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2022 CNDI Kritik
Negative › Links › Humanitarianism

Humanitarianism reifies a monolithic humanity where privileged agencies articulate human insecurity – ambiguous conceptual boundaries allow for manipulation and violence

Watson in 2011

Department of Political Science, University of Victoria, Canada; The 'human' as referent object?: Humanitarianism as securitization, Security Dialogue, Vol. 42(1)

Yet, security is not the only discourse that may be used to legitimize the implementation of emergency measures. Turning to recent historical events, one is struck by the power of humanitarianism in legitimizing a wide range of rather extraordinary measures. The humanitarian discourse that shaped the response to the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami resulted in unparalleled funding from both public and private sources: over US$13.5 billion was donated to disaster relief and recovery, and donors included an unprecedented total of 99 governments (Flint and Goyder, 2006; Telford and Cosgrave, 2007). Additionally, elites have used humanitarianism in varying degrees to justify military interventions in Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia, Angola, Mozambique, Kosovo, East Timor, Sierra Leone, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Liberia, Zaire, Sudan, Côte d’Ivoire, Iraq and Afghanistan (De Waal and Omaar, 1994; Wheeler, 2004; Roth, 2004). Perhaps the pinnacle of justification for military intervention for the purposes of human protection emerged from the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty’s (2001) report The Responsibility To Protect1 . The ICISS report explicitly outlines the foundations of the right to military intervention and garnered relatively widespread international support, including acceptance by the UN General Assembly (MacFarlane et al., 2004). The widespread endorsement of this report, combined with the continued use of humanitarianism to promote massive relief operations and military interventions, amply demonstrates that humanitarianism, like security, is a powerful discourse that legitimizes marshalling a vast amount of resources in the implementation of emergency measures. Humanitarianism as a justification for the use of military force is opposed by critics from all over the political and academic spectrum: from realists concerned with the use of force for reasons other than national security (traditionally understood) to critical theorists concerned with the imperialism of humanitarianism and its legitimization of violence (Slim, 2001; Ayoob, 2002; Bricmont, 2006; for overviews, see Welsh, 2004; McFarlane et al., 2004; Macrae, 1998). Yet, not all critics are completely dismissive of humanitarianism and the types of intervention it justifies. Those who still advocate for humanitarian action aim to create a concept of humanitarianism that either excludes the state and the use of force (ICRC, 2004; Rieff, 2002) or sets out clear parameters for ensuring that states employ force in a humane way and toward humanitarian outcomes (Weiss, 2001; Anderson, 1998; De Waal and Omaar, 1994). Consequently, scholars and practitioners alike have spilled much ink attempting to tie down the meaning of humanitarianism, in order to prevent its abuse at the hands of state and non-state actors. Despite these efforts, humanitarianism lacks rigid conceptual boundaries and is extendable, which facilitates ambiguous and manipulated uses (Chimni, 2000: 244). US and British elites’ justification of the invasion of Iraq in terms of humanitarianism is evidence enough of this problem. Yet, Chimni’s observation is eerily reminiscent of the critiques of the concept of security – that security is an essentially contested concept (Buzan, 1991) and that it is ambiguous and easily manipulated by elites (Wæver, 1995). Wæver (1995: 54–5) writes that security’s conceptual fluidity and discursive power encourages power-holders to use the instrument of security to gain control over an issue and use it for specific, self-serving purposes. He could just as easily have been referring to humanitarianism. In this article, I contend that the power of humanitarianism to legitimize extraordinary measures and the problem of its ambiguity and manipulability are best understood by approaching it as a form of securitization, similar in kind to societal and state security. Securitizing discourses (state, societal, humanitarian, etc.) identify a referent object that is threatened and endorse emergency measures to alleviate the threat. Approaching humanitarianism as a distinct sector of security with its own logic of threat and vulnerabilities addresses three critical gaps in securitization theory: its exclusion of non-state or societal referent objects of security (Buzan et al., 1998: 36; Hansen and Nissenbaum, 2009: 1160), its reliance on domestic and democratic forms of governance (Wilkinson, 2007; Vuori, 2008), and its problematic distinction between normal and emergency measures (Buzan et al., 1998: 25–7; Stritzel, 2007: 367; Rasmussen, 2001). Such an approach also contributes to our understanding of humanitarianism as a structured field in which certain actors hold a privileged position in the enunciation of human insecurity, in which a reified and monolithic form of humanity is declared, and that supports existing international norms pertaining to the provision of security for humans.

2022 CNDI Kritik
Negative › Links › Heg

Cultural hegemony reentrenches militarism by labeling a war-culture as key to local identities

Bernazolli and Flint ’09 (Richelle M. – University of Illinois at Urbana-Campaign; Colin- University of Illinois at Urbana-Campaign; “Power, Place, and Militarism: Toward a Comparative Geographic Analysis of Militarization”)

Contemporary theories of place provide a framework within which geographers can bridge society-wide processes, such as state-building, with local actions, decisions, and experiences. In this view, places are widely conceptualized as networks of social relations, rather than simply the local-scale settings, or containers, in which social relations occur (Agnew 1996; Massey 1994). This overview of place literature will look at the key aspects of place that we will subsequently connect to processes of militarization: place as a recursive and contingent process of social construction; the role of the production and maintenance of ideology; and the contestation of dominant ideologies and identities as a component of the social construction of place. The recursiveness of place, which is central to contemporary usage of the concept, stresses that as places are socially constructed, they concurrently foment particular behaviors and attitudes, which in turn, reproduce the places. These processes vary between localities, so that the general phenomena observable at the level of ‘mass society’ are experienced uniquely from place to place (Agnew 1987). Thus, the unique and the general, the structure and the agent, are related in a network of interdependent localities (Agnew 1987). Historical contingency likewise ‘emphasizes institutional and individual practices as well as the structured features with which those practices are interwoven’ (Pred 1984, 280) and further contributes the notion that places are constructed over time. While social relations (and the places they constitute) are dynamic and even sometimes fleeting, new interactions and behaviors that appear in their place are not built on a ‘clean slate’, but instead on the remains of previous ones, inevitably shapedby what came before (Pred 1984; Massey 1994). Finally, the construction of place may often be the result of elite actions in pursuit of particular goals, as Johnston (1991) posits, but it is important to recognize that subaltern members of society also play a role – either by complying with elite agendas, or by resisting them (Pile and Keith 1997; Thrift 2000). Place, as a process, is a ‘powerful force in the ongoing hegemonic and counterhegemonic struggles,’ meaning that place reproduces the beliefs that have produced it, and this occurs in such a way that the beliefs eventually appear self-evident and commonsense (Cresswell 1996, 13; Kirby 1993). This idea provides the crucial link between place and ideology. As noted earlier, while places may manifest as areas of resistance to the state, they also play a crucial role in reproducing the geography of the state’s hegemony (Agnew 1987). In a militarized society, this ‘geography of hegemony’ would unfold in a number of ways, particularly in terms of the cultural manifestations of militarism: the adoption and visible signs of military culture and values and ensuing support for militaristic policies. Such activities give rise to a local sense of identity, or sense of place, which often – but not always – serve to perpetuate dominant ideologies and identities (Agnew 1987; Pred 1984; Williams 1977). Places may also be constructed with the aim of resisting elite identities, ideologies, and objectives (Cresswell 1996; Kirby 1993; Pile and Keith 1997). In such cases, rather than serving as the local tools of overarching structures, the social relations and attitudes comprising localities may formulate in opposition to the policies of the state (Kirby 1993). Recent empirical work on the practices of memorialization and commemoration demonstrates how places may consist of competing forces: those which seek to perpetuate dominant ideologies and identities and those which seek to contest them (Alderman and Dwyer 2004; Graham and Shirlow 2002; Johnson 2003; Schein 2006). Ideologies, both dominant and marginalized, are inscribed into the cultural landscape, making this facet of place both a reflection of the human activities and ideals that have gone into constructing it, and at the same time, constitutive of them (Mitchell 2000; Schein 1997). Questions of power, then, are critical to gaining an understanding of how place based activities produce particular landscapes (Dowler et al. 2005). The complexity of place, with its multiple facets and meanings, is important to recognize. However, Agnew’s three aspects of place may be seen as core ‘variables’ around which a research framework may be organized. Agnew (1987, 1996) identified location, which is a place’s role or function in the wider economy; locale, which represents the primary institutions organizing social relations and identity in a place; and sense of place, which refers to the sense of identity tied to a locality. A fourth dimension, connectivity, or linkages to other places and other scales, should also be considered within a place-based research framework (Massey 1994). Agnew’s aspects of place will be revisited later in this article, as we propose possible comparative research designs for the study of militarization. As discussed above, several theories of place have set the foundation for discussing the construction of places within the political processes of state formation and maintenance. One set of processes involved is militarization. But what, exactly, is militarization accomplishing? These processes, constituted in large part by the activities of people in everyday settings, work to make militarism a taken-for-granted, or ‘natural’ facet of many societies. Hence, a useful concept for conceptualizing militarism is that of cultural hegemony, which up to now has been used in research focusing on class relations within capitalist societies. Cultural hegemony, as the following section will discuss, is a term developed by Italian Marxist theorist Antonio Gramsci ca. 1930 in order to explain why the working class had internalized or adopted the capitalist values of the bourgeoisie – in effect, reproducing a system that perpetuated their meager existence. However, this term, in concert with Gramsci’s theories of power, can be readily adapted from an explanation of the adoption of capitalist values to an explanation of the adoption of militaristic values.

2022 CNDI Kritik
Negative › Links › Heg

Reframing US policies as necessary and defensive perpetuates hegemony by presupposing the necessity of militarism for a secure world

Cypher ’16 (James M. - Research Scholar at the Global Institute for Sustainable Prosperity and a Research Professor in the Doctoral Program in Development Studies (UAED), “Hegemony, military power projection and US structural economic interests in the periphery,” Third World Quarterly)

Neoliberalism is a complex, quickly metamorphosing doctrine with many objectives, including especially a largely successful campaign to de-politicise the vast ‘underlying population’.34 As a consequence of this effort, it has only been in the context of the run-up to intervention in Iraq in 2003 that the intellectual hegemony of US militarism has been questioned within the country since the last aftershocks of the Vietnam war era. Notably useful in this short moment of re-politicisation have been the contributions of Blum, which offered a popular summary of US interventions, and Kolko, who presented a sophisticated critique of the pretentions of US power projection.35 Nevertheless, as the ‘perpetual war’ era of the 21st century was consolidated in Afghanistan and Iraq, such disavowals were gradually subordinated through a new crystallisation of US ‘conventional wisdom’, which ceased to view ongoing military campaigns as events beyond the ‘ordinary’. This unnoticed transmogrification was achieved through the constant ‘reframing’ of the geopolitical policies of the US as merely ‘necessary, protective, defensive’ measures as the ‘Pentagon propaganda machine’ worked assiduously with the mass media to de-legitimate opposition to these interventions and promote a numbing, universal ‘patriotic’ discourse.36 Second, Falk emphasised the attention the power elite has given to the avoidance of US war casualties, using technologies that effectively shift the fatalities of war-fighting onto (largely) foreign non-combatants. After Vietnam great care was given to the maintenance of consent through popular disengagement from the realities of intervention. Then President Carter began the reconstruction of US military intervention capabilities with the Rapid Deployment Force. Such new capabilities allowed for lightning US intervention in Panama in 1989. In 2003 ‘Shock and Awe’ – achieved through the rapid advance of overwhelming force – were thought to be the military tactics that would bring Iraq under US dominance before the American populace had an opportunity to react to events. In this instance, as Falk emphasised, Iraqi national resistance quickly formed and a prolonged battle ensued. ‘Fast intervention’, conducted with an array of high-tech weaponry, is designed to assure relatively few US military personnel killed in action. Thus, there is a constant substitution of capital for manpower in the field of battle for many reasons, one being that US corpses quickly pierce the carefully constructed fog of intellectual hegemony deployed to ensure US citizen consent in the application of military force in distant Southern nations. Interventions, then, have been facilitated through new processes and procedures carefully constructed to create a sufficient degree of autonomy to permit the US state to ‘project power’ and intervene without broad societal resistance. Nonetheless, prolonged engagements resulting from creative forms of asymmetric national resistance regularly erode and degrade US social consent, requiring its constant reconstruction. This erosion of consent can be forestalled to a considerable degree thanks to a culturally well-entrenched allegiance to US militarism. Militarism entails both individual and societal deference to all things military – including the military definition of reality, as Mills argued: ‘military power has become an ascendant end in itself…heightening the prestige and increasing the power of the military…tends to become a basis of national policy’.37 However, US militarism has always, ultimately, been a civilian-dominated construct, although since 1945 the civil–military relationship has frequently been ‘fractious, combative and problematic’.38 Militarism is the societal belief that the use of force in international relations – as a preferred option – can achieve national objectives. Furthermore, it is the dominance of military affairs in the construction of national priorities and policies. Militarism, in the US guise, does not mean that high-ranking military cadres precipitate episodes of ‘power projection’. Rather, most frequently, this role is filled by civilians – often in the face of opposition or scepticism from the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Militarists believe in the ‘logic of violence’, although there is no logic to violence except its assurance of ‘blowback’. Militarism has its deepest roots in the south states of America, where ‘valour’ and unquestioning ‘patriotism’ have long been held up as the highest of societal values. Today US military bases are spread throughout the southern states, reflecting the abiding influence of generations of jingoistic Senators and Congressional Representatives. US militarism is embraced by an influential portion of the civilian population, regardless of geography, particularly through the institutional power of the Veterans of Foreign Wars (VFW, with 1.4 million members), the American Legion (2.4 million veteran members) and retired officer associations. Of equal importance, with the end of national military service (in 1973), a multi-generational ‘caste’ of military families formed, with the south states constituting its strongest representation.39 Thus, the ideological hegemony needed to enable near-constant military interventions since the end of the Cold War is not structurally fragile. Neither is it unassailable. Regardless of the calamitous conditions arising from US interventions – including massive civilian casualties and displacement – a vociferous portion of the populace embodies unmitigated support for US military ‘power projection’. Another portion of the population – always risking the accusation of treasonous practices – embraces a counter-hegemonic position either as pacifists and/or because of their critique of the structural political economy of US military interventions. At any moment in time a vast proportion of the apolitical US populace has no strong commitment to either the permanent militarist faction or to those who hold an a priori position of opposition. Under conditions of prolonged military engagement this structurally uncommitted and easily deceived portion of the populace slowly and quietly withdraws its consent for interminable exercises in power projection. This is normally characterised as ‘war fatigue’ the ‘Vietnam Syndrome’ or some other sweeping term adopted by mass media entities that interpret, and communicate, the results of (frequently manipulated) public opinions polls. Manufactured consent, then, can be challenged at crucial conjunctures. Nonetheless, deeper structural and inertial forces tend – time and again – to reassert the intellectually hegemonic construct of US militarism.

