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2022 Michigan Counterplan
AT: EU CP › 2AC – Nuclear Deterrence

EU is strengthening its deterrence capacity now

Agnes Szucs 2022, She is an EU reporter at Anadolu Agency, and previously worked as a Media and Communication Manager at the European Parliament, January 2022, “EU must develop deterrence capacity: Bloc's foreign policy chief”, //skwon

The EU must expand “a lot” its deterrence capacity as it was not able to prevent the war, the EU foreign policy chief said on Tuesday, referring to the ongoing Russia-Ukraine war. “Our deterrence has not been strong enough to stop (Russian President Vladimir) Putin’s aggression,” Josep Borrell told EU lawmakers at the European Parliament’s plenary session dedicated to the Russian-Ukrainian war. He stressed that the EU must strengthen its “deterrence capacity a lot” to be able to prevent wars. He argued that the Russia-Ukraine war shed a light on the fact that the common EU defense is “no longer a luxury, it is a necessity,” stressing that the bloc needs “instruments for coercion, retaliation, and counter-attacks.” This will be “the birth certificate of a geopolitical Europe,” Borrell stressed, referring to the bloc’s new defense strategy, the so-called Strategic Compass that will be adopted next week. At the same time, he asserted that the EU has already demonstrated its ability to act as a “hard power” by imposing strong sanctions on Russia. Borrell’s Strategic Compass sets concrete proposals and timelines for strengthening the EU defense, such as setting up a swiftly deployable EU force of 5,000 troops, investing in industrial capabilities, and securing the bloc against cyberattacks. The plan would strengthen the bloc’s defense in a complementary way to NATO requirements. EU lawmakers will vote later on Tuesday for a resolution condemning Russia's war on Ukraine.

Latest developments Since Russia's war on Ukraine began last Thursday, it has been met by outrage from the international community, with the EU, UK, and US implementing a range of economic sanctions on Russia. The EU adopted last week three sanctions packages against Russia, targeting among others, President Putin, top diplomat Sergey Lavrov, the Russian banking sector, and key state-owned companies. On Sunday, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy officially signed his country's request to join the EU. In an open letter, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, the Czech Republic, Bulgaria, Slovakia, Slovenia, and Romania expressed support for Ukraine's swift candidacy. So far, at least 136 civilians, including 13 children, have been killed and 400 others, including 26 children, injured in Ukraine, according to UN figures. Around 660,000 people have fled Ukraine to neighboring countries, the UN refugee agency said on Tuesday.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
AT: EU CP › 2AC – Squo Solves Autonomy

Strategic autonomy is inevitable but would be blocked by a lack of financial resources absent NATO involvement – Brexit threw everyone for a loop

Hidayet Çilkoparan 18, Master of Science in the Department of International Relations at the Graduate School of Social Sciences of the Middle East Technical University, “EUROPE’S SECURITY CHALLENGES AND TRANSATLANTIC RELATIONS”, October 2018, Middle East Technical University, /lg

Since the very beginning of the European integration process after WWII, integration in the field of security and defence has not always been high on the agenda. Similarly, the progress achieved in the new century has remained limited. Mainly due to the closer linkage of these areas to national security and sovereignty, and perhaps even more importantly because of NATO’s presence, considerable integration under the EU roof in these areas has not been considered possible or likely. Since the end of the Cold War, especially from the 2000s onward, however, the EU has been gradually deepening its integration in security and defence. Security challenges like conflicts in the Balkans and other countries in the EU’s immediate neighbourhood, terrorism and irregular migration, as well as other new threats and challenges like cyber-security that have demonstrated that no country can counter and eliminate these threats alone have given momentum to the EU’s further integration in these areas. The rising strength of the RF in international politics, demonstrated by its aggressive interventions in its immediate neighbourhood and beyond under the leadership of President Putin has been another major factor. The recent rhetoric of the US leadership about disengagement from European security and NATO also appears to have encouraged the EU its efforts to quickly enhance its defence capabilities and accordingly new initiatives were undertaken.145

Academicians, thinkers, analysts, observers, politicians, so on, who have been observing the development of EU security and defence policy and trying to understand why Europe felt the need to develop its own defence capabilities, while a robust collective security organization like NATO existed. Some explained this need through the IR theory of structural realism. They argued that “instead of balance of power, balance of threat” need to be focussed on. Even though the EU did not perceive an immediate threat from the USA, its decades-long hegemony in Europe, sustained through NATO, has started becoming disturbing and Europeans decided to take steps to balance the US, so that they could enjoy a balanced partnership in transatlantic relations and affect US decisions on actions it may take with regard to international security and stability.146 

2022 Michigan Counterplan
AT: EU CP › 2AC – No Solvency

Independence from NATO decks case solvency – intra-European conflicts would prevent interoperability and joint capability development

