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2022 Michigan Kritik
**Final Supplement – FMPS** › **Kritik Updates** › Psycho 1NC – Universality K vs K Affs

Independently—only embracing universality can confront existential impacts.

McGowan, 20—professor of film studies at the University of Vermont (Todd, “This Is Not Identity Politics,” Universality and Identity Politics, Chapter 6, ebook, dml)

There is one arena where the limitations of particularism become fatal. The political implications of the refusal of universality are catastrophic when we look at climate change. Even when we think about climate change as a global phenomenon, our starting point is too often the various disturbances that we link together to form the idea of climate change. We encounter climate change in particular manifestations like shifting weather patterns, more intense storms, higher water levels, increased temperatures, and so on. The question then becomes whether or not the particulars constitute climate change, which is precisely what opens the door to climate skeptics. But even if we all agree that these particular indications amount to climate change, particularist thinking shapes how we respond.

Although climate change requires a universalist approach, we confront it from the perspective of the particular. As a result, most political initiatives are particular: recycling, driving less, biking more, not using the air conditioning, placing solar panels on one’s roof, planting trees, and so on —up to taking a ship across the ocean to reduce one’s carbon footprint. Even the more holistic solutions like the carbon tax or restrictions on carbon output do not confront the crisis through a universalist politics. We can only address the problem of climate change effectively when we address it in universal rather than particular terms.

2022 Michigan Kritik
**Final Supplement – FMPS** › **Kritik Updates** › Psycho 1NC – Universality K vs K Affs

Vote neg to theorize universality as central to political struggle. That’s the only way to reckon with and confront the worst forms of capitalist violence.

McGowan, 20—professor of film studies at the University of Vermont (Todd, “Conclusion: Avoiding The Worst,” Universality and Identity Politics, Conclusion, ebook, dml)

Universalist projects always threaten to become seduced by the possibility of creating the universal into a full presence rather than discovering it as a necessary absence. In doing so, they succumb to terror. This is the perversion that universalism must constantly be on guard against. Whenever people insist on their ability to create a world of complete equality, we should recognize this perversion at work. Even if the perversion of universality is an unavoidable danger inherent in universalizing, it is nonetheless worth the risk. The alternative of total particularity is more murderous and barbaric than the Committee for Public Safety. This is why the solution cannot be a retreat into the confines of particularity.

Particularity does not exist without the absent universal that gives this particularity its sense. The universal is antecedent to the particular. The attempt to retreat from the danger of the universal to the security of a particular identity is doomed to fail. What’s more, the repression of universality for the sake of a full embrace of particularity leads to disaster.

2022 Michigan Kritik
**Final Supplement – FMPS** › **Kritik Updates** › Psycho 1NC – Universality K vs K Affs

Centering particular identity categories strengthens capitalism and creates barriers to collective emancipation by occluding universality as a shared point of solidarity.

McGowan, 20—professor of film studies at the University of Vermont (Todd, “Introduction: Finding Universality,” Universality and Identity Politics, Introduction, ebook, dml)

The clear argument of Capital and Marx’s other major works is that particularity or the celebration of particular identity actually strengthens capitalism and its control over one’s existence. Freedom, if it is seen and pursued as a purely particular struggle, nourishes capitalism. The more we imagine ourselves as identical to our particular identity, the more we see ourselves as isolated subjects, which is what capitalism requires. Capitalist subjects see themselves as isolated monads, and identification with one’s particularity produces this sense of isolation. It is only when freedom becomes a struggle for universal freedom that it challenges the capitalist behemoth.

Far from seeing a danger in universality, Marx believes that the real threat comes from accepting the value of one’s particular identity within the capitalist socioeconomic system. Capitalism thrives on a variety of particular identities because this variety provides for more types of commodities to be sold. In our contemporary capitalist society, the goth can buy trench coats and dark eyeliner while the jock can purchase sweatpants and jerseys. More identities lead to more commodities. Even if one’s identity isn’t tied to a particular look, variety of identity still plays into the capitalist system by providing more opportunity for the production of needs. But more important, seeing oneself as particular puts one in the capitalist mindset, where there is no universality that might change the entire structure. By believing oneself to be an isolated particular identity, one takes up the role of the perfect capitalist subject. Capitalism depends on all individuals believing themselves isolated from everyone else.

2022 Michigan Kritik
**Final Supplement – FMPS** › **Kritik Updates** › Psycho Link – Hegemony

The affirmative’s attempt to construct an American-dominated global system through hegemony is invested in the construct of a “whole” America that sustains itself off Weapon States. In an impossible world of complete hegemony, destruction of subjecthood occurs through the fulfillment of all desire.

Solomon 15 (Ty Solomon is a Lecturer in International Relations (Politics) at the School of Social & Political Sciences, Adam Smith Building, Bute Gardens, University of Glasgow, “The Politics of Subjectivity in American Foreign Policy Discourses”, , University of Michigan Press) AqN