2022 CNDI Kritik
Negative › Links › Heg

Hegemony is upheld through a militaristic ideology – restricts opposition by entrenching itself as key to the economy and national security

Bernazolli and Flint ’09 (Richelle M. – University of Illinois at Urbana-Campaign; Colin- University of Illinois at Urbana-Campaign; “Power, Place, and Militarism: Toward a Comparative Geographic Analysis of Militarization”)

The Gramscian notion of hegemony, which sought to explain societal acquiescence to a capitalist system that created and maintained vast economic inequalities, held that the poor and working-class sectors of society adopt the dominant cultural group’s ‘values, norms, perceptions, beliefs, sentiments, and prejudices’ (Lears 1985, 569). Consider for a moment the role of the military in society, with its own particular values, norms, perceptions, beliefs, and practices. In order to gain and maintain support, or at least acquiescence, for a large, standing armed force and the different activities it takes on, with associated opportunity costs, those who do not necessarily have a stake in the well-being of this system must be somehow convinced that its health and viability is of critical importance to their own well-being. Society as a whole must be acculturated to adopt a particular worldview and set of cultural beliefs that will generate a certain level of acquiescence to whatever it is the military is doing at any time and in any place. In adopting a Gramscian view of hegemony, we do not wish to imply that there is necessarily a ruling military class analogous to the ruling economic class of which Gramsci spoke. Rather, we posit that hegemony – the ability to set agendas and define values and norms – has advanced militaristic goals as well as economic or class goals. Indeed, the various sets of goals are intertwined and often compliment each other. The point here is that Gramsci’s broad notion of power is of use in analyses that go beyond class in a capitalist society. For example, Flint (2006) notes that the Gramscian notion of power demonstrates how ‘geopolitical practices and ideas are disseminated and portrayed to wide audiences in order to justify them and make them appear “normal” while belittling alternative views’ (Flint 2006, 28). Cresswell (1996), in his theorizations of placediscussed above, employs Gramsci’s ideas in order to explain the role of place in constructing dominant ideologies. And Taylor (1999) adapts the Gramscian idea of hegemony from the scale of a particular society to the globe in order to explore the mechanisms by which the last three world hegemons (the Netherlands, Great Britain, and the United States) have each been able to construct and impose their own versions of ‘modernity’ on the rest of the world. Emphasizing that dominant worldviews do not take hold in a simple, top-down manner, Sharp (2000, 31) points out that hegemony, far from being constructed solely through political ideologies on the part of the elites of society, is produced and maintained ‘more immediately through detailed scripting of some of the most ordinary and mundane aspects of everyday life.’ It is this very banality that makes militarism more than merely an elite ideology, or a set of beliefs with which state institutions indoctrinate the less powerful sectors of society. This does not rule out the possibility of resistance to the dominant ideology. Just as Gramsci had to explain open revolts such as workers’ strikes and factory takeovers, the application of cultural hegemony to militarism necessitates an explanation of activities such as war protests. In actuality, maintaining hegemony does not require constant commitment from subordinates to the existing system; rather, the dominant group carefully defines the acceptable range of resistance to these processes. As Lears (1985, 569) points out, most of the time, the vast majority of people find it difficult, perhaps impossible, ‘to translate the outlook implicit in their experience into a conception of the world that will directly challenge the hegemonic culture.’ This explains why we may see protests to a particular event, such as the Iraq War, but not challenges to the overall role of the military in society (although it is the very nature of the military’s role in society that allows such wars to happen). Gramsci’s theories of common-sense power and cultural hegemony rest on his distinction between political society and civil society, a view echoed by Agnew (1987) and Kirby (1993) in their theorization of place. Political society consists of the juridical or coercive institutions, most notably the police and the military. Providing the necessary ‘direct domination’ or command, political society assures the discipline of those members of society who do not consent to the imposed order willingly. Civil society, on the other hand, consists of institutions such as schools, the media, churches, trade unions, and political parties. In contrast to political society, civil society corresponds with the actual function of ‘hegemony’; the diffusion of cultural values and norms that construct the ‘spontaneous’ consent given by the masses to the general direction imposed on social life by the dominant group (Bellamy and Schecter 1993, 118–119). The cultural hegemony of militarism, as with class-based hegemony, can be understood as the convergence of political and civil society in ‘perpetuating the existing order’ (Boggs 1976, 17). One way in which the military sector achieves ascendancy within the state is to become an essential component of the economy. Compared to the cultural or ideological side of militarization, the economic mechanisms of militarization are more tangible and readily quantified. Therefore, although defense spending is often shrouded in secrecy, researchers have been able to utilize secondary data in order to focus empirically on these economic processes, making them well documented in geography. For instance, Markusen et al. (1991, 5) provide ‘a preliminary sketch of a theory of location for the defense industries,’ which the authors note have altered the US economy in fundamental ways, contributing to the rapid development of certain regions and cities vis-à-vis others throughout the Cold War. The edited volume the Pentagon and the Cities (Kirby 1992) was compiled with an eye toward the end of the Cold War and what this geopolitical transition might mean for the many communities across the United States that had come to rely on defense spending for their economic survival. In addition, at this time, Crump (1993) looked at how the spatial distribution of Department of Defense services procurement lead to new patterns of regional development and economic inequalities (see Woodward 2004 for a comprehensive review of military economic geography).

2022 CNDI Kritik
Negative › Links › Diplomacy

The aff’s diplomatic engagement is an attempt to shore up US power through consent- it still relies on imperial power to achieve compliance

De Graaff and van Apeldoorn in 2011

Naná de Graaff VU University - Amsterdam, The Netherlands Bastiaan van Apeldoorn VU University - Amsterdam, The Netherlands, Varieties of US Post-Cold War Imperialism: Anatomy of a Failed Hegemonic Project and the Future of US Geopolitics, Critical Sociology 37(4) 403–427

It is true of course that Obama also at the same time, and in contrast to his predecessor, emphasizes the important role of international institutions and regimes (lauding in particular the United Nations) and since taking office has stepped up, next to the deliberate public relations efforts to restore America’s image abroad, the kind of diplomatic engagement – including with so-called rogue states – that was already going on in a more muted way at the end of the Bush reign. Although this engagement in the meantime has turned out to be less effective than hoped for and is being criticized from both the left and the right, and for instance vis-a-vis Iran a more hard-line stance seems now again in the offing, not just in style and tone but also in terms of actual foreign policy-making during Obama’s first year ‘the multilateral gloves’ (Stokes, 2005) have to some extent been put back on. This seems to fit well with a ‘liberal internationalist’ outlook such as was also expressed by previous democratic administrations (see e.g. Chanley, 1999). Yet this should not be taken as simply a return to previous policies. First, the renewed emphasis on institutions and diplomacy is combined with a continued emphasis on the need to enhance and apply military power, and more so than during the last Democratic presidency. A clear testimony of this is Obama’s Nobel Peace Prize acceptance speech in which he stated that ‘it was not just simply international institutions … that brought stability to a post-World War II world … The United States of America has helped to underwrite global security for more than six decades with the blood of our citizens and the strengths of our arms’ (Obama, 2009b). In the same speech, praised by the leading neoconservative Robert Kagan (2009) as signalling a ‘significant shift’ towards ‘a tougher, less forgiving, more quintessentially American approach’, Obama moreover reiterated that ‘I – like any head of state – reserve the right to act unilaterally if necessary to defend my nation.’ (Obama, 2009b) Second, inasmuch as Obama does represent a relative shift back from coercion to consent, this should be seen in light of the failures of the coercive strategies of neoconservative imperialism. As the latter has undermined consent for US power so much as to become rather counter-productive, playing the ‘goodwill’ card may not only come naturally to Obama, but could also be seen as a strategy to seek to restore what is left of US global hegemony. The renewed search for consent that we have observed in Obama’s first year, however, is one that is born out of the fact that the USA has only a few cards left. This is crucially different from the neoliberal project of the Clinton years, which were the heyday for the power of both the USA and the neoliberal ideology. In short, inasmuch as multilateralism is making something of a comeback, it is out of weakness rather than strength. Finally, as indicated, the biggest challenge for Obama arguably lies on the economic front, where Obama not only has to adapt to the new multipolar reality and the loss of US structural power, but also will have to cope with the economic and ideological failure of the neoliberal accumulation strategy that has been pursued over the past decades; a failure which can be seen as at the heart of the current economic crisis. Returning to our network analysis above, the fact that largely the same people, linked to the same capital interests, which promoted the neoliberal accumulation strategy in the 1990s in the first place (e.g. Larry Summers, Paul Volcker) are now in charge of solving the crisis, in this respect may not bode well. Although Obama has recognized, and indeed made into a key priority of his overall foreign policy, the need to tackle the financial crisis also at a global level, in particular through the G-20 as the new primary platform for global economic governance, the three summits held thus far have produced little in the way of concrete steps towards a global reregulation of finance that could really form the basis for an alternative global growth model.

2022 CNDI Kritik
Negative › Links › Diplomacy

Diplomacy is a tool to infuse foreign policy with distinct class interest- exceptionalism, leverage, and the maintenance of capitalism

ANDREI A. GROMYKO in 1983

Minister of Foreign Affairs (1957–1985) and as Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet (1985–1988). Gromyko was responsible for many top decisions on Soviet foreign policy until he retired in 1988, Modern Diplomacy of Capitalist Powers, vii-viii

This book deals with the current problems of bourgeois diplomacy. Every state defines the objectives and tasks of its diplomacy, which is the sum total of all the measures, as well as the forms, ways, and means used by this state to implement its general policy in international affairs. Priority is attached to foreign policy; however, foreign policy and diplomacy are inseparably linked and interlocked in an integral whole. It follows from this fact that the foreign policy and diplomacy of a state, which has a definite social system, stem from the very nature of this system, or the ideology of the class or classes in power, and are called upon to secure their interests. In short, diplomacy, just like foreign policy, has a distinctive class character. Seeking to shape the destinies of nations, the exploiter classes have always regarded the planning and implementation of foreign policy and diplomatic activity as their exclusive privilege. Today, as in the past, they take whatever steps are necessary to bar the common people from participation in this process in whatever form, let alone directly, through their representatives. Bourgeois diplomacy continues its loyal service to the capitalist system, and to the monopoly bourgeoisie, which views diplomacy as an important instrument for preserving and consolidating its positions on the international scene, for the struggle against world socialism, the revolutionary and national liberation movements. In fulfilling its purpose bourgeois diplomacy makes wide use of the experience and facilities available in the rich arsenal of customs and traditions, norms and methods that took shape and accumulated through centuries of international intercourse, and activity in the foreign policy field. As Lenin pointed out in his time, in all areas of politics, foreign policy in particular, the proletariat which has come to power must know the methods of its opponent and use them at least with equal skill.1 Needless to say, deception, blackmail, and dictation, which have become the stock-in-trade of bourgeois diplomacy, are inapplicable in the practices of socialist diplomacy for reasons of principle and morality. Knowledge and consideration of these methods as diplomatic weapons of the bourgeoisie are quite indispensable for a timely exposure and analysis of imperialist plans and for frustrating them effectively. Falsehood and deception inherent in the diplomacy of capitalist powers are strikingly manifest in the glaring discrepancy between the foreign-policy principles and objectives they announce officially and those, they actually pursue in real life. The ruling sections of these countries proclaiming noble foreign-policy principles and objectives often use them as a cover-up to substitute their own selfish interests for the general state and national interests, to camouflage their true intentions and actions in international affairs, concealing thereby the essence of their diplomacy alien to their peoples.

2022 CNDI Kritik
Negative › Links › Diplomacy

The aff’s use of diplomacy to uphold US interests represents a classist hegemonic project- policy makers have a vested economic interest in maintaining the social and political order

De Graaff and van Apeldoorn in 2011

Naná de Graaff VU University - Amsterdam, The Netherlands Bastiaan van Apeldoorn VU University - Amsterdam, The Netherlands, Varieties of US Post-Cold War Imperialism: Anatomy of a Failed Hegemonic Project and the Future of US Geopolitics, Critical Sociology 37(4) 403–427

We argue that in understanding the variations in US imperialism we also need to examine those ‘specific conjunctures’ in which one hegemonic project may take the place of another without necessarily being linked to a concomitant change in accumulation strategy. However, we stress with Jessop that in order to be successful hegemonic projects need to advance the interests of a dominant class fraction, and thus to be articulated to a successful accumulation strategy – whether old or new. Success is not guaranteed, but seeking to advance these interests is what a hegemonic project is about. Let us now turn to the important ‘geopolitical’ dimension of any hegemonic project as formulated within the national context of a leading capitalist state such as the USA. As states are key in providing the preconditions for capitalist markets to develop and for capitalist accumulation to take place (Van Apeldoorn and Horn, 2007), any national or transnational capitalist class is dependent upon the application of state power both nationally and internationally (see e.g. Wood, 2003). Hegemonic projects, as expressive of underlying class interests, will therefore have to articulate not just a vision with regard to how to establish control over subordinate social groups in a domestic context (i.e. a national-popular programme), but also with respect to world order and the position of the respective state or states within it. It is thus that, as Van der Pijl (2007) maintains, class forms the crucial nexus between global capitalism and geopolitics: rather than viewing them as autonomous, they must be seen as internally related. This is not to imply that geopolitical strategy is in any way determined by objective class interests. On the contrary, these interests must be articulated politically and ideologically, and their possible translation into state policy must be seen as a contingent outcome of social and political struggles. Our claim is, however, that the content of these political and discursive practices is shaped by the social position of the actors engaging in it and by underlying social relations.4 It is thus that we must analyse how actors formulating geopolitical strategies are, to use Gramsci’s (1971) terminology, organically linked to certain social forces and to class interests. It is such ‘organic intellectuals’, located both within and beyond the state apparatus, that must be seen as constructing a hegemonic project – formulating and disseminating a particular strategy – as an articulation of long-term class interests. It is thus that we seek to show how geopolitical strategy is not so much, as Harvey would have it, formulated by a class of state managers with separate interests and motivations (2003: 27), but by intellectuals, policy advisors and (in the end by) state officials who are in fact closely linked to private capitalist interests. Although the capitalist class of the most powerful state may be highly integrated into certain patterns of transnational class formation, it is plausible that it has, at the same time, a clear sense of a distinct national interest. Precisely because of the fact that it sits at the top of the international and global hierarchy, it is acutely aware of the interest it has in maintaining the current system and of what it has to lose if the system breaks down. We therefore hypothesize that hegemonic projects formulated within the context of such a dominant state will tend to express a strong geopolitical consciousness, and include a rather elaborate strategy with respect to how to exercise control over other states and their societies. It is from this perspective that we will below analyse the rise and fall of the neoconservative project in terms of a hegemonic project that has been formulated and propagated within the national political arena of the USA and has subsequently been very successful in shaping US foreign policy after 9/11.5 We explain the rise of this project by situating its origins within the contradictions and limits of what we see as the hegemonic project of neoliberal globalization that unfolded in the 1990s, while arguing that the effect of these structural dynamics were crucially mediated by the concrete agency of a political vanguard tied to dominant social forces within the USA. The neoconservative project, we argue, offered an answer to a crucial question facing the US ruling class: how to prolong US global hegemony at a moment when the ‘answer’ of the neoliberal project no longer seemed that compelling any more.

