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2022 Michigan Affirmative
2AC Case › 2AC – Solvency › 2AC – Clarifying Key

That splits the alliance.

Schütz '19 [Torben; July 2019; Associate Fellow in the Security, Defense, and Armaments program of the German Council on Foreign Relations; "Technology and Strategy: the Changing Security Environment in Space Demands New Diplomatic and Military Answers," https://www.ssoar.info/ssoar/bitstream/handle/document/63288/ssoar-2019-schutz-Technology_and_Strategy_the_Changing.pdf]

While Also Preparing for the Worst by Strengthening NATO’s Role in Space

Given the importance of space assets for Western military and civilian operations, and the risk of negotiation failures in arms control initiatives, Germany should, however, also support NATO considerations to designate space as a military-operational domain of its own, set apart from land, air, sea and cyberspace. A domain describes a “critical macro maneuver space whose access or control is vital to the freedom of action and superiority required by the mission”.7 Designating space as such a domain would prompt NATO more closely to analyze its vulnerabilities in space and its dependence on both civilian and military space-based assets. This would increase NATO’s understanding of the entanglement of space and non-space operations and facilitate considerations about deterrence and defense in space.

2022 Michigan Affirmative
2AC Case › 2AC – Solvency › 2AC – AT: Norms Fail

Failure to establish coherent space policy ends credible deterrence, encourages first strikes, and deliberate risk-taking. Independently, a litany of thumpers outweigh the link.

Tim Swieijs and Frans Osinga 20; Director of Research at The Hague Centre for Strategic Studies, PhD in War Studies from King’s College London; Professor of War Studies at Leiden University, PhD from the Clingendael Institute of International Relations; 4/4/20; "VIII. Maintaining NATO’s Technological Edge," Whitehall Papers, Vol. 95, Issue 1, p. 104-118]

Space assets are increasingly central to the functioning of globally networked societies. Satellite launch capabilities are proliferating, while the cost of satellites is decreasing. Fourteen states can now launch their own satellites and more than 80 states possess space-based assets, while numerous commercial providers offer services from space to anyone who can afford them.14 Space-based assets are also increasingly critical enablers of current and future military operations, with most CS4IR functions depending on them. Major military powers without space-based assets are in essence deaf, blind and mute, and indeed paralysed. Intelligence, communication, precision weapons and logistics all depend on properly functioning space systems.

Not surprisingly, space is increasingly regarded as a military domain. Space is now starting to be weaponised, the terms of the 1967 Outer Space Treaty notwithstanding. In March 2019, India became the fourth country to demonstrate a direct-ascent anti-satellite (ASAT) capability in a live test, following the US, Russia and China, which first did so in 2007. These tests are emblematic of a more pervasive trend. The US, under President Donald Trump, re-established a Space Command in 2019 as a precursor to an eventual Space Force. In China, the Strategic Support Force, established in 2015, has an important role in further developing the PLA’s space warfare capabilities. Russia, building on the vast infrastructure established during Soviet times, remains an important space power.

2022 Michigan Affirmative
2AC Case › 2AC – Solvency › 2AC – AT: Norms Fail

Clarifying escalation thresholds in advance is key to preventing miscalc in a crisis – lack of cold war experience in space makes preemptive norms essential

James P. Finch 14, Principal Director for Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction, Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, where he previously acted as the Principal Director for Space Policy. He has held space-related leadership positions in the Office of the Secretary of Defense and Headquarters U.S. Air Force. December 30, 2014, "Bringing Space Crisis Stability Down to Earth." https://ndupress.ndu.edu/Media/News/Article/577582/bringing-space-crisis-stability-down-to-earth/]

Simply put, the weapon, target, and context all contribute to the perceived intent and effects of a counterspace attack. Unlike in other domains, tremendous ambiguity exists regarding the use of counterspace weapons. This means that all of these variables would be open to interpretation in crises, and it should be remembered that an inherent characteristic of crises is a short timeframe for decisionmaking. When time is short and the potential cost of inaction is significant, or even catastrophic, decisionmakers tend to lean toward worst-case interpretations of an adversary’s actions. This is a clear recipe for inadvertent miscalculation.

Bringing Space Down to Earth

2022 Michigan Affirmative
2AC Case › 2AC – Solvency › 2AC – AT: Norms Fail

Norms are key to crisis stability – building them in advance is goldilocks for deterrence and signaling escalation thresholds

Audrey M. Schaffer 17 Director for Space Strategy and Plans in the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy. September 28, 2017; “The Role of Space Norms in Protection and Defense.” Joint Force Quarterly 87. ]

Militaries stand to gain additional unique advantages from widespread adherence to operational space norms. Norms can serve to highlight abnormal behavior, enabling warning of and protection against space threats. Militaries, therefore, should support domestic and international initiatives to shape operational norms of behavior, and they should lend their expertise to norm development efforts. As international space norms take shape, militaries can then analyze abnormal behavior, characterizing those specific behaviors they would consider hostile or aggressive and determining how to respond appropriately in different situations. Militaries may also need to consider whether to evolve operational policies and practices to meet behavioral expectations.