The fantasy of Krauthammer’s discourse differs notably from fantasies offered by neoconservatives at other times. In one sense, this is to be expected. Different times and issues call for different arguments. Yet many observers note that since the beginning of the movement during the 1970s, one fairly consistent quality of neoconservatism is the ever-present sense of doom just around the corner and national choices that are always starkly dichotomous. As Bacevich (2005: 77) wryly observes, “On the one hand—if the nation disregards the neoconservative call to action—there is the abyss. On the other hand—if the nation heeds that call—the possibility of salvation exists.” Krauthammer’s text displays many of the usual neoconservative precepts, such as the primacy of military power and the idea that American global hegemony is benevolent and beneficial for non-Americans. The key tension in Krauthammer’s text, though, is that the notion of “chaos” lurking close-by conflicts with the major thrust of the message of unipolarity. We can understand the role of desire in the discourse through this tension. Rather than constructing a subject of lack, Krauthammer’s discourse largely constructs a subject much closer to fullness. This, in turn, does not evoke desire for identification but instead kills desire for identification. Desire (as understood here) is coextensive with lack (Fink 1995: 54). To exist as a subject, one must desire. Lack evokes desire, desire drives identification, and only through identification with the social resources of the Symbolic can subjects gain the recognition they need to achieve a sense of stability and security. Krauthammer’s discourse presumably does not spark much desire because the subject it produces is, strictly speaking, not lacking all that much. As the unipolar power—or, as the subject “America” is constructed through the fantasy of being a unipolar power—Krauthammer’s discourse includes little desire for something else that might make the subject feel more secure or more stable. As the unipolar power, the subject “America” already seems quite close to the wholeness of enjoyment in terms of a world of American-imposed rules. Now that the Cold War is over, and now that the only other superpower that remotely had the capability to impose its own global rules is no more, the obstacles to the subject’s enjoyment have largely been removed. Yet the effect of this subject formation on a receiving audience—in terms of an audience “being positioned (or having existing positionings reinforced) as complex subjects” (Fairclough 1992: 135)—depends on the workings of desire. Once the subject approaches the object it believes it desires, desire for that specific object paradoxically begins to fade. If one were to find the Thing that would truly make one whole, desire would die, and subjectivity would evaporate. The ultimate contingency of our desire and identifications would set in, and one would cease to be a desiring subject. As Lacan (1998: 111) argues, “‘That’s not it’ is the very cry by which the jouissance obtained is distinguished from the jouissance expected” when one approaches the perceived missing object. Desire is sustained by not reaching the missing object: “The satisfaction of desire essentially consists of the preservation of its own unsatisfaction, since a subject remains a subject only insofar as . . . he is a desiring lack-of-being that wants-to-be” (Chiesa 2007: 155; see also Fink 1995: 103). That is, the closer the subject gets to enjoyment, the more desire fades and the more anxiety sets in, since only through desire do we have subjectivity, and therefore the more desiring the subject becomes.5 Indeed, fantasy’s purpose is to ward off anxiety and contingency: This way enjoyment is kept at a “healthy” distance, not too far but not too close either; close enough to support the appeal of an object of identification but far enough from letting us entertain the vision of full satisfaction as an imminent possibility—something that would kill desire, induce anxiety, and put identification processes in danger. (Stavrakakis 2007: 198) Although Krauthammer’s message of unipolarity constructs a discursive subject not lacking all that much, thus evoking less desire for identification with it than might otherwise be the case, the fantasy of the “unipolar moment” was not completely without lack. This is expressed a few ways in the discourse. First, we can understand the place of object a in this fantasy as the lack of an American-dominated world, toward which Krauthammer—and the subject his discourse constructs—is oriented throughout the text. While the international system is, in Krauthammer’s view, undoubtedly unipolar, it is not unipolar to the extent that every other state or actor willingly submits to an American-imposed order. “Weapon States” are some of the few states mentioned at all in the text, presumably because they are the outlaws that do not conform to post–Cold War order as defined by the United States. North Korea, Iraq, Libya, Argentina, Pakistan, Iran, and South Africa all pose blockages to American/global order through their possession (at the time) of weapons of mass destruction, even though some of these states were more threatening than others. The obstacle that these few states pose to a truly unipolar world—where “we” no longer must “hope for safety” but can seemingly achieve complete safety—evokes desire to remove them as obstacles to the fantasy of enjoyment. Desire is constructed as pushing toward that elusive object believed to bring the enjoyment of being a complete subject— here, understood as an American-centered world with American-imposed global rules. Although this object is unattainable (since it is but a Symbolic manifestation of a void), the subject’s fantasy allows it to believe that this object is attainable. An absolutely American-dominated global system—a full subject—is indeed presupposed to exist were it not for these few states that pose an obstacle. Krauthammer’s entire discourse guides the audience to believe that a truly American-centered world is entirely plausible and desirable, yet this object of desire that promises enjoyment does not exist. Not merely the social construction of threat, Krauthammer’s production of “Weapon States” hinges on the movements of desire and enjoyment that make possible Self-Other relations. The construction of these threats is in one sense, as many international relations (IR) identity theories would contend, the production of a hierarchy of “identities” in which America is differentiated from those states that are not America or the new American unipolar world (see Weldes 1999). “Weapon States” here constitute the opposing side of a binary between those states that are members of and are perceived to openly welcome the new American world, and those states that are not “us.” Yet in contrast to such approaches, more than just the presence of these Others poses an obvious threat to “us.” Consequently, it is not enough merely to make explicit the binary construction of identities. As Slavoj Žižek (1993: 206) contends, “It is not sufficient to point out how the . . . Other presents a threat to our identity. We should rather inverse this proposition: the fascinating image of the Other gives a body to our own innermost split, to what is ‘in us more than ourselves’ and thus prevents us from achieving full identity with ourselves.” In other words, the construction of the subject through reference to an Other—the construction of “America” through reference to “Weapon States”—is premised on a frustration of the “American” subject of the discourse. The fully enjoying subject is an impossible project, and “America” and a completely American-dominated global system are likewise impossible projects, since no social entity can fully construct itself. The discursive production of “Weapon States” “gives a body,” in Žižek’s words, to the ultimate frustration and incompleteness of the subject in Krauthammer’s discourse. These movements of frustration and desire for a full subject give rise to the construction of fantasies of Self and Other in Krauthammer’s discourse. This process involves the notion that fantasies often presume that Others “steal our enjoyment” (Žižek 1997). This subtly appears several times in Krauthammer’s discourse. Although “we” are without a doubt the only superpower, Krauthammer (1990–91: 29) asserts that “there will constantly be new threats disturbing our peace.” Global stability is “our” stability, since American domination is (again) good, necessary, and vital if “chaos” is to be avoided. “Weapon States” that “brandish” their weapons must be policed to alleviate the threat they pose, and the rise of “intolerant aggressive nationalisms in a disintegrating communist bloc” can be read as moments of fantasy blockages in which the Other is doing something “we” should be doing. One gets the sense that as the lone superpower, America alone should have the right to “brandish” its weapons of mass destruction—for example, in “unabashedly laying down the rules of world order.” One also gets the sense that the potential rise of “aggressive intolerant nationalisms” poses a blockage to the desiring American subject because America itself should have the sole right to engage in the behaviors engendered by such forces. Krauthammer’s entire discourse is constructed around the idea that America should aggressively promote its own ideas for how the world should be organized and policed and that no other entity has the ability or license to do so. America alone should dominate the world, and for Krauthammer, America should be intolerant of anyone else attempting to preempt this new opportunity, for this is the road to “chaos.” America possesses the “strength and will” that the rest of the world does not, and thus America rightfully should exercise those qualities to the benefit of all. Others’ “aggressive intolerant nationalisms” are threatening and not to be tolerated, but American aggressive and nationalistic expansion are to be welcomed. American nationalist-driven internationalism is beneficial for the world, while other nationalisms are threatening. This illustrates the notion that constructions of Self and Other are underpinned by desire and enjoyment—or, rather, the perceived theft of enjoyment by others. “What we gain,” Žižek (1993: 206) contends, “by trans- posing the perception of inherent social antagonisms into the fascination with the Other . . . is the fantasy-organization of desire.” Through Krauthammer’s production of threats, one sees the fascination exhibited by what others are doing, the enjoyment that they are displaying, and how “they” are in a sense stealing the enjoyment that “we” should be having and are lacking. The “fullness” that they seem to attain in their enjoyment is perceived as precisely the Thing that “we” seem to be missing. “America” is lacking in some sense, and the Thing it lacks is the very Thing that “Weapon States” brandish openly. Moreover, there is the worry that isolationism keeps “America” from being fully itself. Indeed, if this revival spreads, an American “collapse to second-rank status will not be for foreign but for domestic reasons,” such as the country’s “insatiable desire for yet higher standards of living without paying any of the cost” (Krauthammer 1990–91: 26–27). Krauthammer’s fears of isolationism relate to the “strength and will” of which he speaks in closing his essay. Yet the manner in which isolationists, in Krauthammer’s view, define the national interest goes against America’s true national interests, which extend beyond the narrow confines of the nation’s borders. America should “unashamedly” lay down its own rules for global order, since the world’s interests coincide with American interests (33). Although isolationism may indeed be an old theme of American foreign policy, it is simply out of place in a unipolar world, which by definition must be dominated by the unipolar power. “Isolationism” in this sense weakens precisely the part of the American subject that must be utilized in imposing and enforcing world order. Krauthammer’s emphasis on the necessity of “American strength and will” for world security points to qualities that the subject “America” needs to have, in some sense has, but in another sense does not have. In other words, “strength and will” are a part of the subject that is missing but that is needed so that the subject can fully become its own image of itself. These characteristics are foremost uniquely American. The rest of the world cannot act without America leading the way, since “where the United States does not tread, the alliance will not follow” (24). The rest of the world lacks the “strength and will” needed to define and carry out global order. In a sense, however, so does the United States. As the unipolar power, America without a doubt has a great deal more “strength and will” than any other power. Yet given a resurgent domestic “isolationism” and other potential “domestic” problems, the United States does not yet have the “strength and will” necessary to fully embrace its global role. The subject is lacking some- thing that is posited as having faithfully served it in the past but that it has lost exactly when it needs it the most. What precisely Krauthammer means by “strength and will” is left undefined, yet their meaning could be filled in any number of ways. This lack of definition—indeed, the impossibility of fully defining what they mean—enables them to function as signifiers covering the subject’s lack in the fantasy. “Strength and will” function as the Symbolic stand-ins for what the subject “America” currently lacks the full force of, yet in some sense they remain a part of the subject. They may have been temporarily or partly lost during the current isolationist revival, but they are still a missing part of the subject that must be rediscovered if “America” is going to more fully step into its proper role as global leader. The partial enjoyment implied in both of these aspects—in the just-out-of-reach image of an American dominated global system and the “strength and will” that is both present in and absent from the subject—sparks the desire for their pursuit. In the fantasy of the “unipolar moment,” the subject “America” seeks the perceived to-be-missing parts of itself that it believes will bring it the enjoyment it seeks, yet the fantasy posits obstacles to explain why enjoyment is not forthcoming and why desire remains frustrated. Although figures such as “Weapon States” are posited as blocking the culmination and stabilization of the subject, these figures merely Symbolically cover over the ambiguity, divisions, and frustrations that are inherent to subject formation itself. Even though the signifier “isolationism” is offered for why our “strength and will” have not been delivered, this of course does not mean that “strength and will” would automatically be forthcoming if “isolationism” were to subside. “Strength and will” do not represent anything but the lack of what the subject is constructed as needing to pursue the image of fullness (an Americandominated world), itself an illusory object projected by the fantasy to pursue enjoyment. However, the desires evoked by the fantasy are very much in tension with the overall tenor of Krauthammer’s discourse. Again, as the subject “America” constructed as the sole superpower, there is not much to desire in Krauthammer’s text for another object that might alleviate the ambiguities of subjectivity. As the sole unipolar power, the collective subject is already close to enjoyment in terms of a world shaped by American-imposed rules. However, when the subject approaches the object it desires, desire itself starts to fade. If one were to find the Thing that would truly make one whole, desire would die, and subjectivity would evaporate. The desires evoked by the fantasy ob- stacles posed and the evaporation of desire the closer it approaches the enjoyment seemingly promised are in tension in Krauthammer’s discourse. In other words, there is not much distance between the subject and the missing object, yet this distance is necessary to maintain desire. The subject in Krauthammer’s discourse (and implicitly projected to an audience) in fact helps to dissolve desire rather than evoking the desire for identification. In closing in on a truly American-centered world, the desire for identification with the subject of this discourse (“America,” the “United States”) induces a kind of dissatisfaction because it comes too close to the object(s) of desire. Without desire, there is no subject, and here the subject is close to fulfilling its desire. In terms of its efficacy or resonance, then, it presumably it fails to spark desires for identification. If the United States now sits astride the globe with relatively little to fear from other great powers, what is left to desire?

2022 Michigan Kritik
**Final Supplement – FMPS** › **Kritik Updates** › Deleuze K – 1NC OCOs Link

This form of technological management is an expression of the death drive – that causes projection of our fears onto the human and non-human world to justify their annihilation

Dodds 12 [Joseph, MPhil, Psychoanalytic Studies, Sheffield University, UK, MA, Psychoanalytic Studies, Sheffield University, UK BSc, Psychology and Neuroscience, Manchester University, UK, Chartered Psychologist (CPsychol) of the British Psychological Society (BPS), and a member of several other professional organizations such as the International Neuropsychoanalysis Society, Psychoanalysis and Ecology at the Edge of Chaos, p. 70]

Here there are echoes of Freud's (1916) idea of 'anticipatory mourning' and the associated attacks and spoiling that we will study below (see p. 72). However, for Searles the natural world is not just a space for externalizing our conflicts. Rather, a healthy relationship to the non-human environment is essential for human psychological well-being. Furthermore, one consequence of our alienation from nature is an omnipotent longing for fusion with our technology, and a powerful anxiety should this fully occur.∂ Over recent decades we have come from dwelling in an outer world in which the living works of nature either predominated or were near at hand, to dwelling in an environment dominated by a technology which is wondrously powerful and yet nonetheless dead ... [T]his technology-dominated world [is] so alien, so complex, so awesome, and so overwhelming that we have been able to cope with it only by regressing, in our unconscious experience ... to a degraded state of nondifferentiation from it ... [T]his 'outer' reality is psychologically as much a part of us as its poisonous waste products are part of our physical selves. (Searles 1972: 368)∂ The further we are alienated from nature, the more we are driven into primitive regressive identification and omnipotent fascination with our technology, a powerful positive feedback loop. The inner conflict between our human and non-human selves, and our animal and technological natures, is projected onto the environment, further rupturing the relationship and leading to a spiral of destructiveness as we 'project this conflict upon, and thus unconsciously foster, the war in external reality between the beleaguered remnants of ecologically balanced nature and *(hu)man's technology which is ravaging them' (ibid.).∂ Here we are in Klein's paranoid-schizoid world, with a primitive ego unable to differentiate between good and bad mother. While ecologists portray a good eco-mummy doing battle with bad techno-mummy, things are not so simple. As we have seen, civilization (and its technology) is a defence, a 'good mother' to protect us from capricious and uncaring mother nature (Freud 1930), but, as Searles suggests, we are supposed to accept that 'our good mother is poisoning us' (Searles 1972: 369).∂ For Searles (1972), behind both nuclear danger and ecological catastrophe lies the raw destructiveness Kleinians link to Thanatos, or what Erich Fromm (1992) understands in terms of necrophilia. Searles (1972: 370) argues that at this level of functioning we project 'our own pervasive, poorly differentiated and poorly integrated murderousness, bora of our terror and deprivation and frustration, upon the hydrogen bomb, the military-industrial complex, technology.' We may find the slow, more controllable death from pollution preferable to 'sudden death from nuclear warfare' or we might yearn for the quick relief of a nuclear blast to the 'slow strangulation' of environmental devastation (Searles 1972: 370). Living with such apocalyptic threats leads to a kind of ultimate version of the defence Anna Freud (1936) described as identification with the aggressor.∂ At an unconscious level we powerfully identify with what we perceive as omnipotent and immortal technology, as a defense against intolerable feelings of insignificance, of deprivation, of guilt, of fear of death ... Since the constructive goal of saving the world can be achieved only by one's working, as but one largely anonymous individual among uncounted millions ... it is more alluring to give oneself over to secret fantasies of omnipotent destructiveness, in identification with the forces that threaten to destroy the world. This serves to shield one from the recognition of one's own guilt-laden murderous urges, experienced as being within oneself, to destroy one's own intrapersonal and interpersonal world.(Searles 1972: 370)∂ In this view, we are seeing a kind of repetition on a planetary level of an early intrapsychic anxiety situation. In childhood 'a fantasied omnipotence protected us against the fUll intensity of our feelings of deprivation, and now it is dangerously easy to identify with seemingly limitless technology and to fail to cope with the life-threatening scarcity of usable air, food, and water on our planet' (ibid.). Unfortunately our technological powers have outstripped our emotional maturity, and the omnipotent phantasies of infancy now have a frightening objectivity. In place of a religion we no longer believe in, or hopes for future generations we no longer have meaningful contact with, we identify with our immortal, inanimate technology.∂ In this realm of omnipotent fantasy ... mother earth is equivalent to all of reality ... a drag ... to our yearnings for unfettered omnipotence ... It may be not at all coincidental that our world today is threatened with extinction through environmental pollution, to which we are so strikingly apathetic, just when we seem on the threshold of technologically breaking the chains that have always bound our race to this planet of our origin. I suspect that we collectively quake lest our infantile omnipotent fantasies become fully actualized through man's becoming interplanetary and ceasing thereby to be man ... [W]e are powerfully drawn to suicidally polluting our planet so as to ensure our dying upon it as men, rather than existing elsewhere as ... gods or robots ... [T]he greatest danger lies neither in the hydrogen bomb ... nor in the more slowly lethal effect of pollution ... [but] in the fact that the world is in such a state as to evoke our very earliest anxieties and at the same time to offer the delusional 'promise' ... of assuaging these anxieties, effacing them, by fully externalizing and reifying our most primitive conflicts ... In the pull upon us to become omnipotently free of human conflict, we are in danger of bringing about our extinction.(Searles 1972: 371-372).

