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2022 Michigan Affirmative
OCO Aff Updates › Case › Zero-Days Good---2AC

Innovation is crucial to preventing cyberattack

Cushing ’14 [Seychelle; November 28; M.A. Political Science from Simon Fraser University; “Leveraging Information as Power: America’s Pursuit of Cyber Security,” ]

Adversaries study America’s cyber tool and techniques “to capitalize on [US…] ideas” for their own strategic advantage.89 On the one hand, innovating on its own code allows America to continue executing its security objectives in cyberspace. On the other hand, innovation allows the United States to speculate on how variations in its attack code may evolve to help anticipate potential attacks from its adversaries. While the United States may not be able to close all of its potential vulnerabilities,90 it can at least flag the unpatched vulnerabilities most likely exploited in a cyber strike. Red-teaming cyber games further allow the US to test both anticipated attacks and potential responses to maintain an informational advantage.91 Cyber favours offense over defence given its lax security architecture. Sophisticated cyber states that are able to innovate first will enjoy a relative advantage.92 Amassing an arsenal of undetected vulnerabilities does not necessarily produce an immediate, usable advantage. Instead, these vulnerabilities provide important information to gauge the strengths and weaknesses of America’s offensive and defensive capabilities. Finding undetected vulnerabilities, and knowing how to exploit those, positions the US to capitalize on the offense-defence innovation cycle to preserve a cyber advantage. The strike methods of nuclear or conventional weapons are largely unchanged and can be used to great effect. Cyber weapons, in comparison, only successfully work once. Innovation is required to not only manage the “constant pressure to keep up,”93 but to also tip the balance of informational advantage in your favour.

2022 Michigan Affirmative
OCO Aff Updates › Case › Zero-Days Good---2AC

Zero-days key to cyber warfighting

Cushing ’14 [Seychelle; November 28; M.A. Political Science from Simon Fraser University; “Leveraging Information as Power: America’s Pursuit of Cyber Security,” ]

The Internet has made information seeking easier given its lax security structure that privileges offense over defence. Where the US once relied on its own ingenuity to support its national security innovations, it can now also purchase the necessary tools keep up with its peer competitors in cyberspace. Buying zero days in the vulnerabilities market thus serves a dual purpose: it takes away potential attack tools from its adversaries while building America’s own cyber arsenal. The problem, however, is that zero days may not work when you need them. Unlike nuclear or conventional weapons, there is no guarantee that an acquired zero-day can remain dormant yet functional. As a result, the US must consistently discover and collect zero-days to maintain a deployable cyber arsenal. America, despite its cyber superiority, cannot credibly threaten to use crushing cyber power to defeat its adversaries without revealing part of its capabilities. Compounding this problem is the fact that a cyber attack alone, while disruptive, is survivable at this time. America is thus experiencing a shift in its security strategy, albeit incrementally. What previously worked in the physical domain does not necessarily translate into successful primacy in the electronic domain. Although Cold War models of deterrence by denial and retribution may help frame the cyber problem, these models will eventually need to give way to new thinking about security in cyberspace. Deterrence, despite its Cold War successes, is not enough to stop your adversaries from attacking you in cyberspace. Instead, resiliency to absorb a cyber attack will carry America further in securing a net security advantage. While absorbing attacks seems counterintuitive, it is a short term risk that will garner important information. Resiliency then is as much about learning about your adversaries, their capabilities, and targets, and it is about comparatively measuring your own vulnerabilities and strengths in cyber offense and defence. The more information America can acquire, the better equipped it will be to face the cyber threat. Preparations for kinetic conflict are likely to begin in cyberspace as states collect vast information about their adversaries. Tapping into the millions of gigabytes of data that passes through the Internet is necessary to help America build a better picture of its adversaries’ actions and intent, including “the readiness of foreign militaries.”250 America, despite its cyber sophistication, cannot undertake such a task alone.251 Instead, the United States strategically shares information and capabilities with its partners to influence the intelligence priorities of the Five Eyes.252 Sharing initially puts the United States in a vulnerable position – exclusive control over a part of its cyber capabilities are conceded to its partners. From a vulnerable position, American cyber power can nevertheless influence conditions necessary to execute innovative, albeit high risk, intelligence operations. Information gathered from cyber can both reflect the strengths and weaknesses of America’s (and by extension, its adversaries’) offensive and defensive capabilities both within and outside cyberspace. Amassing an informational advantage to use against its adversaries will enable the US to enhance its security posture. Information, as the new realm of cyber security illustrates, is still a growing foundation of power. Leveraging information in cyberspace is key to producing a long-term net gain in security. In seeking a cyber advantage, the United States must endure short-term cyber insecurity. Tipping the security seesaw may not produce immediate advantages but instead, can be understood as a step towards long-term security. Consistently working to tip the seesaw towards advantage, while managing the associated vulnerabilities, helps produce a long-term advantage. The US’ ability to enhance its cyber posture while managing the associated vulnerabilities ultimately produces a net gain in national security.

2022 Michigan Affirmative
OCO Aff Updates › Case › Zero-Days Good---1AC

Solves rogue state prolif

Cushing ’14 [Seychelle; November 28; M.A. Political Science from Simon Fraser University; “Leveraging Information as Power: America’s Pursuit of Cyber Security,” ]

Actively seeking to exploit and plant vulnerabilities helps the United States maintain a competitive advantage. Nuclear or conventional weapons, once developed, can remain dormant yet functional until needed. In comparison, the zero-days used in cyber weapons require the US to constantly discover new vulnerabilities to maintain a deployable cyber arsenal. Holding a specific zero-day does not guarantee that the vulnerability will remain unpatched for a prolonged period of time by the targeted state.59 Complicating this is the fact that undetected vulnerabilities, once acquired, are rarely used immediately given the time and resources it takes to construct a cyber attack.60 In the time between acquisition and use, a patch for the vulnerability may be released, whether through routine patches or a specific identification of a security hole, rendering the vulnerability obsolete. To minimize this, America deploys several zero-days at once in a cyber attack to increase the odds that at least one (or more) of the vulnerabilities remains open to provide system access.61 2.4. One Attack, Multiple Vulnerabilities Multiple backdoor entry points are preferable given that America cannot be absolutely certain of what vulnerabilities the target system will contain62 despite extensive pre-launch cyber attack testing63 and customization.64 A successful cyber attack needs a minimum of one undetected vulnerability to gain access to the target system. Each successive zero-day that works adds to the strength and sophistication of a cyber assault.65 As one vulnerability is patched, America can still rely on the other undetected vulnerabilities to continue its cyber strike. Incorporating multiple undetected vulnerabilities into a cyber attack reduces the need to create new cyber attacks after each zero-day fails. Stuxnet, a joint US-Israel operation, was a cyber attack designed to disrupt Iran’s progress on its nuclear weapons program.66 The attack was designed to alter the code of Natanz’s computers and industrial control systems to induce “chronic fatigue,” rather than destruction, of the nuclear centrifuges.67 The precision of Stuxnet ensured that all other control systems were ignored except for those regulating the centrifuges.68 What is notable about Stuxnet is its use of four zero-day exploits (of which one was allegedly purchased)69 in the attack.70 That is, to target one system, Stuxnet entered through four different backdoors. A target state aware of a specific vulnerability in its system will enact a patch upon detection and likely assume that the problem is fixed. Exploiting multiple vulnerabilities creates variations in how the attack is executed given that different backdoors alter how the attack enters the target system.71 One patch does not stop the cyber attack. The use of multiple zero-days thus capitalizes on a state’s limited awareness of the vulnerabilities in its system. Each phase of Stuxnet was different from its previous phase which created confusion among the Iranians. Launched in 2009, Stuxnet was not discovered by the Iranians until 2010.72 Yet even upon the initial discovery of the attack, who the attacker was remained unclear. The failures in the Natanz centrifuges were first attributed to insider error73 and later to China74 before finally discovering the true culprits.75 The use of multiple undetected vulnerabilities helped to obscure the US and Israel as the actual attackers.76 The Stuxnet case helps illustrate the efficacy of zero-day attacks as a means of attaining political goals. Although Stuxnet did not produce immediate results in terminating Iran’s nuclear program, it helped buy time for the Americans to consider other options against Iran. A nuclear Iran would not only threaten American security but possibly open a third conflict for America77 in the Middle East given Israel’s proclivity to strike a nuclear Iran first. Stuxnet allowed the United States to delay Iran’s nuclear program without resorting to kinetic action.78

2022 Michigan Affirmative
OCO Aff Updates › Case › Zero-Days Good---1AC

Allied cyperwarfare enables rapid crisis response and the use of OCO’s in warfighting

Cushing ’14 [Seychelle; November 28; M.A. Political Science from Simon Fraser University; “Leveraging Information as Power: America’s Pursuit of Cyber Security,” ]

