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2022 Michigan Evidence
LIO Good › AT: Warming

Climate change doesn’t cause extinction.

Kerr et al. ’19 [Amber, Daniel Swain, Andrew King, Peter Kalmus, Richard Betts, and William Huiskamp; June 4; Energy and Resources PhD at the University of California-Berkeley, known agroecologist, former coordinator of the USDA California Climate Hub; Climate Science PhD at UCLA, climate scientist, a research fellow at the National Center for Atmospheric Research; Earth Sciences PhD, Climate Extremes Research Fellow at the University of Melbourne; Physics PhD at the University of Colombia, climate scientist at NASA’s Jet Propulsion Lab; Professor and Chair in Climate Impacts at the University of Exeter, a lead author on the Fourth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change in Working Group 1; Paleoclimatology PhD at the Climate Change Research Center, climate scientist at the Potsdam Institute for Climate Impact Research; Climate Feedback, “Claim that human civilization could end in 30 years is speculative, not supported with evidence,” ]

There is no scientific basis to suggest that climate breakdown will “annihilate intelligent life” (by which I assume the report authors mean human extinction) by 2050.

However, climate breakdown does pose a grave threat to civilization as we know it, and the potential for mass suffering on a scale perhaps never before encountered by humankind. This should be enough reason for action without any need for exaggeration or misrepresentation!

2022 Michigan Evidence
LIO Good › AT: Pandemics

Pandemics don’t cause extinction.

Halstead 19 John Halstead, doctorate in political philosophy. [Cause Area Report: Existential Risk, Founders Pledge, https://founderspledge.com/research/Cause%20Area%20Report%20-%20Existential%20Risk.pdf]//BPS

However, there are some reasons to think that naturally occurring pathogens are unlikely to cause human extinction. Firstly, Homo sapiens have been around for 200,000 years and the Homo genus for around six million years without being exterminated by an infectious disease, which is evidence that the base rate of extinction-risk natural pathogens is low.82 Indeed, past disease outbreaks have not come close to rendering humans extinct. Although bodies were piled high in the streets across Europe during the Black Death,83 human extinction was never a serious possibility, and some economists even argue that it was a boon for the European economy.84 Secondly, infectious disease has only contributed to the extinction of a small minority of animal species.85 The only confirmed case of a mammalian species extinction being caused by an infectious disease is a type of rat native only to Christmas Island. Having said that, the context may be importantly different for modern day humans, so it is unclear whether the risk is increasing or decreasing. On the one hand, due to globalisation, the world is more interconnected making it easier for pathogens to spread. On the other hand, interconnectedness could also increase immunity by increasing exposure to lower virulence strains between subpopulations.87 Moreover, advancements in medicine and sanitation limit the potential damage an outbreak might do.

2022 Michigan Evidence
LIO Good › AT: Relations---TL

Chinese expansion causes relations breakdown

Haenle and Bresnick 22 — Paul Haenle holds the Maurice R. Greenberg Director’s Chair at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and is a visiting senior research fellow at the East Asian Institute, National University of Singapore. Sam Bresnick is assistant editor and research assistant.Paul Haenle, Sam Bresnick, "Why U.S.-China Relations Are Locked in a Stalemate," Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 02-21-2022, https://carnegieendowment.org/2022/02/21/why-u.s.-china-relations-are-locked-in-stalemate-pub-86478, accessed 7-10-2022, WMK

Former U.S. President Donald Trump ushered in a more confrontational era in U.S.-China relations, and Biden has largely maintained his predecessor’s approach to Beijing, albeit with a more equanimous tone and embrace of multilateralism. The U.S. government has for decades been concerned by China’s mercantilism, rapid military modernization, and illiberal approach to human rights, but it had held out hope that China might liberalize through increasingly robust contact with the rest of the world. That has not happened, and the United States and others have lost patience with China’s state capitalist system, militarization of the South China Sea, and increasingly authoritarian governance.

But Beijing is not backing down. Despite facing pronounced international pushback during the pandemic, Xi has become even more confident in China’s economic system, governance model, and approach to international affairs. “Time and momentum are on China’s side,” he argued last year at a high-level meeting, though many analysts accuse the party of overconfidence. At the same time, Chinese officials are increasingly looking askance at their U.S. counterparts. Many appear to believe that the United States, though still a formidable power, is in the early stages of an inevitable decline. Just as China resumes its rightful place atop the hierarchy of Asian nations, Beijing’s thinking goes, the United States’ unresolved racial justice issues, income inequality, and political polarization will catalyze an irreversible diminution of U.S. power in Asia and across the globe.