2022 Michigan Kritik
**Final Supplement – FMPS** › **Kritik Updates** › Deleuze K – 1NC OCOs Link

The aff sustains the ‘nuclear priesthood’ of debate – in an attempt to control the absolute contingency of the Real, we repetitively invest in a practice of control over nuclear weapons. The 1AC’s enjoyment of nuclear weapons becomes a form of violent repetition compulsion that turns the case.

Matheson 15 (Calum Matheson is an Assistant Professor of Communication at the University of Pittsburgh, “Desired Ground Zeroes: Nuclear Imagination and the Death Drive,” 6/23/15)

The conflation of Symbolic and Real is at the heart of the Bomb. Jacques Derrida famously wrote that nuclear war is “fabulously textual,” having no existence outside of the system of language, which we might broaden to representation, or better yet, mediation. Derrida argued that because a total nuclear war has not taken place and its coming would obliterate the archive, it can exist only in its “essential rhetoricity” as a “fantasy” or “fable” that has no referent in reality (Derrida 24-27). Some, like Masahide Kato, have criticized Derrida on the grounds that nuclear war has taken place in the form of nuclear testing, part of a larger project of radioactive colonialism and destruction of indigenous peoples (Kato). I read this argument a different way. We do not have to deny that a nuclear war is in some sense ongoing in order to claim that it has never happened. The kind of nuclear war imagined by Kistiakowsky at Trinity can never come to pass because it means the end of everything on Earth. The radioactive destruction of native nations does not qualify as a “total” nuclear war in the minds of strategists and their peace activist Doppelgängers because the war they imagine is beyond any material referent, only hinted at by the presence of the Bomb on Earth. It represents both the Real in its punishing materiality and a speculation that could not exist anywhere but the human imagination. The desire to experience the Real is therefore bound to be frustrated. The final advent of the Bomb always seems imminent but is never realized, so obliteration is endlessly deferred.7 The desire for the Real described in this chapter is thus a source of inevitable failure and frustration. But it is only on part of the death drive. Unable to meet the Real and still remain extant as discrete subjects, taunted by the continuity that lies over the line of taboo, our desires remain. We are dislocated and decentered by the Bomb, but we do not accept our being as dust and ashes. Instead, the subject desirous of the nuclear Real finds its enjoyment in the opposite fantasy: one of power over the conditions of presence and absence, mastery of contingency and the Real itself. This is the dynamic of Freud’s fort-da game, and in context of nuclear war, it manifests itself in the compulsion to repetitively simulate nuclear destruction. Atmospheric nuclear testing ended for the USA in 1963. Ultimately only a relatively small number of people witnessed nuclear explosions anywhere in the world, so inevitably awareness and imagination of the Bomb’s overwhelming presence would spread in an increasingly mediated form. War games as rituals helped to sustain a nuclear priesthood in its (necessarily incomplete) access to the revealed truth of the Bomb after the end of atmospheric nuclear testing left its followers merely longing to “feel the heat.” As these technologies gave form to videogames and ostensibly anti-war simulations, they would democratize access to the Bomb and cement its force as an organizing metaphor for the Real. Ipsos Custodes In his “Seminar on the ‘Purloined Letter,’” Jacques Lacan wrote that “it is the symbolic order which is constitutive for the subject,” and that the subject receives “major determination” from “the itinerary of a signifier” (7). One is “possessed” by the signifier, a thrall to its agency: “the signifier’s displacement determines subjects’ acts, destiny, refusals, blindnesses, success, and fate...everything pertaining to the psychological pregiven follows willy-nilly the signifier’s train, like weapons and baggage” (21). One doesn’t have to adopt a fully deterministic attitude towards structure to accept that it is the sign that speaks through us, not vice versa. Human agency does not operate without restriction, but constitutes a negotiation of rules that largely prescribe our behaviors. In the itinerary of an individual life, one can see the influence of accreted structures that give it form. There is perhaps no better example than that of Vice Admiral Tim Giardina. Giardina is the former deputy head of the United States Strategic Command (STRATCOM) at Offutt Air Force Base in Nebraska, the successor to the Strategic Air Command parodied in Dr. Strangelove. In June 2013, Giardina was caught using counterfeit poker chips at a local casino. It was revealed in the ensuing investigation that Giardina had spent almost 1,100 hours gambling in an eighteen-month period. He was such a common sight that other casino regulars remembered him as “Navy Tim,” and recalled comments he had made about the polygraph requirements for U.S. nuclear forces (he was quoted as saying that the purpose is really to find out if one is “having sex with animals or something really crazy”). Giardina was banned from several casinos but continued to play even after being caught with counterfeit chips.8 Following an investigation by the Naval Criminal Investigative Service, he was removed from his post, demoted to Rear Admiral, and reassigned to Washington (Burns). It is not illegal for Navy officers to gamble. Vice Admiral Giardina’s habitual compulsion to play poker did not seem to have any effect on his official duties. Giardina had to be punished not because his actions are out of line with the ethos of the Strategic Command, but precisely because they are not. Giardina enjoyed gambling in poker, but in forging fake chips, he seemed to enjoy gambling on gambling: his was a kind of “meta-gambling,” taking risks on the rules that regulate risks.9 In doing so, Giardina exposed what Slavoj Žižek calls the “obscene supplement” of his system. Ideological fantasies are maintained by disavowing their central, obscene foundation, a gesture necessary to the function of the fantasy but impossible to acknowledge, for the lack of distance would collapse the whole edifice (Žižek 35-36). Admiral Cecil Haney, commander of STRATCOM, said in recent Congressional testimony that the core mission of the organization remains to deter attack on the United States. This means minimizing pervasive uncertainty and risk. In Admiral Haney’s words, “America’s nuclear deterrent force provides enduring value to the nation. It has been a constant thread in the geopolitical fabric of an uncertain world, providing a moderating influence on generations of world leaders” (U.S. Senate Comm. on Armed Services, Statement 7). More directly, it is necessary to identify “where we are taking risk and where we cannot accept further risk” (U.S. Senate Comm. on Armed Services, Statement 6). “Risk” and “uncertainty” appear constantly in Haney’s statement, which is a statement for minimizing chance and developing “contingency plans” to control the consequences of unforeseen events. The disturbance of Symbolic order by the contingency of the Real is met with an attempt to restore order, to respond to chance with law. Lacan describes this dynamic as the interplay of tuché and automaton: Where do we meet this real? For what we have in the discovery of psycho-analysis is an encounter, an essential encounter—and appointment to which we are always called with a real that eludes us... First, the tuché, which we have borrowed...from Aristotle, who uses it in his search for cause. We have translated it as the encounter with the real. The real is beyond the automaton, the return, the coming-back, the insistence of the signs, by which we see ourselves governed by the pleasure principle. The real is that which always lies behind the automaton...it is this that is the object of [Freud’s] concern. (Lacan, Four Fundamental Concepts, 53-54, italics in original) This is the central element of the repetition compulsion. Driven to make our encounter with the Real, we are perpetually disappointed, but the Symbolic world of reality abhors a vacuum. Automaton describes the endless attempts to reach the Real which are doomed to failure but cannot be surrendered, so are repeated again and again. These repetitive behaviors thus develop an aspect of order, and are, paradoxically, orderly attempts to reach the chaos of contingency. They are also linked by Lacan gambling, death, and signification (“Purloined Letter” 28-29). Nuclear deterrence can be read in this frame as an attempt to secure the world against the contingency of the Real, the uncertainty of nuclear war. It is the STRATCOM automaton’s answer to the chaos of the Bomb’s tuché. But the attempt to restore order has at its heart a desire to encounter the Real. In a history of nuclear defense intellectuals, Fred Kaplan described them in the 1980s at the height of their power having come with the mission “to impose order,” but lacking any means to control the wild abandon of the Bomb in a hypothetical war for which there was no precedent, “in the end, chaos still prevailed” (Kaplan 391). Desire is the motive force, and that what we desire cannot be attained is what requires repetition. When the chaos of tuché reigns, automaton does not surrender, but comes to be an end in itself, a site of investment. Repetition itself becomes enjoyable. In repeatedly simulating nuclear war, defense intellectuals who could not experience the Real of nuclear violence could enjoy the illusion of mastery over the terror and fascination inspired by the Real by appearing to simulate the conditions of presence and absence—in this case, the presence of the world-for-us and its absence in the Bomb’s inferno. Langdon Winner distinguishes between risk (a term prevalent in both nuclear war and poker) and threat or hazard on these grounds: risk always has an implied benefit to it, an element of desire and an opportunity for control (145). There is little empirical basis for nuclear war simulations and the calculations of probability they rely on, so nuclear war plans always require a good deal of faith, and thus to adopt them is a risk—a calculation of both hazard and reward (Ghamari-Tabrizi 8). Their parameters are set arbitrarily by the personnel who design them. In other words, they are games of chance in which we also manipulate the rules. This is the obscene supplement of nuclear deterrence that Vice Admiral Giardina could not be allowed to reveal: we don’t just repeat nuclear simulations again and again because we think that they will someday be perfect. War games are fun, and we don’t always care about the rules. Poker, after all, was rumored to be the genesis of game theory at the RAND Corporation, prominent modelers of nuclear war, and was a favorite pastime of the defense intellectuals who sought to tame the world with human reason (Arbella 51-53).