2022 CNDI Kritik
Negative › Links › Deterrence

Their deterrence and domestic industry arguments are a link- it is the belief in the necessary preparation for war that drives militarist ideology

Carl Mirra in 2008

Ph.D. Adelphi University; Countering Militarism through Peace Education; https://www.tc.columbia.edu/epe/epe-entries/Mirra_ch11_22feb08.pdf

Of special importance to peace educators is Bacevich’s (2005) observation that militarism involves the use of force at the expense of alternative solutions. Following sociologist C. Wright Mills’ description of the “military metaphysic,” Bacevich notes that militarism involves the“tendency to see international problems as military problems and to discount the likelihood of finding a solution except through military means” (2005, p. 2). Bacevich locates the rise ofmilitarism in U.S. society at the turn of the twenty-first century, owing principally to the country’sinclination to equate national greatness with military prowess. The second Bush administration’s doctrines of unilateral and preemptive war also accelerate militarism by prioritizing the use of force. Militarism need not find expression in warfare alone. War preparedness contributes mightily tomilitaristic sensibilities. A thriving war industry adds to a militarized world. It is estimated that the major powers alone possess some 30,000 nuclear weapons and global arms spending wasroughly U.S. $55.8 billion annually at the turn of the twenty-first century (Menon, 2001). Peace researchers have demonstrated that massive arms spending while human needs are unmetconstitute structural violence, since expenditures on arms come at the expense of human needs. Militarism thrives on insecurity, anxiety and fear, thereby allowing resources to be diverted fromeducation, health care and related needs. The World Council of Churches has argued that humanity might have avoided the disaster of nuclear war, but not the disaster of malnutrition, educational neglect and lack of health care (Reardon, 1982). These problems are exacerbated bymilitary spending that diverts badly-needed resources to excessive military preparedness. Thisphenomenon is related to the “military-industrial complex,” a term coined by U.S. President Dwight Eisenhower in 1961. The president warned that the confluence of the private defense industry with the government led to the “mindless pursuit” of “redundant weapons systems” (Roland, 2001, p. 5). Mills’ (1956) formulation of a “power elite” that adopted a military mindset expands Eisenhower’s concept to include how economic priorities propel militaristic attitudes.

2022 CNDI Kritik
Negative › Links › Deterrence

Deterrence rests on the constant preparation for war- this exacerbates structural violence and leads to threat inflation

Christie et al in 2001

Christie, D. J., Wagner, R. V., & Winter, D. A. (Eds.). (2001). Peace, Conflict, and Violence: Peace Psychology for the 21st Century. Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall.

Like Woodrow Wilson, we define militarism in this chapter as a psychological rather than a physical process: Militarism is a set of values that support military activities and enable countries to mobilize for war. Militarism is as important during peace as it is during war. In fact, wars cannot be conducted unless militarism is nurtured long before wars begin. In democracies, somebody must provide a rationale for military expenditures and possible threats. The importance of military readiness must be articulated and that rationale must be persuasively communicated to the public. Legislative decision-makers must agree to allocate funds for the military, rather than to other forms of social spending. In this chapter, we argue that the preparation for war is as problematic as war itself. Because militarism is a global form of structural violence, we begin by analyzing the excessive financial costs and social injustice caused by militarism. Our central concern is why people decide to pay these exorbitant prices. To answer this question, we examine underlying psychological processes that are not always obvious. We assert that money, masculinism, and the search for the mystical drive militaristic sentiments beyond logical ends. Finally, we suggest that psychologically valid mechanisms to address these motives are required before structural violence from excessive militarism can be curbed. Because militarism calls on some of the deepest and most cherished of all human capacities, we believe that salvaging the best of militarism while redirecting the military’s focus is a crucial task for the twenty-first century. THE THIN LINE BETWEEN WAR AND PEACE In modern societies, support for military matters is often covert until armed conflict erupts. When soldiers fight wars, they must leave their families and join scores of other displaced persons to march, kill, and die for the sake of some political objective they often know little about. Because, as we have long known, war is not instinctual, people must be socialized to kill (May, 1943). The media helps the public understand the need to fight by objectifying the enemy and portraying it as evil (Hesse & Mack, 1991), and often even subhuman (Reiber & Kelly, 1991). Such treatment communicates dire predictions of what might happen should the enemy prevail. For example, in the early stages of the Vietnam War, the public was continually warned that a communist government in Vietnam would only be the first of a line of falling dominoes that would eventually threaten the United States. Strong feelings of nationalistic identification get aroused, creating an “us vs. them” dichotomy that is oversimplified and rigid (Tetlock, 1988). Military leaders on our side are depicted as heroes, and people questioning the wisdom of mili- tary action are portrayed as unpatriotic. Yet sudden psychological support of military actions cannot arise in a vacuum. Along with a well-rehearsed army, government leaders and the media build militaristic value systems between wars so that militariesrealism can be instantly activated. In peacetime, such values are often latent. Large numbers of citizens passively condone, if not support, their militaries, in order for them to function effectively when called upon. In this way, the line between peace and war becomes blurred. The first peace psychologist, William James, noted that “battles are only a public verification of the mastery gained during the peace interval…[The] preparation for war by nations is the real war, permanent, unceasing” (James, 1910/1995, p. 19). STRUCTURAL VIOLENCE OF MILITARY PREPAREDNESS Preparation for war is a form of structural violence, since its social, political, and economic structures cause avoidable injury or deaths (Christie, 1997; Galtung, 1969). Structural violence is insidious because it has no active agent, no conscious intent, and no clear point of origin (see Chapter 1). But inevitably, national decision-makers choose between military and social spending. When countries spend precious income on military matters instead of food, health care, or environmental protection and restoration, injuries and deaths to civilians occur. As Eisenhower put it a half century ago, “the problem in defense spending is to figure how far you should go without destroying from within what you are trying to defend from without” (1956, as quoted by Sivard, 1996). Half of the world’s governments spend more to guard their citizens against military attack than to protect them against the enemies of good health, such as contaminated water, poor nutri- tion, and lack of medical care (Sivard, 1993). World military expenditures reached an all-time high of $1.3 trillion in 1987. Despite significant decreases since the close of the Cold War, however, global expenditures in 1995 still amounted to more than $1.4 million per minute. The United States became the world’s military superpower during World War II, when its military budget sky-rocketed from under $13 billion a year to $530 billion (Sivard, 1996). The United States currently eclipses the rest of the world by a huge margin, spending over five times that of the second-biggest spender (Russia); more than the combined budgets of the 13 countries ranking below it (Sivard, 1996); and over 18 times the combined spending of those countries often identified as its biggest threats (North Korea, Iran, Iraq, Libya, Syria, Sudan, and Cuba). Even redirecting relatively small amounts of military expenditures could significantly impact social well-being (see Mazaruna and McKay, this volume; Pilisuk, this volume). For example, just 4 percent of the world’s military budget could raise global literacy to 50 percent, and redirecting 8 percent of military budgets for family planning would stabilize global population by the year 2015. The cost of one nuclear-powered submarine ($2.5 billion) could immunize the world’s children for one year. Clearly, excessive military expenditures constitute great structural violence.

2022 CNDI Kritik
Negative › Links › Cyber Security – China

Articulating Chinese threats to cybersecurity papers over the internal sociopolitical contradictions present in the United States, serving to create a homogenized understanding of both countries that ultimately results in more threats and insecurity

Jacobsen 20

Jeppe Teglskov, assistant professor at the Institute for Military Technology, Royal Danish Defence College. “Lacan in the US cyber defence: Between public discourse and transgressive practice.” Review of International Studies. 2020. Pg 10-18. LJS

In short, the US cyber defence community represents China’s behaviour in cyberspace as a threat that transgresses the values and norms the United States officially follows and promotes. China is everything the United States is not. The Chinese government has an omnipresent gaze, enabled by excessive use of surveillance techniques and censorship, which challenges and violates the respect for and protection of freedom of expression and privacy that the United States promotes online. The Great Firewall represents to the US cyber defence community an attempt to secure the power of the Chinese government and the United States seeks to secure liberal values for all in cyberspace. Thus, Chinese government’s primary interest in consolidating its own centralised power by draining the economic power of others through cyber theft of intellectual property undermines the United States’ official ambition of becoming the global force for good that brings economic prosperity to billions all over the world. Lastly, the opaque Chinese government/patriotic hacker relationship is a transgression of the idea of a transparent and lawabiding state that the United States publicly promotes and defends. Let me now turn to the second step in the symptomal reading; namely highlighting what tensions in the US cyber defence the Chinese fantasy displaces, how the Chinese threat object is taking on different opposing features, and where the ‘repressed’ returns. First, ‘China in cyberspace’ displaces the fact that there are more uncomfortable and disavowed ‘truths’ about the cyberspace politics in the United States, ‘truths’ that are pushed to the margins of the US cyber defence discourse. Prior to the Snowden revelations, this was, for example, the fact that American privacy online is under pressure, not only from Facebook but also from the intelligence agencies’ attempt to prevent terrorism. Similarly, one can detect a process of displacement in relation to the fact that the United States’ pursuit of military superiority in cyberspace involves exploiting vulnerabilities in IT systems used by Americans as well as allies, which ultimately reproduces an environment that is technically insecure. Pushed to the margins by the Chinese fantasy is also the fact that the US cyber defence community itself is riddled with tensions, for example, over funding or who should have authority over the US cyber capabilities – that is, whether to use software exploits (cyber weapons) for intelligence (NSA) or military (US Cyber Command) purposes. Thus, ‘China in cyberspace’ is a symptom of more fundamental tensions. It plays a role as the object that prevents the US cyber defence community from confronting the fact that it is neither defending cyberspace nor is a homogenous whole. In other words, China is not only our other, it is that which enable us to keep the illusion that we are a ‘whole’ American self, and that which allows us to identify with this self. It prevents the US cyber defence community from confronting the fact that the very social field it represents is structured around an impossibility – that fulfilling a fantasy does not deliver the enjoyment it promises. Second, the displacement is supported by a condensation: the Chinese cyber threat takes on contradictory features. While more ‘traditional’ discourse analyses would see such inconsistencies as evidence of a less stable discourse,73 the symptomal reading draws the opposite conclusion. It was noted above, how the Chinese government through its Great Firewall is perceived to exert total control over its citizens and how the government enjoys total homogenisation with these subjects. Yet, it is also commonly understood among members of the US cyber defence community that the technical restrictions deployed by Chinese government authorities are easily circumvented by Chinese netizens and that the general level of cybersecurity in China is low. This is illustrated, for example, by a US Cyber Command official who explained in an interview that the NSA with ease had penetrated networks in Chinese universities, mobile phones, fibre-optic cables and servers controlled by the Chinese government, and second, by an official US policy that invests millions of dollars in technologies to promote freedom online, including tools for citizens to circumvent censorship regimes.74 According to the logic of condensation, the perception of the weaknesses of Chinese cybersecurity exacerbates, rather than dampens the perception of China as a threat. In an interview, a US official working with cyber defence policy worried that the insufficient Chinese cybersecurity allows other groups to route their cyberattacks through Chinese networks, while permitting China to deny responsibility for any hostile cyber activity with reference to a possible third party having penetrated its IT infrastructure. In other words, China is both a cyber superpower and cybersecurity novice – and threatening for both reasons. However, what hold these conflicting narratives together is what they have in common. In both cases, the Chinese government enjoys what the US cyber defence community cannot have: plausible deniability due to poor cybersecurity and totalitarian control with its citizens. This is the role of condensation. Importantly, while China is a symptom that displaces other more fundamental ‘truths’, these ‘truths’ return. Thus, the Snowden revelations symbolise ‘a return of the repressed’. Snowden and other whistleblowers revealed how the US cyber defence community is not simply defending a unified United States from Chinese threats from cyberspace but is conducting excessive surveillance and cyber exploitation practices; as will be elaborated in the following, the US cyber defence entities undermine global network security, collect data on its own citizens, and bribe private companies to share more user data than necessary – and they lie to Congress about it. As I will argue, these transgressive practices should not be understood as being detached from the official US cyber defence discourse characterised by restraint, transparency and clarity, but as constitutive hereof. Transgression is closely connected to the fantasmatic distinction between an idealised harmonious self and the Chinese symptom. The last section elaborates this claim by extracting the kernel of enjoyment that work to sustain the US cyber defence discourse.

2022 CNDI Kritik
Negative › Links › Cyber Security

Cybersecurity discourse relies on objective “experts” whose true purpose is to constantly displace the structural causes of insecurity- the result is an endless set of recommendations that reaffirm the militaristic ideology of the status quo

Jacobsen 20

Jeppe Teglskov, assistant professor at the Institute for Military Technology, Royal Danish Defence College. “From neurotic citizen to hysteric security expert: a Lacanian reading of the perpetual demand for US cyber defence.” Critical Studies on Security. 3/1/2020. Pg 1-10. LJS

