2022
Michigan
Counterplan
Aff › AT: QPQ CP › Deficit—Say No—Domestic Politics
Zannella, 20 [Anthony Zannella Seton Hall University, majored in Political Science and Philosophy, 4-7-2020 "An Analysis of Burden Sharing in NATO and the Problem of Free Riding," Political Analysis: Vol. 21 , Article 5, /alundy]
The literature on burden sharing has shown great development over the years moving from a more pecuniary focus, to a focus that incorporates a variety of inconspicuous factors. From a deterrence and pure public goods standpoint, the United States is bearing an unfair share of the burden. The simple fact that it is leading the way economically (and in turn with the efficiency and effectiveness of its forces) shows that non-U.S. NATO allies are indeed benefitting unfairly from its ally’s efforts. The decline in NATO allied defense spending indicates the acceptance of relying on U.S. capabilities and letting their own forces bear less of the financial responsibility associated with collective defense. However, the simplicity of this model does not consider other factors that can be just as important to burden sharing. The joint product model would seem to take better account of factors that do not seem immediately pertinent to burden sharing but are without a doubt just as important. The dedication of alliance forces can produce strain in a political manner due to the potential loss of life and the ramifications such losses can have back home. Furthermore, the introduction of excludable goods levels the playing field in different ways. The massive output of defense provided by the U.S., incurs significant benefits that are only a positive for the U.S. alone. The expansion of the defense industry, for example, can provide jobs and further stimulate the U.S. economy; however, this is a good that other nations cannot benefit from directly. This same idea can be redirected back to non-U.S. NATO allies. Many of them intend to focus more on domestic issues at home while letting their forces weaken under the greater protection of the United States. With new threats on the rise and a turn to out-of-area operations, it becomes apparent that if the U.S. “is able to provide politically or physically sufficient levels of security for the rest of NATO’s members in response… then other members can free ride and will provide little additional assistance. Therefore, we should expect even more free riding than in the past,” (Siegel 2009).
2022
Michigan
Counterplan
Aff › AT: QPQ CP › Deficit—Say No—Cost
Gilli 17 (Andrea Gilli is post-doctoral fellow at Stanford University’s Center for International Security and Cooperation. “The Trump administration wants Europe to pay more to defend itself. It’s not that easy.” Washington Post. Feb. 3, 2017. https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2017/02/03/europe-may-not-be-able-to-expand-its-defenses-like-president-trump-wants/)
The transatlantic gap in military capabilities — how much defense output the two sides of the Atlantic are able to generate, respectively — has three main causes that cannot easily be addressed:
1) European countries have limited defense budgets — On average, defense expenditure in Europe is just over 1 percent of GDP, while the U.S. defense budget is well above 4 percent of GDP. Would a U.S. retrenchment push European allies to fix this imbalance, and bring NATO members closer to the 2 percent threshold they pledged to move toward in 2014?
2022
Michigan
Counterplan
Aff › AT: QPQ CP › Deficit—Say No—Cost
Wohlforth 16 (William C. Wohlforth, Daniel Webster Professor of Government in the Dartmouth College Department of Government, “The Right Choice for NATO,” This chapter will appear in: Sustainable Security: Rethinking American, National Security Strategy, edited by Jeremi Suri and Benjamin Valentino, )
A further, critical implication of this assessment of the strategic environment is rarely noted: it is entirely inconsistent with shock therapy’s assumption about the lack of serious threats to European security to say that calling the United States’ Article 5 commitment into question will cause European governments step up and create more military capacity via increased spending or cooperation. On the contrary, a relatively benign security setting is arguably more conducive to allowing (p.260) narrow national perspectives to trump EU-wide initiatives and to foster the continuation of minimalist defense efforts than the status quo of US leadership. America’s NATO allies make up nearly a fifth of global military spending. Britain is the fourth biggest military spender in the world, with France close behind (after another US ally, Japan) as sixth. Germany, Italy, Turkey, and Canada all rank among the world’s fifteen biggest spenders.41 Very secure states like Norway and Canada purchase sophisticated weaponry from the US military-industrial complex and order their soldiers into battle in America’s wars in far off lands. Why? A major reason is the alliance with the United States—it is the existence of the overseas hegemon and the perceived need to retain access to it and standing with it that drive much of this behavior.42
Options 1 and 2 are based on the assumption that the international system generates strong pressures for European states to do one or all of three very costly things: ramp up spending on defense; reform entrenched domestic defense practices and institutions; and set aside national prerogatives to generate genuine supranational military defense and decision making at the EU level. Take away Uncle Sam’s “welfare for the rich” and the logic of anarchy will somehow force this outcome. It cannot be ruled out that there is something special about Europe that would cause it to act in this collectively martial way without the US umbrella. But that expectation is inconsistent with most of what we know about international politics and with the lived experience of the EU’s European Security and Defense Policy and Common Foreign and Security Policy. Governments just don’t do extremely expensive and politically costly things without a major prod of some sort. The problem is that there is neither a compelling external security incentive nor a European hegemon to help solve the collective action problem. Germany may play this role in economics, but it is not going to do so in security.43 The likelihood that a US revocation of Article 5 would spur France and Britain to set aside national feeling and unite defense efforts—and that middle powers from Poland to Turkey would acquiesce—is exceedingly low. Indeed, the downward trend in European defense spending has continued despite the continuing decline in American military forces in Europe and despite increasingly loud calls for retrenchment.