Norms are not a panacea for constraining aggressive, hostile, provocative, or otherwise deliberately irresponsible behavior in outer space. Norms may be enough to dissuade a rational actor from routinely engaging in irresponsible acts, but they will not prevent a committed aggressor from deliberately disrupting or denying space services it deems detrimental to its interests. Norms, however, can play a critical role in detecting and responding to potential threats.

2022 Michigan Affirmative
2AC Case › 2AC – Solvency › 2AC – AT: Alt Cause

The plan solves US exceptionalism in space and overcomes alt causes

James Clay Moltz 11, professor in the National Security Affairs Department at the Naval Postgraduate School, October 2011, “Coalition Building in Space: Where Networks are Power,”

Despite the advantages of creating such an allied network for space, it must be admitted that a number of current obstacles exist to such efforts. Traditional U.S. thinking about U.S. exceptionalism in space would have to be revised and a more egalitarian view of alliance partners adopted. The U.S. State and Defense Departments would need to engage in ITAR reform and craft new military-to-military agreements (of the type the U.S. has with Australia) to allow the sharing of space information. In Congress, a new political willingness to fund space systems that would not be solely for national benefit or under purely national control would need to emerge. At the technical level, new integration with allied industry would likely be necessary to create common standards and interfaces, which would initially cost time and money. Still, given the emerging risks in space of and the possible benefits to be achieved by joint efforts, these problems do not seem insurmountable.

2022 Michigan Affirmative
2AC Case › 2AC – Solvency › 2AC – Solvency – Post Strat Con

Cooperating over space-based cybersecurity including at least clarifying Article 5 solves.

Rose Gottemoeller 6-26; Department of Social Sciences, United States Military Academy; Defence Studies, June 26, 2022; “Engaging with emerged and emerging domains: cyber, space, and technology in the 2022 NATO strategic concept,” https://doi.org/10.1080/14702436.2022.2082955

NATO’s ability to achieve its core tasks of Collective Defense, Crisis Management, and Cooperative Security requires strength and resilience of each member state. It is critical to build a common strategic culture among Allies that embraces the technological complexity of these new domains and seeks to address the challenges of the strategic environment. While member states will continue to have differential capabilities within each domain, the culture among Allies must reflect a desire to maintain a competitive edge by growing human capital and technological development. Political elites of member states must also understand how this technological complexity may shape their decision making and their understanding of escalatory pathways (Kubiak and Mishra 2022). NATO must foster a culture of adaptability and flexibility to handle the everchanging nature of cyber, space, and EDT. Consensus, communication, and cooperation, described below, serve as the foundational pillars upon which a resilient and adaptable Alliance grows.

Consensus

2022 Michigan Affirmative
2AC Case › 2AC – Russia Adv › 2AC – Yes Russia Attack

Russia has capability to destroy NATO satellites and GPS – already hacked Ukraine.

Ayres ’22 (Thomas Ayres, retired U.S. Army major general, former general counsel of the Department of the Air Force. “Russia’s war could spread to space; the U.S. should be prepared” 04/26/22 https://spacenews.com/op-ed-russias-war-could-spread-to-space-the-u-s-should-be-prepared/)

As background, recall that in November 2021, while amassing forces on Ukraine’s borders, Russia launched an ASAT satellite missile that destroyed one of its own satellites in orbit. It caused hazardous orbital debris and at the time seemed senseless. Russian authorities blathered and quibbled.

In hindsight, Russia’s demonstration of offensive space capabilities was on their pre-invasion checklist. This preparatory step to invading Ukraine sent a dual warning. First, when Russia invades, don’t interfere with Russian space systems upon which the Russian military relies. Second, if you seek to come to Ukraine’s aid, U.S. and NATO satellites upon which you rely will be in jeopardy.

2022 Michigan Affirmative
2AC Case › 2AC – Russia Adv › 2AC – NC3 Key

Cybersecurity in space is the largest threat to NC3 integrity --- US collaboration with NATO allies to develop new measures now is key.

