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2022 Michigan Counterplan
Aff › Delay DA

Chism, National Archives education specialist, 2005 (

The constitutional amendment process.(teaching content). Kahlil Social Education 69.7 (Nov-Dec 2005): p373(9). )

Even though the steps can be described briefly, actual ratification can take much longer. Some amendments, such as the 27th (Congressional pay increases), took many years to complete the ratification process. It was proposed by James Madison in 1789, but not ratified until 203 years later. This amendment required that any change in the salary of members of Congress only take effect after the next general election (so lawmakers were not voting to increase their own salaries). Congress ratified other amendments in short order, such as the 18th (Prohibition), which took little more than a year. The length of time depends upon the gravity of the issue the amendment is intended to address, the intensity of public sentiment concerning the issue, and whether or not a time limit for ratification was written into the amendment during the proposal stage.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
Aff › Delay DA

There are too many question marks – SCOTUS would take years to determine if it’s legitimate

Olson, 16 – senior fellow at the Cato Institute’s Robert A. Levy Center for Constitutional Studies and is known for his writing on the American legal system (Walter, “An Article V Constitutional Convention? Wrong Idea, Wrong Time”, CATO Institute, 1/5/2016, https://www.cato.org/publications/commentary/article-v-constitutional-convention)//RCU

Some of these ideas are better than others—Gov. Abbott’s 92-page report () is rather erudite, and lays out its arguments skillfully even if I do not find all of them sound—but every such scheme to stage an Article V convention should come with a giant ACME brand stenciled on its side. If it doesn’t just sit there doing nothing, it’s apt to blow up on the spot. The detonation that skeptics most fear is what’s called a runaway convention, in which the delegates called together to, say, install term limits or revamp campaign finance decide to venture into other areas as well, and perhaps start proposing whatever new amendments they think might be a good idea. Hence Justice Antonin Scalia’s brusque dismissal: “I certainly would not want a constitutional convention. Whoa! Who knows what would come out of it?” Some respected scholars who favor a convention argue that strict instructions would deter the assembled delegates from venturing beyond the velvet rope. But if that cannot be made a legal requirement, it winds up more like an honor code. “Congress might try to limit the agenda to one amendment or to one issue, but there is no way to assure that the Convention would obey,” wrote the late Chief Justice Warren Burger. Don’t believe Scalia or Burger? Go ahead and read the instruction kit for a convention, such as it is, in Article V of the U.S. Constitution. It’s quite brief. Here’s the full relevant text: The Congress, whenever two thirds of both houses shall deem it necessary, shall propose amendments to this Constitution, or, on the application of the legislatures of two thirds of the several states, shall call a convention for proposing amendments, which, in either case, shall be valid to all intents and purposes, as part of this Constitution, when ratified by the legislatures of three fourths of the several states, or by conventions in three fourths thereof, as the one or the other mode of ratification may be proposed by the Congress… Note what this does *not* say. It says not a word expressly authorizing the states, Congress, or some combination of the two to confine the subject matter of a convention. It says not a word about whether Congress, in calculating whether the requisite 34 states have called for a convention, must (or must not) aggregate calls for a convention on, say, a balanced budget, with differently worded calls arising from related or perhaps even unrelated topics. It says not a word prescribing that the make-up of a convention, as many conservatives imagine, will be one-state-one-vote (as Alaska and Wyoming might hope) or whether states with larger populations should be given larger delegations (as California and New York would surely argue). Does Congress, or perhaps the Supreme Court, get to resolve these questions—the same Congress and Supreme Court that the process is aimed at doing an end run around? If the Supreme Court resolves them, does it do so only at the very end of the process, after years of national debate have been spent in devising amendments that we find out after the fact were not generated in proper form? Justice Burger described the whole process as “a grand waste of time.” One reason is that after advocates get the process rolling by convincing two-thirds of states, or 34, itself a fairly demanding number, the amendments that emerge from a convention do not get ratified unless three-quarters of states ratify, or 38, a quite demanding number. Put differently, it takes only 13 states to refuse to act to kill any of these ideas, bad or good, in the end. Sorry, Cenk and Marco, but so long as we have a nation fairly closely divided between Blue and Red sentiment, there will be at least 13 states skeptical of some systemic change so big that you had to go around the backs of both Congress and the Supreme Court to pull it off. If you’re a progressive who thinks the populist winds blow only in your favor, reflect for a moment on the success of Donald Trump. If you’re a conservative to whom radio call-ins resound as the voice of the people, consider that state legislatures confronted with the hard legal issues a convention would raise might turn for advice and assistance to elite lawyers (yikes) or even law professors (double yikes).

2022 Michigan Counterplan
Aff › Delay DA

Delay DA of 203 years

Chism 5 [Chism, National Archives education specialist, 2005, The constitutional amendment process.(teaching content). Kahlil Social Education 69.7 (Nov-Dec 2005): p373(9)]

Even though the steps can be described briefly, actual ratification can take much longer. Some amendments, such as the 27th (Congressional pay increases), took many years to complete the ratification process. It was proposed by James Madison in 1789, but not ratified until 203 years later. This amendment required that any change in the salary of members of Congress only take effect after the next general election (so lawmakers were not voting to increase their own salaries). Congress ratified other amendments in short order, such as the 18th (Prohibition), which took little more than a year. The length of time depends upon the gravity of the issue the amendment is intended to address, the intensity of public sentiment concerning the issue, and whether or not a time limit for ratification was written into the amendment during the proposal stage.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
Aff › Veto

Congress vetoes instantly

Michael B. Rappaport, 10, director of USD’s Center for the Study of Constitutional Originalism, November, 2010, “REFORMING ARTICLE V: THE PROBLEMS CREATED BY THE NATIONAL CONVENTION AMENDMENT METHOD AND HOW TO FIX THEM”, http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/20788836.pdf?acceptTC=true

Now, consider a different amendment provision. This provision allows Congress to amend the Constitution, subject to ratification by state legislatures or conventions, but it provides no other amendment method. Thus, it gives Congress a veto on any amendments. This provision would also make the Constitution less reflective of popular views and less desirable. Given the desire of political entities to maintain and expand their power, Congress is unlikely to allow the Constitution to be amended to limit its power. Moreover, because Congress tends to adopt the perspective of the federal government generally, Congress might not be quick to limit the power of the other branches of the federal government.62 Thus, if a change in values or circumstances were to require additional limitations on Congress or even on the federal government, it is unlikely that an amendment adopting those changes would be passed. Moreover, if Congress were to abuse its power, no constitutional reform would be forthcoming. Over time, then, one would expect the Constitution to become increasingly distorted normatively. The Constitution would fail to add needed checks on Congress and the federal government, but would grow to include additional limitations on the states (and perhaps the President). Finally, consider the existing Article V provisions. We can see that it is [are] largely the same as the one described immediately above that permits only the congressional amendment process. Given the defects in the convention process, it is as if that process does not exist. Thus, the same normative distortions that apply to a constitution with only the congressional amendment procedure--a bias in favor of Congress and the national government, and against the states--apply to the existing Constitution. The one exception to this claim is that the national convention process would be available if matters ever turned catastrophic. At that point, the state legislatures might be willing to risk a runaway convention and the other costs to address genuinely overriding problems. But absent this extraordinary situation, the national convention process would not be employed and the Constitution would exhibit serious normative problems. My argument that the failure of the national convention method undermines the constitutional amendment process by preventing certain amendments from being enacted is confirmed by our constitutional history. The dominant pattern of constitutional amendments reveals an amendment process that has neither placed checks on Congress or the federal government, nor provided protections to the states. Instead, it has often expanded the federal government's power or taken actions that have been largely orthogonal to the federal government's interests.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
Aff › Alliances Deficit

Can’t solve alliances.

