2022
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Security K › AT Common 2AC Arguments › AT: Threats Are Real – General
Eberle and Daniel, 2022
(Jakub, Research Director at the Institute of International Relations Prague, and Jan, researcher and the Head of the Centre for the Study of Global Regions at the Institute of International Relations Prague, “Anxiety geopolitics: Hybrid warfare, civilisational geopolitics, and the Janus-faced politics of anxiety,” Political Geography, Vol. 92, January 2022, Article 102502, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.polgeo.2021.102502, accessed 6/30/2022, ZW)
For this purpose, we reach to the literature on the politics of anxiety drawing mainly on the work of Jacques Lacan, a psychoanalyst whose ideas have been increasingly prolific in IR (for an authoritative overview see Zevnik & Mandelbaum, 2021), and, to a lesser extent, critical geopolitics (Klinke, 2016; Laketa, 2019; Müller, 2013). Our approach shares the Giddensian notion that anxiety is an inarticulable, traumatic and potentially paralysing affect that subjects attempt to avoid and repress. However, instead of seeing it as merely something that ‘lurks’ behind as the dark other of normal life, anxiety is understood as a durable affective condition interwoven in everyday experiences as well as social processes and political institutions. It doesn’t just lurk, it is always already there, as it is present in the key mechanisms that hold society together: in the production of social subjects and the creation of rules through which these are regulated and bound together.
2022
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Security K › AT Common 2AC Arguments › AT: Tech Development Neutral
McCarthy, 2021
(Daniel R., Senior Lecturer in International Relations at the University of Melbourne, “Imagining the security of innovation: technological innovation, national security, and the American way of life,” Critical Studies on Security, Vol. 9, Iss. 3, 2021, pp. 196-211, https://doi.org/10.1080/21624887.2021.1934640, accessed 7/2/2022, ZW)
Technological innovation is generically viewed in security studies in an instrumental fashion, as a means to the end of national power and, thus, national security (Mearsheimer 2001, 62; Taylor, C., 2004, 602; cf. Kennedy and Lim 2018). An instrumental understanding of technological innovation presents innovation as context-transcendent and ahistorical. Essentializing innovation in these terms makes it difficult to understand how and why actually existing state innovation policies take a specific form and, in turn, how certain forms of technological innovation become ends in themselves and objects of security politics.
2022
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Security K › AT Common 2AC Arguments › AT: Realism Good
Sireci and Coletta 09 (Jonathan Sireci and Damon Coletta, Damon V. Coletta is Professor of Political Science at the United States Air Force Academy. Jonathan Sireci is a US cadet., Enduring without an enemy: NATOs realist foundations, Institute of International Relations, 2009.)
Difficulties associated with realist reactions to the persistence of NATO begin at the foundations of realism itself. Realism as a theoretical orientation toward the inter national system supposedly values what is over what should be (Carr, c1938, 2001: 63). When a theory that values cold, hard, objective reality as the cornerstone for explaining what will occur denies something obviously real, like continued NATO activity, the irony is damning. Beginning with neorealism, the scientific brand launched by Kenneth Waltz's (1979) Theory of International Politics offered a cogent restructuring of classic realist thought (Keohane, 1986:14). Waltz addressed Hans Morgenthau's failure to clarify the usage of such central terms as 'power' and 'balance of power' while avoiding the reductionism that weakened previous formulations. With respect to actors and goals in his theory, Waltz disciplined his predecessors' ideas, summing up states as 'unitary actors who, at a minimum, seek their own preservation and, at a maximum, drive for universal domination' (Ibid.: 13-15). He argued that the fundamental nature of states leads to balancing in their interactions. The position of every state within the structure of states' relative capabilities permits a systemic expression of international order (i.e., bipolarity or multipolarity) (Nye, 1988). For Waltz, the Cold War was a classic example of bipolar power alignment, NATO was fundamentally linked to this bipolar power alignment, and NATO would not survive the collapse of the Soviet Union because new power arrangements at the interstate level would render it obsolete (Keohane and Waltz, 2000-2001). Waltz excused the glaring failure of neorealism by arguing that the dissolution of the Soviet threat ultimately allowed American policy to become capricious (Waltz, 2000). Essentially, he retreated to the notion that while constancy of threat produces constancy of policy, in the absence of threat, policies become unpredictable.