The goals of security policy experts – a term used collectively here to describe independent consultants and think tankers that produce policy recommendations and advise the US Administration – keep shifting. A case in point is the extensive policy discussion on cyber deterrence. Improving deterrence of cyberattacks against the US has been a recommendation put forward by task forces and commissions at regular intervals during the Obama Administration (National Research Council 2010; CSIS 2017; DSB 2013; DSB. 2017). The Administration’s attempts to accommodate these recommendations have invariably been met by new and different sets of proposals and demands, and a reluctance on the part of experts in the cyber community to stand by previous policy proposals. By way of a brief summary, elaborated further in the body of this article: Before 2010, policy experts called for more offensive cyber capabilities to ensure a cyber deterrence posture. Around the time that the Administration provided these capabilities, the cyber deterrence problem ceased to be attributed to a cyber capability problem and was now thought to result from a lack of signalling. Shortly thereafter, the Administration responded by signalling a willingness to respond strongly to cyberattacks, at which point the expert community began calling instead for resilience in both civilian and military US networks to achieve cyber deterrence. This demand for cyber resilience was put forward in such vague terms that it is impossible to determine when it is achieved. The dependency on increasingly complex socio-technical systems in contemporary society has rendered reliance on experts unavoidable. And with their rise to ubiquity in policy circles, expertise has also become a frequent object of study in social sciences. In critical security studies, the sociological approaches have been particularly attuned to the study of expertise. Within this field, security scholars have focused largely on how the everyday practices of professional experts play a role in categorising what constitutes an insecurity – and ultimately, in (re)producing particular ‘regimes of truth’ (Bigo 2002; Berling and Bueger 2015). In so doing, these contributions see experts as the embodiments of specific forms of knowledge that is practised or articulated as part of a dominant rationality of government (or dispositif or field). This article introduces a strategy for studying security policy experts that does not reduce the expert to the embodiment of a knowledge regime or a tool for political interests. It suggests that paying attention to how the expert subject identifies with and performs its role as an expert vis-à-vis the government that takes policy decisions, advances our understanding of the expert’s role in reproducing insecurities. The article takes its cue from the writings of those critical security scholars that show how today’s risk governance has led to increasing public awareness and general concerns in society about unpredictable and catastrophic events (Aradau and van Munster 2011; Aradau, Lobo-Guerrero, and van Munster 2008). Such concerns about uncertainty, the critical security scholars argue, have not only led to the government introducing precautionary and pre-emptive strategies for governing security but has also given rise to anxious and neurotic subjects (De Goede 2008; Walklate and Mythen 2010; Eklundh, Zevnik, and Guittet 2017). Scholarly contributions within this field have so far almost exclusively diagnosed the neurotic subject among citizens being governed. In fact, the neurotic subject is treated somewhat disconnected from or even juxtaposed to the experts that implement or propose the current security governing strategies and thus can be said to mobilise collective anxieties (Fournier 2014). Experts are, apparently, unaffected by anxieties about future uncertainties. This article extends the notion of the neurotic subject to the expert, and asks: How does a reading of the expert as a neurotic subject advance the way we study the reproduction of insecurities? For answering this question, the Freudian-inspired work on the neurotic citizen by Isin (2004), which is the main inspiration for the above-mentioned turn to anxiety and neurosis in the risk literature, is a useful stepping-stone. However, the article switches the theoretical point of departure from Freud to Jacques Lacan – the latter of which enjoys increasing attention in critical security studies recently (Mandelbaum 2016; Heath-Kelly 2018; Danil 2018; Eberle 2019). To date, the Lacanian contributions within this literature have generally introduced Lacan’s notion of the divided subject – and one or a few concepts related to it – to extend the analytical power of existing critical security and IR approaches (Epstein 2011). However, Lacan offers a – largely unexplored1 – systematic strategy for locating and studying the divided subject in different social relations, his matrix of the ‘Four Discourses’ (Lacan 1998, 2007). The article zooms in on one of the four discourses, Lacan’s discourse of the hysteric, introducing it as an analytical strategy for studying policy experts as neurotic subjects. Lacan defines the Four Discourses as abstract ways to structure our communication and identification. The Hysteric Discourse, one of the four discourses, is a social bond where a neurotic subject constantly protests and demands that an ‘other’, in the position of the master signifier, delivers what the subject desires (for example, absolute security) (Fink 1995, 129–37). The article focuses on US policy experts in the field of cyber defence.2 US cyber defence is as an apt case study not only because ‘cyber’ is officially considered the biggest threat to US national security, but also because cyberspace is articulated in the US as an uncertain, unpredictable and insecure domain where governments rely on assistance from outside experts to solve problems (Dunn Cavelty 2013; Hansen and Nissenbaum 2009). As the neurotic subject is likely to emerge from uncertainty and as experts hold a privileged position in the cyber policy debate, the social bond between the US cyber defence experts and the government is an ideal case for examining the expert as a neurotic subject that communicates through the Hysteric Discourse as well as what it means for the reproduction of insecurity. Through the case study of the US cyber policy experts, the article contributes to the emerging body of critical security studies on experts. It introduces a Lacanian-inspired hysteric strategy for advancing the analysis of security experts. First, the article locates the drifting of desire in the public expert documents on cyber deterrence and argues that the US cyber policy experts’ ever-evolving and ultimately elusive demands are illustrative of a desire for a desire unfulfilled, which reproduces cyber insecurity as a national defence priority. And second, the article shows that the social bond between the cyber policy expert subject and the US government is sustained – despite the former taking up employment in the executive branch – by the subject pushing the object of desire in front of it to the point of ultimately returning to the position as outside experts. Together, the two readings illustrate a critical security strategy for studying the reproduction of insecurity through the experts’ neurotic identification as experts. The article comes in three sections. First, it situates the study of security expertise in the critical literature on risk and uncertainty. Second, it introduces Lacan’s hysteric social bond as a strategy for studying the subject, and third, it illustrates how to apply this strategy through a case study of US cyber defence experts. Security experts and expertise in critical studies on risk and uncertainty The study of experts and expertise in International Relations and security studies is not new. A focus on scientific experts preoccupied IR functionalists of the 1960s as did the concept of ‘epistemic communities’ in the early 1990s where the primary interest was to explore the causal mechanisms by which experts exert influence over security policy. More recently, critical security approaches also turned their attention to the study of experts and expertise (Berling and Bueger 2015, 3–6). The main analytical task of these scholars has been to highlight the contested and contingent ground upon which expertise is constructed and exercised. Leander (2014) offers an excellent example of the contestation and controversies over the production of expert knowledge in the case of the 2013 Sarin gas attack in Syria. And scholars such as Büger and Villumsen (2007) have shown repeatedly how ‘facts’ are produced through a web of practices. The production relates, for example, to the network of peace researchers, US policy-makers, NATO officials and bureaucrats that stabilised the ‘democratic peace thesis’, or to the practice of quantification, expert monitoring groups, and special advisors, which generate a specific form of knowledge on piracy (Bueger 2015). Similarly, a group of security scholars – the so-called Paris School – approaches security as a professional struggle between experts (the managers of unease), who, through their bureaucratic, everyday practices and routines, define what counts as insecurity (Bigo 2002; Huysmans 2006; Bigo and Tsoukala 2008). Whether drawing on the work of Bourdieu, Foucault or Actor-Network Theory, the existing contributions tend either to reduce security experts to the ‘scientific knowledge’ and tools for ‘political interests’ or to treat security experts as passive deployers of security techniques. This tendency is particularly present in the many studies of security governance through risk. Here, the attention to technologies that represent the tools for generating ‘objective’ knowledge about risks has not only pushed the experts developing, proposing the use of, or applying the technologies to the background, but has also directed the analytical lens primarily towards the production of bionic subject-positions of those being ‘risk managed’. Amoore and de Goede (2008, 9–10) call the current usage of data-driven (surveillance) technologies to identify risky bodies and bodies at risk, the ‘techno-expert deployment of risk’. Biometric technologies are the prime example of the dominant mode of risk management, and they are used to illustrate how the technologies, rather than addressing the political subject, govern bodies with the aim of controlling the future through enforcing the (political) status-quo in the present (Bell 2006; Epstein 2008). But while experts are not the focus of these analyses, the literature on security-governance-through-risk contains an opening to ask new questions about security experts. Critical risk scholars such as Aradau and van Munster (2011) argue that governing through calculation and management of the future has fostered public concern about unknowable, future catastrophes, such as terrorism and natural disasters. This increasing focus on unknowable disasters and worst-case scenarios, some scholars have suggested, renders the subject neurotic and anxious (De Goede 2008; Walklate and Mythen 2010; Fournier 2014). The neurotic subject was first discussed in the context of risk by Isin, who draws on Freudian insights to account for citizens’ acceptance of the social effects of neoliberalism. Isin (2004, 225–6) argues that the subject called upon to adjust its conduct in times of emerging risks is not ‘a rational, calculating or competent subject’ but an affective subject that needs ‘soothing, appeasing and tranquillizing’ to manage anxieties. The neurotic subject-citizen speaks and makes demands: It wants the impossible (absolute security and safety) and is presented with new solutions to manage its affects (ibid: 232). The critical security contributions that find inspiration in Isin’s work all locate anxiety and neurosis at the level of the citizens who are being risk managed and in juxtaposition to the experts and government officials that mobilise these anxieties (Fournier 2014: 315–7; De Goede 2008; Eklundh, Zevnik, and Guittet 2017). Charlotte Heath-Kelly (2018) has taken an important initial step towards moving beyond the dichotomy between experts who mobilise anxiety and the anxious subject. She examines the role of anxiety among those experts and government officials who are in a position of securitising issues and who practice security towards various threat objects. With the change in focus, she has also switched the psychoanalytic starting point from Freud to Lacan. She introduces Lacan’s divided (or split) subject and related concepts such as drive, anxiety, enjoyment, and lack and applies them to the War on Terror to understand the continuous invention of new threat objects that occurs as soon as the old ones are destroyed (ibid.). Building on Heath-Kelly’s argument that the subject repeatedly invents insecurities to avoid confronting an ontological lack/insecurity, the next section proposes to situate the subject in Lacan’s most formalised methodological matrix, his ‘Four Discourses’. Lacan’s Discourses do no refer to specific content (e.g. legal, political, medical, etc.) but can be understood as structuring different social bonds between the subject and the social field, i.e. different modes of communication through which the subject identifies. The following section introduces the divided subject and develops an analytical strategy for approaching the neurotic expert-subject through a particular social bond, Lacan’s discourse of the hysteric. From divided subject to hysteric social bond: introducing a new reading strategy Lacan was one of the 20th century thinkers who worked most extensively with the subject. The novelty of Lacan is the way in which he unites three distinct definitions of the subject: the liberal acting subject, the subject of structuralism and the subject of the unconscious. The conventional understanding of the subject is the Cartesian acting subject, often exemplified in the (to Lacan, imaginary) idea of being a whole and autonomous ‘self’ that forms the environment. The opposite conception of the subject is the subject that is subjected to the socio-symbolic structures of society. This subject is the product of – or subject position formed by – for example, a legal, medical or political discourse. Lacan introduces a third subject, which allows him to account for why the subject identifies with the socio-symbolic structures in the first place. He calls it the subject of the unconscious. This subject represents a ‘pre-subjective’ part of the individual that cannot flawlessly pass into the subject – it represents the failure to become the subject. The unconscious takes its form as a nonsymbolisable residual that keeps the subject desiring and identifying with new objects (Fink 1995, 36–48). In other words, the Lacanian subject – when emerging in the socio-symbolic order to assume an identity – cannot escape an ontological lack that is the inevitable result of being positioned in the gap/void between the other two subjects. Turning to Lacan’s divided subject has analytical implications. It becomes a core task for the Lacanian analysis to identify where the subject is positioned in a social context, and how this position allows the subject to cope with or avoid confronting its own dividedness. With his Four Discourses, Lacan seeks to codify the various positions that the subject can take in different social bonds. The Four Discourses – the Master, University, Analyst and Hysteric Discourse – can be thought of as abstract ideal-types for how social relations and identifications play out (Lacan 1998: 14–25, 2007, 11–68). Lacan’s Discourses are condensed formula-based models (called mathemes), which are made up by four positions (agent, other, product, and repressed truth) and four elements (master signifier, system of signification/knowledge, divided subject, and objet petit a), whose relations make up four different social bonds (commanding, indoctrinating, transforming, and protesting) (Žižek 2004, 131–57). Introducing every matheme is unfortunately beyond the scope of this article. It therefore focuses on one of the discourses, the Hysteric Discourse, and unpacks its conceptual relations and social bonds in order to develop a strategy for studying the expert as a neurotic subject. The decision to study experts through the Hysteric Discourse rather than the University Discourse, in which neutral knowledge speaks, echoes the attempt – motivated in the previous section – to move from studying security experts as the embodiments of a specific risk/security governance regime (a system of knowledge) to studying experts as neurotic (divided) subjects. Lacan, like Freud, regards the hysteric as one of the two ways of being neurotic, the other being the obsessional neurotic. Before proceeding, however, it is important to emphasise that the subject, when located in a hysteric social bond, does not refer to a pathological or clinical personality type, but refers to a position occupied within a socio-symbolic system of meaning. Let me now introduce the hysteric social bond as an interpretive strategy for empirical analyses. A social relation resembles a hysteric social bond when a speaking agent deals with uncertainties and doubt by demanding that someone else does something about these feelings, and when this ‘other’ responds to the demands and protests by producing new knowledge and solutions (Fink 1995, 133). Importantly, the fundamental Lacanian assumption is that every social bond is driven by unconscious force, a repressed ‘truth’ that determines how the subject copes with its dividedness. In the Hysteric Discourse, this repressed truth is what Lacan calls objet petit a – the object cause of desire. Objet petit a is one of Lacan’s most ambiguous concepts. In simple terms, it represents the empty position that a lost object can occupy, i.e. the position that allows an object to be currently unobtainable and hence desired. To the subject, a lost object occupying this position holds the promise of full enjoyment, i.e. a complete, secure identity, when reached. Hence, the lost object claims to symbolise the nonsymbolisable lack that remains when the subject attempts to assume an identity. In other words, objet petit a stands for the void or gap that causes desire by holding no positive content (Lacan 2007: 42–4, 176–9). When the objet petit a is repressed as in the hysteric social bond, the subject avoids directly confronting its desire and ultimately the ontological lack at the heart of its being. In empirical analyses, the function of objet petit a becomes visible, for example, as the drifting of desire from one (lost) object to the next with the illusory expectation that every new desired object symbolises and holds the power to overcome what is lacking in the subject/ socio-symbolic universe. In the hysteric social bond, repressing or avoiding confrontation with objet petit a is a defence mechanism supported by anxiety. If the subject were to confront objet petit a, it would come to see itself in a new light, ultimately ripping it out of the comfort of communicating and identifying through the existing social bond. Thus, contrary to how this term is commonly understood, anxiety for Lacan is associated neither with the loss of an object nor with what is absent or uncertain. Rather, anxiety is an expression of presence – of not having in place a lost object (Lacan 2014; Burgess 2017, 29). It is the lack of a symbolisable lack: anxiety is the moment when the subject gets too close to objet petit a. Thus, in the hysteric social bond, anxiety emerges at the prospect of the ‘other’ delivering what the subject desires, and pushes desire along. The constant drift of desire ensured by anxiety in the Hysteric Discourse is both a productive and a conservative force. It is productive because it forces the ‘other’ to constantly improve its efforts in response to the subject’s demands and criticisms, and it is conservative in that the repression of objet petit a prevents the discursive configuration from being questioned and challenged. Following this logic, the worst that can happen to the hysteric social bond is if the ‘other’ caves to the criticism and gives up its position as the master who produces new solutions. This would force the subject to take responsibility for its own choices and decisions, and ultimately, confront its own desire. The hysteric social bond offers an analytical strategy for locating and interpreting how the subject communicates and identifies in particular (security political) contexts. From the above, the initial analytical step is to locate a relationship that resembles a social bond between, on the one hand, an agent that makes demand and criticises and, on the other hand, a master that responds to these demands by producing solutions. The hysteric social bond then directs the analyst’s attention to the way the object of desire manifests itself empirically, including when the social bond seems to break down. The hysteric bond is particularly relevant to the security political analysis because the constant reinvention and articulation of a desired object that promises security when attained reproduces a present sense of insecurity. The next section examines how the object of desire manifests itself, first, in the expert communication through policy recommendations on cyber deterrence made during and in the aftermath of the Obama Administration, and second, in a situation where the hysteric social bond breaks down, as it can be said to do when the cyber policy experts take up positions as secretaries, ambassadors or advisors within government. In both analyses, the article zooms in on the processes through which the expert subject avoids confronting objet petit a and how this avoidance ensures ‘cyber’ as a pertinent national defence issue. The expert subject’s demand for cyber defence Experts supposedly offer impartially and evidence-based knowledge and lay out possible ways forward. Experts are not enmeshed in normative partisan politics. At least, US think tanks emerged in the beginning of the 20th century on this foundation (Rich 2004, 34–41). Traces of this ideal still exist, although there are clear political divisions across US think tanks today (Abelson 2018). In the ongoing policy debates on how to defend the nation in cyberspace, non-partisan task forces and commissions put forward policy recommendations based on their ‘objective’ assessment of the nature of cyberspace and the actors acting within it. One of the most iterated recommendations revolves around how to achieve credible cyber deterrence. Yet, the next subsection reviews the policy recommendations related to cyber deterrence made by commissions and task forces during the Obama Administration and in doing so, challenges the idea of experts as nothing but the embodiments of a dominant knowledge regime. The first subsection reads the relationship between policy expert and government as a hysteric social bond where cyber deterrence is kept out of reach by constantly changing demands or demands that are articulated so vaguely that they are impossible for the government to meet. The second subsection analyses the US cyber policy experts’ entry into the government as a break with the hysteric social bond that risks forcing the neurotic subject to confront its own desire, but it shows that such a move is accompanied by a constant reinvention of excuses as to why the expert-turned-master is unable to provide the cyber defence it is responsible for, ultimately leading to a definition of the object of desire as that which the subject cannot currently do: criticise and make demands. In this way, the hysteric social bond between experts who reproduce insecurities through demands for policy change and a government that seeks to accommodate these demands is sustained. The desire for a desire unfulfilled At the end of 2008, the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) brought together policy experts to develop cybersecurity recommendation for the incoming president. Under the headline ‘Military Doctrine and Deterrence’, the commission report emphasised the importance of ‘the need for a credible military presence in cyberspace to provide a deterrent against potential attackers’ (CSIS 2008, 24). The following quote from the report, however, calls in to question the commission’s own recommendation: Deterrence in cyberspace is particularly complicated because of the problems with attribution and identification. If a country does not know who is attacking, it is difficult to create appropriate and proportionate responses in ways that reduce the chance of escalation. A signal that a country is contemplating a response that goes to all potential attackers will not deter and could actually create more conflict (ibid.: 26). In short, if the attacker is not attributable and hence does not fear retaliation, then even the most potent cyber military is superfluous. To make a policy recommendation and in the same breath call into question the soundness of this policy is a hysteric communication par excellence. It avoids the anxiety that emerges when the specific object of desire (offensive military capabilities) is achieved by already introducing a new object of desire (better attribution). Tellingly, the Administration’s decision to establish the US Cyber Command, the cyber branch of the US military, was immediately criticised as insufficient. CSIS director James Lewis underlined, for example, that ‘the U.S. is widely recognized to have pre-eminent offensive cyber capabilities, but it obtains little or no deterrent effect from this’ (cited in Markoff, Sanger, and Shanker 2010). In other words, the government should do a better job defending against and identifying the culprits in cyberspace. Then Deputy Secretary of Defense, William J. Lynn III was ready with a plan for improving cyber defence capacities. Presenting the Department’s cyber strategy, Lynn underlined that ‘[US cyber] deterrence will necessarily be based more on denying any benefit to attackers than on imposing costs through retaliation’ (Lynn III 2010, 99–100). The newfound priority of cyber defence did not appear to reassure the expert subject. As a case in point, the National Research Council (NRC) hosted a 2010 workshop with policy experts on cyber deterrence. And shortly after, the independent Defense Science Board (DSB) created a task force on Resilient Military System and the Advanced Cyber Threat to provide recommendations on how to maintain deterrence in the cyber era. Neither the NRC workshop nor the DSB report found offensive cyber capabilities or cyber defence to be the solution to the cyber deterrence problem. Instead, the desired object had drifted along: Now, the Administration needs to clearly articulate the willingness and the capacity to respond to cyberattacks not only with cyber weapons but with all available tools – ultimately nuclear weapons (DSB 2013: 15; Rosenzweig 2010, 247). Articulating the willingness to respond to cyberattacks with any means was first introduced by the Obama Administration in the 2011 International Strategy for Cyberspace and subsequently iterated in both the Department of Defense (2015) Cyber Strategy as well as in a White House cyber deterrence white paper of late 2015 (Obama 2011: 14; Department of Defense 2015: 11; Otto 2015). However, as is prototypical in a hysteric social bond, getting close to the object of desire – that is, having more steadfast articulations about the willingness to retaliate – causes anxiety that prompts a slide towards a new object of desire. In this case, manifesting in a redefinition of the meaning of cyber deterrence. Two subsequent commission reports on cyber deterrence, namely the CSIS cyber recommendations to President Trump and the 2017 DSB follow-up report on cyber deterrence (CSIS 2017a; DSB. 2017), no longer focused only on large-scale cyberattacks against the US critical infrastructures as that which needed to be deterred. In fact, the government’s cyber deterrence’s efforts including the articulation of a willingness to respond with all means necessary seemed to have worked, as no serious, crippling cyberattacks against US critical infrastructures had taken place – despite the experts’ continuous criticisms of US national cyber insecurity. What the US did not prevent, however, was economic cyber espionage and minor, non-destructive disturbances of public and private networks. Thus, in the new commission reports, the anxiety over such malicious cyber activity was now included as that which needed to be deterred. Once again, anxiety pushes desire along, now in the form of a desire for better defining a proportional response to cyberattacks on private entities and economic espionage. This drift to better declaratory policy also offers an explanation as to why the government – when it finally delivered on the previous demand for better attribution – failed to satisfy the expert’s desire for cyber deterrence. In 2014, the US successfully attributed and indicted Chinese government hackers for commercial cyber espionage, but as the expert’s desire for cyber deterrence now involved a desire for a strong national security response to cyber espionage, the US government’s attributions only reinforced the demands for economic sanctions (Nakashima 2015). In short, as soon as the government delivers, the expert subject’s desire shifts, from offensive military capabilities in cyberspace to better attribution, to an articulation of willingness to respond, and most recently, to the need to define proportional responses to non-military cyber activity. With the drift, the cyber threat continues as a pertinent national security challenge – to which the solution remains always just out of reach.

2022 CNDI Kritik
Negative › Links › Benign Warfighting

The 1ACs image of benign war-fighting is an age-old tactic enabling innocent domination on the periphery. By placing military benevolence on a pedestal, the aff assigns hegemonic security priestly powers culminating in genocidal sacrifice on the periphery.

Lovell 2019. [Joseph Lovell, Graduate of the Patterson School of Diplomacy, “Americans Can’t Give Up the Cult of War” https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/04/09/americans-cant-give-up-the-cult-of-war/]

The United States accomplished its goals in the Afghan war when a team of Navy SEALs stormed Osama bin Laden’s Pakistani compound and gave him a richly deserved bullet to the head. So why is the United States still there? America has clearly gotten its pound of flesh. There are now more Sunni Islamist militants than ever. Never-ending deployments place massive strains on personnel, drain resources, and divert funding needed for modernization so the United States remains competitive versus its peer adversaries.

Yet despite this, America’s forever wars seem unlikely to end anytime soon. And their purpose has transformed. Like much else in U.S. foreign policy, the geopolitical purpose is secondary to the pride and ceremony involved. Americans may bristle at the insinuation that they are engaged in ritual bloodshed. But the facts point that way. If victory was seen as a pressing national priority, then the fact that only 56 percent of Afghan territory is under friendly control more than 17 years into the war should be viewed as a national scandal and disgrace.

2022 CNDI Kritik
Negative › Links › AI/Biotech

Dual use link—The 1AC’s construction of [insert enemy]’s AI/biotech as an existential threat serves to produce insecurity and creates a spiraling security dilemma

Lupovici 21

Amir, senior lecturer in the School of Political Science, Government and International Affairs and a research fellow in the Blavatnik Interdisciplinary Cyber Research Center. “The dual-use security dilemma and the social construction of insecurity.” Contemporary Security Policy, 42(3), 257–285. pp. 7-11

Threats are not simply given. They are constructed and shaped through social dynamics. This does not mean that the objective elements that affect insecurity are irrelevant. Rather, these elements are mediated through interpretation and carry effects through discourse that identify the threat and justify the response (e.g., Lipschutz, 1995, pp. 1–23). Actors, intentionally and unintentionally, create social structures that produce (in)security and threats. The dual-use dilemma is thus shaped by two interrelated social mechanisms. The first is the social production of the dual-use qualities of the technology. The second is the actors’ construction of the technology of their opponents as an existential threat, which is embedded in a broader social context that includes the actors’ relations, politics, identity, and history andcontinues previous securitizing moves. Through the combination of these, actors construct uncertainty over whether their opponent’s technology is meant for civil or for military/harmful (and potentially existentially threatening) purposes, and thus they allocate resources to address it. This is even if the opponent has no plans for harmful or military application of the dual-use technology. The securitizing moves an actor takes may affect the security of other actors, who in turn may take additional measures and contribute to the spiraling escalation. The concept of securitization captures the social dynamics of insecurity. Securitization is a process through which an intersubjective understanding that something is an existential threat is developed between a securitizing actor (enunciator) and audience. This intersubjective understanding allows the actor to call for exceptional measures to deal with the threat (Buzan et al., 1998; see also Buzan & Hansen, 2009, pp. 212–217; Gad & Lund Petersen, 2011). A crucial element of this process is the speech act of security, as it is the utterance itself that constitutes an issue as a security issue by labeling it as such (Buzan et al., 1998, pp. 26–27). A number of facilitating conditions related to the language used, the securitizing actor, and the “conditions historically associated with the threat” affect the speech act (Buzan et al., 1998, pp. 32–33; Floyd, 2010, p. 13). However, scholars have challenged the emphasis on the semantics of security, pointing to the importance of images and to external conditions affecting the securitizing move that are not related to language (e.g., Vuori, 2008; Williams, 2003). It should also be noted that while the concept of securitization was originally developed to explore the constitutive elements of “new” security issues, such as migration, epidemics, and the environment (Balzacq & Guzzini, 2015; Buzan & Hansen, 2009, p. 215), scholars have begun using this theory to study “traditional” security issues (Hayes, 2013; Lupovici, 2019; Roe, 2008; Vuori, 2008). I follow this line of studies, and especially Van Rythoven’s (2020) article.4 Van Rythoven uses the concept of securitization dilemma to explore the unintended consequences of the security dilemma dynamics. Among other things, he aims to highlight how this concept bridges traditional and constructivist theories of security, and to justify epistemologically and conceptually the combining of the security dilemma with securitization scholarship.5 Van Rythoven provides a promising point of departure to incorporate securitization theory into the study of the security dilemma. First, he defines the securitization dilemma as “a difficult choice where a securitizing move represents a powerful and attractive opportunity for political mobilization, but with the danger of perverse and unintended consequence” (2020,, p. 479). In short, the focus of the dilemma is diverted to the question of whether to securitize or not. Second, securitization theory also allows the capturing of different non-traditional kinds of threat, and not just threats to sovereignty, that initiate the security dilemma for different kinds of actors (and not just to state actors) (Van Rythoven, 2020, p. 484). I further elaborate on Van Rythoven’s assertions by acknowledging the spiral dynamics of securitizing moves. For Van Rythoven, a key aspect of the dilemma is the unexpected consequences of a securitizing move. He highlights the uncertainty that surrounds securitizing moves, as enunciators cannot know whether the audience will accept them or what the impact will be of implementing the practices stemming from these moves (Van Rythoven, 2020, pp. 486–488). While all these uncertainties are important, another key, and underdeveloped, question is how securitizing moves affect other actors. I argue that this dynamic may create a spiral of insecurity where actors respond with a securitizing move to a securitizing move initiated by another actor, thus affecting both actors’ security. Important to understanding security dilemma dynamics is the acknowledgement that securitization is a process rather than a single act (Roe, 2008, pp. 617–618, 624; Watson, 2011, p. 10). Recognizing this allows us to consider the political context in which securitizing moves are embedded, as well as the political effects of securitizing moves (Buzan et al., 1998, p. 25; Guzzini, 2011, p. 331; Hayes, 2013, pp. 16–17). A number of scholars have extended these ideas by considering the different dynamics through which the same security issue is repeatedly securitized. They explore the concept of re-securitization, when an already-securitized issue is put back on the agenda (Mavelli, 2012, p. 190; McDonald, 2011) or attains a new climax (Lupovici, 2016). Scholars have also explored the international effects of securitizing moves. Beyond domestic consequences, securitizing moves’ political effects and outcomes influence other actors, who respond to them as a result of either the rhetoric employed or the behavior triggered (Buzan et al., 1998, pp. 205–206; see also Lupovici, 2019; Wæver, 2011, p. 476). Especially important for capturing dynamics around the chain reaction of a security dilemma is a counter-securitizing move, which occurs when actors resist a securitizing move. Actors can resist a securitizing move in different ways,6 and against different elements of the targeted securitizing move (Stritzel & Chang, 2015, pp. 551–552). Although Stritzel and Chang (2015, p. 553) do not specifically connect their discussion to the security dilemma, they argue that “[a]n explicitly interactive reading of processes of securitization versus counter-securitization … can establish fruitful conversations specifically with military strategy.” Thinking of securitizing moves as part of an iterating process that affects other (international) actors captures the essence of the security dilemma (Table 1). The traditional security dilemma is fueled by the “objective” characteristics of the means acquired by the actors and focuses on whether to arm to prepare for an emerging threat, even though the act of arming may itself be threatening to the opponent. Conversely, the securitization approach to the security dilemma focuses on the actors’ spiraling constructions of insecurity. From this perspective, a security dilemma erupts when an issue is securitized and counter-securitized by rival actors. An actor’s securitizing move is constructed as an existential threat by another actor and thus it is spirally aggravated. The securitization approach of the dilemma is based on the view that, on the one hand, a securitizing move may be advantageous for the securitizing actor by mobilizing support for extraordinary measures, legitimizing their response to an opponent’s challenge or, alternatively, winning them some domestic political gains. On the other hand, the move itself may invite the opponent to make securitizing moves of its own. The result may be a spiral dynamic in which each actor conducts a securitizing move where they securitize the securitizing move taken by an opponent. The dilemma then is whether to securitize and enjoy the benefits of it while also facing the risk of negatively influencing other actors or providing tools for the opponent to perform securitizing moves of their own. When the means Actor A holds or develops (or even the rhetoric related to these processes) are constructed by Actor B as an existential threat and Actor B can justify taking extraordinary measures to address the alleged insecurity, then Actor B contributes to the dynamics of the security dilemma. In turn, Actor A may securitize Actor B’s response—that is, Actor B’s securitizing move is securitized by Actor A. More specifically, Actor A may construct a number of things as an existential threat: (1) Actor B’s construction (labeling the means acquired by Actor A as an existential threat); (2) Actor B’s justification to take extraordinary measures; or (3) Actor B’s execution of the measures legitimized through the securitizing move. Securitizing of any of these issues by Actor A can lead to attempts to justify additional means Actor A should take and can expedite attaining the means of threat to Actor B that have already been justified. The securitized issue becomes part of the opponent’s securitizing move: it provides a pretext for enunciators to perform their own securitizing move and it also gives both sides tools to further securitize the situation, and so on. This creates the dangerous spiral dynamic. Each securitizing move—and the ensuing extraordinary measures—becomes a strong justification for the opponent to re-securitize the opponent’s moves and attain a new securitization climax. I build on a securitization reading of the traditional security dilemma to present the dual-use security dilemma (see Table 2). Basically, the dilemma in the latter is whether to securitize an opponent’s dual-use technology. On the one hand, by securitizing these technologies, an actor can attain domestic support and legitimacy for policy measures, including measures addressing the (constructed) threat Conversely, the securitizing move itself, apart from any execution of these measures, may alarm an opponent or even provide it a pretext for its own securitizing moves, thus initiating a spiral dynamic of insecurity. This may especially be tragic in situations where the actor whose dual-use technology was first securitized had no plans to use the technology for military/harmful purposes. I suggest that the dual-use security dilemma is shaped by two kinds of social dynamics. First, social processes shape whether and how a technology can be seen as dual-use. Second, once a technology is seen as dual-use, enunciators are able to rely on this knowledge to further securitize it.

2022 CNDI Kritik
Negative › Generic Shell

The alternative is critical peace research, a strategy that continuously critiques and questions sovereign conceptions of violence and peace while simultaneously committing to the ethical and practical imperative of non-violent resistance to structures of domination.

Jackson 15 – prof of peace and conflict studies @ U of Otago

(Richard, ‘Towards critical peace research: Lessons from critical terrorism studies,’ chapter in Researching Terrorism, Peace and Conflict Studies: Interaction, synthesis, and opposition, edited by Ioannis Tellidis and Harmonie Toros, pp. 24-31)

Critical peace research: a proposal On the basis of the above assessment, this section briefly outlines a set of core commitments which I believe ought to characterise CPR. I conceive of ‘critical’ (peace) research in two primary senses. First, it simply means an intellectual orientation or attitude which attempts to stand apart from the existing order (while at the same time acknowledging that one can never fully escape one’s own situatedness or biases), which questions widely accepted common- sense and dominant forms of knowledge about peace and conflict, and which asks probing questions about how existing social and epistemic orders came into existence and the processes by which they are maintained. Second, and more narrowly, the term ‘critical’ is used to refer to approaches which draw upon the analytical tools and insights of Frankfurt School- inspired Critical Theory, as well as related critical-normative social theories and disciplinary approaches such as critical constructivism, post- structuralism, feminism, post- colonialism and others. In the first instance, critical approaches are characterised by a healthy scepticism towards accepted knowledge claims and dominant ideas, and instead, seek to continuously question and interrogate that which is taken for granted. In particular, critical scholars are committed to interrogating how the status quo is implicated in some of the very problems that traditional theory seeks to solve, in this case, the ‘problems’ of conflict, violence, lack of reconciliation and the like. In part, this is because critical approaches recognise that knowledge and power are intimately connected– that knowledge is never neutral, but ‘theory is always for someone and for some purpose’ (Cox 1981). Lastly, in contrast to the social scientific adoption of a purportedly neutral standpoint on political and ethical issues, critical approaches are characterised by an openly ethical- normative commitment to human rights, social justice, progressive politics, and improving the lives of individuals and communities – or what is often called ‘emancipation’ or praxis (McDonald 2009). Ontological commitments What exactly are the things called ‘conflict’, ‘peace’, ‘violence’, ‘terrorism’, ‘mediation’, ‘reconciliation’ and the like, that we study, and how should we conceive, understand and speak of them? An openly critical approach would suggest that all of these objects of study are not free- standing, ontologically distinct phenomena discoverable by objective social scientific study. Instead, things like ‘peace’, ‘humanitarian intervention’, ‘cultural violence’ or ‘reconciliation’ are social formations and sets of social activities that are in large part contingent upon, and constituted by, the terms, languages and discourses used to describe and study them. A concept like ‘peace’ is actually ‘an ontologically suspicious concept’ (Elshtain quoted in Neufeld 1993: 172), and whether a particular society is described as ‘peaceful’, ‘post- conflict’, ‘reconciled’, or ‘violent’ is not a value- free fact or ‘truth’ waiting to be discovered by a scholar through the scientific method, but the consequence of the operation of a series of academic, political and social discourses, judgements and practices in different locales. In other words, there is a discursive, political, cultural and academic process by which real world actors and processes are given meaning through the negotiated application of different kinds of political and intellectual labels, categories and narratives, including a set of discursively constructed measures by which ‘peacefulness’ or ‘violence’ can be ranked, or groups judged to be ‘spoilers’, for example. Such measurements are inherently ideological in that they prioritise some values over others: direct violence over structural violence, order over social justice, dialogue over resistance. Moreover, such labels, concepts, categories and meanings are prone to change and contestation; they never just ‘speak for themselves’. In terms of exactly what a ‘conflict’ consists of, for example, something that started as a ‘rebellion’ might then become a ‘terrorist campaign’ (or ‘The troubles’), before being designated a ‘civil war’ (usually, by virtue of reaching an arbitrary fatality threshold), a ‘genocide’ or a ‘counter-insurgency campaign’. This is not to say that critical approaches do not recognise actual physical violence in the ‘real world’ which is experienced by people as ‘civil war’ or ‘terrorism’, or conditions of low direct violence which is understood as ‘peace’. Rather, it is to adopt a Frankfurt School- inspired ontology which maintains a ‘minimal foundationalism’ in which the ontological distinction between subject and object is preserved, and discourse and materiality are conceptualised as shaping each other in a dialectical, never-ceasing dynamic, rather than the one being solely constituted by the other (Toros and Gunning 2009). Such an ontological standpoint recognizes that there are observable ‘regularities’ in human activity (what positivists might call laws), and that one can distinguish between different phenomena on the basis of their delineated characteristics, while at the same time recognising that these characteristics and how they are interpreted are a product of their social and historical context and thus, are not ‘objective facts’ in the positivist sense. Consequently, for critical scholars, the acceptance of the relative ontological insecurity of analytical concepts results in a real sensitivity to the politics of labelling and categorising, and extreme care in the use of different terms during research and teaching. However, critical approaches go even further, recognising that peace, conflict, violence, reconciliation and the like are in themselves constituted by social and political narratives, discourses and practices. As a consequence, critical scholars are interested in the constitutive nature of norms, ideas and other discursive elements which make the social practices of conflict, violence, dialogue, peace and reconciliation possible in specific historical and spatial contexts (Alkopher 2005: 716). In other words, critical approaches suggest that violent conflict cannot be fully understood apart from the particular kinds of narratives, discourses and social practices which make it possible by rendering it conceivable, legitimate and reasonable (see Jabri 1996). Crucial to this process is the role played by existing normative structures which function to construct identities, interests and modes of social action (Alkopher 2005: 720). Importantly, in addition to critical civil war research (see Jackson 2014) within the conflict analysis side of the field, a critical ontology which accepts the social construction and inherent instability of the key concepts is also starting to inform approaches to the study of peace (Richmond 2007, Shinko 2008) and conflict resolution (Hansen 2008), among others. Epistemological commitments A critical epistemology accepts that creating knowledge is ultimately a social process which depends on a range of contextual and process- related factors, not least the social position of the researcher, the institutional context within which they conduct their research, and the kinds of methods they employ. Such factors impact on the kinds of knowledge produced, as well as the purposes to which it is ultimately put. Importantly, this does not mean that all knowledge about the social world is hopelessly insecure, that scholarly standards and procedures in research should be rejected, or that ‘anchorages’ – relatively secure knowledge claims – cannot be found and built upon (Booth 2008). Rather, it suggests that CPR should be characterised by a continuous and critical reflexivity in regards to its own epistemology, methodology and assumptions. It also means that there are few if any knowledge claims about conflict, violence, peace, reconciliation and the like that cannot be challenged or questioned. Related to this, a critical perspective also recognises that no individual, including academic researchers, can completely put aside their personal identity, values, perceptions, and world view and then engage in purely objective, dispassionate, value- free research. Rather, every researcher brings with them a particular culture and set of values and understandings which shapes their research in important ways. At the very least, critical scholars argue that recognising and acknowledging the personal subjectivity of the researcher is an important step (see Breen Smyth 2009), not least because such continuous reflexivity acts as an antidote to the dangerous claim that some kinds of knowledge are objective and wholly unbiased, and therefore superior to others. Crucially, such an epistemological stance does not entail a wholesale rejection of the social scientific notion of objectivity, but instead accepts that there are multiple ways of knowing about objects of social analysis, such as conflicts or peace processes, that it is in any case beyond the capacity of any single narrative to provide the best account of such processes, and that through a pluralisation of perspectives and their inevitable clashes a more justifiable knowledge can be assembled (see Campbell 1998: 279–281). A critical approach therefore suggests that ‘continual contestation, rather than the aspirations of synthesis and totality, should be the aim of inquiry’ (ibid.: 281).

2022 CNDI Kritik
Negative › Generic Shell

Militarist ideology results in the permanent racialized targeting and elimination of bodies to maintain a global economy of violence, a process to which the peoples of the Global North will only respond with a disembodied indifference

Harting 6. [Heike, prof at University of Montreal, Global Civil War and Post-colonial Studies, globalautonomy.ca/global1/servlet/Xml2pdf?fn=RA_Harting_GlobalCivilWar]

