2022
Michigan
Negative
DA › Ambiguity DA › 2NC – AT: New Domain/Inexperienced
Ken Jones 15; MS in Cyber Systems and Operations from the Naval Postgraduate School; March 2015; "Cyber War: The Next Frontier for NATO," https://calhoun.nps.edu/bitstream/handle/10945/45201/15Mar_Jones_Ken.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y
To answer this question, it is important to look at the first (and only) time NATO invoked an Article 5 response; namely, following the 9/11 attacks on the United States. When the partners of the alliance first wrote the Washington Treaty, it was initially to deter the Russians from expanding and to deter nuclear warfare at the onset of the Cold War. Article 5 is purposefully vague to give NATO considerable room to maneuver. Before the 9/11 attacks led by Al Qaida, it would have been nearly impossible for anyone, anywhere, including the framers of the Washington Treaty, to imagine such an attack. Likewise, at the 2014 summit in Wales, NATO announced that it would and could invoke an Article 5 response to a cyber-attack, and that the ambiguity would stand.158 NATO’s Ambassador Sorin Ducaru, NATO’s assistant secretary general for “emerging security challenges,” made the following remarks:
[T]here’s no predetermined threshold…there was a conscious decision by the allies in this policy that there is benefit in keeping flexibility and ambiguity…article 5 was by design something that should be invoked politically by [member] nations in a specific context, on a case by case basis…article 5 was never designed to be triggered by a certain threshold. The only time it was invoked was after 9/11, which was a scenario that had never been contemplated by the founding partners.159 In this same vein, Christopher Painter, the U.S.’ State Department cyber coordinator said:
2022
Michigan
Negative
DA › Ambiguity DA › 2NC – Link – Deterrence
Sugio Takahashi 19; Chief of Policy Simulation at the National Institute of Defense Studies, MA in Political Science from Waseda University; 1/9/19; "Development of gray-zone deterrence: concept building and lessons from Japan’s experience," The Pacific Review, Vol. 31, Issue 6, p. 787-810
Third aspect of gray zone deterrence is that deterring states should never close the window for escalation. The main reason why the challengers use gray zone threats to change the status quo is that, first, they are discontent with the status quo and, second, they recognize their inferiority in conventional military challenge (Mazzar, 2015). The challenger may choose gray zone creeping expansion, rather than conventional military challenge, because the cost of conventional military challenge would easily exceed potential gain. Therefore, they may refrain from launching the challenge in the first place if they realize that their expansion has plausible risk of escalating to military conflict. The tripwire definitely has an effect that the challenger estimates higher possibility for escalation. If deterring states absolutely refrain from escalating countermeasures, the challenger side can continue gray zone creeping expansion eternally without taking any risk accompanied with escalation. In order to stop them, the deterring side needs to develop robust posture to win the possible war in the case of escalation, and make the challengers recognize the possibility of unfavorable military conflict. The critical role of military force, which cannot be substituted by other toolkit of statecraft, exists in this aspect of gray zone deterrence. And in this context, war-fighting capabilities still have an irreplaceable role to play.
2022
Michigan
Negative
DA › Ambiguity DA › 2NC – Link – Deterrence
Mustafa Canbolat and Emrah Sezgin 16; PhD in Management Science from McMaster University, Associate Professor of Operations Management and Business Analytics at the State University of New York; MBA as an International Military Officer from the Naval Postgraduate School, Senior Program Manager at Amazon; December 2016; "Is NATO Ready for a Cyberwar?" https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=810939
One of the most discussed issues in the international arena after the 9/11 attacks was the Digital Disaster scenario that could be experienced in a member country (Bicakci, 2014). Many countries have incorporated cyber security strategies in their national security strategies in order to address cyber-attacks that could threaten the state. The role of NATO in the case of a serious cyberattack against a member country has been a conundrum.
Due to the difficulty of attributing a cyber-attack, NATO appears to have a pragmatic cyber security posture that handles each attack on a case-by-case basis (Burton, 2015). However, NATO officially stated that “NATO will consider (and potentially implement) a collective Article 5 response to cyber-attacks against NATO members, just as it did in response to the terrorist attacks on 9/11” (Burton, 2015, p. 308). Nevertheless, the threshold for the cyber-attacks that could invoke Article 5 is not certain. The head of NATO’s Emerging Security Challenges division, Jamie Shea stated that “[w]e are keeping that ambiguous so a potential aggressor does not get the idea they can carry out cyber-attacks up to a certain level with impunity” (Ashford, 2014, para. 8). Even though setting a specific and certain threshold would make it easier for NATO to determine when to invoke Article 5 against a cyber-attack, keeping it ambiguous gives an advantageous flexibility to the alliance regardless of the attack or adversary (Jones, 2015).
2022
Michigan
Negative
DA › Ambiguity DA › 2NC – Link – Deterrence
Susan Davis 19;General Rapporteur to the NATO parliamentary Assembly Science and Technology Committee; 4/18/19; "NATO in the Cyber Age: Strengthening Security & Defense, Stabilizing Deterrence," https://www.nato-pa.int/download-file?filename=sites/default/files/2019-04/087_STC_19_E%20-%20NATO.pdf
60. NATO maintains a cyber deterrence policy of ambiguity. First, it does not draw a clear line for when a cyber attack is sufficiently harmful to cross the threshold to an armed attack. Second, it does not currently have an operational definition of what the collective response would be if that threshold were to be crossed. Such a cyber deterrence policy offers several advantages, but also poses distinct challenges.
61. A certain degree of ambiguity is beneficial because it could make opponents wary of going too far in their cyber attacks. The opponent always fears stepping over the invisible line, and thus prefers treading lightly. A similarly vague deterrence posture arguably worked well during the Cold War. However, ambiguity on where the threshold lies could indeed lead an opponent who is sufficiently comfortably with taking risks, to continuously exploit the ‘grey zones’, test the defender’s resolve, and conduct ever more daring cyber attacks.
2022
Michigan
Negative
DA › Ambiguity DA › 2NC – ! – Non-State
Łukasz Kulesa 19; Deputy Head of Research at the Polish Institute of International Affairs, MA in International Relations from the Faculty of Law of Jagiellonian university; 11/28/19, "The Future of Deterrence: Effectiveness and Limitations of Conventional and Nuclear Postures," https://carnegieeurope.eu/2019/11/28/future-of-deterrence-effectiveness-and-limitations-of-conventional-and-nuclear-postures-pub-80440
NATO needs to be careful about defining and signaling its redlines. Making these boundaries too specific could embolden adversaries to intensify their actions below NATO’s declared threshold of response. Being deliberately ambiguous and raising the fear of retribution may be more useful for encouraging adversaries’ self-restraint.