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The desire to understand the real is the root cause of nuclear proliferation

Matheson 15 (Calum Matheson is an Assistant Professor of Communication at the University of Pittsburgh, “Desired Ground Zeroes: Nuclear Imagination and the Death Drive”, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill , 2015,

The Real of the Bomb reveals the incompleteness of this world and motivates attempts to find what we imagine is concealed beneath it. Nuclear obliteration is to its devotees perhaps even a promise of divine Truth that offers transcendence of the fallen world of mediation in which reality is never complete. With such a contradictory set of attachments, it is hard to imagine that efforts to think about the Bomb can achieve their goals—while they might demonstrate their own consistent logic, the rationality of nuclear politics is warped by the intrusion of the Real and the desire to commune with it directly. Communication studies is full of cogent analyses of instances where language or other media worked very well indeed to organize political responses, persuade audiences, bind people together around texts, and change attitudes, but these accounts are incomplete without attention to the Real. The subject of nuclear war challenges how we think about communication itself and demands new thinking on the limits of mediation. The central question of this dissertation is not how should we talk about nuclear war, but what can nuclear war 9 show us about how we attempt to mediate that which we understand to exceed the limits of mediation itself? For attempt we do. The vertiginous hole in the whole of reality is only the first part of the Bomb’s relationship to desire. Nature abhors a vacuum, and so does the symbolic order through which the human world is built. The Symbolic, as Jacques Lacan styles it, cannot tolerate the revelation of its inadequacy in the Real, the tears left in our map by the inhuman world. We endlessly attempt to heal the rifts of the Real, to feign unicity where it has failed (Lundberg 2-3). The response to chaos is control; order is imposed against contingency in an effort to re-impose coherence. This dynamic of automaton (order) scripted over tuché (contingency) is developed in Chapter 2. When these attempts fail—and because the Real by its nature cannot be assimilated, they must—we simply try again. In Lacanian psychoanalysis, this dynamic is the repetition compulsion, in which the subject tries again and again to control the conditions for presence and absence, enjoying not the outcome but the exercise of subjectivity itself in the capacity to act and to choose. Subjectivity requires the sacrifice of continuity through the formation of the alienating identity of the mirror phase, a process explained more in Chapters 1 and 2. Discontinuous subjects are organized in part around the lack—something that would make them whole again, represented in an object that is never more than a partial stand-in for this missing completion. Frustrated in the quest for something outside, we enjoy our own subjectivity.2 In the context of nuclear war, this meant ever more sophisticated simulations of a phenomenon about which we remained basically uncertain. This is the second movement of desire in (or for) the Bomb. The enjoyment of our reasserted control over 2 “Enjoyment” is meant here in the Lacanian sense of jouissance, not as happiness or fulfillment, but as an attachment to something that often exceeds pleasure and manifests in quite harmful ways. 10 the Bomb manifested in the repeated attempts to simulate its use and predict its aftermath. The fort-da game described by Freud and explained here in the first two chapters is an important tool for unpacking this dynamic because it posits a sense of control over presence and absence as the condition for a subject’s enjoyment. Fort-da refers to the game in which a child makes an object disappear and reappear in succession, simulating her or his mother’s coming and going and the possibility of her eventual disappearance. Enjoyment comes from the subject’s control over these states of presence and absence, a small example of imposing order in a world of seeming chaos (Freud, Beyond the Pleasure Principle 13-17). Understanding this is necessary to draw the common threads between the cold-blooded excesses of Pentagon nuclear plans, the compulsion that leads survivalists to stockpile rooms full of MREs, and the appeal that apocalyptic videogames hold for millions of players. Ins all of these pursuits, the world is made absent in the fantasy of destruction and present again in the myth of reconstruction, survival, and rebirth. Nuclear weapons scholarship evinces its own compulsion to repeat: myriad investigations of nuclear texts are done, but each leaves something unanswered. The movements of desire are incompletely by scholarship on nuclear weapons concerned only with exposing the truths of nuclear danger, analyzing specific instantiations of nuclear rhetoric, or developing a vocabulary for democratic political resistance. While the instrumental and political aspects of language are important, to focus too narrowly on specific discourses threatens to neglect the forest for the trees. The political movements that attracted great attention in the 1980s—opposition to the Strategic Defense Initiative, the Nuclear Freeze Movement, and the radical disarmament movement—were at best partial successes. This is not to say that these movements or 11 their scholarly treatments are unimportant—they are certainly helpful for those concerned with nuclear activism and decisionmaking. Still, even if we slowly trace an asymptotic relation to the zero of nuclear desire, part of the process is recognizing the pull this unattainable zero has on our efforts to track it and how those investments sustain the larger discourse of nuclear warfare. That larger system persists almost unchanged, with thousands of weapons prepared for launch on short notice, an endless profusion of war plans, an official policy to secure peace through the threat of genocide, and almost complete public ignorance that the sword of Damocles still hangs from its slender thread. The primary difference between nuclear awareness in 1985 and 2015 as it relates to their own weapons is that ever fewer citizens of the nuclear states even bother to check how much the rope is fraying. In other words, the material artifice of nuclear warfighting persists despite repeated attempts to understand its persuasive elements. Existing attempts to study nuclear weapons could benefit from the concept of the death drive as a problematic for communication studies.

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The United States engages in attempts to achieve a fantasy of security as a palliative to its nostalgia for a “lost wholeness”.

Terada 14 - Randall Terada is a member of Lacan Toronto and works with a number of local community agencies providing psychoanalytic based consulting. He received his Ph.D. from York University in 2013. (Randall Terada, “Review: A Politics of the Death Drive”, American Imago , Vol. 71, No. 1 (Spring 2014), pp. 89-96)

Drawing political ramifications, McGowan rejects both the politics of nostalgia—either progressive or conservative—that seeks to redeem a lost plenitude and the deconstructionist alternative that posits a receding horizon of possibility that politics should seek to keep open. Instead, he argues for remaining within rather than fleeing this recurrent manifestation of loss, this condition of masochistic self-wounding that derails our best-laid plans, for which we then blame others: Rather than trying to avoid violence, we can restore to it its proper object—the self. The more the subject engages in a violent assault on its own forms of symbolic identity, its own ego, its own deepest convictions, the more the subject finds an enjoyable alternative to the satisfactions of aggression. (p. 51) The repetitive return to painful and humiliating experiences of vulnerability and loss marks the transition to a subject of drive. Enjoying what we don’t have, McGowan argues, opens up the possibility of a different type of social solidarity, one based on loss, yet open to infinite possibility.

Politics, Knowledge, and Enjoyment

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The United States is on an endless quest for absolute security. Not only is this state unobtainable, but justifies endless interventions for the purpose of enjoying the loss of war.

McGowan ‘13 (Todd, Assoc. Prof. of Film and Television Studies @ U. of Vermont, Enjoying What We Don’t Have: The Political Project of Psychoanalysis, pp. 159-161) EG

Nowhere is the retreat from enjoyment to pleasure more evident than in the American response to the attacks of September 11, 2001. The attacks immediately reinvigorated the social bond for a majority of Americans. The loss that they occasioned brought subjects back to the shared sacrifice that defines their membership in American society. Even as they were horrified by the image of the towers burning and then falling, most Americans, in the strict psychoanalytic sense of the term, enjoyed the attacks insofar as the attacks allowed them to experience once again their social bond with great intensity.

This is a bond that one suffers, just as one suffers from a terrorist attack. Even though it followed from an attack, this bond was not one formed through the male logic of friend/enemy, which is why the headline in Le Monde on September 12, 2001, could proclaim, “Nous sommes tous Américains.”27 The bond formed around the September 11 attacks was not initially a bond of exclusivity with a clear outside and inside. Any subject willing to accede to the experience of loss could become a part of American society at that moment. The not-all of the social bond occurs through the experience of loss, but the recognition of this type of bond is unbearable. One enjoys it without deriving any pleasure from it. It is, in fact, painful. Not only is it painful, but it also entails complete humiliation. The society experiences the shame of being a victim and enduring trauma — the shame of enjoyment itself.

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Offensive cyber operations are the next reinvention of state violence.

---OCC = Offensive Cyber Capabilities

Elgoff and Shires, 21 [Florian J. Egloff works for Center for Security Studies and Centre for Technology and Global Affairs, Department of Politics; International Relations, University of Oxford, Oxford, James Shires works for the Institute for Security and Global Affairs, Leiden University,; Cyber Statecraft Initiative, Atlantic Council, 10-12-2021, accessed on 7-22-2022, Cambridge Core, "The better angels of our digital nature? Offensive cyber capabilities and state violence | European Journal of International Security | Cambridge Core", https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/european-journal-of-international-security/article/better-angels-of-our-digital-nature-offensive-cyber-capabilities-and-state-violence/B225F961FD2212E34FDB0B267A1CB5E6]/ISEE

The transformation and reinvention of state violence has continued into the digital age. The clearest manifestation of state violence in cyberspace is in offensive cyber capabilities: the adversarial manipulation of digital devices and networks for interstate competition and globalised repression. However, the literature on OCCs is dominated by a narrow definition of violence as bodily harm, classifying OCCs as largely non-violent. This narrow definition has both analytical and policy consequences. Analytically, it implies undue homogeneity across the wide range of strategically relevant uses of OCCs. At a policy level, it means that many harms caused by OCCs are un- or under-appreciated by states and other actors. The account provided here provides greater analytical purchase on this expanding domain, as well as stronger normative foundation for action. An expanded concept of violence, including affective and community harms, reveals how OCCs relocate state violence through new means of repression and information manipulation, without simplifying or exaggerating their complex effects. Some readers may object that expanding the definition of violence is hazardous, diluting the devastating effects violent actions have on their victims and their communities. While we recognise this danger, we aim to show that the opposite is also true. Holding on to a narrow definition of violence leads one to misconstrue the harms resulting from the use of OCCs to the detriment of their victims. Further research is required to substantiate this relocation with empirical data, including large-scale surveys of cyber conflict and extended case studies that trace the decision-making processes behind individual deployments. Further work is also needed to transfer this account of violence from states to semi- and non-state actors, as well as to examine the justifications for violent uses of OCCs in more detail. This article has three main implications for theory and policy on cyber conflict. First, the affective and community harms caused by OCCs need to be identified, anticipated, and taken seriously in decisions about their use. Second, research and policy should focus on the most violent uses of OCCs, which may not be state-sponsored cyber-espionage or sabotage, but instead the adaption of authoritarian systems to rely on digital and globalised repression and rework existing practices of information manipulation against their adversaries. Third, and most importantly, adherence to a narrow conception of violence means that many states have undertaken significant harmful actions in their own and each other's societies without recognising them as such. Our current conceptual tools hamper institutional adaptation to counter and mitigate these broader harms, such as military doctrines and capabilities, intelligence capabilities, criminal laws, police support, victim counselling, and so on. Our redrawing of the concept of violence to include affective and community harms provides defensive actors with a stronger conceptual foundation to accurately measure harms exerted via digital means and then act to prevent them. Are OCCs the better angels of our digital nature? We have argued that they are not; on an expanded concept of violence, OCCs represent not Pinkerian optimism, but a more complex relocation of state violence. The main contribution of this article is thus the application of an expanded conception of violence to better understand the impact of OCCs on individuals and societies. But the account of violence put forward here also has broader implications. Many other emerging security technologies, such as lethal autonomous weapons systems, raise similar questions about the extent and type of violence they cause, in part due to their reliance on informational as well as material means to produce harmful effects. The expansion of the concept of violence we have undertaken in this article could also be applied to other information-enabled technologies, to identify and ultimately work to ameliorate currently unseen forms of harm in global politics. Consequently, in addition to its main contribution in rethinking the violence involved in cyber conflict, our study also provides new insights into how to best conceptualise violence in international affairs more widely.

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The AFFs process of mapping is rooted in the desire for control over territory.

