Free beta access. 50 free AI tokens each week. Optional top-ups available. See what is included
Open evidence library

Search the archive.

Current and older evidence is free during beta. Sign in for unlimited card access and full source downloads.

Matching cards
2022 Michigan Kritik
**Final Supplement – FMPS** › **Kritik Updates** › Security K – AT: Perm

The perm fails

Simon Springer 12, professor of geography at the University of Victoria, “Anarchism! Or What Geography Ought To Be,” Antipode Vol. 44(5) pg. 1613

That radical geography retains a decidedly statist focus perhaps also betrays the colonial origins of the discipline itself and a hesitation in breaking from old disciplining habits. Yet the contemporary nation-state, following Anderson (1991) and Billig (1995), must be understood as a smaller-scale replica of the colonial state. Although differing in their diffusion and distribution across space, both national and colonial state power express the same violent principles of a privileged few wielding influence over others, and imposing a singular identity upon antecedent ways of imagining belonging. Marx was not oblivious to this critique, yet here again he advanced a utilitarian ideal. As capitalism spread around the globe, it gave rise to powerful resistance movements by oppressed workers and peasants—led by vanguards—which Marx believed would eventually engender the transcendence of capitalism. In particular instances Marx supported nationalist struggles, viewing nationalism as another “stage in development” towards a future workers’ internationalism (Lewis 2000). Yet from an anarchist perspective it is hard to see the emancipatory end when the means are shot through with violence. What “national liberation” actually represents is the trading of one set of elites for another, and thus one form of colonialism for another. While the territorial expression has been scaled down, the underlying logic remains unchanged. Just as the colonial state sought and was frequently able to impose a monopoly on violence, the struggle to create the nation-state is likewise a struggle for the monopoly of violence (Harris 2004). What is created in both instances—a colonial or national state— is itself a means of violence. In recognizing this congruency—notwithstanding Hart’s (2008:680) so-called “properly post-colonial frame of understanding” that continues to privilege the state—to be “post-colonial” in any meaningful sense is to also be “post-statist” or anarchic, wherein the hierarchies, order, authority, and violence upon which these parallel state projects have been built are rejected outright. Moreover, internationalism by definition can never actually transcend the state; instead it continues to presuppose and assume nations. By calling for trans- geographical co-operation between nations, Marx’s internationalism fails to move beyond the notion of the nation-state as the foundational unit of belonging. Why then has contemporary radical geography not developed an “anti-colonial imagination” that rises to the post-statist challenge that Anderson (2005) argues such a vision actually demands? Reclus and Kropotkin demonstrated long ago that geography lends itself well to emancipatory ideas, and “it was no accident that two of the major anarchists of the late Nineteenth Century were also geographers” (Ward 2010:209). There exists an extraordinary latent potential within contemporary radical geography to become even more radical in its critiques, and thus more liberationist in its focus by embracing an anarchist ethos. Anarchism is able to recognize capitalism, imperialism, colonialism, neoliberalism, militarism, nationalism, classism, racism, ethnocentrism, Orientalism, sexism, genderism, ageism, ableism, speciesism, carnism, homophobia, transphobia, sovereignty and the state as interlocking systems of domination. The mutually reinforcing composition of these various dimensions of “archy” consequently means that to uncritically exempt one from interrogation, is to perpetuate this omnicidal conglomeration as a whole. Unlike the circumscriptions of Marxian geography, the promise of anarchist geographies rests precisely in their ability to think integrally and therein refuse to assign priority to any one of the multiple dominating apparatuses, as all are irreducible to one another (Brown 1996). This means that no one struggle can wait on any other. It’s all or nothing, and the a priori privilege of the workers, the vanguards, or any other class over others is to be rejected on the basis of its incipient hierarchy.

2022 Michigan Kritik
**Final Supplement – FMPS** › **Kritik Updates** › Security K – FW

“Fair rules” are a bureaucratic utopia that reinforces state surveillance and stifles creativity.

David Graeber 15, arguably the most important anthropologist of the 21st century, American-born, London-based anthropologist and anarchist activist, leading figure in Occupy Wall Street credited with coining the phrase “We are the 99 Percent,” assistant professor and associate professor of anthropology at Yale from 1998–2007, “The Utopia of Rules, or Why We Really Love Bureaucracy After All,” Ch. 3 of The Utopia of Rules: On Technology, Stupidity, and the Secret Joys of Bureaucracy, p. 201–205,

Over the last thirty or forty years, anti-authoritarians around the world have been working on creating new, and more effective, modes of direct democracy—ones that might operate without any need for a bureaucracy of violence to enforce them. I’ve written about these efforts extensively elsewhere. A lot of progress has been made. But those working on such projects often find themselves having to deal with exactly this sort of horror of “arbitrary” power. Part of the work of developing new forms of consensus process, for example, is to create institutional forms that encourage, rather than inhibit, improvisation and creativity. As activists sometimes put it: in most circumstances, if you bring together a crowd of people, that crowd will, as a group, behave less intelligently, and less creatively, than any single member of the crowd is likely to do if on their own. Activist decision-making process is, instead, designed to make that crowd smarter and more imaginative than any individual participant.

It is indeed possible to do this, but it takes a lot of work. And the larger the group, the more formal mechanisms have to be put in place. The single most important essay in this whole activist tradition is called “The Tyranny of Structurelessness,”170 written in the 1970s by Jo Freeman, about organizational crises that occurred in early feminist consciousness-raising circles when those groups began to attain a certain size. Freeman observed that such groups always started out with a kind of rough-and-ready anarchism, an assumption that there was no need for any formal, parliamentary rules-of-order type mechanisms at all. People would just sit down in a sisterly manner and work things out. And this was, indeed, what happened at first. However, as soon as the groups grew to over, say, twenty people, informal cliques invariably began to emerge, and small groups of friends or allies began controlling information, setting agendas, and wielding power in all sorts of subtle ways. Freeman proposed a number of different formal mechanisms that might be employed to counteract this effect, but for present purposes, the specifics don’t really matter. Suffice it to say that what is now referred to as “formal consensus process” largely emerges from the crisis Freeman described, and the debate her intervention set off.

2022 Michigan Kritik
**Final Supplement – FMPS** › **Kritik Updates** › Security K – Anarchy Alt

Voluntary agreements solve all relevant concerns

Springer, 17—University of Victoria (Simon, “The limits to Marx: David Harvey and the condition of postfraternity,” Dialogues in Human Geography 2017, Vol. 7(3) 280–294, dml)

Stretching the horizontal vision: Federation beyond hierarchy and authority Life already shows in which direction the change will be made. Not in increasing the powers of the State, but in resorting to free organization and free federation in all those branches which are now considered as attributes of the State. —Peter Kropotkin (2002 [1887]: 68–69) The second major claim that Harvey draws from Barcelona is that anarchism lacks the ability ‘to stretch the vision of political activism from local to far broader geographical scales’ (2017: 242). Harvey means to warn us of what he elsewhere refers to as the ‘fetishism of organizational preference’ (2012a: 7), which he assumes to be a mistaken prioritization of the method of organizing over its desired outcome. To Harvey, such a prefigurative politics, which is the here and now of anarchism (Ince, 2012; Springer, 2012), supposedly prevents anarchists from being able to plan major infrastructures, manage environmental concerns, or service transport and communication networks. Of course, I already provide a partial answer to this in my original essay (Springer, 2014d), where I point to Colin Ward’s (2004) example of postal services functioning not through a central world authority, but via voluntary agreements. Kropotkin (2002 [1887]) makes the same point with respect to the independent federation of European railways in his time. Harvey attempts to preempt being called out on the inaccuracy of his claim by stating that ‘anarchist town planners (including Bookchin) understood this problem but their work is largely ignored within the anarchist movement’ (2017: 242–3). To say this work is overlooked only reveals Harvey’s limited knowledge of the literature and the scant attention he pays to anarchist writings, and particularly to anarchosyndicalism, anarchism’s oldest answer to industrial relations wherein worker-managed production systems are networked into a stateless socialist society (Rocker, 2004 [1938]; Solidarity Federation, 2012). Harvey knows of Bookchin’s libertarian municipalism, but he doesn’t take it seriously. Demonstrating the depths of his state-centric imagination, he lampoons it by saying ‘if it looks like a state, and feels like a state, and quacks like a state, then it’s a state’ (Harvey, 2012c: n.p.). Elsewhere, he suggests Bookchin’s idea about assemblies is ‘well worth elaborating as part of a radical anti-capitalist agenda’ (Harvey, 2012a: 85), yet instead of actually doing so, Harvey falls back on a centralization argument, where the state takes center stage. Perhaps the most confounding statement in Harvey’s entire essay is that the dialectic between decentralization and centralization is one of the most important contradictions within capital ... and I wish all those, like Springer, who advocate decentralization as if it is an unalloyed good would look more closely at its consequences and contradictions. Given that I dedicate an entire essay to this exact question (Springer, 2014b), it’s unfortunate that Harvey asks me to listen when he clearly doesn’t do so himself. Far from treating decentralization as a pure virtue, I attempt to work through what a progressive, anarchist view of decentralized horizontalism actually means. In the process, I identify the contradictions that lurk within Harvey’s hierarchical political outlook, arguing that he ‘poisons the well of decentralization by pre-emptively refusing its possibilities and positioning every movement towards a more autonomous political arrangement as a device that somehow necessarily greases the rails for a neoliberal future’ (Springer, 2014b: 403). Harvey dismisses anarchism’s coupling of decentralization with anti-capitalism precisely because Marxism cannot accommodate prefigurative politics, treating horizontality as a charming, but ultimately limited if not futile, distraction from realizing the bigger revolutionary picture. Horizontalism is consequently positioned as something that might happen after the promised great withering of the state, and so we can see plainly that the ‘stages of history’ is not a caricature, but an unacknowledged specter that continues to haunt the Marxist project. Failing to understand this particular limit to Marxism, Harvey invokes the idea that ‘it is difficult if not impossible ... to take consensual horizontality to much larger scales’ and that it is impossible to proceed without setting up ‘confederal’ or ‘nested’ (which means inevitably hierarchical in my view but then this too may just be semantics) structures of decision-making that entail[s] serious adjustments in organized thinking as well as forms of institutionalized governance. (2017: 248) I’ve already offered a lengthy response, where I make clear that the relationship between scale and hierarchy is not mere semantics (Springer, 2014b), yet Harvey is content to ignore the whole critique of the scalar imagination and the emancipatory politics that flow from a flat ontology (Marston et al., 2005; Woodward et al., 2012). To Harvey it would seem that a caricature of authority is a better reply than thinking through how a rhizomic politics can indeed ‘stretch the vision of political activism’ (2017: 242), and how it does so without resorting to the hierarchical politics that are necessarily implied by scalar thinking. Federalism is, of course, the long-standing anarchist answer to hierarchy (Proudhon, 1980 [1863]; Ward, 2011), yet Harvey apparently can’t be bothered to work through their differences. Instead of a serious discussion of authority, we get nuggets like I certainly would not welcome a pilot landing at JFK proclaiming that as a good anarchist she does not accept the legitimacy of the air traffic controllers’ authority and that she proposes to disregard all aviation rules in the landing process. (Harvey, 2017: 239) While Harvey assumes he has stumbled upon the ultimate trump card, he simply confuses specialist knowledge with authority. This is a question that Bakunin (2010 [1882]: 24) answered long ago when he wrote: In the matter of boots, I refer to the authority of the bootmaker; concerning houses, canals, or railroads, I consult that of the architect or the engineer. For such or such special knowledge I apply to such or such a savant. But I allow neither the bootmaker nor the architect nor savant to impose his authority upon me. I listen to them freely and with all the respect merited by their intelligence, their character, their knowledge, reserving always my incontestable right of criticism and censure. This isn’t good enough for Harvey though, and he routinely ridicules horizontal organization, using extreme examples like nuclear power plants and air traffic control to make his case. For example, in a lecture delivered at London School of Economics (LSE), he argued that horizontalism is impractical because there are many aspects of contemporary life that are now organized in what you might call ‘tightly-coupled systems’ where you need command and control structures. I wouldn’t want my anarchist friends to be in charge of a nuclear power station. (Harvey, 2012b: n.p.) Yet since horizontal organizational tactics in anarchism are usually part of a broader class struggle (Solidarity Federation, 2012), it is absurd to suggest that there would ever be a time where anarchists would enter into assembly—federated or otherwise—during a nuclear meltdown or the complex operation of landing an airplane. Indeed, without a discernable hierarchy to oppose, ‘in what possible circumstance would collective struggle be necessary during such risky periods?’ (fkshultze, 2013). Nonetheless, mutual aid in times of disaster—both natural and manufactured—is a recurrent human theme, where people regularly come together and organize themselves effectively around an ensuing crisis in the complete absence of a centralized authority. We saw this with spectacular effect in the wake of Hurricane Katrina, where the state was more concerned with restoring ‘law and order’ and criminalizing desperate people than it was with relief and rescue efforts. In response to the state’s failure, people instead helped themselves and each other, particularly through the formation of the Common Ground Collective. For Kropotkin (2008 [1902]: 137), the tendency for mutual aid ‘has so remote an origin, and is so deeply interwoven with all the past evolution of the human race, that it has been maintained ... notwithstanding all vicissitudes of history’.