At the same time, NATO should aim to deter specific types of particularly threatening unconventional activities. These include major and sophisticated cyber attacks against allies’ military forces and critical military and civilian infrastructure, proxy military and special forces operations, and state-sponsored terrorism. NATO could declare that such activities may lead it to invoke Article 5 and respond in various ways, including asymmetrically (for example, the response to a cyber attack may not involve only cyber capabilities).
2022
Michigan
Negative
DA › Ambiguity DA › 2NC – Turns Case
Ken Jones 15; MS in Cyber Systems and Operations from the Naval Postgraduate School; March 2015, "Cyber War: The Next Frontier for NATO," https://calhoun.nps.edu/bitstream/handle/10945/45201/15Mar_Jones_Ken.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y
Finally, NATO needs to maintain ambiguity on what justifies an Article 5 response. As mentioned previously, ambiguity has served NATO well. A set threshold for when NATO will invoke an Article 5 response to a cyber-attack on a member country is not necessary. This ambiguity has historically served the alliance well, as demonstrated by the 9/11 attacks. If the alliance had said weapons were only include guns, bullets, tanks, and bombs, it would have set a threshold precluding a NATO response to attacks that turned four planes into improvised missiles. The larger issue of ambiguity is that there is no set definition of what constitutes an armed attack and what circumstances dictate a collective response, as per Article 5. Remaining ambiguous on the severity threshold of a cyber-attack allows the alliance to act in cases of future cyber-attacks that cause severe damage, but also allow NATO to refrain from over-reacting, even if an event is a cyber, or kinetic, attack as per a definition. It would be a mistake to set a threshold for attacks that cannot currently be anticipated.
When NATO was originally formed, it was with the purpose to be unambiguous, with the promise of “massive retaliation” by Eisenhower. This was meant to constantly act as a reminder to the Soviet Union and the Red Army that if they were to surge into Western Europe, in no uncertain terms NATO would respond with nuclear weapons. Ambiguity is useful in times, and at other times, it is not. Had NATO been ambiguous in dealing with the Soviet Union, there could have been opportunity for the Red Army to advance further across Europe, to test and see what NATO, and the United States, would allow them to get away with, without an attack. Ambiguity can also cause problems, particularly in the event of a cyber-attack with some members feeling an attack might warrant retaliation through Article 5, with others feeling that the necessary thresholds have not been met. It is important for NATO to have a clear understanding, or general belief, of what would constitute a serious enough cyber-attack in order to respond, but not through official policy or rules to ensure proper consideration.
2022
Michigan
Negative
DA › Ambiguity DA › 1NC – DA
Z’hra Ghavam 16; Navy Lieutenant Commander; September 2016, "NATO’s Preparedness for Cyberwar," https://www.hsdl.org/?abstract&did=801548
NATO’s publicly declared policy on cyber threats is consciously and purposefully vague.207 Why? Strategic ambiguity has its benefits. According to the Atlantic Council panel, there is no “redline” or “determined threshold” that would automatically define a cyber act as an act of war.208 Leaving the rules undefined affords NATO ample room in which to operate. For a 28-member multinational organization that operates on the principle of consensus, time and latitude for solidifying strategic-level decisions are critical. If NATO publicized a cyber redline, it would box the Alliance into a corner. This kind of policy could embolden cyber offenders and provoke massive intrusions that target NATO’s networks at just below this threshold. Having a defined redline could also invite nefarious cyber actors to cross it to test NATO’s resolve, damage its reputation as a leader in Euro-Atlantic security, and undermine the credibility of its Article 5 commitments.
Following the Wales Summit in 2014, NATO affirmed its stance on law and cyberspace while refusing to address cyber redlines:
2022
Michigan
Negative
DA › Ambiguity DA › 1NC – DA
Justin Lynch 18; Associate Editor at Fifth Domain, contributor to the New Yorker, Foreign Policy, the Atlantic; 7/10/18, "Cyber ambiguity: NATO’s digital defense in doubt amid unstable alliances," https://www.fifthdomain.com/international/2018/07/09/cyber-ambiguity-natos-digital-defense-in-doubt-amid-unstable-alliances/
Today, the alliance counts cybersecurity as one of its core missions. It has placed a new cyber research center in the heart of the Baltic nation.
But amid what is viewed as a sustained campaign of Russian digital warfare on the West and the trans-Atlantic alliance ― whose foundations are being questioned through a surge of populism ― the very future of NATO’s cyber strategy is left intentionally murky.
2022
Michigan
Negative
CP › Unilat CP › 2NC – Grid Plank
Bipartisan Policy Center 14, Washington, D.C.–based think tank that promotes bipartisanship, February 2014, “Cybersecurity and the North American Electric Grid: New Policy Approaches to Address an Evolving Threat”, https://bipartisanpolicy.org/download/?file=/wp-content/uploads/2019/03/Cybersecurity-Electric-Grid-BPC.pdf \\SYang
NERC should continue to develop and enforce cybersecurity standards in a manner that is consistent with a risk-management approach and that provides affected entities with compliance flexibility. FERC and applicable authorities in Canada should be supportive of this approach in their review of NERC standards. n The electric power industry should establish an organization, similar to INPO, that would develop cybersecurity performance criteria and best practices for the entire industry. This organization would be intended to complement the standards process that is in place at NERC. We encourage the industry to establish such an organization before a significant cybersecurity event occurs and requires a rapid response. A centralized, industry-governed institution may be in the best position to promote effective strategies for managing cyber threats that could have broader systemic impacts. This effort should include the full range of generation, transmission, and distribution providers and market operators in the North American power sector, including municipal utilities and electric cooperatives. It should be funded through member dues. We envision that this organization—which we will call, for purposes of this discussion, the Institute for Electric Grid Cybersecurity (hereafter, the institute)— would be charged with several activities: • Development of performance criteria and cybersecurity evaluations. The institute would develop performance criteria and best practices for cybersecurity and perform detailed evaluations of individual facilities according to these criteria. Performance criteria and best practices should be tailored to address conditions for individual companies and systems, taking into account their contribution to larger systemic risks. • Analysis of systemic risks. With industry’s assistance, the institute should conduct analyses to identify facilities or locations on the system, and in particular the distribution system, where a localized cyber event could have disproportionate implications for the broader electric grid or for economic or national security. For example, there may be places on the grid where, because of system interdependencies, the loss of a particular substation could trigger a cascade of impacts in multiple critical infrastructure sectors. While many utilities have taken inventories to identify critical facilities or customers, a broader national inventory, combined with modeling and scenario analysis, should help to identify priority areas for cybersecurity investment from the perspective of protecting the grid as a whole. • Event analysis. While NERC, FERC, state and provincial agencies, and potentially federal law enforcement or intelligence agencies are likely to be involved in analyzing significant cybersecurity events, the institute should play a role in understanding the cause of such events and disseminating lessons learned. • Technical assistance. The institute should provide technical support to entities that need assistance implementing performance criteria. It should also facilitate the use of cybersecurity tools—such as the ES-C2M2—produced by industry and government partnerships. • Training and accreditation. The institute should engage in efforts to define positions and career paths for utility cybersecurity professionals. The institute could partner with, or potentially house, ongoing efforts to develop cybersecurity certifications.