Howell & Pevehouse 11 [William G. Howell and Jon C. Pevehouse, both associate professors at the University of Chicago's Irving B. Harris School of Public Policy, “Chapter 1: Possibilities of Congressional Influence,” in While Dangers Gather: Congressional Checks on Presidential War Powers, Princeton University Press, 6-27-2011, p.27-29]

The Importance of Congressional Appeals/Dissent Because they are legally binding, legislation and appropriations passed by Congress directly impinge on a president’s discretion to wage war. Not surprisingly, then, opponents of a president’s war typically call on Congress to pass laws and cut appropriations. But the public debates that precede military actions also have important consequences for presidential power. Two stand out. By expressing dissent, members of Congress can weaken the presidents ability to credibly convey resolve to foreign allies and adversaries, and they can turn public opinion against him.73 Here, we briefly summarize both of these avenues of congressional influence. SIGNALING RESOLVE To the extent that congressional discontent signals domestic irresolution to other nations, the job of resolving a foreign crisis is made all the more difficult. As Kenneth Schultz shows, an “opposition party can under- mine the credibility of some challenges by publicly opposing them. Since this strategy threatens to increase the probability of resistance from the rival state, it forces the government to be more selective about making threats”—and, concomitantly, more cautious about actually using military force.74 When members of Congress openly object to a planned military operation, would-be adversaries of the United States may feel emboldened, believing that the president lacks the domestic support required to see a military venture through. Such nations, it stands to reason, will be more willing to enter conflict, and if convinced that the United States will back down once the costs of conflict are revealed, they may fight longer and make fewer concessions. Domestic political strife, as it were, weakens the ability of presidents to bargain effectively with foreign states, while increasing the chances that military entanglements abroad will become protracted and unwieldy. A large body of work within the field of international relations supports the contention that a nation’s ability to achieve strategic military objec- tives in short order depends, in part, on the head of states credibility in conveying political resolve. Indeed, a substantial game theoretic literature underscores the importance of domestic political institutions and public opinion as state leaders attempt to credibly commit to war.75 Confront- ing widespread and vocal domestic opposition, the president may have a difficult time signaling his willingness to see a military campaign to its end. While congressional opposition may embolden foreign enemies, the perception on the part of allies that the president lacks support may make them wary of committing any troops at all. The dangers of domestic political dissent are not lost on presidents and members of Congress. Indeed, for Bush (43) it constituted an important reason for seeking congressional authorization to use force against Iraq in the fall of 2002. In a Rose Garden ceremony on October 2, the presi- dent noted, “The statement of support from the Congress will show to friend and enemy alike the resolve of the United States. In Baghdad, the regime will know that full compliance with all U.N. security demands is the only choice and that time remaining for that choice is limited.”76 Then, in remarks eight days later on the House’s vote to authorize the use of force, the president proclaimed, “The House of Representatives has spoken clearly to the world and to the United Nations Security Council: The gathering threat of Iraq must be confronted fully and finally. Today’s vote also sends a clear message to the Iraqi regime: It must disarm and comply with all existing U.N. resolutions, or it will be forced to comply. There are no other options for the Iraqi regime. There can be no negoti- ations. The days of Iraq acting as an outlaw state are coming to an end.”77 By securing congressional authorization, it was supposed, the president could communicate his views and intentions more effectively to the international community that Iraq’s defiance of United Nations resolutions would no longer pass unnoticed.'8 In doing so, it was hoped, Saddam Hussein would finally relent to Bush's demands. Imagine what might have happened during the lead-up to and execu- tion of the Iraq War had Congress not authorized the use of force. Two outcomes seem plausible, even likely. First, the president would have had an even more difficult time assembling an international coalition in sup- port of military action. Recall, after all, that the president expressly sought congressional authorization in the hopes that it would improve the chances of later securing a UN Resolution in support of military action. Second, and in a more speculative vein, had Congress not authorized the use of force, the military operation itself might not have gone so smoothly. Dur- ing the early stages of the Iraq War, the U.S. military took pains to per- suade the enemy to lay down its arms and surrender, rather than fight and face certain death. Accompanying these claims were regular assurances that the United States would see this war through to the end, that it would not stop until the entire Hussein regime was dismantled. To substantiate these claims, Congress’s authorization was critical. For a moment, put yourself in the place of an Iraqi field officer in the spring of 2003. On the one hand, the United States military is bearing down upon you, threatening to kill you and every one of your comrades unless you abandon the fight. On the other hand, should you surrender prematurely, and should the United States fail to depose the Hussein regime, then you can expect to face the wrath of a spurned and spiteful ruler—as the southern Shi’a did a decade prior, after they had risen up in defiance of the Hussein regime only to be persecuted the moment that U.S. troops withdrew. Which option seems preferable critically depends on the likelihood that the United States will see the campaign to its end. For if you have reason to doubt the nation’s resolve, and Congress's refusal to authorize the use of force would buoy this concern, then the latter op- tion might be the right one—producing a longer, bloodier military conflict and raising the cost to an invading army. Similar concerns arose in subsequent years when the United States con- templated troop withdrawals from Iraq. Though the insurgency contin- ued to take its toll on U.S. forces, the president’s popularity waned, and calls for the Iraqi government to police its own state intensified. Bush nonetheless refused to set a firm timetable for troops to leave. And his rea- sons for doing so were plain enough. The president insisted that insurgents were watching U.S. politics closely and that a timetable would encourage the insurgents to “just go ahead and wait us out." Setting a fixed with- drawal date, Bush concluded, simply “concedes too much to the enemy.”79 Whether this prediction was accurate or not, its logic relied on the realization that others monitor U.S. politics generally, and Congress in particular, to gauge the nation’s resolve.

2022 Michigan Evidence
China War Good › --2NC---AT: China First

No Chinese early warning or first strike

David C. Logan 17, PhD student in Princeton University’s Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs and a Graduate Fellow and Deputy Director of the Strategic Education Initiative at Princeton’s Center for International Security Studies, 11/8/17, “HARD CONSTRAINTS ON CHINA’S NUCLEAR FORCES,” https://warontherocks.com/2017/11/china-nuclear-weapons-breakout/

China’s nuclear forces and policies are constrained, first and foremost, by the country’s distinctive approach to nuclear weapons. As Jeffrey Lewis has written, Chinese leadership has historically believed that nuclear deterrence is largely unaffected by the size and configuration of the adversary’s nuclear arsenal, so long as the country can threaten a counterstrike of a few — or even one — nuclear warheads. Marshall Nie Rongzhen, a leading figure in China’s early nuclear weapons program, called this “the minimum means of reprisal.” Recent research by Fiona Cunningham and M. Taylor Fravel, based on reviews of Chinese doctrinal and academic writings and interviews with Chinese military and civilian experts, indicates that these fundamental views have not changed and that China is likely to continue adhering to its relatively restrained strategy of “assured retaliation.” In recent Track-1.5 and Track-2 dialogues between the United States and China, Chinese participants have said that China could credibly threaten the United States with only “a few,” a “handful of,” or even “one” nuclear warhead.

