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2022 Michigan Affirmative
AFF – Cyber Space Assets › 1AC – Cyber Space Assets › 1AC – Russia Advantage

Attacks on space assets and orbital weapons trigger rapid escalation to great power nuclear war

Michael P. Gleason 20, national security senior project engineer at The Aerospace Corporation’s Center for Space Policy and Strategy, previously senior strategic space analyst in the Office of the Secretary of Defense Office of Net Assessment; and Peter L. Hays, retired Air Force Lt Col who works as a defense contractor in the Pentagon supporting the assistant secretary of the Air Force for Space Acquisition and Integration, October 2020, “A ROADMAP FOR ASSESSING SPACE WEAPONS,”

In addition, some argue that space weapons present broader geopolitical risks due to their potential effects on deterrence and strategic stability. Space capabilities have a close relationship to nuclear stability and the potential for escalation between great powers. Space weapons could therefore alter how decisionmakers calculate nuclear deterrence. Many of the visions of space-to-Earth weapons imagine them having incredible speed and accuracy tied to the ability to target any point on Earth with minimal or even no warning. At enough scale and with sufficient destructive effects, such attributes would threaten a first-strike capability; i.e., the ability to wipe out a target country’s nuclear deterrent before it has a chance to launch a retaliatory strike. If so, nuclear deterrence may fail, a consideration that may outweigh all others. Similarly, some have comparable concerns about space-based ballistic missile defenses nullifying a country’s nuclear deterrent and providing a nuclear first-strike incentive for the country that possesses such capability.

Earth-to-space weapons create concerns because targeting early warning satellites, strategic surveillance satellites, and nuclear command and control communication satellites could also be perceived as the immediate prelude to a nuclear first strike by an adversary, triggering a response on the nuclear escalation ladder. Even if space weapons do not fatally undermine nuclear deterrence, they still offer another path to rapid nuclear escalation.

2022 Michigan Affirmative
AFF – Cyber Space Assets › 1AC – Cyber Space Assets › 1AC – Russia Advantage

Cyber-weapons are the only usable ASATs---U.S. dependence on satellite infrastructure incentivizes attacks that risk nuclear war

Abhijeet Singh Baghel 19, M.S. in Cybersecurity, Utica College, December 2019, “Cyber Warfare in Outer Space,” ProQuest Dissertations Publishing, document ID: 27670535

A future war in space includes the possibility of one or more anti-satellite (ASAT) attacks which could destroy one or several important satellites and quickly escalate to a nuclear conflict. In 2014, the Obama administration initiated the need to develop new ASAT defense strategies and technology to counter China after its second ASAT test the year before (Kulacki, 2016). Attacking any U.S. intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) satellite, Global Positioning System (GPS) or communication satellites using missiles such as long-range missiles or Co-Orbital ASATS is expensive, time-consuming, and is hard to keep a secret (Hitchens, 2019d & Wright, 2012). It could be used to deter initial U.S. involvement in conflict but would have devastating impacts on its loss (Please see Appendix A & B for more information).

It is no secret that the U.S.’s major vulnerabilities lie with modernizing the National Airspace System (NAS) and using only one source for timing, navigation, and communication (aka GPS) whereas Russia, Europe, China, and others utilize additional forms of satellite navigation systems (Livingstone & Lewis, 2016). Therefore, only the U.S. would suffer losses with the disruption or destruction of the GPS constellation. To achieve enough damage to the GPS constellation and other space-based assets would require several satellites to be disabled to successfully disrupt the network and disable the U.S. This would have to be done in quick succession before the U.S. could retaliate which is also hard to do and the adversary would have to covertly launch its missiles from several locations or maneuver ASATs currently in orbit to attack its targets. On the other hand, hostile cyber operations are a much bigger threat to the operation of satellites such as GPS (Findler, 2019). As both cyberspace and space assets increasingly rely on each other it is imperative to implement flexible, proactive cybersecurity measures as new threat actors, companies, and technologies are always expanding and evolving space activities (Findler, 2019).

2022 Michigan Affirmative
AFF – Cyber Space Assets › 1AC – Cyber Space Assets › 1AC – Russia Advantage

ASAT attacks cause global nuclear war and collapse terrestrial deterrence---turns every conflict scenario

Laura Grego 18, senior scientist in the Global Security Program at the Union of Concerned Scientists, 3/19/18, “Space and Crisis Stability,” https://www.law.upenn.edu/live/files/7804-grego-space-and-crisis-stabilitypdf

For the foreseeable future, military tensions between the United States, China, and Russia are likely to remain high, as are those between China and India. Even absent intentional confrontation, regional problems, such as those in the Baltics and East and South Asia, have the potential to draw these actors into conflict. Thus, it is imperative to pay attention to any pathways that could lead an actor considering crossing the nuclear threshold, or approaching it very closely.

The United States and Russia continue to retain large nuclear arsenals on high alert1 . Each are developing new strategic weapons, including hypersonic conventional prompt global strike systems with a suggestion mission of holding ground-based anti-satellite weapons at risk.2 Russia has declared the existence of novel nuclear delivery systems as a response to US missile defense systems,3 weapons which complicate the management of crises. China is reportedly considering increasing the size, capacity and alert status of its nuclear weapons delivery systems4 and is also developing new kinds of strategic weapons. China is also developing hypersonic weapons,5 and the ingredients for an arms race around these technologies is in place. India continues to increase the sophistication of its strategic posture. And India, China, Russia and the United States have or are pursuing missile defense technologies that are important both in the nuclear realm but in space issues, since missile defenses present demonstrated or inherent antisatellite capabilities.

2022 Michigan Affirmative
AFF – Cyber Space Assets › 1AC – Cyber Space Assets › 1AC – Russia Advantage

A U.S.-Russian space war spills over to ground-based nuclear miscalculation due to attacks on early-warning

James Acton and Ankit Panda 20, Co-Director of the Nuclear Policy Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace; Stanton Senior Fellow with the Nuclear Policy Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace; Defense News, December 2, “Why the Pentagon must think harder about inadvertent escalation,”

In a paradox worthy of the nuclear age, the conventional capabilities that have enabled the United States to reduce its reliance on nuclear weapons have also increased the risk of misperception that could spark a nuclear war.

The United States now bases its war plans around using its exquisite conventional forces to sever the connections between an adversary’s leadership and its military forces. But in an escalating conflict on the Korean Peninsula, such operations could look to North Korean leader Kim Jong Un like an attempt at regime change — even if the United States did not seek to depose him — and thus induce him to gamble on nuclear use to try to terrify the United States into backing off.

2022 Michigan Affirmative
AFF – Cyber Space Assets › 1AC – Cyber Space Assets › 1AC – Russia Advantage

Nuclear escalation is certain – past NATO exercises prove this is the most likely scenario for space war

David Wilson 20, Writer for Broadview; Broadview, October 19, "Could outer space be the world’s next battleground?" https://broadview.org/weaponization-of-space/

West directed the research team for the 2019 edition of the Space Security Index, an exhaustive annual report on developments related to safety, security and sustainability in outer space. According to the report, in 2018 the United States, Russia and China had a combined total of 263 dedicated military satellites in orbit, in addition to operating several dozen GPS (or equivalent) satellite systems. Eighteen other countries, including Canada, operate military satellites of their own or piggyback military functions on top of civilian uses.

“There’s always been this fear of war in space, as distinct from war on Earth,” says Brian Weeden, who contributed a chapter to the report. “It’s not [distinct]. It’s the integration of space into terrestrial warfare, not something that happens separately.”

2022 Michigan Affirmative
AFF – Cyber Space Assets › 1AC – Cyber Space Assets › 1AC – Russia Advantage

NATO’s ambiguous threshold for what constitutes “armed attack” sufficient to activate Article 5 ensures Russian gray zone probing against allied space assets, risking cascading escalation

Tomas Jermalavičius and Alejandro Leal 20, Head of Studies and Research Fellow at the International Centre for Defence and Security; research assistant at ICDS, post-graduate degree candidate in technology governance and digital transformation at Tallinn University of Technology; Securing Democracy, December 2020, "Gravity of ‘Star NATO’: Can the Alliance Pull the Baltics Into Military Space Affairs?"