2022 Michigan Evidence
LIO Good › AT: LIO Unsustainable

China led order is impossible---social constraints

Allan 18 — Bentley B. Allan is an Assistant Professor of Political Science and an affiliate of the Environment, Energy, Sustainability, and Health Institute at Johns Hopkins University. Srdjan Vucetic is Assistant Professor at the Graduate School of Public and International Affairs, University of Ottawa. Theodore Hopf is an American academic and a leading figure in constructivism in international relations theory. Allan, B., Vucetic, S., & Hopf, T. (2018). The Distribution of Identity and the Future of International Order: China’s Hegemonic Prospects. International Organization, 72(4), 839-869. doi:10.1017/S0020818318000267 WMK

What are the prospects for the Western hegemonic order in the face of China’s rise? Broadly speaking, there are three possibilities. The order could remain stable under the leadership of either the US or a coalition of great powers. The order could dissolve without being replaced. Or, China could lead a hegemonic transition, either by joining and transforming the current order or by constructing an alternative order from the outside. To assess which of these is most likely, we return to the three theoretical expectations about the dynamics of hegemonic order we outlined earlier. We conclude that the first two possibilities are more likely than a Chinese-led transition, given the distribution of identity.

First, does the distribution of identity bolster Western hegemony? The evidence shows that while some aspects of Western democratic neoliberal hegemony are contested, the distribution of identity among the great powers provides strong support for Western hegemony. Masses and elites in the United Kingdom, France, Germany, Japan, Brazil, and India clearly identify with democracy. While the masses in some of these countries reject neoliberalism, elites identify with liberal policies. This suggests that the hegemonic order is likely to remain stable even in the face of a relative decline in American power. Other states would likely be willing to support the order and either bolster American leadership or form a coalition akin to Snidal’s k-group that could maintain most existing rules without a hegemon.

2022 Michigan Evidence
LIO Good › AT: LIO Unsustainable

China can’t become a hegemon

Yue 21 — Yue, J. (2021). The limits to China’s peaceful rise – Deep Integration and a new Cold War. Global Policy, 13(1), 91–106. WMK

The Chinese regime’s peaceful rise rhetoric reveals the country’s developmental quandary in the age of globalization. Rampant corruption as well as the regime’s strong links with Wall Street finance and intimate collaboration with Western industrial capital have fostered a thriving system of crony comprador capitalism (Ho, 2013; Meisner, 1996, p. 300; Pei, 2016),28 characterized by unprecedented state capture by public and private institutional interests who not only are ‘self-serving’, but also ‘serve the interests of global capital’ (Kwong, 2006; Yue, 2018a, pp. 271–331).29 With this ‘worst form of capitalism’ becoming solidly entrenched, the current campaign waged by the seemingly all-powerful paramount leader Xi Jinping against the ‘ultrarich and famous’ high-tech oligarchs, is motivationally dubious, which has in no small part more to do with affirming ‘politics in command’ (zhengzhi guashuai, 政治挂帅) than with reversing ‘state capture’ by private interests.

In fact, from 2002 onward, the liberal globalization approach to economic development has undergirded the CCP’s guiding ideology of ‘building a socialism of (changed from “with”) Chinese characteristics’,30 symbolizing that the country’s dependent pathway of development has since been fully institutionalized (Yue, 2018a, pp. 111 & 317). The ruling elites are so obsessed with the alleged benefits of globalization as to make the country’s embrace of global capitalism a ‘political correctness’. Since under most circumstances globalization is not open to criticism, China’s commitment to the techno-nationalism that it is widely perceived to have embraced remains deeply in doubt.31

2022 Michigan Evidence
LIO Good › AT: LIO Unsustainable

China heg is not sustainable---structural factors

Mueller 22 — John Mueller is a senior fellow at the Cato Institute. He is also a member of the political science department and senior research scientist with the Mershon Center for International Security Studies at the Ohio State University. John Mueller, “China Has Been a Failure at Hegemony, So Let’s Just Chill,” Cato Institute, 01-11-22, https://www.cato.org/commentary/china-has-been-failure-hegemony-so-lets-just-chill, accessed 7-4-2022, WMK

Many in the U.S. foreign policy establishment and elsewhere are sounding an alarm over concerns that, as China develops, it will become the dominant power in its region, a “hegemon” that will have too much “influence” there and do damage to U.S. security interests. For example, in 2017 the National Intelligence Council opined that “geopolitical competition” was on the rise and the Chinese sought “to exert more sway over their neighboring regions and promote an order in which U.S. influence does not dominate.”

Accordingly, as it is often suggested, military hardware must be deployed to somehow keep that from happening.

