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2022 Michigan Negative
AT: Case › AT: Solvency › 1NC – Commercial Alt Cause

Cyber-vulnerabilities can be inserted at any point in the satellite supply chain and remain latent indefinitely---no way the aff can solve it

David Livingstone 16, associate fellow at Chatham House, was policy lead on Military Aid to the Civil Powers at the UK Ministry of Defence between 1994 and 1999; and Patricia M. Lewis is the research director of the International Security Department at Chatham House, September 2016, “Space, the Final Frontier for Cybersecurity?”

For a successful cyberattack to occur, the threat vector needs to be inserted within the system. This could take place during the manufacture, distribution or operation of the products and services that characterize the system. During the manufacturing and distribution phases, conventional physical security controls need to be applied to minimize the risk of cyberattacks. However, during operation, the conjunction of electromagnetic and cyber vulnerabilities becomes critical. As telecommunication systems integrate complex technology to improve performance, flexibility and efficiency, they are increasingly dependent on software that can be modified during operation rather than hardware or firmware that remains relatively unchanged once it has been designed and deployed. One example is the C-RAN (Cloud-Radio-Access-Network) concept being developed as part of the evolution of terrestrial mobile networks, and this type of software will be integrated into future satellite systems. Commercial tools such as SIM-toolkits are increasingly used to perform over-the-air provisioning and denial of service. Over-the-air software (both operating system and application) upgrades will be familiar to everyone using smart devices.

The ability to emulate a network, and to access, configure and control communications devices via wireless interfaces during normal operations also offers opportunities to an attacker to launch a large-scale cyberattack that remains latent within a system indefinitely, until activated at a time of the adversary’s choosing.

2022 Michigan Negative
AT: Case › AT: Solvency › 1NC – Article 5 Not Key

No internal link – no card is reverse causal and says the plan stops the US from overreacting – the US could respond on its own without activating Article 5.

Ken Jones 15; MS in Cyber Systems and Operations from the Naval Postgraduate School; March 2015; "Cyber War: The Next Frontier for NATO," https://calhoun.nps.edu/bitstream/handle/10945/45201/15Mar_Jones_Ken.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y

In light of the recent developments of NATO, it would seem to be in NATO’s best interest to remain ambiguous and allow the organization to approach its response to a cyber-attack on a case-by-case basis. For instance, the attacks on Estonia might require intervention on behalf of the Estonian people due to the fact they are a smaller, lesser defensible state. Estonia would not be successful standing up against Russia, and as Russia becomes more aggressive in the former-Soviet bloc region, small states like Estonia are at risk. If another attack were to occur against Estonia, the attacks would have to be more severe to invoke an Article 5 response. Such a response would enable NATO states to act as if they too have been attacked as per the mutual defense announcement against cyber-attacks at the Wales Summit. Yet, if the United States is attacked in a similar manner, there likely does not need to be the same scale of defense taken, because the United States has more resources and capabilities to respond on its own. Remaining ambiguous allows NATO to choose the best opportunities for supporting and defending member states.

2022 Michigan Negative
AT: Case › AT: Russia Adv › 2NC – No Escalation – Attribution

Lack of attribution is a neg warrant---nobody will escalate randomly before they’ve attributed an attack, and that time delay builds in opportunities for de-escalation

Erica D. Borghard 19, assistant professor at the Army Cyber Institute at the United States Military Academy at West Point and a research fellow at the Saltzman Institute of War and Peace Studies at Columbia University; and Shawn W. Lonergan, research affiliate of the Army Cyber Institute at the United States Military Academy at West Point, Ph.D. in Political Science from Columbia University, Fall 2019, “Cyber Operations as Imperfect Tools of Escalation,” Strategic Studies Quarterly, Vol. 13, No. 3, p. 122-145

Second, beyond operational requirements for secrecy, states make political decisions to eschew attribution for offensive cyber operations.64 States employ technical methods to avoid attribution (e.g., obfuscating points of departure of attacks by using spoofing, proxy servers, third-party infrastructure, compromised certificates, and other anonymizing capabilities) as well as make deliberate efforts to obscure command and control for cyberattacks (e.g., using cyber proxies with varying degrees of plausible deniability).65 The time requirements for a targeted state to achieve attribution at a reasonable confidence threshold, as well as its willingness to share potentially sensitive intelligence information with allies or domestic publics to justify any escalatory responses, create additional temporal breaks for the pressure of a crisis situation to diffuse and for decision-makers to evaluate alternative courses of action.

2022 Michigan Negative
AT: Case › AT: Russia Adv › 2NC – No Escalation – Tech Barrier

Cyber weapons have to be uniquely tailored to each target---escalation can’t happen because the time pressure of a crisis doesn’t allow adversaries to gain access and deploy cyber capabilities

Erica D. Borghard 19, assistant professor at the Army Cyber Institute at the United States Military Academy at West Point and a research fellow at the Saltzman Institute of War and Peace Studies at Columbia University; and Shawn W. Lonergan, research affiliate of the Army Cyber Institute at the United States Military Academy at West Point, Ph.D. in Political Science from Columbia University, Fall 2019, “Cyber Operations as Imperfect Tools of Escalation,” Strategic Studies Quarterly, Vol. 13, No. 3, p. 122-145