2022 Michigan Kritik
**Final Supplement – FMPS** › **Kritik Updates** › Security K – Anarchy Alt

The alternative is the indigenous/neolithic model

Willson 13, Humanities PhD New College San Francisco (S. Brain, JD, American University, “Developing Nonviolent Bioregional Revolutionary Strategies,” http://www.brianwillson.com/developing-nonviolent-bioregional-revolutionary-strategies/)

Industrial civilization is on a collision course with life itself. Facilitating its collapse is a deserved and welcomed correction, long overdue. Collapse is inevitable whether we seek to facilitate it or not. Nonetheless, whatever we do, industrial civilization, based as it is on mining and burning finite and polluting fossil fuels, cannot last because it is destroying the ecosystem and the basis of local, cooperative life itself. It knows no limits in a physically finite world and thus is unsustainable. And the numbers of our human species on earth, which have proliferated from 1.6 billion in 1900 to 7 billion today, is the consequence of mindlessly eating oil – tractors, fertilizers, pesticides, herbicides – while destroying human culture in the process. Our food system itself is not sustainable. Dramatic die-off is part of the inevitable correction in the very near future, whether we like it or not. Human and political culture has become totally subservient to a near religion of economics and market forces. Technologies are never neutral, with some being seriously detrimental. Technologies come with an intrinsic character representing the purposes and values of the prevailing political economy that births it. The Industrialism process itself is traumatic. It is likely that only when we experience an apprenticeship in nature can we be trusted with machines, especially when they capital intensive & complicated. The nation-state, intertwined more than ever with corporate industrialism, will always come to its aid and rescue. Withdrawal of popular support enables new imagination and energy for re-creating local human food sufficient communities conforming with bioregional limits. II. The United States of America is irredeemable and unreformable, a Pretend Society. The USA as a nation state, as a recent culture, is irredeemable, unreformable, an anti-democratic, vertical, over-sized imperial unmanageable monster, sustained by the obedience and cooperation, even if reluctant, of the vast majority of its non-autonomous population. Virtually all of us are complicit in this imperial plunder even as many of us are increasingly repulsed by it and speak out against it. Lofty rhetoric has conditioned us to believe in our national exceptionalism, despite it being dramatically at odds with the empirically revealed pattern of our plundering cultural behavior totally dependent upon outsourcing the pain and suffering elsewhere. We cling to living a life based on the social myth of US America being committed to justice for all, even as we increasingly know this has always served as a cover for the social secret that the US is committed to prosperity for a minority thru expansion at ANY cost. Our Eurocentric origins have been built on an extraordinary and forceful but rationalized dispossession of hundreds of Indigenous nations (a genocide) assuring acquisition of free land, murdering millions with total impunity. This still unaddressed crime against humanity assured that our eyes themselves are the wool. Our addiction to the comfort and convenience brought to us by centuries of forceful theft of land, labor, and resources is very difficult to break, as with any addiction. However, our survival, and healing, requires a commitment to recovery of our humanity, ceasing our obedience to the national state. This is the (r)evolution begging us. Original wool is in our eyes: Eurocentric values were established with the invasion by Columbus: Cruelty never before seen, nor heard of, nor read of – Bartolome de las Casas describing the behavior of the Spaniards inflicted on the Indigenous of the West Indies in the 1500s. In fact the Indigenous had no vocabulary words to describe the behavior inflicted on them (A Short Account of the Destruction of the Indies, 1552). Eurocentric racism (hatred driven by fear) and arrogant religious ethnocentrism (self-righteous superiority) have never been honestly addressed or overcome. Thus, our foundational values and behaviors, if not radically transformed from arrogance to caring, will prove fatal to our modern species. Wool has remained uncleansed from our eyes: I personally discovered the continued vigorous U.S. application of the “Columbus Enterprise” in Viet Nam, discovering that Viet Nam was no aberration after learning of more than 500 previous US military interventions beginning in the late 1790s. Our business is killing, and business is good was a slogan painted on the front of a 9th Infantry Division helicopter in Viet Nam’s Mekong Delta in 1969. We, not the Indigenous, were and remain the savages. The US has been built on three genocides: violent and arrogant dispossession of hundreds of Indigenous nations in North America (Genocide #1), and in Africa (Genocide #2), stealing land and labor, respectively, with total impunity, murdering and maiming millions, amounting to genocide. It is morally unsustainable, now ecologically, politically, economically, and socially unsustainable as well. Further, in the 20th Century, the Republic of the US intervened several hundred times in well over a hundred nations stealing resources and labor, while imposing US-friendly markets, killing millions, impoverishing perhaps billions (Genocide #3). Since 1798, the US military forces have militarily intervened over 560 times in dozens of nations, nearly 400 of which have occurred since World War II. And since WWII, the US has bombed 28 countries, while covertly intervening thousands of times in the majority of nations on the earth. It is not helpful to continue believing in the social myth that the USA is a society committed to justice for all , in fact a convenient mask (since our origins) of our social secret being a society committed to prosperity for a few through expansion at ANY cost. (See William Appleman Williams). Always possessing oligarchic tendencies, it is now an outright corrupt corporatocracy owned lock stock and barrel by big money made obscenely rich from war making with our consent, even if reluctant. The Cold War and its nuclear and conventional arms race with the exaggerated “red menace”, was an insidious cover for a war preserving the Haves from the Have-Nots, in effect, ironically preserving a western, consumptive way of life that itself is killing us. Pretty amazing! Our way of life has produced so much carbon in the water, soil, and atmosphere, that it may in the end be equivalent to having caused nuclear winter. The war OF wholesale terror on retail terror has replaced the “red menace” as the rhetorical justification for the continued imperial plunder of the earth and the riches it brings to the military-industrial-intelligence-congressional-executive-information complex. Our cooperation with and addiction to the American Way Of Life provides the political energy that guarantees continuation of U.S. polices of imperial plunder. III. The American Way Of Life (AWOL), and the Western Way of Life in general, is the most dangerous force that exists on the earth. Our insatiable consumption patterns on a finite earth, enabled by but a one-century blip in burning energy efficient liquid fossil fuels, have made virtually all of us addicted to our way of life as we have been conditioned to be in denial about the egregious consequences outsourced outside our view or feeling fields. Of course, this trend began 2 centuries earlier with the advent of the industrial revolution. With 4.6% of the world’s population, we consume anywhere from 25% to nearly half the world’s resources. This kind of theft can only occur by force or its threat, justifying it with noble sounding rhetoric, over and over and over. Our insatiable individual and collective human demands for energy inputs originating from outside our bioregions, furnish the political-economic profit motives for the energy extractors, which in turn own the political process obsessed with preserving “national (in)security”, e.g., maintaining a very class-based life of affluence and comfort for a minority of the world’s people. This, in turn, requires a huge military to assure control of resources for our use, protecting corporate plunder, and to eliminate perceived threats from competing political agendas. The U.S. War department’s policy of “full spectrum dominance” is intended to control the world’s seas, airspaces, land bases, outer spaces, our “inner” mental spaces, and cyberspaces. Resources everywhere are constantly needed to supply our delusional modern life demands on a finite planet as the system seeks to dumb us down ever more. Thus, we are terribly complicit in the current severe dilemmas coming to a head due to (1) climate instability largely caused by mindless human activities; (2) from our dependence upon national currencies; and (3) dependence upon rapidly depleting finite resources. We have become addicts in a classical sense. Recovery requires a deep psychological, spiritual, and physical commitment to break our addiction to materialism, as we embark on a radical healing journey, individually and collectively, where less and local becomes a mantra, as does sharing and caring, I call it the Neolithic or Indigenous model. Sharing and caring replace individualism and competition. Therefore, A Radical Prescription Understanding these facts requires a radical paradigmatic shift in our thinking and behavior, equivalent to an evolutionary shift in our epistemology where our knowledge/thinking framework shifts: arrogant separateness from and domination over nature (ending a post-Ice Age 10,000 year cycle of thought structure among moderns) morphs to integration with nature, i.e., an eco-consciousness felt deeply in the viscera, more powerful than a cognitive idea. Thus, we re-discover ancient, archetypal Indigenous thought patterns. It requires creative disobedience to and strategic noncooperation with the prevailing political economy, while re-constructing locally reliant communities patterned on instructive models of historic Indigenous and Neolithic villages.