. Ondaatje's novel (2000) opens with an Author's Note that locates the narrative at a time when "the antigovernment insurgents in the south and the separatist guerrillas in the north???had declared war on the government" and "legal and illegal government squads were???sent out to hunt down" both groups. In this instance, the Hobbesian rhetoric of a "war of all against all" is more than a clich??. In fact, it is symptomatic of the novel's ambiguous critique of the role of the Sri Lankan nation-state and its elaborate, modernist discourse of violence. The Note foreshadows what the narrator later repeats on several occasions, namely that Sri Lanka's war is a war fought "for the purpose of war" (ibid., 98) and for which "[t]here is no hope of affixing blame" (ibid., 17). In short, the "reason for war was war" (ibid., 43). At first glance, the narrative's emphasis on the war's self-perpetuating dynamics implies a Hobbesian understanding of violence as the natural state of human existence. At the same time, it translates the actual politics of Sri Lanka's war into the Deleuzean idiom of the "war machine." For, according to Deleuze and Guattari, armed conflict functions outside the control and accountability of the "state apparatus???prior to its laws" (1987, 352), and beyond its initial causes. Although such an interpretation of Sri Lanka's war reflects what the political scientist Jayadeva Uyangoda calls the "intractability of the Sri Lankan crisis" (1999, 158), its political and ethical stakes outweigh its gains. 6 To begin with, the novel's leitmotif of "perpetual war" situates Sri Lanka's conflict within a general context of global war, because, as the narrator reports, it is fought with "modern weaponry," supported by "backers on the sidelines in safe countries," and "sponsored by gun-and drug-runners" (Ondaajte 2000, 43). In this scenario, the rule of law has deteriorated into "a belief in???revenge" (ibid., 56), and the state is either absent or part of the country's all-consuming anarchy of violence. This absence suggests that the state no longer functions, in Max Weber's famous words, as "a human community that (successfully) claims the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within a given territory" (2002, 13). It is of course possible to argue that the novel's critique of the Sri Lankan nation-state lies in its absence. It seems to me, however, that the narrative's tendency to locate the dynamics of Sri Lanka's war outside the state and within a post-national vision of a new global order generates a normative narrative of global war. On the one hand, it resonates with the popular ??? though misleading ??? notion that the "appearance of 'failed states'," as Samuel Huntington argues in his controversial study The Clash of Civilizations, intensifies "tribal, ethnic, and religious conflict" and thus "contributes to [the] image of a world in anarchy" (1996, 35). On the other, situating Sri Lanka's war outside the institutions of the state re-inscribes a Hobbesian notion of violence that helps legitimize and cultivate structural violence as a permissive way of conducting politics. Such a reading of violence, however, overlooks that in a global context violence has become "profoundly anti-Hobbesian" (Balibar 2001, xi). Balibar usefully suggests that the twentieth century history of extreme violence has made it impossible to regard violence as "a structural condition that precedes institutions." Instead, he maintains, "we have had to accept???that extreme violence is not post-historical but actually post-institutional." It "arises from institutions as much as it arises against them" (ibid., xi). Thus, in such popular post-colonial narratives of war as Anil's Ghost, the normalization of violence figures as a forgetting of the institutional entrenchment and historical use of violence as a state-sanctioned political practice. If Ondaatje's novel presents Sri Lanka's war as an "inherently violent" event (Das 1998), it is also an event narrated through the symbolism and logic of archaic primitivism. For example, in the novel's central passage on the nature of human violence, the narrator observes, "The most precisely recorded moments of history lay adjacent to the extreme actions of nature or civilisation ???Tectonic slips and brutal human violence provided random time-capsules of unhistorical lives???A dog in Pompeii. A gardener in Hiroshima" (Ondaatje 2002, 55). The symbolic leveling of the arbitrariness of primordial chaos and the apparently ahistorical anarchism of violence create a rhetoric of the archaic that is characteristic, as Nancy argues, of "anything that is properly to be called war" (2000, 128). He convincingly argues that archaic symbolism "indicates that [war] escapes from being part of 'history' understood as the progress of a linear/or cumulative time" and can be rearticulated as no more than a "regrettable" remnant of an earlier age (ibid., 128). In that, Nancy's observation coincides with Hardt and Negri's that the "war on terror" employs a medievalist rhetoric of just and unjust wars that moralizes rather than legitimizes the use of global violence by putting it outside the realm of reason and critique. In Nancy's observation, however, two things are at stake. First, what initially appears to be a postmodern critique of the grand narratives of history in fact demonstrates that a non-linear account of history may lend itself to the transformation of extreme violence into exceptional events. In this way violence is normalized as a transhistorical category that fails to address the unequal political and economic relations of power, which lie at the heart of global wars. Second, Nancy rightly warns us against treating war as an archaic relic that is "tendentiously effaced in the progress and project of a global humanity" (2000, 128). For not only does war return in the process of negotiating sovereignty on a global and local plane, but the representation of war in terms of archaic images also repeats a primordialist explanation of what are structurally new wars. As theorists such as Appadurai and Kaldor have argued, the primordialist hypothesis of global wars merely reinforces those mass mediated images of global violence that dramatize ethnic wars as pre-modern, tribalist forms of strife. Huntington's notion of civilization or "fault-line" wars as communal conflicts born out of the break-up of earlier political formations, demographic changes, and the collision of mutually exclusive religions and civilizations presents the most prominent and politically influential version of a primordialist and bipolar conceptualization of global war. In contrast to Huntington's approach, however, the narrative of Anil's Ghost contends that all forms of violence "have come into their comparison" (Ondaatje 2000, 203). Notwithstanding its universalizing impetus, the novel thus insists on the impossibility to think the nation and a new global order outside the technologies of violence and modernity. Indeed, in the novel's narrative it is the suffering of all war victims that "has come into their comparison" and suggests that the new wars breed a culture of violence that shapes everyone's life yet for which no one appears to be accountable. On the one hand, then, the novel's self-critical humanitarian project seeks to initiate a communal and individual process of mourning by naming, and therefore accounting for, in Anil's words, "the unhistorical dead" (ibid, 56). On the other hand, read as its critical investment in the war's politics of complicity, the novel's humanitarian endeavor is countered by the narrator's tendency to articulate violence in archaic and anarchistic terms. For, to revert to the symbolic language of "primitivism and anarchy" and "to treat [the new wars] as natural disasters," as Kaldor observes (2001, 113), designates a common way of dealing with them. Thus the rhetoric of the archaic not merely dehistoricizes violence but contributes to the making of a normative and popular imaginary through which to make global wars thinkable and comprehensible. Thus, their violent excesses appear to be rooted in primordialist constructions of the failed post-colonial nation-state rather than a phenomenon with deep-seated roots in the global histories of the present. Such a normative imaginary of global war is produced for the Global North so as to dehistoricize its own position in the various colonial processes of nation formation and global economic restructuring of the Global South. In this way, as Ondaatje's novel equally demonstrates, the Global North can detach itself from the Global South and create the kind of historical and cultural distance needed to accept ultra-objective violence as a normative state of existence. Conceptualizing war as a phenomenon of criminal and anarchistic violence, however, may do more than merely conform to the popular imagination about the chaotic and untamable nature of contemporary warfare. Indeed, anarchistic notions of violence tend to compress the grand narratives and petite recits of history into a total, singular present of perpetual uncertainty, fear, and political confusion and generate what the post-colonial anthropologist David Scott sees as Sri Lanka's "dehistoricized" history. Given the important role the claiming of ancient Sinhalese and Hindu history played in the violent identity politics that drive Sri Lanka's war, Scott suggests that devaluing or dehistoricizing history as a founding category of Sri Lanka's narrative of the nation breaks the presumably "natural???link between past identities and the legitimacy of present political claims" (1999, 103). This strategy seems useful because it uncouples Sri Lanka's colonially shaped and glorified Sinhalese past from its present claims to political power. We need to note, however, that, according to Scott, dehistoricizing the past does not suggest writing from a historical vacuum. Rather, it refers to a process of denaturalizing and, thus, de-legitimizing the normative narratives of ethnicized and racialized narratives of national identity. Anil's Ghost engages in this process of "dehistoricizing" by foregrounding the fictitious and fragmented, the elusive and ephemeral character of history. Indeed, as the historian Antoinette Burton suggests, the novel offers "a reflection on the continued possibility of History itself as an exclusively western epistemological form" (2003, 40). The latter clearly finds expression in what Sarath's brother, Gamini, condemns as "the last two hundred years of Western political writing" (Ondaatje 2000, 285). Steeped in the imperial project of the West, such writing is facilitated by and serves to erase the figure of the non-European cultural Other in order to produce and maintain what Jacques Derrida famously called the "white mythology" (1982, 207) of Western metaphysics. The novel usefully extends its reading of violence into a related critique of knowledge production, so that the latter becomes legible as being complicit in the production of perpetual violence and war. This critique is perhaps most articulated through the character of Palipana, Sarath's teacher and Sri Lanka's formerly renowned but now fallen anthropologist. Once an agent of Sri Lanka's anti-colonial liberation movement, Palipana represents the generation of cultural nationalist who sought history and national identity in an essentially Sinhalese culture and natural environment. Rather than employing empirical and colonial methods of knowledge production and historiography, Palipana had left the path of scientific objectivity, tinkered with translations of historical texts, and "approached runes???with the pragmatic awareness of locally inherited skills" (Ondaatje 2000, 82) until "the unprovable truth emerged" (ibid., 83). Now, years after his fall from scientific grace, Palipana lives the life of an ascetic, following the "strict principles of" a "sixth-century sect of monks" (ibid., 84). To him, history and nature have become one, for "all history was filled with sunlight, every hollow was filled with rain" (ibid., 84). Yet, Ondaatje's construction of Palipana and his account of the eye-painting ritual of a Buddha statue ??? a ritual that assumes a central place in the novel's cosmopolitan vision of artisanship as a practice of cultural and religious syncretism in the service of post-conflict community building ??? are themselves built on a number of historical texts listed in the novel's "Acknowledgment" section. As Antoinette Burton astutely observes, "the orientalism of some of the texts on Ondaatje's list is astonishing, a phenomenon which suggests the ongoing suppleness of 'history' as an instrument of political critique and ideological intervention" (2003, 50). Rather than effectively "dehistorizing" the character of Palipana, then, Ondaatje bases this character and the eye-painting ceremony on a central Sri Lankan modernist text, Ananada K. Coomaraswamy's Mediaeval Sinhalese Art (1908/1956). Cont For Hardt and Negri, then, the state of exception functions as the universal condition and legitimization of global civil war, while positioning the United States as a global power, which transforms war "into the primary organizing principle of society" (2004, 12). They rightly observe that the state of exception blurs the boundaries between peace and war, violence and mediation. Yet, curiously enough, Hardt and Negri's understanding of the state of exception largely emphasizes the concept's regulatory and pragmatic politics, so that the United States emerges as a sovereign power on grounds of its ability to decide on the state of exception. By exempting itself from international law and courts of law, protecting its military from being subjected to international control, allowing preemptive strikes, and engaging in torture and illegal detention (ibid., 8), the United States instrumentalizes and maintains war as a state of exception in the name of global security and thus seeks to consolidate its hegemonic role within Empire. Although Hardt and Negri openly disagree with Agamben's reading of the state of exception as defining "power itself as a 'monopoly of violence' " (2004, 364), it seems to me that Agamben's theory of the state of exception, as put forward in Homo Sacer rather than in States of Exception, might be usefully read alongside Hardt and Negri's crucial claim that global civil war as well as resistance movements depend on the "production of subjectivity" through immaterial labour (2000, 66). What this argument overlooks is that, according to Agamben, the state of exception constitutes an abject space or "a zone of indistinction between outside and inside, exclusion and inclusion" (1998, 181), where subjectivity enters a political and legal order solely on grounds of its exclusion. Moreover, the sovereign ??? albeit a nation, sovereign power, or global network of power ??? can only transform the rule of law into the force of law by suspending the legal system from a position that is simultaneously inside and outside the law. Through these mechanisms of exclusion and contradiction, subjectivity is not so much created as it is deprived of its social and political relationships. Thus the "originary activity" of global civil war is the violent conflation of political and social relationship and thereby the "production of bare life" (ibid., 83), of life that need not be accounted for, as is the case with the civilian casualties of the US-led war against Iraq. The state of exception, however, also figures as a prominent concept in post-colonial theory, for it raises questions not only about the ways in which we configure the human but also how we understand imperial or global war. In 1940, Benjamin famously wrote, "the tradition of the oppressed teaches us that the 'state of emergency' in which we live is not the exception but the rule. We must attain to a conception of history that is in keeping with this insight" (1968, 257). Benjamin's statement, as Homi Bhabha reminds us half a century later in his essay "Interrogating Identity," can be usefully advanced for a critical analysis of the dialectical ??? if not revolutionary ??? relationship between oppression, violence, and anti-colonial historiography. Indeed, "the state of emergency," as Bhabha says, "is also always a state of emergence" (1994, 41). Read in the context of today's global state of exception, namely the recurrence and intensification of ethnic civil wars across the globe and the coincidence of democratic and totalitarian forms of political rule, Bhabha's statement entails a number of risks and suggestions for a post-colonial historiography of global civil war. First, Bhabha's notion of emergency/emergence reflects his critical reading of Fanon's vision of national identity and thus reconsiders the state of emergency as a possible site of "the occult instability where the people dwell" (Fanon 1963, 227) and give birth to popular movements of national liberation. In this context, the state of exception might be understood as both constitutive to the alienation that is intrinsic to liberation movements and instrumental for a radical euphoria and excessive hope that create and spectralize the post-colonial nation-state as a deferred promise of decolonization. It is through this perspective that we can critically evaluate Hardt and Negri's endorsement of what they call "democratic violence" (2004, 344). This kind of violence, they argue, belongs to the multitude. It is neither creative nor revolutionary but used on political rather than moral grounds. When organized horizontally, according to democratic principles of decision making, democratic violence serves as a means of defending "the accomplishments" of "political and social transformation" (ibid., 344). Notwithstanding the concept's romantic and utopian inflections, democratic violence also derives from Hardt and Negri's earlier argument that "the great wars of liberation are (or should be) oriented ultimately toward a 'war against war,' that is, an active effort to destroy the regime of violence that perpetuates our state of war and supports the systems of inequality and oppression." This, they conclude, is "a condition necessary for realizing the democracy of the multitude" (ibid., 67). In one quick stroke, Hardt and Negri move anti-colonial liberation wars into their post-national paradigm of Empire and divest them of their cultural and historical particularities. Moreover, translating explicitly national liberation movements into a universalizing narrative of global pacifism precludes a critique of violence within its particular historical and philosophical formation. In contrast, a post-colonial analysis of global war must tease out the intersections between the ways in which racialized violence constitutes colonial and post-colonial processes of nation formation and helps construct an absolute enemy through which to legitimize global war and to abdicate responsibility for the dehumanizing effects of global economic restructuring. Second, while Bhabha's pun is symptomatic of the resisting properties that he sees as operative in the various practices of colonial ambiguity, it also, despite Benjamin's opinion, draws attention to the possibility that oppression alters the linear flow of Western history and challenges "the transparency of social reality, as a pre-given image of human knowledge" (Bhabha 1994, 41). Here, Bhabha rightfully asks to what extent do states of emergency or acts of extreme violence constitute a historical rupture and, more importantly, call into question the nature of the human subject. It is at this point that a post-colonial reading of the state of exception fruitfully coincides with Agamben's notion of exception. For in both cases, the focus of inquiry is the construction of disposable life through the logic of necropower and the collapse of social and political relationships that enable the exercise of particularly racialized forms of violence, including torture and disappearances. Third, Bhabha's notion of the double movement of emergency and emergence envisions an anti-colonialist historiography in terms of a dialectical process of perpetual transformation. It is at this point, however, that the coupling of emergency or exception and emergence becomes problematic for at least two reasons. First, combining both terms prematurely translates the violence of the political event into that of metaphor and risks erasing the micro- or quotidian narratives of violence ??? such as Arasanayagam's account of war ??? that both legitimate and are perpetuated by political and social states of emergency. In order to examine the relationship between global and communal forms of violence, a critical practice of post-colonial studies, I suggest, must reassess the term "transformation" and, concurrently, the assumption that acts of extreme global violence can be advanced in the service of "making history" (Balibar 2001, 26). In other words, if, as Hannah Arendt argues, there has been a historical "reluctance to deal with violence as a separate phenomenon in its own right" (2002, 25), it is time to examine the possibility of employing post-colonial studies in the service of a non-dialectical critique of global war. This kind of critique must ask to what extent those on whose bodies extreme violence was exercised are a priori excluded from articulating any transformative theory of violence. How, in other words, does bare life ??? if at all possible ??? attain the status of subjectivity within the dehumanizing logic of exception or global civil war? Fourth, like Bhabha, we need to take seriously Benjamin's insight into the intrinsic relationship between violence and the conceptualization of history. Notwithstanding Bhabha's pivotal argument that the violence of a "unitary notion of history" generates a "unitary," and therefore extremely violent, "concept of man" (1994, 42), I wish to caution, alongside Benjamin's analysis of fascism, that what enables today's global civil war is that even "its opponents treat it as a historical norm" (Benjamin 1968, 257). What is at stake, then, in dominant as well as critical narratives of global civil war is their representation as natural rather than political phenomena, and the acceptance of globalization as a political fait accompli. Both of these aspects, I believe, contribute to the proliferation of dehistoricized concepts of the global increase of racialized violence and war. It seems to me, however, that the enormous rise of violence inflicted by global civil wars requires a post-colonial historiography and critique of global war that questions notions of history based on cultural fragmentation, rupture, and totalization. Instead, such a historiography must seek out patterns of connection and connectivity. But more importantly, as I have argued in this paper, it must trace the post-colonial moment of global civil war and begin to read contemporary war through the interconnected necropolitics of global and imperial warfare. Thus, to understand the logic and practice of global war we need to develop a greater understanding precisely of those civil wars and national liberation wars that do not appear to threaten the new global order. Furthermore, a post-colonial critique of global civil war should facilitate the decoding and rescripting of both the normalizing narratives and racialized embodiment of global civil warfare.

2022 CNDI Kritik
Negative › Generic Shell

The 1AC is part of a desire to displace the insecurities of everyday life onto an external narrative- this entrenches militarism as ideology and presents it as a necessity

Victoria M Basham in 2018

Cardiff University, UK, Liberal militarism as insecurity, desire and ambivalence: Gender,race and the everyday geopoliticsof war, Security Dialogue1–12

As Salter (2006: 180) explains, though, it is not simply that states manage subjects but that the price of ‘freedom’, of an everyday life removed from insecurity, is that ‘we come to manage ourselves through a confessionary complex’. Key to this is that we ‘recognize ourselves as a society, as part of a social entity, as a part of a nation or of a state’ (Michel Foucault, cited in Salter, 2006: 181) and regard others as outside this. The desire for this way of life means, therefore, that it is not just existential insecurity that facilitates war and war preparedness, but the multitude of insecurities that make up everyday life, from needing to have steady employment to wanting to feel part of a social and political community. Thus, while global fears are materialized and affective in everyday sites, other and often more pressing matters also play a role in the reproduction of liberal militarism (Pain and Smith, 2008). As Dowler (2012: 497) points out, this is why it is vital to consider how ‘militarization takes root in the banal processes of daily life that are essential to the reproduction of sovereignty’. As Eastwood (this issue) argues, though, everyday desire for war also animates militarism; fear only gets us so far. Importantly, however, as Eastwood also contends, desire is not necessarily fervent: it can be more ambiguous, even unconscious. Anthropologist Gerald Sider (2008: 124– 125) sheds further light on this when describing the everyday as an achievement; as those ways in which people work through and against the chaos, rupture and discontinuity that shape their lives to ‘try to make and to claim some kind of ordinary – some stability to today, some continuity between yesterday and tomorrow, in some parts of their lives at least’. Sider (2008: 125) moreover maintains that ‘what we call everyday life does not name a feature or an aspect of social existence … but a very high-stakes struggle’ – a struggle that is for many people throughout the world ‘largely unavoidable and often in the medium to long run unwinnable’. The desire for the ordinary should not be underestimated, therefore; it takes on a profound, if often taken-for-granted, importance not least ‘because it belongs to the people who have it – it is their time, their space, what makes their moments and their interactions their space and place’ (Sider, 2008: 129–130, emphasis in original). It is not difficult to imagine why this possession of ‘normality’ would be desirable to liberal populations promised that freedom is the very condition of their existence. Perceived threats to that freedom might motivate fears and suspicions that foster militarism. Equally, though, in the example of Syrian airstrikes, and hostility and ambivalence to resettling Syrian refugees, the desire of British citizens to have everyday lives free from concern about the everyday lives of others may call into question the ability of Syrians to have not only an everyday but any life at all. While such effects of desire to protect one’s own everyday are not always deliberate or callous, the prioritization of some lives and ways of life over others facilitates biopolitical forms of state power that entail that ‘the liberal way of war is governed, in part, by the very exercise of such discrimination and the application of lethal violence to it’ (Dillon and Reid, 2009: 49).

2022 CNDI Kritik
Aff › Turns › Perm Solvency – Movements

Only the perm solves – movements fail without showing credible political alternatives, and their anti-reformist ideological purity prevents true democracy.

Teivainen 5 [Teivo Teivainen, professor of World Politics at the University of Helsinki, “The World Social Forum: Arena or Actor?”, Chapter 11 in Charting transnational democracy : beyond global arrogance / edited by Janie Leatherman and Julie Webber, 2005, https://link.springer.com/book/10.1057/9781403981080]

Being anti-something can be politically useful, but only up to a point. The protesters of Seattle and similar events have been very effective in pointing out authoritarian aspects of the capitalist world-system. Even if various groups that have participated in these events do have programmatic statements for alternative futures, the way these events have been staged has not been very conducive in showing these futures to the world. The criticism of not being able to show a credible alternative, or any alternative at all, has become a problem for the legitimacy of the protest movements.

In most of the post-Seattle events, the protesters have often been labeled as “antiglobalization,” and some of them have used the expression themselves. 24 It would, however, be analytically faulty and politically unwise to simply define the movements as being against globalization, if the term is understood as the increasing transgression of nation-state borders on a worldwide level. Many of them are, I would claim, looking for a different kind of globalization, though some may prefer to use the older term internationalism. From a democratic perspective, the problem in some antiglobalization rhetoric is that one easily ends up with rather strange bedfellows. Professing antiglobalization pure and simple is not very helpful in terms of making a distinction between regulating the cross-border movements of speculative capital and those of black immigrants.

