2022
Michigan
Counterplan
Advantage CPs › Net Assessment Office › Solvency – China
Bryan Clark, Dan Patt, and Timothy A. Walton, 11-19-2020, "The Department of Defense Needs to Relearn the (Almost) Lost Art of Net Assessment," GH-PJ
The art of net assessment helped the United States win the Cold War when insightful analysts including and used it to identify points of leverage for U.S. strategy. In the Cold War’s aftermath, outstanding net assessments revealed the emerging Revolution in Military Affairs and its precision-guided weapons regime. But in the years since, net assessment has largely fallen into disuse as a tool to publicly guide defense planning. As an approach that looks for potential opportunities by holistically exploring a competition, net assessment would seem well-suited to the combination of capable adversaries and looming budget constraints facing the United States. Yet, outside a few and internal Department of Defense , net assessments are not helping shape the debate about how to affordably advance U.S. and allied security interests. The most important of these interests, as by defense leaders, is deterring aggression by China and the PLA.
2022
Michigan
Counterplan
Advantage CPs › Net Assessment Office › Solvency – Cohesion
US Department of Defense, No Date "Office of Net Assessment," United States Federal Government, GH-PJ
Since its founding in 1973, the Office of Net Assessment (ONA) has continually provided long-term comparative assessments of trends, key competitions, risks, opportunities, and future prospects of U.S. military capability to the Secretary of Defense and Deputy Secretary of Defense. ONA’s work is conducted in accordance with written guidance by the Secretary of Defense, as well as DOD Directive 5111.1. ONA’s mission and worldview have remained largely unchanged in its 40+ year history. ONA products include internally-produced assessments which represent years of detailed analysis. These assessments are highly classified, tightly controlled in distribution, and provide strategic-level management insights for the Secretary of Defense and other senior DOD leaders. Several such assessments have been completed since 2017. The office also produces and commissions shorter studies, less formal assessments, and topical memos, to support its research or in response to requests from the Secretary or senior DOD or Congressional leadership. These studies include historical analysis, alternative futures, and more speculative work about the possible character of military conflict in the future. ONA research on the character of future warfare since 2000 formed the diagnostic basis of the most recent National Defense Strategy. An ONA-sponsored study helped inform Congress’ decision to reverse the Budget Control Act in 2017. On several occasions since 2016, ONA work has been used in briefings to the President. Though the Department does not publicly disclose the entire scope and nature of ONA's research, the office has produced and distributed hundreds of unique works to individuals across the U.S. government since 2015. ONA products, both externally commissioned and internally written, are read by or briefed to the Secretary, Deputy Secretary, and Under Secretaries of Defense, the Chairman and Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Combatant Commanders. ONA work is also shared widely with other government agencies, including with the National Security Council staff, the National Intelligence Council, the Central Intelligence Agency, and the State Department.
2022
Michigan
Counterplan
Advantage CPs › Net Assessment Office › Solvency – Cohesion
de Maizière and Mitchell, 2020 - Former German Defense Minister and former U.S. Assistant Secretary of State [Thomas and Wess, November 25, “NATO 2030: United for a New Era Analysis and Recommendations of the Reflection Group Appointed by the NATO Secretary General” https://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/2020/12/pdf/201201-Reflection-Group-Final-Report-Uni.pdf Acc. 4/12/22 TA] GH-PJ
NATO should consider creating a new net assessment office, composed of both military and civilian staff and reporting directly to the Secretary General, with the mission of examining NATO’s strategic environment on the basis of agreed threats and challenges across the whole spectrum of military and non-military tools. Such a capacity would be differentiated from, and augment, the tools that NATO has developed in recent years; including the Joint Intelligence and Security Division (JISD), Policy Planning Unit (PPU), and the routine meetings of the senior staff policy board for purposes of horizon scanning and strategic anticipation. A net assessment function, in constant and full consultation with all Allies, would bring a systematic methodology distinct from horizon scanning. It would exist to analyse the organisation’s strengths and options for consideration by Allies on the basis of a holistic assessment of perspectives and tools, and contribute directly to mitigating differentials in Allies’ threat assessments that form a foremost impediment to political cohesion. NATO should develop a practice to ensure that the insights developed by its suite of strategic tools—the JISD, PPU, senior staff policy board, and any new net assessment capability—are better linked to the political discussions in the NAC. This would be to continue the process of adaption to a new strategic environment in which political and non-political tools must be coherently used. NATO needs to be as politically ready as it is militarily. As such, it should institute a practice of periodic wargaming, net assessment presentations, and threat scenarios in the NAC and/or Military Committee (MC), incorporating new data techniques and technologies in visualisation. These should include presentations of scenarios that assess the consequences of NATO’s potential political inaction in a crisis.
2022
Michigan
Kritik
**Final Supplement – FMPS** › **Kritik Updates** › Settler Colonialism K – AT: Perm
Donovan 01 [Mike Donovan (A speech given by ARA Toronto member Mike Donovan at “From protest to resistance,” a hugely successful public forum on the Free Trade Area of The Americas and the radical anti-capitalist, anti-racist and anti-authoritarian elements organizing against it), 1-25-2001, "Stick ’em up motherfucker! An anti-fascist perspective on the movements against global capitalism," Colours of Resistance Archive, ] // st
We are organizing against the FTAA in solidarity with indigenous people of the Americas, both north and South. No one has been as screwed over, exploited, and generally scammed as the indigenous people of the Americas. They’ve had their land stolen, the treaties they signed were broken before the ink was dry, and they’ve been pushed onto ever smaller “reservations.” (Let’s not forget that Canada’s reservation system was the blueprint for apartheid in South Africa.) Their land has been raped for commodities, their children were sent to government run residential schools in a effort to destroy their culture, and they have had outright war and genocide inflicted upon them.¶ The history of indigenous people is also one of incredible and inspiring resistance, however. Indigenous people have fought back, from the Red River rebellion to Pine Ridge, from Kanesatake to Gustafson Lake, from Stoney Point to the Zapatistas in Chiapas, who kick-started the fight-back against the neo-liberal agenda in 1994 when the North American Free Trade Agreement first came into effect. The movements against global capitalism have a lot to learn from indigenous resistance movements, and we damn well better be in solidarity with them and their struggles, too.¶ We have learned in anti-racist and anti-fascist organizing to ask nothing from the state. The state will not stop nazis; it uses and protects them. The state cannot be depended on to write “social contracts” on labor or the environment into international “agreements” on trade, let alone to enforce such protections. The state’s primary purpose in the capitalist system is to subsidize and protect large corporations interests while attacking the working class and indigenous resistance movements opposing those interests. This is exemplified by the massive mobilization of the state’s police forces for The Summit of the Americas in Quebec City, which has been called the “largest security operation ever undertaken in Canada”. The same thing was seen last June in Windsor for the demonstrations against the Organization of American States which initiated the FTAA process. To put any faith in the state would be putting faith in one of the most powerful forces directly opposing our calls for labour rights, environmental protection, indigenous self-determination, open immigration and an end to capitalism itself.
