientalism also encouraged a peculiarly (not to say invidiously) male conception of the world. I have already referred to this in passing during my discussion of Renan. The Oriental male was considered in isolation from the total community in which he lived and which many Orientalists, following Lane, have viewed with something resembling contempt and fear. Orientalism itself, furthermore, was an exclusively male province; like so many professional guilds during the modern period, it viewed itself and its subject matter with sexist blinders. This is especially evident in the writing of travelers and novelists: women are usually the creatures of a male power-fantasy. They express unlimited sensuality, they are more or less stupid, and above all they are willing. Flaubert's Kuchuk Hanem is the prototype of such caricatures, which were common enough in pornographic novels (e.g., Pierre Louys's Aphrodite) whose novelty draws on the Orient for their interest. Moreover the male conception of the world, in its effect upon the practicing Orientalist, tends to be static, frozen, fixed eternally. The very possibility of development, transformation, human movement - in the deepest sense of the word - is denied the Orient and the Oriental. As a known and ultimately an immobilized or unproductive quality, they come to be identified with a bad sort of eternality: hence, when the Orient is being approved, such phrases as "the wisdom of the East." Transferred from an implicit social evaluation to a grandly cultural one, this static male Orientalism took on a variety of forms in the late nineteenth century, especially when Islam was being discussed. General cultural historians as respected as Leopold von Ranke and Jacob Burckhardt assailed Islam as if they were dealing not so much with an anthropomorphic abstraction as with a religio-political culture about which deep generalizations were possible and warranted: in his Weltgeschichte (1881-1888) Ranke spoke of Islam as defeated by the Germanic-Romanic peoples, and in his "Historische Fragmente" (unpublished notes, 1893) Burckhardt spoke of Islam as wretched, bare, and trivial.' Such intellectual operations were carried out with considerably more flair and enthusiasm by Oswald Spengler, whose ideas about a Magian personality (typified by the Muslim Oriental) infuse Der Untergang des Abendlandes (1918-1922) and the "morphology" of cultures it advocates. What these widely diffused notions of the Orient depended on was the almost total absence in contemporary Western culture of the Orient as a genuinely felt and experienced force.' For a number of evident reasons the Orient was always in the position both of outsider and of incorporated weak partner for the West. To the extent that Western scholars were aware of contemporary Orientals or Oriental movements of thought and culture, these were perceived either as silent shadows to be animated by the Orientalist, brought into reality by him, or as a kind of cultural and intellectual proletariat useful for the Orientalist's grander interpretative activity, necessary for his performance as superior judge, learned man, powerful cultural will. I mean to say that in discussions of the Orient, the Orient is all absence, whereas one feels the Orientalist and what he says as presence; yet we must not forget that the Orientalist's presence is enabled by the Orient's effective absence.

2022 Michigan Kritik
LINKS › Middle East Conflict Link

Muslims are constructed as feminine and hyper-sexual, justifying the colonial legacy of penetration and domination of the Middle East

Zine, 2008. (Jasmine Zine, “Between orientalism and fundamentalism” Hunt, Krista, and Rygiel, Kim, eds. (En)Gendering the War on Terror : War Stories and Camouflage Politics. Abingdon, Oxon, GBR: Ashgate Publishing Group, 2008. ProQuest ebrary (Rishi).