2022 Michigan Kritik
**Final Supplement – FMPS** › **Kritik Updates** › Fem IR K – NATO Bad

NATO functions as an institution of hegemonic masculinity---the narrative of military “teaching” and “training” reinforces the Western role of the masculine protector

Wright 4/18 (Katherine AM Wright, Senior Lecturer in International Politics at Newcastle University, 4-18-2022, “Challenging civil society perceptions of NATO: Engaging the Women, Peace and Security agenda”, SAGE journals, )//kpt

NATO as an institution of international hegemonic masculinity: method and approach

NATO is a political-military alliance built on consensus decision-making. Moving beyond its Cold War origins, the alliance’s remit has expanded significantly beyond a sole focus on collective defence to include crisis management and cooperative security. This has seen NATO’s focus enlarge from a regional one to a global one, with recent engagements in Afghanistan, Libya and Kosovo, for example. Its status as a multilateral institution means it is limited by its members’ priorities and therefore sensitive not to implicate NATO or NATO member states in wrongdoing ().

2022 Michigan Kritik
**Final Supplement – FMPS** › **Kritik Updates** › Fem IR K – NATO Bad

NATO is an instrument of hegemonic masculinity---their threat construction and rhetoric of nation-states recreates the impacts they seek to prevent because the masculine will always seek more enemies to securitize and otherize

Cockburn 10 (Cynthia Cockburn, feminist researcher and writer and Visiting Professor in Sociology at City University London, 9-20-2010, “Women-against-NATO – Making a Feminist Case”, War Resisters’ International, Accessed 7-19-2022, )//kpt

In April 2009, as part of the mobilization against the NATO Summit in Strasbourg, No-to-NATO organized a two-day counter-conference, in the course of which some forty women from NATO member states held a workshop on ‘a feminist case against NATO’.[1] Some of us have continued to work together by e-mail, and we hope to mark the forthcoming NATO Summit in Lisbon, Portugal, this November, with women’s protest actions.

What is our ‘feminist case’ against NATO? In many ways it’s the same case we make against militarism and war in general. That’s to say, we note the adverse ways they impact on women, and the damaging gender roles, active and passive, into which they draw both sexes. We point up the fact that gender relations, as we know and live them, are relations of power and inequality, founded in violence. They involve the social construction of masculinity as combative. Proper manhood requires a readiness to use force in defence of ‘honour’, while femininity is associated with passivity and victimhood. Women who want to escape the feminine stereotype have little choice but to imitate the masculine model. This dichotomous gender culture is one of the long-term, underlying, causes of war, because it predisposes our societies to see taking up arms as a normal and acceptable way of dealing with political conflicts. Consequently, feminist activists call for the transformation of gender relations as a necessary element of the movement to end war.

2022 Michigan Kritik
**Final Supplement – FMPS** › **Kritik Updates** › Fem IR K – Turns War

Older models and justifications for waging war no longer hold up, a feminist lens provides these theories with empathy and morality, making conflict increasingly avoidable

Sjoberg 08(Laura, American feminist scholar of international relations and international security and Global Professor of Politics and International Relations at Royal Holloway University of London, “Why Just War Needs Feminism Now More Than Ever”, CS)

In a world where there are as many just war theories as there are just war theorists, yet massively destructive wars take place, just war theory needs both focused moral priorities and some way to regulate meaning without excluding perspectives. Because excluding perspectives is likely to increase, rather than decrease, the number and intensity of international conflicts; just war cannot regulate meaning either by imposing some actors’ meanings on others or by giving way to absolute relativism. Instead, an approach to meaning that is both communicative and empathetic has a number of distinct advantages. First, it demands that parties in a conflict listen to their opponents’ and third parties’ understandings of the meaning of justice. Listening can be a first step to overcoming conflicts. Second, it requires that parties reconsider the claimed universalism of their understandings of global politics. This could inspire less myopic understandings of security states, transgressing realism as a selffulfilling prophecy. Third, the element of emotional identification adds an important additional layer to listening. In empathetic cooperation, actors not only have to ‘hear’ other states’ positions, but are also asked to attempt to understand on rational and emotional levels. Finally, attention to the political margins is important, and long-neglected, in the analysis of the ethics of war. The 21st century has seen a number of international political conflicts that are increasingly violent and increasingly difficult to analyze using traditional just war standards. Where just war theory used to be able to find a state that made war, the war on terrorism has made obvious the relevance of non-state actors to war-making. Where just war theory used to be able to talk about noncombatant identification and immunity, guerilla wars, air wars, and wars against an unidentified enemy have complicated the discrimination principle. Where just war used to be able to confine itself to the cultural context of the belligerents, an increasingly global world sees conflicts between cultural contexts. In such an international political atmosphere, political leaders need an ethical compass to war-making and war-fighting now more than ever. In the face of this increasing need for a moral compass, political leaders find a just war tradition that struggles with being outdated, risks susceptibility to political manipulation, lacks clarity in conceptual understandings of justice and war, and entrenches gender subordination in global politics. Just war needs a unifying motivating morality that allows for both diversity and decisionmaking. The feminist reformulated just war principles contained in this article provide the groundwork for such a motivating morality. Just war needs a way to adapt to cultural pluralism; feminist empathy constructs a workable dialogue. Just war needs a way to adapt to the constant challenge of technological change; feminisms center their moral thinking on the lives of individuals and thus provide a framework for thinking about new technologies. Just war needs a way to pay attention to the structural violence and human security effects of infrastructural attacks and aerial wars. Feminisms’ focus on political marginality helps just war to see this suffering, and to prioritize it in ethical evaluation. From the top levels of strategic policy-making to the margins of political life, people need just war theory now more than ever. Because people need just war theory, just war theory needs feminism.

2022 Michigan Kritik
**Final Supplement – FMPS** › **Kritik Updates** › Fem IR K – Turns War

Feminist perspective solves the most serious impacts of war

Sjoberg 08(Laura, American feminist scholar of international relations and international security and Global Professor of Politics and International Relations at Royal Holloway University of London, “Why Just War Needs Feminism Now More Than Ever”, CS)

Through gendered lenses, we can see a number of guidelines for the reinterpretation of these standards. First, a feminist perspective would argue that the question of just cause is one that should not be decided by any one actor or from any one epistemological perspective or political standpoint. Instead, in keeping with strong objectivity, justice needs to be considered dialogically. Additionally, feminists’ interest in empathy would mean that potential belligerents should, in the dialogue about the meaning of justice, attempt not only to comprehend but also to emotionally identify with the positions of the other actors in the dialogue. An ethic of care demands that the planning and fighting of wars be done with a special concern for the plight of those traditionally marginalized in social and political life. A care-based politics of war-making demands that states and/or other political actors refrain from fighting wars that will not mainly impact those people against whom those actors have just cause. It also suggests that calculations of the ‘civilian damage’ of war include a broader range of human insecurities, including issues like unemployment, debt, transportation damage, health infrastructure damage, and the like (Tickner, 1992). Along the same lines, a gender perspective suggests a broader group of situations that just war theory should be used to analyze. These include any situations where conflict is likely to cause mass human insecurity, including economic sanctions, civil conflicts, and/or religious or cultural oppression. The source of these observations is feminist work on the continuity of violence in international politics. Twenty years ago, Betty Reardon called the international political arena a ‘war system’, indicating that constant political violence, economic deprivation, gender and cultural subordination, and environmental destruction are a structural feature of people’s (and especially women’s) lives in global politics (1985). Chris Cuomo followed up, arguing that war ‘is not just an event’ and instead can be seen as a continuous property of global politics (1996). These insights demonstrate that a feminist approach to war, and its moral consequences, differs substantively from conventional just war approaches. As such, a feminist perspective suggests several foundational principles for a reformulated just war tradition, less totalizing but more honest about its capacities, less deterministic but more prepared to deal with the contingency of today’s international conflicts: (1) A dialogue about the meaning of justice for just cause, inclusive of a broad array of international actors and aiming at building consensus through empathetic cooperation. (2) Emotional identification as a major component of international relations in times of conflict. (3) An ad bellum prescription that an actor should not engage a war, no matter how just the cause, that cannot be fought mainly against those who have created the just cause. (4) Special attention to the impacts of war on those traditionally marginalized in social and political life, especially women. (5) A new, more sensitive principle of discrimination, which acknowledges the terrible civilian damages caused by war, and calculates not only the immediate effects of guns and bombs, but also the lasting human effects of conflict and violence. (6) A modified, ‘war system’ approach to those situations that should be covered by just war analysis that covers the most intense sources of humaninflicted human insecurity, even outside of the traditional confines of ‘war’.

2022 Michigan Kritik
**Final Supplement – FMPS** › **Kritik Updates** › Fem IR K – AT: Scenario Planning

Modern war uses narratives of beautiful and helpless women to justify atrocious acts, only a feminist critique of war theory can reveal the deep flaws in IR theory

Sjoberg 08(Laura, American feminist scholar of international relations and international security and Global Professor of Politics and International Relations at Royal Holloway University of London, “Why Just War Needs Feminism Now More Than Ever”, CS)

Feminists argue that the construction of women as ‘beautiful souls’ at once serves as moral justification for war-fighting stronger than the underlying jus ad bellum standards (protecting innocent women and children), obscures women’s actual suffering in war (given the moral reliance of war-fighting on women’s being shielded from the actions and effects of war), and props up gender subordination more generally (by limiting women’s capabilities inside war and supporting gender differentiation in citizenship status and other social roles). As such, the just war tradition’s reliance on gendered ideal-types in the non-combatant immunity principle has real negative impacts, both inside and outside of the making of war. The gender subordination that just war theory perpetrates is another problem to add to the laundry list of difficulties that the tradition has as it looks for current applicability. Not only does a gender-based critique of the just war tradition demonstrate gender bias in the just war tradition, but also reveals that just war theory often fails on its own terms because of that gender bias (Sjoberg, 2006b). This demonstrates that just war’s difficulties cannot be solved by simply adding new rules for new sorts of war; broader problems exist. A feminist critique of just war theory reveals important ways forward, and suggests broader solutions. This paper argues that a gender-based critique and reformulation of just war theory can suggest an agenda for the reinvention of the tradition in a sharper, more relevant form. Before proceeding to that reformulation, perhaps a note on the method by which one draws gender-based critique is appropriate. Feminist scholars study global politics through ‘gendered lenses’, where gender as an evaluative and constitutive variable frames their analysis of global politics (Peterson and Runyan, 1999). When looking through gendered lenses, feminists are concerned with the influence of gender subordination in global politics and interested in paths to redress that subordination. As Jill Steans notes, ‘feminist critical theorists are trying to find a way forward which retains both gender as a category of analysis and retain the historical commitment to the emancipator project in feminism’ while addressing broader policy issues across state and cultural boundaries (Steans, 1998, 29). A feminist critique of the just war tradition, then, looks for locations of gender subordination within the foundations of just war theory, and then uses gender as a category of analysis to search for emancipatory alternatives.