Designed to support more limited goals, China’s nuclear forces are generally believed to be smaller and less alerted than those of other states. The country has yet to develop an early warning system and some experts believe China would wait several days after suffering a nuclear strike before launching its own nuclear counterattack. Observers believe Beijing does not mate its nuclear warheads to missiles in peacetime, instead storing them separately. According to the counting rules of the New START treaty, China has nearly zero deployed nuclear weapons.

2022 Michigan Evidence
China War Good › --2NC---AT: A2AD

We’d beat A2AD

Gompert et al. 16 – David, former Principal Deputy Director of National Intelligence and is a Senior Fellow for the RAND Corporation, Astrid Cevallos is a Project Associate at the RAND Corporation, Cristina Garafola is a policy analyst at the RAND Corporation (“War with China: Thinking Through the Unthinkable”, RAND Corporation, 2016//Kosack

While intensity depends on the use and loss of engaged U.S. strike and Chinese A2AD capabilities, the significance of total military potential, including reinforcements and mobilization capacity, could increase the longer the war’s duration. Likewise, economic resilience, political support, and international assistance could affect the ability of one or both sides to continue fighting. Both the United States and China have considerable, if asymmetric, capacity to prolong a conflict that neither one is militarily compelled or politically ready to end. A critical question is whether one side or the other can achieve such a clear advantage in the early stages of an intense conflict that the other has little choice but to concede. The U.S. ability to achieve such an advantage is declining as China improves its A2AD capabilities. At the same time, China’s increasing ability to prevent a decisive, early U.S. advantage does not necessarily translate into its ability to conclude a war quickly on its terms. Because a mild conflict would place smaller demands on total war-making capacity than a severe one would, it could have a greater potential than the latter to drag on—even becoming a “frozen conflict.” Conversely, and obviously, a long, severe conflict would involve greater costs on both sides than other cases in military, economic, and political terms. That a long, severe conflict would be the most costly does not mean it is the least likely. The disposition at any moment to keep fighting depends not only on results, losses, and costs to that point but also on expectations of what is to come. As long as neither side expects to lose, hostilities might continue. The United States presently has more military capacity than China to wage a long, severe war. For one thing, the United States has substantial forces located in or designated for other regions that it could bring to bear on a conflict in the Western Pacific, though security conditions in those regions might make it reluctant to do so.16 (Over the years, the Pentagon has crept away from its traditional standard of having sufficient total forces to win two major wars simultaneously.) Furthermore, U.S. forces today could degrade Chinese A2AD capabilities faster than Chinese A2AD capabilities could degrade U.S. forces. While both might suffer significant losses in early severe hostilities, U.S. prospects currently look better than China’s. Future conditions could differ, owing to the potential for greater losses of U.S. forces from Chinese A2AD and, in turn, reduced Chinese losses from those U.S. forces. Moreover, as U.S. military-operational advantages wane, China’s position as the “home team” could become less of a liability and more of an asset, owing to internal lines of communication and movement. A corollary of these shifting military odds is that the expected duration of war, however intense, could increase as Chinese capabilities improve, for the simple reason that China will retain more warfighting capability and face less pressure to yield. More generally stated, the less lopsided a war is likely to be, the less likely it is to end quickly in victory by the stronger side. Since Chinese and U.S. capabilities, operating concepts, incentives, and expectations all point to severe hostilities, this could mean that a war could last longer and be costlier than has been assumed or, paradoxically, than either side would want.

2022 Michigan Evidence
China War Good › --2NC---AT: China BMD

Not a thing

David Gomper and Michael Libicki 19 {David C. Gompert is Distinguished Visiting Professor at the US Naval Academy and was US Principal Deputy Director of National Intelligence from 2009 to 2010. Martin Libicki is the Maryellen and Richard L. Keyser Distinguished Visiting Professor in Cyber Security Studies at the US Naval Academy. 6-12-2019. “Cyber War and Nuclear Peace.” https://sci-hub.tw/https://doi.org/10.1080/00396338.2019.1637122}//JM

Again, nuclear stability depends on fear of retaliation devastating enough to overwhelm any justification for a first strike. Of interest here is whether cyber warfare directed against an enemy’s NC3 could allay that fear by reducing the certainty or efficacy of retaliation. The answer to that question depends on which of the big nuclear powers one considers. Because it has the most survivable retaliatory forces, and because neither Russia nor China has BMD or the equivalent of global conventional strike, the United States has the least reason to worry about the strength of its strategic deterrent.

2022 Michigan Evidence
China War Good › --2NC---AT: Fratricide

Accuracy improvements solve fratricide

Keir Lieber and Daryl Press 17 {Keir A. Lieber is Associate Professor in the Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service and the Department of Government at Georgetown University. Daryl G. Press is Associate Professor in the Department of Government at Dartmouth College. Spring 2017. “The New Era of Counterforce.” https://muse-jhu-edu.proxy.lib.umich.edu/article/657917}//JM

THE FADING PROBLEM OF FRATRICIDE One type of fratricide occurs when the prompt effects of nuclear detonations—radiation, heat, and overpressure—destroy or deflect nearby warheads. To protect those warheads, targeters must separate the incoming weapons by at least 3–5 seconds.33 A second source of fratricide is harder to overcome. Destroying hard targets typically requires low-altitude detonations (so-called ground bursts), which vaporize material on the ground. When the debris begins to cool, 6–8 seconds after the detonation, it solidifies and forms a dust cloud that envelops the target. Even small dust particles can be lethal to incoming warheads speeding through the cloud to the target. Particles in the debris cloud take approximately 20 minutes to settle back to ground.34 For decades, these two sources of fratricide, acting together, posed a major [End Page 21] problem for nuclear planners.35 Multiple warheads could be aimed at a single target if they were separated by at least 3–5 seconds (to avoid interfering with each other); yet, all inbound warheads had to arrive within 6–8 seconds of the first (before the dust cloud formed). As a result, assigning more than two weapons to each target would produce only marginal gains: if the first one resulted in a miss, the target would likely be shielded when the third or fourth warhead arrived.36 Improvements in accuracy, however, have greatly mitigated the problem of fratricide. As figure 1 shows, the proportion of misses—the main culprit of fratricide—compared to hits is fading. To be clear, some weapons will still fail; that is, they will be prevented from destroying their targets because of malfunctioning missile boosters, faulty guidance systems, or defective warheads. Those kinds of failures, however, do not generally cause fratricide, because the warheads do not detonate near the target. Only those that miss—that is, those that travel to the target area and detonate outside the LR—will create a dust cloud that shields the target from other incoming weapons. In short, leaps in accuracy are essentially reducing the set of three outcomes (hit, fail, or miss) to just two: hit or fail. The "miss" category, the key cause of fratricide, has virtually disappeared.37