2022 Michigan Evidence
LIO Good › AT: China Led Order

Chinese led order is incoherent and fails

Stephen 21 — Matthew D Stephen WZB Berlin Social Science Center, China’s New Multilateral Institutions: A Framework and Research Agenda, International Studies Review, Volume 23, Issue 3, September 2021, Pages 807–834, WMK

However, China’s attempts to “upload” its preferred normative vision to multilateral institutions, even its own, are not always successful. For example, while Xi Jinping initially promoted the idea of an AIIB under the principles of win-win cooperation (ASEAN-China Centre 2013), this has not been reflected in official discourses of the AIIB. The World Internet Conference offers an even clearer example. At the first meeting in 2014, attendees awoke on the last day to find copies of a “Wuzhen Declaration” pushed under their hotel room doors, which repeated key Chinese talking points on internet governance. Upon the objections of several attendees, it was not officially promulgated (Wall Street Journal 2014).

The clumsiness of such attempts at normative entrepreneurialism point toward the difficulty for China in using multilateral formats to promote normative change, let alone an alternative ideology to aspire for global hegemony (Allan, Vucetic, and Hopf 2018). This probably reflects the ideological incoherence of contemporary Chinese society, with its awkward mix of Maoist terminology, Dengist pragmatism, and increasing appeals to classical Chinese thought (Holbig 2013; Madsen 2014; Brown and Bērziņa-Čerenkova 2018). More likely is that China’s institutions will contribute to normative change simply by avoiding the overtly liberal ideas present in existing institutions that link states’ international legitimacy to their domestic affairs (Zhang 2011, 2016).

2022 Michigan Evidence
LIO Good › 1ac – Harari

LIO collapse causes extinction---rogue tech, bio arms-racing, and climate change.

Harari ’18 [Yuval; September 26; Professor of History at Hebrew University of Jerusalem; "We need a post-liberal order now," https://www.economist.com/open-future/2018/09/26/we-need-a-post-liberal-order-now]

If the liberal order is collapsing, what new kind of global order might replace it? So far, those who challenge the liberal order do so mainly on a national level. They have many ideas about how to advance the interests of their particular country, but they don’t have a viable vision for how the world as a whole should function. For example, Russian nationalism can be a reasonable guide for running the affairs of Russia, but Russian nationalism has no plan for the rest of humanity. Unless, of course, nationalism morphs into imperialism, and calls for one nation to conquer and rule the entire world. A century ago, several nationalist movements indeed harboured such imperialist fantasies. Today’s nationalists, whether in Russia, Turkey, Italy or China, so far refrain from advocating global conquest.

In place of violently establishing a global empire, some nationalists such as Steve Bannon, Viktor Orban, the Northern League in Italy and the British Brexiteers dream about a peaceful “Nationalist International”. They argue that all nations today face the same enemies. The bogeymen of globalism, multiculturalism and immigration are threatening to destroy the traditions and identities of all nations. Therefore nationalists across the world should make common cause in opposing these global forces. Hungarians, Italians, Turks and Israelis should build walls, erect fences and slow down the movement of people, goods, money and ideas.

2022 Michigan Evidence
ATs › AT: Power Vacuum

Regional fill-in solves

Roy 19 (Dr. Indrajit Roy, Politics Department at the University of York, Junior Research Fellow at Wolfson College and Research Associate at the Department of International Development, University of Oxford, “Interview with Indrajit Roy: Human rights and the Role of Emerging Markets in the Liberal World Order,” 9-17, )

3. How about the US pulling out of multilateral organisations, will there be a power vacuum that might appeal to another county like China?

There might not be as much of a vacuum as we fear. For example, you have multilateral organisations such as the African Union, you have the Association of Southeast Asian Nations [ASEAN]. You have, perhaps not the western dedication to human rights, but attempts for peace harmony and security. So, you may not have a normative commitment to democracy, but one for the commitment to peace. These other models for peace, gives them a chance of developing sustainable mechanisms. I’m not trying to gloat over US withdrawal, but in a sense, I am. Now you get different parts of the world which have a chance, even though it might be messy and embroiled with conflict. There’s no reason to believe that the withdrawal of the US will lead to power vacuum, but actually might give developing powers a chance to regain normal life, for example Afghanistan. West Asia had its own civilisation for 1000s of years, it had communities and sophisticated mechanisms, much better then the alternative conflicts that the West brought. The withdrawal of the liberal international order might actually allow for the return of peace for them. Today, in a lecture on South Asia, I was showing Afghanistan in the 1970s, society was peaceful, people could go to schools, women wore skirts while walking down streets of Kabul. Not to say that wearing miniskirts is an indication of development, but the point is that people were living normal lives as human beings. This was before Afghanistan was sought to be brought into the ‘liberal world order’, before the invasion into Afghanistan which had been brought about by US-backed mujahedin. To answer your question, withdrawal of the ‘liberal world order’, or the US so to speak, from multilateral organisations may just be the best thing for emerging powers. There will be a bit of a power vacuum but not so much as to lead to a Hobbesian state of anarchy.