In comparison, the zero-days used in cyber weapons require the US to constantly discover new vulnerabilities to maintain a deployable cyber arsenal. Holding a specific zero-day does not guarantee that the vulnerability will remain unpatched for a prolonged period of time by the targeted state.59 Complicating this is the fact that undetected vulnerabilities, once acquired, are rarely used immediately given the time and resources it takes to construct a cyber attack.60 In the time between acquisition and use, a patch for the vulnerability may be released, whether through routine patches or a specific identification of a security hole, rendering the vulnerability obsolete. To minimize this, America deploys several zero-days at once in a cyber attack to increase the odds that at least one (or more) of the vulnerabilities remains open to provide system access.61 Multiple backdoor entry points are preferable given that America cannot be absolutely certain of what vulnerabilities the target system will contain62 despite extensive pre-launch cyber attack testing63 and customization.64 A successful cyber attack needs a minimum of one undetected vulnerability to gain access to the target system. Each successive zero-day that works adds to the strength and sophistication of a cyber assault.65 As one vulnerability is patched, America can still rely on the other undetected vulnerabilities to continue its cyber strike. Incorporating multiple undetected vulnerabilities into a cyber attack reduces the need to create new cyber attacks after each zero-day fails. Stuxnet, a joint US-Israel operation, was a cyber attack designed to disrupt Iran’s progress on its nuclear weapons program.66 The attack was designed to alter the code of Natanz’s computers and industrial control systems to induce “chronic fatigue,” rather than destruction, of the nuclear centrifuges.67 The precision of Stuxnet ensured that all other control systems were ignored except for those regulating the centrifuges.68 What is notable about Stuxnet is its use of four zero-day exploits (of which one was allegedly purchased)69 in the attack.70 That is, to target one system, Stuxnet entered through four different backdoors. A target state aware of a specific vulnerability in its system will enact a patch upon detection and likely assume that the problem is fixed. Exploiting multiple vulnerabilities creates variations in how the attack is executed given that different backdoors alter how the attack enters the target system.71 One patch does not stop the cyber attack. The use of multiple zero-days thus capitalizes on a state’s limited awareness of the vulnerabilities in its system. Each phase of Stuxnet was different from its previous phase which created confusion among the Iranians. Launched in 2009, Stuxnet was not discovered by the Iranians until 2010.72 Yet even upon the initial discovery of the attack, who the attacker was remained unclear. The failures in the Natanz centrifuges were first attributed to insider error73 and later to China74 before finally discovering the true culprits.75 The use of multiple undetected vulnerabilities helped to obscure the US and Israel as the actual attackers.76 The Stuxnet case helps illustrate the efficacy of zero-day attacks as a means of attaining political goals. Although Stuxnet did not produce immediate results in terminating Iran’s nuclear program, it helped buy time for the Americans to consider other options against Iran. A nuclear Iran would not only threaten American security but possibly open a third conflict for America77 in the Middle East given Israel’s proclivity to strike a nuclear Iran first. Stuxnet allowed the United States to delay Iran’s nuclear program without resorting to kinetic action.78

2022 Michigan Affirmative
OCO Aff Updates › Case › Zero-Days Good---1AC

NATO OCO doctrine solves zero-day vulnerabilities---intel sharing improves warfighting outcomes, while disclosure enables allied to protect vulnerable networks from attacks

Fiddler 15. Marilyn Fiddler - Marshall Scholar, Department of Politics and International Relations, University of Oxford; Summer, 2015; “Regulating the Zero-Day Vulnerability Trade:A Preliminary Analysis”; I/S: A Journal of Law and Policy for the Information Society, 11, 405. //BY

2. Analysis of NATO as an Institution for Zero-Day Trade Discussions

NATO is an influential body, and, if it addressed trade in zero-days, its policies would have global importance. NATO has been relatively successful in addressing new collective defense challenges, so it may have the institutional flexibility to take on zero-days. NATO membership maps well with participants in the zero-day market, including countries with notable buyers and sellers. Additionally, because NATO is a collective defense organization for allies, conceptions of the underlying security problem and opinions about approach may be more aligned than among states not engaged in collective defense. Given the difficulties of other forms of international cooperation, achieving consensus among allies might be strategically attractive.

2022 Michigan Negative
**Topicality** › T Preemptive › 1NC---T---Preemptive

LAWS literally don’t exist – the plan is banning FUTURE technology

Inger Österdahl 21, Professor at Department of Law at Uppsala University, “Laws on LAWS (Lethal Autonomous Weapon Systems): The Work of the United Nations and the Swedish Position”, The Faculty of Law in Uppsala 179-205, http://www.diva-portal.org/smash/get/diva2:1608922/FULLTEXT01.pdf)/maze

2 LAWS and the Group of Governmental Experts (GGE) Lethal autonomous weapon systems (LAWS) are intensely discussed, but there is no generally accepted definition of what they are. The central point is that they can function without human intervention. However, the question is where the line should be drawn between a highly automated system – which is not subject to discussion within the framework of LAWS – and an autonomous system – which is the subject of discussion within LAWS. With respect to a technical system, the terms automatic and autonomous mean the same thing, that is, the system works without human influence. A technical system can have many automated functions, and a complex system with many automated functions is often labelled autonomous.6 Depending on what definition of LAWS one uses – a definition that sets the degree of automation so high that no such weapon system yet exists or a definition that stipulates a lower degree of automation for a weapon system to be labelled ‘autonomous’ – LAWS can be claimed not to exist today or to exist already. It is uncontroversial to claim that there are weapon systems today with highly automated – or autonomous – functions, without these weapon systems necessarily being subject to discussion within the framework of LAWS. Weapons with certain autonomous functions have existed for more than 100 years. The most common highly automated – or autonomous – weapon systems today are different kinds of targeting robots, which were first put into use during and after the Second World War. Different forms of air defence systems with highly automated – or autonomous – functions also exist, for instance.7 Probably, the discussion on LAWS relates to weapon systems that do not yet exist, but that might soon be brought into existence due to the rapid technological development in the field of AI.

2022 Michigan Negative
**Topicality** › T Preemptive › 1NC---T---Preemptive

“Should” is obligatory, NOT advisory.

Riddle ’14 [Finis E; December 22; Justice on the Supreme Court of Oklahoma; Westlaw, “St. Louis & S. F. R. Co. v. Brown,” 45 Okla. 143]

The specific grounds of objection are that the court should have used the word “shall” instead of “should,” that the word “should” is merely advisory, and that the jury was left at its discretion in the matter of reduction of the damages. It has been said that the word “should” is the past tense of the word “shall,” and we think, in the connection in which it was used, the jury understood that it meant more than simply advisory.

In the case of Smith v. State, 142 Ind. 288, 41 N. E. 595, the Supreme Court of Indiana held that it was more imperative than the word “may.”

2022 Michigan Negative
**Kritik Work** › Cybernetics › 1NC---K---Link---Cybernetics

Artificial intelligence perpetuates racial biases by paining people of color as expendable “human shields.” Search engines, algorithms, and networks have biases engrained within them which makes them predisposed to relegating entire communities as objects that can be disposed of.

Wilcox 22 Lauren Wilcox, 2-20-2022, "Becoming shield, unbecoming human," SpringerLink, https://link.springer.com/article/10.1057/s41312-022-00141-5