2022 Michigan Evidence
China War Good › --2NC---AT: Subs

SSBNs fail

Kristensen and Norris, ’18 Hans M. Kristensen, director of the Nuclear Information Project at the Federation of American Scientists and his collaboration with researchers at NRDC in 2010 resulted in an estimate of the size of the U.S. nuclear weapons stockpile that was only 13 weapons off the actual number declassified by the U.S. government, and Robert S. Norris, senior fellow with the Federation of American Scientists in Washington, DC and a former senior research associate with the Natural Resources Defense Council, June 25th, 2018, “Chinese nuclear forces”, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Volume 74, Issue 4: Special issue: Missile Defense, around the world and, perhaps, in space, , EO

China currently operates a fleet of four Jin-class (Type 094) nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs). All are based at the Longposan naval base near Yulin on Hainan Island.

Each Jin SSBN is designed to carry up to 12 JL-2s (CSS-N-14), a submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) that is a modified version of the DF-31. Each JL-2 is equipped with a single warhead (and, possibly, penetration aids). The JL-2 has not been flight-tested to its full range but is thought to have a range of 7,000-plus km. A 2015 Pentagon report estimated its range is 7,400 km (US Defense Department 2015, 9), and a 2016 Pentagon report put the range at 7,200 km (US Defense Department 2016, 26). The 2017 NASIC report sets the range at 7,000-plus km (US Air Force, National Air and Space Intelligence Center 2017, 33). That would be sufficient to target Alaska, Guam, Hawaii, Russia, and India from waters near China – but unless the submarine carrying the weapon sailed significantly eastward, it could not target the continental United States.

2022 Michigan Evidence
China War Good › 2NC---CF---T/L

Their countermeasures are hypothetical and easily overcome

Austin Long et al. 17 {Dr. Austin Long is a Senior Political Scientist at the RAND Corporation and non-resident Senior Fellow at the Foreign Policy Research Institute. 1/7/2017. “The Limits of Damage Limitation.” https://search.lib.umich.edu/articles?query=The+Limits+of+Damage+Limitation}//JM

Glaser and Fetter conclude their analysis without extending the measure-countermeasure competition very far. In so doing, they fall prey to the “fallacy of the last move,” as though there were no counters to the countermeasures they propose.2 For instance, China can employ decoy mobile missile complexes, but countering decoys is routine in long-term military competitions.3

In the case of surveillance of mobile missiles, U.S. space-based radar (SBR) or other [End Page 193] wide-area surveillance could be used to cue other sensors, such as those using multi- or hyperspectral imaging. These sensors could then detect subtle differences between a decoy missile complex and an actual missile complex. Stealth is likewise no panacea; it too is subject to countermeasures. Of course, responses on both sides can continue. But without more detailed analysis, it is difficult to say whether the United States or China will win the measure-countermeasure battle over a protracted period of time.

2022 Michigan Evidence
China War Good › 2NC---CF---T/L

Models---it would only take 7% of our nukes---assumes their warrants

Heginbotham 15. [Eric; 2015; principal research scientist at MIT’s Center for International Studies and a specialist in Asian security issues, PhD in political science from MIT, former senior political scientist at the RAND Corporation, where he led research projects on China, Japan, and regional security issues and regularly briefed senior military, intelligence, and political leaders; “The U.S.-China Military Scorecard: Forces, Geography, and the Evolving Balance of Power, 1996–2017,” https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR392.html]