2022 Michigan Evidence
ATs › *AT: Thucydides Trap/China war defense

Empirics and theory---transition doesn’t cause war UNLESS China is excluded from the international order

Shifrinson 20 — Joshua Shifrinson is an Assistant Professor of International Relations at Boston University. Joshua Shifrinson (2020) The rise of China, balance of power theory and US national security: Reasons for optimism?, Journal of Strategic Studies, 43:2, 175-216, DOI: 10.1080/01402390.2018.1558056 WMK

Despite the prevalence of these assumptions, however, there are both empirical and theoretical reasons to question whether rising states are prone to prey upon declining states. Few studies examine the evolution of rising state attitudes towards declining states.18 That said, a large literature examining the relationship between power shifts and war – an outcome one might expect if rising states were primed to challenge declining states19 – finds only a tenuous link between shifts in the distribution of power and conflict.20 Rather, this research suggests that only rising states ‘dissatisfied’ with the existing international order and holding ‘revisionist’ attitudes are prone to challenge declining states and provoke conflict.21 Otherwise, rising states tend to pursue policies that do not result in war22 and may even try to avoid courting conflict.23

Similarly, even in cases where rising states notionally hold revisionist or dissatisfied preferences, it is ambiguous whether such attitudes drive rising state strategies towards particular declining states. Not only do notionally revisionist actors often seek allies among the existing great powers – meaning that they may cooperate with decliners to court them as partners – but rising state strategies towards decliners do not always align with judgments of risers’ intentions and motives.24 For instance, Wilhelmine Germany – a state seen by many scholars as a prototypical dissatisfied, revisionist actor – nevertheless supported Austria-Hungary before 1914; likewise, a surging and equally revisionist Soviet Union still attempted to align with the United Kingdom after World War Two.25 In short, not only is there an incomplete link between rising state preferences and conflict during a power shift, but risers’ revisionist or dissatisfied proclivities do not determine the more focused policies used to guide their relations with declining states.

2022 Michigan Evidence
ATs › *AT: Thucydides Trap/China war defense

No miscalc---both sides are primed for de-escalation and the competition will be non military

He 22 — Kai He is Professor of International Relations and Director, Centre for Governance and Public Policy, Griffith University, Australia. He is a visiting Chair Professor of International Relations at the Zhou Enlai School of Government, Nankai University, China. Kai He (2022) China’s rise, institutional balancing, and (possible) peaceful order transition in the Asia pacific, The Pacific Review, DOI: 10.1080/09512748.2022.2075439 WMK

Challenging a popular view that China’s rise will lead the United States and China to fall into the ‘Thucydides trap’—a possible hegemonic war between the two—this paper argues that the international order transition will be different this time. Instead of using military means to change the international order, China and the United States have relied on various institutional balancing strategies to compete with one another for an advantageous position in the future international order. Institutional competition in the form of institutional balancing among great powers will strengthen the dynamics and utility of international institutions, encourage states to offer new public goods, and eventually ensure a more peaceful order transition in the international system.

Since the end of the Cold War, China and the United States have engaged in institutional balancing in both economic and security orders in the Asia Pacific. By targeting US domination and existing rules in global finance institutions, China’s AIIB initiative has encouraged some intense but healthy institutional competition in the arena of global infrastructure finance. Through multilateral cooperation with the ASEAN states in the ARF and ASEAN-dominated institutions, China has also challenged the legitimacy and dominating role of the US-led hub-and-spokes bilateral system in the regional security architecture. One unintended consequence of institutional balancing between the United States and China is the proliferation of multilateral security institutions, such as the SLD, the ADMM-Plus, and the revival of the Quad 2.0 in the region. The AIIB and ARF cases have shown that the international order transition led by institutional balancing might be more peaceful than previously perceived.

2022 Michigan Evidence
ATs › *AT: Thucydides Trap/China war defense

No Thucydides trap---peaceful transition is possible---interdependence and MAD prevents escalation. Tensions never spillover

He 22 — Kai He is Professor of International Relations and Director, Centre for Governance and Public Policy, Griffith University, Australia. He is a visiting Chair Professor of International Relations at the Zhou Enlai School of Government, Nankai University, China. Kai He (2022) China’s rise, institutional balancing, and (possible) peaceful order transition in the Asia pacific, The Pacific Review, DOI: 10.1080/09512748.2022.2075439 WMK

The popular ‘Thucydides trap’ argument and power transition theory in IR suggest that a war is more likely to take place between a rising power and a ruling state when their power gap narrows during the international order transition (Allison, 2017; Organski, 1958). I argue that this argument is too deterministic and pessimistic for two reasons. First, nuclear deterrence based on the ‘mutual assured destruction’ logic among great powers will make direct military conflicts unthinkable, if not impossible. Second, the world has been fundamentally changed by the deepening globalization and integrated supply chains. Although some politicians in the United States advocate the ‘decoupling’ with China, it is a politically motivated rhetoric rather than a well-crafted strategy (Farrell & Newman, 2020). As David Ignatius points out, ‘the United States and China have an increasingly competitive relationship, but they need each other, too, like conjoined twins. Hasty attempts at separation could harm them both. Open research made U.S. technology great; making it more difficult for the best brains to live and work here would be folly’ (Ignatius, 2020). In other words, it will be much harder, more painful, and harmful for the United States and China to decouple from one another, economically and technologically.