2022
Michigan
Kritik
**Final Supplement – FMPS** › **Kritik Updates** › Settler Colonialism K – AT: Perm
Walia 12 [Harsha Walia (A South Asian activist and writer based in Vancouver, Coast Salish Territories. She is active in a variety of different social movements, particularly migrant justice, anti-racism, Indigenous solidarity, Palestine solidarity, and anti-imperialist struggles. In her organizing over the past decade she has prioritized support for Indigenous communities, from multiple land defense struggles to justice for missing and murdered Indigenous women. Her writings have appeared in alternative and mainstream publications, magazines, journals and newspapers), 1/1/2012, "Moving Beyond a Politics of Solidarity Towards a Practice of Decolonization," Colours of Resistance Archive, ] // st
North America’s state and corporate wealth is largely based on the subsidies provided by the theft of Indigenous lands and resources. Colonial conquest was designed to ensure forced displacement of Indigenous peoples from their territories, the destruction of autonomy and self-determination in Indigenous self-governance, and the assimilation of Indigenous peoples’ cultures and traditions. Given the devastating cultural, spiritual, economic, linguistic, and political impacts on Indigenous people, any serious social or environmental justice movement must necessarily include non-native solidarity in the fight against colonization.¶ Decolonization is as much a process as a goal. It requires a profound re-centring of Indigenous worldviews in our movements for political liberation, social transformation, renewed cultural kinships, and the development of an economic system that serves rather than threatens our collective life on this planet. As stated by Toronto-based activist Syed Hussan “Decolonization is a dramatic re-imagining of relationships with land, people and the state. Much of this requires study, it requires conversation, it is a practice, it is an unlearning.”¶ It is a positive sign that a growing number of social movements are recognizing that Indigenous self-determination must become the foundation for all our broader social-justice mobilizing. Indigenous peoples are the most impacted by the pillage of lands, experience disproportionate poverty and homelessness, are over-represented in statistics of missing and murdered women, and are the primary targets of repressive policing and prosecutions in the criminal injustice system. Rather than being treated as a single issue within a laundry list of demands, Indigenous self-determination is increasingly understood as intertwined with struggles against racism, poverty, police violence, war and occupation, violence against women, and environmental justice.¶ Intersectional approaches can, however, subordinate and compartmentalize Indigenous struggle within the machinery of existing Leftist narratives: anarchists point to the anti-authoritarian tendencies within Indigenous communities, environmentalists highlight the connection to land that Indigenous communities have, anti-racists subsume Indigenous people into the broader discourse about systemic oppression, and women’s organizations point to relentless violence borne by Indigenous women in discussions about patriarchy.¶ We have to be cautious to avoid replicating the state’s assimilationist model of liberal pluralism, whereby Indigenous identities are forced to fit within our existing groups and narratives. The inherent right to traditional lands and to self-determination is expressed collectively and should not be subsumed within the discourse of individual or human rights. Furthermore, it is imperative to understand being Indigenous as not just an identity but a way of life, which is intricately connected to Indigenous people’s relationship to the land and all its inhabitants. Indigenous struggle cannot simply be accommodated within other struggles; it demands solidarity on its own terms.¶ The practice of solidarity¶ One of the basic principles of Indigenous solidarity organizing is the notion of taking leadership. According to this principle, non-natives must be accountable and responsive to the experiences, voices, needs, and political perspectives of Indigenous people themselves. From an anti-oppression perspective, meaningful support for Indigenous struggles cannot be directed by non-natives. Taking leadership means being humble and honouring frontline voices of resistance, as well as offering tangible solidarity as needed and requested. Specifically, this translates to taking initiative for self-education about the specific histories of the lands we reside upon, organizing support with the clear guidance and consent of an Indigenous community or group, building long-term relationships of accountability, and never assuming or taking for granted the personal and political trust that non-natives may earn from Indigenous peoples over time.¶ In offering support to a specific community in their struggle, non-natives should organize with a mandate from the community and an understanding of the parameters of the support that is being sought. Once these guidelines are established, non-natives should be pro-active in offering logistical, fundraising, and campaign support. Clear lines of communication must be maintained and a commitment made for long-term support. This means not just being present for blockades or in moments of crisis, but instead, activists should sustain a multiplicity of meaningful and diverse relationships on an ongoing basis. Feminist writer bell hooks suggests, “Solidarity is not the same as support. To experience solidarity, we must have a community of interests, shared beliefs and goals around which to unite, to build Sisterhood. Support can be occasional. It can be given and just as easily withdrawn. Solidarity requires sustained, ongoing commitment.”¶ Organizing in accordance with these principles is not always straightforward. Respecting Indigenous leadership is not the same as waiting around to be told what to do while you do nothing. “I am waiting to be told exactly what to do” should not be an excuse for inaction, and seeking guidance must be weighed against the possibility of further burdening Indigenous people with questions. The appropriate line between being too interventionist and being paralyzed will be aided by a willingness to decentre oneself and by learning and acting from a place of responsibility rather than guilt.¶ Cultivating an ethic of responsibility begins with non-natives understanding ourselves as beneficiaries of the illegal settlement of Indigenous people’s land and unjust appropriation of Indigenous peoples’ resources and jurisdiction. When faced with this truth it is common for activists to get stuck in their feelings of guilt, which I would argue is a state of self-absorption that actually upholds privilege. While guilt is often representative of a much-needed shift in consciousness, in itself it does nothing to motivate the responsibility necessary to actively dismantle entrenched systems of oppression. In a movement-building roundtable long-time Montreal activist Jaggi Singh expressed that “[t]he only way to escape complicity with settlement is active opposition to it. That only happens in the context of on-the-ground, day-to-day organizing, and creating and cultivating the spaces where we can begin dialogues and discussions as natives and non-natives.”¶ Alliances with Indigenous communities should be based on shared values, principles, and analysis. For example during the anti-Olympics campaign in 2010, activists chose not to align with the Four Host First Nations, a pro-corporate body created in conjunction with the Vancouver Olympics Organizing Committee. Instead, we took leadership from and strengthened alliances with land defenders in the Secwepemc and St’át’imc nations and Indigenous people being directly impacted by homelessness and poverty in the Downtown Eastside. In general, however, differences surrounding strategy within a community should be for community members to discuss and resolve. We should be cautious of a persistent dynamic where solidarity activists start to fixate on the internal politics of an oppressed community. Allies should avoid trying to intrude and interfere in struggles within and between a community, which perpetuates the civilizing ideology of the White Man’s Burden and violates the basic principles of self-determination.¶ Building intentional alliances should also avoid devolution into tokenization. Non-natives often determine which Indigenous voices to privilege by defaulting to the more “well-known, “easy to get ahold of” or “less hostile” Indigenous activists. This selectivity distorts the diversity present in Indigenous communities and can exacerbate tensions and colonially-imposed divisions between Indigenous peoples. In opposing the colonialism of the state and settler society, non-natives must recognize our own role in perpetuating colonialism within our solidarity efforts. We actively counter this by theorizing and discussing the nuanced issues of solidarity, leadership, strategy, and analysis not in abstraction but within our real and informed and sustained relationships with Indigenous peoples.¶ Decolonizing Relationships¶ While centring and honouring Indigenous voices and leadership, the obligation for decolonization does rest on all of us. As written by Nora Burke in Building a Canadian Decolonization Movement: Fighting the Occupation at Home, “A decolonisation movement cannot be comprised solely of solidarity and support for Indigenous peoples’ sovereignty and self-determination. If we are in support of self-determination, we too need to be self-determining. It is time to cut the state out of this relationship, and to replace it with a new relationship, one which is mutually negotiated, and premised on a core respect for autonomy and freedom.”¶ Being responsible for decolonization often requires us to locate ourselves within the context of colonization in complicated ways – often as simultaneously oppressed and complicit. This is true, for example, for racialized migrants in Canada. Within the anti-colonial migrant justice movement of No One Is Illegal, we go beyond demanding citizenship rights for racialized migrants as that would lend false legitimacy to a settler state. We challenge the official state discourse of multiculturalism that undermines the autonomy of Indigenous communities by granting and mediating rights through the imposed structures of the state and seeks to assimilate diversities into a singular Canadian identity. Indigenous feminist Andrea Smith reminds us that “All non-Native peoples are promised the ability to join in the colonial project of settling indigenous lands… In all of these cases, we would check our aspirations against the aspirations of other communities to ensure that our model of liberation does not become the model of oppression for others.” In B.C., immigrants and refugees have participated in several delegations to Indigenous blockades, while Indigenous communities have offered protection and refuge for migrants facing deportation.¶ Decolonization is the process whereby we intend the conditions we want to live and the social relations we wish to have. We have to supplant the colonial logic of the state itself. German philosopher Gustav Landauer wrote almost a hundred years ago that “the State is a condition, a certain relationship between human beings, a mode of behaviour; we destroy it by contracting other relationships.” Decolonization requires us to exercise our sovereignties differently and to reconfigure our communities based on shared experiences, ideals, and visions. Almost all Indigenous formulations of sovereignty – such as the Two Row Wampum agreement of peace, friendship, and respect between the Haudenosaunee nations and settlers – are premised on revolutionary notions of respectful coexistence and stewardship of the land, which goes far beyond any Western liberal democratic ideal.
2022
Michigan
Kritik
**Final Supplement – FMPS** › **Kritik Updates** › Settler Colonialism K – Root Cause Russia/Ukraine
Cavanagh and Veracini 17 [Edward Cavanagh (received degrees from universities in Australia, South Africa and Canada. He has published in the fields of history and law, including Settler Colonialism and Land Rights in South Africa (Palgrave, 2013) and The Griqua Past and the Limits of South African History, 1902–1994 (Peter Lang Publishers, 2011).) and Lorenzo Veracini (An Associate Professor in History at the Swinburne University of Technology in Melbourne, Australia. His research focuses on the comparative history of colonial systems and on settler colonialism. His publications include The Settler Colonial Present (Palgrave 2015), Settler Colonialism: A Theoretical Overview (Palgrave, 2010) and Israel and Settler Society (Pluto, 2006). Lorenzo is editor in chief of Settler Colonial Studies.), The Routledge Handbook of the History of Settler Colonialism (Abingdon: Routledge, 2017) pp.313-316] // st
Russian Settler Colonialism¶ While migration to new lands and frontiers is a dominant theme in Russian history, the existence of settler colonialism1 in Russia is fiercely contested. This chapter will argue that in the 19th century Imperial Russia developed ideologies and practices of settler colonialism which bore a clear family resemblance to those of other European states and peoples. It will concentrate primarily on migration, resettlement and colonization in Russia before the revolutions of 1917 and the establishment of the USSR. While the movement of Russians into Siberia and the other republics of the USSR continued throughout the Soviet period, this took place within a high modernist nation-building framework quite alien to earlier European colonial practice, which distinguishes it from the settler colonialism of the Tsarist period.2 ¶ In the 1920s and 30s the first generation of Bolshevik historians to write about the subject, some of whom were Kazakhs or other non-Russians, had a licence to denounce peasant colonization as one of the Tsarist regime’s many exploitative policies, publishing fierce critiques which explicitly compared Russian settlement in Asia to other instances of European colonialism.3 By the outbreak of the Second World War this could (and did) attract accusations of ‘bourgeois nationalism’.4 From the 1940s the very terms ‘colonisation’ and ‘colonial’ were deeply sensitive when applied to Russia, implying as they did parallels with the policies of Western imperialist powers who were the USSR’s ideological enemies. Soviet scholarship on the subject became largely confined to platitudes on the ‘progressive role’ played by Russian settlers in introducing the indigenous peoples of Siberia and the Steppe to advanced agricultural techniques and Bolshevism, descriptions of the exploitation of these regions by Russian capitalist entrepreneurs, and explorations of the rise of ‘class differentiation’ amongst the settlers.5¶ The narrative of growing ‘friendship’ between settlers and the indigenous populations of Central Asia and Siberia was always one of the least convincing aspects of Soviet historiography, but it has had a long afterlife in modern Russia. Even today, suggestions that Russian colonisation policies had anything in common with those of the Western Imperial powers can provoke extremely hostile reactions from Russian scholars.6 Western historians, meanwhile, were largely restricted to the use of published sources until 1991, and the cold war agenda of much Western historical writing meant that it paid little attention to agrarian resettlement in the Tsarist period.7 Twenty-five years on, we now have a small but valuable body of publications based on archival research which analyse this vital question of the history of Imperial Russia in considerable depth and detail.8 Russian settlement in Siberia, which had already all but erased many indigenous peoples and cultures even before the heyday of settler expansion in the ‘Anglo-World’ in the 19th century, has probably attracted the most attention, with the work of the late Anatoly Remnev standing out as the most important.9 Alexander Etkind has suggested that the history of Russian expansion is best understood as a process of ‘internal colonization’ of different peoples (including the Russians themselves) by a state that was equally alien and remote to all, but this interpretation does not take into account the significant differences which had emerged in the treatment of Russian and non-Russian peoples by the imperial state in the course of the 19th century – differences which can be seen most clearly when examining Russian colonization in Central Asia.10 Here Jeff Sahadeo has given us an excellent account of urban settler society in Tashkent,11 and there are a number of publications on Russian settlement on the Kazakh steppe,12 and in the rural regions of southern Central Asia (Turkestan).13 Much has also been written on colonization in Central Asia in Russian, notably an excellent monograph and collection of documents from the Kazakh historian S. N. Maltusynov.14 Unfortunately some of the other scholarship from Kazakhstan takes a narrowly nationalist view of the question, and that from Russia by and large continues to tip-toe round the more difficult and sensitive questions of inter-ethnic relations, while the idea of Russia’s osobyi put’ (‘Special path’ or Sonderweg) remains persistent.15 Nevertheless, even looking solely at English-language historiography, there is now enough published scholarship on Russian settler colonialism to allow its integration into the wider narrative of European colonial expansion and settlement.16
2022
Michigan
Kritik
**Final Supplement – FMPS** › **Kritik Updates** › Settler Colonialism K – Root Cause Russia/Ukraine
Kushnir 22 [Ostap Kushnir (Lecturer at Lazarski University and Coventry University programs. Researcher in government and comparative politics, international organizations, European geopolitics and regionalization, political and economic geography. Specialist in mass communication and mass information.), January 2022, "Russia’s neo-imperial powerplay in Ukraine: The factors of identity and interests," ] // st
I argue that Russian military aggression and diplomatic pressure against Ukraine stems from the neo-imperial thinking of Russian elites and ordinary citizens. This thinking requires a reproduction of expansionist patterns that once led Russia to its “historical greatness”: construction of a territorially large state, rich in resources and demographically. All Articles Society Politics Original Writing Media Become an Author Contact diverse, with its own distinct voice in international relations. The human cost for “making Russia forever great,” however, has rarely been seriously considered¶ Russia as (neo-)empire¶ The most productive way to understand contemporary Russian neo-imperialism is probably to contrast it with traditional imperialism. Мy preferred definition of the latter entails a state’s unilateral desire to project its models of governance, values, and culture onto foreign lands under a pretext that looks plausible to the elites and citizens of that state.¶ The pursuit of imperialist goals was not an uncommon practice in the past. As we know, for example, Western European states expanded their colonial reach to Latin America, Asia, and Africa. They portrayed themselves as philanthropists who “brought civilization” to the “underdeveloped” aboriginal communities—like Prometheus who gave fire to people in need. This “civilizing initiative” usually took various forms: propagation of the Christian religion, the dissemination of new technology, and/or promotion of the principles of postEnlightenment humanism. Later, by the mid-20th century Western European states acknowledged that their Promethean activities had brutally distorted aboriginal cultures and lifeways.[1] Thus, the citizens and elites of these formerly imperial states declared imperialism to be a policy of evildoing—the process of decolonization started.¶ Russian imperialism, on the other hand, has never been properly regarded as destructive or shameful. The pace and breadth of expansion of the Tsardom of Muscovy (that evolved into the Russian Empire under Peter I) into Asia were astounding. East of the Urals there existed many indigenous territories that the authorities in Moscow perceived as “poorly administered” and “isolated.” This perception encouraged aggressive steps to fill the imaginary “power vacuum” with centralized governance. According to Colin Gray, every single year from the mid-16th and to the late 17th century Muscovy/Russia aggrandized itself by the land equivalent of the modern territory of the Netherlands.[2] These 150 years of almost uninterrupted expansion, including the destruction of indigenous and local cultures have never been reckoned with; no remorse has followed to match that of the former empires in Western Europe. Alexander Morrison notes that migration to new lands and frontiers has always been praised in Russian history, while the negative impact of settler colonialism is fiercely contested.[3] As a result, contemporary Russian elites—and the citizens who legitimize these elites through voting—preserve an outward-looking, assertive worldview. They are inclined, therefore, to reproduce the expansionist patterns that had formerly led Russia to its “greatness.”¶ Unlike classical imperialism, which invented honourable justifications for ruthless expansion, Russian neo-imperialism can be said to be milder and more cautious. President Putin and his circle aim to erect a “soft empire” by aggregating the post-Communist republics, as Edward Lucas put it a few years ago.[4] In other words, the Kremlin strives to influence the governments of these republics to make them more Russia-orientated and/or Russia-obligated instead of physically taking over the land that it deems appealing. To achieve these objectives, new tactics are being used, including media brainwashing, cyber-breaches, election manipulation, religious indoctrination, UN veto power, “green man” interventions, and many others. Citing former secretary of Ukraine’s National Security and Defence Council and finance minister Oleksandr Danylyuk, Russian objectives entail in “the establishment of pro-Russian regimes in satellite countries, followed by the violent suppression of attempts to change political course, both at the level of the population and at the level of elites. Relying on the threat of military force, Russia is actively using election fraud, coups, and even revolutions to maintain control in such countries.”[5]¶ Another distinctive feature of Russian neo-imperialist thinking resides in the Kremlin’s very specific framing of its foreign policy objectives. In its statements the Kremlin emphasizes Russian national interests and spheres of influence instead of recognizing and respecting the sovereign choices of neighbouring states and their right to national self-identification. This can be seen in the constant demands by Putin and his circle that NATO stop its enlargement—which it naturally perceives, given its own proclivities, as an increase of America’s “sphere of influence.” The self-evident argument that states themselves apply to join NATO, not that NATO seeks to expand itself, seems to fall on deaf ears. The truth is, furthermore, that NATO can hardly be defined as a catch-all and open-to-everybody organization; it is quite a challenge for any sovereign state to join NATO, requiring much political and social dedication, deliberation, and sacrifices.¶ Similar observations can be made about the Kremlin’s protests in 2014 against Ukraine becoming an Associate Member of the European Union—again, it was objecting to the perceived increase of the EU’s “sphere of influence.” In the direct aftermath of the Euromaidan, Russia demanded the renegotiation of the Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement—a bilateral deal between Ukraine and the EU—to accommodate its interests, i.e., the interests of a third party. Finally, there is the whole Russkii Mir (Russian World) concept, a unilateral attempt to expand the Kremlin’s sphere of influence to all territories where “Russian [serves] as the language of international relations and Russian culture as the shrine of uniform values.”[6]¶ In fact, many scholars have described the neo-imperial thinking of Russian elites and citizens, but under different guises. Alena Ledeneva presents it as an external dimension to Putin’s sistema,[7] Igor Gretskiy formulated an original “Lukianov Doctrine” that a priori limits the sovereignty of Russia’s neighbouring states,[8] and Angela Stent recently introduced the “Putin Doctrine”: “The core element…is getting the West to treat Russia as if it were the Soviet Union, a power to be respected and feared, with special rights in its neighborhood and a voice in every serious international matter. The doctrine holds that only a few states should have this kind of authority, along with complete sovereignty, and that others must bow to their wishes…And the doctrine is tied together by Putin’s overarching aim: reversing the consequences of the Soviet collapse, splitting the transatlantic alliance, and renegotiating the geographic settlement that ended the Cold War.”[9]¶ Rather than attributing any doctrinal approach to Putin himself, I prefer to label contemporary Russian foreign policy as neo-imperial for two reasons. Firstly, it repeats Russia’s historical tradition of expansion, one that proved successful in the past and led to the state’s “greatness.” Secondly, it has little to do with the figure of Putin, who merely became the latest of many imperial-type leaders coordinating Russian expansion. In other words, Putin “filled the shoes” of the tradition, found that these shoes fit Russia’s current ambitions… and he seems to like walking in them.¶ Putin’s justification for Russian neo-imperialism¶ On 18 March 2014, on the eve of the Russian invasion in the Donbas, Putin delivered a pivotal address to the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation.[10] This address entered the history books as the “Crimean speech” and unveiled some of the cornerstones of the Kremlin’s neo-imperialist thinking about the world and Ukraine.¶ Primarily, Putin declared that the US and its allies had undermined the international order and preferred to follow the “rule of the gun” instead of the rule of law. Russia felt humiliated and robbed every time the US ran amok, especially in Central and Eastern Europe. That was not to be tolerated.¶ Secondly, Russian interests had been systematically ignored since the downfall of the USSR. Putin believed that Western leaders were constantly cheating him with their objectives and actions (i.e., NATO enlargement, EU’s enlargement, EU’s Eastern Partnerships, and other developments).[11] Moreover, they were continuing to pursue “containment” policies regarding Russia and attempting, as Putin defined it, “to sweep us into a corner because we have an independent position.”¶ Thirdly, Putin underlined that no one should underestimate Russia’s resolve to take decisive actions: “Russia is an independent, active participant in international affairs; like other countries, it has its own national interests that need to be taken into account and respected.”¶ Fourthly, the downfall of the USSR was yet again portrayed by Putin as the major geopolitical catastrophe of the 20th century. Because of that downfall, the world became US-led and, thus, unstable and imbalanced.¶ Finally, Putin blamed international institutions and organizations for the failure to ensure global security and order. He considered them to be mere tools and agents under the command of Western states.
2022
Michigan
Kritik
**Final Supplement – FMPS** › **Kritik Updates** › Settler Colonialism K – Root Cause Russia/Ukraine
Sviezhentsev 20 [Maksym Dmytrovych Sviezhentsev (A historian of Crimea. His research focuses on the post-Soviet transition of the Crimean settler colony in the 1990s and the Russian involvement in that transition.), 2020, "‘Phantom Limb’: Russian Settler Colonialism in the Post-Soviet Crimea (1991-1997)", Electronic Thesis and Dissertation Repository for a PhD in history supervised by Marta Dyczo, ] // st
Where does the myth that ‘Crimea has always been Russia’ come from? How did the Russian Empire and the Soviet Union ‘make’ Crimea Russian? This dissertation shows how the they applied settler colonial practices to Crimea, displacing the indigenous population and repopulating the peninsula with loyal settlers and how Crimean settler colonial structures survived the fall of the Soviet Union. It argues that this process defines post-Soviet history of the peninsula.¶ For centuries Crimean existed within the discourse of Russian imperial control. This dissertation challenges the dominant view by applying settler colonial theory to Crimea’s past and present for the first time. This produces two major scholarly contributions. Firstly, it broadens the geography of settler colonialism, demonstrating that it existed not only in Western European imperialism but also in Russia’s imperial project. Secondly, it challenges the ‘uniqueness’ of Russian imperialism.¶ The focus is on Crimea as a settler colony during the first years after the USSR’s collapse. The main argument is that the 1990s conflict in Crimea was mainly around decolonization attempts and resistance by the settler colonial system. Contrary to the analysis of ‘conflicts that did not happen’ it argues that Crimea is a case of a conflict that never stopped since the late 18th century. It analyses how settler colonial structures fought for their own preservation in opposition to the forces of decolonization represented by the Ukrainian and Crimean Tatar national movements, maneuvering between the Russian and Ukrainian capitals, which in turn triggered perceptions of Crimean separatism.¶ A main theme is control over the narrative. Crimean settler colonial institutions maintained their monopoly over ‘the truth’ about the peninsula’s past and present. This dissertation demonstrates how this continued in the 1990s, how Crimean newspapers forged the meaning of ‘Crimean,’ redesigned boundaries of inclusion and exclusion in order to marginalize Ukrainian and Crimean Tatar activists. Another important issue is the role of hybrid institutions including government structures in Crimea and the Black Sea Fleet, both which conducted subversive operations (informational and military) to counter and reduce the growing presence of the Ukrainian state on the peninsula.¶ Summary for Lay Audience¶ The annexation of Crimea by the Russian Federation in 2014 for many people was the first time they heard about the existence of this peninsula. A region in the Eastern Europe for most people of the West was too far away from their home to take the conflict around it seriously. Meanwhile, the claims of the Russian authorities that Crimea is ‘historically Russian’ for many seemed like a good enough justification for the annexation. As a result, the first territorial annexation in Europe since the Second World War received little to no active response from the world.¶ The purpose of this study is to demonstrate that the popular image of Crimea is a result of the Russian and Soviet imperial policies. I argue that since the late 18th century Crimea has been a settler colony of the Russian Empire, Soviet Union, and now – Russian Federation. In other words, the history of Crimea is similar to the history of other settler colonies of Western European empires. Therefore, the fact of settler colonization has to be at the basis of any analysis of Crimean past and present. Through the analysis of the political events in Crimea during the 1990s, this dissertation demonstrates that the fall of the Soviet Union did not bring decolonization to the peninsula. Quite the contrary, local institutions fought to preserve the colonial status quo and prolonged a conflict between the colonizers and the colonized. In that fight, Russian state, a former metropole, pretended to be a non-participant, but in fact actively interfered into Crimean domestic politics.
2022
Michigan
Kritik
**Final Supplement – FMPS** › **Kritik Updates** › Settler Colonialism K – Root Cause Russia/Ukraine
Short 22 [John Rennie Short (Professor for School of Public Policy at the University of Maryland. An expert on urban issues, environmental concerns, geopolitics and the history of cartography. He has studied cities around the world, and lectured to a variety of audiences.), 3-14-2022, "Settler Colonialism Helps Explain Current Events," UMBC, ] // st
These tactics of invasion and occupation can also be seen in the way 250,000 Russians moved to Crimea after it was annexed in 2014.¶ Academics sometimes refer to these tactics as “settler colonialism.” As a strategy of subjugation, it has many historical precedents and it provides an important lens for understanding geopolitics in various parts of today’s world.¶ Two types of empire¶ History is studded with empires. Broadly speaking, there are two types.¶ British rule in India exemplifies an empire of control, where imperialists extract wealth and resources without large-scale emigration from the colonizing country. The importation of the wealth of India, especially its textiles, was an essential requirement of Britain’s Industrial Revolution.¶ There are also empires of settlement that occupy colonial territories by moving in large numbers of settlers. Across the world, especially in the lightly settled open grasslands of Australia and the Americas, the original inhabitants were displaced and marginalized as their homeland was taken by treaty, sale, guile and theft.¶ The process often involved brute force or ethnic cleansing as land was seized and handed over to immigrants. In Australia, the British justified colonization by declaring the continent “terra nullius” – that is, empty and uninhabited.¶ Settler colonies were used to safeguard the edges of empires. A policy used by the Qing dynasty (1644-1912) that moved ethnic Chinese settlers into recently captured territory is still used today in Tibet and Xinjiang. Both imperial Russia and the former Soviet Union encouraged citizens to settle border regions, so today at least 20% of the population of Ukraine is ethnic Russian.¶ Settler colonialism¶ Many settler empires rose in the 18th and 19th centuries and continued well into the 20th century. In Africa, for example, settler societies were established by the British in Kenya, the French in Algeria and the Dutch in South Africa.¶ The colonists who moved in, often in large numbers, were typically white Europeans who took control over the land, lives and economy of Indigenous peoples. There were exceptions, though. In Liberia, Black Americans settled in the land of Black Africans; in Israel, mainly Jewish immigrants took over the land of Arab populations; and in China, the majority Han people moved into non-Han areas.¶ My research into the interactions between Indigenous people and European settlers in North America and resistance to cultural integration by an Indigenous art movement in central Australia has offered me a different way to view history. Looking at the past through a lens of settler colonialism substantially changes how we view histories of many countries, including Australia, Canada, New Zealand, South Africa and the U.S.¶ Today’s issues, viewed through a colonial lens¶ Most settler societies are steeped in a prejudiced history in which racial categories define who has power. One strategy has been to make full citizenship available only to settlers and their offspring. Some of the more extreme examples include racialized rule in South Africa that created brutal apartheid and traumatized generations of aboriginal Australians.¶ There is also a long history of child abuse, with Indigenous children taken from their homes to be assimilated into settler society. Emerging evidence of these practices, including those experienced by Indigenous children in Canada’s residential schools, is helping to rewrite the history books from the Indigenous – rather than just from the settler – perspective.¶ By restricting immigration, some countries – including Australia, Canada and the U.S., among others – have tried to maintain their racial or ethnic identities and their power. Many of these policies were weakened only in recent years.¶ But in acts of amazing resilience, Indigenous societies have resisted cultural assimilation, political marginalization and economic insecurity.¶ Land is a key issue, as Indigenous groups continue to pursue land claims and resist land grabs. From ongoing Mapuche claims in Chile to aboriginal Australians’ successful campaign to overturn the legality of “terra nullius,” land seized by settlers is being disputed.¶ New facts and greater awareness of the racist nature of settler societies are challenging the triumphalist view of progress. New information is providing a darker understanding of the impact of settler colonialism on Indigenous peoples, including ethnic genocide and the devastating impacts of the loss of both land and cultural identity.¶ This isn’t just history. Unequal, brutal treatment of settlers and indigenous peoples continues in today’s settler societies, not least of all in Xinjiang and in Ukraine.
2022
Michigan
Kritik
**Final Supplement – FMPS** › **Kritik Updates** › Settler Colonialism K – Root Cause China/Taiwan
Byler 22 [Darren Byler (A sociocultural anthropologist and assistant professor at Simon Fraser University in Vancouver, British Columbia whose teaching and research examines the dispossession of stateless populations through forms of contemporary capitalism and colonialism in China, Central Asia, and Southeast Asia.), May 2022, "Maoist Settler Inheritance and Native Claims in Northwest China," positions politics, ] // st
Since its founding, the revolutionary ethos of the People’s Republic of China has been framed by discourses of liberation and a rhetoric of anti-imperialist solidarity. The founding of the People’s Republic stood in opposition to a legacy of European and Japanese imperialism and the entrenched inequalities of Qing and Republican-era modernism. Like the Soviet Union, China positioned itself as a postcolonial state. But despite these claims and efforts by Maoist leaders to promote multinational solidarity and guard against Han chauvinism, the Han-dominated party-state nevertheless inherited and intensified control over the ancestral lands of the largest non-Chinese speaking groups in the country, the Tibetans and the Uyghurs. This led to the establishment of a settler state in Inner Asia during the Mao era, and, as China transitioned into a central node of global capitalism in the 1980s and 1990s, this Inner Asian project has evolved to include more and more of the features of an internal settler colonialism. At the same time, the enduring legacy of Mao era “settler socialism,” a term that I borrow from the work of my colleague Grace H. Zhou,1 has served to further elide the contemporary autonomy and knowledge claims of Uyghurs and other frontier peoples. ¶ The People’s Republic of China was founded on the imperial legacy of the late Qing Empire. While aspects of the early Qing empire were conciliatory and coalition-focused toward Inner Asian peoples, the People’s Republic also inherited a more recent, largely Han-led, Qing legacy of mass violence carried out by Zou Zangtang’s armies in the 1870s, a Confucian education-centered capture of Turkic institutions, and the mass deportations and settlements of both Turkic and Han people in the region. So as the national liberation campaign was launched by the PRC in the 1950s with the goal of indigenizing Communist Party state systems, administrative structures, and adapting existing institutions such as schools, media, and communal authority structures to promote the core values of the Party these, often unacknowledged, legacies of expropriation and domination played a role in the way Uyghurs were forced, at least in some instances, to receive their liberation.¶ The defensive state building politics of the new People’s Republic also mitigated against Uyghur autonomous liberation. A 1949 conversation between Joseph Stalin and Chinese Communist vice chairman Liu Shaoqi, where Stalin describes the need for Chinese to “occupy” Xinjiang in order to secure oil and cotton resources for China in reaction to British imperialism is particularly instructive in this regard. As Stalin put it:¶ One should not put off occupation of Xinjiang, because a delay may lead to the interference by the English in the affairs of Xinjiang. They can activate the Muslims, including the Indian ones, to continue the civil war against the communists, which is undesirable, for there are large deposits of oil and cotton in Xinjiang, which China needs badly. The Chinese population in Xinjiang does not exceed 5 percent, after taking Xinjiang one should bring the percentage of the Chinese population to 30 percent by means of resettling the Chinese for all-sided development of this huge and rich region and for strengthening China’s border protection. In general, in the interests of strengthening the defense of China one should populate all the border regions by the Chinese.¶ So while the People’s Republic did strive to institutionalize a Uyghur socialism, from the very beginning, the resources of Uyghur and Kazakh ancestral lands now belonged to the party-state and were subordinated to the demands of the majority-led revolution. As an archipelago of Han-led agricultural and military colonies was established across the region in the 1950s the settlement of those lands by decommissioned soldiers and others established the occupation that Stalin invoked. By the end of the decade, many Uyghur and Kazakh carriers of traditional knowledge—glossed as counterrevolutionary superstition, or as “local nationalism”—had been removed from positions of power in community leadership and a new focus on Han-centric scientific modernization came to the fore. This is the period in which Uyghur “native” or yerlik knowledge, a term I will return to in the second half of this essay, came to be conflated with a “backwardness” in need of the “advanced” or scientific civilization of the Han majority. ¶ The enduring presence of imperialist aspects in China’s rule of Inner Asia is what leads me and a number of other scholars committed to decolonization and antiracism to think in parallel with Grace Zhou about 1950s to 1980s Xinjiang, Tibet, Inner Mongolia and Central Asia as spaces of settler socialism. This framing, which I view as both an acknowledgement of the unfulfilled promise of Maoist revolution and an acknowledgment of the emergent occupation, domination and dispossession brought about by the same process, is a way of naming the particular forms of twentieth century Soviet and Chinese colonial projects.¶ Settler socialism is perhaps best understood as a type of “subimperialism” or subcolonialism that responds to what Natasha Kaul refers to as a “moral wound” of past colonization or semi-colonization often narrated as a “century of humiliation” in contemporary Chinese state-narrated history. Subcolonialism, what I take to mean the colonial actions taken by the formerly colonized, is expressed in this case through the imposed development and intensified colonization of China’s Inner Asian frontier (particularly during China’s post-Mao embrace of global capital) and justified through the logic of the wound. This logic leads to the conclusion that because China’s body politic was so badly wounded by its experience with colonialism, it’s occupation, domination and dispossession of peripheral peoples is not only justified but is itself an expression of anti-imperialist care.
2022
Michigan
Kritik
**Final Supplement – FMPS** › **Kritik Updates** › Settler Colonialism K – Root Cause China/Taiwan
Tsai 19 [Lin-chin Tsai (PhD candidate at UCLA), A dissertation submitted in partial satisfaction of the requirements for the degree Doctor of Philosophy in Asian Languages and Cultures at UCLA advised by Shu-mei Shih, 2019, Re-conceptualizing Taiwan: Settler Colonial Criticism and Cultural Production, UCLA, ] // st
At the inception of the Martial Law period, the Nationalist government asserted its territorial claim on China, Taiwan, and other surrounding islands, and contrived to impose a unified Han Chinese national and cultural identity upon every single person on the island. By doing so, it consolidated its ruling power as well as its political legitimacy because it represented the “authentic Chinese polity,” as opposed to the People’s Republic of China (PRC) the Chinese Communist party established. Alternative voices or dissent against this official Nationalist ideology were either brutally repressed or severely silenced. However, the Nationalist political and cultural hegemony was challenged beginning in the 1970s due to a process of social transformation and intellectual transition. The “nativist literature movement” (鄉土文學運動 xiangtu wenxue yundong), a literary movement that took shape in the mid-1960s and further prospered during the 1970s, called for a closer connection of literature with the land and its people on the island of Taiwan via a more realistic mode of literary expression. This movement served as a counter-discourse against the predominant anti-Communist literature (反共文學 fangong wenxue) and nostalgic literature (懷鄉文學 huaixiang wenxue) that the Nationalist government propagandized. Later, the Formosa Incident (美麗島事件 Meilidao shijian, also known as the Kaohsiung Incident)3 in 1979 not only marked a watershed of democratization movements in Taiwan history, but more importantly, paved the way for the founding of the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) in 1986. The above nativist literature movement, as well as the democratization and localization movements since the 1970s, served as social and historical backdrop to the ideological debate between the “Chinese complex” and “Taiwanese complex” in the early 1980s. The rising of “Taiwanese consciousness” (in contrast to the “Chinese consciousness” that the Nationalist government imposed), as well as a variety of social movements during the 1980s, urged the Nationalist government to lift the Martial Law in 1987, putting an end to the thirty-eight year-long martial law era.