For several years, U.S. military publications have suggested that China is working on MIRVing ICBMs.37 The 2015 DoD report on Chinese military power stipulates, for the first time, that MIRVed missiles have been deployed operationally, specifically on the CSS-4 Mod 3 (a modified version of the DF-5A).38 In both our high and low estimates, therefore, we posit that number of Chinese CSS-4s (DF-5As) remains unchanged at 20, but that half of the force has been MIRVed, with each of the MIRVed missiles carrying three warheads.39 It is unclear why China would begin MIRVing with its force of DF-5s, which, due to their vulnerability, will not contribute much to second-strike survivability even with more warheads. Beyond 2017, it seems likely that China may MIRV its road-mobile DF-41, which is currently under development and which would yield more in terms of retaliatory credibility.40 **FOOTNOTE 40 BEGINS** 40 Given that existing mobile missiles (including the DF-31, DF-31A, and JL-2) are relatively small and would require miniaturized warheads, they are unlikely candidates. The DF-41 is said to be some 25-percent heavier than the CSS-10 Mod 2 (DF-31A). Jane’s Strategic Weapons Systems, “DF-41 (CSS-X-10),” January 6, 2015. **FOOTNOTE 40 ENDS** Both our high and low estimates for China posit that the number of CSS-10 Mod 1s (DF-31s) will remain unchanged at 12, but in the case of CSS-10 Mod 2s (DF-31As), there is some uncertainty with regard to the size of the force, and we estimate the potential inventory at between 24 and 48.41 There is also some uncertainty as to how many CSS-NX-14s (JL-2s) might be in service by 2017. Jane’s Fighting Ships reports four Jin-class submarines in service by the end of 2015, with a fifth to be commissioned in 2017.42 The JL-2 SLBM, carried by the Jin, encountered problems during testing, but DoD suggested that tests in 2012 were successful, and DoD’s 2014 Annual Report to Congress on Chinese military power reported that the Jin would undertake its first operational patrols shortly.43 We posit that China will have five Jin-class submarines in service by 2017, with between 50 percent and 100 percent of their full complement of 12 JL-2 SLBMs each (totaling between 30 and 60 missiles).44 Both the Jin-class platform and the missile it carries will be a dramatic improvement over the minimal capability offered by the single Xia-class (Type 092) submarine in past years. We assume that the single Xia-class SSBN will be taken out of service. If it remains in the inventory, its operational status and usefulness will be questionable. The U.S. nuclear arsenal size in 2017 will be constrained by the New START agreement with Russia and, as a result, will be smaller than it was in 2010. For the sake of simplicity, we use the end-point 2018 delivery system numbers for 2017, since it is uncertain when the United States will reach the New START 2018 limits (see Figure 12.7). We do not follow the New START definition of “deployed warheads.” Under New START, the United States and Russia are each limited to 700 deployed strategic delivery systems (ballistic missiles and nuclear-capable bombers), with up to 100 in reserve. The treaty allows each side up to 1,550 deployed warheads. However, New START counts nuclear-capable bombers as a single deployed warhead, despite the ability to place more weapons on the platforms during wartime.45 Using the New START numbers for 2017 delivery vehicles but a somewhat more liberal definition of warheads, the number of U.S. delivery systems will fall from 882 in 2010 to 700 and the number of deployed warheads will fall from 4,806 to 2,144.46 Based on current plans, it appears that the number of Minuteman III ICBMs will be reduced from 450 in 2010 to 400 in 2017, and all will be fitted with a single warhead. The United States will maintain its fleet of 14 Ohio-class SSBNs, but at least two will be in overhaul at any one time (and not count against limits), and each boat will sail with only 20 of its 24 tubes loaded with nuclear-capable Trident D-5 Mk-4A and Mk-5 SLBMs. The United States will maintain 60 nuclear-capable bombers, which we posit will include 44 B-52Hs and 16 B-2As. While we assume that there will be enough gravity bombs for each B-2A to carry a full complement of 20 weapons (for a total of 256 warheads), the load-out for B-52Hs will be limited by the inventory of air-launched cruise missiles (a total of 528 missiles and warheads). Finally, the United States expanded its number of GBIs from 24 to 30 in 2010, and, in March 2013, DoD announced a further increase to 44 by 2017.47 Chinese Vulnerability to First Strike, 2017 Even the low-end projected Chinese force structure outlined above suggests a more robust and survivable Chinese second-strike capability by 2017, though U.S. missile defense and intelligence efforts against PLAN SSBNs will likely continue to cause concerns in Beijing about the viability of its second-strike forces. In the low Chinese case, U.S. forces must target the CSS-10 Mod 1 (DF-31), CSS-10 Mod 2 (DF-31A), CSS-4 Mod 2 (DF-5A), and CSS-4 Mod 3 (DF-5B) ICBMs and SSBN bases harboring the Jin-class (Type 094) that employ SLBMs. At the lowest alert level, the United States can target and destroy all of the weapons that are located and susceptible to attack with an 80 percent chance of success using 157 weapons. While this represents approximately 7 percent of the total U.S. arsenal, it still leaves 1,987 warheads for other purposes. The number of surviving Chinese weapons (15) in the 2017 case is marginally larger than the surviving number in the 2010 case (13). In reality, the gains to survivability should be considered more significant than this modeling might suggest. The surviving systems in the 2017 modeling include three types of relatively modern systems: the CSS-10 Mod 1 (DF-31), the CSS-10 Mod 2 (DF-31A), and the CSS-NX-14 (JL-2), associated with the Jin-class (Type 094) submarine. With five operational submarines and 36 road-mobile ICBM launchers, it becomes more reasonable to imagine modest alert levels that would ensure that a portion of both the land- and sea-based legs of China’s nuclear dyad are kept deployed on an operational basis. While the Jinclass SSBNs will require a “shakedown” period, their introduction into operational service represents a major advance for Chinese nuclear forces and their survivability. The results of attacks against the 2017 upper bound (“high estimate”) case for Chinese missiles, which includes a larger number of CSS-10 Mod 2s (DF-31As) and CSS-N-14s (JL-2 missiles), are somewhat different. In this case, China possesses 160 warheads able to reach the United States prior to the attack, instead of 106. After the hypothetical U.S. first strike, 27 Chinese warheads remain, 12 more than in the “low estimate” case (see Figure 12.8). The additional Chinese missiles and the warheads atop them provide an additional buffer against the possible compromise of some portion of China’s alert forces, and they provide a more convincing second-strike capability in the face of U.S. missile defenses, even when those defenses are assumed to be relatively effective in engaging targets. Note that in neither the low nor high estimate cases does the MIRVing of DF-5 missiles contribute to survivability against a first strike, since the missiles themselves are highly vulnerable to attack. Beijing will continue to harbor concerns about U.S. missile defenses, as well about intelligence-gathering efforts directed against Chinese SSBNs. In the 2017 low Chinese case, the 44 interceptors deployed by the United States will outnumber surviving Chinese strategic warheads by nearly three to one. In the “high” case, the ratio is less than two to one. In the more distant future, if U.S. GBI missile deployment halts at 44 and each interceptor continues to carry only one warhead, the Chinese secondstrike capability will ultimately be able to overwhelm U.S. defenses, especially if China puts MIRVs in the more survivable portion of its missiles. However, Chinese confidence in the effectiveness of its second-strike capability will likely depend on the extent of U.S. interceptor deployment, as well as the state of U.S. missile defense technology and advances in Chinese penetration aids. It will also depend on the survivability of China’s alert forces, especially its SSBNs. In addition to hosting large numbers of survivable missiles, SSBNs are the only Chinese weapons that can launch missiles at U.S. targets from areas where the trajectories do not take them near U.S. GBI sites in Fort Greely, Alaska. Our counterforce first strike modeling, and the sensitivity of results to the size of mobile forces, helps explain why Beijing has reacted to the activities of special oceanographic surveillance ships equipped with SURTASS, such as with the USNS Impeccable (T-AGOS-23), near Yalong Submarine Base in March 2009. The sonar on these ships is designed “to perform acoustic collection surveillance to help locate and identify submarines.”48 As mentioned earlier, Yalong, with its underground submarine portal is a likely location for the new Jin-class (Type 094) SSBN. If the U.S. Navy can detect and trail Chinese SSBNs in the open sea, the Chinese second-strike capability once again becomes questionable, especially when U.S. anti-submarine warfare activities are combined with an active missile defense program. This prognosis, however, only pertains to the immediate future. Looking somewhat beyond 2017, China will likely be able to achieve a highly secure second-strike capability (even with very conservative estimates from China’s perspective), and further increases on its part beyond that point may raise more serious questions about its ultimate intentions. Conclusions Given the asymmetry in the respective number of nuclear weapons, it is hardly surprising that our modeling shows severe structural imbalances in outcomes (see Table 12.7). In every period, a U.S. first strike could destroy all targets with known locations with a relatively high degree of confidence, leaving a relatively small number of missiles on alert and therefore ostensibly not susceptible to attack. Given the small numbers of systems that might be deployed at any given point in time, Beijing would almost certainly have concerns about the effectiveness of its second-strike capability. Assuming a similar level of alert for each of the periods considered, our modeling suggests that the number of Chinese warheads that might survive a first strike has increased over time, from four in 1996 to six in 2003, 13 in 2010, and between 15 and 27 in 2017. More importantly, the systems deployed have become more dependable and survivable over time. In 1996, survivability depended entirely on the status of the Xia, with silo-based CSS-4 Mod 2s (DF-5As) being in fixed locations and therefore highly vulnerable to attack. Since 2003, however, new classes of road-mobile missiles, the CSS-10 Mod 1 (DF-31) and, later, the CSS-10 Mod 2 (DF-31A), have been deployed, representing a second type of mobile asset in the Chinese inventory. Unlike the CSS-4 Mod 2 (DF-5A), these missiles are solid-fueled and are therefore capable of launch on short notice. The Jin-class SSBN (Type 094), five of which are either complete or near completion, will replace the Xia-class (Type 092) by 2017 and provide a far more robust sea-based deterrent. Despite these developments, however, Beijing continues to harbor concerns about the survivability of its nuclear forces. Chinese leaders express particular unease about the future of U.S. missile defenses and their potential impact on the nuclear balance.52 While we did not attempt to model missile defense with any fidelity, our nuclear exchange modeling suggests that the planned number of deployed U.S. GBIs alone (without considering the SM-3 or other systems) could continue to outnumber China’s expected survivable second-strike warheads as late as 2017. Any expansion of the missile defense architecture or enhancements to its capabilities, such as a move toward multiple exo-atmospheric kill vehicles on each interceptor, would further heighten concerns in Beijing about its retaliatory capability. Moreover, Chinese planners may question whether the United States, with its sophisticated space-based and air-breathing ISR assets, might be able to locate and attack a larger portion of China’s nuclear forces than our modeling suggests. Our model probably assumes a higher-alert posture for China than it presently practices, though it is true that China now has much greater capability to keep a portion of its force on alert, should it choose that course. New generations of Chinese land-based missiles (e.g., the DF-31A) are movable but not highly mobile. Chinese analysts question whether, in fact, SURTASS-equipped ships near China are seeking to collect acoustic data on PLAN SSBNs to facilitate their trail and destruction during a crisis or conflict.53 And Chinese concerns about advanced conventional munitions affecting the strategic balance are also increasingly pronounced.