Increasingly since the tragic attacks of September 11, 2001, Muslims have been positioned on the geo-political stage as anti-democratic, anti-liberal and living in societies located outside the western narratives of progress and modernity. The global fault lines of North-South are underscored by the complex fissures that occur as a result of social, economic and political disparities and ideological upheavals, yet the over-riding discourses being purveyed have reduced the dynamics of neo-imperial globalization to the essentialized notion of a ‘clash of civilizations’. Huntington (1993) warned that ‘the fault lines between civilizations will become the battle lines of the future’ (p. 22). This fatalistic prophecy inscribes present global conflicts and insurgencies with a Manichean dualism carving the world into rigid and culturally irreconcilable enclaves. Through this binary formulation of the ‘West and the rest’, Islam and Muslims have become the foils for modernity, freedom and the civilized world. The discursive arena of the ‘war on terror’ has re-inscribed the ideological rhetoric of the Crusades. The Bush doctrine used religious rhetoric to describe the early US campaigns against Muslims in Afghanistan, dubbing this military engagement ‘Operation Infinite Justice’, 2 thereby invoking attributes of God to justify their retributive incursions. Other ways of inscribing the ensuing military campaigns with theological purpose and justification came through Bush’s use of religious sanctions such as the need to rid the world of ‘evil doers’. According to Rosemary Ruether, a professor of theology at the Graduate Theological Union in Berkeley, Bush and many of his supporters on the Christian right speak of his administration as ‘messianic agents chosen by God to combat evil and to establish good’ (Lattin, 2004, p. A16). These pronouncements became similar in ideological nature to the ‘fatwas’ issued by Osama bin Laden and al Qaeda cohorts who characteristically invoked religious legitimacy in their campaigns of violence and ‘jihad’ against the ‘infidel’ West. Whether it is the jingoistic chauvinism of Bush’s ‘American messianic nationalism’ (Lattin, 2004) or bin Laden’s Islamist extremism, both views engage violent forms of religious rhetoric and fundamentalist notions of the enemy ‘Other’ in a theocratic Manichean divide. Along with religious rhetoric, the war on terror, like previous imperialist campaigns, is inscribed with the politics of race and gender. Whether we examine the historical relations of colonialism, or the neo-imperialist relations of current global politics, military violence is rooted in the complex inequalities of race, gender, class and ethnicity. The resurgence of racialized discourses is reminiscent of those predicated on early modernist tropes of social evolutionism and serve to cast Muslims in the global South as ‘uncivilized and barbaric’. Recall Bush’s dictum proclaiming the ‘we (read: civilized West) will bring progress and prosperity to Iraq’. This proclamation locates Iraq and Arab Muslim society in what McClintock (1995) has referred to as ‘anachronistic space: prehistoric, atavistic and irrational, inherently out of place in the historical time of modernity’ (p. 40). The narrative of ‘progress’ therefore creates a rationale for the occupation of Iraq as a benevolent gesture of humanitarianism masking the self-serving neo-liberal economic enterprise at the heart of its imperial design. Racialized knowledge production also acts in collusion with campaigns of power and domination. As Foucault (1982) noted, power and knowledge directly imply one another and it is through sets of discursive practices that particular kinds of subjects are produced (p. 27). Through the discourses of Orientalism, the late Edward Said (1979) described how particular kinds of Arab and Muslim subjects were constructed through literary practices as ‘demonic hordes of hated barbarians’ (p. 59)’, ‘inveterate liars … lethargic and suspicious’, who ‘in everything oppose the clarity, directness and nobility of the Anglo-Saxon race’ (p. 39), or as the archetypal Oriental woman; the Egyptian courtesan who never spoke of herself or represented her emotions, presence or history, but relied on the European man to render and inscribe meanings for her (p. 6). Veiled Muslim women were constructed in the Western literary imagination as objects of desire, sensual, elusive harem girls and yet they were disavowed in the same breath as backward victims of their heathen and misogynistic cultures (Zine, 2002; Kahf, 1999). These history lessons exemplify Said’s warning that ‘too often literature and culture are presumed to be politically, even historically innocent’ (p. 27). Such presumed innocence, masks the machinations of power that operate through discursive practices. The war on terror reinvents these existing tropes and discourses in new ways that produce Muslims as dangerous foreigners, terrorists, and threats to public safety and render Muslim women as victims of their anachronistic faith, lacking agency and voice. Neo-Orientalist writing has gained increasing currency since the 9/11 attacks and ranges from the sensationalist tell-all journalism of dissident Muslim journalist Irshad Manji (2003), marketing her pulp fiction ‘rufusenik’ angst in The Trouble with Islam to even more virulent racist and Islamophobic diatribes such as Italian journalist Orianna Fallaci’s (2002) The Rage and the Pride. Fallaci’s avowed antifascism rings hollow against her bitter racist manifesto. Consider this passage from her seething narrative exalting the ‘progress’ of the West and vilifying the ‘backwardness’ of Islamic society and culture: The motor, the telegraph, the light bulb, I mean the use of electricity, the photograph, the telephone, the radio, the television, have not been invented by some mullahs or some ayatollahs…And let us not forget the standard of life that Western culture has achieved at every level of society. In the West we no longer die of starvation and curable diseases as they do in the Moslem countries. Right or wrong? But even if these were all unimportant achievements, (which I doubt), tell me: what are the conquests of the other culture of the bigots with the beard and the chador and the burqa (p. 92)? She goes on to tirade against the undesirable Muslim foreigners ‘loafing around our cities with their “merchandise”, their prostitutes, their drugs…’ and defiling their cities with ‘the yellow streaks of urine, the stench of excrement blocked the main entrance of the San Salvatore al Vescovo: the exquisite Romanic church…that the sons of Allah transformed into a latrine…’ (pp. 129– 130). Muslim women are cast as ‘idiotic’ ‘uneducated’ and guilty of ‘marrying pricks who want to marry four wives’ (p. 95). Ordinarily such blatant xenophobic, neo-fascist, Islamophobic vitriol would be written off as a racist fiction: the baseless rambling of an acrid mind, however in the post 9/11 era, despite the protests of European anti-racist groups seeking its ban as hate literature, the book can be found easily in some prominent bookstores in the ‘international relations’ section, having garnered mass appeal and sales. 