Then the question is: how will the United States and China compete or ‘fight’ without war when the power disparity continues to narrow between the two nations during the international order transition? In this paper I introduce a new ‘institutional peace’ argument, which suggests that the future international order transition will not feature a military conflict between the United States and China, although diplomatic standoffs and even military tensions might take place more frequently than before. Institutional competition and conflicts among great powers will become a new game (though not the only game) in town during the period of international order transition. Consequently, these institutional dynamics will generate incremental change that may lead to a more peaceful international order transition.

2022 Michigan Evidence
ATs › AT: China Rise Violent

China prefers peaceful rise

Paul Heer 19. Served as National Intelligence Officer for East Asia in the Office of the Director of National Intelligence from 2007 to 2015, since served as Robert E. Wilhelm Research Fellow at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology’s Center for International Studies and as Adjunct Professor at George Washington University’s Elliott School of International Affairs. 1-8-2019. "Rethinking U.S. Primacy in East Asia." National Interest. https://nationalinterest.org/blog/skeptics/rethinking-us-primacy-east-asia-40972

But this policy mantra has two fundamental problems: it mischaracterizes China’s strategic intentions in the region, and it is based on a U.S. strategic objective that is probably no longer achievable. First, China is pursuing hegemony in East Asia, but not an exclusive hostile hegemony. It is not trying to extrude the United States from the region or deny American access there. The Chinese have long recognized the utility—and the benefits to China itself—of U.S. engagement with the region, and they have indicated receptivity to peaceful coexistence and overlapping spheres of influence with the United States there. Moreover, China is not trying to impose its political or economic system on its neighbors, and it does not seek to obstruct commercial freedom of navigation in the region (because no country is more dependent on freedom of the seas than China itself). In short, Beijing wants to extend its power and influence within East Asia, but not as part of a “winner-take-all” contest. China does have unsettled and vexing sovereignty claims over Taiwan, most of the islands and other features in the East and South China Seas, and their adjacent waters. Although Beijing has demonstrated a willingness to use force in defense or pursuit of these claims, it is not looking for excuses to do so. Whether these disputes can be managed or resolved in a way that is mutually acceptable to the relevant parties and consistent with U.S. interests in the region is an open, long-term question. But that possibility should not be ruled out on the basis of—or made more difficult by—false assumptions of irreconcilable interests. On the contrary, it should be pursued on the basis of a recognition that all the parties want to avoid conflict—and that the sovereignty disputes in the region ultimately are not military problems requiring military solutions. And since Washington has never been opposed in principle to reunification between China and Taiwan as long as it is peaceful, and similarly takes no position on the ultimate sovereignty of the other disputed features, their long-term disposition need not be the litmus test of either U.S. or Chinese hegemony in the region. Of course, China would prefer not to have forward-deployed U.S. military forces in the Western Pacific that could be used against it, but Beijing has long tolerated and arguably could indefinitely tolerate an American military presence in the region—unless that presence is clearly and exclusively aimed at coercing or containing China. It is also true that Beijing disagrees with American principles of military freedom of navigation in the region; and this constitutes a significant challenge in waters where China claims territorial jurisdiction in violation of the UN Commission on the Law of the Sea. But this should not be conflated with a Chinese desire or intention to exclusively “control” all the waters within the first island chain in the Western Pacific. The Chinese almost certainly recognize that exclusive control or “domination” of the neighborhood is not achievable at any reasonable cost, and that pursuing it would be counterproductive by inviting pushback and challenges that would negate the objective. So what would Chinese “hegemony” in East Asia mean or look like? Beijing probably thinks in terms of something much like American primacy in the Western Hemisphere: a model in which China is generally recognized and acknowledged as the de facto central or primary power in the region, but has little need or incentive for militarily adventurism because the mutual benefits of economic interdependence prevail and the neighbors have no reason—and inherent disincentives—to challenge China’s vital interests or security. And as a parallel to China’s economic and diplomatic engagement in Latin America, Beijing would neither exclude nor be hostile to continued U.S. engagement in East Asia. A standard counterargument to this relatively benign scenario is that Beijing would not be content with it for long because China’s strategic ambitions will expand as its capabilities grow. This is a valid hypothesis, but it usually overlooks the greater possibility that China’s external ambitions will expand not because its inherent capabilities have grown, but because Beijing sees the need to be more assertive in response to external challenges to Chinese interests or security. Indeed, much of China’s “assertiveness” within East Asia over the past decade—when Beijing probably would prefer to focus on domestic priorities—has been a reaction to such perceived challenges. Accordingly, Beijing’s willingness to settle for a narrowly-defined, peaceable version of regional preeminence will depend heavily on whether it perceives other countries—especially the United States—as trying to deny China this option and instead obstruct Chinese interests or security in the region.