2022
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Security K › AT Common 2AC Arguments › AT: IR Flexible
Pan, 2021
(Chengxin, Associate Professor of International Relations at the School of Humanities and Social Sciences at Deakin University, “Racialised politics of (in)security and the COVID-19 Westfailure,” Critical Studies on Security, Vol. 9, Iss. 1, 2021, pp. 40-45, https://doi.org/10.1080/21624887.2021.1904195, accessed 7/2/2022, ZW)
Of course, boundaries of zones of (in)security can change. But redrawing such boundaries is again often the prerogative of scholars who self-identify with the ‘zone of security’. They routinely play a crucial cartographer’s role in mapping and re-mapping zones of (in)security (Huntington’s civilisational map and the ‘Indo-Pacific’ come to mind).2 Their dominance in the process of knowledge production about (in)security and about IR more broadly exposes and, indeed, often solidifies a colour line in academia that mirrors the racialised realities of IR (see also Henry, and Haastrup and Hagen 2021). Scholars of colour and/or from the South are at best treated as area specialists, a lowly ranked niche in the scholarly epistemic hierarchy, thus perpetuating the epistemic status quo that has helped produce the racially-mediated binaries in security thinking and practice in the first place.
2022
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Security K › FW › AT: Ivory Tower/Not Policy-Relevant
de Goede, 2020
(Marieke, Professor of Politics with a focus on 'Europe in a Global Order’ at the University of Amsterdam, “Engagement all the way down,” Critical Studies on Security, Vol. 8, Iss. 2, 2020, pp. 101-115, https://doi.org/10.1080/21624887.2020.1792158, accessed 7/2/2022, ZW)
Belgian philosopher Isabelle Stengers – and her philosophical companions – may contribute to exploring the affordances of the encounter between STS and CSS in relation to thinking critically. Stengers’ writing is substantial, and I do not here claim to be an expert in her philosophy, nor to be able to do justice to its many aspects. But her work as a practically engaged philosopher serves as an inspiration to further pursue the question of critique at the intersection between STS and CSS. It offers fruitful thinking and concrete starting points to build on Foucault’s notion of specific intellectuals, but also to push beyond. In fact, Stengers builds on Foucault’s calls for an ‘experimental’ critical attitude, which ‘put[s] itself to the test of reality … both to grasp the points where change is possible and desirable, and to determine the precise form this change should take’ (Foucault, quoted in Stengers 2019, 2). With a parallel to 1990s debates on anti-foundationalism in International Relations that debated whether politics is ‘interpretation all the way down’ (Brown 1994; Doty 1997), Stengers (2019, 19) proposes that critique is ‘engagement all the way down.’ This section outlines possible contours of engaged critique as offered in the work of Stengers and others, to think through the ways in which these can be drawn upon for a critical analytics of security.
2022
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Security K › FW › Critique Key to Policy – Hybrid Warfare
Eberle and Daniel, 2022
(Jakub, Research Director at the Institute of International Relations Prague, and Jan, researcher and the Head of the Centre for the Study of Global Regions at the Institute of International Relations Prague, “Anxiety geopolitics: Hybrid warfare, civilisational geopolitics, and the Janus-faced politics of anxiety,” Political Geography, Vol. 92, January 2022, Article 102502, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.polgeo.2021.102502, accessed 6/30/2022, ZW)
Introducing anxiety geopolitics as a conceptual linchpin between disparate arguments from debates on critical geopolitics, ontological security, and politics of anxiety, this article made two central contributions. First, we have theorised the relationship between geopolitics and anxiety, moving beyond the existing accounts above all by pointing out the Janus-faced character of anxiety geopolitics, in which anxiety is both repressed and reproduced. Second, using the case of Czechia, we have argued that hybrid warfare is a discourse that constantly oscillates between repressing anxiety by geopoliticising the source of danger in East/West terms, and subverting its own constructions by presenting the threats as insidious, invisible, and constantly shifting. Therefore, we contend that the HW discourse is structured in a way that cannot achieve its purported ambition to secure populations against ‘hybrid threats’ and instead ends up producing more insecurity and anxiety.