2022
Michigan
Negative
CP › Unilat CP › 2NC – Decentralization Key
David Livingstone and Patricia Lewis 16, associate fellow in the International Security program; leader of the International Security program at Chatham House, September 2016, “Space, the Final Frontier for Cybersecurity?”, https://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/publications/research/2016-09-22-space-final-frontier-cybersecurity-livingstone-lewis.pdf, International Security Department \\SYang
The response to a complex and specifically internationalized cybersecurity problem needs to be based on an international coherent approach, which can be defined as a regime – that is, a set of: … implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules and decision-making procedures around which actors’ expectations converge in a given area of international relations. Principles are beliefs of fact, causation and rectitude. Norms are standards of behaviour defined in terms of rights and obligations. Rules are specific prescriptions or proscriptions for action, decision-making procedures are prevailing practices for making and implementing collective choice. There is an urgent requirement to develop a space cybersecurity regime that will inform and organize policy efforts and subordinate strategies, while remaining federally networked rather than controlled from a centre or hierarchically driven. Too centralized an approach would give the illicit actors, who are generally unencumbered by process or legislative frameworks, an unassailable advantage simply because their response and decision-making time is more flexible and faster than that of their legitimate opponents. To be successful and durable, the space cybersecurity regime should be one that functions intelligently and responsively, and possesses enough flexibility to be able to react in a coordinated way as the environment and circumstances alter. As noted above, over-zealous central direction by regulators in a market-driven sector tends to lead to the supply chain finding ‘workarounds’, leading to the risk of developing a general culture of cyber insecurity in which the default condition is simply to identify the best way to dodge the rules. This hands another advantage to the adversaries of legitimate users of the space domain. However, the international space community has not yet acted as a coherent system in the area of cybersecurity. This problem is compounded by the fact that the nature of space and its relationship to society are entering a period of fundamental change. The stakeholders required for the space cybersecurity discourse remain essentially segregated (apart from occasional meetings at events such as conferences), and are only concerned with managing risks within their narrow fields of interest. Left unaddressed, this dynamic will in all likelihood continue unless there is an external stimulus. As a result, there will be little recognition that each stakeholder can be affected by another’s security, or lack of it, unless there is a change in perceptions. A significant element of self-help is required to make up for the shortcomings of the regulatory cadre. A space cyber regime, based on a lightly regulated initiative from the supply chain, seems to offer the most suitable and sustainable basis for channelling multinational contributions to an internationalized space cybersecurity capability which has to include an ever greater number of different stakeholders. Such a regime must be agile enough to meet the rapidly evolving security challenge facing the space domain, and to continue to develop as the market is transformed over the next decades. Policy requirements Ideally, the policy needed to establish a space cybersecurity regime would align the needs of all the various concerns: on an already complex international stage this would include the millions of end users, individual scientists, the corporate sector and the military; address technical, political, economic and social interests; and combine the tactical with the strategic and the bottom-up with the top-down approach. To align across and within all sectors, one approach is to adopt a single focus – such as the provision of assured broadband via space – and make that the driving force, organizing all other initiatives around it. But the space domain is now becoming so intrinsic to every human activity, whether government, private-sector or individual, that the foundation of a more robust and coherent space cybersecurity regime requires a common understanding of what is essential to determine both the nature of the problem and threat mitigation responses. The approach must be non-hierarchical, where each stakeholder is empowered by knowledge provided by the regime and feels valued as a contributor. Ensuring security in space must correspondingly be a common ambition for all concerned players. Thus a common approach to cybersecurity can be developed and encouraged by applying the principles of governance, management and inclusiveness as outlined below. Governance There are three paramount dimensions in the governance of a space cybersecurity regime. First, whatever is done to combat space cyber insecurity, policy should be adopted and applied in order to enable legitimate users of space-related capability, while increasing the costs (of entry, for example, or discovery and being subject to law enforcement action) for illegitimate users. A culture of space cybersecurity must lead to the development of an innate instinct for what is safe and what is risky throughout the supply chain. Second, the governance of space cybersecurity needs a collective approach, involving as many legitimate stakeholders as possible and practical. This will also create a progressive and dynamic environment where knowledge is a key ingredient; if participants can share experiences and lessons learned, cybersecurity will become increasingly instinctive, from the boardroom down to the shop floor, and its sum will increase. Third, the regime needs to be based on a self-governing and lightly regulated effort by a wide range of legitimate users of space capability. This is because space infrastructure, with its multiple uses, is a complex and constantly adapting area that defies control, centralized management and oversight by any single stakeholder (except for some very specific processes such as orbit or communications frequency allocation). Experience suggests that there is no other option but to deliver this effort within a business environment of transparency and accountability involving collaboration designed to share knowledge. Effective and durable governance of cyberspace requires a shared awareness that implies a dynamic, common approach to raising cyber capability. A culture of space cybersecurity must lead to the development of an innate instinct for what is safe and what is risky throughout the supply chain.
2022
Michigan
Negative
CP › Unilat CP › 2NC – Solves Deterrence
Micah Zenko 14, Whitehead Senior Fellow on the US and Americas Programme at Chatham House, April 16, 2014, “Dangerous Space Incidents”, https://www.cfr.org/report/dangerous-space-incidents, Council on Foreign Relations \\SYang
The United States could issue clear and specific public warnings to deter malicious activity in space. As of yet, U.S. deterrent threats are confined to Pentagon planning documents, or have been applied with little specificity to cyber and space domains contemporaneously. If the space event was detected during the planning stage by the U.S. intelligence community, or it became clear that a country developing space capabilities intended to use them maliciously and the resultant space debris could be predicted by JSpOC, the United States could publicize the costs that such debris would pose to the world’s satellites in an attempt to marshal international condemnation to prevent it.