Second, in addition to being dependent on access, offensive cyber capabilities lack universal effectiveness. While nuclear or conventional munitions are target agnostic—in most cases, the same munition can be used to target an aircraft hangar, a massed enemy formation, a munitions factory, or a hospital—some cyber weapons must be tailored to a specific target set or type.23 As Martin Libicki notes, “A piece of malware that brings one system down may have absolutely no effect on another. The difference between the two may be as simple as which patch version of a piece of software each system runs.”24 The 2017 WannaCry ransomware attack that wreaked billions of dollars in damage and was attributed to North Korea’s Lazarus Group, for instance, targeted hundreds of thousands of computers around the world across a range of industries that were running an older version of Windows.25 The widespread damage belies the highly specific and targeted nature of the malware—almost all of the affected systems were running a version of Windows 7; the same strain of malware had no effect on computers running more up-to-date operating systems. Moreover, asset owners of targets of strategic significance—such as critical infrastructure—typically employ highly customized software and specific hardware with tailored configurations that are unique to those systems and usually only intimately understood by the original developers and manufacturers. It has been reported, for example, that the malware employed in the Stuxnet cyberattacks against the Iranian nuclear program was tailored to target the specific model of Siemens programmable logic controllers (PLC) used at the Natanz enrichment facility.26 Indeed, while Stuxnet was discovered in computers around the world, it delivered destructive effects only against the centrifuges in Natanz.27 The non-substitutability of entire classes of offensive capabilities by definition increases the cost of developing an arsenal of offensive cyber capabilities.28

Therefore, the time and resource requirements to gain access and develop specific offensive capabilities may render important escalatory response options infeasible or impractical at the desired time. Operational planning and execution must consider that a given capability may not be usable or even exist at a chosen time of employment.29 As the above discussion illustrates, many of the target sets that would represent strategic (and therefore escalatory) targets, such as a state’s critical infrastructure or nuclear command and control, demand extensive planning, pre-positioning, and capability development in advance of employing offensive capabilities. Therefore, the timing of a crisis plays a crucial role in decisions about cyber escalation responses. Specifically, the time required to develop access to hold strategic targets at risk means that, even if a state seeks to escalate against an adversary using cyber means, it may find itself limited by the accesses and capabilities it possesses at the moment a crisis occurs. Cyber response options may be limited to less decisive or more vulnerable target sets, rather than those that are more strategically significant.

2022 Michigan Negative
AT: Case › AT: Russia Adv › 2NC – No Escalation – Generic

Quick timeframes are a neg warrant---defenders can patch vulnerabilities within minutes, but escalation requires attackers to have sustained access---those defensive pauses prevent cyber-space escalation and allow decisionmakers to defuse crises

Erica D. Borghard 19, assistant professor at the Army Cyber Institute at the United States Military Academy at West Point and a research fellow at the Saltzman Institute of War and Peace Studies at Columbia University; and Shawn W. Lonergan, research affiliate of the Army Cyber Institute at the United States Military Academy at West Point, Ph.D. in Political Science from Columbia University, Fall 2019, “Cyber Operations as Imperfect Tools of Escalation,” Strategic Studies Quarterly, Vol. 13, No. 3, p. 122-145

Third, these limitations become even more salient when we consider how strategic interactions are likely to play out over time during repeated crisis interactions. Because the virtual domain is changeable in a way that the physical world is not, actions taken by defenders in the context of a crisis can radically and unpredictably alter an attacker’s ability to deliver and sustain effects against a target over time.30 Access and capabilities are neither guaranteed nor indefinite—they have a shelf life.31 Footholds into a target’s network that were time intensive to develop can unexpectedly disappear as vulnerabilities in a network are patched. Exploits may have a short shelf life as revealing information about them enables targets to identify indicators of compromise (IOCs) and use these to prevent further damage from specific malware strains or quarantine malicious traffic using known malware signatures. An example of the latter is the US Cyber Command initiative, beginning in 2018, to share information about adversary malware by uploading samples to VirusTotal.32 Therefore, a target can “transition from vulnerability (to a particular attack) to invulnerability in, literally, minutes.”33 Third-party disclosure about software vulnerabilities by governments or private actors can also unintentionally precipitate the loss of access as exposure about vulnerability information enables network defenders to take measures to remedy them.34 For instance, the disclosures that began in 2016 by the group Shadow Brokers of purportedly pilfered US National Security Agency exploits and zero days ostensibly put US government accesses at risk.35 Put simply, a vulnerability upon which an access relies may in theory be only one update or disclosure away from being patched.

Thus, in the context of an ongoing crisis interaction between an attacker and defender, the former’s operational tempo is likely to be interrupted by the latter’s behavior, forcing the attacker to devote additional time to find or acquire new vulnerabilities and exploits in the midst of an offensive operation or campaign. As Inglis notes, to succeed in an offensive cyber campaign that unfolds over time, attackers must be able to sustain “the efficacy of tools under varying conditions caused by the defender’s response and the natural variability and dynamism of cyberspace.”36 The ability to build or acquire new accesses and capabilities “in real time” during a crisis is highly limited.37 Indeed, General Paul Nakasone remarked in a January 2019 interview on the radical difference in shelf life between conventional and cyber capabilities:

2022 Michigan Negative
AT: Case › AT: Russia Adv › 2NC – No Escalation – Generic

No cyber escalation

Erica D. Borghard 19, assistant professor at the Army Cyber Institute at the United States Military Academy at West Point and a research fellow at the Saltzman Institute of War and Peace Studies at Columbia University; and Shawn W. Lonergan, research affiliate of the Army Cyber Institute at the United States Military Academy at West Point, Ph.D. in Political Science from Columbia University, Fall 2019, “Cyber Operations as Imperfect Tools of Escalation,” Strategic Studies Quarterly, Vol. 13, No. 3, p. 122-145

There are important empirical reasons to suspect that the risks of cyber escalation may be exaggerated. If cyberspace is in fact an environment that generates severe escalation risks, why has cyber escalation not yet occurred? We posit that cyber escalation has not occurred because cyber operations are poor tools of escalation. In particular, we argue that this stems from key characteristics of offensive cyber capabilities that limit escalation through four mechanisms. First, retaliatory offensive cyber operations may not exist at the desired time of employment. Second, even under conditions where they may exist, their effects are uncertain and often relatively limited. Third, several attributes of offensive cyber operations generate important tradeoffs for decision-makers that may make them hesitant to employ capabilities in some circumstances. Finally, the alternative of cross-domain escalation—responding to a cyber incident with noncyber, kinetic instruments—is unlikely to be chosen except under rare circumstances, given the limited cost-generation potential of offensive cyber operations.

2022 Michigan Negative
AT: Case › AT: Russia Adv › 1NC – No Escalation

Russian cyberattacks happening now – cyberattacks against Ukraine prove no escalation

Josephine Wolff 22, an associate professor of cybersecurity at The Fletcher School at Tufts University, March 2022, “Why Russia Hasn’t Launched Major Cyber Attacks Since the Invasion of Ukraine,” Time Magazine, Technology,

In the relatively short and rapidly evolving history of cyber conflict, perhaps nothing has been established with greater certainty and more widely accepted than the idea that Russia has significant cyber capabilities and isn’t afraid to use them—especially on Ukraine. In 2015, Russian government hackers , leading to widespread outages. In 2017, Russia deployed the  via Ukrainian accounting software and the virus quickly spread across the globe costing businesses billions of dollars in damage and disruption. In the months that followed the NotPetya attacks, many people  that Ukraine served as a sort of “testing ground” for Russia’s cyberwar capabilities and that those capabilities were only growing in their sophistication and reach.

As tensions escalated between Russia and Ukraine, many people were expecting the conflict to have significant cyber components—the United States Department of Homeland Security even issued a  to businesses to be on high alert for Russian cyberattacks,  the U.K.’s National Cyber Security Centre. What is surprising is that—so far, at least—the devastating Russian cyberattacks everyone has been expecting have yet to materialize. There’s no guarantee, of course, that a large-scale cyberattack on  or global banks or anything else isn’t just around the corner. Russia has proven time and again that it has few compunctions about targeting critical infrastructure and causing considerable collateral damage through acts of cyber aggression.

2022 Michigan Negative
AT: Case › AT: Russia Adv › 1NC – No Attacks

Russia won’t attack satellites out of fear of nuke war

Nancy Gallagher 20, Director at the Center for International and Security Studies at Maryland, published 05-2020, “Space Governance and International Cooperation”, CISSM /billy

When applying the Strategic Stability logic to space, most U.S. defense analysts are missing the biggest reason why the United States should be willing to go beyond dialogue, transparency, and voluntary norms to stronger, more reliable forms of security cooperation—the connection to nuclear weapons and terrestrial strategic stability. DOD officials engaged in the space policy reviews have said that the main reason why the Soviets never attacked U.S. satellites was because they believed that would lead to a nuclear war. These officials assume that adversaries will be less inhibited now because the United States would probably respond to most kinds of space interference with non-military or conventional means. In other words, increased nuclear strategic stability has decreased space strategic stability.

2022 Michigan Negative
AT: Case › AT: Russia Adv › 1NC – Lasers Alt Cause

Russian laser attacks are an alt cause

Matthew Humphries 5/18, has a Bachelor's degree in Computer Science and a Master's degree in Games Development, “Russia Claims Its Peresvet Laser Weapon Can Blind Satellites, Burn Drones”, 5/18/2022, PCMag, https://www.pcmag.com/news/russia-claims-its-peresvet-laser-weapon-can-blind-satellites-burn-drones

Russia claims to have a laser weapon that can blind satellites in orbit around Earth as well as "inflict thermal destruction" on a drone in mid-air from miles away.

As Reuters reports(Opens in a new window), the mobile laser weapon is called Peresvet and was first announced back in 2018 by Vladimir Putin. At a conference in Moscow yesterday, deputy prime minister Yury Borisov stated that a recent test had seen the laser burn up a drone 5km (3 miles) away in just five seconds.

2022 Michigan Negative
AT: Case › AT: China Adv › 2NC – No Escalation – Grid

Critical infrastructure attacks don’t generate anywhere near the impact required to trigger escalation

Erica D. Borghard 19, assistant professor at the Army Cyber Institute at the United States Military Academy at West Point and a research fellow at the Saltzman Institute of War and Peace Studies at Columbia University; and Shawn W. Lonergan, research affiliate of the Army Cyber Institute at the United States Military Academy at West Point, Ph.D. in Political Science from Columbia University, Fall 2019, “Cyber Operations as Imperfect Tools of Escalation,” Strategic Studies Quarterly, Vol. 13, No. 3, p. 122-145

Even under circumstances in which a state may possess the right cyber response capabilities at the desired time, its response may not generate sufficient costs against the target to be perceived as escalatory.41 Fundamental limits on the cost-generation potential of offensive cyber operations stem from the fact that cyber capabilities lack the physical violence of conventional and nuclear ones. Cyber weapons target data; they disrupt, manipulate, degrade, or destroy data resident on networks and systems or in transit.42 Moreover, aside from those cyber capabilities that permanently destroy data and for which there are no backups to which a target can revert, cyber effects are temporary and often reversible.