2022 Michigan Kritik
**Final Supplement – FMPS** › **Kritik Updates** › Fem IR K – Climate Link

Especially true when looking at their solvency mechanism, their usage of the DoD cements a masculine framework for solutions, their policies are built around supporting the military, not fixing the climate crisis

Nagel 15(Joane, Social and Behavioral Sciences – Sociology Professor, “Gender, Conflict, and the Militarization of Climate Change Policy”, CS)

A preponderance of largely male governments and male-dominated economic interests protecting the unequal status quo can be understood mainly as hindrances to successful climate negotiations. But they are not the only important gendered features of the international system responsible for influencing climate change policy. As we saw above, the military is another gendered institution intimately related to national governments and economies. National militaries are less responsible for stalling organized responses to climate change; they are critical articulators of climate change hazards and advocates for defining climate change as a problem not of controlling carbon emissions, but of protecting national security. Despite the end of the Cold War (characterized by a large-scale U.S.–USSR arms race) in 1990, in 2010 world military expenditures were higher than in any year since the end of the Second World War in 1945. The United States far outpaces other countries in military expenditures. The U.S. accounted for thirty-nine percent of global military expenditures in 2012, when military expenditures consumed more than four percent of the U.S. gross domestic product. The United States is among a handful of the most militarized countries in the world, as measured by military expenditures per capita, including Israel, South Sudan, Saudi Arabia, North Korea, Russia, Jordan, Algeria, and Azerbaijan. Even the world’s poorest countries sport national armies whose weapons and training are subsidized by or purchased from the world’s major arms dealers, most notably the United States, Russia, France, the United Kingdom, and China. The world’s militaries are historically hyper-masculine institutions with cultures embracing honor, bravery, loyalty, strength, and violence. Men dominate the ranks and leadership of military institutions just as they dominate national politics and economics around the world. In the United States, the military plays a critical role in scientific research, including climate change research. The U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) has a basic scientific research and development budget that is two and a half times greater than the National Science Foundation (NSF)—the agency tasked with funding basic research across the sciences, mathematics, and engineering. The NSF has a broad mission of supporting transformative research on all topics and issues across disciplines. The DOD’s much narrower mission is to protect national security. This focus on security—food security, energy security, water security, and environmental security—determines the research projects it supports. As a result, the DOD has been a powerful voice in emphasizing national security dangers from and defenses against climate change and in shaping the work of the many researchers it supports in universities, industry, and national labs and research facilities. The DOD’s agenda reflects classical military/masculine tactics for attacking climate change: large-scale geo-engineering approaches to manage solar radiation or sequester carbon, energy research focused on military missions, conflict scenario planning, climate forecasting and modeling, and global resource assessments. The DOD has very limited interest in funding “softer” (feminine) research topics on the health, social, racial, gender, or age disparities in climate change impacts, factors that promote community resilience in the face of disasters, or strategies for reducing the carbon emissions causing climate change.

2022 Michigan Kritik
**Final Supplement – FMPS** › **Kritik Updates** › Fem IR K – Climate Link

Their securitization of climate change is the continuation of a long line of failed militaristic policies, only embracing a feminist perspective can we truly mitigate their impacts

Nagel 15(Joane, Social and Behavioral Sciences – Sociology Professor, “Gender, Conflict, and the Militarization of Climate Change Policy”, CS)

In their 2007 report, National Security and the Threat of Climate Change, a group of prominent retired U.S. military advisors described climate change as a “threat multiplier” facing many countries in the world, especially the United States. They cataloged dangers to national security from climate changerelated flooding, drought, extreme weather, disease, famine, and environmentally forced migration. The report’s focus on dangers and conflicts reflected the institutional perspective and interests of its all-male military advisory board. They recommended strategic planning to defend against the threat of climate change. They did not call for action on the causes of climate change such as the reduction of greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions. The militarization of climate change, by defining it primarily as a security threat, represents one of several ways in which climate change policy is gendered. The international failure to respond effectively to climate change also can be understood by analyzing the gender dimensions of the institutions that dominate international climate change research, planning, and negotiations. In her 2010 Nature article, “Call in the Women,” feminist geographer Susan Buckingham argued that gender imbalance is a major reason for the ongoing stalemate in international efforts to curb greenhouse gas emissions. Starting in 1995, international environmental leaders have gathered each year at United Nations Conference of Parties (COP) meetings around the world to settle on a response to escalating changes in the global climate. In the past twenty years of annual COP meetings, these mainly male negotiators have not managed to produce any significant binding agreements to reduce the rate and scale of climate change. Negotiators’ inability to craft an international climate change agreement has persisted in the face of mounting scientific evidence and wide consensus about the dangerous consequences of climate change to the planet’s biosphere and human societies. Critics of negotiators’ ineffectiveness typically fault the economic interests of carbon emitting countries in maintaining a global energy and economic system that benefits them. They seldom attribute COP meeting failures to the enduring power of gender privilege. Buckingham, however, sees a more gendered COP landscape marked by the gendered culture and approach of male negotiators. To bolster this critique, she reports consistent research findings supporting improved decision making in economic and political settings where women are included in adequate numbers. Not surprisingly, this research is ignored by predominately male representatives who dominate the ranks of COP representatives (women comprise less than thirty percent of COP delegates). This is despite the fact that in 1995 the United Nations called for including women in all levels of environmental decision making. Buckingham’s conclusion: “there is enough evidence now to justify increasing women’s involvement in decision-making on climate change. We should do so without delay.” It is not simply their gender that accounts for the poor track record of the mainly male negotiators; it also is the interests that they represent. If women representatives replaced some or all of the men at these meetings, would agreements be reached, GHG levels reduced, and the dangers of climate change averted? It would be an interesting experiment, and simply on the ethical grounds of gender equity, it warrants mandating equal gender representation at all COP meetings and other United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC)–sponsored bodies and activities, including the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. Gender parity, however, would not change the national and economic interests dominating COP meetings. Whether they are men or women from the global North or South, representatives at COP meetings typically represent elite interests. Women might bring a different experiential and gendered perspective to the negotiations, but they still would face institutional resistance to change, especially by a UN system historically run by elite men. This is partly because gender is not only a feature of individuals. Gendered cultures, practices, and networks characterize organizations as well.

2022 Michigan Kritik
**Final Supplement – FMPS** › **Kritik Updates** › Fem IR – AT: Perm

They girlboss-ify the movement

---not sure if this has been put out or not yet

Cockburn 11 (Cynthia Cockburn, feminist researcher and writer and Visiting Professor in Sociology at City University London, 2011, “Snagged on the Contradiction: NATO, Resolution 1325, and Feminist Responses”, Accessed 7-19-2022, )//kpt

Contradictions in Resolution 1325

2022 Michigan Kritik
**Final Supplement – FMPS** › **Kritik Updates** › Fem IR – FW 2NC

Feminist scholarship is key to valuable discussions about NATO

Wright 3/8 (Katharine A. M. Wright, Senior Lecturer in International Politics at Newcastle University, 3-8-2022, “A feminist perspective on the Russia-Ukraine War: Implications for NATO”, the London School of Economics and Political Science, Accessed 7-19-2022, )//kpt

Russia’s intervention in Ukraine seemingly caught the international community and many International Relations scholars by surprise. It has been heralded as a  leading to a (re)focus on the state as the primary referent point of international politics. Yet while feminist IR scholars have made important inroads into the discipline in recent decades, demonstrating how the , at this time of crisis we again find feminist insights marginalised from mainstream discussion of the war and its consequences (with a few notable exceptions, including work by  and a subsequently postponed ).

Feminists IR scholars have much value to add to the discussion to aide our understanding of the war and its gendered impact. For example, how masculinities and femininities are invoked in constructing Russia and Ukraine in geopolitical imaginaries, the absence of women from both Ukranian and Russian negotiation delegations, or in the gendered silences of just who is seen to fight/be protected in Western media coverage, to name just a few of examples. However, the purpose of this blog is to focus on the implications of the war for NATO through a feminist lens.

2022 Michigan Kritik
**Final Supplement – FMPS** › **Kritik Updates** › Cap K – Link – Queerness

Desire is predetermined by capitalism – consolidation of new identities that inevitably pursues the logic of commodification limits the development of collective agency

Hennessy 17 (Rosemary Hennessy, Professor of English and Director of the Center for the Study of Women, Gender, and Sexuality at Rice University, “Profit and Pleasure : Sexual Identities in Late Capitalism”, Taylor & Francis Group, 8/21/17, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/umichigan/detail.action?docID=4983407.