2022
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Security K › Alternative › 1NC – Reject Alt
Van Rythoven 14 (Eric Van Rythoven, PhD candidate at Carleton University studying emotion, securitization, and world politics, E-international Relations, December 21, ) SW
The recent forum on emotions and world politics in the journal International Theory is a welcome development for the field of International Relations. The contributors helpfully remind us that emotions research in IR remains hampered by a number of deeply embedded assumptions, such as the belief that emotions are only private and personal phenomena, or the belief there is a sharp dichotomy between emotion and rationality. Critically assessing these assumptions is important not only because it highlights what the discipline gets ‘wrong’ in its picture of world politics, but because it illuminates how current theories help to propagate such distortions.
In this brief intervention I focus on an additional assumption concerning emotion, one which permeates the subfield of security studies. Here I am referring to the widely shared belief in the ubiquity of fear in the politics of security. While this association is historically rooted in Hobbesian accounts of anarchy it has a distinct contemporary form. Fear, we are told by a variety of figures, permeates the politics of security and is consistently and successfully marshalled by political elites, security professionals, and bureaucrats to sustain new images of threat which lead to an ever broadening security agenda. Fear, whether over predatory great powers, immigrant minorities, or infectious diseases, facilitates securitization. As a latent social resource collective fears always appear to be waiting patiently in the margins of discourse until they are easily and unproblematically deployed in a security argument.
2022
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Security K › Impact › China War
Song 15(Weiqing Song, chinese university of hong kong press, 2015, Securitization of the "China Threat" Discourse: A Poststructuralist Account, Jstor, https://www.jstor.org/stable/24291932?seq=1) TG
A few researchers diverge from the mainstream response to this
issue. Oliver Turner, for example, highlights the ideational rather than material factors in the processes of representing the China threat complicit in the U.S.–China policy.13 He argues that the main purpose of these processes is to create a threatening Chinese identity, foreign to that of the United States, to trigger actions that reinforce the binary opposition between the two countries. Before Turner and in the same vein, Pan takes a poststructuralist discursive approach to interpreting the role of the China threat within the U.S. political discourse. He focuses on the “discursive construction of otherness” by which China is fashioned as a “threatening, absolute other” to the “US-led evolutionary scheme.”14 Much of Pan’s discussion of this issue is devoted to real policy implications, namely the risk that considering “theory as practice” in U.S. policy will give rise to a real “China threat.”15 He further expands his scope of enquiry by deconstructing the Western representation of China’s rise. To him, dominant Western perceptions of China’s rise tell us less about China and more about Western self-imagination and its desire for certainty.