2022 Michigan Evidence
ATs › AT: China LIO Bad

*China is also committed to a rules-based order---their argument is US hypocrisy

Walt 21 — Stephen Walt. “China Wants a ‘Rules-Based International Order,’ Too” Foreign Policy. March 31st, 2021 WMK

But the distinction between the United States’ supposed commitment to a system of rules and China’s alleged lack thereof is misleading in at least three ways. First, it overlooks the United States’ own willingness to ignore, evade, or rewrite the rules whenever they seem inconvenient. If we are honest with ourselves, we have to acknowledge that Washington sometimes thinks it is perfectly okay for might to make right and for winners to take all. The collapse of the Soviet Union, when the United States took full advantage of a weakened post-Soviet Russia, is a perfect example.

Second, as Harvard University’s Alastair Iain Johnston has shown, China accepts and even defends many principles of the existing order, although of course not all of them. That situation may change in the future, of course, but even a vastly more powerful China would undoubtedly seek to retain whatever features of the present order serve its interests.

2022 Michigan Evidence
ATs › AT: LIO Good – Warming

Empirics---LIO structurally cannot solve environmental crisis

Zelikow 22 — Philip Zelikow Professor of History at the University of Virginia. A former U.S. diplomat and Executive Director of the 9/11 Commission, he has worked for five presidential administrations., “The Hollow Order,” Foreign Affairs, July/August 22 https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/world/2022-06-21/hollow-order-international-system, accessed 7-1-2022, WMK

In their statement, China and Russia achieved peak hypocrisy. But the existing world order, which aspired to build a global commonwealth, had already been failing. The free world’s leaders had long ago started favoring performative commitments over the real action needed to safeguard the planet from crises. They expanded NATO without meaningfully responding to increasing Russian aggression. Distracted and chastened by misadventures in the Muslim world, Washington in particular disengaged from practical deeds, even as its rhetorical commitment to the international order varied. The United States’ high defense spending had more to do with satisfying domestic constituencies than with supporting any positive strategy. The world’s transition from fossil fuels to renewable energy sources was based on hollow pledges and private action. As support for globalization waned, the United States and other countries retreated from trade agreements and neglected international institutions for civilian and common economic action. The world’s drive in the early years of this century to improve global health and human development petered out.

2022 Michigan Evidence
ATs › AT: LIO Good – Warming

China international order solves

Walt 21 — Stephen Walt. “China Wants a ‘Rules-Based International Order,’ Too” Foreign Policy. March 31st, 2021 WMK

By contrast, China favors a more Westphalian conception of order, one where state sovereignty and noninterference are paramount and liberal notions of individual rights are downplayed if not entirely dismissed. This vision is no less “rules-based” than the United States’, insofar as it draws on parts of the United Nations charter, and it would not preclude many current forms of international cooperation, including extensive trade, investment, collaboration on vital transnational issues such as climate change. China is also a vocal defender of multilateralism, even if its actual behavior sometimes violates existing multilateral norms. Nonetheless, a world in which China’s preferences prevailed would be different than one in which the U.S. vision proved to be more influential.

2022 Michigan Evidence
ATs › AT: LIO Good – Warming

LIO can’t solve warming

Patrick 21 — Stewart M. Patrick is a James H. Binger Senior Fellow in Global Governance at the Council on Foreign Relations., “The International Order Isn’t Ready for the Climate Crisis,” Foreign Affairs, November/December 2021, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/world/2021-10-19/climate-crisis-international-order-isnt-ready, accessed 7-1-2022, WMK The planet is in the throes of an environmental emergency. Humanity’s continued addiction to fossil fuels and its voracious appetite for natural resources have led to runaway climate change, degraded vital ecosystems, and ushered in the slow death of the world’s oceans. Earth’s biosphere is breaking down. Our depredation of the planet has jeopardized our own survival.

Given these risks, it is shocking that the multilateral system has failed to respond more forcefully and has instead merely tinkered at the margins. Although the United States and the European Union have adopted measures to slow the pace of global warming—by setting more aggressive greenhouse gas reduction targets, for example—nothing guarantees that they will adhere to those pledges, and such steps do little to encourage decarbonization in China, India, and other major emitters. These efforts also fail to address other facets of the looming catastrophe, not least collapsing biodiversity.

