The fantasy of Krauthammer’s discourse differs notably from fantasies offered by neoconservatives at other times. In one sense, this is to be expected. Different times and issues call for different arguments. Yet many observers note that since the beginning of the movement during the 1970s, one fairly consistent quality of neoconservatism is the ever-present sense of doom just around the corner and national choices that are always starkly dichotomous. As Bacevich (2005: 77) wryly observes, “On the one hand—if the nation disregards the neoconservative call to action—there is the abyss. On the other hand—if the nation heeds that call—the possibility of salvation exists.” Krauthammer’s text displays many of the usual neoconservative precepts, such as the primacy of military power and the idea that American global hegemony is benevolent and beneficial for non-Americans. The key tension in Krauthammer’s text, though, is that the notion of “chaos” lurking close-by conflicts with the major thrust of the message of unipolarity. We can understand the role of desire in the discourse through this tension. Rather than constructing a subject of lack, Krauthammer’s discourse largely constructs a subject much closer to fullness. This, in turn, does not evoke desire for identification but instead kills desire for identification. Desire (as understood here) is coextensive with lack (Fink 1995: 54). To exist as a subject, one must desire. Lack evokes desire, desire drives identification, and only through identification with the social resources of the Symbolic can subjects gain the recognition they need to achieve a sense of stability and security. Krauthammer’s discourse presumably does not spark much desire because the subject it produces is, strictly speaking, not lacking all that much. As the unipolar power—or, as the subject “America” is constructed through the fantasy of being a unipolar power—Krauthammer’s discourse includes little desire for something else that might make the subject feel more secure or more stable. As the unipolar power, the subject “America” already seems quite close to the wholeness of enjoyment in terms of a world of American-imposed rules. Now that the Cold War is over, and now that the only other superpower that remotely had the capability to impose its own global rules is no more, the obstacles to the subject’s enjoyment have largely been removed. Yet the effect of this subject formation on a receiving audience—in terms of an audience “being positioned (or having existing positionings reinforced) as complex subjects” (Fairclough 1992: 135)—depends on the workings of desire. Once the subject approaches the object it believes it desires, desire for that specific object paradoxically begins to fade. If one were to find the Thing that would truly make one whole, desire would die, and subjectivity would evaporate. The ultimate contingency of our desire and identifications would set in, and one would cease to be a desiring subject. As Lacan (1998: 111) argues, “‘That’s not it’ is the very cry by which the jouissance obtained is distinguished from the jouissance expected” when one approaches the perceived missing object. Desire is sustained by not reaching the missing object: “The satisfaction of desire essentially consists of the preservation of its own unsatisfaction, since a subject remains a subject only insofar as . . . he is a desiring lack-of-being that wants-to-be” (Chiesa 2007: 155; see also Fink 1995: 103). That is, the closer the subject gets to enjoyment, the more desire fades and the more anxiety sets in, since only through desire do we have subjectivity, and therefore the more desiring the subject becomes.5 Indeed, fantasy’s purpose is to ward off anxiety and contingency: This way enjoyment is kept at a “healthy” distance, not too far but not too close either; close enough to support the appeal of an object of identification but far enough from letting us entertain the vision of full satisfaction as an imminent possibility—something that would kill desire, induce anxiety, and put identification processes in danger. (Stavrakakis 2007: 198) Although Krauthammer’s message of unipolarity constructs a discursive subject not lacking all that much, thus evoking less desire for identification with it than might otherwise be the case, the fantasy of the “unipolar moment” was not completely without lack. This is expressed a few ways in the discourse. First, we can understand the place of object a in this fantasy as the lack of an American-dominated world, toward which Krauthammer—and the subject his discourse constructs—is oriented throughout the text. While the international system is, in Krauthammer’s view, undoubtedly unipolar, it is not unipolar to the extent that every other state or actor willingly submits to an American-imposed order. “Weapon States” are some of the few states mentioned at all in the text, presumably because they are the outlaws that do not conform to post–Cold War order as defined by the United States. North Korea, Iraq, Libya, Argentina, Pakistan, Iran, and South Africa all pose blockages to American/global order through their possession (at the time) of weapons of mass destruction, even though some of these states were more threatening than others. The obstacle that these few states pose to a truly unipolar world—where “we” no longer must “hope for safety” but can seemingly achieve complete safety—evokes desire to remove them as obstacles to the fantasy of enjoyment. Desire is constructed as pushing toward that elusive object believed to bring the enjoyment of being a complete subject— here, understood as an American-centered world