The utility of military instruments of power for the purposes of coercion or brute force inheres in their abilities to inflict—or credibly threaten to inflict—significant damage and harm against a target state (its civilian population or its military forces) to achieve a political objective.43 Cyber weapons could be (and have been) used to disrupt an adversary’s networks and systems—overwhelming them such that they temporarily lose the ability to function or the target loses confidence in their reliability—or even to produce destructive effects by destroying data resident on these systems or, in rarer circumstances, producing effects in the physical realm.44 While conducting multiple cyberattacks against a targeted state’s critical national infrastructure, for example, could in theory generate significant economic and national security consequences, the temporal aspects of offensive cyber operations as described above limit the ability of even the most capable states to sustain persistent, high-cost effects against multiple strategic targets over time. There is simply no guarantee that a state can generate significant costs against a target in the context of an unfolding crisis. This reality starkly contrasts with the relative predictability and reliability of conventional effects. Indeed, the empirical record has largely validated this claim; “the vast majority of malicious cyber activity has taken place far below the threshold of armed conflict between states, and has not risen to the level that would trigger such a conflict.”45 This is why, in Lin’s parlance, “going cyber is pre-escalatory” and countervalue cyberattacks (those that target civilian, rather than military, assets) occur “all the time now and are at the BOTTOM of the escalation ladder” [emphasis in original].46 Rather than their ability to wreak permanent, destructive effects, cyber operations are often prized for their temporary and reversible nature.47

2022 Michigan Negative
AT: Case › AT: China Adv › 2NC – No Escalation

Cyberattacks aren’t perceived as an “armed attack” – they are non-lethal and elicit weaker responses than kinetic attacks

Martin C. Libicki 20, Professor at the Center for Cyber Security Studies at the U.S. Naval Academy, “Correlations Between Cyberspace Attacks and Kinetic Attacks,” May 2020, 2020 12th International Conference on Cyber Conflict, http://195.222.11.251/uploads/2020/05/CyCon_2020_11_Libicki.pdf

4. PROPOSITION: CYBERATTACKS WILL BE TAKEN AS SERIOUSLY AS EQUALLY DAMAGING KINETIC ATTACKS If countries react to cyberattacks as they would to equivalent kinetic attacks, then an escalation in cyberspace (defined as above) could well result in a comparable escalation in physical space – again with the expected effects on international stability. But would they? Much of the answer depends on what constitutes “comparable.” Kinetic military effects tend to include death and destruction. No cyberattack has killed anyone directly, and few have actually broken physical things; wiping a hard drive – as many cyberattacks have done – still leaves the hard drive physically intact. But cyberattacks have been quite costly to their victims, even if measured solely in disruption and remediation costs. The NotPetya attacks were said to have cost their (mostly corporate) victims up to $8 billion (Greenberg 2018). Putatively, a kinetic attack that destroys $8 billion worth of military equipment but harms no one would be comparable and should, one would imagine, bring about a comparable reaction. Imagining a kinetic attack that breaks things but hurts no one used to be an exercise in fantasy. But the Iranian take-down of a $150 million U.S. Global Hawk in the summer of 2019 was such an attack. The U.S. response, a cyberattack, was also non-lethal. Lest this choice of avoiding lethality be ascribed to the individual characteristics of the U.S. President, note that the Pentagon was also thinking along similar lines. One of its favored options was to sink an Iranian craft, but only after giving its sailors time to get away (Baker, Schmitt, and Crowley 2019). Earlier, a Turkish shootdown of a Russian jet near the Syrian border had drawn a cyber response (e.g., DDOS attacks), but nothing violent (Murgia 2015). Returning to NotPetya, the U.S. reaction to this costly event was a limited set of sanctions. If Russia had deliberately disabled commercial satellites whose total replacement value summed to that much, would the United States have also limited its response to sanctions? One might counter that many of the affected corporations were not U.S.-headquartered: for example, Maersk, a Danish shipping company. If that matters, then replace United States by NATO and re-ask the question. So, while the non-lethality of cyberattacks means that a plausible response would be non-lethal, the failure to respond to NotPetya suggests that the broad scope of the cyberattack may have also played a role. Perhaps a cyberattack that damages software and thereby levies costs on victims is different in kind from a comparably costly kinetic attack that damages hardware. Research by Professor Jacqueline Schneider casts further doubt that a cyberattack would be treated as tantamount to a comparable kinetic attack (see Kreps and Schneider 2019). The results of two exercises – one conducted at the U.S. Naval War College and the other on-line – suggest that cyberattacks introduced into a simulated crisis were more often ignored or, at most, motivated a weak response in comparison to comparable kinetic attacks. In fairness, the United States has been used as the exemplar of how countries may respond to cyberattacks and other countries may react differently. But the United States deserves attention because it has responded most overtly, whether through public statements, levied sanctions, or news reports (Israel is also active, but it is a far smaller country and unique in many relevant respects). It is unclear whether the difference is that the United States suffers more cyberattacks than other countries (or seems to in part because of uncensored media coverage) or whether other countries have covert ways of responding that are not widely known. That noted, Jensen and Valeriano (2019) indicate that when citizens of the United States, Russia, and Israel were given a scenario with a major cyberattack, only a small percentage chose to escalate as a result. Roughly half of the respondents wanted something less than a titfor-tat response. They concluded that, “to date, cyber operations have tended to offer great powers escalatory offramps”. Conclusion: cyberattacks would be deemed less likely to garner a kinetic response than would kinetic attacks that levy comparable costs, because they are generally nonlethal and somehow considered less serious and more easily recovered from.

2022 Michigan Negative
AT: Case › AT: China Adv › 2NC – No Escalation

Cyberattacks will not escalate – cyberattacks repeatedly evoke minor responses that don’t lead to escalation

Martin C. Libicki 20, Professor at the Center for Cyber Security Studies at the U.S. Naval Academy, “Correlations Between Cyberspace Attacks and Kinetic Attacks,” May 2020, 2020 12th International Conference on Cyber Conflict, http://195.222.11.251/uploads/2020/05/CyCon_2020_11_Libicki.pdf

Overall, there is little public evidence that hostile events in cyberspace echo strongly outside it. Indeed, rarely do events in cyberspace – much less escalation in cyberspace – lead to serious responses at all. Some research suggests that even severe cyberattacks would generally be less likely than kinetic attacks to induce a response. Although opening cyberattacks can precede kinetic attacks, there are also cases when war comes as a surprise and cyberattacks are not used until the proper accesses to target systems have been gained. Cyberattacks have the potential to put hitherto sacrosanct targets – notably space systems, and other NC3 elements – in play, but cyberattacks have reportedly taken place against satellites while kinetic attacks (weapons tests aside) have not, so far. The failure to respond to cyberattacks may have played a role in enabling missile attacks on Saudi Aramco facilities, but the link is distant (seven years earlier) and tenuous. There is no analog (yet) in the Russo-Ukrainian conflict. Several reasons could be adduced to explain the lack of correlation. One is that while there could be cyberattacks consequential enough to induce echoes in the physical world, none have reached that threshold and it may well be that none could reach that threshold. Even as the attack surface for cyberspace operations keeps growing, hackers grow more talented, and their leaders more aware of the gains available from such operations – defense is not sleeping. Those who own networks are taking cybersecurity seriously (at long last), cloud computing may have helped put defenses in the hands of those for whom protection is a profit center, and the cybersecurity industry itself is robust. Succeeding generations of software – e.g., versions of Windows operation systems – are also more impervious to intrusions. Two is that, in common with many widely-feared phenomena, cyberattacks have evolved from an acute problem (one both rare and fearsome) to a chronic problem (more common, but something that one can adjust to). Three, the oft-expressed belief that cyberwar is war has yet to take hold. Because cyberspace operations are ambiguous (and not easily grasped even when clear) and their effects almost always temporary and not (yet) lethal, they may be considered something separate and apart. Time will tell whether this distinction will continue to be observed.

2022 Michigan Negative
AT: Case › AT: China Adv › 1NC – No Escalation

Cyber attacks don’t cause escalation – resources, reversibility, and lesser impact

Sarah Kreps, 19 — (Sarah Kreps; Political Science Department, Cornell University, Published: 9-29-2019; "Escalation firebreaks in the cyber, conventional, and nuclear domains: moving beyond effects-based logics"; OUP Academic; Accessed: 6-26-2022; https://academic.oup.com/cybersecurity/article/5/1/tyz007/5575971)//Pen-SY

The perseverance of the firebreak has come to define nuclear strategy, especially for the United States.1 It is also increasingly central to debates around US cyber strategy. Therefore, as critics of the persistent engagement strategy argue, understanding the logics of cyber escalation is vitally important to the strategy’s success [49–51]. Despite the importance of escalation for current US cyber strategy success, there is very little scholarly consensus about cyber escalation.2 As Joseph Nye asserts, “escalation ladders and thresholds are poorly understood” in the cyber realm [66]. A number of scholars and policymakers argue that cyber operations do not change the fundamental nature of escalation. For these scholars, it is the effects created by weapons that matter for escalation and not necessarily the means or the domain in which the effects are created. Cyberspace operations may have unique qualities, but the fundamental logics of escalation are tied to weapons’ effects and rather than how these effects are delivered. As long as cyberspace operations can create similar effects as operations in other domains, they create the same escalation ladders. The debate within this literature is about the technical ability of cyberspace operations to create the same effects as the other domains [56, 59, 60, 62, 67, 68]. Kostyuk et al., e.g., equate permanent damage to civilian infrastructure as the cyber equivalent of a nuclear war and existential attack, all of which should warrant a comparable escalatory response. They caveat that “at present, we do not believe a single mode of cyber attack alone would pose an existential threat to the US, however, this may change in the near future” [69]. Scholars within this line of reasoning devote significant attention to understanding the difficulty cyberspace operations have achieving access, the resources required for creating complex effects, and the highly-reversible nature of most cyberspace operations. Glaser and Farrell provide an effects-based typology and point to five characteristics of effects that may decrease escalation of cyberattacks: physical versus nonphysical damage (first- or second-order physical effects), no visible damage, military versus civilian, attacks that kill versus those that do not, and attacks in war versus peace [13]. According to this understanding of cyberspace and escalation, responses to a cyberattack should not be qualitatively different from any other attack as long as cyberattacks can advance to the level of nuclear or large-scale conventional capabilities [57, 59]. Until cyberspace attacks can provide the decisive edge toward taking territory or create the lethal effects comparable to large-scale or nuclear war, they will not be treated the same as attacks in other domains. The perspective is largely consistent with Valeriano and Maness’s quantitative analysis of cyberspace operations, who find cyber operations to be largely low intensity and find no evidence of higher intensity retaliation to cyber attacks [69].

2022 Michigan Negative
AT: Case › AT: China Adv › 2NC – No Escalation – Empirics

All empirics go neg

Erica D. Borghard 19, assistant professor at the Army Cyber Institute at the United States Military Academy at West Point and a research fellow at the Saltzman Institute of War and Peace Studies at Columbia University; and Shawn W. Lonergan, research affiliate of the Army Cyber Institute at the United States Military Academy at West Point, Ph.D. in Political Science from Columbia University, Fall 2019, “Cyber Operations as Imperfect Tools of Escalation,” Strategic Studies Quarterly, Vol. 13, No. 3, p. 122-145

There is a widespread view among practitioners and scholars that cyberspace is defined by an inherent potential for dangerous escalation dynamics between rivals.1 On the practitioner side, for example, senior US intelligence and military leaders expressed concerns about first-strike incentives leading to escalation in a 2017 joint statement to Congress, testifying that “adversaries equipped with [offensive cyber capabilities] could be prone to preemptive attack and rapid escalation in a future crisis, because both sides would have an incentive to strike first.”2 On the academic side, there is a palpable fear that cyberspace is an environment in which offense has advantages over defense and that this—coupled with factors such as problems of attribution, poor command and control, and the absence of meaningful thresholds or red lines—generates real risks of inadvertent escalation.3 Concerns about escalation grew even more passionate in the wake of the US Department of Defense’s release of its 2018 Cyber Strategy document, which articulates an operational concept of “defending forward” in which the DOD “disrupt[s] or halt[s] malicious cyber activity at its source.”4

However, there are important empirical reasons to suspect that the risks of cyber escalation may be exaggerated. Specifically, if cyberspace is in fact an environment that (perhaps even more so than others) generates severe escalation risks, why has cyber escalation not yet occurred? Most interactions between cyber rivals have been characterized by limited volleys that have not escalated beyond nuisance levels and have been largely contained below the use-of-force threshold.5 For example, in a survey of cyber incidents and responses between 2000 and 2014, Brandon Valeriano et al. find that “rivals tend to respond only to lower-level [cyber] incidents and the response tends to check the intrusion as opposed to seek escalation dominance. The majority of cyber escalation episodes are at a low severity threshold and are non-escalatory. These incidents are usually ‘tit-for-tat’ type responses within one step of the original incident.”6 Even in the two rare examples in which states employed kinetic force in response to adversary cyber operations—the US counter-ISIL drone campaign in 2015 and Israel’s airstrike against Hamas cyber operatives in 2019—the use of force was circumscribed and did not escalate the overall conflict (not to mention that force was used against nonstate adversaries with limited potential to meaningfully escalate in response to US or Israeli force).7

2022 Michigan Negative
AT: Case › AT: China Adv › 1NC – No Attack

Chinese cyber threats are overblown – the U.S. is far more advanced in its cyber and military capabilities and the lack of coordination in the Chinese military decks its ability to launch a major satellite cyber attack

Jon R. Lindsay 15, an Associate Professor at the School of Cybersecurity and Privacy at the Georgia Institute of Technology with a joint appointment in the Sam Nunn School of International Affairs and the School of Public Policy, “Exaggerating the Chinese Cyber Threat,” May 2015, Policy Brief, Quarterly Journal: International Security,

The secrecy regarding the cyber capabilities and activities of the United States and China creates difficulty in estimating the relative balance of cyber power across the Pacific. Nevertheless, the United States appears to be gaining an increasing advantage. For every type of purported Chinese cyber threat, there are also serious Chinese vulnerabilities and growing Western strengths.

Much of the international cyber insecurity that China generates reflects internal security concerns. China exploits foreign media and digital infrastructure to target political dissidents and minority populations. The use of national censorship architecture (the Great Firewall of China) to redirect inbound internet traffic to attack sites such as GreatFire.org and GitHub in March 2015 is just the latest example of this worrisome trend. Yet prioritizing political information control over technical cyber defense also damages China's own cybersecurity. Lax law enforcement and poor cyber defenses leave the country vulnerable to both cybercriminals and foreign spies. The fragmented and notoriously competitive nature of the Communist Party state further complicates coordination across military, police, and regulatory entities.