Dr. Jared Dunnmon 17, postdoctoral fellow in the Computer Science Department at Stanford, 2017, “Nuclear Command and Control in the Twenty-First Century: Maintaining Surety in Outer Space and Cyberspace”, https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/resrep23162.5.pdf \\SYang

While rapid advances in information technology, communications, and computation have yielded many improvements to NC3 systems, these improvements have come at the cost of NC3 surety and security. The two domains in which these costs are most apparent are the two newest arenas of conflict: outer space and cyberspace. In the words of Admiral Haney, “the space domain, along with cyberspace, is simultaneously more critical to all U.S. operations yet more vulnerable than ever to hostile actions.”14 The worrisome combination of international norms that have been far outpaced by the speed of technological advancement and democratization of key space and cyber technologies has led the United States to a point where it is difficult to be confident that the current NC3 structure is resilient in a cyber-physical sense. Outer Space The major threat to NC3 posed by vulnerabilities in space-based assets results from potential disruptions to both early warning and communications functions. As noted by Frank Rose, former deputy assistant secretary of state for defense policy and verification operations, The United States in particular is deeply reliant upon space. While such reliance enables the United States and our allies and partners to undertake a range of operations in support of peace and security, this reliance has increasingly been viewed by potential adversaries as a vulnerability to be exploited through the development of counterspace capabilities. This reality is particularly emergent in the context of NC3. At present, it is known that Russia and China are actively pursuing or already maintain such capabilities as laser weapons for satellite denial, electromagnetic (EM) jamming for communications degradation, and physical antisatellite (ASAT) systems. Given heavy reliance on satellites such as Advanced Extremely High Frequency (AEHF) and Air Force Satellite Communications (AFSATCOM) in the NC3 system, ensuring both reliability and resiliency to these types of threats will be critical to creating a flexible and efficient NC3 system. Cyberspace In the cyber domain, potential vulnerabilities exist in all three parts of the command, control, and communications triad. Specifically, due to cyberspace’s relatively low cost of entry, cyber threats range from state-sponsored offensive military operations and espionage activities, to [violent extremist organizations] intent on disrupting our way of life, to cyber criminals and recreational hackers seeking financial gain and notoriety. Additionally, the U.S. supply chain and critical infrastructure remains vulnerable to cyber attack, and even as we detect and defeat attacks, attribution remains a significant challenge. At present, assumptions are that NC3 is secured via a combination of air gaps, technological superiority in outer space and cyberspace, and human intervention in the control loop. Unfortunately, this is not always the case. In the intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) program, for instance, documented vulnerabilities include potential entry into the firewalled NC3 system, phony orders being conveyed via a backup antenna, distributed denial of service (DDoS) attacks on the nuclear infrastructure, and even a direct attack on thousands of feet of cable of the Hardened Intersite Cable System. For the strategic ballistic missile submarine (SSBN) component, it has been widely publicized that the United States has chosen to use Linux-based operating systems in its SSBNs, as opposed to Windows XP-based architectures currently used by the British Trident program. While neither of these operating systems is inherently problematic, the fact that their use in specific functional domains has been published so widely will enable hackers to focus on the correct class of exploits to use against these systems. This observation, furthermore, hints at a distressing reality: with the emergence of ubiquitous cyber threats, the U.S. acquisition process has already begun moving toward increased levels of security and classification across the Department of Defense (DoD) enterprise, which hinders efficiency at all levels of the acquisition process. Without firing a shot, the opponent may well have caused substantial cost to the United States already due to the inefficiency resultant from broadly increased data security and classification procedures. With the bomber airborne component of the command, control, and communications triad, the Air Force has experienced several NC3 breakdowns in the past several decades, the most recent of which involved the inadvertent placement of several nuclear warheads in a strategic bomber that flew over the United States. While this latter situation was not necessarily a cyber failure of commission, it is certainly one of omission in the sense that appropriate command and control safeguards were not in place to prevent such a mistake from occurring. Critical infrastructure that either directly or indirectly supports the nuclear enterprise, such as the domestic power grid is also vulnerable to cyber attack. Janet Napolitano, former secretary of homeland security, recently estimated that an adversary could disable one of the major U.S. power grids with 80 to 90 percent probability of success. The frequency of such cyber vulnerabilities generally correlates with the size of the codebase—one can usually assume one error per thousand lines of code. For perspective, a generic Linux operating system had 15 million lines of code as of 2011. Thus, while the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) currently deploys a wide variety of cyber-defense techniques in defense of nuclear assets, including vulnerability scanning, firewalls, commercial antivirus systems, encryption, data loss prevention, data at rest security, network monitoring, enterprise forensics, and automated security control assessment, it is impractical to find every possible vulnerability in a large codebase and thus impossible to guarantee absolute security from zero-day exploits.2Further, post-detection attribution remains a challenge that usually takes weeks to sort out, meaning that attribution may be unachievable on timescales characteristic of a crisis. Many of the most daunting challenges for NC3 resilience lie at the intersection of cyberspace and outer space domains, where cyber attacks are directed at space-based NC3 assets. A recent study revealed substantial numbers of exploitable flaws in many widely used commercial satellite architectures, including the Iridium constellation, International Maritime Satellites (INMARSAT), and other satellites commonly used by both North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) forces and critical infrastructure systems. Key vulnerability categories included hard-coded credentials (undocumented credentials that can authenticate in documented interfaces), undocumented protocols (protocols not intended for end users), insecure protocols (end-user protocols that pose a security risk), and backdoors (mechanisms used to access features not intended for end users). Outcomes from reported exploits included control over systems as varied as land-based communication and aircraft navigation, either of which could have a debilitating effect on MEECN integrity and ultimate NC3 efficacy. Understanding and mitigating the potential effects of these cyber threats to space-based assets will be imperative in ensuring the continued effectiveness of NC3.