2022 Michigan Evidence
China War Good › 2NC---CF---T/L

Err neg---all of their evidence comes from the position that civilian deaths are unacceptable, but all we actually need to win is that it doesn’t cause extinction

Matthew Kroenig 17 {Matthew Kroenig is an associate professor in the Department of Government and School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University and a senior fellow in the Brent Scowcroft Center on International Security at the Atlantic Council. Summer 2017. “The Limits of Damage Limitation.” https://muse-jhu-edu.proxy.lib.umich.edu/article/667398}//JM

In “Should the United States Reject MAD?” Charles Glaser and Steve Fetter argue that the United States should forgo a damage-limitation capability against China’s strategic forces.1 To arrive at this conclusion, however, they underestimate the advantages of a [End Page 199] damage-limitation strategy and do not even consider more feasible and desirable policy options for a strategic equilibrium with China. When these steps are corrected, it becomes clear that the United States should not forgo this capability. Rather, it should preserve its damage-limitation capability and quantitative nuclear superiority over China, while accepting the inevitability of China’s possession of an assured nuclear retaliatory capability. Glaser and Fetter begin by making the conceptual mistake of searching for an arbitrary threshold for meaningful damage limitation. In doing so, they underestimate the value of limiting damage in the event of nuclear war. Glaser and Fetter are correct that completely denying China’s nuclear deterrent is increasingly difficult if not impossible as China expands and modernizes its arsenal, but this is an unnecessarily high bar. Damage limitation is better conceived of as a continuous, not a binary, variable. There is no magical threshold beyond which the ability to limit damage in a nuclear war ceases to matter. Any U.S. president would want to protect as much of the country as possible in the event of a nuclear exchange, and any damage-limitation capability (even far below the threshold set by Glaser and Fetter) would therefore be valuable. To argue otherwise, one would have to argue that saving millions of American lives is unimportant or politically irrelevant, which is an untenable position.

2022 Michigan Evidence
China War Good › 2NC---China War Good

Chinese CRISPR causes extinction---global bioweapons war and irreversible infertility

Adrian Rauchfleisch and Marko Kovic 17 {Adrian Rauchfleisch, Ph.D. is a co-founder and on the board of directors of the Zambia Institute for Policy Analysis and Research. Marko Kovic, CEO of arscognitionis. 6-6-2018. “Careless CRISPR in China: How to regulate the unimaginable?” https://zipar.org/short-term-challenge/careless-crispr-in-china/}//JM

What is CRISPR all about? CRISPR (or CRISPR-Cas9) stands for Clustered Regularly Interspaced Short Palindromic Repeats which are “systems that can be programmed to target specific stretches of genetic code and to edit DNA at precise locations”.3 In short, researchers can permanently modify genes in living organisms with CRISPR. In the early 2000s scientists first started to name specific repeat regions in bacterial genomes CRISPR. Around 2010 scientists showed that together with the protein Cas9 it is possible to target specific DNA sequences and in 2012 researchers demonstrated that it is possible to delete or replace any gene in an organism’s genome.4 As happens often in the history of science, different research groups published their discoveries at the same time5. This lead to a fierce patent fight that has been decided only recently.6 7 The whole patent fight calls into question how useful such patents are. After all, the CRISPR technology is based on knowledge accumulated in various labs around the world and mainly financed through public resources.8 A CRISPR-monster born in China While the major discoveries and the first commercialization of the technology all happened in the West, China took the CRISPR stage in 2015, a year that has been called CRISPR’s “monster” year by the MIT Technology Review.9 This is not surprising, as China has since 2013 the second largest R&D spending in the world10 and CRISPR is an explicit priority area for the Chinese Academy of Sciences.11 In the years between the initial discovery and 2015 Chinese scientists have pushed the boundaries of science. In 2015 even the Chinese public became aware or CRISPR as the data of Chinese search volumes on the Chinese Internet illustrates.12 Scientists in China have successfully modified the genes of living organisms such as monkeys, dogs, and goats.13 A group of scientists in Shanxi province, for example, successfully created a new type of goat with longer hair (more Cashmere wool) and stronger muscle growth (more meat for food consumption).14 The biggest Chinese breakthrough to date also happened in 2015, when a group of Chinese researchers managed to edit human embryos for the first time.15 This move came not without criticism. In 2015, a number of scientists called for a moratorium because “genome editing in human embryos using current technologies could have unpredictable effects on future generations”.16 Relative search volume for “CRISPR” over time on China’s second largest search engine Qihoo 360. Peak in November 2015 and stronger attention afterward. The genetically edited embryos of the first Chinese experiment showed some unintended mutations. 17 Still, in 2016, CRISPR was tested for the first time in a person during a clinical trial in Chengdu.18 At the moment, externally applied gels and creams are tested in China to treat patients infected with the human papillomavirus.19 Of course, such simple applications of CRISPR could help to cure many diseases in the future. At the same time, the risk of CRISPR is great, both if the technology is used for criminal purposes as well as if benevolent applications of CRISPR yield unintended or at least undesirable outcomes. CRISPR as existential risk Saying that CRISPR is risky is not very controversial – assuming that new technologies are inherently risky is a common heuristic. However, labeling CRISPR as an existential risk might sound outright alarmist. But it is not: CRISPR is indeed an anthropogenic existential risk, but that does not mean that humankind is just about to be wiped out by it. Existential risks are risks that threaten the existence of humankind. Existential risks have a maximally great scope (all humans are affected, even future generations that would have existed if not for the adverse outcome) and gravity (the risk is terminal).20 In addition, existential risks have some probability, usually above zero. CRISPR is an existential risk both in civilian and in criminal or military applications. In the latter scenario, it is easier to understand why: Weaponized CRISPR is a potentially potent bioweapon that could do great damage whilst being very precise and accurate. A global CRISPR bioweapon war, if it ever came to that, would not produce the same levels of physical destruction as global nuclear war, but it might introduce cumulative hazards comparable to nuclear winter. The criminal and military application of CRISPR is somewhat salient in current risk analysis. For example, then U.S. director of national intelligence James Clapper declared CRISPR a global threat in February 2016, along other threats such as North Korean nuclear weapons21. Civilian applications of CRISPR are aimed at helping people, not killing them. However, unintended consequences of premature wide-scale introductions of CRISPR products might create existential risk. Imagine a thought experiment: If some pharmaceutical company were to introduce a CRISPR anti-aging cream that really works and makes people biologically younger, that product would be in extremely high demand almost immediately. Now imagine that that cream had an unintended side-effect: Irreversible infertility. The CRISPR cream would, almost certainly, still be in extremely high demand, resulting in a precipitous drop in overall fertility. This could result in the loss of humankind’s reproductive capacity and thus in the (gradual) extinction of humankind. The existential risk of CRISPR (and similar technologies) is typical of the dilemma of human progress: The more technologically mature humankind becomes, the greater anthropogenic human risks become Gene editing race between China and the US In 2017, after China had taken the CRISPR lead, it was time for the US to push the boundaries. Just recently, results of an experiment from scientists in the US were published: The scientists involved in the experiment also modified genes in human embryos, just as their Chinese counterparts did, but this time, apparently no mutations occurred.22 The technology and research race between the two nations can best be illustrated with the number of publications originating in each country. Since 2002, when Jansen et al.23 coined the term CRISPR in their paper, 6,942 scientific papers were published up to now.24 Most papers originated from US institutions (2890) followed by Chinese (919), German (413) Japanese institutions (390). Even though CRISPR research is dominated by institutions situated in the US and China, it is a technology used all over the world. One major reason is the rather low cost of the procedure.25 It is even possible to buy a “DIY Bacterial Gene Engineering CRISPR Kit” to do your own gene editing at home.26 However, this kit only allows using the most basic form of CRISPR. Colour intensity indicates the number of papers originating in a specific country. We used the country of the institution of the corresponding author of a paper. Data from Web of Science – own visualization. How to regulate the unimaginable It is very likely that we just got a first glimpse of what will be possible in the future. After the first experiment in China with human embryos, scientists from all around the world gathered at a global summit in Washington DC in 2015.27 Unsurprisingly, it was difficult for the participants to reach an agreement as every country regulates research differently. In the end, a statement by the organizers “stopped short of calling for a ban on editing human embryos and germ cells for basic research”.28 In cases where the work of scientists affects society as a whole, governments usually start to regulate research. In the case of the US, for example, a majority of people is worried about the idea of gene-edited babies.29 In democratic societies, citizens can influence regulations and public debates about opportunities and threats are possible. In Switzerland, we had a national vote in 2016 about genetic testing of embryos.30 The majority approved to modify the law on medically assisted reproduction. However, in authoritarian countries, such decisions are made top-down without open public debates.