The geopolitical context, technological trends and new concepts of warfare raise the unpalatable prospect of the militarisation of space. The Outer Space Treaty does not prohibit that – it only bans the deployment of nuclear weapons in it.12 But while an attack against terrestrial objects on the Alliance’s territory from future space-based weapons would constitute a clear act of armed aggression, it remains to be seen if an attack on, for instance, satellites owned by an Allied government could eventually trigger requests to activate Article 5 of the Washington Treaty. Even if the current answer is “no” or “it depends,” it will be hard to avoid further discussions given the growing importance of the space domain.13 After all, the Alliance has already agreed that devastating cyberattacks could prompt an invocation of the collective defence clause, and some nations are very clear about their national responses to acts of aggression in outer space. For instance, the French Space Defence Strategy of 2019 explicitly states that “in the event of armed aggression in space, France may avail itself of its right of self defence.”14 It is hard to imagine its Allies, such as the Baltic States, standing aside should Paris decide to request the activation of Article 5 in response to an escalating conflict in outer space.

Aggression in outer space or from the surface of the Earth against space-based assets is not in the realm of technological fiction. Various countries are developing and deploying counter-space capabilities that are able to destroy, degrade, deny or compromise space-based assets. These include kinetic means, such as anti-satellite (ASAT) missiles, as well as non-kinetic capabilities. Countries ranging from China and India to Russia and the US have tested and demonstrated their ability to destroy satellites with missiles.15 Russia is also developing a new system that is able to deploy into outer space swarms of small “killer satellites” loaded with explosives that would be carried into orbit by missiles launched from a MiG-31BM fighter aircraft.16 This is a concept that will enable counter-space operations that are cheaper, faster, larger in scale and less demanding (e.g. in targeting accuracy) than employing ground-launched ASAT missiles.

2022 Michigan Affirmative
AFF – Cyber Space Assets › 1AC – Cyber Space Assets › 1AC – China Advantage

Grid collapse causes extinction.

Sherrell R. Greene 18, Nuclear Engineering M.S. degrees from the University of Tennessee, recognized subject matter expert in nuclear reactor safety, nuclear fuel cycle technologies, and advanced reactor concept development, worked at the Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) for over three decades, as Director of Research Reactor Development Programs and Director of Nuclear Technology Programs; Sept 07, 2018 “Enhancing Electric Grid, Critical Infrastructure, and Societal Resilience with Resilient Nuclear Power Plants (rNPPs),” Nuclear Technology 205(3), https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/00295450.2018.1505357?cookieSet=1]

There are a variety of events that could deal crippling [devastating] blows to a nation’s Grid, Critical Infrastructure, and social fabric. The types of catastrophes under consideration here are “very bad day” scenarios that might result from severe GMDs induced by solar CMEs, HEMP attacks, cyber attacks, etc.5

As briefly discussed in Sec. III.C, the probability of a GMD of the magnitude of the 1859 Carrington Event is now believed to be on the order of 1%/year. The Earth narrowly missed (by only several days) intercepting a CME stream in July 2012 that would have created a GMD equal to or larger than the Carrington Event.41 Lloyd’s, in its 2013 report, “Solar Storm Risk to the North American Electric Grid,” 42 stated the following: “A Carrington-level, extreme geomagnetic storm is almost inevitable in the future…The total U.S. population at risk of extended power outage from a Carrington-level storm is between 20-40 million, with durations of 16 days to 1-2 years…The total economic cost for such a scenario is estimated at $0.6-2.6 trillion USD.” Analyses conducted subsequent to the Lloyd’s assessment indicated the geographical area impacted by the CME would be larger than that estimated in Lloyd’s analysis (extending farther northward along the New England coast of the United States and in the state of Minnesota),43 and that the actual consequences of such an event could actually be greater than estimated by Lloyd’s.

2022 Michigan Affirmative
AFF – Cyber Space Assets › 1AC – Cyber Space Assets › 1AC – China Advantage

Satellites are key to overall cyber-vulnerability of critical infrastructure---attacks risk blackouts and collapse crisis response and deterrence relationships

Patricia Lewis 16, research director for international security at Chatham House; and David Livingstone, associate fellow for international security at Chatham House, 11/21/16, “The cyber threat in outer space,” https://thebulletin.org/2016/11/the-cyber-threat-in-outer-space/

Satellites that orbit the Earth form the exoskeleton of the world’s critical infrastructure. Global communications, air transport, maritime trade, financial services, weather and environmental monitoring, and defense systems all depend on an expansive network of satellites in space. As the September 2014 cyber attack on the US weather system starkly demonstrated, the strategic space-based assets of America and other nations have serious cyber vulnerabilities. In the maritime arena too, space-based monitoring systems are regularly being jammed or spoofed by vessel operators entering false information in order to disguise their illicit activities.

The vulnerability of satellites, their ground stations, and other space assets to cyber attack is often overlooked in wider discussions of cyber threats to critical national infrastructure. Yet just as with other digital networked systems, satellites are vulnerable to cyber attacks that include data theft, jamming, spoofing, and satellite hijacking. All of these present serious risks for societies and critical infrastructures, and analyzing the intersection between cyber security and space security is essential to understanding this evolving problem. So too is the need for an ogranized global effort to confront these threats. Despite some progress at the United Nations and elsewhere, there is currently no international body dedicated to the issue of cyber security in space. Establishing such a multi-stakeholder regime, with the aim of assessing risks and promoting best practices, would begin to close this critical gap.

2022 Michigan Affirmative
AFF – Cyber Space Assets › 1AC – Cyber Space Assets › 1AC – China Advantage

Missile defense is key to deter North Korea – failure of missile defense causes North Korean nuclear attack

Vince A. Manzo AND John K. Warden 21, a Research Analyst with the Strategic Initiatives Group at the Center for Naval Analysis (CNA); a Senior Policy Analyst on the Strategic Analysis & Assessments team at Science Applications International Corporation (SAIC). AUGUST 29, 2017 “WANT TO AVOID NUCLEAR WAR? REJECT MUTUAL VULNERABILITY WITH NORTH KOREA”; War On the Rocks; https://warontherocks.com/2017/08/want-to-avoid-nuclear-war-reject-mutual-vulnerability-with-north-korea/

The North Korea policy of the Donald Trump administration has been mired in a morass of contradiction and bluster. But there might be a silver lining: There is an indication that the administration will follow its predecessors and attempt to deny North Korea the ability to hold the United States at risk with nuclear weapons. If effectively implemented as a part of a comprehensive deterrence strategy, this approach would give the United States and its allies the best chance of containing a nuclear-armed North Korea and avoiding nuclear war.

In their attempts to formulate an effective strategy, the previous two administrations articulated an important strategic principle: The United States will attempt to deny North Korea the ability to hold the U.S. homeland at risk with nuclear-armed intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs). This is not, however, the same as saying that the United States will prevent North Korea from testing an ICBM or deploying an operational ICBM force, a goal that does not seem possible without paying an unacceptable cost. Rather, the principle is a signal of U.S. intent to deny North Korea the ability to use the threat of nuclear strikes against the U.S. homeland as coercive leverage.

2022 Michigan Affirmative
AFF – Cyber Space Assets › 1AC – Cyber Space Assets › 1AC – China Advantage

Specifically, cyber-attacks on space-based sensors cause total failure of missile defense systems

Beyza Unal 19, Ph.D., senior research fellow with the International Security Department at Chatham House, July 2019, “Cybersecurity of NATO’s Space-based Strategic Assets,”

Missile defence relies heavily on early warning capabilities otherwise known as integrated threat warning and threat assessment (ITW/TA): US space-based infrared sensors detect the hot plumes of ballistic missile launches and communicate the information to the service component command.

Theatre missile defence, which includes the Patriot missile defence system – a long-range surface-to-air missile system used by the US and NATO allies – and standard missile defence systems, and which is part of the naval component of the integrated Aegis weapon system, also serves as part of overall missile defence capability.45 The Aegis combat system operates in the maritime domain, using radar to track and guide weapons to destroy targets; its elements – which include a space tracking and surveillance system, the AN/SPY-1A radar, a command and decision system and a display system – could all potentially be exposed to cyberattacks.