with American-imposed global rules. Although this object is unattainable (since it is but a Symbolic manifestation of a void), the subject’s fantasy allows it to believe that this object is attainable. An absolutely American-dominated global system—a full subject—is indeed presupposed to exist were it not for these few states that pose an obstacle. Krauthammer’s entire discourse guides the audience to believe that a truly American-centered world is entirely plausible and desirable, yet this object of desire that promises enjoyment does not exist. Not merely the social construction of threat, Krauthammer’s production of “Weapon States” hinges on the movements of desire and enjoyment that make possible Self-Other relations. The construction of these threats is in one sense, as many international relations (IR) identity theories would contend, the production of a hierarchy of “identities” in which America is differentiated from those states that are not America or the new American unipolar world (see Weldes 1999). “Weapon States” here constitute the opposing side of a binary between those states that are members of and are perceived to openly welcome the new American world, and those states that are not “us.” Yet in contrast to such approaches, more than just the presence of these Others poses an obvious threat to “us.” Consequently, it is not enough merely to make explicit the binary construction of identities. As Slavoj Žižek (1993: 206) contends, “It is not sufficient to point out how the . . . Other presents a threat to our identity. We should rather inverse this proposition: the fascinating image of the Other gives a body to our own innermost split, to what is ‘in us more than ourselves’ and thus prevents us from achieving full identity with ourselves.” In other words, the construction of the subject through reference to an Other—the construction of “America” through reference to “Weapon States”—is premised on a frustration of the “American” subject of the discourse. The fully enjoying subject is an impossible project, and “America” and a completely American-dominated global system are likewise impossible projects, since no social entity can fully construct itself. The discursive production of “Weapon States” “gives a body,” in Žižek’s words, to the ultimate frustration and incompleteness of the subject in Krauthammer’s discourse. These movements of frustration and desire for a full subject give rise to the construction of fantasies of Self and Other in Krauthammer’s discourse. This process involves the notion that fantasies often presume that Others “steal our enjoyment” (Žižek 1997). This subtly appears several times in Krauthammer’s discourse. Although “we” are without a doubt the only superpower, Krauthammer (1990–91: 29) asserts that “there will constantly be new threats disturbing our peace.” Global stability is “our” stability, since American domination is (again) good, necessary, and vital if “chaos” is to be avoided. “Weapon States” that “brandish” their weapons must be policed to alleviate the threat they pose, and the rise of “intolerant aggressive nationalisms in a disintegrating communist bloc” can be read as moments of fantasy blockages in which the Other is doing something “we” should be doing. One gets the sense that as the lone superpower, America alone should have the right to “brandish” its weapons of mass destruction—for example, in “unabashedly laying down the rules of world order.” One also gets the sense that the potential rise of “aggressive intolerant nationalisms” poses a blockage to the desiring American subject because America itself should have the sole right to engage in the behaviors engendered by such forces. Krauthammer’s entire discourse is constructed around the idea that America should aggressively promote its own ideas for how the world should be organized and policed and that no other entity has the ability or license to do so. America alone should dominate the world, and for Krauthammer, America should be intolerant of anyone else attempting to preempt this new opportunity, for this is the road to “chaos.” America possesses the “strength and will” that the rest of the world does not, and thus America rightfully should exercise those qualities to the benefit of all. Others’ “aggressive intolerant nationalisms” are threatening and not to be tolerated, but American aggressive and nationalistic expansion are to be welcomed. American nationalist-driven internationalism is beneficial for the world, while other nationalisms are threatening. This illustrates the notion that constructions of Self and Other are underpinned by desire and enjoyment—or, rather, the perceived theft of enjoyment by others. “What we gain,” Žižek (1993: 206) contends, “by trans- posing the perception of inherent social antagonisms into the fascination with the Other . . . is the fantasy-organization of desire.” Through Krauthammer’s production of threats, one sees the fascination exhibited by what others are doing, the enjoyment that they are displaying, and how “they” are in a sense stealing the enjoyment that “we” should be having and are lacking. The “fullness” that they seem to attain in their enjoyment is perceived as precisely the Thing that “we” seem to be missing. “America” is lacking in some sense, and the Thing it lacks is the very Thing that “Weapon States” brandish openly. Moreover, there is the worry that isolationism keeps “America” from being fully itself. Indeed, if this revival spreads, an American “collapse to second-rank status will not be for foreign but for domestic reasons,” such as the country’s “insatiable desire for yet higher standards