2022 Michigan Affirmative
2AC Case › 2AC – Russia Adv › 2AC – No Kinetic – Russia

Russia won’t risk a kinetic attack on NATO satellites – too worried about the response. Will only risk cyberattack.

Hitchens ’22 (Theresa Hitchens, Space and Air Force reporter at Breaking Defense, former Defense News editor, former senior research associate at the University of Maryland’s Center for International and Security Studies at Maryland (CISSM), former director of the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR). “” 02/15/22 )

There is little question that Russia will jam and/or spoof GPS receivers should it decide to invade Ukraine, as going after GPS has become almost ubiquitous as a first military move since the conflict in Kosovo.

But US government officials, former officials and outside experts are divided on how worried the US government ought to be about attacks aside from GPS jamming. Specifically, there is concern that Russia could directly target US  satellites, including  birds.

2022 Michigan Affirmative
2AC Case › 2AC – Russia Adv › 2AC – No Kinetic

No kinetic attacks – hacking is cheaper, harder to attribute, can be easily scaled across targets, and are reversible – infinitely more strategic.

Waterman ’21 (Shaun Waterman, award-winning journalist and communicator who has worked for the BBC, United Press International and POLITICO, and an expert on cybersecurity and counter-terrorism who has presented at leading conferences like Hacker Halted and the Aspen Security Forum. “Hacking the Space Force” 07/22/21 )

And that’s not a moment too soon: Unclassified threat assessments show that vital U.S. space assets are increasingly vulnerable to a range of emerging threats. However, hacking is a much lower-cost way of interfering with a satellite than kinetic or directed-energy attacks, and can more easily be scaled across multiple targets, according to the Aerospace Corp. And because many cyberattacks are reversible and can be hard to attribute, they offer an adversary a much greater opportunity to hide their hand—or at least preserve some plausible deniability—said Craig Miller, president of government systems at Viasat Inc., which provides satellite hardware and services to DOD.

“Someone can launch a cyber attack, and there’re ways to obscure it and obfuscate it, so that it’s difficult to find the source. … And they’re also often reversible, you can turn them off, or you can stop them, whereas other effects [like kinetic or directed-energy attacks] cause permanent damage, and it’s much clearer who did it,” he said. 

2022 Michigan Affirmative
2AC Case › 2AC – Russia Adv › 2AC – No Kinetic

Satellites most vulnerable to cyber attacks while kinetic dangers remain extremely rare

Adam Ali.Zare Hudaib 16; Network & Cyber Security Expert / Penetration Tester / Ethical Hackers Trainer / Ethical Hacker / IT Security Trainer., Published: 2016; "Satellite Network Hacking & Security Analysis"; Adam Ali.Zare HudaibInternational Journal of Computer Science and Security (IJCSS), Volume (10); Accessed: 6-22-2022; https://www.academia.edu/24899095/Satellite_Network_Hacking_and_Security_Analysis)//Pen-SY

Satellite networks are also vulnerable to cyber terrorism or coordinated space-based and groundbased threats and attacks committed by unlawful and/or politically motivated terrorist groups who target critical communications systems such as satellite networks to cause data corruption, disruption of critical infrastructure services, economic damage, harm, and loss of life [22]. Satellite network attacks attributed to cyber terrorismcan result in disruptions in financial markets and disclosure of government, law enforcement, medical, and/or military classified data [22]. Intentional satellite system incursions motivated by cyber terrorismraise questions about the dependability, reliability, availability, and security of satellite network services and erode public confidence in the integrity of satellite-dependent, critical infrastructure applications [22]. Vulnerable Software While kinetic dangers (i.e., being hit and/or damaged by stray objects such as meteorites or other satellites) remain rare, satellite systems are remarkably vulnerable to a range of cybersecurity issues and hostile attacks because they are hugely complex and expensive, take months to deploy, and the primary emphasis is on getting a working system that meets specification and the contract deliverables. Most cyber exploit attacks take advantage of incomplete code that does not boundary check incoming data allowing for stack buffer overflow attacks. These are very prominent in embedded C and C++ systems and require an additional vulnerability assessment exercise, at great cost and time, in order to fully secure a system. In these cases an internal buffer may be overrun by an intentionally ‘malformed’ packet and code execution achieved by overwriting the area of memory where the return address resides. Once basic code execution is achieved, new threads and processes may be started and most, if not all, facilities within the system can be accessed [23].