Lambach, 21 [Daniel Lambach is a political scientist, currently working as a Heisenberg Fellow at the Research Centre Normative Orders at Goethe Universität Frankfurt, July 2021, accessed on 7-23-2022, Researchgate, "Space, scale, and global politics: Towards a critical approach to space in international relations", https://www.researchgate.net/publication/353136176_Space_scale_and_global_politics_Towards_a_critical_approach_to_space_in_international_relations]/ISEE

There are different ways of conceptualising ‘space’. The first is to view it in a Cartesian sense, that is, a geometric container that other things exist or happen in. Cartesianism is the foundation of geo-determinism, which is encapsulated in the old aphorism that ‘geography is destiny’. Geo-determinism was characteristic of classical geopolitics but was falling out of favour in Political Geography as early as the 1940s. It was replaced by a possibilist understanding of geography, wherein geography is constant but its social impact is mediated by politics, technology, and other factors. Both determinist and possibilist approaches are based on a fixed understanding of space, thereby making geography little more than a ‘territorial stage’ upon which states interact. In Geography and Sociology, space is today viewed in relational and social constructivist terms, as the result of interactions among phenomena, objects, and people. Doreen Massey argues that ‘identities/entities, the relations “between” them, and the spatiality which is part of them, are all co-constitutive’.Footnote67 Martina Löw speaks of space as ‘a relational arrangement of bodies that are incessantly in motion’.Footnote68 Löw's use of ‘arrangement’ implies order, in spite of space's inherent dynamism. Therefore, spaces are reflective of other sociopolitical structures and why ‘social and political practices are co-implicated in different spatial manifestations’.Footnote69 In short, spaces are constructed. While earlier scholarship in Human Geography aimed to identify spaces, its current approach is to understand the social process by which spaces come to exist.Footnote70 This constructivist approach focuses on the process of space making and is particularly associated with scholarship in critical geopolitics, border studies, and feminist geography.Footnote71 Spaces are not independent of physical environments, as the discussion of Simmel's relational sociology highlights. Gazit speaks of space – the ‘dynamic webs of socio-cultural and symbolic relations’ – evolving within, around, and in relation to ‘brute topographical physical settings’. Stuart Elden refers to these settings as ‘terrain’, which consists of geophysical landscapes, a built environment, and their respective material and physical properties. Terrain exists as part of, and in relation to human societies and is therefore malleable, constantly shaping and being shaped by social action. In line with much geographic writing, I approach space as an abstract and general construct and other geographical concepts as more specific kinds of space. For instance, ‘places’ are spaces that have social purposes and meanings. Places are created through shared memories and are enmeshed in wider social relations; in the words of Setha Low, places are the ‘spatial location of subjectivities, intersubjectivities and identities’.Footnote74 As other spaces, places are productive and play their part in the constitution of gender and other social identities. To give another example, territory is politically controlled and bounded space. Territories have three characteristics: The first is a ‘classification by area’. Second, territorial claims have to be communicated, for example by reification of a space and the symbolic marking of borders in space and on maps. Third, territoriality always implies an attempt at enforcing claims of control. In sum, territoriality should be understood as ‘the attempt by an individual or group to affect, influence, or control people, phenomena, and relationships, by delimiting and asserting control over a geographic area’. ‘Territory’ should not be restricted to terrestrial spaces but also look to those spaces – oceanic, atmospheric, outer space, cyberspace – beyond the familiar environment of terra.

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Satellites generate a point of view that is not neutral but violent.

Peters, 20 [Kimberley Peters works for the Helmholtz Institute for Functional Marine Biodiversity at the University of Oldenburg and for the Institute for Chemistry and Biology of Marine Environments, 11-2-2020, accessed on 7-24-2022, PubMed Central (PMC), "The territories of governance: unpacking the ontologies and geophilosophies of fixed to flexible ocean management, and beyond", https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC7662200/]/ISEE

There is, of course, a need to be just as cautious about these de-territorialized developments in marine management. Captain Page posits that ‘new’ approaches should not necessarily replace old ones with de-territorialized modes supplanting territorialized ones. Indeed, as noted, there is quite some evidence that conservation enclosures ‘work’. Decisions on how to manage the marine environment should be based on the particularities of the situation: the balance between protecting the ecosystem, the economy, livelihoods and more-than-human oceanic life. In some scenarios, depending on the purpose of governance and the desired goals, zoning may be optimal; in others, not. As Captain Page noted, ‘I mean the funny thing is that sometimes these things [dynamic approaches] don't replace something else, they just complement and supplement. They have different capabilities and different features' (Captain Ed Page, unpublished interview, 5 November 2016). There is also a need to be cautious about any assumed benefits of de-territorialized approaches vis-à-vis their territorial predecessors. As Maxwell and colleagues note, there is still a ‘gap’ in some of the data needed to make responsive techniques workable ([60], see also [68]). They also rely on the dependability of technological apparatus (satellite tracking systems and such like). In addition, there is a need to ensure that legal frameworks can support such developments where necessary ([60], p. 42). Boucquey and colleagues argue a point further, noting that we should be careful that the data driving such responsive or flexible processes aren't themselves making ‘durable’ new kinds of ocean knowledge ([10], p. 484). Data are always the mirror of their creator, not the world itself, and this can bring with it challenges in respect of reliability, especially where the data for such processes derive from portals of oceanic information collected and collated by various agencies each with vested (political) interests in how the marine environment is used and protected (and for whom) [69–71]. Indeed, while governance does involve a broad range of actors ([2], p. 317), it is not an equal process. In attempting to include a variety of sectors—humanitarian organizations; ocean conservancy NGOs; private companies; and beyond—governance is said to be ‘bottom-up’ rather than ‘top-down’ in developing modes of organizing, managing and governing people, activities and spaces. As such, the voice of much ocean policy tends to speak in a collective ‘we’ that represents all. Consider, for example, the strapline to the UN Decade of Ocean Science: ‘the science we need, for the ocean we want’ ([53], emphasis added). But who is that ‘we’? What science is needed by different actors, and what kind of ocean do different people desire? Governance, management and policy, accountable as they may try to be, do not ensure every voice is heard and every perspective is accounted for (see Flannery et al. on MSP, [15,16] and the recent report on the latest BBNJ Intergovernmental Conference on Marine Biodiversity of Areas Beyond National Jurisdiction, for example, where some nations and perspectives were unable to participate fully [72]). It is necessary to consider the discourses of territory and regimes of power within which territory as a ‘political technology’ sits [4]. Territorializing practice is a political means of taking and appropriating space [5,73]. Modes of ocean governance that are territorial, then, are not politically innocent—they involve the allocation and even seizing of space for a particular purpose (even where that purpose may be situated as a ‘greater good’). In 2014, the Transnational Institute (TNI), Masifundise Development Trust and Afrika Kontakt laid out a brochure highlighting practices of ocean—the snatching of space through schemes such as MPAs, which while situated as beneficial for ocean protection and conservation, can by-pass the needs, experiences, knowledge and uses of local indigenous populations in relation to their ocean space [75]. Indeed, planning and conservation practices based on territorializing logics hold with them colonial traces where territories were first established through the violent land grabs of colonial and imperial enterprise (see [74], p. 10). It is important to go back and engage critically with these histories in the context of present day and future-oriented governance and management strategies to unsettle such approaches [74]. Moreover, it is important that a homogeneous ‘we’ (a ‘we’ that is often a white, western, and predominantly male) also steps back from the work of governance, not just to include, but reorientate entirely approaches to ocean governance through decolonialism. Only this has the potential to truly ‘transform’ the ocean for sustainability.

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Mapping produces an organization of space that is static.

Peters, 20 [Kimberley Peters works for the Helmholtz Institute for Functional Marine Biodiversity at the University of Oldenburg and for the Institute for Chemistry and Biology of Marine Environments, 11-2-2020, accessed on 7-24-2022, PubMed Central (PMC), "The territories of governance: unpacking the ontologies and geophilosophies of fixed to flexible ocean management, and beyond", https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC7662200/]/ISEE

What both were challenging was the difficulty of transferring a landed way of ‘doing business’ to sea in respect of the dynamism of the sea and mobility of life within it. They were presenting alternative geophilosophies (geographically de-territorialized modes of thinking) and different ontologies (of a world not rooted, but mobile). The sea, both sets of authors argued, is geophysically liquid, mobile, three-dimensional. You can draw a line on map, but not the ocean itself. You can attempt to designate a zone, but the sea and life at sea move [61,62]. More so, because the deep sea is legally an international space and for the most part is beyond state jurisdiction, it cannot be territorialized in the same way (although this, of course, does not stop some from trying; see [6]). These different modes of knowing and understanding, of fluid geophilosophies and ‘wet’ ontologies—of de-territorialization—unlock different potentials for ‘doing’ governance. In late 2016, I began a project searching for examples where less mainstream governance regimes were being developed. These were ways of organizing the marine realm that had mobilized a radically different ontology from the territorializing, grounded practices typical of ocean management. It is, of course, difficult to search for such approaches that diverge from the accepted, dominant regimes of marine governance. Indeed, where do you start to find ‘experimental’ modes of managing the seas and oceans, and the activities, and life, within them? Such an approach requires looking beyond the ‘trap’, as Elden calls it [42], that can be territory. As Elden urges, we need to start from a point of looking beyond accepted knowledge regimes [42]. This requires a substantial cognitive shift to recognize our own indoctrination in the reproduction of such traps. Instead we must be aware of how this ‘constrains our thinking’ and ‘hamstrings our potential for critique’ ([42], p. 757). Undertaking this work creates space to see or make visible other organizations of governance. This can occur through a tracing of stories, a listening to new narratives, an openness to future scenarios, built through an array of data including official records, archives, mind maps, interviews, oral histories and other qualitative as well as quantitative data sources, including modes of scenario formation to imagine oceans differently through time (for the latter see [63]). The Bering Strait is a narrow seaway of 44 nautical miles positioned between the landmasses of Russia and the American archipelago of Alaska [64]. It was an area with little explicit marine governance, in part because it has not been a well-used global transport route (although it has, historically been a ‘nexus’ for localized trading, something typically ignored in contemporary governance developments; see [65]). Yet with climate change, ice melt, and an increasingly viable passage emerging, vessel traffic is increasing and with it risks to marine life [65]. Indeed, as the Pew Charitable Trust have noted, this poses unique challenges for, a highly productive marine ecosystem… Almost the entire western Arctic population of bowhead whales travels through the strait twice a year. It also provides important food for the Pacific Walrus, spectacled eider, and grey whales. An estimated 12 million seabirds nest or forage in the area each year. The strait is also home to indigenous communities whose inhabitants have lived a traditional way of life along its shores for untold generations. [64] With ecosystem threats owing to ship strikes, noise, discharge and contamination [65], efforts began to consider mechanisms to mitigate potential harm. In 2010, the United States Coastguard (USCG) began a consultation regarding the implementation of a ship routeing scheme for the Bering Strait to guide increased shipping traffic. Although pertaining to mobility—guiding the movement of ships along a corridor—the technique of governance planned and proposed rested on the very static, fixed, territorializing and grounded modes of spatial management typical in marine environments. A maritime motorway, suggested through the USCG Port Access Route Study, would create a static corridor, cut through space, mapped onto the ocean as a surficial device of management. It was a solution that sought to fix in space governance, in a realm of mobility, where whales, walrus, fish, ice, all move. Against this backdrop, an organization, a Marine Exchange was already working with a different geophilosophy and ontology. The Marine Exchange of Alaska (MXAK), a non-governmental, not-for-profit organization that has been operating since 2001, embodies a networked approach to maritime domain awareness. Through a process of information dissemination to help guide users of the marine environment, it is also flexible and responsive to the very mobile and dynamic environment in which it operates, sharing information in ‘real-time’. As Captain Ed Page, director of the MXAK noted, this presents a radically different way of thinking about how we protect and conserve the Bering Strait. So my point is I think the best way to manage places like the Bering Strait is actually send information … using this new technology, warn those at risk… you can say ‘you can go through the Bering Strait but here's the guidelines now, just stay this far away from shore and … we'll let you know where you can go when you get there because it's a dynamic situation (Captain Ed Page, unpublished interview, 5 November 2016). Built through networks—of satellites, weather stations, radar sites, ships, processed AIS data from the Marine Exchange building, the desk operators, the environment itself, fog, rain, sun, mobile marine life, ice floes—the organization of space emerges through an ethos of knowledge sharing that has no discrete territorialized boundaries built on landed assumptions, but reflects the very relational and connected nature of the marine environment and the human and more-than-human ‘actants’ using the space (see also [24]). It works on a networked ontology responsive to ‘earthly’ processes and relations. This de-territorialized, open, networked geophilosophy provides us with an arguably less areal, flat ontology for thinking about governance. By comparison, it provides us with a spherical, three-dimensional, imaginary, where the earth is connected in a system of related, networked, assembled and co-constituted parts; where the ‘earth’ is, as Elden notes ‘in flux, dynamic, indeterminate, and changeable, rather than static and fixed’ ([66], p. xiv). We might think of the Bering example not as a territorialized zone of management—a cartographic, fixed, mode of stewarding space—but an ‘open building site’ (to quote [67], p. 65). Although, to be clear, the MXAK is not a formal governance actor in Alaska (it is an NGO offering services for stewardship over the marine environment) it offers us, by example, a radically different view of how we might ‘do’ governance based on dismantling dominant territorial discourses. As Callon notes, an actor-network provides ‘more an inspirational frame than a constraining theoretical system… (which) postulates between humans and nonhumans… (in) the configuration of sociotechnical network’ ([67], p. 62). As Captain Page noted, …with AIS (technology) you can actually send information to vessels, an icon or a box and explain what it is by visually showing the issue, like, ‘this is an area to be avoided because of the presence of whale… Reduce your speed or give it a wide berth’. Or, ‘there's a presence of ice here, so you want to avoid that ice because your vessel is not configured or not designed to operate in those icy conditions (unpublished interview, 5 November 2016). Of course, such systems are based on goodwill and collaboration that might not be transferable to all examples, but it demonstrates an approach that exceeds [27] the limits of existing marine strategies. Indeed, although a very distinct example, it makes visible the possibility of a different way of doing governance. As Maxwell et al. note, a shift towards dynamic ocean management… defined as management that rapidly changes in space and time in response to changes in the ocean and its users through the integration of near real-time biological, oceanographic, social and/or economic data…. can refine the temporal and spatial scale of managed areas, thereby better balancing ecological and economic objectives. ([60], p. 42)

2022 Michigan Kritik
**Final Supplement – FMPS** › **Kritik Updates** › Deleuze K – 1NC Cyberspace Link

Cyberspace is the new site of reterritorialization. The AFFs attempt to exert sovereignty generates the conditions for cyberwar to take place.

Lambach, 19 [Daniel Lambach is a political scientist, currently working as a Heisenberg Fellow at the Research Centre Normative Orders at Goethe Universität Frankfurt, 5-11-2019, accessed on 7-22-2022, Oxford University Press, "The Territorialization of Cyberspace*", https://academic.oup.com/isr/article/22/3/482/5488469]/ISEE

States reterritorialize the “national territory” in cyberspace. These territories are cyber-analogies to physical state territory that solidify states’ regulatory reach and undergird jurisdictional claims. This reterritorialization strategy proceeds from the normative assumption that all online activity that occurs “in” a country (because users, servers, or data are “located” there) should be treated as a part of a corresponding cyberspace territory. This belief has been strengthened by the growing popularity of geolocation technology, which makes the virtual coincide with the physical. Discourses about “cybersovereignty,” “data sovereignty,” or “digital sovereignty,” which are mainly championed by Russia and China but also find some traction in countries like France and Germany, are evidence of this belief (Drake et al. 2016, 45–48; Fliegauf 2016, 79). There are a variety of instruments available to states seeking to recreate their national territory in cyberspace. National firewalls are one of the best-known ways for governments to both communicate their territorial claim and display power within the bounded space. These firewalls combine a range of filtering mechanisms like IP blocking and keyword searches to censor discussions about sensitive topics and deny access to websites deemed subversive. The “Great Firewall of China” is the best-known example, but other countries have developed, or are developing, similar systems of censorship. North Korea is probably the most extreme example, where, until recently, users could only access the countrywide Kwangmyong intranet. Today, access to select internet sites is possible under tight restrictions and government scrutiny. Internet “kill switches” are the ultimate display of power. Being able to shut off the entire national internet, or parts thereof, in a controlled fashion and for extended periods of time demonstrates the capability of the state (DeNardis 2014, 199–221). And while this is clearly a tactic of last resort, there have been shutdowns lasting days or weeks as well as partial shutdowns targeting parts of the country or certain times of the day. The difficulty of a shutdown is determined by the network structure; the smaller the number of “choke points”—for example, Internet Service Providers and autonomous systems—the easier it is for state actors to accomplish (Roberts et al. 2011; Belson 2017). Data localization laws have also become very popular in recent years in the wake of the Snowden revelations.12 Their stated aim is to safeguard data protection for citizens and corporations, mandating “that certain types of data collected in a particular country be stored and/or processed within that country” (Bowman 2015) and regulating which companies are allowed to manage these kinds of data based on whether the corporation falls under national jurisdiction. As Baur-Ahrens points out, the routing and storage requirements of such laws require “changes to the basic functioning of the underlying Internet infrastructure” (Baur-Ahrens 2017, 37). National firewalls, kill switches, and data localization laws reinforce container notions of territorial statehood. They clearly communicate territorial boundaries and openly display state control over territory. Another way of reifying the “national” territory is through country-code top-level domains (ccTLDs), such as .ru, .cn, or .de, which symbolically connect a virtual domain to a country (Mueller and Badiei 2017), although this mostly applies to larger countries. States like Tuvalu or Tonga are marketing their ccTLDs, .tv and .to, globally without reterritorializing a “national” territory in cyberspace. Nonetheless, ccTLDs have legal repercussions: domain name registries—that is, the agencies administering ccTLDs—typically mandate through their terms and conditions that registrants of a “national” domain follow national laws. Notions of cyberwar, cyberdefense, and cyber deterrence also reterritorialize cyberspace into separate state “containers.”13 First, such discourses and strategies reify certain network nodes—for example, CIR or national assets associated with military or intelligence branches of the state (Stevens 2012, 151)—as forming an integral part of a “national territory,” any attack on which is considered grounds for retaliation. Cyberwar strategists often point out the risks that hostile cyber operations can pose for infrastructure in physical space—for example, electrical grids, financial networks, or railways—thus connecting the “national cyber-territory” with the physical state territory (Warner 2012, 795–98). Second, “cyberwar” in the narrowest sense of the term is a practice conducted by states and state proxies (Lupovici 2016, 326–27). The literature is consistent in reserving this term for hostilities between states, whereas actions by/on private actors are commonly described as “cyber attacks” or “cyber operations.” Cyberwar and the state territorial container in cyberspace are mutually constitutive. This is why national security apparatuses have proclaimed cyberspace to be the “fifth domain of warfare” (after land, sea, air, and space) (Manjikian 2010, 384–88; Dunn Cavelty 2015). As a result, many countries have expanded or are expanding their cyberdefense and cyberwarfare capabilities (Fliegauf 2016, 79; Mueller 2017, 73–77). The division of “inside” and “outside” is also important in doctrinal debates about cyberdefense. In other words, should cyberdefense be solely about protecting the “territory,” or should it also include active measures (“active defense,” “hacking back”) that reach beyond the territory and deterritorialize the site of conflict? Beyond these various instruments, there are nascent, and as yet unrealized, possibilities to make cyberspace map even closer to offline geographies by revising fundamental protocols that govern the internet's functionality (Mueller 2017, 81–84). One such proposal would be to move the domain name system (DNS), which translates domain names into the numerical format that the internet protocol uses, from a global system into a system of interconnected national domain name systems, substantially increasing the scope for control by national regulators. In the words of three leading internet experts, this would create “the mother of all fragmentations” (Drake et al. 2016, 28). Beyond this reterritorialization of cyberspace into state containers, some states, given the requisite resources and power, can also create regulatory territories, which expand the reach of a state's laws and regulations in extraterritorial ways.14 The structure of cyberspace and of internet governance makes such a differentiated approach possible, even necessary. States have great control over infrastructure localized in their country but little control over global aspects of cyberspace. However, very powerful countries like the United States or coalitions like the EU can hope to make extraterritorial claims stick. Creating regulatory territories typically rests on an expansive claim to jurisdiction. Jurisdiction was and is typically assigned according to the location of a particular act or one of its constituent elements. Cyberspace has substantially complicated this line of legal reasoning because it is very easy to claim “territorial contacts and thus jurisdiction, for example, on the basis of where the server is located, where the content is viewed, where the content is uploaded, where the content is deliberately directed to, where effects are felt, etc.” (Ryngaert 2015, 63; see also Berman 2002). Absent a rule for adjudicating between jurisdiction claims, there are few legal limits on states’ claims for quasi-global regulatory territories. For instance, there is an ongoing dispute between the French Data Protection Agency (CNIL) and Google relating to the EU “Right to be Forgotten,” where the CNIL demands that Google enforce its orders to delist personal information relating to a claimant from Google's search results globally, not just for users geolocated in the EU (Daskal 2018, 214–88). This multiplicity of regulatory territories and the lack of clear rules for dispute resolution has recently sparked debates about the necessity of norms to regulate cyberspace (Svantesson 2016), especially in the fields of cyberdefense and cybersecurity (Finnemore and Hollis 2016; Schmitt 2017; Taddeo 2018). While the practical impact of these discussions has been arguably shallow, at least thus far, a norms approach is instructive for an appreciation of some deeper dynamics. Put very simply, there is an ongoing and unresolved process of norm contestation between a multistakeholder approach and a multilateral model of internet governance, much of which turns on whether extraterritorial regulatory territories are permissible. The multistakeholder approach has been the prevalent model of internet governance since the 1990s and emphasizes the inclusion of private actors in policymaking, limited influence of governments, and a decentralized architecture of the internet (Carr 2015). It is most clearly expressed by the United States and, with some variation, their Western allies. The second position is informed by ideas of cybersovereignty and argues for a more state-centric form of governance, mediated by intergovernmental organizations like the United Nations (UN) or the International Telecommunications Union (ITU). This position is championed by Russia and China, who believe that “multi-stakeholderism is a front for maintaining Western-centric dominance of this new ‘global commons’” (Lantis and Bloomberg 2018, 156) and does not respect national sovereignty (Aronczyk and Budnitsky 2017; Wei 2017; see also Warner 2012, 792–93; Maurer 2017, 50–67). This debate has been going on for more than two decades and has shaped institutional developments in internet governance. Notable sites of contestation include the United Nations General Assembly's First Committee since 1998 (Tikk-Ringas 2012), the 2003 and 2005 World Summits on the Information Society, and the annual, UN-endorsed Internet Governance Forum, inaugurated in 2006. In 2011, Russia, China, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan proposed an international code of conduct for information security to the UN General Assembly, later elaborated into a proposal to the ITU World Conference on International Telecommunications (WCIT) in 2012, that the ITU International Telecommunications Regulations treaty be amended to include the internet under its ambit. This would have given the ITU substantial authority over many aspects of internet governance. The WCIT fell apart when the two camps failed to find an agreement, prompting the United States delegates to walk out of the meeting, although some contentious issues were later resolved at the 2014 ITU Plenipotentiary Meeting. These disputes can be read as competition among “territorial projects,” with repercussions down to the level of infrastructure. The multilateralists envision a more vertically integrated internet of state territories and interstate cooperation. The multistakeholderists prefer a more open, decentralized internet, where states and private stakeholders work together. The latter position is much more comfortable with regulatory territories, whereas the former views these as encroaching on national territories (Aronczyk and Budnitsky 2017). But the opposition between these positions should not be overstated—as much as China wishes to maintain control over “its” portion of cyberspace, it is aware of the economic and commercial significance of the internet (Lantis and Bloomberg 2018, 158). This was also visible in the UN Group of Governmental Experts on Developments in the Field of Information and Telecommunications in the Context of International Security (UN GGE). Since 2004, expert groups have discussed various security-related issues regarding information and telecommunications. And even though the 2017 meeting failed acrimoniously, it should not be forgotten that the 2013 and 2015 meetings had agreed that international law, including the UN Charter, applied to cyberspace as well (Sukumar 2017) and that the use of proxies in offensive cyberoperations should be discouraged (Maurer 2017, 5). A territorialization perspective on states in cyberspace challenges the “internet fragmentation” view of states erecting hard boundaries that will inevitably destroy the internet as we know it, although these arguments are not without merit. We do see efforts to recreate “container” notions of state territories in cyberspace, but these are in tension with “extraterritorial” regulatory spaces. In contrast to narratives of states “colonizing” the cyber-frontier (Saco 1999), the reterritorialization of state territories in cyberspace is a more complex and conflictual process and does not necessarily create “hard” boundaries.

2022 Michigan Kritik
**Final Supplement – FMPS** › **Kritik Updates** › Deleuze K – 1NC Biotech Link

Biotechnology is the next site for control. The human body will be reduced to bioinformatics.

Faucher, 13 [Kane X. Faucher is a professor at University of Western Ontario, January 2013, accessed on 7-24-2022, Springer, "EX LIBRIS: A NOMAD INFORMATION SCIENCE?", https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/bbm%3A978-94-6209-428-4%2F1.pdf]/ISEE

One area of applied informatics has taken the form of what has been called bioinformatics. This burgeoning field of inquiry involves the storage and retrieval of biological data, be this identifying unique genetic markers in the individual or for security purposes in retinal identification. When it is employed for the regulation and control of individuals by state or corporate entities, the “dark side” of bioinformatics would be an outgrowth of what Michel Foucault calls “biopower,” the overall function of which is to subjugate human subjects to regulatory controls. Even beyond human subjects, bioinformatics in its connection to biotechnologies has been instrumental in the creation of new pest-resistant seeds, such as are developed by major biotech firms like Monsanto, Syngenta, et al. It is possible, with the assistance of Deleuze and Guattari’s concepts, to develop an alternative, if not nomadic, bioinformatics that recognizes what a body can do, and studies its flows rather than subjects bodies to regulatory control relying on computational processes. Although much of bioinformatics, as allied with biotechnology and genomics, starts with mathematical formulae, algorithms, and statistics to discover the simple behavioural rules at a cellular and genetic level to explain biological processes in biotic systems, a “nomadized” or “iterantized” bioinformatics would appreciate the flows and assemblages in biotic systems as being signals of expression. Would it be useful? The short answer would be no, but it is a move away from utility that uncovers the intensive qualities of the biological world. Deleuze and Guattari are rightly suspicious of any practice that takes reductionism as its starting point––be that of an atomic or genetic register––given that it may smuggle hylomorphism as the pivot around which the understanding of the world turns. It is here that we grapple with the metonymy or polysemy of the very word information and how it is applied in different contexts. In information systems theory, this is indexed on the product of data processing and the automation of processes in computing technology. This takes for granted the term of information being under the sole discretion of the technical aspects of the term which excludes from view its more philosophical or even mathematical understanding, although it seems to share more overlap with the latter with respect to a Shannon-Weaver definition. From the technical standpoint emerges the engineering approach to managing large systems, specific communication problems, and “information overload.” Again, this use of information is strictly deployed for the purposes of understanding and improving the infrastructure of “information” systems in communication technologies and the Internet. Winnowing information as a subspecies of computing technologies, researchers in informatics such as Bo Dahlbohm are quite explicit in defining the boundaries which betrays a certain technocentric perspective: To turn computers into powerful computing machines you need to know numerical methods and algorithms; to develop information systems you must master business modelling, systems design, and project organization; personal computing requires psychological theories of human-computer interaction, skills in interface design, and how to do usability studies; and to support networking you must understand human communication and cooperation, network technology and multimedia production, and the role of cyberspace as a new arena for human enterprise (1996, p. 44) When we consider the information landscape today as a process of harnessing social power through regimental ordering systems that distribute variety within constraints via radical customization, the informatic trope continues to operate in the digital Umwelt as a means of identity determination and the colonization of digital space. Moreover, informatics might actually have a considerable impact on relations between the social and data: First, these technoscientific practices and logics form discrete examples where the relationship between the body and language is reconfigured as a relationship of materiality and data/information. Secondly, this manifestation has been occurring in a socio-cultural site thoroughly enframed by the technological apparatus of computer and telecommunications based developments, contributing to the increasingly intimate conjunction of molecular science research and technological development that constitutes contemporary technoscience. (Thacker 1998) One of the main applications of bioinformatics, beyond the sequencing of genes and developing techniques for steering genetic production in harnessing genetic information, would be the direct intervention of biotechnology on plant life. What began with the discovery of DNA and the increasing power of technology, blossomed in the 1970s and boomed in the 1980s toward the manipulation of discrete genetic sequences for maximizing crop yields that could resist pests. In effect, the harnessing of genetic information toward these ends is an attempt to inscribe both the image of the molecular biologist’s intentionality and capital’s drive for utility and production at the very site of life itself. More particularly, the emergence of genetic variations through modification is an attempt to inscribe or de- and re-territorialize genetic code along capitalist decoded flows that enable older forms of capital such as the idea of private property (in the form of intellectual copyright, or what we can call the mental labour form of the property flow), and according to relative human scales that inscribe itself in biological ones. The practice of genetic modification or biotechnological engineering differs from its older cousin of selective cross-breeding in that the process for constructing something new and possibly more durable occurs directly at the level of code rather than at the level of the completed organisms placed in relation. At the genetic modification level, the versatility and options for recombination are much more varied, for it becomes possible to splice code from an amphibian with that of a tomato––something that cannot be done at the level of cross-breeding due to the breeding incompatibility of their respective biological kingdoms. As Mark Hansen notes (2000), Deleuze and Guattari’s take on evolution appears to adopt more of a neo-Darwinian approach aligned with their biophilosophy, rejecting in part Bergson’s vitalism. And yet, Deleuze and Guattari seem also to reject Darwin’s natural selection, preferring to raise selection to the level of the abstract machine. In this way, it would be a hasty mistake to impute to Deleuze and Guattari a kind of apologia for biotechnologically based genetic modification as the scene of a more profound selection given the strong relation between biotechnological engineering and capitalism in the decoding of flows and the territorialization of life according to the axiomatic of capitalism itself. We must first distinguish between three ways by which new organisms are produced: 1. By mutations that are not directly aided by human intervention, 2. Selective breeding, and, 3. Direct genetic alteration. Mutations in species can occur partially as a result (or answer to) an environmental problem, such as the development of the frog’s tongue to catch flies, or the adaptation to changing climates and interspecies conditions of competition (what can be called perplication). This may be explained in Deleuzean terms as analogous to the “natural selection” of singularities that form assemblages from the ideal line of matter-movement, their temporary assemblage as a perplication whereby the accidents of contingent reason are what condition and resolve the problemata. They may also occur on the basis of more internal and possibly spontaneous arrangements, such as copying fidelity error from one gene sequence to another. A more invasive procedure emerged due to scientific advancements linked to the discovery of DNA: genetic modification. No longer simply a matter of selective breeding of a single or related species, geneticists could perform their changes directly to the genetic code itself, thus making it possible to cross previous boundaries so that, for example, partial code sequences of a frog’s skin could be grafted unto the code of a tomato’s skin. However, it also implicitly endorses fragmentation of the body, or true organ-ization. When Deleuze and Guattari speak of becoming-other, or the person becomingdog, they are not speaking literally, but in terms of what assists in articulating the very traits of the individual in a process of individuation as rooted in a nonhylomorphic understanding of form and content and the double articulation that takes place in terms of content and expression as a relative line. However, the connections that can be drawn between how Deleuze and Guattari define the rhizome seem to uncomfortably apply to genetic modification insofar as here we are presented with radical connectivity between codes, and a crossing over of signification regimes that in effect designify stable relations to allow the new to emerge. But that is only surface resemblance. What we are presented with is the convergence of neoliberal capital and cybernetics inspired control mechanisms making use of the very technical instruments designed for control and modulation frameworks as applied to the combinatory potentials of genetics in the form of biotechnologies. The distribution of genetic modification activities in large scale agriculture, or agri-business, are now assigned by those whose actions control the possibilities that can be harnessed and exploited in the genetic laboratory. The plant is thus deterritorialized from the field, the gene from its sequence, the farmer from the farming function as dequalified labour. The construction of new patterns in genetic territory are expanded at the macro scale, encompassing now corporatized arable lands for the cultivation of these patterns made manifest in a range of products. Nature itself is not so much “created anew” through selective breeding and natural selection as it is modulated according to predetermined outcomes, and corrective feedback is conducted in a variety of ways to ensure maximum yields of resistant strains, and to engage an apparatus of both political influence lobbying to ensure compliance with the genetic modification mission, and litigation against those farmers who would assert any autonomy with respect to their own seeds or in any way challenge the effects of genetic drift and transgene escape. In this way, despite the heavy emphasis on free modulation, biotech corporations like Monsanto or Syngenta still have recourse to disciplinary structures such as the State and its laws, and in some cases can easily outmaneuver the law by continuing to violate laws that stipulate that GM crops cannot be planted within a defined distance of certified organic crops.