¶ In these circumstances, postcolonial discourse was introduced to Taiwan’s academe and became a prevailing theoretical paradigm of Taiwan literature studies beginning in the 1990s. The academic trend of postcolonial theory began with Han Taiwanese literary scholar Chiu Kuei-fen’s seminal essay, “Discover Taiwan: Constructing the Postcolonial Discourse of Taiwan,” presented at the sixteenth annual Republic of China Comparative Literature conference in 1992. This essay led to a series of debates between Chiu and another Taiwan-based literary scholar Liao Chao-yang centering on whether or not Taiwan is a postcolonial state.4 Chiu defined Taiwan as a postcolonial society by stressing Taiwan’s translingual and cross-cultural condition attributed to its history of multiple colonialisms. Liao questioned Chiu’s argument, noting that although Taiwan can be considered a multicultural and multilingual society, the national language (Mandarin Chinese) is still the dominant language promoted by the Nationalist ideological policy after 1945. Therefore, the hybrid and multilingual characteristics of Taiwan, Liao argued, do not constitute a basis for Taiwan’s postcoloniality. Between 1995 and 1996, their debate about Taiwan’s postcoloniality triggered a more intense wave of debates among other scholars from diverse disciplines. These debates were published in Chung-wai Literary Monthly (中外文學 Chungwai wenxue, now renamed Chung-wai Literary Quarterly), one of the leading journals of literary and cultural studies in Taiwan. Further debates in the late 1990s involved the issues of whether Taiwan is postcolonial or postmodern, of the rise of Taiwanese consciousness and the politics of Taiwanese identity and subjectivity, and of Taiwan’s nationhood/ statehood.5¶ In hindsight, it is clear that the advent of postcolonial discourse in Taiwan is significant to the formation of Taiwanese political, national and cultural identity, as it offers critical and theoretical insights to conceptualize Taiwan’s colonial past. More importantly, postcolonial criticism has significantly contributed to the study of Taiwan literature as an autonomous discipline. During the Nationalist authoritarian era, Mandarin Chinese was the national language of Taiwan. Speaking other languages, such as Hakka, Minnan or Hoklo, Japanese, or several Austronesian languages spoken by the indigenous peoples, was censored. While the studies of Chinese literature or Sinology were favored by the Nationalist government, Taiwan literature, and other studies associated with or relevant to Taiwan, were considered valueless, if not treated as a taboo, during this period. In this sense, the insights of postcolonial theory and historiography which acknowledge the historical subjectivity and cultural hybridity of Taiwan became a useful and critical lever to foreground the specificity and uniqueness of Taiwan literature as a distinct field of study against the hegemony of Chinese studies or Sinology that the KMT advocated. As Taiwan literature scholar Lee Yu-lin aptly states, postcolonial criticism has been introduced to Taiwan as a theory to supplement the nativist discourse beginning in the 1970s by providing more critical and complicated methodologies and theoretical concepts.6 The peaceful transition of power from the KMT to the DPP in 2000 and the support of institutionalization of Taiwan literature by the DPP government further consolidated the discursive primacy of postcolonial theory. In short, postcolonial studies in Taiwan and Taiwan literature as a distinct field of study, together with the institutionalization of Taiwan literature, have been intimately intertwined, supplementing and complementing one another.7¶ Even with such theoretical primacy, some scholars have continued to question the applicability of postcolonial theory in Taiwan. Liao Ping-hui has persuasively pointed out that the KMT recolonization after the February 28 Incident in 1947,8 and the expelling of Taiwan from the United Nations in 1971 led to the “belatedness” of postcoloniality in Taiwan, since the former led to the White Terror of the KMT rule and the Order of Martial Law promulgated by the Governor of Taiwan Province Chen Cheng (陳誠) in 1949, and a series of setbacks in the international arena further delayed Taiwan’s entry into the postcolonial condition.9 As a result, postmodernism, in Liao’s view, had been taken by some scholars as a “substitute project” for this “belated postcoloniality” to reconsider multiculturalism and multilingualism of Taiwan’s society. By the same token, Liou Liang-ya also argues that Taiwan’s history of multiple colonialisms and the lack of transitional justice after lifting the Martial Law in 1987 had further deferred Taiwan’s postcolonial project, and thus the postcoloniality of Taiwan, in comparison to several other newly established independent nations around the world, is “belated.” 10 Liou then reminds us that we need to more prudently reconsider what has constituted Taiwan’s postcoloniality and whether or not Taiwan has entered the postcolonial phase at all. Although Liou maintains this cautious attitude toward postcolonial discourse and its theoretical applicability, she still believes that the insights of postcolonial theory as well as the texts of postcolonial fiction in Taiwan not only critique the Nationalist government’s recolonization and authoritarian rule of Taiwan but also address “issues such as gender, race, and class in relation to Taiwanese identity and Taiwan’s colonial past” as opposed to the China-centered Nationalist historiography.11¶ As scholars noted, another problematic of postcolonial studies in Taiwan lies in its dualistic construct of the colonizer and the colonized. As Li Cheng-Chi and Lee Yu-lin have argued in their article, “The Problematics of the Postcolonial Project in Taiwan,” the dialectic paradigm of postcolonialism (the colonizer vs. the colonized, domination vs. resistance) is an oversimplified paradigm for the study of Taiwan’s colonial history. Because of the belatedness of postcoloniality and the marginalized international status of Taiwan under the dual impact of the global neocolonialism and the rising power of China, they contend that Taiwan’s postcolonial project should instead understand its own limitation and insufficiency.12 They thus propose that it is imperative to reexamine the dichotomy of postcolonial dialectics within the formation of knowledge production in Taiwan and reconsider the history of serial and multiple colonialisms of Taiwan at the intersection of different empires, races, ethnicities, classes, gender, and so forth. The postcolonial project in Taiwan, they conclude, will remain “an incomplete project,” if we fail to recognize its theoretical inadequacy and incompatibility with Taiwan’s reality and its far more complicated colonial history.¶ Despite their divergent views on Taiwan’s postcoloniality, we should note that they are all predominately articulated from a Han-centered perspective and periodization of history. According to the orthodox Nationalist historiography, Taiwan has entered its postcolonial phase right after the Japanese colonial government retreated in 1945. But for most of the Han Taiwanese people who lived through the Japanese colonial period and suffered from KMT’s recolonization, it is 1987, the year in which the Martial Law was lifted, that should be regarded as the beginning of the postcolonial era. For the indigenous peoples in Taiwan, postcoloniality is not just “belated” (as described by Liao and Liou), but rather, has “not yet” come into being. If the “post-” in “post-colonialism” can be understood in temporal terms, then the colonial condition, from the perspective of Taiwan indigenous peoples, has not yet come to an end. Sun Ta-chuan (Paelabang Danapan), one of the leading indigenous intellectuals,13 has protested that there will always be theoretical blind spots if Taiwan’s postcolonial studies and Taiwanese nativist discourse fail to take indigenous peoples into consideration. 14 Genetically and linguistically speaking, the indigenous peoples of Taiwan are peoples of the Austronesian language group, and have inhabited Taiwan (and other surrounding islands) for thousands of years, far before the seventeenth century arrival of Han immigrants from China.15 These Han immigrants from China became the demographic majority of Taiwan’s population in the late seventeenth century attributable to the settlement policies of the Dutch colonial government and the first Han regime that Zheng Chenggong established. These Han immigrants and their descendants have not stopped their exploitation of the indigenous peoples over natural resources and land. On top of the dispossession of land and resources throughout history, Taiwan indigenous peoples have been subject to both racial/ethnic discrimination and structural violence via mainstream Han settler society for hundreds of years. Specifically, indigenous peoples have long been stigmatized as “uncivilized groups” and categorized into “cooked savages” (熟番 shufan, an ethnic construct that refers to the indigenous population who occupy the plain areas of Taiwan) and “raw savages” (生番 shengfan, generally referring to the aborigines who lived in the mountains) since the Qing period. During the ROC era, the indigenous populations were relegated to the derogatory category of “mountain compatriots” (山胞 shanbao), while plains indigenous groups were considered “civilized” and were assimilated into the body of Han settler society via cohabitation and intermarriage with early Han settlers. Not until very recently were some plains indigenous communities recognized as indigenous peoples and renamed as the Pingpu indigenous peoples (平埔族 pingpuzu) in order to make a distinction between the two categories of indigenous population. The disavowal of the Pingpu indigenous status by Han settler regimes caused the loss of cultural practice and ethnic identity of the plains indigenous communities. Today, many of the plains indigenous tribes are still struggling for official recognition. Belated official apologies by President Tsai Ing-wen on August 1, 2016, unfortunately, did not bring about forgiveness from the indigenous peoples. Rather this official attempt provoked, even deeper disappointment and indignation from the indigenous activist communities, not to mention the thorny controversy over radioactive waste in Orchid Island (or Lanyu), Taiwan’s main nuclear dumpsite where the Tao indigenous people reside. The story of the dark history of the Han settlers and their continual suppression and exploitation of the indigenous peoples of Taiwan from the seventeenth century to the present is indeed a very long one.¶ Colonization for indigenous peoples in Taiwan is not a past tense, but rather the present tense. The postcolonial discourse, to borrow Liao Ping-hui’s words, can “only partially describe what constitutes the ‘postcolonial’ condition in Taiwan,” 16 given its total neglect of indigenous peoples. Postcolonialism, as New Zealand-based indigenous scholar Linda Tuhiwai Smith succinctly argues, serves to a large extent as “a strategy for reinscribing or reauthorizing the privileges of non-indigenous academics because the field of ‘post-colonial’ discourse has been defined in ways which can still leave out indigenous peoples.” 17 This type of colonial situation whereby settlers (superordinate migrants) displace the indigenous residents and take over the land is what scholars have termed settler colonialism.