2022 Michigan Affirmative
2AC Case › 2AC – Russia Adv › 2AC – Grey Zones Bad

Grey zones increase the likelihood of cyber attacks – those could escalate

Pearson and Landay ’22 (James Pearson, European Cybersecurity Correspondent for Reuters, Jonathan Landay, U.S. National Security Correspondent for Reuters, Winner of the 2017 Arthur Ross Media Award. “Cyberattack on NATO could trigger collective defence clause – official” 02/28/22, )

A cyberattack on a NATO member state could trigger Article 5, its collective defence clause, a NATO official said on Monday, amid concerns that chaos in cyberspace around Russia's invasion of Ukraine could spill over into other territories.

The military alliance has for years made clear that a serious cyberattack could trigger the clause, but such a scenario has so far been largely hypothetical.

2022 Michigan Affirmative
2AC Case › 2AC – China Adv › 2AC – Yes China Attack

China and Russia are already beginning to be aggressive – they are developing weapons that will be used to commit acts of war in space.

Rogin ’21 (Josh Rogin, columnist for the Global Opinions section of The Washington Post and political analyst for CNN. “A shadow war in space is heating up fast” 11/30/21, https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2021/11/30/space-race-china-david-thompson/)

When Russia blows up a satellite in space with a missile (), or when China tests a new hypersonic missile (), the ongoing arms race in space leaps into the news. But in between these “”-like moments, outside the public’s view, the United States and its adversaries are battling in space every day.

While Washington officials and experts  of an arms race in space, the United States’ adversaries are constantly conducting operations against U.S. satellites that skirt the line between intelligence operations and acts of war. The pace of conflict is intensifying, according to a top Space Force general, who told me that China could overtake the United States to become the number one power in space by the end of the decade.

2022 Michigan Affirmative
2AC Case › 2AC – China Adv › 2AC – Deterrence Solves

There are growing cyber threats to the NATO’s satellites – Russia and China are rapidly advancing their cyber capabilities and have the potential to attack the NATO’s space based assets

Karl-Heinz Brunner 21, member NATO Parliamentary Assembly and the Bundestag Defence Committee and Subcommittee on Disarmament, Arms Control, and Non-Proliferation, October 2021, “Space and Security – NATO’s Role,” NATO Parliamentary Assembly, Science and Technology Committee, https://www.nato-pa.int/download-file?filename=/sites/default/files/2021-04/025%20STC%2021%20E%20-%20SPACE%20AND%20SECURITY%20-%20BRUNNER_2.pdf