2022 Michigan Negative
AT: Case › AT: China Adv › 2NC – Lasers Alt Cause

China developed laser technology and are inclined to use them – satellite attacks inevitable

Chris Zappone 21; Digital Foreign Editor at The Age and Sydney Morning Herald, Published: 8-9-2021; "Space lasers and the new battlefield emerging under China’s anti-satellite tactics"; Sydney Morning Herald; Accessed: 6-30-2022; https://www.smh.com.au/world/asia/space-lasers-and-the-new-battlefield-emerging-under-china-s-anti-satellite-tactics-20210804-p58ft2.html)//Pen-SY

Space lasers are a real thing, even if they’re not generally made to blow up passing satellites. Designed to damage or disable sensor equipment on orbiting satellites, ground-based lasers can help hide a nation’s activities. Photography from satellites, for example, has been key in helping reveal the extent of Beijing’s detention of Muslim Uighurs in western China. Weeks before the Federation of American Scientists produced analysis showing missile silos being built in western China, US-based analysts – drawing attention to anti-satellite lasers in Xinjiang – warned that US satellites, the kind that could keep an eye on China’s military, were “increasingly vulnerable to China’s ground-based lasers”. Sydney-based space analyst Chris Flaherty said that when it came to lasers, “dazzling”, or interfering with a satellite’s camera, and “blinding”, permanently damaging a satellite, “are the prime technologies that are deployable right now”. The technology gives a country the power “to deny a satellite’s ability to operate, to shut it down or to damage it – without creating space debris”. Michael Duitsman of the California-based James Martin Centre for Nonproliferation Studies said the laser facility in Xinjiang was thought to have been started as far back as 2009. It “significantly predates both the Uighur cultural genocide and the current missile silo construction,” he said. Inspecting images from earlier this year, Duitsman said there had been some construction in the support area for the laser, as well as modification at one of the buildings. Concerns about the use of lasers used this way in a future space conflict are spreading. The prospect of a contest for space dominance between China, the US and Russia prompted the US to create the Space Force in 2019. Last month, Defence Minister Peter Dutton announced Australia would begin exploring options for Space Electronic Warfare, because it’s a capability that doesn’t “create debris or damage the space environment”. Flaherty said to better understand China’s intentions with lasers aimed at satellites, one need only look at the example Russia provides. In 2018, Russia unveiled its Peresvet laser system and positioned it near mobile units of intercontinental ballistic missiles. In doing so, it can temporarily blind passing satellites overhead from taking pictures. Flaherty said “any superpower that has important strategic assets ... will deploy a laser”. US-based China space analyst Dean Cheng believes Beijing would likely have installed them to frustrate the satellite photography of its military bases and equipment. “It would not be surprising if the Chinese wanted to limit Indian ability to see into Tibet,” said Cheng. He said lasers could be used to protect one of China’s missile silo fields, as well as naval and air bases that could be used in an invasion of Taiwan. But the ability to use lasers against satellites is well known by space-faring powers. “What is more problematic is that the West relies more on space for the conduct of military operations, so effective anti-satellite systems work much more to the benefit of” Russia or China, which focus their military closer to their own regions, Cheng says. Economically, the West has more to lose in such a scenario because widely adopted Western technologies such as GPS have evolved to rely on peaceful access to space. Simply raising questions about China’s capabilities to disrupt a rival nation’s satellites is part of the new game, one that differs from the Cold War rivalry. The physical distance of orbit makes it hard to know with certainty whether an outage of a satellite happened as a cause of an accident, or if something was the result of hard-to-detect aggression. For example, in 2006, China used a laser that temporarily blinded a US military reconnaissance satellite. “The action temporarily blinded the satellite but caused no permanent damage, leading to speculation that China may not have been intentionally trying to interfere with the satellite,” said US congressional testimony in 2019. Like the ambiguity of attributing the origin of a cyber attack, the cause of a problem in orbit is hard to determine as the satellite passes 200 kilometres overhead at a speed of 25,000 km/h. Messing with a rival’s satellites in orbit in ways that can easily be misinterpreted, using lasers, or some other directed energy, is a change from the Cold War. Back then Russian or American interference with each other’s satellites could easily be interpreted as a prelude to a nuclear launch, and so was something to generally avoid. Today, while the nuclear risk hasn’t gone away – as China’s missile silo building proves – technology has evolved, orbits have grown much more crowded, and so has the willingness of some space powers to court risk. China, among others, has been on a mission to build space power since it – and the world – witnessed volleys of US satellite-guided bombs raining down on Iraqi troops during the Persian Gulf War of 1991. “The Gulf War set off the next technology trend for countries to catch up,” Flaherty said. Since then, many more satellites and nations have entered orbit, producing data and services we rely on daily: GPS, space-based timing for transactions, Google maps, precise weather data for agriculture. If China or another power used lasers aggressively against orbiting satellites, it’s no longer about two superpowers facing off like during the Cold War space race, said Flaherty.

2022 Michigan Negative
AT: Case › AT: China Adv › 1NC – Lasers Alt Cause

Chinese laser attacks are an alt cause

*Brian Chow and **Henry Sokolski 20, *Senior Physical Scientist and Professor at RAND Corporation and **Executive Director of the Nonproliferation Policy Education Center, 7/10/2020, “Op-ed | U.S. satellites increasingly vulnerable to China’s ground-based lasers”, Space News, https://spacenews.com/op-ed-u-s-satellites-increasingly-vulnerable-to-chinas-ground-based-lasers/

The Defense Intelligence Agency warned in January 2019 that China likely will field in 2020 a ground-based laser weapon that can counter low-orbit space-based sensors. By the mid-to-late 2020s it may field higher power systems that could damage the structures of non-optical satellites.