2022
Michigan
Negative
CP › Unilat CP › 2NC – Solves NC3
Dr. Jared Dunnmon 17, postdoctoral fellow in the Computer Science Department at Stanford, xx/xx/2017, “Nuclear Command and Control in the Twenty-First Century: Maintaining Surety in Outer Space and Cyberspace”, https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/resrep23162.5.pdf \\SYang
One approach to the above scenarios would be an in-depth analysis of each question to determine exactly how the United States should respond. However, in light of substantial modernization to the NC3 system currently planned and under way, it is perhaps most useful to consider technological and policy avenues that could be pursued with the goal of ensuring that the above scenarios, each of which is fraught with uncertainty around nuclear intentions and appropriate U.S. response, would never come to pass. Distinct sets of technology and policy recommendations intended to inform discussion around modernization and design of the future nuclear enterprise are presented below. Technological Directions Several concrete technological initiatives would help reduce operational uncertainty and ensure resilient NC3 functionality. Apply Advanced Forensics Techniques All NC3 satellites should be outfitted with advanced forensics capability. Motion sensors, heat sensors, and EM intensity sensors should be emplaced in order to assess whether any given satellite inoperability resulted from external physical attack. For protection from cyber attack, domestic control over supply chains should be pursued to reduce the possibility of backdoors, insecure or undocumented protocols, and hard-coded credentials. Finally, in addition to traditional antivirus scans of satellite software, commercially available assessments based on computationally efficient code-level machine learning tools that proactively detect both new variants and repackaged versions of existing malware should be implemented.48 Such methods should prove powerful in reducing the possibility of a successful cyber attack on NC3 systems. Emphasize Modern Network Defense Techniques in NC3 Traditionally, network defense has focused on keeping attackers outside of a virtual “wall,” while keeping all critical functionality accessible to those with valid credentials. In today’s democratized cyber environment, cost to attackers is substantially lower than cost to defenders. Thus it is useful to consider moving toward an architecture that is more akin to a building with all of its doors open, but riddled with traps and misdirection. As NC3 is modernized to utilize Internet-based protocols,49 for instance, considering widespread implementation of mechanisms designed to increase costs to attackers via such methods as honeypots, script white-listing, and address scrambling would help to deter and frustrate potential attackers. Honeypots, or environments that look like useful targets to an attacker but are in fact benign, can be particularly useful in enabling U.S. personnel to identify candidate attack vectors and enact defenses before critical systems are compromised. Script white-listing entails using efficient data structures to enable a computer to run only code with a bit representation that has been explicitly pre-specified as part of an allowed execution set. Finally, address space scrambling methods such as address space layout randomization (ASLR) protect from common buffer overflow attacks by randomly arranging address space positions of key portions of a process, such that an attacker cannot jump between different points reliably. As a higher-level consideration, the United States should consider the idea that it is generally not possible to be completely sure that a networked computer system has not been compromised. If an adversary informed the United States that it had compromised U.S. NC3 and that surety of the nuclear deterrent had been affected, it would be extraordinarily difficult for the United States to prove otherwise, which fundamentally undermines the strength of the U.S. deterrent posture. Thus, it is imperative that the United States be able to viably make the argument that compromising the entirety of NC3 would be a statistical impossibility; and for this to occur, there must exist no possible mechanism for a single point of failure. While the command, control, and communications triad architecture ensures this posture adequately from a physical standpoint, it is imperative that NC3 systems be constructed with the same ideas in mind. Specifically, the United States should consider a fractionated NC3 network design, with a large number of sub-networks, each secured via different sets of protocols or standards. In this case, it would be nearly impossible for an adversary to convince either itself, the United States, or third parties that the surety of the U.S. nuclear deterrent could be fully compromised by what would effectively be a first cyber strike. Minimize Code Base Size As systems are modernized to take advantage of twenty-first century information technology (IT), the temptation will exist to implement a great deal of additional functionality. While there may exist substantial operational benefits to additional features, these should always be balanced with the reality that more code almost always equates to more vulnerability—and NC3 is an area wherein a vulnerability could result in mistakes of nuclear import.50 Thus, the usual analysis around the cost-benefit trade-off of IT upgrades may not apply to NC3 systems, and this reality should be taken into account in system design processes. Maintain Small-Scale Launch and Inexpensive NC3 Communications Hardware A particularly interesting suggestion put forth by Dr. John Harvey, former principal deputy assistant secretary of defense for nuclear, chemical, and biological defense, is that “small, single-purpose ‘cheap-SATs’ to replenish lost communication or GPS [global positioning system] functionality” could improve system-level resilience of space-based NC3 assets. Instead of or in addition to large, multifunctional satellites, leveraging the widespread proliferation of small, inexpensive CubeSats51 that cost on the order of $100,00052 to construct and launch could substantially reduce overall system cost and improve reliability. In addition to allowing inexpensive system updates as technology improves, these small satellites would be extremely difficult to target for ASAT operators. Further, since Dr. Harvey’s address in 2014, small-scale launch technology has seen significant advances. In fact, several commercial entities currently have the technology to offer 150-kilogram payloads to sun-synchronous orbit (500-kilometer altitude) on a single dedicated rocket costing only $5 million.53 These rockets could be retained specifically for emergency NC3 launches as backups to current satellites. In this way, expensive AEHF satellites that would require an expensive, large-scale launch to reconstitute would be supplemented or ultimately replaced by a small satellite and dedicated launch ecosystem that would result in a substantially more resilient NC3 system. Moving to a reserve of small satellites as a backup for the NC3 network would also have the advantage of increasing the number of possible launch sites the United States can use. At present, only a handful exist, and these are well-known to any potential adversary.54 Decrease Reliance on Space-Based NC3 In addition to shoring up the reliability of space-based NC3, ultimately decreasing U.S. reliance on these assets would likely enhance overall NC3 surety.55 In particular, relying more on the various airborne components of the NC3 system and deploying “long-range airborne communications relay networks that could be stood up on short notice” would potentially mitigate the vulnerabilities posed by cyber threats to space-based assets. This risk reduction would result not only from the ability to more rapidly deploy space-based systems, but also from the simple reality that 50. Danzig, Surviving on a Diet of Poisoned Fruit. 