42. Space denial capabilities of NATO (near-)peer competitors have significantly increased in recent years, and so have the number of tests of such technologies. Several countries possess weapon systems that have the potential to harm space assets at any time. According to CSIS’s 2020-Space Threat Assessment there are four types of systems that can be used to damage or destroy space-based assets (Harrison, Johnson, Roberts, Way, & Young, 2020): (1) kinetic physical counterspace weapons, built to directly strike satellites or the ground stations operating them; (2) non-kinetic weapons, including lasers, high powered microwave (HPM) weapons, and electromagnetic pulse (EMP) weapons, that can physically affect space assets without any direct contact; (3) electronic attacks targeting signal transmissions to and from satellites by interfering with radio-frequencies (RF) by creating noise in the same frequencies (jamming) or by falsifying a signal and tricking the receiver into it (spoofing), thus corrupting the data; (4) cyberattacks, that target data instead of transmission frequencies. 43. Kinetic physical counterspace weapons have attracted the most attention by far. Tests of direct-ascent anti-satellite (ASAT) weapons have increased as more countries develop capabilities in this domain (Harrison, Johnson, Roberts, Way, & Young, 2020). The most prominent of these tests has arguably been the destruction of a satellite by China in 2007 which increased space debris in LEO by roughly 10% and was followed by broad international condemnation (Ohlandt, McClintock, & Flanagan, 2021). A more recent ASAT test by China, conducted in 2018, was further evidence of Beijing’s growing prowess and ambition in space. Building on extensive experience from Soviet-era ASAT-programmes, Russia has also invested in numerous kinetic physical counterspace capabilities and allegedly has a range of ground-based and air-launched directascent ASAT missiles that could target satellites at its disposal (Harrison, Johnson, Roberts G., Way, & Young, 2020). 44. In addition to direct-ascent systems, co-orbital ASAT-weapons have also already been deployed in space. Their activity is more difficult to detect, however, as it is very similar to on-orbit maintenance or debris removal missions. As most space technologies, co-orbital weapons are a dual-use technology and can be used for both civilian and military purposes. Arguably, any asset in the orbits above earth can be qualified as a weapon just because of its high velocity. With speeds between 11,000 (GEO) and 28,000 (LEO) kilometres per hour, a satellite that changes orbit becomes a kinetic weapon by definition. 45. Some of the most advanced space denial assets have been developed and tested by the People’s Republic of China (PRC). The Pentagon’s annual China military power report notes that Beijing’s space capabilities include orbiting space robots (U.S. Department of Defense, 2020). Similarly, Russia has repeatedly launched inspection-satellites into LEO, which could potentially serve as co-orbital ASAT weapons. Although Moscow has not officially announced any plans to develop space based ASAT weapons, US Space Command accused the Kremlin of testing such weapons-systems under the guise of maintenance in 2020 (US Space Command, 2020). 46. Other than China and Russia, numerous other states are working on counter-space capabilities (Raju, 2020). The threat is also illustrated by the variety of modes of action against satellites: missiles, co-orbital, jamming, directed energy and cyber (Weeden & Samson, 2020). Research and development in these areas is significant, progress is rapid, and some capabilities such as jamming are already in use, in the Middle East (BBC, 2012) or to disrupt NATO exercises in the High North (Deutsche Welle, 2018). Even civilian systems, such as those intended for rendezvous and proximity operations to dock with a space station or perform maintenance, could be dual-use and pose a threat in the vicinity of military satellites or those providing services essential to our economies and lifestyles. 47. While receiving less public attention than their kinetic counterparts, non-kinetic weapon systems such as lasers and electronic technologies enabling jamming or spoofing have also been increasingly developed and tested. According to the Rand Corporation, China continues to develop space weapons and has developed jamming capabilities and tested them in exercises (Manson & Shepherd, 2020). 48. The development of China’s non-kinetic capabilities dates back to the purchase of Soviet-era equipment from Ukraine in the late 1990s (CSIS, 2018). Since then, Beijing’s indigenous space industry has made the ability to jam satellite communications one of its priorities (USCC, 2015) and has developed and tested several systems (DIA, 2019). China’s electronic warfare capacity includes an ionospheric radar located on the island of Hainan that is able to influence particles up to 2,000 kilometres. In 2020, officials announced an airborne laser which, although developed to target military aircraft or missiles, could potentially be used against satellites (Zhen, 2020). 49. Russia, too, has been consistently enhancing its space denial capabilities. The state armament programme for the period until 2027 lists the development of defensive space-based systems deployed to protect Russian satellites (Zak, 2018). Moreover, Russia is commonly believed to be testing electronic counterspace warfare, jamming and spoofing adversaries’ satellites in conflict zones as well as in nearby territories (Harrison, Johnson, Roberts, Way, & Young, 2020) and even on GPS-Satellites within its own state borders (BBC, 2018). 50. Finally, several actors in space have developed substantial knowledge in the cyber realm. As cyber-attacks are significantly cheaper and much harder to attribute than direct-ascent or co-orbital ASAT, they are a compelling alternative to these weapon systems. Russia has demonstrated its cyber capabilities as early as 1998, when it allegedly took control of a US-German satellite, pointed it at the Sun and thus destroyed its instruments (Tucker, 2019). The Chinese government appears to also have tested its cyber capabilities in several instances such as during the 2014 National Oceanographic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) hack (Al-Rodhan, 2020). The attack disrupted weather information and impacted end users around the globe (Al-Rodhan, 2020). More generally, research and development in space denial capabilities is significant, progress is rapid, and some capabilities, such as jamming, are already in use, for example in the Middle East (BBC, 2012) or to disrupt NATO exercises in the High North (Deutsche Welle, 2018).

2022 Michigan Affirmative
2AC Case › 2AC – China Adv › 2AC – Cyber Solves

Only revitalizing NATO cooperation can stop a Sinocentric world order---failure to mobilize various geographic focuses allows numerous cyberspace threats.