The natural world obeys no sovereign boundaries, and neither does the worsening ecological crisis. It is time to take bold steps to overcome the disconnect between an international system divided into 195 independent countries, each operating according to its own imperatives, and a global calamity that cannot be resolved in a piecemeal fashion. It is time to govern the world as if the earth mattered. What the world needs is a paradigm shift in U.S. foreign policy and international relations—a shift that is rooted in ecological realism and that moves cooperation on shared environmental threats to center stage. Call this new worldview “planetary politics.” All governments, starting with Washington, must designate the survival of the biosphere as a core national interest and a central objective of national and international security—and organize and invest accordingly.

2022 Michigan Evidence
ATs › AT: Inevitable/Sustainable

[x] --- globalization and populist backlash

Mearsheimer 19 (John J, President and Fellows of Harvard College and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, “Bound to Fail: The Rise and Fall of the Liberal International Order,” International Security, Volume 43, Issue 4, Spring 2019)

SUMMARY The various causal processes described above have all played an important role in subverting the liberal international order. Although each one has a distinct logic, they have often operated synergistically. For example, the negative effects of hyperglobalization on the lower and middle classes have combined with the nationalist resentment over immigration and the sense of lost sovereignty to fuel a strong populist backlash against the principles and practices of the liberal order. Indeed, that anger has often been directed at the liberal elites who have benefited from the order and who vigorously defend it. That resentment, of course, has had significant political consequences. It has caused deep political divisions in the United States and other Western democracies, led to Brexit, helped put Trump in the White House, and fueled support for nationalist leaders around the world. Where Are We Headed? One might acknowledge that the liberal international order is in terminal decline, but argue that it can be replaced with a more pragmatic version, one that avoids the excesses of the post–Cold War order.85 This more modest liberal order would pursue a more nuanced, less aggressive approach to spreading liberal democracy, rein in hyperglobalization, and put some significant limits on the power of international institutions. The new order, according to this perspective, would look something like the Western order during the Cold War, although it would be global and liberal, not bounded and realist. This solution is not feasible, however, because the unipolar moment is over, which means there is no chance of maintaining any kind of liberal international order for the foreseeable future. Furthermore, President Trump has no intention of pursuing a "liberal-lite" world order, and without his support, that option is a nonstarter. But even if Trump were not an obstacle and the international system were to remain unipolar, the United States would fail if it lowered its sights and attempted to construct a less ambitious liberal order. Indeed, it would end up building an agnostic international order instead. It is impossible to build a meaningful liberal global order with modest or more passive policies. The enterprise requires too much social engineering in too many places. If it has any chance of succeeding (I think it has none), the liberal unipole and its allies must relentlessly pursue highly ambitious global policies, which is why the United States and its liberal partners acted the way they did in the wake of the Cold War. That approach, however, is now politically infeasible because of past failures. Consequently, the liberal democracies have no choice but to take small steps here and there to remake the world in their own image, while adopting a live and let live approach toward most countries in the world. That humble approach would effectively produce an agnostic order. But that is not going to happen, because the system is multipolar and great power politics are once again at play. Thus, the key question is: What kinds of realist orders will dominate the landscape in the new multipolar world? THE NEW REALIST ORDERS There are likely to be three different realist orders in the foreseeable future: a thin international order and two thick bounded orders—one led by China, the other by the United States. The emerging thin international order will be concerned mainly with overseeing arms control agreements and making the global economy work efficiently. It is also likely to pay more serious attention than in the past to problems relating to climate change. In essence, the institutions that make up the international order will focus on facilitating interstate cooperation. The two bounded orders, in contrast, will be concerned principally with waging security competition against each other, although that will call for promoting cooperation among the members of each order. There will be significant economic and military competition between those two orders that will need to be managed, which is why they will be thick orders. Two key features of the new multipolar world will profoundly shape the emerging orders. First, assuming that China continues its impressive rise, it will be involved in an intense security competition with the United States that will be the central feature of international politics over the course of the twenty-first century. That rivalry will lead to the creation of bounded orders dominated by China and the United States. Military alliances will be core components of those two orders, which are now beginning to form and will resemble the Soviet-led and U.S.-led orders in the Cold War. Beijing and Washington, however, will sometimes have reasons to cooperate on select military issues, an endeavor that will fall within the purview of the international order, as it did during the Cold War. Again, the focus will be principally on arms control agreements and will involve Russia as well as China and the United States. The existing treaties and agreements dealing with proliferation are likely to remain in place, because all three great powers will want to limit the spread of nuclear weapons. But Beijing, Moscow, and Washington will have to negotiate new treaties limiting their arsenals, as the superpowers did during the Cold War.86 Nevertheless, the U.S.-led and Chinese-led bounded orders will be largely responsible for dealing with core security matters.