2022
Michigan
Counterplan
Neg › Entrapment DA › 2NC !—Scenario—Norway/Russia—Support Angers Russia
Wegge ’22 [Njrod.; Mar; Norwegian Defence University College, Norway; Arctic Review on Law and Politics, “The Strategic Role of Land Power on NATO’s Northern Flank,” https://arcticreview.no/index.php/arctic/article/view/3428/6330; Vol. 13, 2022, pp. 94–113]
The defence of Norway, including its arctic islands, must be seen in the context of the NATO alliance. Experiencing the failed policy of neutrality in 1940, followed by five years of German occupation, Norway has, since the foundation of NATO in 1949, looked westward for her security. After deciding to join NATO, Norway sought to improve the likelihood of receiving support in crises and war through several means, including the active policy of inviting foreign troops to exercises in Norway, and increased military coordination and integration with other western powers, especially the USA. To adapt the Norwegian force structure, including its operational concepts, to conform with her key NATO partners, particularly the USA, and to some degree the UK, has, since 1949, been given high priority, influencing both ways and means. In this perspective, working to ensure both American willingness as well as ability, to assist Norway on NATO’s northern flank has been crucial in Norway’s effort to deter potential Soviet aggression. From this perspective, the massive nuclear capabilities of the Northern Fleet represent not only a Norwegian problem, but also a challenge for the USA and its NATO allies. Norway has both overlapping interests with NATO, as well as its own unique national interests. As a state directly bordering Russia, Norway has a particular need to combine the deterrence policy of invitation and integration of allied forces, with certain screening measures and self-imposed restrictions. These restrictions are most notably, disallowing the siting of foreign bases with regular combat units during peacetime, restrictions forbidding nuclear weapons in Norway, and restrictions on how far east allied exercises and training in Norway can take place. Norway’s policy-line, influencing both ideas about military objectives, concepts and resources, captures the country’s dual approach, and can be summed up in the phrase “integration and screening”.
Norway has been of particular interest to the US given the country’s proximity to the Kola Peninsula and the Russian Northern military district. This location was, and remains, an unusually well-placed location for the collection of military intelligence in addition to potential force projection. In addition, Norway’s closeness to the North Atlantic and the crucial transit route for Russian submarines seeking to enter central areas of the Atlantic Ocean and posing a threat to trans-Atlantic communication, has been another vital aspect of US military interest in Norway.
2022
Michigan
Counterplan
Neg › Entrapment DA › 2NC !—Scenario—Norway/Russia—Security Spirals
Wilhelmsen ’20 [Julie.; Sep 30; Norwegian Institute of International Affairs; Journal of Global Security Studies, “Spiraling toward a New Cold War in the North? The Effect of Mutual and Multifaceted Securitization ,” https://academic.oup.com/jogss/article/6/3/ogaa044/5916402; Vol. 6, 2021, pp. 1–19]
Studying Escalation through Mutual and Multifaceted Securitization
While some hold that the growing rhetoric of confrontation between Russia and the West can be employed without running the risk of war (Lieven 2018), I take this use of words seriously. Political language serves to make some courses of action legitimate and logical, while precluding others (Hansen 2006, 21; Jackson 2006; Wilhelmsen 2017). According to this fundamental discourse-theoretical insight, securitization—defined as a process where the other is increasingly cast as different and dangerous to the self—will manifest itself in concrete policy practices (Hagmann 2015, 9; Hayes 2009, 985; Wilhelmsen 2017, 28–29). Thus, there is a link between the rhetoric of confrontation that produces the subjectivities of threatened self and threatening other, and the policy responses initiated in the course of such a securitization.6 The more different and dangerous to the self the other is construed as being, perhaps even to the level of “existential threat,” the more reasonable and logical will the use of force against this other appear (Bandura 1990, 7–8; Wilhelmsen 2017, 24–26).
2022
Michigan
Counterplan
Neg › Entrapment DA › 2NC !—Scenario—Norway/Russia—Miscalc
Wilhelmsen ’20 [Julie.; Sep 30; Norwegian Institute of International Affairs; Journal of Global Security Studies, “Spiraling toward a New Cold War in the North? The Effect of Mutual and Multifaceted Securitization ,” https://academic.oup.com/jogss/article/6/3/ogaa044/5916402; Vol. 6, 2021, pp. 1–19]
Focusing on the changing relations between Norway and Russia, I show how rising tension spread from the 2014 crises in Ukraine to the North.1 Initially, both parties declared that they neither wanted nor believed that the new strategic tension between Russia and the West would spread to or define relations in this region. This was not surprising. Norway and Russia had managed to build a close and practical partnership in the North following the end of the Cold War. Relations in the region had been characterized as pervaded by a spirit of cooperation and a “culture of compromise” (Hønneland and Jensen 2015). However, by October 2018, NATO was conducting “Trident Juncture,” the largest military exercise since the Cold War on Norwegian territory, with twenty-nine NATO countries participating, as well as Finland and Sweden, involving 50,000 troops in all.2 While this exercise was underway, Russia unexpectedly announced that it would conduct missile tests in the Norwegian Sea simultaneously.3 Few could deny that the new Russia–West tensions had spread to the North. Although the Norwegian authorities were reluctant to identify Russia as a “threat” for an entire year after the annexation of Crimea, today they openly speak of and prepare for hostilities. Russia, for its part, recently claimed that Norway has become “the frontier of deterrence of Russia” in the policy plans of the United States and NATO.4
This development will be explained with reference to changing Russian and Norwegian representations of each other: toward construing the other part more as a threat than a partner in one issue-area, the rippling outward of this representation to other issue-areas, the policy changes effectuated in line with these shifting representations, and how these changes have been (re-)acted upon by the other side. Within such a process of mutual and multifaceted securitization, attention to domestic audiences, quests for internal unity, and coherent identity articulation in volatile times send signals of offense and non-recognition across the border to the foreign state audience—playing into a mutual blame game, shaping interaction, and further escalating tensions to the point where the threat of hostilities seems imminent. As long acknowledged by security-dilemma theorists, both the classical realist and newer constructivist proponents, interaction has a dynamics of its own (Herz 1950; Jervis 1978; Mitzen 2006; Booth and Wheeler 2008). I argue that the emerging and mutual pattern of representing the other as a threat, not only in the military sphere, but also across issue-areas, has become an “autonomous” driver of conflict—regardless of whether either side (Norway/NATO/West, and Russia) might originally have had offensive designs on the other.5
2022
Michigan
Counterplan
Neg › Entrapment DA › 2NC !—Scenario—Norway/Russia—Yes Escalation
Johnjo Devlin, 6-15-2022, "Beyond the Wall: The NATO Soldiers Guarding the Arctic from Russia," No Publication, //EZAY
It may seem odd that Østtun is defending this barren tundra. But make no mistake: Control of the Arctic is of vital strategic importance for the Kremlin.
Much of Russia’s oil and gas production sits within the Arctic Circle, and about 20 percent of Russian exports are generated here. As global warming thaws the ice, sea trade routes are beginning to open up too. Controlling these may give Russia influence over global commerce in decades to come, and the invasion of Ukraine has shown just how far Vladimir Putin is willing to go to achieve his strategic goals. Not since the Cold War has Arctic security been such a high priority for NATO.
2022
Michigan
Counterplan
Neg › Entrapment DA › 2NC !—Scenario—Norway/Russia—Yes Emboldenment—Studies
Wilhelmsen ’20 [Julie.; Sep 30; Norwegian Institute of International Affairs; Journal of Global Security Studies, “Spiraling toward a New Cold War in the North? The Effect of Mutual and Multifaceted Securitization ,” https://academic.oup.com/jogss/article/6/3/ogaa044/5916402; Vol. 6, 2021, pp. 1–19]
This study builds on in-depth, systematic scrutiny of official statements from the years 2014 to 2018. The Norwegian data are statements, press releases, speeches, etc., from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA), the Prime Minister's Office, and the Ministry of Defense (MoD). The Russian data are transcripts and statements from the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and transcripts from the public appearances of the President. The texts have been “scraped”—downloaded in full—from www.regjeringen.no, www.mid.ru, and www.kremlin.ru. Using the open source “corporaexplorer” software (Gjerde 2019), we then extracted a clearly defined subset of this large document collection: The final text collection contains documents that include references to both Russia and the Arctic on the Norwegian side, and documents that include references to Norway or the Arctic on the Russian side—the difference being due to the far higher number of documents on the Norwegian side. In certain parts of the analysis, the official texts retrieved through web-scraping have been supplemented by media articles referring to comments from Russian and Norwegian officials. The aim has been to sample more statements at particularly critical events in order to study action–reaction patterns.
The texts have been studied by using discourse analysis in the tradition of Laclau and Mouffe (1985), with emphasis on the contested nature of meaning-making. This has implied systematically mapping the changing pattern of self and other representations in official texts. The method has been designed to foreground the constitutive power of language and capture securitization as a process by studying a plethora of official utterances over time (Wilhelmsen 2014, 58–64; Stengel 2019). I focus not only on how certain verbs, adverbs, and adjectives attached to nouns might help to constitute the other as increasingly different and dangerous to the self (Milliken 1999, 232–33), but also on how linguistic repetitions, mergers, and comparisons might contribute to such a process. The article also lists concrete policy practices that have been implemented in line with Norway's changing representations of Russia in the section “A new Norwegian approach to Russia.” These have been retrieved from Norwegian media and from Norwegian MOD and MFA websites. While the combination of systematically reading and manually coding such large bodies of text is exceptionally time-consuming, the mixture arguably strengthens the reliability of interpretivist endeavors such as this (Hopf and Allan 2016, 20).
2022
Michigan
Counterplan
Neg › Entrapment DA › 2NC !—Scenario—Norway/Russia—Yes Emboldenment
Wilhelmsen and Gjerde ’18 [Julie and Kristian Lundby.; Dec; Senior Researcher, Norwegian Institute of International Affairs (NUPI); Research Fellow, Norwegian Institute of International Affairs (NUPI); Arctic Review on Law and Politics, “Norway and Russia in the Arctic: New Cold War Contamination?,” https://arcticreview.no/index.php/arctic/article/view/1334/2948; Vol. 9, 2018, pp. 382–407]
Russian officials elaborate on relations with Norway especially in the context of ministerial visits, but also in commenting on specific events and answering questions from the press. In this explicit, official Russian discourse on Norway, we find several distinct representations of Norway, fairly stable, but with a shift in emphasis since 2014: Norway is increasingly seen as the prolonged arm of NATO and the USA—a significant point, given the representation of NATO as a threat.
Initially, Norway appears mainly as a good neighbor, in bilateral relations and through multilateral institutions like the Arctic Council, the Northern Dimension, and the Barents Euro-Arctic Council. Norway is often mentioned in the energy context, with Statoil as a promising corporate partner for Russian companies and an example of a successful state corporation. Norway gets recognition for its contribution to cooperative efforts aimed at removing chemical weapons from Syria. In particular, the 2010 maritime delimitation agreement between Russia and Norway is hailed as a key achievement under the Medvedev presidency, and is later defended against internal Russian accusations that the treaty was a “gift” from Russia to Norway—the treaty is presented as “just and in accordance with international law,” and “advantageous to both states.”
2022
Michigan
Counterplan
Neg › Entrapment DA › 2NC !—Scenario—Norway/Russia—Yes Emboldenment
Wilhelmsen and Gjerde ’18 [Julie and Kristian Lundby.; Dec; Senior Researcher, Norwegian Institute of International Affairs (NUPI); Research Fellow, Norwegian Institute of International Affairs (NUPI); Arctic Review on Law and Politics, “Norway and Russia in the Arctic: New Cold War Contamination?,” https://arcticreview.no/index.php/arctic/article/view/1334/2948; Vol. 9, 2018, pp. 382–407]
While this greater emphasis on Russia as human rights violator is voiced mostly by the Norwegian MFA and the Prime Minister, also MoD representations construct Russia as an opposite to Norway/the West/NATO in terms of values. Further, MoD texts now represent Russia as a security-oriented big power in the North. Modernization of the Russian military is no longer associated with “normalization” as in 2012, but with Russia’s rising big-power ambitions. Norway is held to need new military capabilities in the North to defend its sovereignty and protect its interests. Presenting a strong NATO as prerequisite for Norwegian security, the new government also seeks to strengthen transatlantic bonds and reinforce collaboration with NATO. These entities are represented as trustworthy, orderly, and reliable, whereas Russia’s status is tilting toward threatening. According to MoD texts, greater collaboration is needed within the transatlantic community, not necessarily with Russia. The NATO–Russia Council is seen as the best multilateral forum for relating to Russia. We also note the expressed ambition of giving Norway a more central role in NATO and of taking the NATO footprint North, through more allied training and exercises as well as military capabilities. In sum, and building on the changes in Norwegian Self/Other representations, we find a clear re-orientation toward a realist mode of policy already before the annexation of Crimea—in MoD understandings of the High North as primarily a security space, as well as in policies aimed at making national security a priority in the North.
4.2. A tectonic shift, 2014–2016
2022
Michigan
Counterplan
Neg › Entrapment DA › 2NC !—Scenario—Norway/Russia—1NC
Heier, 18—professor, Norwegian Defence University College (Tormod, “Avoiding War: How Should Northern Europe Respond to the US-Russian Rivalry?,” Arctic Review on Law and Politics Vol. 9, 2018, pp. 267–286, dml)
Norwegian willing compliance with allied injunctions has contributed to making Norway a “small middle power” in Europe.44 This is because NATO guidance has helped Norway stir a military transformation that has channelled scarce resources from a large mobilisation force into a more agile professional force. Despite a lack of sustainability however, prospects for more permanent US reinforcements – seen since 2014 – have to some extent eased Norwegian apprehensions. This is particularly so as Russian “snap exercises” and cyberattacks towards critical infrastructure have increased over the past few years.45 Burden sharing in Afghanistan, Iraq and Syria, as well as intensified intelligence gathering towards Russia’s Northern Fleet have nevertheless cemented transatlantic ties. This logic has long roots in Norwegian strategic thinking. According to Defence Minister (1986–1989) Johan Jørgen Holst, a potential crisis with Russia should not end up as a war with Norway, but rather as a war about Norway.46 Burden sharing abroad would make it easier to get US attention and support if a Norwegian tripwire needed to be triggered in the High North. This burden sharing takes place in part through military channels in the Norwegian Intelligence Service, as well as in various parts of the Navy, Air Force and Special Forces commands, which on a daily basis operate closely with US forces in the United States, Norway, Belgium, Germany, Jordan, Iraq and the United Arab Emirates. It also occurs through Norway’s extensive diplomatic networks embodied in the Ministry of Defence and Foreign Affairs, which on a daily basis cultivates US ties in Washington D.C., Brussels and London.47 Norway’s fears of abandonment by NATO have been allayed, in accordance with Snyder’s theoretical assumptions.
In addition, these networks can be interpreted as a sort of deterrence towards Russia. A more visible US presence in Norwegian airspace and territorial waters, as well as in the northern counties of Finnmark, Troms and Trøndelag underscores a more credible US deterrent component in Northern Europe. Combined with updated reinforcement and readiness plans, as well as more allied exercises, this enhanced NATO presence sends the signal to Russia that Norwegian and US security are inseparable, at least in theory. The credibility of this claim is further seen through a softening of previously self-imposed restraints, such as restrictions on allied bases and exercises closer to Russia’s second strike capability on the Kola Peninsula. Other examples are found in the US Marine Corps’ presence on a rotational basis in Mid-Norway,48 high intensity combat exercises in Finnmark county with extensive US participation,49 new infrastructure for US Air Forces in southeast Norway, and new facilities for the US ground forces in Troms county.50 These developments are consistent with Walt’s expectation of a small state’s balancing behaviour towards an assertive neighbour.
2022
Michigan
Counterplan
Neg › Entrapment DA › 2NC !—Yes Entrapment—Means Entrapment
David Edelstein 18 — (David Edelstein; Vice Dean of Faculty in Georgetown College and a professor in the Department of Government, Published: December 2018; "Entrapment Revisited: Strategic and Structural Dynamics"; Accessed: 7-5-2022; https://cpb-us-w2.wpmucdn.com/u.osu.edu/dist/5/66008/files/2018/12/Entrapment-Revisited-Strategic-and-Structural-Dynamics-1xpycy1.pdf)//Pen-SY
Finally, means entrapment describes a situation in which Ally A is maneuvered by Ally B into committing more resources to confrontation than it otherwise desired. This is distinct from goal entrapment: even if A and B agree on their strategic objectives, B may still end up dragging A into a costlier commitment than intended by underproviding the capabilities required and pushing A to make up the difference. This situation can either be intentional – where B withholds available resources from a contest in order to deploy them elsewhere and/or shift the burden onto its partners – or unintentional – where B underestimates the capabilities required to achieve a specified end and, lacking the requisite resources, turns to A. In either case, A is compelled to intervene for fear of harming the alliance’s credibility, prestige, and future functions. Metaphorically, and occasionally literally, B calls for A’s cavalry to ride over the hill to its assistance. Although poorly catalogued, means entrapment may be the most common form of entrapment. States, after all, regularly promise one another the military tools required for joint military action, only to change course and leave their partners high and dry. During the opening days of World War One, for example, Austria-Hungary reneged on agreements to deploy most of its forces against Russia while Germany attacked France, exposing Germany to Russian assault and requiring Germany to alter its own war plans.38 Similarly, Soviet and Chinese officials only agreed to back North Korea in the Korean War when assured by North Korea that the contest would be quickly won and limited in scope; when this assumption proved overly optimistic following the American-backed intervention in June 1950, the USSR and China were forced to commit their own forces rather than see their client collapse.39 As we discuss below, the 2011 allied intervention in Libya also demonstrates means entrapment as the United States found itself committing substantial resources in support of the intervention despite an initial instinct to limit its involvement.
2022
Michigan
Counterplan
Neg › Entrapment DA › 2NC !—Yes Entrapment—Goal Entrapment
David Edelstein 18 — (David Edelstein; Vice Dean of Faculty in Georgetown College and a professor in the Department of Government, Published: December 2018; "Entrapment Revisited: Strategic and Structural Dynamics"; Accessed: 7-5-2022; https://cpb-us-w2.wpmucdn.com/u.osu.edu/dist/5/66008/files/2018/12/Entrapment-Revisited-Strategic-and-Structural-Dynamics-1xpycy1.pdf)//Pen-SY
A third type of entrapment is goal entrapment. Here, Ally A may be willing to initiate a confrontation or fight alongside Ally B, but the two states diverge in their preferences for the goals of the contest and/or terms for settling the dispute. In theory, this can occur through two different pathways. First, if Ally A has more modest goals than Ally B, A may become entrapped in the more ambitious goals of its ally once confrontation begins simply by B’s refusal to end a standoff or conflict when A desires. Again, A’s only alternative is to abandon its ally, a risky proposition with a confrontation looming or war at hand. Second, and closely related, one ally may entrap another by expanding the scope of a confrontation. Here, Ally B might seek broader gains or more ambitious terms than A, and so layer on new demands or carry a contest into new venues. This move risks entrapping Ally A, as failure to back B may result in B’s defeat, the loss of crucial resources, and opening up inter-allied political fissures that may dissolve the alliance. As an example of goal entrapment, consider the sequence of decisions that led to the allied Operation Torch landings in northern Africa in 1942. In May 1942, President Franklin D. Roosevelt promised Josef Stalin that the allies would shortly alleviate the pressure that the Germans were putting on the Soviet Union. Great Britain, however, resisted a cross-channel attack, seeing in an assault against the main body of German strength in Western Europe – which would have to be led largely by British forces as the U.S. forces were still mobilizing – an exercise that risked exhausting British strength. British leaders instead preferred an assault on North Africa, a move that would be less costly, divert (at least in theory) German resources away from the Soviet Union, and relieve continued Axis threats to British colonial holdings in the Mediterranean/Middle East. The resulting Anglo-American dispute over military strategy continued throughout the summer of 1942 and, as Mark Stoler showcases, significantly undermined Allied unity. Ultimately, American leaders faced with sustained and immutable British opposition to a 1942 attack on France acceded to British demands. Though many American leaders suspected that Britain’s efforts were motivated less by military factors and more by a political effort to bring American resources to bear to protect British influence in the Mediterranean, no cross-channel assault was to come until 1944.35 What is striking about the decisions leading up to Operation Torch is how the driving considerations were simultaneously the pledge of assistance made to Stalin, and Britain’s successful efforts to channel these pledges into a campaign that widened the European war to include North Africa. Once again, entrapment does not have to entail fighting a war against one’s own interests - it can mean pursuing certain objectives for little reason other than to accommodate a partner. Vincent O’Hara offers a damning critique of Operation Torch, “"Torch was a rushed, half-baked experiment in the art of war, full of untested ideas and amateur touches. The politicians mandated if for political reasons over the objections of most of their military chiefs." O’Hara’s political reasons were precisely Roosevelt’s determination to meet the obligation he felt he had to intervene in a way that would distract Germany from its assault on the Soviet Union.36 The entrapment in this case was in terms of the goal of the war, not the general decision to fight in the first place.37