2022
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Security K › Impact › China War
Kimiayjan and Romero, 22 Pouyan Kimiayjan: Research Associate at the Institute for Peace and Diplomacy and Johnsen Romero: Policy Research Assistant at the Institute for Peace and Diplomacy and a Yenching Scholar at Peking University; The National Interest; January 15, 2022; https://nationalinterest.org/feature/securitized-competition-china-working-against-america-199279 // KM
In November 2021, U.S. president Joe Biden and Chinese president Xi Jinping held their first on managing great power competition and a “new Cold War.” The talks, however, a diplomatic breakthrough. There was no agreement on such as arms control, the coronavirus pandemic, climate change, and trade disputes. While the summit may ultimately ease tensions in the medium-term, the two countries were less inclined to agree on a framework that would encourage a more conciliatory approach. Part of the difficulty appears to be a political atmosphere that is increasingly hostile to diplomacy and a rising disposition to framing competition in security terms. The occasional rhetoric of non-confrontation aside, the threat perceptions of policymakers in Washington and Beijing are normalizing an existential contest for the twenty-first century. Instead of strengthening existing economic partnerships in the Asia Pacific region, the U.S. foreign policy establishment is more willing than ever to rally allies and lean on security partnerships—such as —to buttress the rules-based international order it has traditionally led. As China has risen to be an economic powerhouse in its own right, the United States has consistently resorted to “securitization” as a policy of choice. The militarization of Washington’s posture in the Pacific predates Biden and his immediate predecessor. Much overlooked is the Obama administration’s once-touted “” to Asia and its aim to reassign U.S. defense priorities to the region. On one hand, the “pivot” meant an increase in U.S. military spending and U.S. Navy assets in the region; on the other, China began ramping up its own military spending [and] its to secure its claims and trade routes in the South China Sea. Consequently, the regional military buildup can exacerbate tensions in several turbulent theatres. For instance, the prevailing security dilemma among the two powers can further escalate military tensions over , sparking a conflict with disastrous consequences for regional stability and the world economy.
2022
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Security K › Impact › 1NC – Cyclical Insecurity
Eberle and Daniel, 2022
(Jakub, Research Director at the Institute of International Relations Prague, and Jan, researcher and the Head of the Centre for the Study of Global Regions at the Institute of International Relations Prague, “Anxiety geopolitics: Hybrid warfare, civilisational geopolitics, and the Janus-faced politics of anxiety,” Political Geography, Vol. 92, January 2022, Article 102502, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.polgeo.2021.102502, accessed 6/30/2022, ZW)
On the other hand, however, the Lacanian take allows us to account also for the politics that is imminent in the failure of these anxiety-managing attempts. As we have argued, all narratives built around particular objects of fear, including geopolitical ones, are eventually failing, as these objects are ultimately ‘false targets’. They are merely temporary discursive vessels functioning as placeholders for expressing deeper ontological anxiety, which is bound to strike back. Consequently, attempts to make societies (feel) more secure, habitually end up making them (feel) equally, or even more, insecure and anxious, regardless of how much effort is invested into fighting this or that particular threat. As Heath-Kelly (2015, 2018) and Jacobsen (2020) have shown, successful security discourses like counter-terrorism or cybersecurity have actually managed to internalise this ‘failure to secure’ (Heath-Kelly, 2015) by incorporating it into their very structure. According to them, counter-terrorism and cybersecurity are constructed as dangers so slippery and multifaceted that once we resolve one problem (by killing Osama bin Laden, resolving a particular cyberthreat), a whole new range of terrorist groups or cyber issues emerges to occupy their place.