51. A variety of companies (e.g., Planet Labs), universities, national labs (e.g., Los Alamos National Laboratory), and research institutions already fly multiple CubeSats. 52. “Commercial Space Launch Schedule and Pricing,” Spaceflight.com, accessed 31 July 2016, http://www.spaceflight .com/schedule-pricing/. 53. “Space Is Now Open for Business,” Rocket Lab, accessed 31 July 2016, https://www.rocketlabusa.com/. 54. Ellis, personal conversation with the author. 55. Rose, “Using Diplomacy to Advance the Long-Term Sustainability and Security of the Outer Space Environment.” This content downloaded from 67.194.16.231 on Fri, 24 Jun 2022 18:46:22 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms 30 Project on Nuclear Issues performing diagnostics and updates on hardware that is not in outer space is a far simpler process than the reverse.56 Policy Considerations Carefully Consider Unilateral Action: Anticipatory Self-Defense and Belligerent Reprisal Given the Tallinn Manual’s clear authorization of anticipatory self-defense and the potentially dire consequences of the scenarios outlined above, it would be prudent to pursue a national policy that enables U.S. intervention to combat the development of cyber capabilities that would compromise NC3. In the context of peacetime international law, this would likely entail either claiming extraterritorial jurisdiction over those developing anti-NC3 cyber capabilities and/or claiming anticipatory self-defense if an attack is imminent. Were the United States to already be engaged in an armed conflict, the functional equivalent of anticipatory self-defense would be legally termed belligerent reprisal.57 In this case, if the United States views attacks on NC3 as outside the boundaries established by the LOAC, the question would become whether a proportional attack on opponent (potentially on their NC3) would be appropriate, and, if so, what form that proportional response would take. Even in the case that U.S. NC3 is compromised, for instance, it is still desirable from the U.S. point of view for the adversary’s NC3 systems to be able to verify that the United States has not launched a nuclear attack. Thus, in the context of belligerent reprisal, it is critical to make a clear policy decision on what constitutes a proportional, but practically optimal response to an attack on U.S. NC3.
2022
Michigan
Negative
CP › Unilat CP › 2NC – Solves Commercial
Amber Gillette 21, Staff Assistant Intern, Science and Technology Innovation Program, September 16 2021, “From Supply Chains to Spacecraft: Taking an Integrated Approach to Cybersecurity in Space”, https://www.wilsoncenter.org/blog-post/supply-chains-spacecraft-taking-integrated-approach-cybersecurity-space \\SYang
In his opening remarks, Morin noted key ways in which the average American interacts with space systems, including timing synchronization, banking systems, and emergency service provisions. “Space is really fully integrated into our society and it’s becoming more so everyday,” said Morin. “Both U.S. national security and our economic prosperity are dependent on space to a degree that most people just don’t fully appreciate.”
Space systems are not one of the 16 critical infrastructure sectors that are recognized as vital to U.S. national security and economy. However, developments in space technology, from advancing rocket designs to commercial deorbit services, are elevating space systems towards an official critical infrastructure designation, according to Erin Miller, Executive Director of the Space ISAC. “Even before Richard Branson travelled, space systems were and are critical infrastructure… It’s not necessarily the degree to which we’re dependent that makes the case, it’s just the fact that we are dependent upon space systems,” she said.
2022
Michigan
Negative
CP › Unilat CP › 2NC – Solves Commercial
Katie Arcieri 21, e-commerce reporter for S&P Global Market Intelligence, July 12, 2021, “Securing private, public US space assets”, https://www.spglobal.com/marketintelligence/en/news-insights/latest-news-headlines/securing-private-public-us-space-assets-65316329 \\SYang
The Biden administration has recently focused its efforts on quelling cybersecurity threats here on Earth. But security threats also exist in outer space as the U.S. increasingly relies on government and commercial satellites and other space assets needed for telecommunications, 5G networks and defense systems technology.
The Wilson Center's Science and Technology Innovation Program will provide an overview of potential cyberthreats in space during a July 14 virtual program titled "Cybersecurity on the Final Frontier: Protecting Our Critical Space Assets from Cyber Threats." The Washington, D.C.-based center is holding the event in partnership with The Aerospace Corp. and the Space Information Sharing and Analysis Center.
2022
Michigan
Negative
CP › Unilat CP › 2NC – Solves Allies
Franklin D. Kramer 17, Robert J. Butler, Catherine Lotrionte, distinguished fellow and board director of the Atlantic Council; retired U.S. Air Force colonel and a former member of the Defense Department’s Senior Executive Service, the first Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Cyber and Space Policy; Senior Associate at CSIS and a Senior Fellow at the McCrary Institute for Cyber and Critical Infrastructure Security at Auburn University and former Brent Scowcroft scholar at the Atlantic Council, “Cyber and Deterrence: The Military-Civil Nexus in High-End Conflict”, https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/resrep03691.8.pdf \\SYang
In a conflict, cyber security will be as or more important in forward theaters as it will be in the United States. Most US allies and partners do not have the same cyber capabilities as DoD, yet it will be their infrastructures and national capabilities that US forces will be relying upon for numerous tasks. Accordingly, the concept of “extended cyber deterrence” will be an important role for the DoD in connection with each of the theaters noted above. The concepts are set forth in the issue brief “Cyber, Extended Deterrence, and ATO,”90 but their application goes beyond NATO to all arenas where US critical interests are intertwined with allies and partners. Most obviously, the United States will continue to develop doctrine and capabilities to provide for the effective use of cyberspace in a conflict as part of US war-fighting capabilities. As noted above, cyber tools potentially could disrupt an adversary’s communications, logistics, sensors, and military supporting infrastructure. The secretary of defense has stated that cyber is currently being used in the conflict with ISIS,91 and NATO has recently designated cyber an operational domain.92 Cyber will continue to be integrated into combat planning. Cyber security will be important not only for US forward forces, but also for the militaries and the critical infrastructures of host nations. It is notable that in each of the theaters that the United States plans for, the potential adversary has been identified as the source of significant cyber intrusions. Russia is responsible for the hacking of the Democratic National Committee, among many other cyber incidents.93 China is responsible for the attack on the Office of Personnel Management and Chinese officers have been indicted for continued cyber espionage.94 Iran is behind the tack on Saudi Arabia’s oil company and Iranian hackers have been indicted for attacks on American banks.95 North Korea is behind the attack on Sony and has regularly attacked South Korean networks.96 What these attacks demonstrate is the vulnerability of host nations to cyberattack, a vulnerability that could significantly undercut deterrence or the capacity of