By the late nineteenth century, the market economy in Europe and the United States was also drawing sexuality out of the family in many forms, in commercial entertainment and new kinds of nonprocreative intimacy (D’Emilio and Freedman 166– 200 ). The recruitment of women into the workforce in the colonies and the metropolitan centers was a crucial component of these changes, negotiated ideologically through the often contradictory adjustments to women’s and working-class men’s positions as subjects of consent, of property, and of racial identity. For women, the discourses of sexuality often organized access to political agency and ownership. Women continued to provide invisible labor in the home, and a gendered division of labor within the family alliance remained essential to the production of labor power and by extension to the accumulation of surplus value in the marketplace. The new technologies of sex operated in a normative, dialectical way both to undermine and to resecure this arrangement, and one of the ways they did so was through the reification of sexual identity. The reification of sexual identity in the late nineteenth century is overdetermined by a set of structural changes in capitalist production that involved technological developments, the mechanization and consequent de-skilling of work, the production boom brought on by technological efficiency, the opening of new consumer markets, and the eventual development of a widespread consumer culture (Hobsbawm 34– 55 ). A new and growing mass media, including the advertising industry, displaced unmet needs into new desires and offered the promise of compensatory pleasures, or at least the promise of pleasure in the form of commodity consumption. The inducement of social demand and consumer desire was one of the key components of the new consumer culture and a crucial mechanism through which capitalist overproduction was managed ideologically. This process took place on multiple fronts and involved the formation of newly desiring subjects, forms of agency, intensities of sensation, and economies of pleasure that were consistent with the requirements of a more mobile workforce and a growing consumer culture. Most significantly, the position of desiring subject was gradually being opened to women who would eventually be recruited as the ideal and consummate consumers. Related to the formation of new desiring subjects was the emergence of the new identities heteroand homosexual. These new subjects of sexual desire were at odds with a Victorian gender hierarchy that accorded the position of desiring subject only to men. As George Chauncy has argued, the differentiation of homosexual desire from cross-gender behavior at the turn of the century reflects a major reconceptualization of the nature of human sexuality. Basic to this change was a shift from a paradigm for human sexuality in which men were active sexual agents and women were passive or passionless sexual recipients. Active or passive sexual aim — which was taken to be paradigmatic for one’s masculine or feminine gender role — had formerly been more important than sexual object choice. More and more frequently, however, sexual object choice became the distinguishing feature of sexual identity, and it was on the basis of this standard that the distinction between heteroand homosexuality was erected (Chauncy 1994, 92 ). The emergence of new consuming and desiring subjects only gradually and unevenly displaced the Victorian social logic of gender with the modern logic of sexual object choice ( 100 ; Floyd 173 ). The dialectical process of “displacement” is a significant instance of overdetermination here. The new identity categories heteroand homosexual disrupted the bourgeois gender hierarchy that had supported a domestic economy of household production and property rights in that they accorded both men and women positions as subjects and objects of desire. But a patriarchal gender hierarchy was reinscribed in the emergent heteronorm and its homosexual other to the extent that the oppositions between femininity and active desire and between masculinity and sexual objectification remained intact. Heterosexuality became a normative identity whose stability was guaranteed through an array of reified perverse (sexual and racial) others but also through a modernized gender hierarchy. In other words, the organizational structures of gender and desire on which heteronormative identity relies prescribe a double reification of the human capacity for sensation, affect, and social intercourse. Heteronormativity posits a “natural” equation between sex (male or female) and gender (masculine and feminine) and it polices desire according to a gendered asymmetry between sexual subject (e.g., masculine) and object choice (feminine). At the same time, heteronorms reify homosexuality — defining, disciplining the human potential for sensation and social intercourse into an identity that complies with the heteronormative logics of gender and desire, only perversely so. It was only gradually through the nineteenth century that homosexuals, predominantly men, came to be seen as discrete sexual identities whose perverse sexual desire (men for men) was interpreted (and sometimes lived) through a heteronormative gender scheme. Sexual identity as an identity organized around whom one desires to be sexual with was engendered out of the scientific effort to explain and to tame disruptions of the gender system. This gradual shift from gender (in)coherence to (homo)sexual desire as the basis for identity is evident in the writing of late-nineteenth-century sexologists. In the work of the first generation of sexologists, the “invert” or “third sex” is in fact a subject who presents an incoherently gendered identity. The term “invert” was first used in the mid-nineteenth century to describe not homosexuality but a broadly transgendered condition of which same-sex desire was one symptom (Hekma; Prosser 135– 55 ). Generally the term “invert” is understood in terms of the classic description of “a woman trapped in a man’s body.” As an individual who makes sense of himself or herself as incoherently gendered, or as someone who is understood that way by others, the invert transgresses the gendered fabric of possessive individualism. After 1900 (which marked the publication of Havelock Ellis’s Sexual Inversion ) the term “invert” fell out of common use as gender difference was increasingly being folded into a new conception of sexual difference based on a desiring subject constructed in terms of aim or object choice. Freud, for example, refigures the transgendered components of inversion into perverse sexual object choice; other perversions and related sexual identities are understood to be deviations from a normative sexual aim. In this way the “invert’s” transgender identity becomes only one stop on the way to homosexual identity. This shift to sexual object choice as the defining feature of sexual identity has a contradictory relationship to patriarchal gender ideology. The emergence of a new subject of sexual desire was conditioned by the gradual disruption of gender distinctions taking place through changes in the division of labor, property, and consent law. This was a subject that was not defined so much in terms of species needs for reproduction as in terms of individual consumer preferences or the objects he or she desires (Birken 49 ). But the challenge to the asymmetrical gender scheme of bourgeois culture was not so pat. In sexology, for example, we find that even as the promotion of this new consuming subject of desire opened up the possibility of challenging the gender differences that defined reproduction, it also erected a new version of them. By emphasizing the multiplicity of individual preferences and the idiosyncratic nature of desire, and by starting with the assumption that individuals are first of all free consumers — or subjects of desire — sexology disrupted the traditional bourgeois gender hierarchy. At the same time sexology performed the conservative function of reinstalling the heterogender paradigm within this new sexual ideology of desire. As sexuality was being wrenched free from reproduction and everyone was potentially being sexualized, the threatening possibility of a genderless sexual desire was contained by a new paradigm of sexual identity that articulated it in a heterogendered frame. The new identities heteroand homosexual, based as they were on the appropriate gender of the object of desire, became ways of distinguishing sexual identities that not only tamed the potential threat to patriarchal gender difference but actually reincorporated it into a new (heterogender) ideology of sexual identity. The increasing differentiation of sexual identities (in the form of perversions) reflected the decline of older holistic concepts of gender and the articulation of newer, more object-oriented ones. The implications of this transcoding of gender were most telling for women. That women were permitted a new sexual agency may have been a break from the bourgeois gender ideology of passionless womanhood, but the desiring feminine subject was acceptable only so long as she directed that desire toward a heteronormative goal in which she was not the agent but the object of desire. The enfolding of bourgeois gender ideology within the new ideology of sexual desire helped forestall the possibility of even imagining lesbian desire in any other terms than female inversion. Consequently, until well into the twentieth century, sexologists and the culture at large could only conceive of the “real” lesbian who desires another woman by engendering her as “mannish” or butch (Birken 94– 96; Chauncy 107 ). The heteronormative identity that was consolidated in the late nineteenth century, then, prescribes a double reification of the human capacity for sensation, affect, and social intercourse through the organizational structures of gender and desire: it proposes an equation between sex and gender and it organizes desire according to the gendered asymmetry, which we might call “heteropolarity.” At the same time, heteronorms reify what comes to be known as “homosexuality”— defining, disciplining the human potential for sensation and social intercourse into an identity that complies with the heteronormative logics of gender and desire, only perversely so. In other words, the heteronormative paradigm set the terms even for queer desire. The emergence of this heterogendered, heteropolar normative paradigm and of the reified identities of heteroand homosexual is an important feature of the historical formation of a new desiring subject. Sexology’s construction of a sexuality of desire separated the human capacity for sensation and affect from the ideology of family need. As a new subject of desire rearticulated bourgeois gender ideology in this and other cultural sites, the relationship between sexual identity and gender remained uneven, contradictory, and prescribed. The construction of sexual identity in terms of object and aim potentially made it possible to conceive of all combinations of desiring subject and object (masculine/feminine man or masculine/feminine woman desiring masculine/feminine man or masculine/ feminine woman). But because capitalist investment in a heterogendered division of labor persisted, the potentially arbitrary boundaries between sexual identity and gender identity would continue to be secured through heterogendered norms, even as those boundaries were contested and unevenly articulated in mainstream and counterculture. By scripting desire in terms of heterogendered identities that are understood to be opposite sexes, the distinction between heteroand homosexuality controlled the unruly possibility posed by the new desiring subject — the possibility that masculinity, femininity, sexual agent, and sexual object might indeed correlate in any number of possible desiring combinations within or between persons. I am not the first to argue that the consolidation of two distinct social identities — heteroand homosexual — is not simply a discursive event or a cultural phenomenon. Several historians have made this point. John D’Emilio’s well-known early essay argues that it was two aspects of capitalism — wage labor and commodity production — that allowed men and women to call themselves gay, to see themselves as part of a community, and to organize politically on the basis of that identity. D’Emilio and Estelle Freedman as well as other scholars (George Chauncy, Jeffrey Weeks) have suggested that commodity consumption was also a key material condition for the emergence of new sexual identities. The late-nineteenthcentury shift to a consumer economy provoked a more widespread acceptance of pleasure, self-gratification, and personal satisfaction that easily translated to the province of sex. What I want to stress is that this cultural-ideological process was overdetermined by the logic of the commodity, a logic that binds ways of knowing and forms of identity to changes in the relations of production. In other words, the reification of sexual identity is overdetermined by the relationships that capitalist production came to rely on in the late nineteenth century, relationships that include forms of consciousness that are adequate to new demands of production and consumption. These new demands took place in several arenas — among them the recruitment of women into the workforce and consumer culture and the gradual unhinging of sexuality from its procreative function as regulated by the family’s patriarchal gender system. One of the most significant displacements was the conjuncture of rationalized production with the engineering of desire inducement. Against the background of the Great Depression of the last quarter of the nineteenth century, the expanding volume of overproduction fueled the rise of commodity consumption and a new consumer culture in industrialized nations. The competitive struggle for control of consumer demand generated the spectacular growth of advertising and innovations in the field of credit designed to increase consumption (Birken 120 ). At the same time, the technological developments responsible for overproduction also spurred new forms of rationalized labor that would eventually take the form of Fordism. In an excellent recent essay, Kevin Floyd astutely contends that this historical development is a significant one in the history of the subject of desire under capitalism. The conjuncture of engineered production and engineered desire inducement interfaced with the construction of men and women as sexual subjects and sexual objects and helped give desire a certain ideological independence. The result was a reification of the erotic, ultimately inseparable from the retrenchment of capitalism (Floyd 178 ), a reification we might understand as overdetermined by the displacements of new forms of commodity production and consumption, by the transposition of need into desire, and by changes wrought in other cultural-ideological categories. Emerging as the prime institution involved in the formation of sexual identity in the late nineteenth century, heteronormativity shaped this reification in the service of the kernel of human relationships essential to capitalism in several ways. One of them involved the contradictory and dialectical relationship between sexuality and gender. By the end of the nineteenth century, heteronormative sexual identity was becoming one of the historical components of labor and labor power insofar as it organized forms of consciousness on which social divisions — including but not restricted to the division of labor — would depend. In disciplining human affect and sensation into discretely gendered subjects and objects of desire, heteronormativity reinforced the sexual division of labor in the home as well as the exploitation of women’s labor in the wage market. The distinction between a normative sexual subject and its abject other on which heteronormativity rested also served to contain the threat posed to patriarchal gender hierarchies by the unhinging of sexuality from family. In addition, the reification of sexual identity was an important part of a much broader process of moving human eros into the realm of exchange value. By consolidating human sensation into discrete and bounded sexual identities, heteronormativity helped shape the human potential and need for sensation and social interaction (or eros) in terms of objective aims or desires. This reification of the erotic would prove vital to the development of commodity culture insofar as it helped consolidate forms of desire that would be crucial in the marketing and consumption of commodities. 12 Satisfaction of needs through exchange value is the most common phenomenon of alienation, and human sexuality has certainly entered commodity exchange through this process. But the less visible relationship between commodification and sexuality lies in the reification of the human potential for sensation and affect into sexual identities. Like all cultural practices in capitalist production, this process was and is a contradictory one. The freeing up of sensory-affective capacities from family alliances was simultaneously rebinding desire into new commodified forms. But while heteronorms organized desire and identity, they never did so completely or entirely successfully. Unlike the poststructuralist or cultural materialist who sees these failures as the effect of a radical instability inherent in discourses or in language itself, the culture theorist who returns her analysis to capital knows that heteronorms are insecure because they are sites of ideological crisis and symptoms of the social struggle over meaning and ultimately over resources. This struggle threatens to disclose not only the fabricated nature of sexuality but also the social relations that bind its organization to capital’s contradictory structures. The narratives and social movements of nineteenth-century marriage resisters, “New Women,” and some feminists disclosed many of these connections and indicated that heteronormative resistance was not always launched by homosexuals who only gradually as a group countered the sexual norms they themselves were being framed by. Let me sum up some of the points I am making. First of all, heteronorms are cultural-ideological. They depend on the reification of sensory-affect into identities that legitimate and enable certain historical processes of capitalism. The gender foundation of heteronormative sexual identities is directly related to the extraction of surplus value through the gendered division of labor both in the family’s role in the reproduction of labor power and in the workplace. To the extent that heteronormativity is premised on a gender hierarchy, it has served to legitimate and naturalize the gendered division of labor. However, just because capitalism has made use of heteronormativity does not mean that it is necessary for capitalist production. Capitalism does not require heteronormative families or even a gendered division of labor. What it does require is an unequal division of labor. If gayor queer-identified people are willing to shore up that unequal division — whether that means running corporations or feeding families, raising children or caring for the elderly — capital will accept us, and in areas where production has moved far out of the patriarchal household and patriarchal gender ideologies have flexed or changed, it has done so, though unevenly and reluctantly. This limited acceptance is not just a freestanding cultural phenomenon any more than the emergence of “new families” includes all non-nuclear arrangements. While heteronormativity’s dependence on gender difference continues to bolster an unequal division of labor in the home and in the marketplace, and the ideology of family shelters an unwaged domestic labor force — whether straight or gay — race still has to bear a great share of the burden for the production of surplus value. The companion to the “New (white) Gay Family” is the single workfare mother whose sexual identity is less relevant than her social status as excessive breeder. Finally, I am arguing that reified sexual identities — straight, gay, queer — are tied to capitalism’s class system in that they are ways of seeing and knowing oneself and others that shore up the logic of commodity exchange on which capital is based. This is a logic that abstracts social phenomena, including human relationships, from the historical conditions that make them possible. In this regard, claiming a queer identity or claiming a straight identity can participate in the same cultural logic. The point I want to stress here is not that sexuality has a class character or that class trumps sexual identity, but that consolidation of new sexual identities that pursues the logic of commodification limits the development of collective agency. The occlusion of class in theories of sexuality and the disavowal of class struggle or class affinities in sexual liberation movements are part of the legacy of capital’s commodification of consciousness. One of the costs of the reification of eros into heteronormative identity and its homo-alternative is the separation of class and sex analysis. Underlying this split is the loss of a way of seeing and a form of social organization that recognizes that human needs are collectively produced and that can address the immense human toll taken by the contradictory relationships through which this process is enacted under capitalism.

2022 Michigan Kritik
**Final Supplement – FMPS** › **Kritik Updates** › Cap K – Link – Queerness

The affirmative’s queer project becomes commodified without an examination of capitalism

Hennessy 17 (Rosemary Hennessy, Professor of English and Director of the Center for the Study of Women, Gender, and Sexuality at Rice University, “Profit and Pleasure : Sexual Identities in Late Capitalism”, Taylor & Francis Group, 8/21/17, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/umichigan/detail.action?docID=4983407.

Cultural studies is an extensive and eclectic transdisciplinary mode of inquiry, marked by contestations, internal divisions, disparate genealogies, and a rich diversity. I take the risk of offering some generalizations about it as a body of knowledge, not because I want to subsume this contentious plurality under a monolithic profile, but in order to highlight some of the ways the discourses and paradigms that came to prevail amid this diversity bear a historical relation to the process of commodification that has accompanied the triumph of neoliberalism in the past twenty years. Cultural studies is now a massively funded field, and in that sense, as in much other cultural production, its U.S. variant has become the leading global instance. In some very literal ways, cultural studies in the United States has been commodified in that its knowledges have entered the circuit of commodity exchange pervasively and profitably. What emerged twenty years ago as maverick institutes insecurely anchored in academic institutions has become a full-blown, funded discipline, complete with graduate programs and Ph.D.s, conferences and cross-continental networks, high-profile corporate publishers, course readers and histories. Some of the leading figures in cultural studies have commented on the perils of its success. Lawrence Grossberg suggested in 1988 that the selling (out) of U.S. cultural studies was well advanced and that its success story has “all the ingredients of a made-for-tv movie” (Pfister 204 ). 3 Stuart Hall has commented on this evolution, too, referring to it as a dangerous time for cultural studies in the United States precisely because of the incorporation of academia and the isolation of American intellectuals within the established confines of institutional academic life. If these are boom times for cultural studies, it may be no accident that these are also times when one of the potentially sharpest combatants of neoliberalism is losing its critical edge. “In the period of this Clinton administration,” Stuart Hall warns, “[cultural studies] feels like a deeply reactionary form of free enterprise modernity” (Morley and Chen 397 ). The enormous outpouring of academic work in cultural studies over the past two decades has also been characterized by a distinct and emphatic erasure of capitalist economy from its knowledges, more specifically an erasure of the historical links between culture and capitalism that is characteristic of cultural materialism. Critical notice of this de-linking has been a part of the history of cultural studies, too, however, and more of these critical voices are beginning to be heard in the United States. For example, the collection Cultural Studies in Question, edited by Marjorie Ferguson and Peter Golding, takes this problem as one of its main concerns. 4 In their introduction, Ferguson and Golding contend that “cultural studies has neglected the deep structural changes in national and global, political and economic and media systems by eschewing economic, social or policy analysis” (xiv). In an essay in the same volume, Nicholas Garnham argues that in order to move on and fulfill the promises of its original project, cultural studies needs to “rebuild the bridges with political economy that it burnt in its headlong rush towards the pleasures and differences of postmodernism” ( 56 ). In large measure this headlong rush took the form of Foucauldian cultural materialism. We can see this trajectory quite distinctly in the work of Stuart Hall himself, who finally abandoned his always somewhat tenuous endorsement of historical materialism by the late eighties in favor of the post-marxism of Foucault and Laclau and Mouffe. 5 Hall’s contributions to cultural studies are formidable, as evidenced in his own work, his relationship to the many projects produced out of the Center for Contemporary Cultural Studies in Birmingham, England, and his transnational influence. 6 At the center, after a protracted engagement with Althusserian marxism throughout the seventies, Hall and other scholars shifted their attention from grappling with the problem of how to address the relationship between capitalism’s economic base and the cultural-ideological superstructure to elaborations of the internal articulation of the superstructure itself (Sparks 83 ). In the next decade and into the nineties concern with the complex causal connections between capitalism’s underlying structures and cultural forms and with any specifically marxist analysis virtually disappeared from the incorporation of cultural studies. One index of the materialism that has come to define the British legacy can be seen in the Open University textbook series Culture, Media and Identities . These are glossy, well-packaged books aimed at introducing an undergraduate audience to cultural studies. Each of them follows a heuristic model called “the circuit of culture.” Through a circuit of interlocking relations — production, consumption, regulation, representation — this model illustrates the various processes by which identities come to be. The authors assert that it is “possible to start at any point” ( 2 ) in the circuit, but that an analysis has to go all the way round in order to be complete. Two features of this heuristic are notable: capitalism’s relationships of exploitation have no determining force on culture because “culture is now regarded as being as constitutive of the social world as economic or political processes.” Not only this, the authors go on to confirm, “in recent years ‘culture’ has been promoted to an altogether more important role as theorists have begun to argue that because all social practices are meaningful practices, they are all fundamentally cultural” (duGay 2 ). In the Open University series textbook Identity and Difference, edited by Kathryn Woodward, the “production” and “consumption” of identities are also thoroughly cultural activities. The section on “Sexualities,” by Lynn Segal, for example, treats the ways sexual identities are represented through cultural texts and symbolic systems. It includes a historical perspective that stretches from Anglo-European sexology to queer theory, and indeed it does mention scholarship that “correlate[s] shifts in scientific accounts of sexual difference with wider social changes and contests for power” (Segal 190 ). But there is no mention of what these “wider social changes” might be, what they might have to do with adjustments in capitalism’s relations of labor or with forms of commodification. The question remains whether abandoning all causal connections between culture and material relations outside of culture has strengthened cultural studies’ critical edge. My own view is that it has not. It seems to me that no analysis of cultural forms that professes to critically intervene in the violence taking place in the wake of neoliberal social policies can evade the historical relationships between culture and capital. In promoting a view of culture severed from any ties to the fundamental structures of capitalism, cultural studies is helping to produce forms of consciousness that supplement neoliberalism’s conservative individualism. While much work in cultural studies may seem overtly opposed to the privatizing tactics of neoliberalism, to the extent that cultural studies produces ways of understanding that exile meaning-making and identity in the realm of culture, sheltered from any link to capital or class, its discourses reiterate a cultural logic that has been one of capitalism’s most potent ideological forms. Surprisingly, this is a view that Stuart Hall himself intimates against the grain of his own later work. In an interview in 1992 , he predicted that in the future class concerns will be more central to cultural studies than they were in the eighties. In fact, he added, “I am sure that we will return to the fundamental category of capital” (Morley and Chen 400 ). 7 What would it mean to reverse this trend, to return cultural studies to the fundamental category of capital? How might we do so in a way that would allow us to link culture to the development and meeting of human needs and yet not forfeit inquiry into the complex ways cultural forms and identities are historically articulated? Of course, I am especially interested in how the answers to these questions might affect how we understand sexual identity. Sexual identity has become one of the prime channels of cultural studies’ “headlong rush toward the pleasures and differences of postmodernism.” Not only has it provided the occasion for much new work on the libidinal economies of culture, but sexual identity also has been hailed as the basis for new postmodern models of political alliance and cited as an obvious index of the limits of class analysis. 8 Consequently, the very possibility of linking the study of sexual identity to capital has become all but unspeakable. As a way into this hypermanaged forbidden zone of cultural work, I want to suggest that we revisit some of the abandoned debates in the encounter between cultural studies and marxism at the dawn of neoliberalism.