2022
Michigan
Counterplan
Neg › Entrapment DA › 2NC !—Yes Entrapment—Timing Entrapment
David Edelstein 18 — (David Edelstein; Vice Dean of Faculty in Georgetown College and a professor in the Department of Government, Published: December 2018; "Entrapment Revisited: Strategic and Structural Dynamics"; Accessed: 7-5-2022; https://cpb-us-w2.wpmucdn.com/u.osu.edu/dist/5/66008/files/2018/12/Entrapment-Revisited-Strategic-and-Structural-Dynamics-1xpycy1.pdf)//Pen-SY
Timing entrapment occurs when members of an alliance disagree over the optimal moment at which to confront an opponent. Weaker members of an alliance, for example, may feel proportionally more threatened by an adversary at an earlier date than proportionally stronger members of an alliance, and so be more inclined to adopt hardline policies that increase the likelihood of war before the alliance’s stronger members reach that point. 30 Likewise, unsettled domestic politics may give some members of an alliance incentive to go to war sooner than its allies prefer if a ruling coalition seeks to resolve an external threat but fears being turned out of office before its allies are prepared for joint action.31 Under these circumstances, even if Ally A might eventually be willing to assertively confront or fight alongside Ally B against a common opponent, B may initiate a confrontation at a time that State A finds unattractive, yet A feel compelled to back B for fear of later having to stand alone later (when it would prefer to fight). Put differently, Ally A left to its own devices might prefer to address an external threat without resorting to behaviors that increase the risk of conflict, feeling it has the capacity to wait or hoping that war can avoided through deterrence or a negotiated settlement; nevertheless, Ally B may behave in ways that makes war more likely in the short-term for fear that time is no longer on its side. In theory, states seeking to entrap partners at times its partners would rather avoid can do so in a number of ways. Some states, for instance, may spoil negotiations with an opponent designed to settle outstanding disputes so that a diplomatic standoff festers or escalates.32 Alternatively, states may engage in provocative behavior over disputed issues designed to trigger an aggressive stance by an opponent that merits an allied response. And, in extremis, states can simply begin hostilities despite allied opposition, thereby daring its partners not to back it up. In all these situations, Ally A is faced with the choice of either being drawn into an escalating crisis or war, or abandoning B. When A chooses to support, entrapment occurs. To not act, despite the ill-advised timing of B’s provocations, would potentially leave B weakened and vulnerable to a defeat in the face of a seemingly pressing threat that, in the end, may be far worse for State A. Russia’s involvement in World War I on behalf of Serbia presents an example of timing entrapment. Few would deny that Russia believed it had a strategic interest in defending Serbia and bolstering the pan-Slav identity. As Jack Levy and William Mulligan argue, however, the timing of this support poses a puzzle. If Russia was perceived by Germany as a rising power and a potential threat, then it would have been sensible for Russia to lay low and avoid provoking Germany into a wider war. Yet in the dangerous summer of 1914, St. Petersburg stood by its Serbian allies even as they issued an ultimatum to Austria-Hungary that made war considerably more likely. As Levy and Mulligan note, “1914 was not Russia’s favored year for war.” But the Russians were also fearful of the diplomatic consequences of an unfavorable outcome to the Austro-Serbian crisis.” And, “Although Habsburg control of Serbia did not present an immediate threat to Russian territorial integrity, a more prominent consideration was Russian credibility. In the context of Balkan politics, Russian inaction in the face of Austro-Hungarian aggression could have had severe consequences.”33 To reiterate, our contention is not that Russia supported Serbia despite strategic interests wholly to the contrary. Rather, our claim is that entrapment occured in a more subtle yet very consequential manner: rather than waiting for a more opportune moment for war, Russia was pulled in on behalf of its ally, Serbia, at a time more of Serbia, than Russia’s, choosing.34
2022
Michigan
Counterplan
Neg › Entrapment DA › 2NC !—Yes Entrapment—Credibility Gaps
Elizabeth Calos 12 — (Elizabeth Calos; Published: 2012; "The Weakest Link: Credible Deterrence Threats and Alliance Entrapment"; Inquiries Journal; Accessed: 7-5-2022; http://www.inquiriesjournal.com/articles/1614/the-weakest-link-credible-deterrence-threats-and-alliance-entrapment)//Pen-SY
However, this paper argues that there is a codicil to this argument. In order for a defensive alliance to act as an effective deterrent to external aggression, the alliance must be able to pose a credible threat, which will prevent states outside of the alliance from threatening its members. Thus, defensive alliances must present a strong enough deterrent threat to protect even the weakest members of the alliance. This means that the weak or medium powered states within an alliance are particularly invested in maintaining the strength of the deterrent signal sent by the alliance. The deterrent signal that is sent by the alliance is the combination of each state's relative strength and military capability, thus any loss of strength by one alliance member decreases the efficacy of signal sent by the alliance as a whole. Since weaker states depend on this signal to protect the state from potential adversaries, there is an inherent obligation for lower powered states to ensure that the signal remains strong. Conversely, great powers or strong states depend less on the deterrent signal sent by the alliance and more on the military and economic strength of the state itself. Thus, weaker states within a defensive alliance would be drawn into conflicts where the other alliance members are the aggressor because if the alliance member should lose, the credibility of the alliance's deterrent threat would be diminished. Even though the mandate of the defensive alliance does not cover entry into non-defensive conflicts, states involved in defensive alliances could find themselves involved in conflicts originated by weaker alliance members. Figure 1 demonstrates the logic of this argument visually.