2022
Michigan
Kritik
**Final Supplement – FMPS** › **Kritik Updates** › Settler Colonialism K – Russia Link
Ivakhiv 22 [Adrian Ivakhiv (A professor of environmental thought and culture at the University of Vermont. Canadian by birth and Ukrainian by ancestry, his research on culture, identity, and ecology has taken him to the Chernobyl exclusion zone in Ukraine and the Carpathian mountains of east central Europe. He blogs at Immanence.), 3-23-2022, "Decolonialism and the Invasion of Ukraine," No Publication, ] // st
Decolonization, Take 1: Ukraine and Russia¶ Writing in e-flux journal (and reprinted in left-wing German magazine Taz), Oleksiy Radynski, filmmaker and cofounder of Kyïv’s Visual Culture Research Center, astutely untangles the deeply colonialist underpinnings of Putin’s war on Ukraine and Ukrainians. In “The Case Against the Russian Federation,” Radynski briefly pursues two fascinating lines of argument. (Each of them has been developed in greater depth by others, but not to my knowledge combined in such a concise and currently relevant way, thus my focus on it here.)¶ The first argues that Putin’s, and many Russians’, anti-Ukrainianism—the “deep ethnic and political hatred towards Ukrainians” evident in his recent speeches—is a disavowal of that which threatens them internally. Ukraine today represents “a radically different Russia,” with the disavowal working in both directions.¶ What Putin calls the “historical unity” of both nations refers to centuries of imperial domination by Russia … We [Ukrainians] share with Russians a history of serfdom (a form of de facto slavery in the Russian Empire), worker movements, revolution, industrialization, and war. Generations of our families have mixed with each other. But any relationship between metropole and colony—like any master-slave relationship—is dialectical and reciprocal …¶ By colonizing Ukraine, the Russian metropole had unwittingly swallowed a political culture based on horizontal forms of democracy—even if they seem brutal, like the Cossacks’ councils, the anarchist armies of Nestor Makhno, or the Maidan uprisings. And this alien presence will disintegrate the metropole from within. In a way, the Putinist fear of a “Russian Maidan” uprising in Moscow is totally justified—but not because, as Russian propaganda suggests, it will be organized by NATO-trained Ukrainian terrorists. The fear is justified because, if Russians are a little bit Ukrainian, they might also be able to topple an authoritarian government … It is this “historical unity” that today’s autocratic Russia is trying by all means to exorcize from within itself by turning Russia into a police state and preempting the popular uprising.¶ In other words, Ukraine threatens to topple the “historical unity” of Russian imperialism—so (for Putin) it must be vanquished.¶ Radynski’s second line of argument is that the latter, Russian imperialism, is at root a Slavic and eastward variation on the European settler colonialism that expanded across the Americas and beyond. Far from simply expanding to peacefully settle the lands to the east of their Kyïvan Rus’ “homeland,” as it is often imagined, expansion to the east, north, and south involved “the genocide of indigenous populations” (Finno-Ugric and Turkic speaking peoples, among others), “the extraction of resources, and the emergence of autocratic governance.”¶ As mentioned, Radynski’s arguments are not original (nor are they intended as that), and there are others who have developed them in more detailed and refined form. For instance, on Russian colonization of the Siberian Far East, see Forsyth 1994; Stephan 1994; Wood 2011; Pesterev 2015. On Russian imperial coloniality more generally, including self-exculpatory discourses of “self-colonization,” see Sunderland 2000; Morrison 2012; Tlostanova 2012; Etkind 2013 and 2015; Eskanian 2015; and this beautifully illustrated 2020 article by Engelhardt; and in relation to Ukraine, Chernetsky 2003; Velychenko 2004; Sakwa 2015; this 2020 panel; and Badior 2022. And that’s just a smattering.¶ Radynski concludes, provocatively, by advocating that¶ Kyiv accept its thousand-year-old historical responsibility towards the colonized nations oppressed in today’s Russian Federation by belatedly acknowledging itself as the unfortunate origin of a despotic, colonialist Russian state—a state that oppresses every people with the misfortune of being within its territory, including the Russian people. For the sake of all these peoples—and the rest of humankind—the Russian state in its current form should cease to exist.¶ In this intentionally provocative version of decolonization, Kyïv, the Ukrainian capital, would reclaim its (colonial/postcolonial) mantle of “mother of Russian cities” to play a leading role in the decolonization of this entire part of the world, which has hitherto been largely neglected by decolonial theory elsewhere. Decolonialism as a liberatory process would thus proceed through Kyïv, with this thousand-year-old capital now an “obligatory passage point” for it (as actor-network theory might call it).¶ Decolonization, Take 2: Russia and the World¶ Here’s where things get trickier. Arguments about decolonization rest upon an understanding of the identity of the colonizer. A nuanced historical analysis can critically distinguish between British, French, Spanish, Russian, and other forms of colonial, as well as imperial, power. A less nuanced, but more globally palatable, understanding typically takes aim instead at the broad and loose category of “the West,” while placing itself ostensibly in the service of the non-West, that is, “the rest.” Each of these approaches has its virtues (Europe, speaking generically, did indeed colonize the world), but each also carries risks. (See here for an example of a poorly informed “decolonial” analysis of the invasion of Ukraine.)¶ Let’s put this in the context of the “war for hearts and minds” being played out in global media. As Carl Miller’s Twitter analysis has shown, Russian information warfare may not be doing so well in the West during the present invasion—it’s mainly succeeded in fragmentary pockets of the far right (and far left). But it appears to be doing much better in the non-West, especially the BRICS countries (Brazil, India, China, South Africa) and other parts of Africa and Asia, where it may in fact be strategically aimed. Mother Jones’s Ali Brelan makes the same argument, and notes that the US right wing has just started getting in on the pro-Putin action. Another take on Russian social media strategy is that it is focusing on being feared rather than being loved, and that it is succeeding better with that.¶ As I argued in my recent piece on Noam Chomsky, one of the lessons of this invasion is that we live in an unstable and multipolar world, and if our analytical lenses remain fixated on Europe and the Atlantic world, we will fail to recognize what’s happening.¶ A thinker who has argued this for a long time, but who has also weaponized it on behalf of Russian neo-imperialism, is Alexander Dugin (who’s been covered on this blog numerous times). Like decolonial thinkers who emphasize the need to rebalance “the West versus the rest,” taking the side of the latter, Dugin sets himself up as the geopolitical theorist for “the rest.”¶ Like a specific (but not dominant) strand of decolonial thinkers, he maps this “West versus rest” duality onto the opposition of tradition versus progress, where the West is corrupting the fabric of traditional society, which was “organic,” “holistic,” “rooted,” and so on. “With the Enlightenment,” Dugin writes,¶ the West entered a totally artificial civilization based on wrong ideas—such as progress, materialism, technology, capitalism, selfishness and atheism. That was the Enlightenment—Luciferian pride, the war against the Heaven. That coincides with Western colonial expansion. Colonialism was a kind of projection of the same disease on the global scale. No civilization concentrated so much effort on the material aspect of life as the West. The Chinese discovered the powder long ago but used it in order to make beautiful fireworks. It was a kind of cultural and artist phenomena. When Europeans discovered the same gunpowder, they started immediately to kill each other and all other peoples. Western hegemony is based on disease so we should recognize the Western civilization of modernity as the pathology.
2022
Michigan
Kritik
**Final Supplement – FMPS** › **Kritik Updates** › Psycho 2NC – AT: Universality = Violent
McGowan, 20—professor of film studies at the University of Vermont (Todd, “Universal Villains,” Universality and Identity Politics, Chapter 3, ebook)
One could even go so far as to say that the interpretation of the political catastrophes of the twentieth century was itself another catastrophe. It produced fewer victims, to be sure, but the damage to political thought that it left behind was long-lasting. Rather than seeing Nazism and Stalinism as particular crimes stemming from an abandonment or distortion of universality, the common interpretations of these phenomena characterized them as instances of the universal’s inhuman barbarism. These were not crimes of the universal, but this is how most interpreters saw them. Interpreters thus missed that these were either crimes of particularity (in the case of Nazism) or crimes of a deviation from the universal (in the case of Stalinism). The deleterious effect of the predominant interpretation reverberates through the theorization of politics up to the present. We continue to exist in the wake of the fundamental misinterpretation of the horrors of the twentieth century.
Theodor Adorno is perhaps the exemplary figure of this widespread misinterpretation. Adorno contends that the eradication of difference is Nazism’s primary crime. (He doesn’t talk at length about Stalinism but focuses exponentially more of his theoretical energy on Nazism.) His analysis of Nazism links its eradication of difference in the figure of the Jew to the history of universalizing German philosophy. While Adorno locates his own thought in the dialectical tradition of Hegel and Marx, he also sees Hegel’s universalism as guilty for preparing the way for Nazism’s annihilation of the particular. 1 Excessive universality is not just the Nazi sin, but also that of the entire tradition of Western thought beginning with Homer.