2022
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Security K › Link › Terrorism
Kronfeld 18- a philosophy doctorate student at Rutgers University
Melissa Jane Kronfeld, May 2018 “The Construction and Prioritization of Threats in the Post-Cold War Era and the Evolution of American National Security Policy ” https://rucore.libraries.rutgers.edu/rutgers-lib/57350/PDF/1/play/ //mj
When employing crisis discourse to frame the threat of terrorism, Trump has consistently engaged in the amplified, fear-mongering rhetoric necessary for high level prioritization, as depicted in Chapter Four. Crisis discourse plays on American fears of threats to its values and principles. Morgan Marietta, et. al. argues Trump has been successful at, “melding threat and absolutism into the absolutist threat” by grounding rhetoric in the context of threats to personal safety.1476 And linking foreign policy to national identity, as explored in the Chapter Two, is a powerful rhetorical tool and critical framing mechanism. Oz Hassan writes, Trump securitized Islam through Islamophobia and Orientalism, making Muslims an existential threat.1477 Like his predecessors, Micah Zenko writes, Trump has succeeded in depicting terrorism as a ‘monolithic enemy.’1478 Trump has described terrorism, as “a tremendous threat, far greater than people in our country understand.”1479 In his inaugural address, the President declared, “we will unite the civilized world against radical Islamic terrorism, which we will eradicate completely from the face of the Earth.”1480 Trump has stated he would ‘demolish’ and ‘destroy’ ISIS and vowed to ‘eradicate’ the threat of ‘radical Islamic terrorism.’1481 And following the August attacks in Spain, Trump declared terrorism must be stopped “by any means necessary.”1482 But this further illustrates continuity across administrations. As Zenko notes, Bush, Obama and Trump have all suggested, “tough-sounding but implausible objectives.”1483 But Trump’s discourse tends to differ is in the amplification of certain elements of the threat. For example, the administration frequently employs the term ‘radical Islamist terrorism,’ and he has referred to terrorists as ‘lawless savages’, ‘savage killers’ and ‘horrible enemies.’14
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Security K › Link › Tech – Dual Use
Lupovici 21 Lupovici, Amir. “The Dual-Use Security Dilemma and the Social Construction of Insecurity.” Taylor & Francis, 6 Jan. 2021, Amir Lupovici is a senior lecturer in the School of Political Science, Government and International Affairs at Tel Aviv University and a research fellow in the Interdisciplinary Cyber Research Center at Tel Aviv University. He was a faculty fellow in the School of International Service at American University (2017-2018) and a visiting scholar in the Centre for Conflict Resolution of International Conflicts at the University of Copenhagen (2014), https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/13523260.2020.1866845. //parip
A dual-use security dilemma occurs when actors face an opponent that wields technologies with both civil and military/harmful applications. In developing this concept of the dual-use security dilemma, I build on traditional and constructivist approaches to security. Following traditional security scholars, I suggest that uncertainty shapes actors’ behavior and argue that we can extend the concept of security dilemma to capture the dynamics around the threat of dual-use technologies. However, these uncertainties, and actors’ responses, are also socially constructed and shaped by knowledge and social understandings. From a traditional security perspective, the dual-use security dilemma extends the dynamics of policy makers’ fears around an opponent’s defensive or offensive intentions to include the fear of the potentially harmful civil technologies. Policy makers are uncertain whether the opponents have harmful intentions in using the technology. But the potential of their using or adapting the technology for harmful purposes, even over the long term, creates insecurity and may spur policy makers to take measures to address the threat. Similar to the traditional security dilemma, these measures can influence an opponent’s behavior, leading it to acquire military means or even to make military use of the dual-use technology. Furthermore, and also like the traditional security dilemma, these dynamics may spiral, aggravating the actors’ security. Even actors whose aim was to develop technology solely for civil purposes may find themselves in an arms race or a costly situation. While militarily arming a civilian project can be very expensive (for both sides), failing to respond to a military project because of its civilian characteristics can also be very costly. From a constructivist approach, the dilemma is shaped by how the insecurity is constructed. Insecurity is not given, but rather is socially produced through actors calling attention to certain issues and mobilizing support to address them. Moreover, how a technology is applied—for peaceful or military purposes—is also socially determined. This means a technology’s dual-usage is influenced not only by its technical characteristics, but also by international norms, by how it is conceived, and by how knowledge is mediated by socio-scientific agents. Seeing a technology as dual-use allows an actor to construct it as a(n) (existential) threat, even if the technology is developed for civil purposes. The dilemma, then, is whether or not to securitize. While securitizing a potential challenge carries the advantage of preparing for a threat and mobilizing support for certain policy measures, it can also contribute to a spiral insecurity dynamic. Once a technology has been acknowledged as dual-use, an enunciator can take advantage of the accompanying uncertainty of how the technology will be used. They can securitize an opponent's dual-use technology to justify taking extraordinary measures to address it—regardless of the opponent’s intentions around developing the technology’s military/harmful applications. Furthermore, the very act of securitizing an opponent’s technology without taking any extraordinary measures—can alarm an opponent, who then initiates a securitizing reaction. All these may result in a securitizing chain reaction that decreases both actors’ security.