How real is the threat? Analysts have already identified five Chinese laser bases. One in Xinjiang has four main buildings. One of these building is thought to be for tracking satellites, while equipment in the other three could be used to dazzle or disable satellite sensors. If the Xinjiang facility is representative of the other four, all five bases can be located and are vulnerable to aerial attacks.

2022 Michigan Negative
AT: Case › AT: China Adv › 1NC – Article 5 Key

Aff fails---only terrestrial retaliation can deter---otherwise China calculates mutual destruction to be net beneficial even if they’re rational, which they aren’t.

James Lewis 13, Senior vice president and program director at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), “Reconsidering Deterrence for Space and Cyberspace”, https://www.stimson.org/wp-content/files/file-attachments/Anti-satellite%20Weapons%20-The%20Stimson%20Center.pdf \\SYang

In order to deter China from using ASAT weapons, China’s leaders would have to calculate that an ASAT attack would lead to an escalation of conflict or to damaging retaliation. In peacetime, Beijing would probably calculate that an ASAT attack might risk being seen as a casus belli. If so, it is unlikely that China’s kinetic or directed energy weapons would be used outside of conflict. If, however, Washington and Beijing are already engaged in an armed clash, the threat of the use of force in space is somewhat moot. Washington could, for example, threaten to escalate the conflict by warning that an attack on a satellite will result in the destruction of China’s space launch complex. Beijing may nonetheless calculate that at this stage of its military modernization, interfering with US satellites is worth any retaliatory interference with their own satellites, and that the risk of escalation in other domains is either low or acceptable. There is some evidence that Chinese military leaders may underestimate risk and overestimate the utility of asymmetric attacks. China has little experience with the arms control negotiations that underpinned nuclear deterrence, has a different conceptual framework for conflict and international relations, and lacks the experience of the Cold War for interpreting American actions and signals. Chinese military concepts on “deterrence” differ significantly from US concepts, meshing Schelling’s ideas of deterrence and compellence in ways that encourage use and increase the risk of miscalculation.7 Deterring Chinese ASAT attacks during armed conflict would require threatening something other than China’s own satellites, since the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) is not yet so dependent on space assets that the satellites’ loss would constrain their operations as much as the loss of American satellites would hurt US forces. In this situation, Chinese leaders may see an exchange of satellite attacks as working to their benefit. Only a credible threat to retaliate against a terrestrial target would change China’s calculus, but such threats bring the risk of escalation of conflict that would need to be weighed carefully. Responding to an attack on a military target in space or a military cyber network with an attack on the Chinese homeland would likely be seen by China as escalatory. Additionally, nationalist sentiment among the citizens of potential opponents like China or Iran suggests the most likely effect of US escalation unless it was sustained and broadly destructive, would be to reinforce support for the regime and for a continuation of the conflict. Belief shapes perception. The Kremlin believed that the United States was inherently aggressive and sought the destruction of the Soviet Union. Soviet political and military leaders debated whether the US investment in weapons was to retain a credible deterrent or to attain first strike capabilities. Paranoia also colors how authoritarian Chinese military leaders may underestimate risk and overestimate the utility of asymmetric attacks. regimes that lack domestic legitimacy view the United States. Cultural and linguistic differences also contribute to misinterpretation of deterrent messages.

2022 Michigan Negative
AT: Case › AT: Squo › 1NC – Squo solves

The aff became non inherent on June 29th whent NATO announced its Strategic Concept

NATO 22, 6-29-2022, “NATO 2022 STRATEGIC CONCEPT” https://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/2022/6/pdf/290622-strategic-concept.pdf/billy

24. We will expedite our digital transformation, adapt the NATO Command Structure for the information age and enhance our cyber defences, networks and infrastructure. We will promote innovation and increase our investments in emerging and disruptive technologies to retain our interoperability and military edge. We will work together to adopt and integrate new technologies, cooperate with the private sector, protect our innovation ecosystems, shape standards and commit to principles of responsible use that reflect our democratic values and human rights.

25. Maintaining secure use of and unfettered access to space and cyberspace are key to effective deterrence and defence. We will enhance our ability to operate effectively in space and cyberspace to prevent, detect, counter and respond to the full spectrum of threats, using all available tools. A single or cumulative set of malicious cyber activities; or hostile operations to, from, or within space; could reach the level of armed attack and could lead the North Atlantic Council to invoke Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty. We recognise the applicability of international law and will promote responsible behaviour in cyberspace and space. We will also boost the resilience of the space and cyber capabilities upon which we depend for our collective defence and security.

2022 Michigan Disadvantage
PTX Updates › Midterms

Manchin’s refusal to cooperate on climate policy energizes democratic voter’s

Hans Nichols 22, 7-16-2022, "Democrats' Manchin rage," Axios, https://www.axios.com/2022/07/16/democrats-manchin-rage

Democrats are publicly fuming that Sen. Joe Manchin (D-W.Va.) can't be trusted and has doubled-crossed them yet again on Build Back Better. But privately, they're taking him at his word that he's still committed to working with them to lower prescription drug prices.

Why it matters: Party leaders are moving to vote on a drug pricing and health care subsidy package this month. Capping drug costs is hugely popular across party lines and could give Democrats a major boost ahead of November if infighting doesn't sink a deal.