3 Such anti-Islamic and racialized motifs are activated in new ways to justify the current neo-colonial military campaigns in the Middle East by influencing popular consciousness and manufacturing the public consent required for these practices of war and domination to take place. Thobani (2003) aptly points out that the current discourse in the war on terror has an unsettling resonance with earlier colonial constructions of the enemy ‘other’: The language used in the construction of the ‘enemy’ is very familiar to peoples who have been colonized by Europe. It echoes colonial constructs of the native as barbaric and dangerous, whose colonization was not only justifiable but also welcome, bringing them into civilization and democracy. The use of this highly charged colonial discourse at that particular moment of crisis revealed the nature of the absolutist racialized Western ideology being mobilized to rally the troops and to build a national and international consensus in defense of the ‘West’ and its civilization (p. 402). Through the pervasive forces of the media, these ideas are easily and uncritically absorbed by the masses as a means to legitimate the right to power and the right to rule over others in an almost benevolent and paternal gesture of bringing modernity, democracy and liberalism to those Fanon (1963) poignantly described as ‘the wretched of the earth’. This new hegemony operates as a form of ‘camouflaged politics’ masking the self-serving economic and political rationale behind the global dynamics of power. The current rise of militarism is also galvanized by a globalizing patriarchy that purveys a conquest-driven masculinist stance. According to Okazawa-Rey (2001): Patriarchal values are promoted by militarism, particularly the social construction of masculinities that revere the (false) notion of invincibility, relationships of domination and subordination, the eroticization of domination, emotional detachment, and the dehumanization of ‘others’ into enemies, like Arab ‘terrorists’ and Columbian ‘drug lords’. Misogyny is also at the core of militarism (p. 21). As part of the ‘eroticization of domination’ the use of sex and sexual metaphors has long been associated with colonization as well as the current military industrial complex. For example, the feminization of land becomes a prevalent motif in colonial consciousness metaphorically tying the conquest of the female ‘other’ to the conquest of indigenous land. McClintock (1995) describes how geographic space became feminized in the narratives of exploration and conquest. From the time of Columbus, who described the world as the shape of a woman’s breast to the Enlightenment, McClintock describes the metaphysics of colonial fantasies that inscribed gendered notions of conquest and subjugation: Knowledge of the unknown world was mapped as a metaphysics of gender violence – not as the expanded recognition of cultural difference – and was validated by the new Enlightenment logic of private property and possessive individualism. In these fantasies the world is feminized and spatially spread for male exploration, then reassembled and deployed in the interests of massive imperial power (p. 23). Bullock (2002) describes how the colonial Orient was feminized and depicted in the travel writing of Flaubert who described swimming in the Red Sea as ‘lying on a thousand liquid breasts’ (p. 8). The male imperial gaze therefore allowed for the metaphorical conquest over feminized land to work hand in hand with concurrent physical conquest taking place. Veiled Muslim women, however, inhibited the imperialist masculinist gaze by covering their bodies and producing an effect whereby they inverted the gaze and could see but not be seen (see Bullock, 2000). Pornographic images of unveiled Muslim women were circulated in the form of postcards during the European colonization of the Middle East and North Africa in the nineteenth century, rendering the bodies of these women, otherwise covered and obscured from view by their veils, open to the imperial male gaze (see Alloula, 1986). Muslim women who were cloistered in the inaccessible inner sanctums of the eroticized ‘harem’ were now laid bare and open to the otherwise forbidden visual access of European men. Ella Shohat writes that ‘it is this process of exposing the female Other, literally denuding her, which comes to allegorize the western masculinist power of possession, that she as a metaphor for her land, becomes available for Western penetration and knowledge’ (1993, p. 53). During the 1991 Persian Gulf War, the feminization of land and masculinization of conquest was reinvented by invoking metaphors of sexual violence in the representation of the US military campaign. Analyzing the sexual politics embedded in the media representation of the Persian Gulf war, Kari Points (1991) observes how sexual violence was invoked in military euphemisms: ‘Listening to US military talk about the conflict, I began to realize, that the United States was being portrayed as the masculine conqueror and Iraq as the feminine victim. An air force pilot at the start of the war predicted ‘it’ll just be slam bam thank-you Saddam!’ (p. 1). Further, in response to Saddam Hussein’s famous dictum of fighting the ‘Mother of All Battles’, a US air force officer responded with the challenge ‘Tell him dad’s coming to kick mom’s butt’. One of the most chilling examples Points cites was reported by the Washington Post and describes how fighter pilots aboard the USS John F. Kennedy watched porno movies before their bombing missions (p. 2). This revelation allegorizes disturbing images of cascading bombs as the brutal ejaculate of US military imperialism being released upon the subdued feminized Iraqi nation. Sexual bravado and the emasculation of the enemy ‘other’ are legacies that have carried over to the current ‘war on terror’ with Iraq as the continuing theater of combat. New forms of violence and degradation now occupy the notorious torture chambers of Saddam Hussein’s Abu Ghraib prison. According to Burnham, ‘the Abu Ghraib portraits of sexual humiliation and submission have exposed the unbelievably tangled strands of racism, misogyny, homophobia, national arrogance and hypermasculinity that characterize the US military’ (2004, p. 3). She goes on to note that the demoralizing images of Iraqi prisoners forced to wear women’s underwear are a sign that ‘degradation and weakness are still equated with the female in this man’s army’ (p. 3). In this way, the sexualized narratives in the war on terror continue the discursive practices of European colonialism where according to McClintock (1995) ‘…the rhetoric of gender was used to make increasingly refined distinctions among the different races. The white race was figured as the male of the species and the black race as the female (p. 55)’. Therefore the grotesque feminization of Arab men through the degrading and sexually humiliating acts performed at Abu Ghraib recasts the earlier script of imperial domination in new yet equally demeaning ways. That Arab men are made to perform a debased and conquered feminized role in this new colonial narrative of occupation is as much a vulgar expression of the US military’s enforcement of their perceived racial and civilizational superiority as it is of their thinly guised misogyny and homophobia (see Brittain, Ch. 4). Speculation has arisen that this new form of sexual humiliation as a tool of military subjugation was inspired by the book The Arab Mind by anthropologist Rapheal Patai (1973/2002). 4 This book, detailing a litany of Orientalist claims about a singular ‘Arab Mind’ not only essentializes a presumed collective psyche but graphically depicts the perceived sexual proclivities of Arabs, such as the idea that masturbation was seen as more morally shameful than visiting prostitutes. Whitaker (2004) questions whether it was this ‘fact’ that lead to Iraqi prisoners being forced to masturbate in front of cameras. He goes on to argue that Patai’s book, dubbed as the ‘bible of the neo-cons on Arab behaviour’, provided the US military with the psychological ammunition to add this new form of sexual violence to their arsenal of racialized psychological subjugation. Whitaker notes that the Arab Mind is likely the single most popular and widely read book on the Arabs in the US military and while discredited as Orientalist fiction in credible academic circles, was used as a textbook for officers at the JFK special warfare school in Fort Bragg. This neo-Orientalist genre of literature has therefore had a powerful affect on shaping essentialized notions of Arab otherness based on presumed narratives of sexuality and deviance that has scripted the demoralizing role-play of Abu Ghraib. The role of Orientalist knowledge production therefore continues to play a powerful ideological role in the continuing imperial contest and enactment of violence against the body of the racialized Arab Other.