2022 Michigan Evidence
China War Good › 2NC---China War Good

China war is inevitable---uncertainty from each side creates structural incentives that make war probable

Yoder, 1/28 Brandon K. Yoder, Ph.D., Department of Politics, University of Virginia, Research Fellow at the National University of Singapore Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy Centre on Asia and Globalisation, January 28th, 2019, “Uncertainty, Shifting Power and Credible Signals in US-China Relations: Why the “Thucydides Trap” Is Real, but Limited”, Journal of Chinese Political Science, Volume 24, Issue 1, , EO

This logic has not been well-recognized by either US foreign policymakers or scholars of US-China relations, however. On economic issues, the US adopted a strategy of unconditional cooperation for the first two decades of China’s rise. This strategy was not necessarily misguided. However, absent any degree of hedging by the US, China’s cooperation with the US-led economic order should have been seen as largely non-credible. A rising China had strong incentives to misrepresent any hypothetically-revisionist intentions it might have held, as long as doing so would elicit continued US accommodation that facilitated China’s rapid power gains. Yet many China experts took China’s cooperative behavior during this period at face value, ignoring its incentives to misrepresent and drawing overly optimistic conclusions that China truly shared American preferences for the international order [29, 32, 56, 61].

Even more troublingly, the Trump administration has recently expressed confident beliefs that China’s intentions are hostile, and consequently begun to implement policies of escalating economic containment toward China. Yet this conclusion is also unwarranted: China’s revisionist behavior has been generally limited to its territorial disputes in the South China Sea, whereas its economic and institutional actions are either ambiguous or supportive of the US-led liberal order [31].

2022 Michigan Counterplan
AT: Advantage CPS › REVENGE › Adv-CP Card AnswersThis card is like 1/2 way there- it still assumes an increase in temperature

21. Growth is still the answer to the world’s economic problems

Peterson 22, Nick Peterson, Nick Peterson is a writer for the financial times, 4/10/2022, “Growth is still the answer to the world’s economic problems”, https://www.ft.com/content/e1242c8e-e918-4eb5-9bf1-33d32c098b65

In 1931, John Maynard Keynes published a short essay entitled “Economic Possibilities for Our Grandchildren” in which he considered the feasibility of solving what he called “the economic problem”. According to Keynes, the issue of scarcity ought to have been dealt with by the early 21st century. Decades of capitalist progress would leave society with the capacity to produce the resources needed to guarantee everyone a good standard of living. The problem, at this point, would be finding ways to spend well-earned leisure time. More than 90 years later, it is fair to say that Keynes’ prediction of abundance was not wrong: the scale of production possibilities available to us in 2022 is well beyond what he probably imagined in 1931. But “economic problems” have not gone away. In fact, there is an intellectual debate raging over how to define our primary issues and what to do about them. Is finding a way to create more growth still the key to a good society? Or is our primary economic problem finding a way to deal with inequality and environmental degradation? The most recent contribution to this debate comes from Jonathan Haskel, professor of economics at Imperial College Business School, and Stian Westlake, chief executive of the Royal Statistical Society. They situate themselves firmly in the “more growth” camp. Their book, Restarting the Future, suggests that capitalism can be revitalised by promoting “further investment” in what they call “intangible capital”. This thesis builds on their last collective effort, Capitalism without Capital, published in 2017. In that book, Haskel and Westlake outlined how the capitalist system has shifted from investment in physical capital, such as machines and factories, towards intangible capital, such as software. Importantly, this kind of capital behaves differently from physical assets: the more it makes up the economy, the more it can change the dynamics of capitalism itself.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
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20. Growth is good.