Liselotte Odgaard 22, professor at the Norwegian Institute for Defense Studies, 2/24/2022, "NATO’s China Role: Defending Cyber and Outer Space," Washington Quarterly, 45(1), pp 175-180, https://doi.org/10.1080/0163660X.2022.2059145, sg

Rather than highlighting the need for a division of labor within NATO, the 2022 invasion has highlighted that Russia’s appetite for threatening Europe with military action is closely entwined with its long-standing strategic cooperation with China. Intelligence reports that China told Russia in February 2022 not to invade Ukraine before the end of the Winter Olympics in Beijing testify to the closely orchestrated Chinese-Russian approach to the West.18 Moscow and Beijing are both strategic opponents of the US, a shared status that has spurred them to coordinate their separate geostrategic priorities in Europe and the Indo-Pacific, forging unison pushback against what they consider Western encroachments on their spheres of interest.19 The poorer than expected performance of the Russian armed forces in its 2022 war with Ukraine has pushed China to try to appear neutral. Nevertheless, China has joined Russia in opposing further enlargement of NATO, and in the Indo-Pacific, Russia has joined China in opposing Taiwanese independence.20 It would be wise for Europe and the US to plan for Sino-Russian geostrategic coordination to continue unless more clear evidence that China will abandon Russia is presented. One thing is certain: China will work with the partners that help it advance a Sinocentric international order based on authoritarian regimes. And to counter this development, Europe and the United States need to devise effective mechanisms for joint responses to Beijing as well as to Moscow.

A US-European division of labor is not likely to help NATO develop tools to defend itself against threats from China and Russia. The lack of electronic warfare in Russia’s war with Ukraine has revealed gaps between its concept of operations and the tactics of the Ukrainian military. As demonstrated in prior operations in Syria and the Donbas, Russia will adapt and learn in the short and long term. For example, Russia can be expected to improve its electromagnetic spectrum management in order to enhance its planning and management of forces on the battlefield. Meanwhile, China is watching the performance of the parties involved in the war with a view to update its cyber and space capabilities as well as strategic concepts. As a consequence, both Russian and Chinese threats will continue to increasingly emerge in the cyber and space domains. This calls for global and functional defenses rather than an exclusive geographical focus. It is more important than ever to design NATO for a future where threats toward transatlantic security are global and requires a unified response.

2022 Michigan Affirmative
AFF – Cyber Space Assets › 1AC – Cyber Space Assets › 1AC - Solvency

NATO unity is key – interoperability in space enables effective communication

Beyza Unal 19, PhD Old Dominion University, senior research fellow with the International Security Department at Chatham House, specializes in nuclear and cyber policies, worked in the Strategic Analysis Branch at NATO Allied Command and Transformation, William J. Fulbright alumna, July 2019, “Cybersecurity of NATO’s Space-based Strategic Assets,” https://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/2019-06-27-Space-Cybersecurity-2.pdf

Interoperability enables allies to operate their space systems without having to make adaptations so that their systems can function efficiently.

Interoperability has been an issue in the land, air, and maritime domains. Space-assets planning would benefit from the lessons learned in those domains – for instance, by studying and understanding the complexities involved in intelligence- and information-sharing across all domains. Allies could allocate funds towards a body of work that could focus on interoperability in space. Doctrines and standardization could help to improve interoperability among allied systems. Yet, allies should also realize that standardization would mean using the same vectors as a baseline, thus leading to an increase in risk (in the remaining vulnerabilities) across the alliance as a whole.

2022 Michigan Affirmative
AFF – Cyber Space Assets › 1AC – Cyber Space Assets › 1AC - Solvency

International action is key – US cooperation with NATO secures satellite assets

David Fidler 18, the James Louis Calamaras Emeritus Professor of Law at Indiana University, Adjunct Senior Fellow for Cybersecurity and Global Health at the Council on Foreign Relations, 4/3/18, “Cybersecurity and the New Era of Space Activities,” https://www.cfr.org/report/cybersecurity-and-new-era-space-activities

The tasks of securing outer space and cyberspace are converging. The internet increasingly depends on space-enabled communication and information services. Likewise, the operation of satellites and other space assets relies on internet-based networks, which makes these assets, like cars and medical equipment, devices on the internet of things. New government actors, companies, goals, and technologies are expanding and transforming space activities. However, neither space policy nor cybersecurity policy is prepared for the challenges created by the meshing of space and cyberspace, which could increase national security risks.

To meet these challenges, government, industry, and international action is needed. The Donald J. Trump administration’s National Space Council should develop cybersecurity recommendations for space activities, and federal agencies should prioritize these within the government and in cooperation with the private sector. In crafting needed legislation for commercial space activities, Congress should bolster industry efforts to strengthen cybersecurity. Private-sector actors should strengthen their adoption of cybersecurity best practices and collaborate with one another on improving implementation of cybersecurity strategies. Internationally, the United States should pursue collaboration on space cybersecurity through the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), plurilateral space cooperation mechanisms, and bilateral forums.