2022 Michigan Affirmative
AFF – Cyber Space Assets › 1AC – Cyber Space Assets › 1AC – China Advantage

US-China nuclear war causes nuclear winter---guarantees extinction

Nicole S. Lovenduski et al. 20. PhD, Department of Atmospheric and Oceanic Sciences, University of Colorado, Boulder; Cheryl S. Harrison, PhD, Institute of Arctic and Alpine Research; Holly Olivarez, Environmental Studies Program, University of Colorado; Charles G. Bardeen, PhD, Atmospheric Chemistry Observations and Modeling Laboratory, National Center for Atmospheric Research; 6 , Owen B. Toon, PhD, Laboratory for Atmospheric and Space Physics; Joshua Coupe, PhD Department of Environmental Sciences at Rutgers; Alan Robock, PhD, Department of Environmental Sciences at Rutgers; Tyler Rohr, Water Power Technologies Office, Department of Energy, and Samantha Stevenson; Bren School of Environmental Science and Management. “The Potential Impact of Nuclear Conflict on Ocean Acidification”. Geophysical Research Letters. 47, e2019GL086246. https://doi.org/10. 1029/2019GL086246

Nuclear warfare could have devastating impacts on millions of people, yet it has been suggested that regional or global nuclear conflict may be possible in the future (Toon et al., 2019). In addition to the calamitous impacts of nuclear conflict on a local level, research conducted with a range of climate models finds a global cooling in response to various conflict scenarios (Coupe et al., 2019; Malone et al., 1985; Mills et al., 2014; Pausata et al., 2016; Robock et al., 2007; Turco et al., 1983). This global cooling is driven by fires started by the nuclear weapons. These fires inject smoke into the upper troposphere, where rapid lofting can spread the sunlight-absorbing soot particles into the stratosphere (Turco et al., 1983). Recent research implies that even a small nuclear conflict may have impacts on the global climate system, affecting the state and circulation of the atmosphere (Robock et al., 2007), increasing the sea ice extent in both hemispheres (Mills et al., 2014), and reducing plant productivity and crop yields in regions far from the conflict location (Özdogan et al., ˘ 2013; Toon et al., 2019; Xia & Robock, 2013). While less studied, the potential impacts of nuclear conflict on the ocean are many. Numerous physical, chemical, and biological processes in the ocean are temperature dependent, and sunlight is a critical ingredient for photosynthesizing phytoplankton at the base of the marine food web. Using a climate model with an interactive ocean, Mills et al. (2014) evaluated the ocean physical response to a potential India/Pakistan nuclear war that lofts 5 Tg of black carbon particles into the stratosphere; they find a 0.8◦ C decrease in globally averaged sea surface temperature, with smaller temperature reductions at depth. Recently Toon et al. (2019) used an Earth system model that includes a representation for phytoplankton to evaluate the ocean biological response to nuclear conflict; they report a 5–15% decrease in phytoplankton productivity under a range of conflict scenarios. Such findings prompt further investigation into how nuclear conflict and the resulting global cooling may alter the chemical state of the ocean. Perturbations in the ocean's carbonate chemistry are of particular interest, owing to their importance for ocean acidification. Ocean acidification is an ongoing, large-scale environmental problem driven by fossil fuel emissions of carbon dioxide (CO2). Cumulatively since the preindustrial era, the ocean has absorbed 41% of the carbon emitted by human industrial activities (McKinley et al., 2017). While this ocean absorption of carbon has partially mitigated anthropogenic global warming, it has fundamentally altered the carbonate chemistry of the ocean, increasing the concentration of hydrogen ions ([H+]) while decreasing the concentration of carbonate ions ([CO2− 3 ]). Observations collected at time series sites across the global ocean find statistically significant reductions in the potential hydrogen (pH = −log([H+])) and the saturation state of the calcium carbonate mineral aragonite (Ωarag, which is proportional to [CO2− 3 ]) over the past few decades (Bates et al., 2014). These changes are a direct consequence of the ocean absorption of anthropogenic carbon; carbonate chemistry dictates that the excess carbon will react with water and CO2− 3 to decrease ocean pH and Ω (Feely et al., 2004). Both of these changes may have negative consequences for marine organisms, in particular for those that precipitate calcium carbonate shells (e.g., coccolithophores, pteropods, foraminifera, corals, molluscs, and echinoderms), as the precipitation is hindered by low pH, and because decreases in Ω favor shell dissolution (Doney et al., 2009). To date, there have been no studies of the effects of nuclear conflict on ocean acidification, though past modeling studies on the ocean's response to volcanic forcing and to proposed geoengineering schemes have intimated that ocean carbonate chemistry is highly sensitive to these types of external forcings. Using a fully coupled carbon-climate model, Frölicher et al. (2011) find that volcanic-induced cooling following the 1991 Mt. Pinatubo eruption led to immediate increases in the flux of carbon from atmosphere to ocean and consequently, increases in the total dissolved inorganic carbon (DIC) concentration in the surface ocean. Eddebbar et al. (2019) demonstrate that air-to-sea CO2 fluxes are significantly enhanced following the eruptions of Agung, El Chichón, and Pinatubo in a large ensemble of simulations with an Earth system model. Matthews et al. (2009) conduct solar radiation management climate engineering simulations with an intermediate complexity model of the coupled climate-carbon system; they find changes in ocean pH and Ωarag as a result of the anomalous cooling. Similarly, Lauvset et al. (2017) indicate that radiation management geoengineering leads to changes in North Atlantic pH in a fully coupled Earth system model, but they do not explore changes in Ωarag. While these studies are suggestive of the carbonate chemistry response to nuclear conflict, the external forcing perturbations are of a different magnitude and duration than those imposed by nuclear conflict. Further, it is difficult to mechanistically understand the ocean carbonate chemistry response to such external forcing perturbations in fully coupled models, where the terrestrial response to forcing additionally influences the atmospheric CO2 concentration. Here, we use a state-of-the art Earth system model to simulate the ocean carbonate chemistry response to a range of nuclear conflict scenarios. We decouple the ocean carbon cycle from that of the terrestrial carbon cycle via a direct prescription of the atmospheric CO2 boundary condition used for air-sea CO2 flux, that is, changes in the terrestrial biosphere have no influence on the atmospheric CO2 that the ocean sees. As we will demonstrate, we find large perturbations in ocean pH and Ωarag as a result of nuclear conflict. These perturbations have relatively long duration (order of 10 years) and are driven by decreases in temperature and subsequent increases in the ocean carbon inventory. 2. Methods We analyse output generated by the Community Earth System Model (CESM) version 1.3, a state-of-the-art coupled climate model consisting of atmosphere, ocean, land, and sea ice components (Hurrell et al., 2013). The atmosphere component of CESM in our simulations is the Whole Atmosphere Community Climate Model (WACCM; Marsh et al., 2013) with nominal 2◦ resolution, 66 vertical levels, and a model top at ∼145 km; it uses the Rapid Radiative Transfer Model for GCMs (RRTMG; Iacono et al., 2000) for the radiative transfer. The Community Aerosol and Radiation Model for Atmospheres (Bardeen et al., 2008) is coupled with WACCM to simulate the injection, lofting, advection, and removal of soot aerosols in the troposphere and stratosphere, and their subsequent impact on climate (Coupe et al., 2019; Toon et al., 2019). The ocean component of CESM is the Parallel Ocean Program version 2 (Danabasoglu et al., 2012) with nominal 1◦ resolution and 60 vertical levels. The biogeochemical ocean component of CESM is the Biogeochemical Elemental Cycling model that represents the lower trophic levels of the marine ecosystem, full carbonate system thermodynamics, air-sea CO2 fluxes, and a dynamic iron cycle (Doney et al., 2006; Moore et al., 2004, 2013; Moore & Braucher, 2008; Long et al., 2013; Lindsay et al., 2014). LOVENDUSKI ET AL. 2 of 9 Geophysical Research Letters 10.1029/2019GL086246 The ocean in the coupled CESM simulation is initialized from rest with World Ocean Circulation (WOCE) temperature and salinity (Gouretski & Koltermann, 2004). Biogeochemical tracers are initialized to observationally based climatologies where possible (Lauvset et al., 2016); where these were not available (such as dissolved iron and phytoplankton biomass), the model is initialized with fields interpolated from an existing CESM simulation. The new, fully coupled simulation was spun up for 4 years to an approximate steady state with a constant atmospheric CO2 mixing ratio of 370 ppm, representative of the mixing ratio in the year 2000. Due to the relatively short spin-up period, the globally integrated air-sea CO2 flux is not in steady state (drifting at a rate of 0.14 Pg C year−2) when the perturbation forcing is applied. We therefore present our results as anomalies from