2022
Michigan
Counterplan
Neg › Entrapment DA › 2NC !—Yes Entrapment—Top Level
Jeffrey D. Berejikian and Justwan Florian 21 Jan 2022 [Josiah Meigs Distinguished Teaching Professor at the University of Georgia, and Associate Professor of Political Science., Associate Professor of Political Science at the University of Idaho. His work focuses on political psychology. ; “Defense treaties increase domestic support for military action – Contemporary Security Policy," Contemporary security policy, http://contemporarysecuritypolicy.org/defense-treaties-increase-domestic-support-for-military-action/]//EZAY *note this is an author written summary
American political leaders often frame U.S. security interests by emphasizing the specific details of U.S. defense commitments. For example, during a recent high-profile diplomatic visit to the Philippines in July of 2021, Secretary of State Blinken privately affirmed the US commitment to President Duterte. The United States also signaled its intentions to China directly. An American warship was deployed to conduct freedom of navigation operations in the South China Sea to coincide with the visit.
However, in addition, Secretary Blinken took time to both publicly call attention to the between the US and Philippines and explain its meaning; “We also reaffirm that an armed attack on Philippine armed forces, public vessels, or aircraft in the South China Sea would invoke US mutual defense commitments under Article IV of the 1951 US-Philippines Mutual Defense Treaty.”
2022
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Counterplan
Neg › Entrapment DA › 2NC !—Yes Entrapment—Top Level
Edelstein and Shifrinson 18, *David M. Edelstein, Professor of Foreign Studies at Georgetown, and *Joshua R. Itzkowitz Shifrinson, an Assistant Professor of International Relations, Boston University, (“Entrapment Revisited: Strategic and Structural Dynamics”, )
Recent efforts to examine entrapment, however, define the issue differently. In a widely cited study, for example, Tongfi Kim argues that Snyder’s definition, is “too broad” because it encompasses both military and non-military behaviors that may or may not be desirable from the perspective of the state in question. Instead, Kim argues that Snyder’s original definition should more properly be understood as “entanglement” – “the process whereby a state is compelled to aid an ally in a costly and unprofitable enterprise because of the alliance” – while “entrapment” more narrowly refers to “undesirable entanglement in which the entangling states adopts a risky or offensive policy not specified in the alliance agreement [emphasis added].”14 Beckley embraces Kim’s approach, arguing that entrapment occurs “only when an ally instigates a conflict with a third party in order to drag its alliance partners into the dispute.” Entanglement, by contrast, “occurs when a state is dragged into a military conflict by one, or more, of its alliances” – a definition very close to Snyder’s original – with “alliances” themselves requiring states to be bound by a formal treaty.15 Meanwhile, Lanoszka’s rigorous examination of mechanisms that might undergird entrapment relies on a similar distinction. As he writes, “Entrapment is a type of entanglement” that “occurs because of risky or offensive actions taken outside the parameters of the original alliance treaty.”16 And, just as Kim notes that entrapment is “undesirable entanglement,” Lanoszka argues that “entrapment by definition cannot take place if the defender wishes to fight in order to protect an ally that it sees as vital for the goods that it provides.”17 In short, recent redefinitions relabel Snyder’s original concept as “entanglement,” narrow entrapment to only include going to war for an ally in overt contravention of one’s interests, and narrow its applicability to formal alliances.