2022 Michigan Affirmative
AFF – Cyber Space Assets › 1AC – Cyber Space Assets › 1AC – Russia Advantage

Mounting Russian ASAT capabilities necessitate a clarification of non-kinetic response thresholds

Marcin Piotrowski ’19, Ph.D. in Political Science from the University of Warsaw, Analyst with the International Security Program at the Polish Institute of International Affairs; Polish Institute of International Affairs, November 14, "Russia’s Approach to Anti-satellite Weapons and Systems,"

Implications for the U.S. and NATO. Russia is concerned about the United States’ growing technological advantage and military domination in space and is proposing international laws aimed at limiting ASAT. At the same time, the Russian authorities are developing kinetic ASAT weapons, which are presented as a response to similar projects carried out by China, the U.S. and India. Russia is currently able to add ASAT functions to missile defence systems such as A-235 and S-400, which can intercept exo-atmospheric warheads. In the next few years, it will also be able to use kinetic ASAT weapons (Rudolf and S-500) against civilian and military satellites in low-earth orbit and to deploy robotic satellites capable of disrupting military and civilian satellites in higher orbits. Russia’s ASAT weapons are an element of its “asymmetric response” to the development of the United States’ missile defence, new ground-launched missiles and hypersonic weapons. The U.S. is also paying close attention to Russia’s visible and advanced non-kinetic ASAT capabilities in terms of electronic and cyber-attacks. These threats from Russia were among the factors justifying the recent creation of a new space force branch of the military in the United States.

The broadening spectrum of Russia’s ASAT capabilities also requires a response from NATO and EU states. The Alliance approved a space policy in June, and the next stage might take place at the December meeting of NATO heads of state and government in London, where space will be recognised as a fifth domain of military operations and the Allies will work on a specific space strategy. NATO’s doctrines current see air and space as one, so need to be updated to take account of new threats. Within NATO there is a need to address the implications of ASAT weapons on Article 4 of the Washington Treaty. It may be that non-kinetic disruption of a satellite belonging to any NATO member will be the subject of consultations under Article 4, and the Alliance could decide that the physical destruction of a member’s satellite may be deemed an act of aggression that would call for Article 5 to be invoked. Allied exercises should incorporate ASAT-attack and GPS-jamming scenarios in future, particularly when planning large-scale exercises such as the upcoming Defender 20. Poland’s armed forces technical modernisation programme for the period to 2035 assumes the acquisition of reconnaissance satellites, so additional protection from non-kinetic attacks might be necessary. The EU institutions and countries should use information campaigns to increase awareness among civilians who rely on satellites vulnerable to non-kinetic ASAT attacks during peacetime or in hybrid warfare.

2022 Michigan Affirmative
AFF – Cyber Space Assets › 1AC – Cyber Space Assets › 1AC – Russia Advantage

Any direct conflict with Russia would quickly draw in other powers and cause extinction

CJ Atkins 22, Ph.D. in political science from York University in Toronto, March 17, 2022, “Why a Ukraine ‘no-fly zone’ would mean the end of the world…literally” https://www.peoplesworld.org/article/why-a-ukraine-no-fly-zone-would-mean-the-end-of-the-worldliterally/

The reality is that enforcing a no-fly zone would literally mean that NATO (which basically implies U.S.) warplanes and missiles would be shooting down Russian planes—American military personnel killing Russian military personnel.

That would mean war—immediate war between Russia and the 30 nations of the U.S.-dominated NATO alliance. And a war between Russia and the United States could very easily escalate to an all-out nuclear confrontation. Russia already put its nuclear forces on high alert before the invasion of Ukraine and warned others to stay out, and U.S. missiles are always ready to launch at a moment’s notice.

2022 Michigan Affirmative
AFF – Cyber Space Assets › 1AC – Cyber Space Assets › 1AC – Russia Advantage

The US would retaliate to an attack on a satellite – NC3 failure is sufficient for a nuclear response

Michael T. Klare 19, professor emeritus of peace and world security studies at Hampshire College and senior visiting fellow at the Arms Control Association, November 2019, “Cyber Battles, Nuclear Outcomes? Dangerous New Pathways to Escalation,”

In January 2018, details of the Trump administration’s Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) were posted online by the Huffington Post, provoking widespread alarm over what were viewed as dangerous shifts in U.S. nuclear policy. Arousing most concern was a call for the acquisition of several types of low-yield nuclear weapons, a proposal viewed by many analysts as increasing the risk of nuclear weapons use.

Another initiative incorporated in the strategy document also aroused concern: the claim that an enemy cyberattack on U.S. nuclear command, control, and communications (NC3) facilities would constitute a “non-nuclear strategic attack” of sufficient magnitude to justify the use of nuclear weapons in response.