2022 Michigan Kritik
LINKS › Terrorism Link

The discourse of anti-terrorism portrays women as victims, needing heroic men to save them

Johnstone 2009 (Rachael, Law @ U of Akureyri Iceland, Chicago-Kent Journal of International and Comparative Law, p. 44, www.genderandsecurity.umb.edu)

Finally, the discourse of the “War on Terror” itself revealed a perceived need for the state to define its masculinity in the aftermath of attack. This required painting men as heroes and women as victims.211 Chinkin and Charlesworth described the media responses in the immediate aftermath in which women were featured as heavenly rewards for terrorists or as victims of the attack, preferably widows of murdered men, rather than the women who themselves worked daily in the twin towers or in the rescue services.212 Women in the armed services and firefighting teams were conspicuous by their invisibility.213 Women in Afghanistan are depicted as victims of a brutal Taliban, requiring rescue by heroic (Western) men – though not political participation.214 The suffering women endure under the airpower of those same Western forces and the hardship encountered as essential services are put beyond their use are unfortunate “collateral damage” — a sacrifice for their greater long-term good.215 Susan Faludi’s 2007 investigative retrospect of the media in the aftermath of 9/11 provides thorough confirmation of the Australians’ early impressions.216 In such times, a feminist perspective of the state that seeks women’s empowerment and equal participation in the public sphere is unlikely to find favor.