2022
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Security K › Link › Russia – General
Paegle 22 – member of the Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Government (Jana Paegle, “Pipeline demagogy?: The EU’s framing of Russia in the policy realms of decarbonization and energy security before and after the annexation of Crimea in 2014”, 6-17-22, https://www.diva-portal.org/smash/record.jsf?pid=diva2%3A1671671&dswid=-1632) //AK
How the EU frames Russia before and after the Crimean annexation betters our understanding of the motives and incentives behind a securitized unanimity in EU energy policy and decarbonization given previous internal dissensus. Europe’s energy transition and security policy is contingent upon Russian relations, considering its gas dependency. Given the 2022 Ukrainian invasion, studying past rhetorical change instigated within the EU is relevant, using the 2014 annexation as a potential catalyst. Russian energy flows reaching the EU are decreasingly predictable since they pass through key transit states like Ukraine. An overview of recent EU-Russian normative trajectories becomes appropriate as the EU tackles an energy crisis and is interconnected with an unreliable energy provider. Complex interdependence is used to explain the EU’s framing of Russia in energy relations, where mutual dependence, vulnerability and sensitivity to policy change define the states’ well-being, as postulated by Keohane and Nye. Marco Siddi’s conflict-cooperation dichotomy on the Russian Other supplements the framing analysis. An abductive coding approach forms the methodology, where the chosen material may inform the codes, alongside conceptual themes generated beforehand. The frames are applied to EU-parliamentary policy briefings, commission frameworks and bilateral EU-Russian roadmaps spanning between 2011-2016 with three yielded frames: ‘Commercial ties and sunk costs’, ‘Jeopardized security order’, and ‘Fossil-bound authoritarianism’. These frames are divided into pre-and post-annexation sections. The outcome points to attitude shifts in the EU, from perceiving Russia as a Cooperative Other to an Antagonistic Other. This manifests itself within energy security realms and partly in decarbonization. All three frames imply an EU-Russian bilateral relationship entrenched with sunk costs and commitments—with ideological rifts widening in energy security where the EU frames Russia as a normative and contractual violator. The changed framing of Russia may thus help explain how EU energy policy experienced recent change.
2022
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Security K › Link › Russia – General
Simanov 21 - Samara University
Егор Simanov “HOW COULD NATO AND RUSSIA CO-EXIST IN THE TIME OF THE INFORMATION AND "HYBRID" WARS? “No 1 (18) (2021) Pages: 100-105 https://journals.ssau.ru/smus/article/view/8782/en_US
The current condition of relations between Russia and the West, which consists of the NATO member-states, tends to chaotization and elimination of the institutions providing the architecture of regional and global security.