2022
Michigan
Kritik
**Final Supplement – FMPS** › **Kritik Updates** › Psycho 2NC – AT: Perm vs K affs
McGowan, 20—professor of film studies at the University of Vermont (Todd, “Our Particular Age,” Universality and Identity Politics, Chapter 1, ebook)
One of the most politically debilitating errors of recent thought is the contention that one must construct the universal out of particulars. According to this position, particulars are given, while we derive universals from the act of bringing a series of particulars together. This epistemological turn is politically debilitating precisely because it occurs on the Left rather than on the Right—its natural home. In contemporary politics, the Left retreats to the terrain of the particular, which is the Right’s terrain.
This position is fully visible in the contributions from Ernesto Laclau and Judith Butler to the collection Contingency, Hegemony, Universality. In different ways, Laclau and Butler voice their discomfort with universality. 26 This discomfort reveals that they each see the particular as an ontological given and the universal as what we arrive at through engagement with multiple particulars. They are, to put it in the terms from above, disciples of Aristotle rather than Plato.
2022
Michigan
Kritik
**Final Supplement – FMPS** › **Kritik Updates** › Psycho 2NC – AT: Perm vs K affs
McGowan, 20—professor of film studies at the University of Vermont (Todd, “Our Particular Age,” Universality and Identity Politics, Chapter 1, ebook)
Universality is the lack in every particular. 16 It is the insubstantiality of the particular, the dependence of the particular on what it is not. No particular entity is simply self-contained and exists on its own. It is always involved with what it is not.17 The universal is not the other on which the particular depends but what makes the particular’s selfsufficiency impossible. The point at which the particular cannot sustain itself in isolation is the point at which its involvement in universality becomes noticeable. The lack that forges this connectivity is the site of universality. If particular objects were self-contained and isolated, it would be impossible to affect them in any way. There would be genuine particularity—isolated monads. But chopping down a tree or eating a tomato or even skipping a rock across a lake reveals the intrusion of universality in the particularity of these objects. These are not just collisions of particulars with other particulars. The lack that makes such collisions possible is a universal opening insofar as it gives the lie to the isolation of the particular.
Because it exists only as an absence, we can never simply have universality. The universal’s status is thus always in question, always subject to doubt and debate. It is never fully instantiated in the way that Aristotle would have it, but this status is what gives universality its transformative potential. By instantiating the universal, Aristotle strips it of its power to transform the present by reducing it to the present. Instantiating the universal has the effect of hiding it.
2022
Michigan
Kritik
**Final Supplement – FMPS** › **Kritik Updates** › Psycho 2NC – Alt vs K affs
McGowan, 20—professor of film studies at the University of Vermont (Todd, “Introduction: Finding Universality,” Universality and Identity Politics, Introduction, ebook)
But at the same time, the widespread suspicion of universality and corresponding elevation of identity make possible a clarification of both universality and identity. The political catastrophe is a philosophical opportunity. In the wake of this political reversal, we can make clear that universality is not totalitarian and that particular identity isn’t actually outside of universality. Universality is at once what is missing in the totality and the necessary foundation of every particular identity. Paradoxically, the structure of universality can become fully evident in the aftermath of the political turn against the universal. This turn demands a reevaluation of what universality actually is. The universal is not what it seems to be. It is not a quality that multiple particulars possess in common.
The universal is what particulars share not having. The shared absence of the universal rather than the shared possession of it bonds particulars together. The key to an emancipatory politics in the aftermath of Nazism and Stalinism—and in the epoch of global capitalism—is the recognition that the universal is what we don’t have in common or our shared absence.
2022
Michigan
Kritik
**Final Supplement – FMPS** › **Kritik Updates** › Psycho 2NC – Link – POMO
McGowan, 20—professor of film studies at the University of Vermont (Todd, “Universal Villains,” Universality and Identity Politics, Chapter 3, ebook)
Most left-wing theorists turned away from universality after Stalinism without directly commenting on it. With the exception of Merleau-Ponty, Jean-Paul Sartre, and a few others, theorists simply took up a defense of the particular as their response to the gulag. The silence of Theodor Adorno on Stalinism is especially conspicuous, given how much time he devoted to the analysis of Nazism and the individuals who succumbed to its appeal. But equally noteworthy is the lack of analysis by figures like Michel Foucault, Gilles Deleuze, and Jürgen Habermas, just to name a few. Almost no major theorist of the generation that emerges during the 1960s tries to theorize why the communist project went so wrong with Stalin.
Instead of explicitly critiquing Stalinism for its universality as they do with Nazism, most theorists tended to particularize Marxism in order to make it more palatable and to eliminate the danger of the Marxist universal that Stalinism represents for them. In this vision, there become multiple forms of Marxism. Stalinism results from the narrowing of this multiplicity to a single universal model. Stalin oversteps by taking Marxism too far in a universal direction, but we can retain Marxism as long as we jettison the universality that makes it unpalatable.
2022
Michigan
Kritik
**Final Supplement – FMPS** › **Kritik Updates** › Psycho 2NC – Universality Good vs K affs
McGowan, 20—professor of film studies at the University of Vermont (Todd, “Introduction: Finding Universality,” Universality and Identity Politics, Introduction, ebook)
Despite the obviousness of inequality in contemporary society, universal equality has ceased to be a thriving political project. This is perhaps the strangest feature of the current order. Rather than fight the massive inequality with a project of universal equality, we engage in struggles for justice for a series of groups—without ever defining justice, without ever naming the equality that would constitute justice. The absence of universalist claims today stands out and separates our epoch politically from prior ones. But the turn away from universality is not just one political development among many. To betray universality is to give up on the project of emancipation altogether.
This is what all the great political revolutionaries of the past have recognized. From the Jacobins in France to the suffragettes in the United States to the African National Congress in South Africa, the most significant political actors have seen universality as the absolute key to their struggle. This is why abolitionist hero Frederick Douglass participated in the epochal Seneca Falls Convention for women’s suffrage and why feminist Elizabeth Cady Stanton joined the Anti-Slavery Convention. They were not practicing coalition building. Both understood that one could not separate the emancipation of some from the universal project of emancipation.
2022
Michigan
Kritik
**Final Supplement – FMPS** › **Kritik Updates** › Psycho 2NC – FW vs K Affs
McGowan, 20—professor of film studies at the University of Vermont (Todd, “Our Particular Age,” Universality and Identity Politics, Chapter 1, ebook)
How one conceives a struggle is always more significant than which side one takes in the struggle—because it determines which side will be more psychically appealing. We should not measure political victory by who wins elections or by whose issues triumph but by how we envision the political struggle itself. The decisive political question involves not the conclusions that we come to but the form that politics takes. This is evident on a very elementary level in the thinking of Karl Marx: he sees that if we view global politics as the confrontation between sovereign nations, it is impossible to recognize the class antagonism that knows no national borders. We’ll always be thinking about international conflicts and will never be able even to raise the question of class exploitation that transcends national barriers. Historically, Marxists have spent so much time fighting against nationalism because they recognize that investment in the idea of the nation produces a fundamental barrier to seeing the possibility of class struggle.1
This is why one of the first things that Lenin wanted to do when he created a communist government in Russia was to put an end to Russia’s participation in World War I. Following Marx, he saw that the question of an international conflict would render the class struggle invisible. This lesson from Marxism shows that our conception of what constitutes the form of political conflict shapes the possibilities that will be able to emerge in the actual political struggle.
2022
Michigan
Kritik
**Final Supplement – FMPS** › **Kritik Updates** › Psycho 1NC – Universality K vs K Affs
McGowan, 20—professor of film studies at the University of Vermont (Todd, “The Importance of Being Absent,” Universality and Identity Politics, Chapter 2, ebook, dml)
This shared way of relating to the universal can be seen as the basis of freedom. Although societies may suppress the awareness of freedom, freedom is universal across every type of social order. The basis for this universal freedom is the inability of any form of mastery, no matter how despotic, to be complete. No society can determine its subjects with complete success but has a point of nonbelonging on which mastery ultimately founders. This point of nonbelonging universally marks every form of society and every type of culture from within. Despite efforts to minimize its effects, it acts as a constant disturbance of every society’s daily functioning. As the point of nonbelonging, the universal is the reverse side of total despotism. Universality exists in despotism’s lack.1
Even if a structure of mastery assimilates one point of nonbelonging, it cannot assimilate nonbelonging as such. Mastery strives toward becoming total, but as it comes closer to eliminating all resistance, it runs into an insuperable barrier—its own dependence on what it cannot assimilate—that acts as a brake on its total control. This barrier energizes the compulsion to mastery by giving it something to act on and thus a reason for being. But despite the power exercised on it, the barrier proves unyielding because it represents the necessary condition for the existence of any mastery at all. As a result, despotic power can’t achieve total despotism. Its external barrier is really an internal limit. If the external barrier ceases to be intractable, another one will emerge. When it comes to despotism, the elimination of one barrier is always the prelude to a new one that will seem just as intractable as the former one did.