of living without paying any of the cost” (Krauthammer 1990–91: 26–27). Krauthammer’s fears of isolationism relate to the “strength and will” of which he speaks in closing his essay. Yet the manner in which isolationists, in Krauthammer’s view, define the national interest goes against America’s true national interests, which extend beyond the narrow confines of the nation’s borders. America should “unashamedly” lay down its own rules for global order, since the world’s interests coincide with American interests (33). Although isolationism may indeed be an old theme of American foreign policy, it is simply out of place in a unipolar world, which by definition must be dominated by the unipolar power. “Isolationism” in this sense weakens precisely the part of the American subject that must be utilized in imposing and enforcing world order. Krauthammer’s emphasis on the necessity of “American strength and will” for world security points to qualities that the subject “America” needs to have, in some sense has, but in another sense does not have. In other words, “strength and will” are a part of the subject that is missing but that is needed so that the subject can fully become its own image of itself. These characteristics are foremost uniquely American. The rest of the world cannot act without America leading the way, since “where the United States does not tread, the alliance will not follow” (24). The rest of the world lacks the “strength and will” needed to define and carry out global order. In a sense, however, so does the United States. As the unipolar power, America without a doubt has a great deal more “strength and will” than any other power. Yet given a resurgent domestic “isolationism” and other potential “domestic” problems, the United States does not yet have the “strength and will” necessary to fully embrace its global role. The subject is lacking some- thing that is posited as having faithfully served it in the past but that it has lost exactly when it needs it the most. What precisely Krauthammer means by “strength and will” is left undefined, yet their meaning could be filled in any number of ways. This lack of definition—indeed, the impossibility of fully defining what they mean—enables them to function as signifiers covering the subject’s lack in the fantasy. “Strength and will” function as the Symbolic stand-ins for what the subject “America” currently lacks the full force of, yet in some sense they remain a part of the subject. They may have been temporarily or partly lost during the current isolationist revival, but they are still a missing part of the subject that must be rediscovered if “America” is going to more fully step into its proper role as global leader. The partial enjoyment implied in both of these aspects—in the just-out-of-reach image of an American dominated global system and the “strength and will” that is both present in and absent from the subject—sparks the desire for their pursuit. In the fantasy of the “unipolar moment,” the subject “America” seeks the perceived to-be-missing parts of itself that it believes will bring it the enjoyment it seeks, yet the fantasy posits obstacles to explain why enjoyment is not forthcoming and why desire remains frustrated. Although figures such as “Weapon States” are posited as blocking the culmination and stabilization of the subject, these figures merely Symbolically cover over the ambiguity, divisions, and frustrations that are inherent to subject formation itself. Even though the signifier “isolationism” is offered for why our “strength and will” have not been delivered, this of course does not mean that “strength and will” would automatically be forthcoming if “isolationism” were to subside. “Strength and will” do not represent anything but the lack of what the subject is constructed as needing to pursue the image of fullness (an Americandominated world), itself an illusory object projected by the fantasy to pursue enjoyment. However, the desires evoked by the fantasy are very much in tension with the overall tenor of Krauthammer’s discourse. Again, as the subject “America” constructed as the sole superpower, there is not much to desire in Krauthammer’s text for another object that might alleviate the ambiguities of subjectivity. As the sole unipolar power, the collective subject is already close to enjoyment in terms of a world shaped by American-imposed rules. However, when the subject approaches the object it desires, desire itself starts to fade. If one were to find the Thing that would truly make one whole, desire would die, and subjectivity would evaporate. The desires evoked by the fantasy ob- stacles posed and the evaporation of desire the closer it approaches the enjoyment seemingly promised are in tension in Krauthammer’s discourse. In other words, there is not much distance between the subject and the missing object, yet this distance is necessary to maintain desire. The subject in Krauthammer’s discourse (and implicitly projected to an audience) in fact helps to dissolve desire rather than evoking the desire for identification. In closing in on a truly American-centered world, the desire for identification with the subject of this discourse (“America,” the “United States”) induces a kind of dissatisfaction because it comes too close to the object(s) of desire. Without desire, there is no subject, and here the subject is close to fulfilling its desire. In terms of its efficacy or resonance, then, it presumably it fails to spark desires for identification. If the United States now sits astride the globe with relatively little to fear from other great powers, what is left to desire?