2022 Michigan Evidence
ATs › AT: Inevitable/Sustainable

[x] --- Nationalism

Huang 21 — Department of Political Science, University of Florida, Gainesville, FL Huang Q. The Pandemic and the Transformation of Liberal International Order. J Chin Polit Sci. 2021;26(1):1-26. doi: 10.1007/s11366-020-09698-0. Epub 2020 Oct 16. PMID: 33082701; PMCID: PMC7565235. WMK

Besides the challenge brought by the entrenchment of authoritarianism, the second challenge to current order stems from the exacerbation of nationalism. One of the underlying tensions of the current order exists between states seeking to assert their agency against the seemingly inexorable and homogenizing forces of globalization promoted by the liberal order. States refuse to be hollowed out by the globalizing forces and seek to assert their authority and legitimacy both within their territorial boundaries and in transnational processes. Nationalism has been a tool for modern states to legitimize their power at home and position themselves in the international arena. Besides its linkage to language and symbolism, nationalism is “a sociopolitical movement and an ideology of the nation” [69]. The pandemic provides fertile ground for nationalism to thrive in both democratic and authoritarian countries, as states reclaim their place and authority left by the retreat of globalizing forces. With help from nationalist and populist politicians, nationalism has blended with populism and authoritarianism and become stronger in both democratic and authoritarian hosts.

Confronted with the pandemic, many countries rushed to fend for themselves instead of joining together in multilateral efforts. State leaders worldwide unilaterally closed borders, restricted incoming travelers, grappled with solutions to meet their own soaring demands for medical supplies, and prepared to fix their damaged economies. States have reasserted their roles in responding to crises, guarding their sovereignty, and managing their own economies in the uncertain times, while the globalizing forces promoted by the current order are in the retreat. The self-serving calculations of national interests, in both political and economic spheres, have dominated many leaders’ thinking since the outbreak of the pandemic and are likely to continue influencing policymaking in the post-pandemic struggle for recovery. The exacerbation of nationalism has eroded the popularity and authority of international institutions that buttress the principle of multilateralism and the seemly unstoppable forces of globalization promoted by the current order. It also pushes states to make choices that are most aligned with their national interests, from both material and ideological perspectives.

2022 Michigan Evidence
ATs › AT: Inevitable/Sustainable

[x] --- COVID

Huang 21 — Department of Political Science, University of Florida, Gainesville, FL Huang Q. The Pandemic and the Transformation of Liberal International Order. J Chin Polit Sci. 2021;26(1):1-26. doi: 10.1007/s11366-020-09698-0. Epub 2020 Oct 16. PMID: 33082701; PMCID: PMC7565235. WMK

The first challenge to the current liberal order comes from the entrenchment of authoritarianism during the pandemic, as characterized by authoritarian resilience, autocratization,4 and the consolidation of competing political-economic models built by leading authoritarian countries. As numerous democracies test the boundaries of freedom and control, authoritarian leaders across the world exploit the coronavirus crisis to tighten control over their people even further. The sweeping measures and institutional arrangements utilized by these leaders to combat the virus will leave significant legacies on both domestic politics and foreign policies. Interpreted in the path-dependence framework, the decisions made at certain “formative moments or conjunctures” can influence the long-term institutional trajectories. These institutions can be “sticky” and resistant to changes [43]. Moreover, riding the wave of autocratization, leading authoritarian countries like China have consolidated their competing political-economic models vis-à-vis the Western-dominated model. As increasingly powerful and ambitious patrons in the global arena, they have provided alternative sources of economic power, security, aid, ideology, as well as institutional platforms to the autocrats and emerging autocrats, without imposing political conditionality that favors liberal values. The pandemic has provided opportunities to consolidate their positions and promote their models worldwide.

The entrenchment of authoritarianism is first and foremost reflected by the durability of authoritarian regimes during the pandemic. To the disappointment of those seeking cracks in the authoritarian regimes hit hard by the pandemic, the autocrats around the world have largely survived the tests resulting from the pandemic. In particular, the resilience of communist regimes, such as China and Vietnam, has provided clear examples of entrenched authoritarianism during the pandemic. In the case of China, confronted with the worst health crisis faced by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), the regime’s capacity is questioned by many scholars and observers. Pei argues that the pandemic has shown the regime’s lack of capacity in responding to the health crisis and exposed the fragility of Xi Jinping’s strongman rule. The regime will be trapped in economic stagnation and increasing social unrest domestically and in great-power competition abroad. As a result, it will start to “unravel by fits and starts” [44]. This assessment is consistent with Pei’s earlier diagnosis of the CCP’s serious illnesses and regime decay, as well as other scholars’ observation of China’s “frozen” political system [45, 46]. However, the evidence so far suggests that the regime has not only managed to survive the crisis but also boosted its legitimacy.