the United States and its allies and partners to prevail in a conflict. To mitigate such vulnerability, three key elements should be used: First, the United States needs to act as a “cyber framework nation” to support host nation capabilities. This would involve the establishment, transfer, training, and support of cyber capabilities to enhance protection, resilience, and restoration. For example, the United States could help a less cyber-capable ally establish an effective intrusion protection system, provide forensic support, and develop resilience capabilities to be utilized in the event of an attack by an adversary. There are several ways to undertake such efforts but one of the most useful would be to utilize the National Guard’s State Partnership Program. The program pairs state National Guard units with seventy-six countries.97 As noted above, the National Guard is substantially increasing its cyber capabilities, including its focus on critical infrastructures. That expertise can be utilized in working with allies and partners in conjunction with the relevant combatant command. The National Guard’s partnership efforts can build on what the NMTs and the National Guard are doing in the United States, adapted, of course, to the particulars of the host nation. The National Guard could also be part of an initiative to provide “fly away” cyber-warfare teams to provide host nation states’ “blue team” assistance to “operate in degraded environments,” including providing malware forensics and recovery/restoration support. In addition to the National Guard, the DoD Cyber Crime Center (DC3) could have a valuable international role. DC3’s current mission revolves around five focus areas: digital forensics, cyber training, technical solutions, Defense Industrial Base (DIB) cybersecurity, and analytics.98 Like the Guard, DC3 provides tremendous depth and breadth of support; applied to international requirements it could enhance a greater USG role through a modest budget. DC3’s mission could be expanded to support extended cyber deterrence, especially in the areas of building greater allied cyber resilience. Key elements could include growing international training and information-sharing programs for allies (similar to ongoing programs with DIB companies in the United States). Second, associated with US assistance, it will be important for the host nation to establish operational partnerships with key private entities, including ISPs and power grid operators. As discussed in the context of the United States, military, telecommunications, and electrical grid operators should help create, in advance, capabilities that would mitigate a high-end attack. The United States, as a cyber framework nation, would help the host nation organize for this effort. Depending on the theater, it may be important to undertake such efforts on a regional, as opposed to a national, basis. Again, the United States will be well positioned to help create the necessary regional activities. Third, host nations will need to undertake steps comparable to those identified for the United States. These include • identifying highest-priority national military cyber assets and supporting telecom and power grid networks that would need to be protected; • extending/enhancing automated intrusion protection and developing resilience efforts, starting with data classification and segmentation, to participating host nations’ militaries, telecommunication companies, and electrical grids. It will be important to utilize high-end protection capabilities, such as multi-factor authentication, end-to-end data encryption, and diverse and redundant networks to ensure best information ssurance practices in data confidentiality, integrity, and availability; • increasing detection capabilities by provisioning shared cyber threat intelligence capabilities. A cyber threat intelligence capability would develop and share cyber indications and warnings regarding the movement of high-end state cyberthreat activity towards host nation networks and information assets; and • developing cyber defense “playbooks” and training exercises for cyber-attack response, with techniques, tactics, and procedures (TTPs) developed to maximize the value of the defense and resilience capabilities noted above. National grid and telecommunications partners in the private sector would be included as part of the playbook TTPs and training exercises. As previously discussed by the authors: “Initially, the cyber framework nation can help to establish or enhance an existing national framework. Over time, simulations, exercises, and information sharing will help direct and prioritize other efforts by exposing gaps and opportunities. Joint exercises, when effective, usually result in some degree of information sharing. Explicit and incidental information sharing, especially between private and public sector partners, will be a critical requirement if operational protection and/or resilience is to be achieved. Each country should pick a model it finds compatible, but the keys are a combination of speed and full interchange. In the US, one of the most effective models is the ‘Information Sharing and Analysis Center (ISAC), a nonprofit organization that provides a central resource for gathering information on cyber threats to critical infrastructure and providing two-way sharing of information between the private and public sector.’ ISACs are typically developed around a critical infrastructure sector, such as the electrical grid or telecommunications sectors. The Financial Services ISAC is often considered the greater among equals, as it has a highly automated system for rapid cyber threat information exchange.”99 As the foregoing indicates, cyber will be a critical element of high-end conflict. Enhancing deterrence and defense will require extensive actions by allied and host nation militaries along with civil authorities and the ISPs and grid operators in the host nation. VI. CONCLUSION High-end conflict will create challenging requirements for cyber, far beyond those that are already faced on an ongoing basis. The DoD needs to work with civil authorities and the ISPs and grid operators in the United States and forward theaters to create the prospects for deterrence and, if necessary, to defend and prevail in conflict.
2022
Michigan
Negative
CP › Unilat CP › 1NC – Cyber Sanctions
Iryna Bogdanova and María Vásquez Callo-Müller 21, research fellow at the World Trade Institute (WTI), University of Berne, post-doctoral researcher at the University of Lucerne, December 7, 2021, “Unilateral Economic Sanctions to Deter and Punish Cyber-Attacks: Are They Here to Stay?”, https://www.ejiltalk.org/unilateral-economic-sanctions-to-deter-and-punish-cyber-attacks-are-they-here-to-stay/#:~:text=Unilateral%20cyber%20sanctions%20are%20restrictive,in%20other%20malicious%20cyber%20activities. \\SYang
When international cooperation fails to take root, unilateralism blossoms – as we see in the field of cybersecurity. Unilateral cyber sanctions are restrictive economic measures of a temporary nature imposed against individuals, legal entities, government bodies and officials that conduct or facilitate cyber-attacks or engage in other malicious cyber activities. They are imposed without any prior authorization of a regional or an international organization, i.e., according to states’ domestic laws.
The 2014 cyber-attack on Sony Pictures Entertainment, as a result of which private data, including unreleased movies, was stolen and emails were hacked as well as thousands of confidential documents were leaked, paved the way for the US cyber sanctions targeting North Korea, thus adding pressure to one of the most sanctioned countries in the world. In the following years, the United States expanded its cyber sanctions framework and used it to sanction malicious actors as well as states sponsoring them.