2022 Michigan Kritik
**Final Supplement – FMPS** › **Kritik Updates** › Cap K – Link – Feminism

Feminism fails – it encourages a “leaning in” to the accumulative tendencies of capitalism

*does not link to vulnerability

Fraser 13 (Nancy Fraser, professor of philosophy and politics at the New School for Social Research in New York, “How feminism became capitalism's handmaiden - and how to reclaim it”, The Guardian, 10/14/13, ) // EL

As a feminist, I've always assumed that by fighting to emancipate women I was building a better world – more egalitarian, just and free. But lately I've begun to worry that ideals pioneered by feminists are serving quite different ends. I worry, specifically, that our critique of sexism is now supplying the justification for new forms of inequality and exploitation. In a cruel twist of fate, I fear that the movement for women's liberation has become entangled in a dangerous liaison with neoliberal efforts to build a free-market society. That would explain how it came to pass that feminist ideas that once formed part of a radical worldview are increasingly expressed in individualist terms. Where feminists once criticised a society that promoted careerism, they now advise women to "lean in". A movement that once prioritised social solidarity now celebrates female entrepreneurs. A perspective that once valorised "care" and interdependence now encourages individual advancement and meritocracy. What lies behind this shift is a sea-change in the character of capitalism. The state-managed capitalism of the postwar era has given way to a new form of capitalism – "disorganised", globalising, neoliberal. Second-wave feminism emerged as a critique of the first but has become the handmaiden of the second. With the benefit of hindsight, we can now see that the movement for women's liberation pointed simultaneously to two different possible futures. In a first scenario, it prefigured a world in which gender emancipation went hand in hand with participatory democracy and social solidarity; in a second, it promised a new form of liberalism, able to grant women as well as men the goods of individual autonomy, increased choice, and meritocratic advancement. Second-wave feminism was in this sense ambivalent. Compatible with either of two different visions of society, it was susceptible to two different historical elaborations. As I see it, feminism's ambivalence has been resolved in recent years in favour of the second, liberal-individualist scenario – but not because we were passive victims of neoliberal seductions. On the contrary, we ourselves contributed three important ideas to this development. One contribution was our critique of the "family wage": the ideal of a male breadwinner-female homemaker family that was central to state-organised capitalism. Feminist criticism of that ideal now serves to legitimate "flexible capitalism". After all, this form of capitalism relies heavily on women's waged labour, especially low-waged work in service and manufacturing, performed not only by young single women but also by married women and women with children; not by only racialised women, but by women of virtually all nationalities and ethnicities. As women have poured into labour markets around the globe, state-organised capitalism's ideal of the family wage is being replaced by the newer, more modern norm – apparently sanctioned by feminism – of the two-earner family. Never mind that the reality that underlies the new ideal is depressed wage levels, decreased job security, declining living standards, a steep rise in the number of hours worked for wages per household, exacerbation of the double shift – now often a triple or quadruple shift – and a rise in poverty, increasingly concentrated in female-headed households. Neoliberalism turns a sow's ear into a silk purse by elaborating a narrative of female empowerment. Invoking the feminist critique of the family wage to justify exploitation, it harnesses the dream of women's emancipation to the engine of capital accumulation. Feminism has also made a second contribution to the neoliberal ethos. In the era of state-organised capitalism, we rightly criticised a constricted political vision that was so intently focused on class inequality that it could not see such "non-economic" injustices as domestic violence, sexual assault and reproductive oppression. Rejecting "economism" and politicising "the personal", feminists broadened the political agenda to challenge status hierarchies premised on cultural constructions of gender difference. The result should have been to expand the struggle for justice to encompass both culture and economics. But the actual result was a one-sided focus on "gender identity" at the expense of bread and butter issues. Worse still, the feminist turn to identity politics dovetailed all too neatly with a rising neoliberalism that wanted nothing more than to repress all memory of social equality. In effect, we absolutised the critique of cultural sexism at precisely the moment when circumstances required redoubled attention to the critique of political economy. Finally, feminism contributed a third idea to neoliberalism: the critique of welfare-state paternalism. Undeniably progressive in the era of state-organised capitalism, that critique has since converged with neoliberalism's war on "the nanny state" and its more recent cynical embrace of NGOs. A telling example is "microcredit", the programme of small bank loans to poor women in the global south. Cast as an empowering, bottom-up alternative to the top-down, bureaucratic red tape of state projects, microcredit is touted as the feminist antidote for women's poverty and subjection. What has been missed, however, is a disturbing coincidence: microcredit has burgeoned just as states have abandoned macro-structural efforts to fight poverty, efforts that small-scale lending cannot possibly replace. In this case too, then, a feminist idea has been recuperated by neoliberalism. A perspective aimed originally at democratising state power in order to empower citizens is now used to legitimise marketisation and state retrenchment. In all these cases, feminism's ambivalence has been resolved in favour of (neo)liberal individualism. But the other, solidaristic scenario may still be alive. The current crisis affords the chance to pick up its thread once more, reconnecting the dream of women's liberation with the vision of a solidary society. To that end, feminists need to break off our dangerous liaison with neoliberalism and reclaim our three "contributions" for our own ends. First, we might break the spurious link between our critique of the family wage and flexible capitalism by militating for a form of life that de-centres waged work and valorises unwaged activities, including – but not only – carework. Second, we might disrupt the passage from our critique of economism to identity politics by integrating the struggle to transform a status order premised on masculinist cultural values with the struggle for economic justice. Finally, we might sever the bogus bond between our critique of bureaucracy and free-market fundamentalism by reclaiming the mantle of participatory democracy as a means of strengthening the public powers needed to constrain capital for the sake of justice.

2022 Michigan Kritik
**Final Supplement – FMPS** › **Kritik Updates** › Rupture K Link – Ballot

Asking for the ballot is a double turn.

Rita Dhamoon 05. Professor at the Department of Political Science in the University of British Columbia. “Beyond Inclusion Politics: Reconstituting the Political Order”. 6/2/5. . GJII

Furthermore, inclusion discourses can potentially relativize and trivialize differences (Lee & Cardinal, 1998: 226). The CAPAR goes to some length to avoid this. It cites the Ethnic Diversity Survey which found that nearly 50 percent of Blacks reported discrimination or unfair treatment compared to 33 percent of South Asians and 33 percent of Chinese respondents (Heritage, 2005: 8); it acknowledges that in exploring “the different experiences of ethno-racial and ethno-cultural groups and to provide meaningful statistics on racism, race must be compared with other factors such as gender, age, education and income” (Heritage, 2005: 9); and it specifically identifies the value of intersectional analysis because of the particular “issues affecting Aboriginal women, racial minority women, and migrant, immigrant and refugee women” (Heritage, 2005: 27). Yet despite these measures, it is striking to note that the plan conflates racism with colonialism and anti-Semitism, thereby undermining the ability to address differences. Whilst the plan acknowledges particular kinds of experiences -- such as employment discrimination against ethnic groups, disproportionate numbers of Indigenous people in prisons, and attacks against Jewish synagogues -- it does not name these as racism, colonialism and anti-Semitism. Thus even though the plan lays out a working definition of racism (Heritage, 2005: 7-9), it fails to identify the differing forms of racialized, colonial and anti-Semitic experiences. This is important, for instance, because of the ways in which Indigenous people are addressed in the CAPAR without reference to historical and on-going colonial legislative acts that are racially oppressive, including for the example the Indian Act which continues to be used by the state to control status determination and band membership.4 Though Indigenous peoples are racialized in ways similar to people of colour through white supremacy, the attempted erasure of Indigenous bodies, knowledge, resources and land is distinct from the racism faced by people of colour in Canada. As Lee and Cardinal state, “By not recognizing hierarchies in categorical difference, strategies of inclusion contribute to the erasure of inequality by pluralizing differences and ignoring power and resource differentials” (Lee & Cardinal, 1998: 226). The role of power should be critical in any analysis of racialized, ethnic and/or cultural identities and relations, and yet is strangely neglected in the CAPAR. Instead, the plan articulates inclusion through a discourse of collective unity. One of the three objectives of the CAPAR is “to strengthen social cohesion through antiracism measures” (Heritage, 2005: 10). The conclusion reiterates this point in which it is stated that the priorities of the CAPAR “enhance the value of Canadian citizenship by strengthening our social bonds, and making our shared values more relevant to contemporary life in Canada” (Heritage, 2005: 56). In particular the plan highlights the role of Citizenship and Immigration Canada in integrating immigrants. Whilst the framing of integration presents ways to include otherwise excluded peoples, the discourse of inclusion masks the ways in which integration itself can be wrought with conformist and assimilationalist tendencies. Whilst the necessity to develop bonds of social cohesion and shared values and citizenship should be an important feature of the political order, mechanisms of inclusion can also potentially erase differences that some groups want to maintain. Many Indigenous leaders made this argument following the 1969 White Paper which suggested that erasing the requirement of status for Indians would bring this group of Indigenous people to the same level of citizenship as other Canadians. As Indigenous activist and scholar Harold Cardinal (1969) argued shortly after the White Paper was published, while First Nations people have historically been excluded because of their status they also depend on their legal status as ‘Indians’ to assert treaty rights and make claims of self-determination.5 Inclusionary goals, in other words, presume that integration is desirable but without fully accounting for the fine line between integration and assimilation. That is not to say that the CAPAR promotes a model of forced assimilation. Rather, the plan expresses the desire for inclusion through what Richard Day calls ‘seductive integration’ (2000: 9). Day argues that dominant groups create a society in which excluded Others are implicitly seduced into dominant norms, values and structures because their chances of political, economic and social success are dependent on integrating (or being included) into the core. As such, inclusion is framed for the benefit of racialized Others rather than as a way to demand forced conformity; if ethnic and racial minorities become included into mainstream society through participation in dominant practices and structures, or so the argument goes, they will reap material benefits. This not only overestimates the potential of inclusion to eliminate repressive and productive forms of power (where one outcome is racism), but it also underestimates the ways in which inclusion enables the state to manage the ‘strangeness’ of Others through indirect measures. Put differently, inclusion does not necessarily end racism and at the same time it allows the state to regulate racialized Others by bringing those on the outside into the core.

2022 Michigan Kritik
**Final Supplement – FMPS** › **Kritik Updates** › Rupture K Link – Pragmatism Swiss Army Knife

Embrace pragmatism – fallibilism, anti-skepticism, and consequentialism are the most effective instruments to navigate both abstract theory and the political world. They’re compatible with revolutionary visions but defense misconceives pragmatism as a defense of actual pragmatists.