In this paper, we adopt a revised form of Snyder’s original conception because of conceptual and empirical limits in the revised definitions advanced in recent studies. Before offering our definition, it is first worthwhile noting the problems posed by the revised definitions. On one level, defining entrapment solely as an issue of formal alliances sidesteps the reality that many real world debates concern worries of entrapment via informal alliances. Critics of American backing for Ukraine, for instance, worry that informal-but-real American security engagement with Ukraine may end up pulling the United States into a conflict with Moscow for the sake of Kiev.18 Likewise, as U.S.-Indian ties strengthen as the U.S. seeks partners to confront China, it is reasonable to question whether the United States will end up courting an increased risk of conflict with China as Indian-Chinese relations themselves deteriorate for issues separate from those the United States has with the PRC.19
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Counterplan
Neg › Entrapment DA › 2NC !—Comparative
Edelstein ’19 [David M. Edelstein; commentator for war on the rocks; 2-6-2019; "Competition with China and the Future of the Asian International Order"; War on the Rocks; https://warontherocks.com/2019/02/competition-with-china-and-the-future-of-the-asian-international-order/; Accessed 7-13-2022; AW]
Is this competition likely to lead to war between the United States and China, Russia, or other countries? In short, the probability of great power war is higher now than it has been in some time, but nuclear weapons continue to limit the likelihood of a systemic great power war breaking out. However, as the United States becomes more concerned about Chinese intentions and as Beijing becomes more focused on short-term targets of opportunities in the South China Sea and elsewhere, the probability of conflict rises. Where war is most likely to occur is through a process of alliance entrapment, a potentially volatile scenario that has been underappreciated by advocates of an American-led global international order. Skeptics of entrapment have typically pointed to the experience of the Cold War to argue that the likelihood of great powers becoming entrapped by their weaker allies is limited. During the Cold War, however, both the United States and the Soviet Union defined their interests globally, making it difficult for either to be entrapped into a conflict it had not defined as part of its interests. Today, the United States may be more tempted to define its interests more narrowly even as it recognizes the risk posed by a rising China. The result is a higher likelihood of American entrapment in conflicts it might otherwise prefer to avoid. Such entrapment is a particular risk for great powers like the United States that remain absolutely powerful but are arguably in relative decline. The United States has an interest in not seeing China become a hegemonic power in East Asia. At the same time, the United States is not likely to confront China directly over its growing interests and aspirations in the region. The anticipated costs of direct conflict between the two countries are likely sufficient to dissuade either side from initiating such a war. Instead, conflict is more likely to emerge when a friend or ally of the United States — such as Vietnam, the Philippines, or Japan — finds itself in a crisis with Beijing. Washington will be tempted to intervene on behalf of these friends in order to put the brakes on any growing Chinese influence in the region. Dangerously, smaller powers may be tempted to provoke China precisely to generate this American response. Military clashes in the waters of East and Southeast Asia are relatively easy to envision, and have already occurred in recent decades — consider, for example, the Mischief Reef disputes in the 1990s, or the Scarborough Shoal incident in the 2000s. Fortunately, such clashes are likely to remain limited in scale. While some worry that innovations in nuclear weapons technology have made such weapons more usable and more practical in the conduct of warfare, the dynamics of escalation from the use of a small, low-yield nuclear weapon are still difficult to predict. The dangers of a catastrophic nuclear conflagration will continue to place a lid on any possible future conflicts between the United States and China. Importantly, however, the risks of continuous crises and skirmishes are significant — and escalation is possible.
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Michigan
Counterplan
Neg › Entrapment DA › 2NC L—AT: Plan is Narrow
Priebe et al ’21 [Miranda; Dec 2021; Ph.D. in political science, Massachusetts Institute of Technology; M.P.A. in international relations, Princeton University; RAND Corporation “Do Alliances and Partnerships Entangle the United States in Conflict?,” https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RRA739-3.html]
Advocates of restraint often present entrapment as a general risk that is associated with U.S. security relationships. They have not made any explicit distinctions between alliances and partnerships as we do here. These strategists have pointed to the potential entrapment risks associated with the U.S. alliances with Japan, the Philippines, and Eastern European and Baltic allies in NATO. Restrainers also see risks in relationships with U.S. partners, such as Taiwan and Georgia. They argue that Taiwan’s leaders would have been more cautious in their rhetoric about independence in the past if Taiwan had not had a long-standing security relationship with the United States. Advocates of restraint also claim that expectations of U.S. support led Georgia to adopt provocative policies toward South Ossetia in 2008, which led to war with Russia. Although the United States was not drawn into this conflict, restrainers argue that the case highlights how U.S. security relationships incentivize risk-taking by allies and partners.
Second, alliances can entangle if the United States sees its credibility— specifically, its reputation for upholding its commitments—as being on the line in a wider variety of issues involving its allies and partners. Even though a U.S. commitment might be narrow, such as defending the ally’s homeland in the event of an attack, the United States might worry that other allies and adversaries see a U.S. response to any issue involving the ally as an indication of U.S. commitment in different contexts. The United States might come to believe that, to protect its credibility, it has to fight wars over peripheral interests involving U.S. allies both to reassure allies and to deter adversaries. Entanglement dynamics do not have to involve the ally or partner that the United States is defending. Rather, entanglement would be at work if the United States were to become involved in conflict to show its reliability to other allies and partners who might be watching. These mechanisms could result in the United States risking or fighting wars that it would not have considered absent the alliance or partnership.
2022
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Counterplan
Neg › Entrapment DA › 2NC L—Empirics
Ashford ’17 [Emma M.; Jul 6; Defense and Foreign Policy Studies, Cato Institute; Canadian Foreign Policy Journal “Hegemonic blackmail: entrapment in civil war intervention,” https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/11926422.2017.1341843#2b85d6ca-6520-4a3d-8e4a-aa9f2ee3f33d-357c6cfb-53ba-4fa0-8e6b-e69fc2b8ce9f]
In order to better understand these dynamics, this article offers a preliminary analysis of two recent cases where the United States has faced substantial pressure to intervene in civil wars: Syria and Libya. In both cases, American allies have taken active military and covert actions, and have sought to induce the United States to join them. These case studies do not aim to test a specific hypothesis – or to prove that alliance pressure is the only factor which influences intervention decision-making – but rather aim to further explore and illustrate the process of civil war entrapment. The two cases are distinct: the United States chose to join a major North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) intervention in Libya, but has been more reticent to intervene directly against the Assad regime in Syria.
Alliance dynamics in Libya