Hugo Meijer & Stephen G. Brooks 21, CNRS Research Fellow at Sciences Po, Center for International Studies, and the director of the European Initiative for Security Studies & professor of government at Dartmouth College, “Illusions of Autonomy: Why Europe Cannot Provide for Its Security If the United States Pulls Back”, Spring 2021, International Security 45(4), p. 7-43 /lg

An additional challenge is institutional. Europe’s strategic cacophony has prevented Europeans from developing an autonomous, military-planning, command and control (C2) structure.110 Indeed, a report by the European Parliamentary Research Service explains that one of the greatest challenges of European defense is “the lack of integration of the military structures of the Member States.”111 Although an effective and autonomous European defense would require the creation of a permanent planning and C2 infrastructure, the question of developing an autonomous Operational Headquarters (OHQ) has proven highly divisive.112 An OHQ was never established because of conºicting national interests and priorities among Europeans, in particular France, Germany and the UK. Whereas Paris has long supported the establishment of a military OHQ to bolster the EU’s strategic and operational planning structures and its contingency planning and C2 capacity, London has strongly resisted, seeing it as a duplication of NATO’s assets. Germany has stood somewhat in between, though closer to the UK, favoring a focus on civilian-military planning and C2, not least to avoid duplicating structures already existing at NATO.113 As a result, the EU remains entirely dependent on NATO or national assets for the planning and conduct of major executive operations, for which it has no autonomous military structures.114

If the United States were to pull back from Europe, it remains to be seen whether the Europeans could rely on a “Europeanized” NATO, in which the integrated structures would stay in place but without the United States.115 Military planning and C2 require a clear chain of command. When NATO was created, Europeans agreed to be under U.S. military command, rather than attempting the far more difªcult task of agreeing to be under the command of another European country or group of European states. More generally, as the hegemonic power in NATO, the United States has facilitated institutionalized cooperation among Europeans and helped partly contain Europe’s strategic cacophony.116 For decades, a U.S.-led NATO has been the overarching shaper of national defense policies and military transformation in Europe, helping overcome coordination and collective-action problems.117 In light of Europe’s deep-seated strategic divisions, a U.S. disengagement would amplify these coordination and collective action problems (assuming NATO survived) and would further hinder institutionalized, intra-European defense cooperation at all levels: strategies and doctrines; training; operational learning; interoperability; and joint capability development. Likewise, without the United States, the persistent and profound divergence of threat perceptions and strategic priorities among Europeans is likely to impede their capacity to agree on shared C2 structures for conducting operations, except for the lowest end of the spectrum of conºict (e.g., peace support operations).118

2022 Michigan Counterplan
AT: EU CP › 2AC – No Solvency – Ukraine

EU can’t solve—Ukraine thumps

Judy Dempsey 2022, Dempsey is a nonresident senior fellow at Carnegie Europe and editor in chief of Strategic Europe, February 2022, “What Ukraine Reveals About NATO and the EU”, //skwon

They don’t like to admit it. But there is an unnecessary rivalry between NATO and the European Union. NATO is a military, defensive organization. The EU is an economic and political one with vast resources to make a difference to its own members and to its neighbors. Both organizations can complement each other, with NATO focusing on military operations and the EU on civilian missions. They don’t.

The crises in Europe’s eastern neighborhood, the latest being Russia’s military intimidation of Ukraine to the extent where Moscow is threatening its sovereignty and independence, are testing NATO and the EU. The outcome will affect Europe’s ability to act strategically and further integrate. The omens don’t look good for either.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
AT: EU CP › 2AC – Strategic Autonomy Fails

European defense spending and capabilities are insufficient to develop a posture independent of NATO’s assistance

Dr. Peter van Ham 2k, professor of West European Politics at the George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies at Garmisch–Partenkirchen, Germany, “Europe’s New Defense Ambitions: Implications for NATO, the U.S., and Russia”, April 2000, George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies, /lg

Ever since NATO’s Brussels summit of 1994, the United States has, at least rhetorically, supported the development of a European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI) and expressed its readiness to make Alliance assets and capabilities available for WEU operations. Although American media were somewhat dumbfounded by what was generally seen as an overly ambitious European attempt to go it alone and establish a European military union (akin to the other EMU), U.S. officials have aired their agreement with Europe’s military push. At first, however, Washington was concerned with the message of the EU’s Cologne summit of June 1999, where the Europeans proposed to give the EU a defense character without committing themselves concretely to a commensurate increase in Europe’s military capabilities. In this respect, the subsequent Helsinki summit was reassuring to the United States, because it embedded the CESDP within the Atlantic security framework and followed through with concrete military headline goals.