the drifting control integrations. Three control simulations of 20-year duration are generated using round-off level differences in atmospheric initial conditions. As each of these control simulations has different phasing of internal variability (e.g., El Niño-Southern Oscillation), we use the standard deviation across this ensemble to identify statistically significant perturbations due to nuclear conflict. We report on the anomalies generated from four simulations of nuclear conflict with varying amounts of soot injection: three India/Pakistan conflict scenarios that inject 5, 27, and 47 Tg of soot, respectively, and one US/Russia conflict scenario that injects 150 Tg of soot. The initial soot injection amounts are generated from plausible scenarios for nuclear conflict following advice from a number of military and policy experts; the reader is referred to Toon et al. (2019) for further details on scenario development. In each case, we prescribe that the conflict begins on 15 May of the 5th year of the first control simulation, and we integrate the model for a 15-year period following the injection. We assume that the smoke generated by mass fires from nuclear conflict is injected into the upper troposphere above the target sites (in the U. S./Russia case, smoke is spread evenly over the two nations), as in Toon et al. (2019). WACCM lofts much of this smoke higher into the stratosphere via solar heating of black carbon aerosols in the smoke, where the black carbon aerosols persist for about a decade. The resulting annual mean, post-conflict (May to the following April) anomalies in aerosol optical depth are shown in Figure 1a. These optical depth changes result in a 10–40% reduction in incoming solar energy (Toon et al., 2019). While we discuss the anomalies generated from all four of these conflict simulations, we describe two in greater detail throughout this manuscript: the U. S./Russia case, as it is the largest climate perturbation overall, and the India/Pakistan 47-Tg case, as it is the largest climate perturbation generated by a regional nuclear conflict. Ocean biogeochemistry in the version of CESM used for our simulations has been extensively validated in the literature (Brady et al., 2019; Freeman et al., 2018; Harrison et al., 2018; Krumhardt et al., 2017; Lindsay et al., 2014; Lovenduski et al., 2015, 2016; Long et al., 2013, 2016; Moore et al., 2013; McKinley et al., 2016; Negrete-García et al., 2019). Of particular note for our study, the simulated surface ocean carbonate ion concentration from a long, preindustrial control simulation of CESM compares favorably with reconstructed observations, albeit with lower interannual variance than has been measured at subtropical time series sites (Lovenduski et al., 2015). In Figure S1 in the supporting information, we illustrate the comparison between observationally based estimates of surface ocean pH and Ωarag (from GLODAPv2; Lauvset et al., 2016) and the CESM control ensemble mean. In this comparison, we note that the observational estimates have been extensively interpolated and are intended to represent year 2002 carbonate chemistry parameters, whereas CESM has been integrated under an atmospheric CO2 mixing ratio that corresponds to year 2000 forcing. We find high correspondence between the spatial patterns of modeled and observed pH and Ωarag, giving us confidence that CESM is capable of representing the mean state of these two variables. 3. Results Globally averaged surface ocean pH increases in response to each of the nuclear conflicts, where the magnitude of the pH anomaly scales with the amount of soot injected (Figure 1b). In each case, the pH anomaly exceeds the interannual standard deviation of pH in the control ensemble mean (gray shading in Figure 1b). We observe the largest increases in surface ocean pH in response to the U. S./Russia 150-Tg case; here the globally averaged surface ocean pH anomaly exceeds 0.05, corresponding to a ∼10% decrease in the global mean hydrogen ion concentration. Under each scenario, the pH anomaly peaks 2–4 years after the conflict and persists for ∼10 years. With the exception of the high-latitude oceans, the pH increase following the nuclear conflict is pervasive across the surface ocean (Figures 2a– 2c). In the 47-Tg India/Pakistan scenario, we observe local pH anomalies exceeding 0.06 units on average in years 2–5 post conflict (Figure 2c); the anomalies are largest in the North Atlantic, North Pacific, and Equatorial Pacific. These large, abrupt changes in surface ocean pH may have important consequences for calcifying organisms, as shell precipitation can be affected by the ambient hydrogen ion concentration in seawater (Kroeker et al., 2013). Since the beginning of the industrial revolution, global ocean pH has dropped by an estimated 0.1 units (Ciais & Sabine, 2013). The anomalies in pH generated by our simulations exceed 50% of this historical change and occur over a much shorter time period. Whether and how organisms respond to the initial and rapid alleviation of low pH, followed by an immediate return to the current pH state in the global ocean, is as yet unknown (see, e.g., Haigh et al., 2015). In contrast to our results for pH, we observe decreases in surface ocean Ωarag following nuclear conflict (Figure 1c), which should tend to inhibit the maintenance of shells and skeletons in calcified organisms. While minimal changes in Ωarag are simulated for the 5-Tg India/Pakistan case, the other three cases produce large decreases in saturation state, on the order of 0.1 to 0.3 units (Figure 1c). In each of these three cases, the anomalies exceed the interannual standard deviation of Ωarag in the control ensemble mean (gray shading in Figure 1c). The peak response in these three cases occurs 3–5 years post conflict, a year or so later than the pH response. While for pH the globally averaged anomaly is negligibly small, 10-years post conflict; anomalies in globally averaged Ωarag persist beyond our 15-year simulation time frame for all conflict scenarios. The decreases in aragonite saturation state span the tropics and subtropics, with the exception of the central and eastern Equatorial Pacific region (Figures 2d– 2f). Local decreases in saturation state exceed 0.5 units in the western North Atlantic and western North Pacific under the 47-Tg India/Pakistan scenario (Figure 2f). Importantly, the simulated decreases in saturation state are highly pronounced in regions that host diverse coral reef ecosystems (for instance, the western and southwestern Pacific and the Caribbean), and like pH, the changes in saturation state occur fairly rapidly. Projections from climate models suggest that coral reef ecosystems across the world will experience aragonite saturation state declines from their preindustrial value of 3.5 to 3.0 by the end of the century (Ricke et al., 2013); alarmingly, our simulations project similar Ωarag declines over a 3- to 5-year period, which then persist for years after the initial forcing dissipates. The opposite-signed anomalies in pH and Ωarag induced by nuclear conflict seem puzzling at first, as for "typical" anthropogenic ocean acidification scenarios, both of these variables simultaneously decrease. Why would nuclear conflict cause opposing responses in pH and saturation state? To understand these opposing responses, we need to consider the carbonate chemistry system in seawater and its sensitivity to changing temperature. Gaseous CO2 reacts with seawater to form carbonic acid (H2CO3), which then dissociates to form H+ and bicarbonate (HCO− 3 ). The hydrogen ion then reacts with CO2− 3 to form additional HCO− 3 , CO2 + H2O− ↽−−−−−−⇀−H2CO3. (1) H2CO3− ↽−−−−−−⇀−H+ + HCO− 3 . (2) H+ + CO2− 3 − ↽−−−−−−⇀−HCO− 3 . (3) The equilibrium constants for these reactions (typically expressed as K0, K1, and K2, respectively; Sarmiento & Gruber, 2006) are sensitive to changes in temperature, for example, the cooling induced by nuclear conflict. We need to also consider the dissolution reaction for mineral calcium carbonate (CaCO3) in seawater, CaCO3(s)− ↽−−−−−−⇀−Ca2+ sat + CO2− 3,sat, (4) where [Ca2+]sat and [CO2− 3 ]sat are the concentrations of dissolved calcium and carbonate in equilibrium with mineral CaCO3, and the solubility product (Ksp) for this reaction is also sensitive to temperature (Sarmiento & Gruber, 2006). Further, the saturation state for a calcium carbonate mineral in seawater (here: aragonite), can be expressed as Ωarag = [Ca2+][CO2− 3 ] Ksp , (5) where both [CO2− 3 ] and Ksp are affected by changes in temperature (Ca2+ is highly abundant in seawater, and thus changes in temperature do not affect its concentration enough to matter for CaCO3 dissolution; Emerson & Hedges, 2008; Sarmiento & Gruber, 2006). Thus, we can decompose the anomalies in pH and Ωarag into the component driven by temperature-induced changes in the carbonate chemistry equilibrium constants (K0, K1, K2, and Ksp) and the component driven by all other changes to the carbonate chemistry system, such as changes in the DIC concentration, the alkalinity, or the salinity. We approximate the temperature sensitivity of the equilibrium constants using a program developed for CO2 system calculations (CO2SYS; van Heuven et al., 2011) via finite difference approximation. The component driven by all other changes to the carbonate system is computed as the residual of the other two terms. The pH response to nuclear conflict is the sum of two opposing drivers: an increase in pH driven by a decrease in sea surface temperature that alters the carbonate chemistry equilibrium constants and a decrease in pH driven by an increase in the DIC concentration of the upper ocean. Figure 1b illustrates the temporal evolution of the components of the global pH anomalies from the India/Pakistan 47-Tg simulation driven by changes in the equilibrium constants versus all other changes in the carbonate chemistry system. The equilibrium constant-driven pH anomaly is positive, peaking 2–3 years after the conflict, whereas the “other” component of the pH anomaly is negative, peaking 3–5 years after the conflict. The resulting total pH anomaly is positive, indicating that it is more strongly influenced by changes in the equilibrium constants than other changes. In the India/Pakistan 47-Tg case, globally averaged temperature reaches a minimum 2 to 3-years post conflict; the model initially produces 3.5◦C–4◦C anomalies at the surface that rewarm toward pre-conflict values for the duration of the simulation (Figure 3a). In contrast, surface ocean salinity-normalized DIC anomalies peak 3 to 5-years post conflict (Figure 3b), mainly as a result of the enhanced solubility of CO2 in colder seawater. While decreasing biological export production also contributes to increased DIC in the surface ocean, this signal is small relative to the change driven by enhanced air-to-sea CO2 flux (e.g., Figure S2). The delay in DIC relative to temperature anomalies is a result of the long (order months to years) timescale for CO2 to fully equilibrate with the surface mixed layer (Emerson & Hedges, 2008). The cold, high DIC surface anomalies slowly propagate into the global ocean thermocline; we observe 1◦ C and 10 mmol m−3 anomalies in temperature and DIC, respectively, at a depth of 300 m that persist beyond the length of our simulation (Figure 3). As there are no significant anomalies in global mean alkalinity or salinity post conflict (not shown), we conclude that the DIC perturbation drives the “other” component of the pH anomalies. We find similar behavior for these components in the other conflict scenarios (not shown). The negative Ωarag anomalies post conflict are driven by a combination of lower temperatures and higher DIC concentrations. Colder surface temperatures tend to increase Ksp, while higher surface DIC concentrations tend to decrease [CO2− 3 ], resulting in lower Ωarag values post conflict. Figure 1c illustrates that the DIC (other) component dominates the total Ωarag anomaly for the India/Pakistan 47-Tg simulation. As for pH, the equilibrium constant component peaks earlier than the other component; this is due to the timing of the temperature and DIC perturbations (Figure 3). The spatial patterns of the post-conflict surface pH and Ωarag anomalies in the India/Pakistan 47-Tg scenario (Figures 2c and 2f) result from perturbations in local surface ocean temperature and DIC (Figure S3). Negative temperature anomalies and positive DIC anomalies are pervasive in the tropics and extratropics, with the exception of the eastern Equatorial Pacific, where a large and long-lasting El Niño-like event develops following the conflict (Coupe, et al., manuscript in review). This strong reduction in the equatorial trade winds greatly weakens upwelling in the cold tongue region, producing near-zero surface temperature anomalies and a reduction in vertical DIC supply here (Figure S3). In the Southern Ocean, temperature and DIC are not much affected by the nuclear conflict, likely a result of enhanced upwelling of warm water from the subsurface (Harrison, et al., manuscript in preparation). Taken together, the aforementioned changes in temperature and DIC lead to increases in pH and decreases in Ωarag over most of the ocean surface (Figure S4). The changes in surface ocean pH that we simulate for nuclear conflict resemble the simulated response of pH to volcanic eruptions, but are an order of magnitude larger. Figure S5 illustrates the anomaly in surface ocean pH in the first year following the eruptions of Agung, El Chichón, and Mt. Pinatubo, as estimated by the CESM Large Ensemble (Kay et al., 2015), which uses the same physical and biogeochemical ocean components as in our nuclear conflict simulations. The ensemble mean isolates the evolution of the Earth system under historical external forcing, including the aerosol loading following volcanic eruptions (Eddebbar et al., 2019), and averages across the various representations of internal variability (Deser et al., 2012; we note that ensembles are not necessary for the nuclear conflict scenarios since the much larger magnitude of forcing provides a higher signal-to-noise ratio). The anomaly in the ensemble mean shown here thus cleanly captures the response of surface ocean pH to volcanic eruptions. Here we show the anomaly in preindustrial pH (pH anomalies in equilibrium with preindustrial atmospheric CO2, which is computed simultaneously with contemporary pH at model run time), as the contemporary pH anomalies include also the response to increasing atmospheric CO2 from one year to the next. The similarity in the spatial patterns of volcanically induced pH anomalies and those produced under nuclear conflict is striking (cf. Figures S5 and 2c), suggesting that volcanic forcing produces similar temperature, DIC, and thus pH anomalies (including the El Niño-like response to volcanic forcing in the eastern Equatorial Pacific, described in Eddebbar et al., 2019). However, the eruption-driven pH anomaly is both smaller (an order of magnitude) and of shorter duration (∼2 years) than in the India/Pakistan 47-Tg simulation. Unfortunately, a similar analysis of volcanic Ωarag anomalies in the CESM Large Ensemble was not possible as preindustrial [CO2− 3 ] was not saved to disk. 4. Conclusions and Discussion We report on the surface ocean pH and Ωarag anomalies generated from four simulations of nuclear conflict using the CESM with full ocean carbonate system thermodynamics. Globally averaged surface ocean pH increases in response to each conflict, with the largest increases in the North Atlantic, North Pacific, and Equatorial Pacific Ocean. The pH anomalies persist for 10 years post conflict and are primarily driven by changes in the carbonate chemistry equilibrium constants as a result of decreases in sea surface temperature. In contrast, CESM simulates globally averaged decreases in surface ocean Ωarag in response to nuclear conflict, with the largest decreases in the tropics and subtropics. The Ωarag anomalies persist beyond the length of our 15-year simulations and are driven by a combination of changes in the carbonate chemistry equilibrium constants and the solubility-driven increases in DIC. We further demonstrate that the surface pH anomalies induced by nuclear conflict resemble those induced by volcanic eruptions in the same modeling system. The simulated changes in global and regional pH and Ωarag as a result of nuclear conflict are large and abrupt. In the most extreme forcing scenario (U. S./Russia 150 Tg), over a period of ∼5 years, global surface ocean pH increases by 0.06 units, and Ωarag decreases by 0.3 units. To put these numbers into perspective, this simulated rate of change of pH is 10 times larger than the rate of change we have observed over the past two decades as a result of ocean acidification (−0.0018 year−1; Lauvset et al., 2015). Worryingly, surface ocean Ωarag decreases more than six times faster than has been observed in the open ocean over the past three decades (−0.0095 year−1 at the Bermuda Atlantic time series; Bates et al., 2014). While the cooling associated with nuclear conflict rapidly and briefly alleviates the decline in pH associated with ocean acidification, the increase in solubility causes the ocean to absorb ∼11 Pg of excess carbon in a 10-year period, leading to a rapid drop in Ωarag. Whether and how calcifying organisms might respond to such rapid and opposing changes in pH and Ωarag is as yet unknown. In order to measure organism response to ocean acidification, a majority of laboratory studies perform CO2 bubbling perturbation experiments, which simultaneously decrease the pH and Ωarag in the surrounding seawater solution (Pörtner et al., 2014). This simultaneous change in two carbonate chemistry parameters challenges our ability to isolate the organism response to changes in pH or changes in Ωarag alone. A recent laboratory sensitivity study of marine bivalve larvae used chemical manipulation experiments to decouple these two parameters; they found that larval shell development and growth were negatively impacted by decreasing Ω and unaffected by changes in pH (Waldbusser et al., 2014). If these sensitivities are sustained in other organisms, we might conclude that calcifying organisms would be severely affected by nuclear conflict. Our findings shed light on the ocean biogeochemical response to other forms of extreme external forcing, such as volcanic eruptions (Eddebbar et al., 2019; Frölicher et al., 2011) and solar radiation management climate engineering (Lauvset et al., 2017; Matthews et al., 2009). They may further inform the study and understanding of the role of ocean acidification in marine extinction following the Chicxulub impact event (Henehan et al., 2019). Importantly, our results suggest that even a regional nuclear conflict can have an impact on global ocean acidification, adding to the list of the many, far-reaching consequences of nuclear conflict for global society.

2022 Michigan Affirmative
AFF – Cyber Space Assets › 1AC – Cyber Space Assets › 1AC – China Advantage

China non-kinetic satellite attacks escalate quickly – the US is more vulnerable than adversaries

Nicholas Wright et al 18, Georgetown University, Dean Cheng (Heritage Foundation), Col Peter Garretson (USAF), Namrata Goswami (Independent Analyst), James Lewis (Center for Strategic and International Studies), Bruce W. MacDonald (Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies), Kazuto Suzuki (Hokkaido University, Japan), Brian C. Weeden (Secure World Foundation) and Nicholas Wright (Georgetown University) 7-2018, “Outer Space; Earthly Escalation? Chinese Perspectives on Space Operations and Escalation”, (SMA) Periodic Publication /billy

Information is the lifeblood of US military strength, making the space assets that create and/or transmit this information to distant forces extraordinarily appealing targets. The US economy increasingly depends on space-enabled information services (SEIS) as well. China is also becoming more space dependent, but most scenarios for possible military space operations would occur much closer to China (e.g., Taiwan, East/South China Sea) than to the US mainland, allowing China to be less space-asset dependent than the US. The space and cyber domains are closely intertwined, and in their essence deal with information and share a number of similarities. The importance of both the space and cyber domains to strategic planning and crisis management is matched by the lack of much real-world crisis management experience in these domains. These incentives exist for Russia as well. In a crisis, both China and the US would likely face an unstable, high-stakes environment that is neither familiar nor well understood. In this environment, China in particular would likely be tempted to escalate quickly in both space and cyber domains to disrupt US military forces and operations if it could, ideally before they could even arrive (Miller & Fontaine, 2017). Being somewhat less space dependent, China would be less vulnerable to US space offense and might be more emboldened to escalate in space than the US. Both countries seem likely to conduct offensive operations in cyberspace during the early stages of a crisis, though they would want to exercise some caution in the extensiveness of their operations because of escalatory risks. Understanding space escalation dynamics in the context of crisis stability requires grasping its strategic landscape, including how deterrence functions or fails in a crisis and what factors strengthen or weaken that deterrence. Interdependencies between and among space and other domains are enormously complicated, and their exploration is essential to understanding twentyfirst century strategic crisis dynamics. In the late stages of a crisis that threatens to transition into conflict, adversaries would be likely to engage in limited space and cyber actions designed both to send a signal of intention to escalate if conditions are not met (could be either a real threat or a bluff) and to put themselves in a more advantageous position should major conflict break out. Space asset vulnerabilities provide an adversary with dangerously attractive incentives to escalate and preemptively attack in a crisis (MacDonald, Blair, Cheng, Mueller, & Samson, 2016). In such a scenario, each side would confront the choice of striking first with all its assets in place, knowing that a conflict is beginning; or ceding the initiative, absorbing a first strike, and making a ragged retaliation against an opponent fully expecting such a response. As a crisis progresses and becomes more intense, each side must wrestle with the prospect that the chances for full-scale conflict are increasing. While neither side may wish for a full-scale war, neither side wishes to receive a major first strike. instability, where pre-emption pays far greater benefits than retaliation (Colby & Gerson, 2013). The weaker or more disadvantaged country in a crisis may find this line of thinking irresistible, or at least preferable to the alternatives. Countries sometimes go to war not because they want to, but because doing so appears less risky than not doing so. Any space power would want to avoid being in an unstable use-or-lose situation. In addition, a major feature of the space and particularly cyber domains is that major attacks can be initiated with little advance warning—and in the case of cyber— with almost no warning. In the space and cyber domains, there is nothing comparable to the stabilizing threat of an assured second-strike capability like that represented in the nuclear domain by sea-based ballistic missiles. For the United States, there are greater risks if conflict escalates into space. Given our greater dependence on space both militarily and economically, the US will want to emphasize deterrence of conflict in space. This can be achieved not just by having space offense, though this would be a necessary component, but also through cross-domain pre-eminence. Conflict is unlikely to be confined to space; cyber and conventional domains will also be involved. Even if the US prevailed in a space-only conflict, the victory would likely be Pyrrhic unless it was overwhelming—China and Russia are unlikely to engage their forces far away from their shores, unlike the US. Thus losing our space capabilities would be more damaging to us than it would be to Russia or China (Morgan, 2010). Until we have a much more survivable and resilient space architecture, we should not want to put our space assets at risk unless absolutely necessary. This 'vulnerability/dependence gap' can be addressed through cross-domain advantages that the US has, particularly in the cyber domain

2022 Michigan Affirmative
AFF – Cyber Space Assets › 1AC – Cyber Space Assets › 1AC – China Advantage

Lack of dialogue to clarify intentions in emerging conflict spheres like the outer space-cyberspace intersection escalates crises on earth by creating use-or-lose pressures for all space-enabled military assets

Laura Grego 20, senior scientist in the Global Security Program at the Union of Concerned Scientists, 1/8/20, “The New U.S. Space Force Will Make Space More Dangerous, Not Less,” https://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/28452/why-the-trump-space-force-will-make-space-more-dangerous

But keeping space secure also requires reducing the threats to satellites. On this score, the Space Force is likely to make space a more contentious and dangerous environment, not less. It’s not just Trump’s rhetoric about dominance in space that is harmful; resources for the new military service will be provided to “deter aggression in, from, and to space.” This will create incentives within the national security bureaucracy to hype the threat of space weapons, and to then build new weapons to counter them.

In a speech last spring outlining his priorities for space, Gen. David L. Goldfein, the chief of staff of the U.S. Air Force, stated that, “It’s not enough to step into the ring and just bob and weave… At some point, we’ve got to hit back.” What Goldfein failed to mention is that the U.S. already has more sophisticated anti-satellite technology than potential adversaries like Russia and China. In fact, having anti-satellite weapons actually does very little to keep one’s own satellites safe from attack. Yet military leaders appear to believe that reserving the option to deny the use of space to potential adversaries is more important than the benefits that come with a less weaponized space.

2022 Michigan Affirmative
AFF – Cyber Space Assets › 1AC – Cyber Space Assets › 1AC – China Advantage

China is increasing their technological advancements in space – an attack on NATO’s system would rapidly degrade alliance military capabilities and lead to miscalculation

Madeline Moon 20, a member of the UK Delegation to the NATO Parliamentary Assembly, Vice-Chairperson of the Sub-Committee on Transatlantic Defence and Security Cooperation from 2012 to 2015, rapporteur of the Sub-Committee on Future Security and Defence Capabilities “THE SPACE DOMAIN AND ALLIED DEFENCE,” NATO Parliamentary Assembly, https://www.nato-pa.int/document/2017-space-domain-and-allied-defence-moon-report-162-dscfc-17-e-rev1-fin, p. 1-10 /BL

2. NATO forces depend greatly on the use of space-based systems for essential communications, navigation, tracking, and targeting capabilities, as well as weather forecasting. Space-based system coordination plays a vital role in all current NATO key pillars of defence; allowing for the effective management of conventional forces at home and abroad, nuclear deterrent systems, and the evolving ballistic missile defence system. Rapid development, use, and dependency on space, however, imply growing risks.

3. Renewed attention to kinetic anti-satellite (ASAT) capabilities as well as other forms of non-kinetic space denial capabilities such as jammers and lasers is increasingly bringing space to the forefront of security policy planning and debate. As great power strategic competition rises again in Europe and Asia-Pacific, the ability to deter and defend space assets is more important than ever due to the rising costs associated with a space denial campaign.

2022 Michigan Affirmative
AFF – Cyber Space Assets › 1AC – Cyber Space Assets › 1AC – China Advantage

Non-kinetic attacks on space based assets are the most likely – NATO collective defense is key to deterrence

Madeline Moon 20, a member of the UK Delegation to the NATO Parliamentary Assembly, Vice-Chairperson of the Sub-Committee on Transatlantic Defence and Security Cooperation from 2012 to 2015, rapporteur of the Sub-Committee on Future Security and Defence Capabilities “THE SPACE DOMAIN AND ALLIED DEFENCE,” NATO Parliamentary Assembly, https://www.nato-pa.int/document/2017-space-domain-and-allied-defence-moon-report-162-dscfc-17-e-rev1-fin, p. 1-10 /BL

42. Non-kinetic means, for example, cyber hacking, laser dazzling, or the emission of electromagnetic pulses, can also be used to interrupt or disable rather than destroy satellites. While considered less damaging to the space environment and potentially less traceable, many forms of non-kinetic attacks are very difficult to attribute, stirring fears of quick escalation and questions of proportionality of response in a near future conflict where space-assets would likely be involved. Russia and China are already heavily invested in this domain, ultimately seeking the means to disrupt US hegemony in space (Pellegrino, Stang, 2016).

Non-kinetic means: cyber-attacks, jamming, spoofing, and dazzling

2022 Michigan Affirmative
AFF – Cyber Space Assets › 1AC – Cyber Space Assets › 1AC – China Advantage

Ukraine completely shifted NATO priorities towards Russia---failure to readdress Chinese advancements opens the door for Chinese adventurism AND security threats.

Liselotte Odgaard 22, professor at the Norwegian Institute for Defense Studies, 2/24/2022, "NATO’s China Role: Defending Cyber and Outer Space," Washington Quarterly, 45(1), pp 175-180, https://doi.org/10.1080/0163660X.2022.2059145, sg

NATO’s vague recognition in 2021 that China constitutes a challenge to the transatlantic alliance reflects an institution that has failed to take on the security threats emanating from Beijing. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine on February 24, 2022 highlights the reasons why this omission is problematic. The war in Ukraine has reignited transatlantic unity of purpose in addressing threats from Moscow toward European security. The existential shock that Europe is facing now that a Russian regime has shown itself willing to go to war against European countries carries with it the risk that China will be forgotten when NATO discusses its future priorities. During the war, China is walking a tightrope between maintaining its commitment to sovereignty and territorial integrity and keeping up cooperation with Russia. The future strength of the Chinese-Russian partnership is likely to be determined by the continued usefulness of Moscow in China’s efforts to carve out more space for a Sinocentric international order based on authoritarian regimes. Meanwhile, China will continue to engender threats to the US and Europe in all domains and across geographical regions.

With the summit statement of the North Atlantic Council released June 14, 2021, NATO extended a commitment to “engage China with a view to defending the security interests of the Alliance,” since “China’s stated ambitions and assertive behavior present systemic challenges to the rules-based international order and to areas relevant to Alliance security.”1 China’s coercive policies, nuclear arsenal, military modernization, military cooperation with Russia, lack of transparency, and use of disinformation are listed as main areas of concern for the alliance. NATO takes the China challenge seriously but has yet to devise a strategy to address it.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
NEG › Advocacy Fails

Companies backlash by lobbying

Landwehr, Borning & Wulf 21 – [Marvin Landwehr is a Ph.D. student for Pluralist Economics and Socio-Informatics at the University of Siegen, Alan Borning is a Professor Emeritus in the Paul G Allen School of Computer Science & Engineering at the University of Washington, Volker Wulf is a professor in Information Systems and the director of the Media Research Institute at the University of Siegen; 12/19/21; “Problems with surveillance capitalism and possible alternatives for IT infrastructure”; ; accessed 7/19/22; Lowell-JL]

Since these measures directly attack the power position of IT companies, countermeasures are to be expected, including extensive lobbying and media campaigns, as well as the continuing instrumentalization of intellectual property laws. For example, even if an IT service was involved in the creation of content, it should not be granted any intellectual property rights to it. Otherwise, Facebook, for example, could use intellectual property law to prevent users from scraping their own content and uploading it onto competing systems. The same is true for cloud computing providers. Therefore, IP restrictions are quite consequential and must be considered in responding to the expected countermeasures. However, intellectual property is just one way in which law is used to create abstract forms of capital. In her recent book The Code of Capital, Pistor (2020) shows how the law selectively codes claims and ideas into capital. All of these forms need to be considered as expected legal countermeasures big companies will apply against regulation. Furthermore, investigations and whistleblowers will be necessary for identifying misconduct. As a consequence, there should be compensation paid, and since one of the aggrieved parties is society as a whole, it is easily justifiable to channel this compensation into the development of alternatives, as one source for funding for them.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
NEG › TVA

Informed consent and the minimum data approach protect our personal information while browsing – this limits the damage of surveillance capitalism

Landwehr, Borning & Wulf 21 – [Marvin Landwehr is a Ph.D. student for Pluralist Economics and Socio-Informatics at the University of Siegen, Alan Borning is a Professor Emeritus in the Paul G Allen School of Computer Science & Engineering at the University of Washington, Volker Wulf is a professor in Information Systems and the director of the Media Research Institute at the University of Siegen; 12/19/21; “Problems with surveillance capitalism and possible alternatives for IT infrastructure”; ; accessed 7/19/22; Lowell-JL]

Another area of legislative activity is do-not-track legislation. The general goal of these bills is to allow users to decide whether or not they are willing to be tracked by third-party websites while browsing websites and potentially while using other internet-based services.

True informed consent

2022 Michigan Counterplan
NEG › TVA

Regulation is key to solve the consequences of surveillance capitalism – only working with both tech and regulations can solve

Landwehr, Borning & Wulf 21 – [Marvin Landwehr is a Ph.D. student for Pluralist Economics and Socio-Informatics at the University of Siegen, Alan Borning is a Professor Emeritus in the Paul G Allen School of Computer Science & Engineering at the University of Washington, Volker Wulf is a professor in Information Systems and the director of the Media Research Institute at the University of Siegen; 12/19/21; “Problems with surveillance capitalism and possible alternatives for IT infrastructure”; ; accessed 7/19/22; Lowell-JL]

Turning now to what could be done, one goal should be to limit the damage done by the surveillance capitalism business model, while still retaining key benefits of the services it provides. But if possible, we would like to move beyond damage control and support positive visions of how IT can better support people and communities. Crafting and deploying such solutions is an exceedingly difficult problem. Even though this business model has only recently come into being, the corporations practicing it have become dominant, and the technologies and services are threaded throughout our lives, communities, and economies. Regulation will be a key element of a response. However, regulation should not simply be a reaction to technology and an attempt to curb its worst excesses: technology should not be taken as a fixed, external force that will inevitably follow a particular path. Nor is surveillance capitalism at its root a technological problem amenable to a purely technological fix. Instead, regulation and technology should be co-designed and co-evolved. Citizens and civil society organizations will play key roles as well, by pushing for more effective regulation and supporting technologies, by helping to foster alternative models for providing needed services, and by adopting new social practice.

Regulation and law

2022 Michigan Counterplan
NEG › Res Good

NATO is good

Coker 09

(Christopher Coker is Professor of International Relations at the London School of Economics and Political Science, 3-27-2009, "Post-modern NATO," Rusi, , DOA July 21, 2022)