2022 Michigan Kritik
**Final Supplement – FMPS** › **Kritik Updates** › Security K AT: Global Cooperation

No uniqueness---the western led liberal order has completely and utterly failed to facilitate global cooperation over anything

Robert J. Lieber 14. Professor, Department of Government, Georgetown University, “The Rise of the BRICS and American primacy,” International Politics, Vol. 51, p. 137-154

Skepticism about the BRICS and the momentum assumed by liberal internationalists has not been scarce.6 Realist scholars have understandably been critical of the assumptions underlying these approaches as well as of the foreign policy choices they imply. However, other scholars too have found increasing reason for criticism. For example, Barma et al (2013, p. 56) have recently observed that, ‘Instead of a gradual trend toward global problem solving punctuated by isolated failures, we have seen over the last several years essentially the opposite: stunningly few instances of international cooperation on significant issues’. Moreover, Patrick (2010, p. 44) of the Council on Foreign Relations has cautioned that, ‘The United States should be under no illusions about the ease of socializing rising nations. Emerging powers may be clamoring for greater global influence, but they often oppose the political and economic ground rules of the inherited Western liberal order, seek to transform existing multilateral arrangements, and shy away from assuming significant global responsibilities’. In this regard, Laidi has argued that despite their own heterogeneity, the BRICS actually share a common objective in opposing Western liberal internationalist narratives that run counter to traditional state sovereignty. Instead, they seek to protect their own prerogatives, independence of action and national autonomy in an increasingly interdependent world (Laidi, 2012, pp. 614–615).

2022 Michigan Kritik
**Final Supplement – FMPS** › **Kritik Updates** › Security K AT: But Nukes!

Nukes can be safely dismantled and repurposed.

Benjamin Plackett 19, science journalist, 2/8/2019, “The Science of Dismantling a Nuclear Bomb,” https://www.insidescience.org/news/science-dismantling-nuclear-bomb

What do you do with the leftover uranium or plutonium? Once the weapon has been taken apart, the process of dealing with what’s left is identical for both the older and the more sophisticated bombs. “When the great powers decided to reduce their stockpiles, we were left with fairly substantial quantities of plutonium,” said Rosner. “So, what do you do?” One obvious answer is to repurpose the radioactive material -- either plutonium or uranium -- to produce electricity. To make it suitable for a power plant, the material needs to be diluted with less enriched versions. "There are no power reactors anywhere in the world that are designed to deal with weapons-grade material,” said Plant. “You have to down-blend it before you can turn it into fuel.” But that isn’t what actually happens to most of the radioactive material. “It’s not always economically viable. It can be cheaper to enrich new material than it is to downgrade it and repurpose it,” said Rosner. “Shipping plutonium or uranium all over the place from storage to reactor isn’t popular either.” “Mostly it’s just stuck in storage facilities,” said Rosner. Decommissioning the radioactive waste and keeping it safe is a science in its own right. The extracted uranium or plutonium will contain different isotopes -- variants of themselves that have different atomic masses, which means their radioactivity decays at different rates. The highly radioactive isotopes have short half-lives, which means they decay much faster than the less radioactive ones, and that creates a lot of heat. “The material has to be put in water pools for about half a decade to cool the rods while they decay,” said Rosner. “Then you’re left with relatively low-level waste that’s less radioactive.”

2022 Michigan Kritik
**Final Supplement – FMPS** › **Kritik Updates** › Security K – AT: Realism

Realism makes war structurally inevitable. Only a fundamental shift in thinking patterns solves.

Andrew Robinson 10, political theorist and activist based in the UK, 8/6/10, “In Theory Anarchism, war and the state,” , Stras

In response to a common misconception, it is not true that anarchists oppose the state because they are naïve about human nature. Anarchist views about human nature are widely variant. Objections to the state can be convincing based on many different views, such as distrusting people to hold too much power without abusing it. Statists might be said to have a dual conception of human nature: the good people are trusted with excessive power so as to disempower the bad people. Statism is thus associated with hierarchical differentiations of people. Further, the objection is not simply to states as institutions but to state-like ways of relating and acting: in some accounts, the state is a social relation. In anarchist theory, states are viewed as expressions of hierarchical, oppressive social logics. They are forces of decomposition, which tend to attack or break down alternative, horizontal social relations. They are also based on ‘reactive’ emotional forces of suspicion, hatred and aggression which they channel to produce warlike relations among people. They also turn on one another, accumulating wealth by pillaging other states or societies. Against such state violence, anarchist strategies often seek to find or form focal-points for social power which can counterbalance or draw energies away from state power. These focal-points necessarily involve living and acting in non-militarist, non-authoritarian ways.

In Statism and Anarchy, Bakunin portrays the modern state as primarily military, and closely connected to the ruling class. As a military force, the state is necessarily aggressive, competing with other states for power. It produces moral and intellectual decay through its corrupting power. The extent of this decay depends on the extent to which the state’s way of thinking filters down through society, a process which is strongest in the most militaristic states. The ‘people’, primarily meaning the excluded and powerless, are for Bakunin a potential counterpoint to the state, and can destroy it in insurrection.

2022 Michigan Kritik
**Final Supplement – FMPS** › **Kritik Updates** › Security K AT: Squo Solves/AFF good

The system is unsustainable

Rana Dasgupta 18, Distinguished Visiting Lecturer at Brown, 4/5/2018, “The demise of the nation state,” https://www.theguardian.com/news/2018/apr/05/demise-of-the-nation-state-rana-dasgupta

What is happening to national politics? Every day in the US, events further exceed the imaginations of absurdist novelists and comedians; politics in the UK still shows few signs of recovery after the “national nervous breakdown” of Brexit. France “narrowly escaped a heart attack” in last year’s elections, but the country’s leading daily feels this has done little to alter the “accelerated decomposition” of the political system. In neighbouring Spain, El País goes so far as to say that “the rule of law, the democratic system and even the market economy are in doubt”; in Italy, “the collapse of the establishment” in the March elections has even brought talk of a “barbarian arrival”, as if Rome were falling once again. In Germany, meanwhile, neo-fascists are preparing to take up their role as official opposition, introducing anxious volatility into the bastion of European stability.

But the convulsions in national politics are not confined to the west. Exhaustion, hopelessness, the dwindling effectiveness of old ways: these are the themes of politics all across the world. This is why energetic authoritarian “solutions” are currently so popular: distraction by war (Russia, Turkey); ethno-religious “purification” (India, Hungary, Myanmar); the magnification of presidential powers and the corresponding abandonment of civil rights and the rule of law (China, Rwanda, Venezuela, Thailand, the Philippines and many more).

2022 Michigan Kritik
**Final Supplement – FMPS** › **Kritik Updates** › Security K – AT: Perm

It causes bloodshed

Springer et al. 12. Simon Springer, professor of geography at the University of Victoria (Canada), Anthony Ince, professor of geographical and earth sciences at the University of Glasgow, Jenny Pickerill, professor of geography the University of Leicester (UK), Gavin Brown, professor of geography the University of Leicester (UK), and Adam J. Barker, professor of geography the University of Leicester (UK), “Reanimating Anarchist Geographies: A New Burst of Colour,” Antipode Vol. 44 No. 5 2012 pg. 1598

Social transformation is, of course, necessarily a spatial project, and a spatial dimension to the effective critique of existing structures is an important element of imagining and forging spaces for new ones. Accordingly, we remain deeply cynical of those ostensibly “radical” views that leave the prescriptions and authority of the state firmly intact. Without appreciating the infinite possibilities that actually exist if we only had the collective courage and freedom to explore them, we are left with an all too limited vision of the geographical horizons of human organization. We must similarly remain attentive to the idea that adaptations and abuses of state power are intrinsic not only to neoliberalism and capitalism more generally (Peck 2001), but also to Marxism in its traditional sense. In the face of the sheer enormity of the bloodshed that came with communist projects in the former Soviet Union, Maoist China, and Pol Pot’s Cambodia, and the conflict, othering, and violence that is facilitated by a Westphalian system of sovereign rule, we long for and are actively committed to procuring alternative socio-spatial arrangements wherein people are liberated from all forms of domination and are free to collectively make of themselves what they will. While we are keen to critique Marxist-Leninism in all its various guises, we acknowledge that there are heterodox Marxists working with more autonomist and libertarian ideas that share similar concerns and are far less antithetical to anarchist approaches. At the same time, we recognize that it is incorrect to suggest— as post-left anarchists like Fredy Perlman (1983) have argued—that if we simply choose to act differently then society will magically transform into a post-capitalist, post-statist world. Anarchist thinkers have long interrogated complex matrices of control and surveillance, highlighting the ways in which the agents of state and capital converge to produce powerful regimes of containment or straightforward obliteration of their political opponents (Graham 2005, 2009; Gue ́rin 2005; Marshall 1992; Woodcock 2004). Indeed, Daniel Gue ́rin’s (2010 [1936]) careful tracing of the synergies between the rise of European fascism in the 1930s and the organizational and disciplinary logic of the capitalist state can be read as a powerful warning from history in the current context of recession, unrest, and the re-emergence of the far right.

Thus, anarchist approaches to understanding and acting in society operate in a tension between an assertion of peoples’ agency to collectively self-manage their affairs on the one hand, and the everyday matrices of power that constrain autonomy, solidarity and equality on the other. However, anarchism is also a philosophy that is healthily sceptical of analysis for its own sake, and combines its powerful critique of capital and authority with a creative and decentralized mode of praxis. So while we recognize the importance of utopian thought, we are not content to dwell exclusively in the realm of ideas, and advocate for the importance of direct action in changing for the better the material conditions of our own lives as well as the lives of others (Graeber 2009). Notwithstanding the now-cliche ́d refrain that anarchists were at the creative centre of the movements against neoliberal globalisation around the turn of the twenty-first century, anarchist thought and action has profoundly influenced contemporary society in a much more long-term and subcutaneous sense. The proliferation of wikis, peer-to-peer file-sharing and open-source software; the continued popularity of the co-operative movement, tenants’ associations and trade and credit unions; and a host of small- scale mutual aid groups, networks and initiatives—these have, all to varying extents, been pioneered, inspired or run by anarchists. Our perception of anarchism’s role in the world is, however, in direct proportion to our understanding of what anarchism is and where (or how) it takes place. Although at times it may appear that anarchism is chiefly (or solely) manifested in occasional spectacular riots on the streets of Athens, Prague, London and Seattle, papers in this special issue indicate that anarchism is a philosophy of everyday life, ingrained in its practitioners as a tool for survival, wellbeing and social change. It is worth noting that, perhaps precisely due to the legacy of Reclus and Kropotkin, anarchist geographers have tended to shy away from engaging with the more insurrectionary approaches to anarchism, where instead anarchism has been understood as a living breathing process that is acutely implicated in our shared histories, our present circumstances, and our collective futures. In this special issue, a broad understanding of anarchism is deployed to demonstrate how it—much like other political philosophies—is a multi-vocal and developing terrain, contested both from within and without.