The “human shield” is a civilian “whose status as a civilian is simultaneously assumed only to be disavowed” (Perugini & Gordon, 2017, p. 3) and said disavowal does not turn them into a combatant, but a liminal figure on the threshold between civilian and combatant. The war crime of using “human shields” becomes then a claim that these “human shields” are actually an attack, not on the so-called human shields but on those who are using violence against such persons. It is part of a calculative logic of making citizens responsible for their own deaths, instead of the military bearing responsibility to prevent civilian deaths, and it plays precisely on the question of how ‘the human shield’ is produced as an object of knowledge. Neve Gordon and Nicola Perugini take readers on a far-reaching tour of historical and contemporary instances of human shielding, both voluntary and involuntary in Human Shields: A History of People in the Line of Fire (2020) with powerful story-telling that underpins disturbing truths about how violence becomes legitimated. The paradoxes of the figure of the “human shield” lie at the heart of the work, and Gordon and Perugini use this figure as a means to pry open international humanitarian law’s inconsistencies in regard to who counts as “the human”. Of critical importance is their insistence that “the seemingly neutral term human in the phrase human shield denotes not merely an ostensibly universal biological condition but also a political one” (p. 5). Gordon and Perugini’s wide-ranging series of vignettes on different aspects of how human shields have been deployed and/or invoked, and to what effect, provides a compelling read in which the abstract question of “who counts as human” comes to life with great complexity. Yet, the underlying argument speaks to deep injustices at the core of frameworks for thinking about the ethics of violence. “Human shielding” and the discourse around the legal and ethical implications of this category “illustrates how racial, class, religions, sexuality, and gender orders help shape our understanding of the human and thus the ethics of violence and how legal frameworks, particularly the laws of war reflect, reinforce, and even produces these orders and their ethical valence” (p. 6). As Gordon and Perugini argue, because the figure of the human shield elides the two main classifications of humans—combatants and noncombatants—this figure “destabilizes the order regulating the use of lethal violence in war” (2020, p. 7). Throughout the history of the use of such human shields from the American Civil War onward whether or not being a “human shield” protected one from the violence of war or did not reflects and reproduces racialized, gendered, and class about how life is valued by the opposing force. The claim that persons were “human shields” when used to justify treating such persons outside of the protections granted to civilians (inadequate as these maybe) makes humans into weapons of war who are positioned as defensive weapons to block or divert attacks: humans that are objects, obstructions. There is a paradox evident in this kind of use of “lawfare” as Gordon and Perugini show in many compelling examples: the deaths of civilians who are said to be “human shields” positions responsibility for the deaths of such persons in their own hands, not those who attacked them. While Gordon and Perugini note the paradox of the human shield being a civilian-who-is-not-a-civilian, another paradox might be said to exist in the coexistence of the “human” and the “shield”, that is, a human whose becomes less human, (that is to say, less worthy of humane treatment) when their bodies are considered weapons. As such, thorny questions of the ethics and politics of ‘human shielding’ revolve around the weaponization of the body. The weaponization of the body has most often been considered in terms of forms of military discipline, dehumanization, and even mechanization of the soldier’s body within the military apparatus (as Bourke, 1999 discusses for example). Paul Kirby has recently explored some of the uncanny and uncomfortable ways in which the soldier’s body and particularly, the body part of the penis figures in discussions of wartime sexual violence and the idiom “rape as a weapon of war” (Kirby, 2020). While IR traditionally considers weapons to be instrumental and as human artifacts, and recent critical scholarship has sought to examine how “objects, ideologies, practices, bodies, and affects get drawn into specific assemblages of violent intentionality” (Bousquet et al., 2017, p. 1). Benjamin Meiches has recently argued, “weapons operate as bodies that incite, prompt, and undermine human agency in ways that are largely unaccounted for by traditional security studies literature” (Meiches, 2017, 10). Referring to hunger strikers/death fasters struggling against the Turkish state, Banu Bargu has articulated this form of the “weaponization of life” as a form of necropolitical resistance to one’s construction as “bare life” (2014, 81). Here, it is not the “body” per se that is weaponized, but the body as a conduit through which the weaponization of life works as a political tactic (Bargu, 2014, p. 16). What particularly interests me about Gordon and Perugini’s work here is embodied persons made into weapons: the “becoming-weapon” of “human shields” especially when this is a designation given to certain persons. While Gordon and Perugini focus on instances that are or might be interpreted as involving human shields from a wide variety of examples (including environmental struggles), their primary concern is how human shielding is considered in the laws of war, including in appeals made to the laws of war. I wonder, however, if in thinking about the ways in which certain persons, certain bodies are made into weapons, or treated as such, we might locate these varied histories of human shielding into an even broader and longer standing set of concerns about the human, weapons, and war that extend even beyond the temporal and spatial limits of “war” as it is treated in the laws of war. To this end, Gordon and Perugini’s work on “proximity” and “proximate” human shields (pp. 159–169) was one of the most intriguing discussions. “Proximate” human shields are those who are categorized this way only due to their proximity to fighting, as in civilians located in and around Mosul, Iraq, when it was held by ISIS in 2016, rather than having been coerced into an area near a military target or intentionally choosing to put themselves between military force and a target. As Gordon and Perugini note, “Since practically any person trapped in a war zone can be cast as a proximate shield rather than as an innocent bystander without the accuser having to demonstrate anything about the action of that person of the belligerents, it becomes relatively simple to frame hundreds of thousands of civilians as human shields. This act of framing convers entire urban populations trapped in a war zone into killable subjects” (2020, p. 164). Importantly, the civilian population was not depicted as human shields when the Iraqi army, assisted by the US and its coalition: “proximate human shields are the weapon of the state par excellence” (p. 165). Such “proximate” human shields are only framed as such by major media outlets when they are in supposedly decolonized parts of the world. As such, Gordon and Perugini put their respective fingers on the core of the issue when they write, after noting that human shielding was codified in international law when the laws of war became applicable to conflicts in (former) colonies, “[p]recisely when increasing numbers of nonwhites were finally recognized as fully human, they also become potential human shields, and when they are either used or framed as human shields, they lose some of the legal protections they gained following decolonization” (p. 169). This question of “proximate human shields,” as becoming less human as they “become shield” and thus “become weapon” through proximity and military/legal parlance is a form of objectification that recalls Frantz Fanon’s famous declaration “All I wanted was to be a man among other men” (Fanon 1967 [1952] p. 112) and its rejoinder “and then I found that I was an object in the midst of other objects.” (p. 109). Making of persons into objects was and is legal, political, cultural, and epistemic strategy of colonialism to enable extraction. The native is one of many such things that need classification, management, containment. Such “body-objects,” as Mbembe elaborates in expanding upon Fanon’s work, is a matter of a “spectral and phantasmatic object, at the limit of desire and of terror….” (Mbembe, 2019, p. 133). The spatial designation of bodies is a core component of colonialism: “Colonizing broadly consisted in a permanent work of separation: on one side, my living body; on the other, all those ‘body-things’ surrounding it” (Mbembe, 2019 p. 46). In the work of designating which persons are “civilians” and which persons are “human shields,” there also seems to be some congruity with Denise Ferreira da Silva’s “transparency thesis,” which attempts to comprehend the role the “racial” plays in modern thought and its ties to the emergence of “the global” in the “first encounter” of Europe’s conquest of the Americas (2007). For Ferreira da Silva, this project produces the human body as the exteriorization of the mind and establishes the distinction between the “transparent I” of Europe post-Enlightenment and the “affectable other” institutes race as the signifier of those persons who are subject to universal reason, although not capable of grasping it. Ferreira da Silva locates this subaltern racial subject as being constituted temporally and ontologically before principles of universality upon which the laws of war are constructed. The designation of racial difference carries with it suggestion of threat, raising fears of insecurity, contagion, consumption, annihilation: it carries with it an inversion of the relations of violence in which, the recipients of violence are coded as having caused such violence. The racialized body is coded as a justifiable site pre-emptive violence as it is coded as always about to commit violence. Christina Sharpe captures that this inversion of how violence is framed: “We see in many visual and other representations in public life, certainly in the US…Black people ejected from the state become the national symbols for the less-than-human being condemned to death; become the carriers of terror, terror’s embodiment (an internal, the internal terroristic threat) and not the primary objects of terror’s multiple enactments but the ground of terror’s possibility.” (Sharpe, 2016, p. 79). The racialization of such weaponized bodies is not limited to prior racial categorization either: David Theo Goldberg, for example, describes as “racially indexed” the “prevailing proxy articulation” of migration, terrorism, contagious disease, and the threat of invasion implicit in each as racialized (2009, p. 359), and certainly other articulation of racialized threat and invasion can be cited and articulated. As Helen Kinsella points out, the commentary on additional protocol I suggests that civilians and combatants are to be differentiated “principally by visual means,” and that “visuality is not a neutral observation, but an embodied, racialized, and gendered practice that does not merely detect, but actively produces what is to be seen and how it is to be understood” (2016). Fanon’s description of epidermalization as means of estrangement from fully human being by colonial power has been supplemented by a range of digital technologies, vast, and complex surveillance and intelligence gathering systems involving facial recognition, digital databases, algorithmic analysis, AI detection of gunshots and more that are used by military and policing bodies alike to predict and track both known individuals and patterns of movement in order to identify potential threats to the order. Work by Timnit Gebru, Joy Buolamwini, Safia Noble, Ruha Benjamin, and others has drawn attention to how contemporary AI technologies like search engine algorithms, facial recognition technologies, and more are built upon, and reproduce, gender, and racial differences, often leading to the perpetuation of racial oppression. Ruha Benjamin refers to as “the New Jim Code” in terms of the use of new technologies that reproduce and even exacerbate existing power hierarchies, especially those of race, while appearing to be racially neutral (2019). This suggests that the “visual” means of identifying and producing human shields as objects of knowledge and either protection or vulnerability is not longer, if it ever was, dependent on the visual alone, but rather a broad array of technologies of visualizing, sensing, and data gathering and analysis, much of it indebted to prior “codes” of interpretation. The; in the context of the war spread of surveillance and targeting technologies suggest that the question of “who counts as human” in terms of how violence is regulated on terror, the US and NATO have shifted to “militants,” “insurgents,” “unlawful combatants,” and particularly in terms of the use of drone strikes, “military-aged males”: all whom make up the “ungrievable” and killable bodies. Rather than “civilians,” Christiane Wilke documents, for example, how the term “uninvolved” was used to refer to a much narrower range of perceived “innocence” following the September 2009 Kunduz air strike which killed up to 113 civilians (2017). In a similar vein, I’ve elsewhere written about how the use of various forms of digital surveillance and visual evidence was not enough to override the “racial schema” (including the labeling of certain activity as that of a “human shield”) that affected the decision to bomb an Afghan convoy on the basis of a perceived “imminent threat” (Wilcox, 2017). It is also certainly worth thinking about to what extent, given the racialization of how the figure of “human shields” has come to be treated, and the ongoing coloniality of many of the conflicts involving the use of, and framing battles over, the use of human shield (especially in relation to Israel’s ongoing occupation of Palestinian lands) whether further consideration beyond the legal, temporal, and spatial limitations of the laws of war might push this work even further. The killing of teenager Trayvon Martin by George Zimmerman who invoked “stand your ground” laws to enable his acquittal although Martin was only carrying a package of candy skittles, or police officer Derek Chauvin’s attempted defense of killing George Floyd—that Floyd was suffering from “excitable delirium” (a term with no medical definition meant to cast him as possessing superhuman strength) certainly resonate with ongoing legacies of racialized bodies as “always already” weapons. That is, absent almost uniquely compelling video evidence to the contrary (and in many cases despite such evidence) such racialized bodies are accepted as threats and therefore justifiably killed. Neither of these two, nor any of the thousands of other similarly killed were labeled “human shields” but both are examples of, Judith Butler’s words on the subject, “those who exemplify the form of human life worth saving and those who in their person and their cultural or racial status come to represent a living threat to a form of human life worth saving” (Butler, 2015 p. 233). Gordon and Perugini have powerfully, skilfully, and with great detail, shown how this division is reproduced in international law and practice; by tracing this through-line, they have brought to the fore the intricate workings of how “humans” can be made less so, and “shields” can be made to do the opposite of protecting.

2022 Michigan Negative
**Kritik Work** › Cybernetics › 1NC---K---Link---Cybernetics

Technology has been weaponized by NATO to drown out counternarratives – that outweighs—it causes techno fetishism of modern warfare.

Elsa Hedling 22, is an associate fellow at the Europe Programme, Swedish Institute of International Affairs (UI) and a PhD Candidate at Lund University., “Embodying Military Muscles and a Remasculinized West: Influencer Marketing, Fantasy, and “the Face of NATO”, Global Studies Quarterly (2022) 2, 1–12, 3-10-2022,

Strategies of Depiction: Fitspirator, Viking, and Modern Warrior

NATO’s desired audiences are found in a noisy environment, filled with competing messages and alternative voices. New technologies and social media channels mean that all organizations must constantly communicate to their desired audiences or risk their communications being drowned out by noise or counter-narratives [. . .] Like never before, individual influencers can be a major factor in affecting societal change. An individual can now attract millions of supporters from around the world to any particular cause. (Paxton 2018) This quote from the NATO Review, an online magazine pub- lished monthly by NATO, describes the reasoning behind using influencer marketing as strategic communication. In October 2018, NATO released a first video of Matberg vis- iting the new NATO headquarters (HQ) in Brussels, which was shared widely by NATO (on YouTube, Facebook, Twitter, and Instagram) as well as by Matberg himself. The thirty- second film features Matberg arriving in his service dress uniform, with a backdrop of member-state flags (zooming in on the NATO flag), and shaking hands with the Secretary- General Jens Stoltenberg, whose “normal” body accentu- ates the massive body of Matberg. The music alludes to a movie scene and communicates significance and sincerity. In a close-up, Matberg smilingly explains that “Trident Junc- ture is the biggest NATO exercise in decades” and that he is going up to Trondheim to “see what the fuzz is all about.” The film ends with Matberg stating “Stay tuned for more!, exiting the HQ premises and putting his navy cap back on his head. The video launched Lasse Matberg as a personality who would give not only a glimpse into the life of a NATO soldier but also an entertaining report from Trident Junc- ture. In the following weeks, he did multiple media inter- views, which he documented in his “insta-stories” along with images and short video footage from his own participation in Trident Juncture. The social media content quickly went viral and attracted media attention both within and outside NATO’s member states. As an example of the latter, the Rus- sian state media agency Rossiya Segodnya published an arti- cle (originally published in a Serbian outlet) asking if “hand- some Lasse is NATO’s secret weapon in a future Instagram war” (Mekina 2019). Several clips feature Matberg heading toward an army he- licopter and scenic views from the helicopter flying over Norwegian fjords. Although the helicopters, tanks, vessels, and army clothes communicate that Trident Juncture is a military event, the beautiful nature, smiling faces, the ab- sence of rifles, and the large number of journalists and photographers in the images signal a media spectacle (Der Derian 2001). Matberg navigates the scenes in the ways of a celebrity; he looks healthy and relaxed, stops, shakes hands, and poses for the photographers, always with a smile reveal- ing his bright white teeth. The celebrity and “clean-war” rep- resentations detract attention from any contentious or less- appealing aspects of military buildup (Stahl 2010). Trident Juncture did however include combat training, and such im- agery was also shared but in other channels aimed to attract more traditional audiences. The strategy of a clean-war rep- resentation of Trident Juncture through social media was described by NATO officials as “fusing hard power imagery with a positive message” (Hilton 2019). Closely connected to the clean-war depictions, images of advanced weaponry invoke “techno-fetishism” (Stahl 2010). In two video clips with “Top Gun-aesthetics,” Matberg walks toward a moving helicopter in slow motion accompanied by dramatic music. More notably, a number of short clips feature Matberg “amazed” by a micro unmanned aerial ve- hicle (a really small helicopter that fits in his hand). The small size and the fact that it is unmanned not only enhance the clean-war trope but also glorify the modern military by emphasizing the precision and effectiveness of high-tech weapons (Stahl 2013). The micro helicopter is controlled by a joystick controller (Matberg is childishly excited to try it out), which adds to the “gamification of war” (Jarvis and Robinson 2019). Paying attention to the fantasmatic logics, we can see how the techno-fetishist depiction of modern warfare is merged with Matberg’s muscular Viking imagery (discussed further below), which rather signals readiness for close combat.

2022 Michigan Negative
**Kritik Work** › Feminist IR › AT: It’s a Link of Omission

No, these aren’t merely links of omission. Their post-facto desire to include gender as a variable is antithetical to the alternative.

Sjoberg 18

(Laura, total bae, Associate Professor of Political Science at the University of Florida., 2018, Feminist Security and Security Studies, Chapter 4 in: The Oxford Handbook of International Security, edited by Alexandra Gheciu, William C. Wohlforth, JKS)

The fourth commonality that I noted in 2009 was that Feminist Security Studies work shares the view that “the omission of gender from work on international security does not make that work gender-neutral or unproblematic” (Sjoberg 2009: 202). This might be the most radical tenet Feminist Security Studies shares. In this view, Feminist Security Studies is not another paradigm like realist work or constructivist work—where it offers a different perspective than other paradigmatic alternatives based on a different worldview. Instead, it argues that security studies across paradigmatic approaches is incomplete and exclusive inasmuch as it is [oblivious] blind to the gendered nature of the analysis it undertakes and the gendered nature of the global political phenomena that it observes. In this view, Feminist Security Studies is not seeking the inclusion of gender, either as a variable of analysis or as a perspectival approach, but instead the transformation of security studies.

2022 Michigan Negative
**Kritik Work** › Feminist IR › Subject Formation

Subject formation comes first—the community they create will inevitably privilege masculine comfortability and dismiss feminist connections- building a feminist affect is necessary to form embodied collectives that drive political action.

Chamberlain 16

(Prudence, Department of English, Royal Holloway University (2016): Affective temporality: towards a fourth wave, Gender and Education, DOI: 10.1080/09540253.2016.1169249, JKS)

This discussion of the contemporary and feminist timekeeping serves as a framing device for the way in which the wave narrative can be considered as an ‘affective temporality’. Social movements are bound to emotional convergences, in which feeling becomes transferred amongst wider groups, encouraging them to action. This is central to initiating and then sustaining surges of feminist activism, drawing a number of subjects together through shared investment within a specific historical moment. The formulations of affect also mirror the way in which the contemporary is constructed through Agamben’s work, allowing for activists to cohere while still remaining without set definition. In The Affect Theory Reader, Melissa Gregg and Gregory J. Seigworth state that ‘affect is born in in-between-ness and resides in accumulative besides-ness’ (2010, 2). This sense of ‘beside- ness’ mirrors the simultaneity of the contemporary, while the ‘between-ness’ relates to the idea that feminism is caught in temporal tension, in which the past dictates and future aspirations orientate. Affect also explores the relationship between the private and the public, as Love out- lines when she writes: Politics and feelings are very different kinds of things; the public sphere is big, feelings are small; social life happens out there, psychic life, somewhere inside; public time is collective time, measured by the clock, whereas in psychic life the trains hardly ever run on time. (2007, 11) Inevitably, it is challenging to map what is ostensibly a more personal and feeling sphere onto a wider public, or indeed vice versa. However, despite the difference between public and personal, affect creates an undeniable relationship between the two. The feminist tenet that the ‘personal is political’ encourages a shared public intimacy, which is central to the transference and perpetuation of affect. Airing feeling, and allowing feeling to be aired, creates a context in which responses and emotions become integral to a political collective. Cvetkovich writes that she views ‘affect as a motivational system and as the ground for forging new collectivities’ (2003, 12). Resonating with the formulation of waves affects may serve to catalyse and sustain a surge of related activity. If feminist unity is no longer pre- dicated on identity, then common ground is found through political aims. The movement away from collectives determined by shared characteristics to those formed through shared feeling creates a feminism that is able to adapt and evolve with affect at its centre. Affect may in fact work as an adhesive for political subjects, sticking them together through shared feeling (Ahmed 2010). Affect, then, is able to form collectives that are driven to political action through feeling, forming a cohesive series of relations and connections.

2022 Michigan Negative
**Kritik Work** › Feminist IR › Research 1st

You should prefer the research process and product of Feminist IR *over their moralizing “but what do you do tho”

Sjoberg 11

(Laura is bae, Sjoberg is Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Florida, Looking Forward, Conceptualizing Feminist Security Studies, Politics and Gender, 2011, doi:10.1017/S1743923X11000420, JKS)

Along these lines, I have come to see the substance of Feminist Security Studies as a dialectical-hermeneutic argument, an approach that has implications for its process and its product. In this understanding, the purpose of doing research in Feminist Security Studies is to raise problems, not to solve them; to draw attention to a field of inquiry, rather than survey it fully; to provoke discussion, rather than serve as a systematic treatise. The conflicts and contestations both among feminists in Feminist Security Studies and between feminists and security that have come up in this conversation are not an outline of problems that need to be solved or divides that need to be crossed, healed, or closed. Instead, those debates, along with how they are handled and addressed, constitute Feminist Security Studies. Feminist Security Studies, then, neither needs to solve nor ignore either the fundamental differences among feminists or the dissonance between Feminist Security Studies and security studies as a discipline. Instead, Feminist Security Studies is defined not only by its fundamental contestabilities but also by its actual contestations. Feminist Security Studies is not the sum of the different approaches or the winner of the debate between them, but the narrative generated from their arguments, disagreements, and compromises.

2022 Michigan Negative
**Kritik Work** › Feminist IR › 1NC- Reproductive Futurism

The panic over potential threats to the nation is a form of masculine futurity which allows reproductive bodies to be regulated. Claims of utilitarianism justify the endless sacrifice of reproductive freedom in the name of the “greatest good.”

Petersen 15

(Kristin Petersen B.A., University of Southern California 2003 M.A. New York University 2008, A dissertation submitted to the Faculty of the James T. Laney School of Graduate Studies of Emory University in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Women’s, Gender, and Sexuality Studies, The Logic of Futurity: Reproduction, Cultural Eugenics, and Contingencies of Women’s Citizenship in the Contemporary United States, Proquest, JKS)

Cultural theorist Ruth McElroy suggests, “Women’s belonging to nations is indissoluble from their reproductive biology” (325). For all that motherhood may be conceived as a private choice occurring in the supposedly private sphere, reproduction and motherhood are nonetheless public and political as well, and thoroughly entangled with women’s status as members of their nation. By virtue of their reproduction (or even lack thereof!), women can be constructed in cultural narratives and political scripts as contributors to society or threats to the national good, caretakers of the future who merit protection and support or wayward parents who must be disciplined back into the national fold, national maternal ideals or outsiders within. The state’s identification of and response to women as reproducers reflects the continuous processes of the politics of belonging, which “involve not only the maintenance and reproduction of the boundaries of the community of belonging by the hegemonic political powers...but also by their contestation, challenge and resistance by other political agents” (Yuval-Davis 20). We see these politics of belonging manifested not only discursively, but also in the policies and laws that protect or privilege some mothers and not others, some children, but not all. When anthropologists Faye Ginsburg and Rayna Rapp ask, “who defines the body of the nation into which the next generation is recruited? Who is considered to be in that national body, who is out of it?” (3), therefore, there is no one answer; rather, this is the question perpetually being asked and answered by political discourse and practice infused with the logic of futurity. The hopes and fears of the present political moment and the imaginative desires for the future are thus continually projected upon the bodies of women and their procreative capacities. Futurity, I suggest in this project, as a possibly inevitable perspective or worldview, allows for the state to focus on women as reproductive beings in a way that it does not for men. Following from Foucault’s explication of biopower, the modern state takes an interest in the workings and ostensible health of its populations, creating new knowledges and indices for the normal as it counts up the characteristics of its citizenry and sets goals for demographic management. While Foucault tends not to focus on the reproductive elements of the state’s biopolitical interest—for instance, the setting of ideal rates of fertility, health expectations for women and children, creation of access to the medical, economic, and social resources needed for reproduction—these are, I would argue, operations of the state that have potential for tremendous impacts upon women particularly. The other biopolitical interests of the state—appropriate number of workers, manageable immigration rates, proper ratio of elderly to young, and so on—are also all implicated in the procreative behaviors of women, which would seem to intensify the state’s interest in them. Brought into the broader framework of women’s political status and national belonging, reproduction in this context seems poised to function as an axis upon which the dispensation of women’s citizenship can pivot, with particular regard to her racial, economic, and social demographic and the state’s assessment of her (and her children’s) value to the national future. Penelope Deutscher suggests that through the emergence of biopower: Women would later assume a status as a reproductive threshold of the future and health of nations, populations and peoples. But the condition for this role for women and maternal reproductivity was the very possibility of reproduction being associated with a shifting field of possible substances, telos, outcomes and obligations: the overall good, the general happiness, the future of the nation, the health of the nation, the competitiveness of the nation, the future of the people, individual flourishing or freedom, individual rights, domestic happiness, the family unit as building block of the nation, the transmission of the bloodline, the family name, transmission of property or family or genealogical transmission, reproduction of the labour force, etc. That reproduction be plausibly thought of in such terms at all was a precondition of it becoming associated with women’s role as threshold of futurity. (Deutscher 129) The state’s biopolitical management of women’s reproduction may thus allow it to approach women primarily as reproductive beings, an essentalist or even utilitarian collapse that may make it easier to intervene upon their bodies and perhaps reflects a deeply ingrained discomfort with the notion that women have tremendous potential power to impact the composition of the future. In this project, I am proposing a framework of futurity that is in operation, characterized by discursive and eugenic aspects, that uses women as the vehicle for future world-building and nation-making. This futurity aims to enact particular visions of the future via changes in the present, particularly through the management of women’s reproduction in the present such that the future population comports with present desires. When this futurity framework is picked up by the state in its various capacities, I suggest there are significant consequences for women’s citizenship as women because they are so intrinsically linked in the cultural and political imaginary with reproduction. In the process of grappling with these concepts, this project asks how the logic of futurity functions to organize the terms of women’s social or political belonging in reproductive terms. How does the state pick up and extend this logic to women, and how might that impact the meaningfulness of women’s citizenship or national belonging? Does the logic of futurity, the constant pressure of the forward vision combined with the imaginative limitations of the present, insist upon women’s citizenship being or becoming something fundamentally different from men’s by virtue of reproductive capacity and association? Exploring these questions brings this project into several disciplinary contexts, including feminist theory and philosophy, political theory, disability theory (eugenics), and even the sphere of economics. In connecting these concepts to ongoing conversations about women and citizenship in the contemporary United States, this project is ultimately working to tie together disparate fields and illuminate how they interact with respect to a model of futurity that I theorize as containing discursive and eugenic aspects. It may be that state-based discourses and practices related to women’s reproduction and citizenship are not so much causes as they are effects of the logic of futurity.

2022 Michigan Negative
**Kritik Work** › Feminist IR › 1NC- Reproductive Futurism

The aff’s drive to prevent extinction is a form of masculine survivalism where gendered bodies become the unwilling tools to sustain humanity. You should refuse their obsession with patriarchal reproduction.

Mitchell 15

(Audra Mitchell, Audra Mitchell is a settler scholar who lives and works on the Ancestral and treaty lands of the Neutral (Attawandaron), Haudenosaunee and Mississaugas of the New Credit (please see Honouring the Land). She currently holds the the Canada Research Chair in Global Political Ecology at Wilfrid Laurier University. From 2015-18 she held the CIGI Chair in Global Governance and Ethics at the Balsillie School of International Affairs Audra is an Associate Professor at Wilfrid Laurier University, Canada, 8-3-2015, "Gendering extinction," Worldly, , JKS)

The reproduction of survival/ the survival of reproduction

2022 Michigan Negative
**Kritik Work** › Feminist IR › 1NC- Feminist Failure

Thus, the alternative is to reject the aff and embrace feminist failure. This is a politics that requires a gendered thinking of the political to open discursive space for feminist interventions to unsettle the comfortability of the 1AC.

Stern and Zalewski 09

(Maria, lecturer and researcher at the Department of Peace and Development research at Gotberg university, AND MARYSIA ZALEWSKI, Director of Centre for Gender Studies at university of Aberdeen. “Feminist fatigue(s): reflections on feminism and familiar fables of militarization” Review of International Studies (2009), 35, 611–630, Cambridge journals, JKS)

In this article we pick up on the contradictory threads running through the account above to re-consider the work of feminist scholarship in the study of international politics through the specific example of familiar feminist fables of militarisation. The rest of the article will proceed as follows. First, we will explain why we think it matters to have a discussion about feminism framed by its location within the disciplinary boundaries of the academic study of international politics. We then move to explain what we mean by the performative predicament of sexgender and the attached weariness inflecting feminist narratives; we then give readings of how this predicament plays out in what we call familiar feminist fables of militarisation. Finally, we return to the question of feminism’s failure, working with the idea of failure as being part of the process of intervening politically.7 In an associated move, we consider the grammar of temporality that haunts representations of feminism. We argue that this grammar or logic of temporality glues feminism to a generational trajectory of activity always seemingly en route to proffering a solution to gender – unsurprisingly beckoning an unavoidable failing to ever arrive. We work with the spectre of feminist failure – which we suggest is one of the dominant motifs of feminism within contemporary IR theory – to accomplish two tasks. One is to interrogate the implications of the performative production of sexgender through feminism, which, although well discussed in feminist theory more generally, has not been adequately attended to in the field of International Relations. We link the discussion of feminism’s reproduction of sexgender to the ongoing implicit and explicit expectation that a central task of feminism is to produce effective and productive knowledge in a conventionally recognisably temporal and political manner.9 Feminism’s ‘failure’ to ever ‘fully arrive’ is suggestive of unfulfilled expectations in this context. Our overall concern has to do with the multiple violences that persistently prevail in the construction of theories of international politics – and which can be traced through reading the production of feminist failure in IR, as demonstrated through our familiar narratives of militarisation. We ultimately suggest that failure to resolve the predicaments that feminist International Relations scholarship appears to face may be alternatively presented as a specific political and pedagogical stance which offers potential aporetic room for ‘thinking otherwise’ about the production of knowledge. In conclusion we reflect on the atmosphere of feminist anxiety, or melancholia, that the article infers, culminating with the suggestion that failure and disenchantment are perhaps necessary to re-imagine the possibilities of unrecognisable interventions that lie at the heart of feminist political imaginations. Feminism/International Relations We are not offering a conventional audit of feminist work in International Relations in this article;14 rather, our focus is primarily on one thread of the discursive production of feminism within the discipline of International Relations. traditional forms of feminism have fared in relation to and in competition with conventional theories of international politics. Such studies clearly privilege IR’s boundaries but also tend to work with a very parsimonious definition of feminism.15 Our approach works with a more expansive and malleable understand- ing of the practices and possibilities of feminism. Hence, it is not our intention to measure how far feminism has succeeded in the context of the discipline’s conventional epistemological, methodological and political boundaries,16 or to prove in some kind of neo-scientific way that IR has ‘got it wrong’, but rather to investigate some implications of the discursive representation and production of feminism within the discipline. We argue that one of the dominant motifs or signatures of feminism within IR is one of decline and demise particularly in relation to feminism’s theoretical and methodological potential.17 These apparent tired limits of feminism within IR mirror a quandary facing feminist scholarship more generally.18 Manifestations of this quandary include a certain lassitude inflecting narratives about gender weaved through feminism parsimoniously represented,19 accompanied by a sense that feminism is becoming increasingly obsolete.20 As noted above, we investigate this quandary in order to think more deeply, if tangentially through feminism, about the limitations and accompanying violence that marks the academic production of knowledge,21 as well as to ponder feminism’s own performative function in this regard. Feminist scholars have consistently focused on the knowledge that authoritative accounts of the world accredited by academic institutions generates; and as an historically hyper-masculinised discipline, IR has always been a significant empirical site to investigate, not least its role in discursively reproducing gender and related power structures, regimes and practices.23 In this overly ‘manly [inter- national] moment,’24 it therefore remains important to reflect on the gendered power that pervades the construction and performance of scholarly investigations.25 This entails continuing to scrutinise the discursive production of feminism in the context of its representation within the disciplinary boundaries of the academic study of international politics, especially as this is an arena which has embarked on a re-energised (re)turn toward hegemonic certainty.26 In our investigation of this we have chosen to focus our inquiry on demonstrating how, in the production of feminist narratives of militarisation through IR, we can glimpse traces of how ‘organizational practices play a central role in recreating and entrenching gender hierarchies, gender symbols and gender identities.’ To carry this enquiry forward we therefore offer a doubly layered and interlocking reading of the general discursive production of feminism within IR, as exemplified in stories of militarisation. We work with the paradox of feminism’s apparent failure within IR given that, at this historical juncture, the nexus of feminism and global politics calls for harder work to mitigate the harms produced through gender and that feminist work is globally abundant.28 The idea that feminism has apparently failed in regard to its own normative ambitions given that global gendered inequality remains endemic calls for careful reflection.29 Though all certainly do not ascribe to the belief that the task of feminist scholars in IR is to accurately map gender relations in order to prescribe solutions to gender(ed) violence, the idea that this is the purpose of feminist work – however diffusely articulated – is nonetheless widespread.30 And clearly feminist scholars/activists have not shied away from this remit; indeed quite the opposite, as they/we have seemingly eagerly grasped apparent opportunities to alter unjust gendered struc- tures and practices. Such normative projects have indeed been perceived to be the hallmark and raison d’être of much feminist activity.31 Correspondingly, feminist scholars have traditionally been expected to respond to the task of ‘doing some- thing’, hopefully practical and tangible, about the disadvantages which have ensued from cultural constructions of gender.32 Indeed, in our view it is increasingly politically and pedagogically required by what we call the burgeoning ‘gender industry,’ for feminist scholars to strive towards providing effective knowledge to this end, including, for example, the formulation of policy, especially policies for gender mainstreaming, or through the delivery of academic programmes in universities or to meet institutional research auditing and funding requirements.

2022 Michigan Negative
**Kritik Work** › Feminist IR › 1NC – Alt - FSS

The alternative is to reject the affirmative and engage in feminist security studies – this requires shifting our focus from security cooperation to building communities of care that recognize NATO is incompatible with feminist movements.

Kumskova and Scheyer 19 [Victoria Scheyer (Master’s Degree in Human Rights from Columbia University and has previously worked for several non-profit and academic research centres, where she conducted in-depth gender analysis across the security spectrum) and Marina Kumskova (Master’s Degree in International Peace. Studies at the University for Peace mandated by the United Nations. She has previously worked with think tanks and research institutes on various research projects on feminist politics, gender analysis and migration.) “FEMINIST FOREIGN POLICY: A FINE LINE BETWEEN ‘ADDING WOMEN’ AND PURSUING A FEMINIST AGENDA.” Journal of International Affairs, vol. 72, no. 2, 2019, pp. 62–63. JSTOR, https://www.jstor.org/stable/26760832. Accessed 28 Jun. 2022.] // st

Safety and Wellbeing In traditional foreign policy approaches, security is given high priority. Concepts such as national or human security represent understandings of governments on what to target or how to achieve security. Feminists have criticized both concepts because these approaches ignore or overlook the gendered dimension of security.35 Feminist security studies emphasize and elaborate the importance of asking questions such as “security for who, by whom?”36 It is the questioning of the militarized security that is not able to protect women, children, civilians, migrants, among others, neither in times of conflict nor in times of peace.37 Feminist security studies emphasize the need to rethink traditional concepts of security. Putting the security issues of all intersectional groups and individuals at the center of security, the usefulness of the military industrial complex will have to be questioned.38 Buying tanks or fighter jets are not preventing children from dying of hunger, stopping preventable diseases from spreading, or averting gender based violence. Instead, this form of security often perpetuates these situations.39 In an ever-changing society featuring dynamically evolving conflicts, Sylvester emphasizes that there is a need to always review, reframe, and reflect on current approaches of security and avoid the formulation of universal, timeless, and fixed security concepts.40 With this in mind, we refrain from unpacking the concept of security, and we support feminist ideas of shifting the focus from security toward the peace, safety, and wellbeing of the gendered individual. Wellbeing, in this vein, includes physical safety in addition to the social and political security of people and the fulfillment of basic social needs. We argue that the way problems are framed inherently influences the way solutions are found. While defining security not through the absence of violence but through the foundations of peace, world leaders can commit to peace through, for example, renaming the United Nations Security Council into the United Nations Peace Council. Feminist Foreign Policy demands shifting toward a positive peace model and away from security. Empathic Communities The third indicator we have identified is based on the building of empathic communities. We differentiate between alliances based on military or defense strategies and communities based on empathy and friendship. Alliances such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), or even the current structure of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), serve the goal of engaging in alliances to advance militarized security and national interests. These coalitions further capitalize on the fundamental values of neo-realism in international politics and represent the hegemonic security model. Because these alliances always come with implicit assumptions such as the presence of an enemy, a threat, and power conflict, violent escalation often proves inevitable. Feminism claims that there are more reasons for building communities, which are not about military and power, but rather about common goals such as peace, mutually beneficial trade agreements, or agreements on disarmament. Those can eventually build trust and dependencies so that attacks and war would seem illogical. Communities such as the Group of Friends of 1325, the Informal Expert Group on Women, Peace, and Security, and Friends of Gender Parity are built on agreements that open dialogue builds trust and empathy.

2022 Michigan Negative
**Kritik Work** › Feminist IR › Link – Human Control

The aff opens up the gateway for the military to conduct exacerbated surveillance that disproportionately affects people of color through the lens of white technomasculinity.

Philip Olson and Christine Labuski, 8-7-2018, "‘There’s always a [white] man in the loop’: The gendered and racialized politics of civilian drones," SAGE Journals, https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/0306312718792619

As corporations and civilian actors grasp the economic potential for UAS, drones are becoming an increasingly common sight in US civilian airspace. Non-military UAS have existed for decades, consisting mainly of remote control (RC) aircraft used by amateur pilots and hobbyists, but the past decade has seen UAS pressed into service for a wider range of purposes, including agriculture, search and rescue, cinematography and remote sensing (The Economist, 2017). And while military-domestic transfers of technology are common, advancements in civilian drone technologies also benefit the military by offloading research and development to the private sector (Boucher, 2015). Widely perceived as ‘exceptional [military] tools’, drones ‘are fast becoming everyday tools’ (Shaw et al., 2012: 1505), and UAS are often deployed in similar ways across both military and domestic contexts. Targeted surveillance is among the most conspicuous of shared applications. UAS visualizing capacities developed alongside the use of other technologies for surveillance, including ‘security’ cameras, cell phones, laptop computers, body and dashboard cameras, global positioning systems (GPS) and geographic information systems (GIS). The near-ubiquity of surveillance devices has led to what some scholars refer to as an age of omniveillance, in which ‘everyone will soon be watched, targeted, and tracked’ (Shaw et al., 2012: 1505) and where it is ‘unreasonable to expect to not be recorded at all’ (Tran, 2015: 195). Though often referred to in ordinary and distributive terms (Bell, 2009; Koskela, 2012), these surveillance technologies index a ‘scopic regime’ (Gregory, 2011: 190) through which social hierarchies of race, gender and geopolitical location are enacted and enforced in intrusive and often violent ways. AbuLaban (2015) refers to this regime, including its ability to render a growing number of people ‘targetable’, as a ‘key organizational practice of late modernity’ (p. 46). We identify two broad groups in our study: established and emerging users. In comparison with emerging users, who exhibit a range of interest in and understanding of the roles that UAS will play in their lives, established users possess more of the technical knowledge, skills and control through which UAS have thus far been interpreted. A key distinction between our two user groups is demographic: established users are almost exclusively white and male/masculine, while emerging users are more diversely identified (Mellström, 2004; Wajcman, 1991). Given that established users have been tasked with advising the FAA on civilian UAS regulation, it is important to consider not only who might soon be sharing the sky with law enforcement, farmers and hobbyists, but also how drone technologies are discursively constructed across these populations. In this study, established users aligned – though not to a person – with the focus groups that contained the highest percentages of men: TEST, SCI and USER. And though we are keenly aware of gender’s arbitrary and plural nature (Connell, 1998), the men from these groups enacted a strikingly consistent hegemonic masculinity (Connell and Messerschimdt, 2005), one that valued and elevated technological expertise, even as it left unmarked the stratified social origins of this technoscientific knowledge (Cockburn, 1985). In this essay, we interpret the discourse of these white technomasculine experts as a form of prototypical white technomasculinity. Our data also suggest that military-civilian continuities persist for established users and that this group sees the challenges to greater civilian uptake of UAS as technical and individual rather than collective and justice-oriented. Sclove (1995) refers to focal and non-focal features of technological systems, but our analysis of race, gender and drones reveals that we can also distinguish between focal and non-focal people, or groups of people – that is, between the perspectives of those who control the development of civilian UAS and those whose lives are more likely to be disrupted or menaced by these systems. Surveillance remains central to how UAS are imagined and we further argue that via prototypical white technomasculinity – a subject position interpreted as original, standard and in no need of justification (Gordon, 2006: 242) – surveillance can be perceived as unproblematic and even ‘cool’. This perspective differs sharply from how surveillance technologies are experienced and described by so-called minority groups in the US and elsewhere, including people of color (of all genders), women (of all racial groups), and queer and other nonconforming people (e.g. Abu-Laban, 2015; Browne, 2015; Tran, 2015). We employ the term ‘so-called’ here in order to underscore that though white technomasculine people often understand their discourse to reflect a neutral or majoritarian stance, it is more accurate to describe them as a particular minority interest group. Browne suggests that the experiences of black women in particular, whose lives are routinely subjected to what she calls ‘a scrutinizing surveillance’ (Browne, 2015: 156), can be instructive for interrogating the racialized and gendered dimensions of security and surveillance. It is our worry that racialized and gender minorities in the US will bear a disproportionate burden of what Koskela (2012) calls ‘the fruits of surveillant labor’ (p. 53). Related, we are concerned that uncritical and/or under-informed perspectives on UAS will mask the role of discriminatory attitudes and affects in shaping how these technologies are deployed. Prototypical white technomasculinity camouflages digitized data as both neutral and precise, despite the fact that even cursory assessments of such data reveal that algorithms rely upon developers’ perceptions of normality and difference (Magnet, 2011; Wilcox, 2017). Gender and race are ‘intertwine[d] with practices of intense information gathering’ and ‘[d]isciplinary power and control’ (Koskela, 2012: 50) and, in military contexts, analysts have argued that drone surveillance and signature strikes are often ‘little more than a form of high-tech racial profiling’ (Wall, 2016: 1123). In sum, though there might be consensus regarding military drones’ capacity to carry out ‘lethal surveillance’, there is disagreement among differently ‘targetable’ populations regarding the dangerous nature of civilian UAS. Following Browne (2015: 116–121), we advocate for the cultivation of a critical technological consciousness in relation to civilian UAS. Such a consciousness would apprehend the particularity of the white technomasculine perspective – evinced here by our focus groups – through which UAS are constructed, and would advocate for ‘informed public debate … accountability by the state and the private sector’, and an acknowledgement of the ‘connections between contemporary … [UAS] technologies and their historical antecedents’ (p. 116). Absent such a consciousness, the public uptake of commercial drones will likely rehearse the social hierarchies by which they were generated and that perpetuate unmarked white technomasculinity. To highlight the constructed specificity of this subject position, we use transcript data from the white technomasculine actors in our focus groups to demonstrate that UAS can scarcely be discussed – by these actors and those they influence – without masculine pronouns and imagined scenarios involving exclusively male actors. We refer to this discourse as a white technomasculine imaginary, given the disproportionate role these actors play in designing, employing and now regulating these and other technologies. Such an imaginary may constrain the abilities of emerging users to identify and develop alternative uses, questions and ethical norms related to civilian drones. Highlighting the specificity of white technomasculinity helps us to see that masculinities are not only constructed and plural, but also contingent upon the mutable social arrangements through which they are upheld (Cockburn, 1985; Connell, 1998; Salter, 2014). Civilian UAS technologies may facilitate new ways of living race and gender in an omniveillant world; we note focus group moments where anxiety and vulnerability inhere in white technomasculinity. Here we join Daggett (2015) in asking whether civilian drones, despite their militaristic and imperial origins, can subvert or even queer social relations. Though not currently marketed as tools with which emerging users can engage in sousveillant acts – ‘taking back the night’ or ‘shooting back’ (Beirne et al., 1997), for example – our focus groups suggest that drones have the capacity to produce ontological insecurity in white technomasculine actors who may newly perceive themselves as ‘targetable’.

2022 Michigan Negative
**Kritik Work** › Feminist IR › Link – NATO

The US and NATO have historically victimized women as a justification for their western imperialism, furthering their hegemonic masculine protectionist logic.

Katharine Am Wright, 9-19-2017, "Telling NATO’s story of Afghanistan: Gender and the alliance’s digital diplomacy," SAGE Journals, https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/1750635217730588

The gendered underpinnings of NATO’s approach to public diplomacy are nothing new. For example, in the 1960s, NATO produced a propaganda movie called The Atlantic Decade, warning of the dangers of Soviet expansion and specifically targeting women, with the narrator introducing Turkey by saying ‘here too women have been liberated’ (Risso, 2009: 509). Today, NATO’s approach to public (and now digital) diplomacy continues to be underpinned by narratives, whether they concern individuals, states or the alliance itself. As Wibben (2010: 43) argues, narratives are political, they enable and limit representation and these representations shape our world and the possibilities within it, challenging the link between ‘experience, meaning, and knowledge’. A narrative approach is therefore a useful means to challenge traditional conceptions of security concerned with creating meaning and imposing value in what is viewed as an ‘anarchic world’ because it makes ‘explicit the operation and production of particular kind[s] of meaning, and … draw[s] out the implications this understanding has for human existence’ (Polkinghorne, 1988: 16, quoted in Wibben 2010: 44). A deconstructive approach necessitates consideration of the way they are ‘read, understood and located institutionally’ because, for example, the existence of narratives of women in the third world does not necessarily equate to a challenge to established hegemonic histories and their subjectivities (Mohanty, 1991, quoted in Cooke, 1996: 292). The mediatization of war means that the ‘delocalized world’ of TV, newspapers and the internet is where battles over ‘legitimacy, effectiveness and consequences are fought’ (Behnke, 2002: 198). Therefore, understanding NATO’s engagement with digital diplomacy and the narratives that underpin it is important, yet NATO’s public diplomacy efforts have been left on the margins of scholarly analysis of the alliance. This is significant given that, as Ringsmose and Borgesen (2011: 524) argue, in a world of international cooperation and international media, national narratives are not formed in a vacuum. It also leaves work on the use of strategic narratives by both governments (Jakobsen and Ringsmose, 2015; Ringsmose and Børgesen, 2011) and militaries (Crilley, 2015; 2016) separated from the wider regional security context. The use of digital platforms by governments and military actors is on one level an attempt to engage the media and at its most successful this can contribute to the formation of successful strategic narratives, which turns the media into a ‘conveyor belt transmitting elite cues to the public’ (Jakobsen and Ringsmose, 2015: 217). However, it can also be viewed as a means to circumnavigate the traditional dissemination of information through the media in order to engage directly with consumers (Crilley, 2016: 55). The remit of NATO’s Public Diplomacy Division supports both of these purposes, with the division tasked with complementing information activities within each member state and addressing issues related to the public perception of the alliance (Public Diplomacy Divison, 2006: 333). The recalibration of NATO’s public diplomacy to engage with digital platforms came in part as a result of the NATO-led ISAF mission in Afghanistan and the Taliban’s ability to grab both the Afghan and international media’s attention with civilian casualty numbers (Betz, 2011: 622). To address this issue, NATO created a specific media centre hosted in Afghanistan, the web-based NATO TV platform, and appointed Michael Stopford as Deputy Assistant Secretary General for Strategic Communication. Stopford had been credited with bolstering Coca-Cola’s image and reputation in his previous role as an executive for the company (Castle, 2008). This resulted in a change in NATO’s approach to public diplomacy through a shift to direct engagement with publics through digital platforms. The alliance now has a significant digital presence across multiple social media platforms: for example, NATO TV (now hosted on YouTube) features short explanatory clips on NATO, NATO’s military capabilities and short documentary style stories, including on Afghanistan. NATO TV provides a useful insight into NATO’s approach to digital diplomacy, and while the primary video featured on the channel is one detailing what NATO is and why it exists, the three most viewed videos across the site are on ballistic missile defence, female prisoners in a prison in Herat and the food scene in Kabul (NATO, 2017). This demonstrates that NATO’s digital diplomacy strategy is not just concerned with selling NATO and NATO’s ‘hard power’ but has utilized more contextualized narratives to inform outreach initiatives. It also draws attention to the way gendered narratives are utilized to support NATO’s digital diplomacy strategy. The prominence given to women’s stories on the YouTube challenge has been the subject of critique, which concerned the alliance’s apparent ‘failure’ to explicitly link a video showing Afghan women voting in the 2015 presidential election to the alliance’s (‘hard power’) actions to support this (Seib, 2014: 98). However, this analysis misrepresents the purpose of NATO’s public diplomacy, where in respect of public information campaigns the intention is not to sell ‘hard power’, nor to engage in promoting the alliance to individuals already supportive of its agenda but rather to permeate a wider audience.1 In relation to public diplomacy campaigns linked to NATO enlargement in Central Europe, this was also evident, with discussions of NATO framed ‘around the notions of rights, peace, culture, and values’, rather than defence (Kuus, 2007: 271). As NATO’s Head of Communication has stated, the intention of such content is for individuals to be drawn to it not because it is about NATO, but because of the issue it addresses (Inside Agency, 2014). In applying feminist analysis it is possible to see how gendered narratives are instrumentalized by the alliance to support (in this case) a tacit association of NATO with women’s rights. This in turn reinforces the secondary justification underpinning the war in Afghanistan, that the action was taken in order to liberate Afghan women (Shepherd, 2006). The (continued) instrumentalization of (Afghan) women Afghan women have been central to Western involvement in Afghanistan, far predating the 2001 intervention. Efforts to ‘modernize’ women’s status in Afghanistan go as far back as the early 20th century (Kabeer and Khan, 2014: 5). However, the Western approach to Afghan women has been far from consistent, underscoring its instrumentality. For example, during the rise to power of the Soviet-backed regime in Kabul and the subsequent Soviet occupation (1979–1989) efforts were made to emancipate women (Kabeerand Khan, 2014: 1). At this time, the US conveniently left women’s rights off the agenda in formulating its opposition to Soviet actions, although the US was drawing upon women’s rights to oppose other regimes at the time (Enloe, 1989: 57). The selective and instrumental use of women’s rights in US foreign policy was reinforced when the US-backed mujahidin came to power in Afghanistan in 1992 and ushered in one of the worst periods of human rights abuses the country had seen. The subsequent overthrow of the mujahidin in 1994 by the Taliban led to severe restrictions on women’s rights, including to movement, work and education (Kabeer and Khan, 2014: 2). As Kandiyoti (2007: 505) argues, women’s rights have ‘become implicated in the geopolitical manoeuvrings of powerful global actors’ and this makes the invocation of the ‘principled politics solidarity’, which has emerged in the War on Terror, extremely problematic. The discourse surrounding the US-led intervention in Afghanistan in 2001, and subsequent NATO-led ISAF operation has been noticeably gendered. As Messerschmidt (2016: 167) identifies, Bush and Obama drew on a masculinist protection logic in their articulations of the War on Terror, which constructed a particular gendered villain–victim–hero discourse in order to gain support for their actions both globally and regionally. Their speeches constructed the hero–villain relationship as unequally gendered, with the hero – the US – occupying a hegemonic masculinized position as ‘civilized, virtuous, just and peaceful’, while the subordinate masculinized villain – the Taliban – was ‘uncivilized, cruel, unjust, and violent’. In contrast, all ‘other’ people in the world were feminized, framed as ‘passively dependent, innocent, uniformed, vulnerable and unable to protect themselves’ (Messerschmidt, 2016: 169). Feminine subordination in the masculinist protection model is not submission, rather it is undertaken willingly, with adoration expressed for the protector (Young, 2003b: 3). This saw Afghan women framed as victims and, as such, in need of rescue, along with the rest of the world. In November 2001, Laura Bush made history when she became the first First Lady to give the President’s radio address, shortly after the start of the US-led Operation Enduring Freedom intervention in Afghanistan. She drew heavily on the experiences of Afghan women in making her case in support of the intervention: Civilized people throughout the world are speaking out in horror – not only because our hearts break for the women and children in Afghanistan, but also because in Afghanistan we see the world the terrorists would like to impose on the rest of us. (Bush, 2001) The address invoked the emancipation of Afghan women as supplementary to the primary justification that the intervention was a necessary defensive action to protect American people following the attacks of 9/11 and was framed around the masculinist protection logic. As Cooke (2002: 485–486) points out, the rationale presented was that to defend our universal civilisation we must rescue the women. To rescue these women we must attack these men; These women are to be rescued not because they are more ‘ours’ than ‘theirs’ but rather because they will have become more ‘ours’ through the rescue mission. Following the 2001 intervention in Afghanistan, women became beneficial not just in rhetoric but in both doctrine and practice to population centric counter-insurgency (Dyvik, 2013: 412). This was most visible in the military’s use of Female Engagement Teams (FETs) intended to engage local populations. FETs both mirrored essentalized notions of women as peaceful and instrumentalized gender as a ‘new strategic asset’, enabling women to engage in the post-9/11 masculinist protectionist narrative (Pratt, 2013: 778). The gendering of counterinsurgency also served to demonstrate that the US was ‘no longer fighting its new battles with outmoded methods’ (Mcbride and Wibben, 2012: 200). FETs were a new initiative but, as one member of a FET later reflected, ‘we were tourists, unable to solve problems with units that changed every 12 months. Everything was temporary, except Afghanistan’ (Pope, 2016). The preoccupation of the Western interveners with ‘rescuing’ Afghan women has both imperialist undertones and political implications (Khan, 2013: 105). The centrality of Afghan women to the NATO-led ISAF mission in Afghanistan has pervaded every element of the intervention, with public diplomacy and strategic communication no exception. This is exemplified in a classified CIA document released through Wikileaks (CIA [Wikileaks], 2010) which notes: Afghan women could serve as ideal messengers in humanizing the ISAF role in combating the Taliban because of women’s ability to speak personally and credibly about their experiences under the Taliban, their aspirations for the future, and their fears of a Taliban victory. Outreach initiatives that create media opportunities for Afghan women to share their stories with French, German, and other European women could help to overcome pervasive scepticism among women in Western Europe toward the ISAF.