2022 CNDI Kritik
Aff › Turns › Interventionism Good Turn

US interventionism is good – it’s the only alternative to mass death.

Rieff 99 (David, World Policy Institute, New York Institute for the Humanities and Council on Foreign Relations, Summer, “A New Age of Liberal Imperialism?” World Policy Journal, Vol XVI No 2, http://www.worldpolicy.org/journal/rieff2.html)

Finessing the Disaster And yet in Kosovo (this had almost happened in Bosnia), the West was finally hoist on the petard of its own lip service to the categorical imperative of human rights. It was ashamed not to intervene, but it lacked the will to do so with either vision or coherence. Kosovo is probably a lost cause; it is certainly ruined for a generation, whatever eventual deal is worked out, as Bosnia, whose future is to be a ward of NATO, America, and the European Union, probably for decades, has also been ruined for a generation, Dayton or no Dayton. What remains are the modalities through which this disaster can be finessed, and its consequences mitigated. It is to be hoped that in the wake of Kosovo, the realization that this kind of geo-strategic frivolity and ad hoc-ism, this resolve to act out of moral paradigms that now command the sympathy but do not yet command the deep allegiance of Western public opinion-at least not to the extent that people are willing to sacrifice in order to see that they are upheld-will no longer do. To say this is not to suggest that there are any obvious alternatives. Even if one accepts more of its premises than I do, the human rights perspective clearly is insufficient. As for the United Nations, it has been shown to be incapable of playing the dual role of both succoring populations at risk while simultaneously acting like a colonial power and imposing some kind of order and rebuilding civic institutions. The important Third World countries seem to have neither the resources nor the ideological inclination to intervene even in their own regions, as Africa's failure to act in Rwanda in 1994 demonstrated so painfully. The conclusion is inescapable. At the present time, only the West has both the power and, however intermittently, the readiness to act. And by the West, one really means the United States. Obviously, to say that America could act effectively if it chose to do so as, yes, the world's policeman of last resort, is not the same thing as saying that it should. Those who argue, as George Kennan has done, that we overestimate ourselves when we believe we can right the wrongs of the world, must be listened to seriously. So should the views of principled isolationists. And those on what remains of the left who insist that the result of such a broad licensing of American power will be a further entrenchment of America's hegemony over the rest of the world are also unquestionably correct. What Is to Be Done But the implications of not doing anything are equally clear. Those who fear American power are-this is absolutely certain-condemning other people to death. Had the U.S. armed forces not set up the air bridge to eastern Zaire in the wake of the Rwandan genocide, hundreds of thousands of people would have perished, rather than the tens of thousands who did die. This does not excuse the Clinton administration for failing to act to stop the genocide militarily; but it is a fact. And analogous situations were found in Bosnia and even, for all its failings, in the operation in Somalia.

2022 CNDI Kritik
Aff › Turns › Securitization Turn

New security frameworks and a move away from securitization causes the state to become more interventionist—turns the K

Tara McCormack, ’10, Lecturer in International Politics at the University of Leicester, 2010, (Critique, Security and Power: The political limits to emancipatory approaches, page 127-129)

The following section will briefly raise some questions about the rejection of the old security framework as it has been taken up by the most powerful institutions and states. Here we can begin to see the political limits to critical and emancipatory frameworks. In an international system which is marked by great power inequalities between states, the rejection of the old narrow national interest-based security framework by major international institutions, and the adoption of ostensibly emancipatory policies and policy rhetoric, has the consequence of problematising weak or unstable states and allowing international institutions or major states a more interventionary role, yet without establishing mechanisms by which the citizens of states being intervened in might have any control over the agents or agencies of their emancipation. Whatever the problems associated with the pluralist security framework there were at least formal and clear demarcations. This has the consequence of entrenching international power inequalities and allowing for a shift towards a hierarchical international order in which the citizens in weak or unstable states may arguably have even less freedom or power than before. Radical critics of contemporary security policies, such as human security and humanitarian intervention, argue that we see an assertion of Western power and the creation of liberal subjectivities in the developing world. For example, see Mark Duffield’s important and insightful contribution to the ongoing debates about contemporary international security and development. Duffield attempts to provide a coherent empirical engagement with, and theoretical explanation of, these shifts. Whilst these shifts, away from a focus on state security, and the so-called merging of security and development are often portrayed as positive and progressive shifts that have come about because of the end of the Cold War, Duffield argues convincingly that these shifts are highly problematic and unprogressive. For example, the rejection of sovereignty as formal international equality and a presumption of nonintervention has eroded the division between the international and domestic spheres and led to an international environment in which Western NGOs and powerful states have a major role in the governance of third world states. Whilst for supporters of humanitarian intervention this is a good development, Duffield points out the depoliticising implications, drawing on examples in Mozambique and Afghanistan. Duffield also draws out the problems of the retreat from modernisation that is represented by sustainable development. The Western world has moved away from the development policies of the Cold War, which aimed to develop third world states industrially. Duffield describes this in terms of a new division of human life into uninsured and insured life. Whilst we in the West are ‘insured’ – that is we no longer have to be entirely self-reliant, we have welfare systems, a modern division of labour and so on – sustainable development aims to teach populations in poor states how to survive in the absence of any of this. Third world populations must be taught to be self-reliant, they will remain uninsured. Self-reliance of course means the condemnation of millions to a barbarous life of inhuman bare survival. Ironically, although sustainable development is celebrated by many on the left today, by leaving people to fend for themselves rather than developing a society wide system which can support people, sustainable development actually leads to a less human and humane system than that developed in modern capitalist states. Duffield also describes how many of these problematic shifts are embodied in the contemporary concept of human security. For Duffield, we can understand these shifts in terms of Foucauldian biopolitical framework, which can be understood as a regulatory power that seeks to support life through intervening in the biological, social and economic processes that constitute a human population (2007: 16). Sustainable development and human security are for Duffield technologies of security which aim to create self-managing and self-reliant subjectivities in the third world, which can then survive in a situation of serious underdevelopment (or being uninsured as Duffield terms it) without causing security problems for the developed world. For Duffield this is all driven by a neoliberal project which seeks to control and manage uninsured populations globally. Radical critic Costas Douzinas (2007) also criticises new forms of cosmopolitanism such as human rights and interventions for human rights as a triumph of American hegemony. Whilst we are in agreement with critics such as Douzinas and Duffield that these new security frameworks cannot be empowering, and ultimately lead to more power for powerful states, we need to understand why these frameworks have the effect that they do. We can understand that these frameworks have political limitations without having to look for a specific plan on the part of current powerful states. In new security frameworks such as human security we can see the political limits of the framework proposed by critical and emancipatory theoretical approaches.

2022 CNDI Kritik
Aff › Turns › Militarism Good Turn

Militarism is key to leadership and preserving order to check those who threaten the world order

David Brooks 01, a Canadian-born American political and cultural commentator who writes for The New York Times, “Age of conflict,” November 5, 2001, https://www.weeklystandard.com/david-brooks/the-age-of-conflict

Obviously nobody knows what the future years will feel like, but we do know that the next decade will have a central feature that was lacking in the last one: The next few years will be defined by conflict. And it's possible to speculate about what that means. The institutions that fight for us and defend us against disorder -- the military, the FBI, the CIA -- will seem more important and more admirable. The fundamental arguments won't be over economic or social issues, they will be over how to wield power -- whether to use American power aggressively or circumspectly. We will care a lot more about ends -- winning the war -- than we will about means. We will debate whether it is necessary to torture prisoners who have information about future biological attacks. We will destroy innocent villages by accident, shrug our shoulders, and continue fighting. In an age of conflict, bourgeois virtues like compassion, tolerance, and industriousness are valued less than the classical virtues of courage, steadfastness, and a ruthless desire for victory. […continues…] But now violence has come calling. Now it is no longer possible to live so comfortably in one's own private paradise. Shocked out of the illusion of self-reliance, most of us realize that we, as individuals, simply cannot protect ourselves. Private life requires public protection. Now it is not possible to ignore foreign affairs, because foreign affairs have not ignored us. It has become clear that we are living in a world in which hundreds of millions of people hate us, and some small percentage of them want to destroy us. That realization is bound to have cultural effects. In the first place, we will probably become more conscious of our American-ness. During the blitz in 1940, George Orwell sat in his bomb shelter and wrote an essay called "England Your England." It opened with this sentence: "As I write, highly civilised human beings are flying overhead, trying to kill me." What struck him at that moment of danger was that it really does matter whether you are English or German. The nation is a nursemaid that breeds certain values and a certain ethos. Orwell went on to describe what it meant to be English. Now Americans are being killed simply because they are Americans. Like Orwell, Americans are once again becoming aware of themselves as a nationality, not just as members of some ethnic community or globalized Internet chat group. Americans have been reminded that, despite what the multiculturalists have been preaching, not all cultures are wonderfully equal hues in the great rainbow of humanity. Some national cultures, the ones that have inherited certain ideas -- about freedom and democracy, the limits of the political claims of religion, the importance of tolerance and dissent -- are more humane than other civilizations, which reject those ideas. As criticism of our war effort grows in Europe, in hostile Arab countries, and in two-faced countries like Egypt and Saudi Arabia, which dislike our principles but love our dollars, Americans will have to articulate a defense of our national principles and practices. That debate in itself will shape American culture. We will begin to see ourselves against the backdrop of the Taliban. During the Cold War, we saw ourselves in contrast to the Soviet Union. Back then, we faced a godless foe; now we are facing a god-crazed foe. As we recoil from the Islamic extremists, we may be less willing to integrate religion into political life. That would mean trouble for faith-based initiatives and religion in the public square. On the other hand, democracies tend to become patriotic during wartime, if history is any guide, and this will drive an even deeper wedge between regular Americans and the intellectual class. Literary critic Paul Fussell, a great student of American culture in times of war, wrote a book, Wartime, on the cultural effects of World War II. Surveying the culture of that period, he endorsed the view of historian Eileen Sullivan, who wrote, "There was no room in this war culture for individual opinions or personalities, no freedom of dissent or approval; the culture was homogeneous, shallow and boring." […continues…] Don't make the mistake of interpreting the events of Sept. 11 purely in terms of terrorism and murder. . . . The terrorists are a virulent subset of a much larger group of anticapitalists, one that includes many politicians, bureaucrats, writers, media types, academics, entertainers, trade unionists and, at times, church leaders. The barbarians at the gates are more numerous than you thought. But the most important cultural effect of conflict is that it breeds a certain bloody-mindedness or, to put it more grandly, a tragic view of life. Life in times of war and recession reminds us of certain hard truths that were easy to ignore during the decade of peace and prosperity. Evil exists. Difficulties, even tragedies, are inevitable. Human beings are flawed creatures capable of monstrosity. Not all cultures are compatible. To preserve order, good people must exercise power over destructive people. That means that it's no longer sufficient to deconstruct ideas and texts and signifiers. You have to be able to construct hard principles so you can move from one idea to the next, because when you are faced with the problem of repelling evil, you absolutely must be able to reach a conclusion on serious moral issues. This means you need to think in moral terms about force -- and to be tough-minded. During the Cold War, Reinhold Niebuhr was a major intellectual figure. In 1952, he wrote The Irony of American History. The tragedy of the conflict with communism, he argued, was that, "though confident of its virtue, [America] must yet hold atomic bombs ready for use so as to prevent a possible world conflagration." The irony of our history, he continued, is that we are an idealistic nation that dreams of creating a world of pure virtue, yet in defeating our enemies we sometimes have to act in ways that are not pure. "We take, and must continue to take, morally hazardous action to preserve our civilization," Niebuhr wrote. "We must exercise our power." We have to do so while realizing that we will not be capable of perfect disinterestedness when deciding which actions are just. We will be influenced by dark passions. But we still have to act forcefully because our enemies are trying to destroy the basis of civilization: "We are drawn into an historic situation in which the paradise of our domestic security is suspended in a hell of global insecurity." Niebuhr's prescription was humble hawkishness. He believed the United States should forcefully defend freedom and destroy its enemies. But while doing so, it should seek forgiveness for the horrible things it might have to do in a worthy cause. To reach this graduate-school level of sophistication, you have to have passed through elementary courses in moral reasoning. It will be interesting to see whether we Americans, who sometimes seem unsure of even the fundamental moral categories, can educate ourselves sufficiently to engage in the kind of moral reasoning that Niebuhr did. The greatest political effect of this period of conflict will probably be to relegitimize central institutions. Since we can't defend ourselves as individuals against terrorism, we have to rely on the institutions of government: the armed forces, the FBI, the CIA, the CDC, and so on. We are now only beginning to surrender some freedoms, but we will trade in more, and willingly. As Alexander Hamilton wrote in the Federalist Papers, "Safety from external danger is the most powerful director of national conduct. Even the ardent love of liberty will, after a time, give way to its dictates. . . . To be more safe, [people] at length become willing to run the risk of being less free." Moreover, we will see power migrate from the states and Capitol Hill to the White House. "It is of the nature of war to increase the executive at the expense of the legislative authority," Hamilton continued. This creates rifts on both left and right, because both movements contain anti-establishment elements hostile to any effort to relegitimize central authorities. The splits have been most spectacular on the left. Liberals who work in politics -- Democrats on Capitol Hill, liberal activists, academics who are interested in day-to-day politics -- almost all support President Bush and the war effort. But many academic and literary leftists, ranging from Eric Foner to Susan Sontag to Noam Chomsky, have been sour, critical, and contemptuous of America's response to September 11. The central difference is that the political liberals are comfortable with power. They want power themselves and do not object to the central institutions of government, even the military, exercising power on our behalf. Many literary and academic liberals, on the other hand, have built a whole moral system around powerlessness. They champion the outgroups. They stand with the victims of hegemony, patriarchy, colonialism, and all the other manifestations of central authority. Sitting on their campuses, they are powerless themselves, and have embraced a delicious, self-glorifying identity as the out-manned sages who alone can see through the veils of propaganda in which the powerful hide their oppressive schemes. For these thinkers, virtue inheres in the powerless. The weak are sanctified, not least because they are voiceless and allegedly need academics to give them voices. These outgroup leftists dislike the Taliban, but to ally themselves with American power would be to annihilate everything they have stood for and the role they have assigned themselves in society. […continues…] For Bush, the leader of the free world, the issue is terrorism, not street crime. But now he too is engaged in the effort to restore order so that people can go about their lives. He is the one rounding up the posse, forsaking social issues and other moral debates for a straightforward act of international prosecution. He is reasserting authority to show that under Pax Americana, the world is governable. […continues…] But history never repeats itself neatly. No one can predict the political and cultural consequences of a war, any more than the course of the war itself. But it does seem clear that we have moved out of one political and cultural moment and into another. We have traded the anxieties of affluence for the real fears of war. We have moved from an age of peace to an age of conflict, and in times of conflict people are different. They go to extremes. Some people, and some nations, turn cowardly or barbaric. Other people, and other nations, become heroic, brave, and steadfast. It all depends on what they have in them. War isn't only, as Bourne said, the health of the state. It's the gut-check of the nation.