Jack Knight & James Johnson 11. Jack Knight is professor of political science and law at Duke University and the author of Institutions and Social Conflict. James Johnson is associate professor of political science at the University of Rochester and former editor of Perspectives on Politics. “The Priority of Democracy: Political Consequences of Pragmatism”. Princeton University Press 2011. 8/22/11. Chapter 2. 25-28. GJII

Pragmatism “narrowly conceived” is a philosophical view that consists of “a set of arguments about knowledge, meaning and truth.”1 That said, pragmatists are an unruly lot. They disagree among themselves about various philosophical and political issues.2 We are uninterested here in adjudicating these disputes. Our concern is less with policing pragmatism and its boundaries than with advancing a conception of democracy that derives considerable motivation from its pragmatist bearings but that will prove compelling whether or not one embraces pragmatism. We consequently distinguish between the general, relatively ambiguous concept of pragmatism and the particular conception of pragmatism that we endorse. In so doing, we embrace what Dewey calls “the pragmatic rule” which holds that “in order to discover the meaning of [an] idea ask for its consequences.”3 As we formulate and defend our conception of pragmatism, we are especially concerned with highlighting its consequences for thinking about political institutions in general and democratic political arrangements in particular.

Our characterization of pragmatism explicitly is reconstructive. We do not claim that this or that classical or contemporary pragmatist actually adopts a position of the sort we outline. We do, however, draw upon the resources that those classical and contemporary pragmatists offer as we formulate our own defensible pragmatist position. Our enterprise is distinctive in large part because other pragmatists either have not made the sorts of argument we advance, have derived different implications from positions we might share, or would resist the more general position that we reconstruct from particular arguments. We are, in any case, interested here less in engaging in a full-scale debate with these writers than in relying upon them, as foil or as warrant, for the conception that we reconstruct.

2022 Michigan Disadvantage
AT: DOD DA › AFF

No tradeoff – Spending just got increased

Connor O’Brien and Lawrence Ukenye - 7/14/22 Lawrence Ukenye has a journalism and political science major from Temple University, Connor O’Brien has a political science major from Anslem College and is a current senior defense reporter for Politico

The House approved sweeping defense policy legislation on Thursday that marks the second straight year Democrats and Republicans endorsed significant increases to President Joe Biden’s Pentagon spending plan. The $839 billion National Defense Authorization Act, approved in a 329-101 vote, is $37 billion more than the administration sought in military spending. On top of the budget, the bill also rebukes several of Biden’s national security plans. Members maintained a nuclear cruise missile the administration planned to scrap, hampered F-16 sales to Turkey and limited the number of aircraft and ships the Pentagon can retire. In a bipartisan blowout, 180 Democrats and 149 Republicans joined forces to pass legislation, which authorizes Pentagon spending levels and sets overarching military policy. “It is the definition of a bipartisan bill,” said Rep. Mike Rogers of Alabama, the top Republican on the Armed Services Committee. It includes billions for more aircraft and ships than the Pentagon sought, following a bipartisan vote by the House Armed Services Committee to raise the bill’s price tag by $37 billion. Republicans and a sizable number of Democrats saw Biden’s request — already a $30 billion increase from the current year — as not enough to keep up with runaway inflation and match challenges posed by China and Russia. The final Pentagon topline will have to be hammered out by House and Senate leaders in a compromise defense bill. And lawmakers must also pass a spending bill that makes the increase a reality. Lawmakers this week slugged it out over the size of the Pentagon budget. The House rejected a push by progressive Reps. Barbara Lee (D-Calif.) and Mark Pocan (D-Wis.) to revert the bill to Biden’s original $802 billion request, though most Democrats backed the effort. House Armed Services Chair Adam Smith (D-Wash.) unsuccessfully fought against increasing the topline during a June committee markup. He backed the progressive push to slash the topline by $37 billion, arguing Biden’s budget level is sufficient to meet the military’s needs. “It’s not like we aren’t spending money if we stick to the president’s budget,” Smith said. “I think that’s the number we should stick to.” Biden’s quest to sell F-16 fighters to Turkey also suffered a setback at the hands of Democrats, as the House approved an amid concerns about its purchase of Russian weapons, violation of neighboring countries’ territory and human rights concerns. The measure was adopted 244-179, with 184 Democrats backing the proposal. If the provision becomes law, Biden will have to certify that the sale is critical to U.S. national security. Progressives suffered another blow by the inclusion of funding to continue the development of a sea-launched nuclear cruise missile, a program the White House sought to kill. But lawmakers added guardrails on the weapon by requiring an analysis of alternatives and the declassification of the Pentagon’s Nuclear Posture Review before funding can be freed up. Most contentious issues that could have broken up the bill’s bipartisan coalition were kept off the floor, most notably a to expand troops’ access to abortions at military medical facilities. Still, Democrats muscled through some of their priorities. The House narrowly approved a provision from Del. Eleanor Holmes Norton (D-D.C.) that grants the mayor of the District of Columbia the same control over its National Guard that governors of states have, whereas the city’s Guard powers are currently controlled by the president. The amendment was approved by the House after failing in the Armed Services Committee. Democrats also voted to repeal the 2002 Iraq War authorization, a post-9/11 presidential power that authorized military force with Congress’ approval. Similar proposals have passed the House but haven’t yet seen action in the Senate, despite Senate Majority Leader Chuck Schumer claiming the move was a priority. Other proposals with no connection to defense were wrapped into the bill. Rep. Ed Perlmutter (D-Colo.) won inclusion of his legislation to allow cannabis businesses to access the banking system. A bipartisan proposal from Reps. Mikie Sherrill (D-N.J.), Democratic Caucus Chair Hakeem Jeffries (D-N.Y.) and others were included to eliminate the federal sentencing disparity between drug offenses for powder and crack cocaine. A heightened budget topline saw lawmakers propose purchasing more aircraft and ships, and prevent the military from retiring many older weapons as a money-saving move. The bill authorizes 13 new warships, adding five ships the Navy didn’t request — an extra Arleigh Burke-class destroyer, another Constellation-class frigate, another fleet oiler and two expeditionary medical ships. It also requires the Navy to keep five of the nine littoral combat ships it sought to retire. Lawmakers turned back a push by Smith to allow the service to scrap all nine hulls. The bill also authorizes 64 F-35 fighter jets, three more than the Pentagon sought across the military services. Lawmakers approved $354 million to procure three more F-35C carrier-based jets for the Navy.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
Aff › Impact Answers › Impact Turn – Populism

Republican win lead to populism

Ulmer 5/26/22 – (Alexandra Ulmer is a U.S. National Correspondent with Reuters. “Beyond Donald Trump, Trumpism is the winner in U.S. midterm primaries," Japan Times, 5-26-2022, ) – LASA LC

The crushing defeat of David Perdue in Tuesday’s Republican gubernatorial primary in Georgia likely delighted Donald Trump’s adversaries, who have been keeping scorecards to measure the performance of election candidates backed by the former U.S. president. Trump has weighed in on November’s midterm elections like no former president, announcing more than 190 endorsements and holding rallies with his proteges. The success of his endorsees is seen as a key sign of his continued influence over the party as he hints at another run for the White House in 2024. But political analysts and Republican strategists caution that any jubilation among Trump’s enemies over Perdue’s loss to Georgia Gov. Brian Kemp is short-sighted, and that any scorecard is a poor barometer for the state of Trumpism in the United States in 2022. While Trump’s candidates have had mixed success so far this year in party primaries, many Republican voters still embrace Trump’s false claims of voter fraud in the 2020 election, as well as his right-wing, “America First” populist ideology. And failure to win Trump’s endorsement has not stopped some Republican candidates from going hard-right to try to win over his base. “In 2016, Trump was really the only candidate running as that sort of populist. Now it’s increasingly what most Republican primary candidates sound like,” said Republican strategist Alex Conant. That underlines the continuation of the Trump-led metamorphosis of the Republican Party since he was voted out of the White House in 2020, even as some party leaders seek to move the party away from Trumpism, the strategists and analysts said. “I think the No. 1 thing Trump has absolutely changed in the party is that Republicans don’t even try playing nice anymore. My side has become more angry,” said Republican strategist Chuck Warren. The people’s ‘Make America Great Again’ Trump’s kingmaker status was put to the test this month when several high-profile, Trump-backed candidates faced Republican primaries in Ohio, Pennsylvania, North Carolina and Georgia. Around two-thirds of high-profile candidates backed by Trump triumphed in their contests in May, although some were running unopposed or against weak challengers. One race, the Republican senate contest in Pennsylvania between television personality Mehmet Oz, who received Trump’s endorsement, and former hedge fund executive David McCormick, has yet to be decided. In lobbying for the former president’s endorsement, both men cast aside their elite backgrounds to espouse the Trump-style populism that now resonates with Republicans. The primary was shaken up by Kathy Barnette, a conservative political commentator, who came from nowhere at the 11th hour to tighten a race that had until then appeared to be a two-man contest. While she finished a distant third in the primaries, analysts said she was emblematic of how Trump’s Make America Great Again movement has expanded beyond his control. “MAGA does not belong to President Trump,” Barnette said during a Republican debate last month, even as Trump spoke out against her. “Although he coined the word, MAGA actually belongs to the people.” Republican voters in Pennsylvania also backed Trump-endorsed far-right candidate Doug Mastriano for governor, who supports abortion bans with no exceptions and backs Trump’s false claims of election fraud. Mastriano won his contest. In North Carolina, Republican voters powered Trump-backed Representative Ted Budd, who voted to overturn Joe Biden’s election win, to victory in the state’s Republican Senate nomination. Georgia’s governor’s race, where Perdue was pummeled on Tuesday by Kemp, shows how the Republican Party has shifted to the right, irrespective of how Trump-endorsed candidates perform in these primaries. While Kemp did not entertain Trump’s conspiracy theories of 2020 election fraud, he did enact sweeping voting restrictions, limited abortions and expanded gun rights. But voters were only willing to follow Trump so far in backing flawed candidates in May’s nominating contests. In another race on Tuesday, for Georgia’s secretary of state position, some experts had forecast neither securing a majority, triggering a run-off. Instead, incumbent Brad Raffensperger narrowly defeated Trump-endorsed Rep. Jody Hice, who amplified Trump’s baseless claims that he actually won the Georgia presidential vote in 2020. In North Carolina, voters ousted scandal-plagued congressman Madison Cawthorn despite Trump’s last-minute plea to give him “a second chance.” And in Nebraska, Trump’s choice for governor, Charles Herbster, lost amid accusations that he had sexually harassed several women. But what is already clear, analysts say, is that Trump’s winning 2016 strategy to seize on the issues bitterly polarizing Americans is increasingly being emulated by Republican candidates this year and enthusiastically embraced by party supporters. The spread of this right-wing populism may ultimately open the door for more challengers to Trump’s vice-like grip on the party ahead of the next presidential election, said Conant, the Republican strategist.