Caden 19, Art Carden, AIER PhD in economics at Samford, 12/12/2019, “Growth Is Good”,

Growth is good. Through history, economic growth in particular has alleviated human misery, improved human happiness and opportunity, and lengthened human lives. Wealthier societies are more stable, offer better living standards, produce better medicines, and ensure greater autonomy, greater fulfillment, and more sources of fun. If we want to sustain our trends of growth, and the overwhelmingly positive outcomes for societies that come with it, every individual must become more concerned with the welfare of those around us.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
AT: Advantage CPS › REVENGE › Adv-CP Card AnswersThis card is like 1/2 way there- it still assumes an increase in temperature

19. Capitalism is sustainable

Foss et al. 22 (Nicolai J. Foss , Peter G. Klein, and Samuele Murtinu, Foss has a works at the Copenhagen business school, Klein works for Baylor, and many more qualified authors, September 2022, accessed on 6-18-2022, Scandinavian Journal of Management, "The economy doesn’t need a reset, and neither does management theory", https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0956522122000215)

What these critics are describing here is not capitalism but “cronyism” (Rubin, 2016). As Klein et al. (2021) argue, confusing capitalism and cronyism is a long-standing mistake. Classic proponents of the free-enterprise system such as Schumpeter (1942)¸ Mises (1922), or Friedman (1962) describe capitalism as a mode of social organization which entails that (1) productive resources are (mostly) privately owned, (2) markets are used to allocate resources, products and services, (3) individuals and groups are (mostly) free to engage in economic activity without centralized control or interference from the state, and (4) institutions exist that enable (1) to (3), notably by making sure that property rights to resources are precisely delineated and enforced, which enables investments and make the costs of exchange relatively low (for qualifications, reservations, etc., see ). These are the “primitives” of capitalism as a system. Other oft-mentioned aspects (whether positive, negative, or purely descriptive), such as free movements of goods, capital, and labor across borders, are derived from these. Critics of capitalism take for granted that capitalism is responsible for rampant pollution, increasing inequality, concentration of industries, and so on, but rarely engage in systematic, empirically grounded, comparative institutional analysis. Both theory and a careful study of the historical record suggest that non-capitalist systems experience these problems to a far greater degree than capitalist systems. For example, in a market economy, well-defined property rights can keep pollution and other sustainability issues under control (Rothbard, 1982); in contrast, the worst known cases of industrial pollution occurred in the twentieth century in the non-capitalist countries behind the Iron Curtain. Freedom of contract will secure dynamism and social mobility and thus counteract tendencies to concentration of industries and capital and increasing inequality (Dean and Geloso, 2021, Nikolaev and Bennett, 2016, Bennett & Nikolaev, 2016). Socialist economies, and capitalist economies characterized by a substantial degree of government intervention, experience stagnation and social strife. The basic vision outlined by the above thinkers has been remarkably correct when applied to the economic history of the last two hundred years. Whenever capitalist principles have been applied they have tended to bring prosperity, education, improvements in health, and equality of opportunity (Leeson, 2010). The wealth generated by the operation of free markets provide the resources needed to deal with many environmental issues. Defining property rights to hitherto unowned resources, that is, pollution rights and making these tradeable has become an instrument of allocating such rights to their highest-valued uses and stimulate innovation in technologies that reduce CO2 emissions. Free markets and borders that are open to the movement of products and services enable the diffusion of such technologies. In short, free markets have increasingly been instrumental in dealing with ecological challenges. Among the various socio-economic systems, it is clear that “capitalism comes closest to meeting the conditions of efficiency and maximum well-being, even if no capitalist economies meet these conditions perfectly” ().

2022 Michigan Counterplan
AT: Advantage CPS › REVENGE › Adv-CP Card AnswersThis card is like 1/2 way there- it still assumes an increase in temperature

18. Viewing growth as trading off with the environment undermines true progress towards solving for environmental degradation and loss

Loris, 19, Nicolas Loris, Nick is an economist who focused on energy, environmental, and regulatory issues as the Herbert and Joyce Morgan fellow, 10/23/2019, “Breathe Free: Capitalism Helps Protect the Environment”,

Too often, we use phrases like “balancing economic growth and environmental protections.” This suggests that more growth necessarily degrades the environment. But the two aren’t mutually exclusive. When America and the rest of the world embrace policies rooted in economic freedom, both prosperity and the environment flourish. In this instance, you really can have your cake and eat it, too.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
AT: Advantage CPS › REVENGE › Adv-CP Card AnswersThis card is like 1/2 way there- it still assumes an increase in temperature

17. Anti-growth movements fail---crackdown, and movements fail specifically in the modern era

Toney, 13, Simon Toney, University of Sydney, Department of Government and International Relations, Anti-Capitalism: A Beginner’s Guide, The perils of ‘movementism’, pg. 142-144, -FT

Many of these marches, protests and initiatives were very successful on their own terms. This is to say that they provided a focal point for activists who might not have had wider contact with concerned citizens or groups who shared some if not all of their aims and objectives. The protests were mobilising occasions. They enabled people to learn and share experiences in an intense environment which heightened the sense of a great deal being at stake. They also seemed to matter in tangible as well as intangible ways. Elites certainly gave the impression that they were concerned about these protests, and this served to reinforce the feeling that the stakes were high. Huge numbers of police and military personnel were used to protect conference centres, hotels and the participants themselves from the protesters. The protests tapped into popular sentiment and in their own ways affected the climate of opinion, such that elites had to be responsive to the concerns articulated by the protesters. So for a while it seemed that protests and demonstrations were an effective way of bringing activists together and influencing the actions and policies of global elites. Here, quite tangibly, was ‘the movement’. However, even within the movement there were those who expressed scepticism about such an emphasis being given to what had become a mobile carnival of protests and demonstrations - or ‘serial protesting’ as Naomi Klein aptly put it. Alex Callinicos, to take one notable example, offered a critique of what he termed ‘movementism’, which he equated to the belief that protests and demonstrations would displace the need for more durable forms of organisation, for the development of a programme and ultimately for capturing power from elites as KA opposed to merely influencing them in the direction of more just or equitable policies. He predicted, presciently as it turned out, that once the initial wave of energy and enthusiasm for protests had begun to wane, the shortcomings of this approach would be revealed and that in its stead would be left recrimination and few victories. What Callinicos neglects in his argument is that one of the reasons why activists focused on protests and demonstrations is because ‘party building’ seemed such a tired formula. Protests were the antidote to the Leninist ‘cure’ as far as many disaffiliated activists were concerned. On the other hand, it is certainly true that much of the momentum went out of summit protests over the course of the first decade of the twenty-first century. This was so for several reasons, which it is worth recounting to get a sense of the changing context in which anti-capitalist initiatives took place. Firstly, what became obvious was the mounting cost to individuals and groups of taking part in major demonstrations. As part of the War on Terror unleashed in the wake of the 9/11 al-Qaeda attacks, most states had invested significantly in intelligence services, counter-terrorism initiatives, surveillance capacity and police and army training to combat threats to ‘civil security’. This was justified by reference to the threat of attack from religious extremists. But ‘threat’ is an elastic term that can be used to encompass a range of ‘extremists’ who seem to represent a threat to law and order. Many of these techniques were now deployed against those engaged in anti-capitalist protests and demonstrations. It became familiar for protesters in, for example, the UK to be confronted by a squad of police officers - the Forward Intelligence Team (FIT) - brandishing cameras to record the faces of all those engaged in a protest. Such overt displays of policing are designed to fulfil two functions. Firstly, they demonstrate to the public that protests are considered by authorities on the same continuum as more violent or terroristic activities. Secondly, they are designed to intimidate participants. Making protestors the subject of overt surveillance is a Draconian reminder of who is in charge’. The idea is to ramp up the personal cost of being engaged in such activities, deterring ordinary people who may wish to demonstrate their displeasure at government policy or the actions of global elites. This leaves behind a rump of more militant activists who can more easily be monitored and controlled.