2022
Michigan
Negative
CP › Unilat CP › 1NC – Generic Unilat CP
Gregory Falco 18, Research Fellow with the Belfer Center’s Cyber Security Project at Harvard Kennedy School, July 2018, “Job One for Space Force: Space Asset Cybersecurity”, http://osa-public.s3.amazonaws.com/papers/csp_falco_space_asset-final.pdf, Cyber Security Project \\SYang
What can space asset organizations do? Organizations developing space assets are largely unregulated for cybersecurity purposes. The lack of specific space asset cybersecurity requirements necessitates a considerable degree of self-policing. Without mandatory standards, space asset organizations can improve their security either individually or collectively. What follows are some options to consider: • Employ existing cybersecurity standards and develop new standards for space systems where needed. There is no lack of cybersecurity standards and best practices available for developers to follow when attempting to design and develop secure systems. Many of these standards, like the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) Cybersecurity Framework, are well-documented and widely adopted in some form.28 Most space systems’ security can benefit from using these standards. In some cases, these standards may not apply for the specific technologies used in space systems. For these systems, space asset organizations should create new space asset-specific standards and best practices so that security can be applied consistently across the organization. Vendors of space asset organizations should also be held to these standards. This should involve the explicit testing and demonstration that vendors to these organizations conform to the security standard in place for the space asset organization. • Establish cybersecurity capabilities for mission systems and internal network/server systems. Similarly to what was done at NASA JPL, it is important to establish separate cybersecurity specialists for mission systems and internal networks/server systems. The distinction between the two systems are operational technology versus information technology—each one has very different operating and security requirements and need to be addressed accordingly. 28 Nicole Cieslak. “NIST Cybersecurity Framework Adoption on the Rise.” Tenable. 2016. https://www. tenable.com/blog/nist-cybersecurity-framework-adoption-on-the-rise. To date, congress has provided little guidance in terms of enabling cybersecurity across sectors. One of the few examples includes the Cybersecurity Information Sharing Act (CISA) which was signed into law in late 2015 by President Obama. CISA is meant to help facilitate information sharing between the government and the private sector by limiting the liability of the private sector for certain attack disclosure.29 Congress should develop more laws that could be specifically relevant to space assets. Recommendations concerning these laws follows. • This is Urgent. Act quickly. Be proactive, not reactive. Do not wait to pass a law on space cybersecurity until there is a WannaCry (major ransomware attack that compromised healthcare systems around the world) or Mirai (IoT attack that took down a major DNS provider on the East Coast resulting in downtime for websites such as Facebook, Twitter and Reddit) equivalent for Space. It seems that action only occurs when a disaster strikes. A space cyberattack can have serious consequences as detailed previously and we cannot wait until something happens to pass legislation protecting these critical systems. • Clarify critical infrastructure security requirements to include underlying systems. Currently, policy concerning critical infrastructure security does not require third-party, enabling infrastructure to also comply with the same requirements. Space systems should be held to the same standards of the critical infrastructure on which they rely. • Assign responsibility and liability for cyber. Cybersecurity responsibility and associated liability for a breach should be clarified and assigned for space asset organizations. An important component of cybersecurity legislation currently under review concerns the liability of technology developers, owners and operators. In January 2017, the FTC sued D-Link for the vulnerability in their routers leading to the widespread Mirai botnet attack in October 2016.30 This was the first time a manufacturer was sued for the cybersecurity failures of their devices. Legal guidance concerning where liability falls will encourage the responsible party to take the necessary measures to secure their systems. Today’s lack of clarity around liability for the space asset ecosystem results in poor accountability and inaction to secure these important systems. • Make space asset organizations accountable for cybersecurity. All government contracts with space asset organizations should require the contractor to comply with key performance parameters (KPPs) pertaining to cybersecurity. Today, cybersecurity KPPs are a subcomponent of system survivability KPPs. Cybersecurity KPPs should be firmly enforced for all government contracts. • Expand 32 CFR 236 to include space asset organizations. Currently, the defense industrial base is required to report all cyber incidents that have affected or could affect national security under the Department of Defense-Defense Industrial Base Cybersecurity Activities Regulation31. Considering the critical posture of space systems and the U.S. reliance on these assets for both national security and critical infrastructure, space asset organizations should be included under this ruling. This would improve cybersecurity transparency between the government and space asset organizations. • Establish a Space System Information Sharing and Analysis Center (ISAC). Government agencies such as the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) could play a crucial role as a convener for public and private sector entities that work with space systems. The DHS could become an important facilitator for this sector’s efforts to improve cybersecurity by creating a Space System Information Sharing and Analysis Center. The DHS should require participation of government agencies that work with space systems ranging from the Department of Defense (DoD) to NASA to participate in the Space System ISAC. This would provide an incentive for private sector space asset organizations to also join. If 32 CFR 236 were expanded to include space asset organizations, the Space System ISAC could be made compulsory through this requirement. Sharing threat information across space system agencies and space asset organizations would be a logical step to improve the security posture of the sector. Some agencies or private organizations may be much further ahead in securing systems than others and sharing insights will help all ISAC members involved. What can a Space System ISAC do? Sharing threat information across space system agencies and space asset organizations would be a logical step to improve the security posture of the sector. Some agencies or private organizations may be much further ahead in securing systems than others and sharing insights will help all ISAC members involved. The recommendations for what a Space System ISAC should are as follows. • Encourage collaboration among space-relevant organizations. The DHS should require participation of government agencies that work with space systems ranging from the Department of Defense (DoD) to NASA to participate in the Space System ISAC. This would provide an incentive for private sector space asset organizations to also join. If 32 CFR 236 were expanded to include space asset organizations, the Space System ISAC could be made compulsory through this requirement. Sharing threat information across space system agencies and space asset organizations would be a logical step to improve the security posture of the sector. Some agencies or private organizations may be much farther ahead in securing systems than others and sharing insights will help all ISAC members. • Establish information sharing requirements. The Space System ISAC should require member entities to disclose vulnerability and attack information to one another within a predefined period. This would be in the spirit of the UK’s General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) that requires an organization to disclose when personally identifiable information is breached within 72 hours of discovery. • Document and maintain space system cybersecurity best practices and standards. Member organizations should share internal or contractor standards for cybersecurity in a manner that does not release sensitive information. A master list of best practices should be shared across the Space System ISAC and curated. Member organizations can comment on the merits of the best practices and cater existing cybersecurity standards to be highly relevant to the idiosyncrasies of space systems. • Cooperate with ISACs for other critical infrastructure sectors that rely on space systems. Because space systems underpin other sectors, certain threat information for space systems should be shared with the relevant sectors that might be affected if an attack occurs. The Space System ISAC should work with the oil/gas, electricity and emergency services ISAC to communicate threats that are relevant to these critical infrastructure and services. The potentially affected critical infrastructure organizations could then work with the space asset organizations to remediate the vulnerability where appropriate.