2022
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Security K › Link › Russia – Disinformation
Unver 22 - Associate Professor at Ozyegin University, Department of International Relations (Ahmet Kurnaz AND** Research Assistant, Political Science and Public Administration, Çanakkale 18 Mart University “Securitization of Disinformation in NATO Lexicon: A Computational Text Analysis” https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=4040148)
Our analysis has shown that NATO has developed two disinformation-related communication strategies for two outlets: a more up-to-date and faster-developing threat discourse for its Twitter presence, and a more traditional, slow-moving threat presence visible in its official documents. This is particularly interesting and acutely visible in more 20th century military topics like command and control cohesion, missile defense, air defense architecture, naval defense, satellites and military intelligence-related topics that are more frequently mentioned in official documents, and much less referenced on Twitter. However, the overwhelming majority of disinformation, misinformation, hybrid war, information warfare and fake news-related communication topics are securitized on Twitter. This shows the emergence of two NATO discourses: one for its official documents, and one for its social media presence and messaging. The advent of digital communication technologies and social media has been significant for the evolution of securitization. Since securitization entails production and dissemination of insecurity frames through discursive networks, a more dynamic, interconnected information ecosystem is more conducive for collective meaning-making. On social media, the formation of insecurity processes are more rapid and interactive, and are able to influence and alter traditional, boring securitizing acts of elites. To that end, media outlets like Twitter provide a more interactive and fast-paced securitizing environment where elites and non-elites can set the security agenda and mobilize masses. The most clear expression of this novel medium, as demonstrated in our results, is that NATO’s Twitter securitization efforts change much faster, and spread more widely than traditional outlets like official speeches, texts and reports. This could be interpreted in two ways: first, that NATO may prefer securitizing disinformation exclusively on Twitter, since such threats are generally more visible and debated on social media platforms. The second interpretation is that NATO’s official statements and documents could largely be focusing on macrolevel doctrinal issues that pose a direct military security threat to its members, rather than disinformation, which is a nuisance, but poses no direct military threat. Since disinformation is being discussed in contemporary policy debates within the context of electoral integrity and social polarization, their actual military relevance may be less relevant to be taken into account in formal NATO documents. In either case, our study of the NATO lexicon demonstrated that disinformation and related terms are constructed as uniquely ‘Russian’ nuisances. This isn’t surprising since most of these terms - at least their digital interpretations - have entered the NATO lexicon after the Russian military involvement in eastern Ukraine and Crimea. However, since then, Russia remained the only country against which NATO has constructed its disinformation narratives, indicating that Russia is NATO’s sole disinformation concern. Although very recently China has emerged as a runner-up country within the context of COVID-related disinformation concerns, Russia is largely the main threat in NATO’s lexicon. This could be counterproductive to long-term NATO efforts to combat disinformation, given the global prevalence of fake news and information meddling. While Russian disinformation efforts are observably valid, cornering a universal problem like disinformation into the limited space of NATO’s interactions with a single country may lead to conceptual contraction. This in turn, may prevent NATO from mobilizing full alliance resources against disinformation, defined as a global and universal problem. Overall, our analysis has shown that NATO still defines its security identity against Russia, and there isn’t a significant shift in NATO’s securitization dynamics since the Cold War, evidenced by our comparative analysis of older and newer NATO texts. Although Chinese disinformation attempts have also begun to enter into NATO threat language, NATO’s primary discursive security identity continues to develop against and around Russia. This is most evident in our longitudinal analysis or pre- and post-2014 documents that prioritize Russia as a threat alike, implying that it is not really disinformation or fake news agenda that is rendering Russia a threat for NATO. This suggests the hypothesis that even if technologies change, NATO Russia rivalry will remain securitized the same way. In other words, contemporary disinformation and fake news agenda is a continuation of the same NATO-Russia rivalry – at least in discursive form – through newer mediums.
2022
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Security K › Link › NATO
Porter 10 (Patrick Porter, Patrick Porter is Chair in International Security and Strategy at the University of Birmingham. He is a Fellow at the Royal United Services Institute, NATO'S FUTURE: Hooked On Security, TheWorldToday.org, November 2010)//KS
Currently, pressing menaces to our way of life are played out through banks not tanks. Yet NATO is not content with this staggering historical success, it cannot get enough security. Hungry to justify its existence and fascinated with itself, it ! scans the horizon for threats and the shadows of threats. NATO's role and limits have not been finally settled. Neither operations in the Sudan, Bosnia, Kosovo and I Afghanistan, nor new missions, nor new members, resolve the issue. There are endless arguments for growing it, redefining it, abandoning it, even for an Atlantic-Russian super-alliance. This identity question is not abstract. The issue of NATO's domain was bloodily raised in Russia's 2008 war over South Ossetia and Abkhazia, it divides the Ukrainian people, and in Afghanistan soldiers are dying and losing limbs to keep the alliance afloat. Its visionaries point to an unstable, complex world, a turbulent frontier on the periphery forever threatening our core. They warn of terrorists armed with apocalyptic weapons, of failing states and stealthy cyber attacks, a web of chain reactions and chaos. Their remedy is expanding membership and forward leaning offensives into failed states, or new game-changing defenses such as a missile shield system. And in the age of human security, defense means the export of Atlantic market democracy to stabilize the dark places of the earth and widen our defensive perimeter. Addiction increases in intensity even while the addict loses sight of the side effects. With peace and stability our forbears could not have dreamt of, NATO's addiction and identity crisis has become dangerous in itself. If there is a threat, it lies partly in NATO's messianic restlessness; its innocent vision of threats not flowing partly from its own behavior, but being simply ťout there'; its ideological fundamentalism; its own self-perception as the natural guardian of world order with obviously pure intentions ; and its exhausting, self-defeating pursuit of relevance.