2022 Michigan Negative
**Kritik Work** › Feminist IR › Link – NATO

NATO promotes progressive gender values while sustaining masculine values of protection and sovereignty

Elsa Hedling 22, is an associate fellow at the Europe Programme, Swedish Institute of International Affairs (UI) and a PhD Candidate at Lund University., “Embodying Military Muscles and a Remasculinized West: Influencer Marketing, Fantasy, and “the Face of NATO”, Global Studies Quarterly (2022) 2, 1–12, 3-10-2022, https://academic.oup.com/isagsq/article/2/1/ksac010/6546420)/maze

We argue that influencer marketing, through engaging fantasy, provides a site where military organizations can cre- ate appeal among a wider audience by bridging incompati- ble notions of soldiering, gender, and geopolitics. Through the story of Lasse Matberg, the political project of NATO military buildup was positioned as simultaneously neces- sary, commonsensical, and pleasurable, and NATO could project gender-progressive values while safeguarding “tra- ditional,” muscular masculinity. Our findings add primar- ily to feminist International Relations (IR) research, which has critically analyzed how NATO communication efforts construct the organization as a cosmopolitan defender of gender justice and human rights, thereby legitimating its actions and existence (Kuus 2007; Wright 2019; Wright and Rosamond 2021). More broadly, feminist IR scholars have shown how notions of protection, territoriality, and sovereignty—all central to contemporary security politics— are deeply gendered. Gender relations and specific ideas of masculinity and femininity are, explicitly or implicitly, invoked in discourses about who and what must be pro- tected, from whom and by whom (Young 2003; Parashar, Tickner, and True 2018; Agius and Edenborg 2019; Strand and Kehl 2019). When seen in light of the above research, our findings show how NATO, through new communica- tion technologies, can engage and appeal to a wider audi- ence by combining a “pro-feminist,” cosmopolitan message with other meanings, associated with “traditional” masculin- ity or nationalist mythologies. These ambiguous enactments of gender and geopolitics are particularly significant in a time when liberal and cosmopolitan values, feminism, and gender equality are increasingly challenged by populist and “masculinist” discourses inside and outside NATO (Nicholas and Agius 2018).

In addition to the primary contribution, our findings are relevant to several other IR conversations. It contributes to the literature on war’s relation to pleasure and joy (Dawson 1994; Welland 2018), which has dealt primarily with mili- tary recruitment, marketing campaigns, or fictional repre- sentations of war. In contrast, we demonstrate how influ- encer marketing—through mundane and interactive visual storytelling centering on the soldier persona—offers a par- ticularly fertile genre for the production of fantasy. More generally, the article adds to visual IR scholarship by taking seriously the ways in which social media can create new pos- sibilities for conducting global politics (Bleiker 2015; Crilley 2021). The article also joins IR discussions of how social me- dia are used to engage with global publics as part of strategic communication, public, and digital diplomacy (Shepherd 2015; Leaver and Highfield 2018, Duncombe 2020; Hedling and Bremberg 2021).

2022 Michigan Negative
**Kritik Work** › Feminist IR › Link – NATO

NATO represents an ambitious war machine whilst simultaneously posturing itself as a progressive entity

Cynthia Cockburn 11, British academic, feminist, and peace activist., “Snagged on the Contradiction: NATO UNSC Resolution 1325, and Feminist Responses”, 2012 Women in Action, 11-24-2011 , https://www.isiswomen.org/phocadownload/print/isispub/wia/wia2012/WIA2012_07TalkingPointsCynthiaCockBurn.pdf)/maze

NATO and The Woman Question The big challenge lies in getting the new instrument implemented, getting governments to commit to it and translating it into action for peace making initiatives and peace-keeping operations. That task has engaged many women and women’s organisations in a great deal of sustained efforts from that day to this.5 They had to ‘get their hands dirty’, negotiating not only with member governments but also with state militaries, for they are the ones who ‘man’ the aforesaid ‘peace keeping operations’. Who else but they, can ensure that women’s concerns are addressed by the UN ‘blue beret’ units who work among the distressed populations in conflict and post-conflict situations? Up to a point, implementing Resolution 1325 could mean relatively unproblematic and even creative encounters with the ‘civil-military’ functionaries of relatively benign state armies like those of the Netherlands, a country which sees its army more as a peace keeping force rather than a war-fighting army.6 However, many of the armies of Western Europe (and increasingly of Eastern Europe and even further afield) are marshalled within, and often commanded by the structures of the North Atlantic Alliance, by NATO. In our No-to-NATO movement we have developed a strong, sustained and carefully argued critique of the Alliance. It may speak the dainty language of ‘security’, but its actions show that it is an ambitious, expansionist and belligerent war-machine, primarily serving the economic and strategic interests of the more powerful among its member states.7

NATO has adopted Resolution 1325 with an energy that could easily pass for enthusiasm. A glance at its website will show 47 documents relating to the topic.8 A multi-media exhibition has been mounted about NATO’s contributions to the implementation of the Resolution (September 2010). There are pleasing photos of young women in army fatigues carrying babies, waving to children. NATO even celebrates International Women’s Day. Apparently standing shoulder to shoulder with the women’s movement, Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen asked, on 8 March 2010, “Would a world in which women enjoyed rights equal to those of men be safer and more stable? It is difficult to say, but ultimately a lasting peace in many of the world’s most troubled areas may depend upon the answer.”9 The Alliance was, it is true, rather slow off the mark at first in grasping the merits of Resolution 1325. They made their first move in 2007, seven years after it came into effect, and in doing so, they addressed action on ‘women, peace and security (WPS)’ from the start, as a joint policy initiative between NATO and the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council. In other words the 28 NATO member states didn’t put a go on it alone. They decided, on their own reasons, to include the 22 ‘Partnership for Peace’ states. Otherwise, this would not be, they said, “a true partnership policy on an issue of global interest.”10 They set up an informal ‘ad hoc group’ to make progress on the matter. It was the following summer, 2008, that the North Atlantic Council ‘tasked’ the NATO Strategic Command to provide guidance on implementing Resolution 1325. In other words, this was the point when the big political boys asked the big military boys to put their minds on women. The result was a Bi-Strategic Command guidelines to be ‘taken forward’ by the NATO civil and military authorities. All these member and ‘partner’ nations were urged to adopt National Action Plans on the Resolution. The Alliance envisioned Resolution 1325 policy on WPS as ‘an integral part of NATO’s corporate identity, in the way it plans and conducts its everyday business, and the way it organises its civilian and military structures’. It should also be fully integrated into ‘all aspects of NATO-led operations’ (my emphasis).