2022
Michigan
Negative
CP › Terrestrial CP › 2NC – satellites bad
Demiyanov, ’22 (Andrey Demiyanov, Jordan News Reporter. “Kessler Syndrome: An existential wave of doom across the horizon?” 09/01/22 https://www.jordannews.jo/Section-129/Technology/Kessler-Syndrome-An-existential-wave-of-doom-across-the-horizon-11705)
Knowing just how dangerous space debris can be and its century-long orbital decay, let’s now dive into the deep rabbit hole that is modern-day’s tech giant’s aspirations to launch more satellites into space.
We have launched over 12,170 satellites into space; 7,630 are currently in orbit at varying orbits. Of those 7,630 there are over 3,000 inactive satellites, essentially space junk, hovering around the earth’s atmosphere cruising around at speeds of 27,500km per hour or more.
Elon Musk, the modern-day layman’s hero of space exploration, has set forth a plan to put over 1,300 satellites into space to establish a satellite internet network that would enable even the most distanced individuals across the earth to gain access to the internet.
Jeff Bezos has also set his sights on launching satellites into space to gain access to the developing industry of satellite internet, and there are currently over a dozen companies that are seeking to do the same.
While the notion of internet access for all at an affordable rate throughout the world with a satellite dish sounds appealing — how far are can we push the envelope before Kessler’s model starts ringing the alarms?
While many would argue it is essential to do so, the measure of sending out hundreds, if not thousands of satellites into orbit by these companies to simply provide a need that in theory can be provided through other means seems highly irrational when considering the long-term effects that this innovation may develop.
Access to the internet, however, is just one side of the coin — countless telecommunication companies, government entities, and other stakeholders vested in the use of orbital bodies are continuously pushing Kessler’s model further and further into the red, wherein in the coming future, we may begin to genuinely have to worry about the aforementioned domino effect.
The real problem
Hypothetically, if the Kessler Syndrome becomes a reality and a chain of collisions to commence, the earth won’t exactly be bombarded with debris like in a sci-fi movie where the entire planet has fiery fail raining down on its residents.
However, it will mean that hundreds of services that rely on satellite technologies will come to a complete standstill.
Life without internet, telecommunications, or even basic GPS will become a reality. Launching further satellites into space will become extremely challenging, and space exploration may, in fact, be reasonably impacted as a result of the debris that will be left hovering thousands of kilometers over the earth.
Kessler admitted that the chance of the collision is currently sitting at almost null percent back in 2009. The harsh reality is that ever since then, satellite launches have increased significantly, therefore increasing the total number of cosmic bodies making their rounds around the earth.
And it appears that unless genuine exploration into the topic is performed and regulation is put into place, Kessler’s Syndrome won’t just be a hypothetical reality — but an inevitable time bomb that will eventually set humanity back into the dark ages.
While the obvious solution at first glance may be to clean out space of such debris, not only is it highly costly but there is no rational way to determine what debris is potentially on its way to set off a collision chain and what debris can be left alone. Therefore, the only method to the madness is developing powerful enough systems that can measure trajectories of most, if not all, known space debris around the earth — and then mapping out their trajectories years ahead to predict what objects may pose a threat in the forthcoming future.
But even that, in essence, is impossible. As mentioned, the earth’s gravitational pull extends hundreds of light-years, albeit at a significantly reduced strength.
Considering that we have several planets in our solar system, all of which have their own gravitation fields that indirectly affect the trajectories of these objects, it becomes nearly impossible to accurately predict any kind of potential future.
Perhaps, in the end, the only real way to prevent Kessler’s model from ever being realized is to simply limit the number of total space objects themselves. Perhaps tech enterprises must stop chasing the great and instead strive to do good.
2022
Michigan
Negative
CP › Terrestrial CP › 1NC – CP
Goward ’22 (Dana A. Goward, president of Resilient Navigation & Timing Foundation. “Get the Bullseye Off GPS” 04/19/22, )
On Nov.15, 2021, a missile streaked into space from Russia. Once above the atmosphere, it released a kinetic kill vehicle that destroyed a retired Russian satellite. The resulting debris endangered other satellites and the International Space Station, including the Russian members of its crew.
A week later Russian troops massed along the border with Ukraine. A Russian news commentator recognized as Putin’s mouthpiece satellites and blind NATO forces.
2022
Michigan
Negative
CP › Hotlines CP › 1NC – Hotlines solve
Ariel (Eli) Levite 19, nonresident senior fellow in the Nuclear Policy Program at the Carnegie Endowment; and Lyu Jinghua, visiting scholar with Carnegie’s Cyber Policy Initiative, 1/24/19, “Chinese-American Relations in Cyberspace: Toward Collaboration or Confrontation?,”
Third, enhance mechanisms and channels for routine as well as emergency bilateral information sharing and coordination on cyber events and notification of major military activities. This proposal builds on preexisting bilateral arrangements for sharing information, such as in the cooperation between the respective national CERTs from the two countries. However, what arrangements are now in place do not suffice to dispel misperceptions and prevent miscalculations, and avert explosive incidents especially in the political and military spheres. Blocking communications and blinding or, even worse, spoofing time and navigation systems of civilian and military assets in peacetime are especially prone to lead to escalation. While it is highly necessary to adopt mutually understood rules of the road in this sphere, a first step would be to establish or complement bilateral hotlines and other crises communications and consultation channels among both military commanders as well as high level decisionmakers with corresponding political/policy guidance to endow them with real substance.
It is also worth considering in this context how to apply the MOU on Notification of Major Military Activities in cyberspace. In this memorandum, signed by the U.S. Defense Department and Chinese Ministry of National Defense in November 2014, both sides “affirm their aspiration to establish a voluntary foundation for notifications of major military activities, such as exchange information voluntarily about their respective country’s security policy, strategy, and legal information, including the adjustment of respective national defense policies and strategy, by providing briefings and information about speeches, major government publications such as White Papers, strategy publications, and other official announcements related to policy and strategy,” and allow for “observation of military exercises and activities that should be voluntary and occur within the existing framework of bilateral U.S.-China military relations.”33 Similar voluntary exchange of information, interpretation of cyber strategy and publication, and invitation from either side to observe cyber exercises hosted or co-hosted by the other side could be one part of confidence-building efforts in cyberspace.