NATO has expanded beyond its initial notion of an Atlantic community. No longer is it delineated by the Iron Curtain, and the Alliance has resisted calls to define itself against Islamic fundamentalism. NATO still needs a new self-understanding, key to which will be a clearer sense of its relationship with Russia. The Argentinean writer Jorge Luis Borges once remarked that we are all confronted by the ‘modesty of history’. In plying their trade historians and political scientists try to identify historic turning points and to date them precisely, but history is more modest. Its essential dates remain secret for a long time. I cite Borges because one of the decisive dates he chose, and one which moved him profoundly (or so he tells us), was the liberation of Paris in August 1944. For what he saw at the time was the conception of something new – a western community or coalition that having triumphed over fascism would stand firm against communism as well. Had Borges been alive today what dates would he have chosen for the transformation of that community in its institutional form, the Atlantic Alliance? Since the end of the Cold War NATO has changed profoundly. If we seek to date that change perhaps we should look to the Partnership for Peace initiative of 1994; or the NATO-Russia Founding Act signed three years later which placed the relationship between the West and its old protagonist on a contractual footing; or the invitation at Madrid in 1999 to three East European countries to begin the process of enlargement. One could choose all or any of these as keystones in NATO’s path to becoming a post-modern alliance. Post western alliance To claim that NATO has become a post-western alliance may strike one as at best ironic, at worst plainly perverse. At the Washington Conference in 1949 one of the participants Paul Henri Spaak called it ‘an act of faith in the destiny of western civilization’. It is worth remembering, in fact, that the alliance was meant to be more than a military alliance. Its founding fathers hoped to forge an Atlantic Community as Christian Herter, John Foster Dulles’ successor at the State Department called it. At the end of the 1950s, in fact, the United States fought to give the alliance a federal framework – a permanent council elected by the NATO Council of Ministers; a political general staff or steering committee, or Atlantic Commission. In the end, an Atlantic Community was not forged. Instead, the United States and Europe began drifting apart. As Walter Hallstein, the President of the European Commission remarked in 1961, the Europeans were no longer interested in the Alliance as a ‘collective political personality’; they were interested only in a loose association based on two separate pillars – Europe and the United States. Yet until the very end of the Cold War, the Alliance’s ‘Western’ credentials were constantly reaffirmed: in the Atlantic Declaration of 1974 and most recently the Transatlantic Declaration of 1990. Even after the collapse of communism and long before 9/11 there was still a hope that NATO would remain a western club, by defining itself against another universal enemy: Islam. In the attack by Islamic fundamentalists on western culture many observers seemed to be confirmed in their conviction that the worlds of secularism and Islam were as fundamentally incompatible as those of capitalism and communism. In Islamic fundamentalism many commentators saw another existential threat to western civilization. In the event, the attempt in February 1995 by the NATO Secretary-General, Willie Claes, to reaffirm the alliance on that basis met with little or no support. History has now moved on. Willie Claes’ ‘Huntingdonian’ predilection for seeing it in cultural terms was not wrong in itself, but the clash of civilizations thesis is based on a very modern definition of civilization. The idea of civilization which the West fought so hard to impose on its enemies can no longer be sustained. It now refers to a distinctive mode of existence in the global age, not an ideal order of human society. It is no longer possible to insist that the peoples of the world are living through a stage in a unitary scale of progress whose apex is western civilization. Indeed, long before the Cold War had run its course this had been conceded by no less a figure than Raymond Aron. Aron shared none of his own countrymen’s fears of American hegemony or their aversion to Anglo-Saxon universalism. He would be among the first to applaud his country’s return to NATO’s integrated military command. But he recognized that if civilization itself was to be defended in the future against fundamentalist forces that challenged everything that made life ‘civil’ the West would have to be less exclusive in its definition. ‘The present phase of civilization is coming to an end’, he wrote in the 1960’s, ‘and for good or ill humanity is embarking on a new phase,’ that of forging a single world civilization for the first time, one truly universal in its appeal. What Aron recognized was that every culture - to take one critical example, human rights - must realize values in its own way. He recognized that the whole debate on human rights had been bedeviled for far too long by western ideas. There is no global consensus on what constitutes those rights but NATO is trying to demarcate what President Bush called ‘the non-negotiable demands of human freedom’. In 1996 in a speech in Aachen Vaclav Havel defined what the term ‘civilization’ meant in the post-modern era. Like Aron he talked of a new West, a wider one, though still distinguished by ‘a metaphysically anchored sense of responsibility’. The West’s task, he argued, should be to rededicate itself to a different project – to admit that there are values which transcend the West itself; to find what it has in common with other cultures; ‘to join forces with them in search for the common moral minimum necessary to guide us’. Let me highlight two key phrases from that speech. NATO must have a normative purpose in the twenty-first century, or what Havel calls ‘a metaphysically anchored sense of responsibility’. But in a post-modern age it cannot have a maximalist one: the desire to impose a western definition of civilized norms. The ‘moral minimum’ is what it must aim for. This is not a minimalist objective, however, for it requires the alliance to intervene for the first time on behalf of those who are not even members. It did this in Kosovo in 1999, the alliance’s first war. It is attempting to do this in Afghanistan today, in its second military venture. Post Atlantic Alliance To call NATO a post-Atlantic Alliance may appear equally perverse given its decision to forge a Euro-Atlantic Partnership and a Euro-Atlantic Council but both of these were conjured into existence for a reason. i.e. ‘Atlanticism’ as it was traditionally understood is no longer sustainable. For most of its history, of course, NATO was an Atlanticism institution whose founding document was not the Washington Treaty of 1949 but the Atlantic Charter of 1941 to which the United States put its name four months before it entered the Second World War. The Charter was not only a statement of principle signed by Britain and the United States. The British signed it on behalf of all but one of the European governments in exile in London. The exception, France, only signed in December 1944 – three months after its liberation (so Borges, perhaps, was right after all, to date the conception of the Atlantic Alliance – as opposed to its birth – to the liberation of Paris). In the words of André Malraux, the Old and New Worlds had been divided by the Atlantic, an ocean which had provided a passage for those fleeing political and economic oppression in Europe. In the 1940s the immigration largely stopped. The Atlantic became a bridge, not a barrier. In that sense, the Old World was conjoined with the New. The Atlantic Alliance was lauded precisely for that reason. It offered, wrote the contemporary historian Hans Kohn, a vehicle through which ‘the nations on the two shores of the Atlantic’ had begun to realise their communality for the first time. Although they had not shared a common past they would, at least, share a common destiny. Atlanticism grew naturally out of the politics and sympathies forged in two World Wars. It was consistent with the very ‘modern’ belief that countries were not states so much as contracts with history. What was the United States, asked the poet William Carlos Williams, but ‘the inspired invention of European thought’. In the political sphere Atlanticism was a also a corner stone of Britain’s supposed ‘special relationship’ with the United States. But it was also vitally important in helping the United States understand itself. For the American elite’s idea of national consensus at the time was also in step with the popular response to assimilation. Indeed, the East and Central Europeans who began arriving after 1910 only to find themselves discriminated against as ‘non-whites’ were the first to benefit from Atlanticism. For at its core was the belief in the force of equality. That ideology, in turn, became a mainstay of the government’s own effort of mobilisation. It facilitated its attempt to unite the nation behind the rhetoric of the Cold War. It marked the historic moment when the ‘ghetto-whites’: the Slovaks, Poles and Ruthenians felt fully accepted as Americans. It was all the more ironic, therefore, that the Atlanticism which helped end social divisiveness within the US and unite the United States should have divided western and eastern Europe. In closing the gap between the old and new worlds, Atlanticism widened the gap between the two in the western imagination. The decision forty years later to enlarge NATO was important for that reason. It spelt the end of what the historian Norman Davies calls ‘the Allied version of history’ – the belief in a unique, secular brand of western civilisation in which the Atlantic Alliance was presented as the pinnacle of human progress with the Atlantic Charter as its key. The Allied version of history was pernicious precisely because it drew an imaginary line behind which the West deemed itself to be more progressive, advanced and civilised. The Hungarian writer Istvan Bibo was probably right to suspect in 1946 - even before the Iron Curtain was drawn across the continent - that many westerners were not unhappy to see Eastern Europe policed by a great power, in part because they suspected its people of ‘an innate barbarism’. It is now clear, of course, that many fault lines have shaped the history of Europe. Some run north/south and divide the members of ‘old Europe’. The lukewarm support for the Kosovo war in the south, and 85 per cent support ratings in the Nordic world highlighted the differences. It is symbolically fitting that NATO should have become the instrument by which Eastern and Western Europe (and the United States, with its large and politically important East European minorities) have rediscovered each other. It is morally important that the Czech Republic has embraced what Havel once described as “the poetic charm” of NATO membership. The phrase reminds me of a passage in the novel Life is Elsewhere by his fellow countryman, Milan Kundera. Referring to the coup of 1948 which his generation welcomed as a new dawn, Kundera reflects that ‘the wall behind which people were imprisoned was made of verse’. The new poetics of history is no longer communism but European integration, and instead of imprisoning people behind a conceptual wall, it offers them a wider horizon. Is the process of NATO expansion complete? Should the Alliance admit Georgia and Ukraine? Historically and culturally neither have been ‘European’ – they have always been on the margins (if that) of the western imagination. The same cannot be said of Russia. Alliance without borders Throughout the Cold War NATO and the Warsaw Pact found themselves locked into a position of strategic inertia. History in the twentieth century, wrote the philosopher Walter Benjamin, was a permanent state of emergency. And like all such states it demanded a suspension of action, (though not, of course, belief). The very concept of movement, Benjamin added, had become associated with the notion of catastrophe – ‘the fact that things move on is the catastrophe’ he warned. History since then has become the permanent revision of what has been achieved, and this is no less true in the security field than every other. In today’s Europe ‘the structure of peace’ is no longer based on two opposing military blocs deterring each other from breaking the peace. Today’s Europe is characterized by change: the transformation of the security environment is the principal theme of politics and security studies. The old system was built on the principle of power restraining power. Great emphasis was based on drawing lines in the sand. Today the emphasis is on inter-penetration and transparency. The British diplomat Robert Cooper describes its chief characteristics : the break down the distinction between domestic and foreign affairs the growth of mutual interference in traditional domestic affairs and mutual surveillance. Intrusive verification which is at the heart of the news arms control regime is a key element of a global order in which state sovereignty is no longer considered to be absolute. the rejection of force for resolving disputes, and the codification of rules of behavior the growing irrelevance of borders the extent to which security is based on transparency, mutual openness, interdependence and mutual vulnerability One of NATO’s twenty-first century missions is to help construct a community in which common identities are constituted by normative practices other than national sovereignty; and in which people find themselves involved in the life of the region as well as their own country. NATO shares that task with other institutions, especially the OSCE which is also trying to forge a common security perspective or ‘single cognitive space’. Peace in Europe is now maintained by the institutional synergy of several security organizations of which NATO is one. The OSCE is another. If anything, the Russians take the OSCE more seriously than most western countries, or, at least, claim to. Some time ago Vladimir Lukin, the chairman of the Duma International Affairs Committee, suggested that the second phase of NATO enlargement should include all the participating members of the OSCE (including Russia), and that thereafter, the organization should dissolve itself and become the OSCE’s military arm. This is unlikely to happen but the West needs to find some more permanent basis for its relationship with Russia. For synergy is a process not a product. Each institution increases the effectiveness of the other; it is the relationship between them which enhances each. Since 1991 we have seen the emergence of the Russia-NATO Council. There was also talk of a joint NATO-Russia brigade. The alliance has put much of its history behind it; it has embraced globalization with some real success; it has fought one war and finds itself involved in another. But for good or ill, the relationship with Russia is still crucial to the new alliance NATO is in the process of becoming. Until it is resolved we will not know what the alliance will finally become.