In December 1999, following the Helsinki summit, U.S. Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott argued that “[t]here should be no confusion about America’s position on the need for a stronger Europe. We are not against; we are not ambivalent; we are not anxious; we are for it. We want to see a Europe that can act effectively through the Alliance or, if NATO is not engaged, on its own. Period, end of debate.”7 But, of course, the transatlantic debate over the reorganization of European security and defense has just started in earnest, with many a serious quarrel and argument lying ahead. One of the main questions will be why, or perhaps even whether, the United States has given up its resistance to the organization of European defense within the EU. (Of course, answering this question depends to a large extent on the outcome of the U.S. presidential elections of November 2000. An Al Gore administration may be more supportive of Europe’s new defense ambitions than a George W. Bush administration.)

2022 Michigan Counterplan
AT: EU CP › 2AC – Strategic Autonomy Fails

Brexit and Trump thump – empirics prove that aff cards are written by unreliable Europe enthusiasts

Luis Simon 17, research Professor at the Institute for European Studies (Vrije Universiteit Brussel) and Director of the Brussels office of the Royal Elcano Institute with a PhD in International Relations from the University of London (Royal Holloway College), “DON’T BELIEVE THE HYPE ABOUT EUROPEAN DEFENSE”, 06/27/2017, War on the Rocks, https://warontherocks.com/2017/06/dont-believe-the-hype-about-european-defense/

If you’re a Europe-based think tanker, policy wonk, or commentator, Donald Trump and Brexit are great for business. Just about every Brussels pundit is leading off his musings about Europe’s future with some sort of Trump or Brexit hook. If you haven’t heard by now that either Trump, Brexit, or — ideally — both offer historical windows of opportunity for European defense cooperation, you’re way outside of the Brussels bubble.

Those invested in the notion that the European Union can become strategically autonomous interpret pretty much whatever happens out there as a catalyst for greater European defense cooperation. Every time there is some sort of global crisis or “external shock,” catalyst-related narratives pop up — there are just too many politicians, officials, and pundits in Europe who lust after such narratives.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
AT: EU CP › 2AC – Strategic Autonomy Fails

Moving away from interoperability with NATO is impractical – too many European divisions on whether autonomy is desirable

Moritz Pieper & Martijn Lak 19, visiting Research Fellow at the German Institute for International and Security Affairs and Lecturer in International Relations at the University of Salford, UK & lecturer at Hague University of Applies Sciences and the Erasmus School of History, Culture and Communication, Rotterdam, “The End of Transatlanticism? EU Security and Defence Policies and the ‘Strategic Autonomy’ Debate from a Historical and Contemporary Perspective”, 2019, Studies in European Affairs 23(4), p. 23-44 /lg

In addition, the level of logistical entanglement serves to illustrate why a separation of EU defence structures from NATO structures would be a near-impossibility: NATO Prague Capabilities Commitments resemble the Helsinki Headline Goal, NATO’s ‘smart defence’ resembles the aim of “pooling and sharing” (Ghent Framework). Autonomy from the US is thus being made all the more diffi cult by an institutional copying that duplicates capacities in function and purpose.55 Ronja Kempin and Barbara Kunz thus argue that “[i]t thus makes little sense for U.S.-skeptic Europeanists to pit themselves against Atlanticists as if we were back in de Gaulle’s 1960s or the post-Cold War 1990s”.56

The notifi cation of November 2017 to formally launch PESCO recognizes as much. The Council states: “Enhanced defence capabilities of EU Member States will also benefit NATO. They will strengthen the European pillar within the Alliance and respond to repeated demands for stronger transatlantic burden sharing” (p. 1), and writes of the need to ensure “interoperability with NATO” (p. 5). The mechanism of Permanent Structured Cooperation, introduced by the Lisbon Treaty but never implemented, was launched on 23 June 2017. The ambition behind the realization of PESCO is to allow EU member states to work more closely together in the area of security and defence issues by providing “an ambitious, binding and inclusive European legal framework for investments in the security and defence of the EU’s territory and its citizens”, as the notifi cation reads.57 On a broader conceptual level, the Commission has also launched its own White Paper on the future of Europe.58 Member states willing to cooperate more on defence matters would be able to do so under the third scenario put forward in the Commission White Paper (“those who want more do more”). As the Commission puts this vision of a multi-speed Europe in security affairs: “This includes a strong common research and industrial base, joint procurement, more integrated capabilities and enhanced military readiness for joint missions abroad”.59 Interestingly, scenario 4 (“doing less more effi ciently”) talks of a “European defence Union” that would be able to speak with one voice on all foreign policy issues.60

2022 Michigan Counterplan
AT: EU CP › 2AC – Strategic Autonomy Fails

Strategic autonomy fails due to “strategic cacophony” and capacity shortfalls – best study

Hugo Meijer & Stephen G. Brooks 21, CNRS Research Fellow at Sciences Po, Center for International Studies, and the director of the European Initiative for Security Studies & professor of government at Dartmouth College, “Illusions of Autonomy: Why Europe Cannot Provide for Its Security If the United States Pulls Back”, Spring 2021, International Security 45(4), p. 7-43 /lg

Determining whether Europeans could achieve strategic autonomy anytime soon if the United States were to pull back from Europe requires an examination of the historical trajectory and the current and likely future state of European interests and defense capacity. Although existing studies have analyzed important elements of each, a more systematic analysis is needed.11 Regarding interests, this article provides the most comprehensive and thorough coding of national threat perceptions across all of Europe, showing where each country falls across a set of deªned categories of threat prioritization. Concerning defense capacity, it adds to existing understandings of Europe’s deªciency by providing novel longitudinal data on European conventional defense capabilities over the past three decades and by outlining a series of four interwoven challenges that would greatly complicate the pursuit of strategic autonomy.

Our analysis shows that European efforts to achieve strategic autonomy will be hampered by two major constraints: profound defense capacity shortfalls that will be hard to close, and “strategic cacophony,” that is, profound, continent-wide divergences across all the domains of national defense policies, most notably threat perceptions.12 These mutually reinforcing constraints impose a rigid limit on the capacity of Europeans to achieve strategic autonomy anytime soon. Consequently, if the United States were to fully withdraw, the continent would become signiªcantly more vulnerable to Russian meddling and aggression. Furthermore, if the U.S.-backed NATO were to disappear, this would undermine the only institutional framework that has fostered some degree of coordination in Europe (at the strategic, doctrinal, and capability levels) and partly contained Europe’s strategic cacophony. This, in turn, would make institutionalized, intra-European defense cooperation appreciably harder.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
AT: EU CP › 2AC – LTNB – NATO Drawn In

Any future EU-led military operations will inevitably involve NATO jurisdiction

Dr. Peter van Ham 2k, professor of West European Politics at the George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies at Garmisch–Partenkirchen, Germany, “Europe’s New Defense Ambitions: Implications for NATO, the U.S., and Russia”, April 2000, George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies, /lg

Although the EU’s Helsinki communiqué stresses the need to avoid “unnecessary duplication” of the EU’s defense organization with that of NATO, it is clear that some duplication of capabilities and infrastructure is inevitable and, probably, even beneficial. It should not be overlooked that most of WEU already duplicates, in one way or another, NATO structures. The EU has, therefore, accepted that some duplication of effort and organization is foreseeable. If Europe’s new defense ambitions were to provide Europeans with more military capabilities (i.e., more strategic transport and intelligence capabilities), thereby duplicating what the United States already has available, this would be the type of replication all NATO allies could happily live with.

NATO’s Fading Centrality. Another issue which will have to be thrashed out is the future relationship between the “New EU” and NATO. Non-EU NATO members have made it clear that they want to be involved in the decision shaping process on European defense. The United States has tried to formalize the EU-NATO relationship on these issues, but France has blocked these efforts and claims that the Europeans first have to clarify their military ambitions among themselves. Paris also argues that, for the time being, WEU should be the institution of choice for debating defense issues with other European countries, as well as with Turkey and the United States. The EU has, however, decided to embark upon strengthening ties between the European Parliament (to include its working groups and committees) and NATO’s North Atlantic Assembly.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
AT: EU CP › 2AC – LTNB – NATO Drawn In

EU separation from NATO is impossible – interest in close cooperation and lack of independent capabilities

Hidayet Çilkoparan 18, Master of Science in the Department of International Relations at the Graduate School of Social Sciences of the Middle East Technical University, “EUROPE’S SECURITY CHALLENGES AND TRANSATLANTIC RELATIONS”, October 2018, Middle East Technical University, /lg

NATO has strong and deterrent military capabilities, and no one is in doubt that when there is political will and solidarity among its members, the Alliance is able to respond any threat coming from an external source. 

On the other hand, the EU is still in a soul-searching process in terms of its military role in the current European security architecture; still seeking to achieve strategic autonomy from NATO, it has been caught unprepared for the US President Trump’s approach to NATO and European security. 

2022 Michigan Counterplan
AT: EU CP › 2AC – LTNB – NATO Drawn In

NATO and the EU are intertwined when it comes to security and defense – overlap, liaison offices, and formal agreements make cooperation frequent

Nele Marianne Ewers-Peters 5/26, Chair for International Security & Conflict Studies at Helmut-Schmidt-University/University of the Federal Armed Forces Hamburg and Non-Resident Research Fellow at the Global Europe Centre based at the University of Kent who was previously Lecturer and Research Fellow at Leuphana University Lüneburg, Germany and DAAD Postdoctoral Fellow in the Programme ‘The United States, Europe, and World Order’ at the Foreign Policy Institute of the School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS) at Johns Hopkins University, “Positioning member states in EU-NATO security cooperation: towards a typology”, 05/26/2022, European Security, /lg

Increasing interactions and functional overlap depend, however, also on the distribution of power among the two organisations, which can either be symmetric or asymmetric. Traditionally, power is in the hands of states with autonomy over decision-making and it has been distinguished between “power over”, power exerted by one actor over another in a relationship, and “power to”, the ability to trigger change and shape certain outcomes (Ojanen 2018). In this context, power of an organisation denotes “its ability to retain, or expand, its capability to pursue its policies within the area of functional overlap”. Under an asymmetric power distribution, a so-called “sectoral specialisation” of the organisations is most likely to happen because the weaker organisation needs to withdraw its governance activities from the respective policy area (Gehring and Faude 2014, p. 479). In the case of a symmetric power distribution, both organisations need to coordinate their governance activities in the overlapping policy area. Herein, multiple members – those states that are members of more than one international organisation within the same interorganisational network – play a crucial role as they can negotiate the institutional arrangements within both organisations to avoid conflicts and malfunctions of the regulatory bodies. Under symmetrical power distribution, co-governance and a division of labour are more likely to occur than role specification (Gehring and Faude 2014). Accordingly, Gehring and Faude propose “that institutional adaptation gives rise to an institutionalised division of labour among the elemental institutions of an institutional complex” (2014, p. 482). Division of labour then results in enhanced cooperation and fostered exchanges. In the case of the EU and NATO, their functional overlaps have increased over time as both have actively collaborated, for example, in crisis management operations in Bosnia and Herzegovina and off the Somali coast. As a result, they have become so-called interlocking institutions due to their increasing coordination and cooperation (Biermann 2009, Schleich 2014).

Interorganisational interactions are not a one-way street and can take different forms including exchanges of information and material resources, coordination of activities, joint activities and decision-making and the establishment of formal structures (cf. Biermann 2008, 2015). Interorganisational relations may also go a step further in which one organisation can influence and shape the other’s policies, procedures and institutions, leading to a process of socialisation and learning from the other organisation (Johnston 2001). While learning can be accelerated through the rotation and exchange of staff members, the so-called alumni effect (Koops 2017a, 2017b), it can also be prevented by communication problems, lack of implementation and shortage of resources.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
AT: EU CP › 2AC – LTNB – NATO Drawn In

European crises have empirically inspired an increase in EU-NATO collaboration – proven by cybersecurity threats

Nina Graeger 17, Senior Research Fellow at the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs (NUPI), where she was Head of Department from 2008 to 2013 and Associate Professor II in International Relations at the Norwegian University of Life Sciences since 2013, “Grasping the everyday and extraordinary in EU–NATO relations: the added value of practice approaches”, 08/17/2017, European Security 26(3), p. 340-358 /lg

Studying the EU–NATO relationship as practice enables the researcher to transcend the extraordinary-everyday dichotomy but also to overcome the arguably “hyped-up” focus on the extraordinary in security and strategic studies. While designed to provide a (rapid) response to an extraordinary situation or event, security production involves practices that are ordinary, day-to-day experiences and where social artefacts constitute an essential part. In the EU–NATO relationship, such artefacts include everything from meeting agendas, reports, and informal memos exchanged between EU and NATO staff and diplomats, informal briefings by EU commanders in the North Atlantic Council (NAC) or by NATO commanders in the EU Political and Security Committee (PSC), as well as mutual visits to EU and NATO vessels at sea in the anti-piracy or refugee operations (Græger 2016).7.

However, crises may also strengthen and expand the repertoire of everyday security practice. The Russian annexation of the Crimea in 2014 put the relevance of EU–NATO cooperation, also for territorial security, back on the political agenda.8 Both the EU High Representative for the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy/Vice President of the European Commission and the NATO Secretary General have emphasised that a more uncertain and hostile European security environment is a challenge that their respective organisations should handle together (Mogherini 2014, NATO 2016a, 2016b). Since 2014, EU and NATO representatives have met informally on several occasions to exchange views, discuss common or coordinated responses, and convey joint messages to the external world.9

2022 Michigan Counterplan
AT: EU CP › 2AC – LTNB – NATO Drawn In

EU strategic autonomy is impossible – practical obstacles and inevitable reliance on NATO

Jolyon Howorth 17, Visiting Professor of Political Science and International Affairs at Yale University, Senior Research Fellow at the European Union’s Institute for Security Studies, Senior Research Associate at the IInstitut Français des Relations Internationales, and Fellow at the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs at Harvard University, “EU–NATO cooperation: the key to Europe’s security future”, 08/17/2017, European Security 26(3), p. 454-459 /lg

Nevertheless, at the strategic level, the EU–NATO relationship remains absolutely fundamental to the future of the European security and defence project for two interconnected and seemingly incompatible reasons. The first is the very existence of NATO, its history, its mythology and its political reality: an alliance that, unlike any other in history, has outlived the demise of the threat against which it was initially created. This has been in very large part due to US leadership and to the perceived usefulness of NATO to American global strategy. US leadership has had, as an inevitable corollary, European followership. Whatever the specifics of the constant tensions over burden-sharing, American leadership has generated a degree of demotivation on the part of Europeans, which US commentators have castigated as “free-riding”. At the same time, since the end of the Cold War, there have been growing demands, in Washington, for the EU to take over greater direct responsibility for the stabilisation of its volatile neighbourhood (the Balkans, the Maghreb and the Eastern borderlands). Europe, since 1989, has ceased to be central to the US strategic radar screen. This has given rise to the various projects for a European defence capacity, both from within NATO (the short-lived attempt, in the 1990s, to form a European Security and Defence Identity – ESDI) (Howorth and Keeler 2003), and outside of NATO (the 20-year quest for a Common Security and Defence Policy – CSDP) (Howorth 2014). However, so long as US policy suggests that Uncle Sam will always be on hand to ensure European security if a serious crisis develops, there will inevitably be clear limits to the ambition of the purely European project.

From this perspective, the “micro-cooperation” that forms the focus of some articles in this special issue (in particular, Smith et al. 2017, Graeger 2017), is only one part of the challenge. Arguably, as Duke and Gebhard (2017) suggest in this volume, and as the case studies of Fiott (2017), Lavallée (2017), Mayer (2017) conclude, of even greater long-term concern is the overall nature of the relationship between these two security actors. What is each of them for? Why does Europe need two such entities? Should ever greater cooperation lead to a formal division of labour or to a radically new balance of responsibilities and commitment as between the US and the Europeans?

2022 Michigan Kritik
Security › AT: de Araujo

De Araujo ev flows neg – it’s not inevitable and the alt can solve

2AC de Araujo 14 (Marcelo, “Moral Enhancement and Political Realism,” Journal of Evolution and Technology 24(2): 29-43)

The idea of a “structure” should not be understood here in metaphysical terms, as though it mysteriously existed in a transcendent world and had the magical power of determining leaders’ decisions in this world. The word “structure” denotes merely a political arrangement in which there are no powerful law-enforcing institutions. And in the absence of the kind of security that law-enforcing institutions have the force to create, political leaders will often fail to cooperate, and occasionally engage in conflicts and wars, in those areas that are critical to their security and survival. Given the structure of international politics and the basic goal of survival, this is likely to continue to happen, even if, in the future, political leaders become less egoistic and power-seeking through moral enhancement. On the other hand, since the structure of the international system of states is itself another human institution, there is no reason to suppose that it cannot ever be changed. If people become morally enhanced in the future they may possibly feel more strongly motivated to change the structure of the system of states, or perhaps even feel inclined to abolish it altogether. In my view, however, addressing major threats to the survival of humankind in the future by means of bioengineering is unlikely to yield the expected results, so long as moral enhancement is pursued within the present framework of the international system of states.

2022 Michigan Kritik
Security › at realism

Expansionary modernization is reactionary to US provocation

Jalil 19 - Research Fellow at the Institute of Strategic Studies Islamabad (Ghazala, , EM)

While Mearsheimer claims that great powers act aggressively and aim to gain so much power that they are the ultimate hegemons in the system, Waltz’s defensive realism sees the states as acting defensively to maintain rather than upset the balance of power. For Waltz, the states are primarily concerned with maintaining “their position in the system.”55 Defensive realists argue that offence-defence balance favours the defence. 56 Therefore, a robust defence and careful balancing should deter any aggressive impulses from great powers. Defensive realism argues that great powers are concerned with maintaining the status quo rather than maximising their power because often the cost of expansion outweighs the benefits. Defensive realism sees security dilemmas as a problem where an increase in the power of one state increases the insecurity of the other causing the latter to increase its power. Under the conditions of defensive realism, great powers would try to alleviate any security dilemmas rather than exacerbate it. China’s current policy seems to be firmly rooted in defensive realism. Its policy seems to be aimed at maintaining the balance of power rather than upsetting it. As the earlier section has argued, China is not a revisionist power but a status quo one. The analysts like Shiping Tang are convinced that China’s security strategy flows out of its realisation of the security dilemma whereby the Chinese leaders have understood that an aggressive expansionist strategy would just lead to counterbalancing alliances. “This recognition has led China to adopt a defensive realism-rooted security strategy emphasising moderation, self-restraint and security cooperation.”57 Moreover, China’s military modernisation, its Taiwan policy and its increased policies in the South China Sea also make more sense if seen through the lens of defensive realism. China’s Taiwan policy may be more geared towards preventing redistribution of power in the region. Since the US is providing arms assistance to Taiwan, China may be averse to the US aiding Taiwan’s independence ─ the latter issue is one where China has made clear that independence is not acceptable to China. Similarly, there is good evidence that China’s military modernisation programmes and training exercises since the Taiwan Strait Crisis of 1996 are aimed partially at dealing with the issue of the Taiwanese separation.58 On the question of whether China is balancing against the US, Johnston says, “There seems to be little doubt that China’s military modernisation programme since the mid-1990s has been aimed in large measure at developing capabilities to deter or slow the application of the US military power in the region.”59 It would then seem that China is not concerned with gaining power or projecting its powers but with balancing against a predominance of the US power in the region. China has not shown any signs of hegemonic behaviour as a lot of Western analysts feared. Instead of guided by offensive realism, China’s policies seem to be guided by defensive realism where it is concerned with survival and with maintaining its position in the system. Just as the US fears China’s hegemonic rise, China also fears the increase of the US influence in the region and its talk of containing China. China’s policy may change in the future to display hegemonic tendencies. However, at present, there is not much evidence to support the theory of offensive realism.

2022 Michigan Kritik
Security › at realism

No intrinsic drive towards competition- the alt can solve

Busser 6 [“The Evolution of Security: Revisiting the Human Nature Debate in International Relations”, Mark Busser, Master’s Candidate, Department of Political Science, York University, YCISS Working Paper Number 40, August 2006]

Beyond the problems with the scientific evidence behind Thayer’s ontological claims, there are also problems with his proposed epistemological project of consilience. Using sociobiology to unite the social and natural sciences (and to give bases to a revitalized classical realism) would depend on achieving a near omnipotence, where known genetic programs could be weighed against known environmental influence, using science to predict the results. At the outset of his essay, Thayer implies that science is progressing at a rapid pace towards making this a reality. Yet evolutionary explanations for specific behaviours become incredibly problematic given all of the possible factors and externalities which might have affected evolutionary outcomes, all of which are impossible to map into even the most complex mathematical theoretical games. Bell and MacDonald point out that many biologists dispute whether sociobiology can offer useful commentary on humans “because of the central role of culture, language, and self-reflexivity in determining human behaviour.” Similarly, in response to Shaw and Wong, Joshua Goldstein cites evidence that human 5 6 beings do not demonstrate an inherent tendency towards aggression, instead displaying cooperation more often. Goldstein offers the possibility that human behavioural traits like aggression, altruism, and sacrifice are shaped more by cultural transmission than by genes. This possibility enormously complicates the attempt at consilience intended by Thayer and his contemporaries, by adding in incalculable variables that come with social and cultural interactions. 5 7 Because of these complications, Lewontin, Rose, and Kamin have asserted that sociobiology’s grand argument is discredited since no aspect of human social behaviour has ever been linked to a specific gene or set of genes. As Mary Clark observes, one of the major results of the human genome project was the 5 8 falsification of the supposition that each protein produced in a human cell was coded by a separate gene. In fact, genes often work interdependently, with the same gene recurring along the chromosome and causing different outcomes depending on its position and neighbouring genes. Clark describes the complex signals and activations which occur at the genetic level, concluding that rather than a linear unidirectional blueprint, the human genome is more like an ecosystem, and can be responsive to its microscopic – and perhaps even the macroscopic – environment. 5 9 Just how important are the influences culture, social behaviour, and environment to the human condition, as distinct from biological programming? In many caveats and footnotes within Thayer’s own argument, he includes statements that acknowledge the importance of cultural factors in the shaping of modern human societies. If all behaviour cannot be explained by sociobiology and other evolutionary arguments because behaviours are contingent on cultural and environmental factors, how strong is the scientific support for Thayer’s revived realist project? As Bell and MacDonald have suggested, many of the scientific foundations Thayer employs to support his epistemological program are indeterminate because they cannot explain when cultural or environmental factors will play a role. On the ontological side, Thayer certainly comes a long 6 0 way from proving that human nature is defined by and limited to egoism and dominance, as he had intended to do. If knowledge borrowed from evolutionary biology and other natural sciences suggests that culture and environment play a significant role in shaping human behaviours, then it may not be the realist project that is best supported by a deep and sustained interdisciplinary exploration.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
aff answers › 2ac – secrecy bad

Satellite attacks cause nuclear war

Grego, 17—Senior Scientist, Global Security Program, with the Union of Concerned Scientists (Laura, “50 years after the Outer Space Treaty: How secure is space?,” , dml)

For the foreseeable future, military tensions among the United States, China, and Russia are likely to remain high, as are those between China and India. It is imperative to track investments and strategies that could escalate a crisis or lead actors to consider approaching or crossing the nuclear threshold. Attacks on satellites can create or escalate terrestrial crises in ways that are difficult to predict and which are particularly dangerous among nuclear powers.

While the OST prohibits nuclear weapons in space, it is less specific about other military activity, and states have different interpretations of “peaceful purposes.” Thus, the drift is toward a space regime that includes increasingly sophisticated anti-satellite technology, with very little mutual understanding about how actions in space are perceived and what constraints, if any, global governance provides.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
aff answers › 2ac – secrecy bad

Strong LOAC norms against civilian casualties prevent satellite attacks

Beard, 18—associate professor of law at the University of Nebraska-Lincoln (Jack, interviewed by Brandon McDermott, “Crafting The Manual For Warfare In Space,” , dml)

There's another factor here too, the growing commercialization of space. With more and more launches, with more and more satellites – the individual operators the individual companies – those are the responsibility of the states under the rules that are now in place in the Outer Space Treaty. You can see, as space becomes more congested and more competitive that there are going to be problems that are likely to occur between – for instance – space mining entities. Which is no longer a far-fetched idea. As competition for resources in space grows the likelihood of a conflict grows and so you'd like to try to interpret some of the terms that haven't been applied yet in space. Phrases like “interference,” or “due regard,” which are found in the treaties haven't ever been interpreted to this point in any real detail.

It would be nice to know what the appropriate response is to certain actions in space and things that are perceived as hostile in order to prevent as much damage as possible to civilian objects and to civilians. The law of armed conflict has as one of its central goals preventing unnecessary or excessive damage to the civilian population. There are satellites up there that are solely dedicated to all sorts of humanitarian purposes – weather satellites, satellites related to rescue and emergency – those sorts of things aren't appropriate targets in an armed conflict and should be treated with some special regard.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
Authors › Prodicts › Prodict---Nye

Soft power key to hegemony---hard power fails

Wagner 14 [Jan-Philipp N, Jan works at the International Association for the Evaluation of Educational Achievement. "The Effectiveness of Soft & Hard Power in Contemporary International Relations", E-International Relations, https://www.e-ir.info/2014/05/14/the-effectiveness-of-soft-hard-power-in-contemporary-international-relations/// KS]

An example for the ineffectiveness of basing foreign policy making solely on hard power strategies is the U.S. invasion into Iraq in 2003. According to Steinberg, “the strategy [of the invasion of Iraq] failed to understand what elements of power were needed most to defeat the emerging threat” from terrorist groups (2008, p. 159). This misunderstanding resulted in ignoring two key elements of soft power: the Bush administration firstly forgot about the USA’s dependence on their allies’ intelligence and policy forces and on global public support; and secondly, the question of the legitimacy of the invasion was not attributed any importance (ibid., p. 160). In the short term, these mistakes led to the failure of the action. In the long term, they have caused the degradation of American soft power as “the strategy undermined the U.S. global position” (ibid., p. 160) and “global public confidence in U.S. leadership” (ibid., p. 157). The USA felt the endurance of this damage for instance when facing problems of their development aid programs in Africa (cf. Hackbarth, 2008; and see below). Due to the above mentioned factors limiting the effectiveness of hard power, it is hard to find successful foreign policies solely based on hard power resources. Many states now enact soft power rather than hard in its external relations. India’s foreign policy for instance is presently within the process of this transition. Wagner lists two main reasons for this transition: On the one hand, “India’s hard power approach of the 1970s and 1980s was not very successful” (Wagner, 2005, p. 2); and on the other hand, the economic advancement after 1991 facilitated the use of economic tools in foreign policy (ibid.). This explanation mirrors some of the above mentioned factors triggering the decline in the use of hard power.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
Authors › Prodicts › Prodict---Mearshimer

Offensive realism backed up by Chinas revisionism

Alenezi 2020 {Danah Ali Alenezi, “US rebalance strategy to Asia and US-China rivalry in South China Sea from the perspective of the offensive realism”, //KS}

In fact, there are many evidences support Mearsheimer’s predictions. For instance, in terms of the shift in the balance of power. Arguably, the three decades of the growing economic development placed China as the second largest economy in the world. The economic estimations assert that China’s economy would be the number one by 2020 (Logan, 2013, p. 2). However, the most importantly, China since the 2000s, has been translating this economic power to military might and global influence. For instance, China tripled its military spending during the period from 2000 to 2011 (Mislan, 2017). In fact, this huge spending on military power means the compromise the balance of power in Asia in favor of China. On the other hand, it gives an indication that China actually seeks to be a regional hegemony. The assertiveness and strictness of China’s foreign policy, particularly in the SCS since 2008, are another important indication of the Mearsheimer’s predictions. Moreover, China’s foreign policy since 2008 has become a more stringent in many flashpoints issues with the USA such as climate change, North Korea, Taiwan and Iran (, pp. 605-606).