2022
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Security K › Link › Hybrid Warfare
Eberle and Daniel, 2022
(Jakub, Research Director at the Institute of International Relations Prague, and Jan, researcher and the Head of the Centre for the Study of Global Regions at the Institute of International Relations Prague, “Anxiety geopolitics: Hybrid warfare, civilisational geopolitics, and the Janus-faced politics of anxiety,” Political Geography, Vol. 92, January 2022, Article 102502, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.polgeo.2021.102502, accessed 6/30/2022, ZW)
*HW = hybrid warfare
2022
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Kritik
Security K › Link › Hybrid Warfare
Eberle and Daniel, 2022
(Jakub, Research Director at the Institute of International Relations Prague, and Jan, researcher and the Head of the Centre for the Study of Global Regions at the Institute of International Relations Prague, “Anxiety geopolitics: Hybrid warfare, civilisational geopolitics, and the Janus-faced politics of anxiety,” Political Geography, Vol. 92, January 2022, Article 102502, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.polgeo.2021.102502, accessed 6/30/2022, ZW)
*HW = hybrid warfare
2022
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Kritik
Security K › Link › Democracy/Liberalism
Pan, 2021
(Chengxin, Associate Professor of International Relations at the School of Humanities and Social Sciences at Deakin University, “Racialised politics of (in)security and the COVID-19 Westfailure,” Critical Studies on Security, Vol. 9, Iss. 1, 2021, pp. 40-45, https://doi.org/10.1080/21624887.2021.1904195, accessed 7/2/2022, ZW)
Mainstream Western security thinking is predicated on a self-gratifying imaginative geography: the world is divided roughly into two contrasting zones, one marked by community, order, and security and the other by disorder, insecurity, and threat. These imagined binaries are both underpinned by and emblematic of a thinly disguised Orientalist, Eurocentric, and ultimately racist idea, which equates the former zone more or less with whites and the West, and the latter with non-whites (Barkawi and Laffey 2006; Howell and Richter-Montpetit 2019). The idea, often passed off as fact (through the Western-dominated subfield of security studies), has been constitutive of the highly racialised realities in international relations (Bell 2013; Carrozza, Danewid, and Pauls 2017; Ling 2017; Howell and Richter-Montpetit 2020).
2022
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Security K › Link › Cybersecurity – General
Jacobsen, 2020
(Jeppe Teglskov, researcher at the Royal Danish Defence College’s Institute for Military Technology, “From neurotic citizen to hysteric security expert: a Lacanian reading fo the perpetual demand for US cyber defence,” Critical Studies on Security, Vol. 8, Iss. 1, 2020, pp. 46-58, https://doi.org/10.1080/21624887.2020.1735830, accessed 7/2/2022, ZW)
At the end of 2008, the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) brought together policy experts to develop cybersecurity recommendation for the incoming president. Under the headline ‘Military Doctrine and Deterrence’, the commission report emphasised the importance of ‘the need for a credible military presence in cyberspace to provide a deterrent against potential attackers’ (CSIS 2008, 24). The following quote from the report, however, calls in to question the commission’s own recommendation: