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2022 Michigan Kritik
***NEG › Alternative

Alt solves – Feminism is the only solution to the continuum of violence. Overthrow of the patriarchy is key to preventing nuclear war.

Eschle 13 (Catherine, University of Strathclyde, “Gender and the Subject of (Anti)Nuclear Politics: Revisiting Women's Campaigning against the Bomb”, 2013, International Studies Quarterly Vol. 57, No. 4 (December 2013), , pd)

However, women's antinuclear activism, and indeed nuclear politics more generally,4 has faded from the pur¬view of gender and security studies in recent years. This is problematic, in the first place because it means femi¬nist IR scholars have paid negligible attention to post-Cold War nuclear developments. While it could be argued this simply reflects the demobilization of women's antinuclear campaigning in the United States and UK with the end of the Cold War and the corresponding decline of the threat posed by the nuclear arms race, feminist IR scholarship has long contested such a straightforward empiricist reading of what counts as wors¬thy of research. In any case, nuclear weapons did not dis¬appear in the 1990s and nor did campaigning against them, as we are reminded by an important but neglected body of feminist work on/aligned with critical responses to the 1997 Indian nuclear tests (e.g., Oza 2006; Das 2007; Chowdhry No date).5 The failure more generally in gender and security studies to engage with such develop¬ments serves not only to fix women's antinuclear cam- paigning in a particular form and to a particular moment, but also to aid the naturalization of nuclear weapons in the post-Cold War world. An additional problem resulting from the decline of ongoing critical engagement with nuclear politics in gender and security studies is that the 1980s Cold War activism of such key initial influence now tends to be perceived in rather simplistic and even stereotyped ways. On the one hand, the rare mentions of nuclear politics in recent over¬views of gender and security studies imply a rather idealized view, relying as they do on a truncated version of the narra¬tive by Enloe and Sylvester et al. about Greenham women stepping into agency in IR, without critically re-examining the original texts or revisiting the evidence (Blanchard 2003:1294, 1302; Sjoberg 2009:197, note 84; Shepherd 2010a,b:78-9).6 The cumulative result is the romanticiza¬tion of the figure of the Cold War woman antinuclear cam¬paigner as a kind of feminist warrior who has now passed into the history books. On the other hand, in gender and security studies more generally, these same campaigners have been effectively demonized. With feminist IR scholars forced to confront misreadings of their own project as bio¬logically determinist by the mainstream of IR (see Tickner 1999; Shepherd 2010a), and with the rising popularity in the field of antiessentialist poststructuralist approaches, initial anxieties about women's peace politics have been strongly reinforced and attention has swung sharply in the opposite direction, toward investigations of the role of women as gender-destabilizing agents of political violence. There is an implicit assumption here that the Cold War anti¬nuclear activist is intrinsically pacific and gender-conserva-tive, the nemesis of feminist IR rather than its lost hope. As Tina Managhan has indicated (2007), however, such an assumption can and should be scrutinized. In line with Managhan, my starting point in this article is the proposition that an antiessentialist, poststructural¬ist-influenced methodology, far from necessitating the avoidance of women's antinuclear activism, can illumi¬nate it in fresh and interesting ways. Recent systematiza¬tions of this methodology in gender and security studies are set out in part one, along with the parameters of my empirical research. I then go on in part two to identify the "basic discourses" in circulation among women cam¬paigners against nuclear weapons in the United States and UK in the later Cold War period, each offering differently gendered constructions of the political subject mobilized in antinuclear struggle. In the third and final part of the article, I explore the ways in which these discourses are reproduced and reconfigured in the post-Cold War texts of Helen. Caldicott, in the United States, and Angie Zelter, in the UK. In so doing, I argue that there were multiple figures of the antinuclear campaigner circulating in Cold War women's activism and that new subjectivities are emerging in contemporary writing in ways that reflect and reproduce the shift from a Cold War to a post-Cold War context and the differing political environments of the United States and UK. I conclude that gender and security scholars ought therefore to revi¬sit fixed, unitary assumptions about the identities of women antinuclear campaigners, as one element in a broader, critical reengagement with the gendered dimen¬sions of nuclear politics. I close by suggesting some future lines of enquiry for such an undertaking, with The literature in IR combining poststructuralism and feminism is heterogeneous and rapidly expanding, but it is specifically the recent methodological recommenda¬tions with regard to gender and security studies devel¬oped separately by Lene Hansen and Laura J. Shepherd that I am interested in here. For these scholars, the sub-stantive focus of poststructuralist-influenced feminist enquiry should be on the discursive construction of gen¬dered subjects in global politics. Thus, Hansen states, " [t]he relationship between identity and foreign policy is at the center of poststructuralism's research agenda" (2006:1), while for Shepherd it is her specifically feminist "curiosity about 'the concept, nature and practice of gender"' and the ways in which "gender configures boundaries of subjectivity" in IR that drives her research (Shepherd 2008a:3, citing Zalewski). To conceive of gen¬dered selfhood as discursively constructed is to see it as "existing only insofar as it is continually rearticulated and uncontested by competing discourses" (Hansen 2006:6). Defined as systems of meaning and representa¬tion, discourses are claimed to "fix" self-understandings and interpretations of the world, and thus to reproduce power relations (Shepherd 2008a:20-3), albeit always tem¬porarily and in incomplete ways. We are thus enjoined to enquire into "multiple and competing discourses about gender ... and security ... [which] articulate specific sub¬jects, ascribe identities to these subjects and position them in relation to each other" (Shepherd 2010b:76), thereby instantiating gendered relations of domination and resistance. As both Shepherd and Hansen make clear, the "discur¬sive ontology" (Hansen 2006:17) underpinning their approach is radically antiessentialist. In general terms, it entails rejection of the analytical utility of distinguishing between nondiscursive and discursive realms, and with this the possibility of enquiring into the material roots of tex¬tual representations, in favor of illuminating how material realities become interpreted as such (Hansen 2006:21-3; Shepherd 2008a:17-19). More specifically, this is an ontol¬ogy that goes beyond the argument in earlier second-wave feminism that the biological fixities of sex are distinct from and nondetermining of gendered identities and roles that are rather socially constructed and challengeable. A post¬structuralist-influenced feminist perspective necessitates rather a more thorough-going discursive constructionism in which the continual reenactment of the gender norms circulating in discourse is seen to shape and give meaning to concrete bodily differences. On this view, the chief task of the scholar bridging feminist and poststructuralist tradi¬tions should be to destabilize apparent certainties about both sex and gender rather than to make claims about or on behalf of gendered identities and thus reinforce power relations. In this light, my claim that Hansen and Shep¬herd's framework can help to illuminate antinuclear cam¬paigning by women needs some justification. There are two issues here that need disentangling. The first has to do with biological essentialism, and whether women's antinuclear activism and the study of it necessarily replicates the view that there are characteristic male and female traits, which are presocial or natural, and which determine immutable social and political outcomes. On this point, it should be recalled that the pioneering feminist IR writings mentioned above not only elaborated a critique of crass assumptions about the embodied subjectivities of women and men circulating in antinuclear discourses, but also lauded certain enactments of antinuclear campaigning as destabilizing of gender certainties, most notably at Green-ham Common. Moreover, as Managhan's more recent study of campaigners at Greenham and elsewhere demonstrates (2007), even when biologically essentialist identities are mobilized, they may have subversive political results.? Managhan concludes that the tactical effects of such identi¬ties should be subjected to careful empirical investigation from a poststructuralist-feminist perspective, rather than assumed a priori to be problematic (2007:646). By implica¬tion, their discursive construction merits critical scrutiny, rather than dismissal or avoidance. A second and more serious issue arises, however, if we accept the premise that a focus on women's antinuclear campaigning necessarily rests on an essentialist approach to the gendered subject in more general terms—assuming fixed, stable entities called women who exist prior to, and who are productive of, discourses and texts. Yet this pre¬mise too is contestable. Many poststructuralist feminists have argued on political grounds that it is possible to maintain a deconstructive analytical approach toward gen¬der while simultaneously pursuing an empirical focus on women, in an effort to avoid "complicity with mainstream efforts to 'write women out of IR" ' (Managhan 2007:644, citing Sylvester). In this vein, such scholars have combined "elements of skepticism, particularly about the social formation of subjects, with elements of a standpoint femi¬nism that has us acknowledging and interpreting what subjects say" (Sylvester 1994:52). Others have sought to develop a more theoretically consistent justification for their focus on women as subjects. Alison Stone, for one, has reinterpreted Butler as implying that "women" have "a history, a genealogy, a 'line of descent"' (2005:5, citing Gatens; see also 2004:15-23), with gender identities, how-ever, fleeting and unstable crystallizing in a layering pro¬cess through which past constructions leave their traces on what follows: "All women thus become located within an ongoing chain of practice and reinterpretation, which brings them into complex filiations with one another" (Stone 2004:19). As Shepherd concludes (2008a:4), such a view "allows for research that investigates the ways in which 'women' as subjects and objects act, speak, write and represent themselves, are represented, written about, spoken about and acted on" 8-including, one assumes, within the context of antinuclear discourses. After all, these have long been the site for the (self-)construction of feminized subjectivities in oppositional relation to the masculinized nuclear state, albeit largely within white, Western, middle-class parameters. So how, more concretely, should such research on women antinuclear campaigners be conducted? Hansen and Shepherd imply that written texts offer a particularly fruitful starting point, as sites in which discourses about gendered subjects are circulated and in which instances or practices of gendered representation are embodied (Shepherd 2008a:24-5). While neither author focuses entirely on the written word, also examining visual imagery and the body (Hansen 2000:300-305; 2007; Shepherd 2008a:24; 2008b), their stress on systems of representation and meaning-making nonetheless goes hand-in-hand with an emphasis on "the analytical centrality of language" (Shepherd 2008a:3) as "articulated in written and spoken text" (Hansen 2006:2). In the case of antinuclear politics, such an emphasis presents a useful empirical alternative to the mass mobilizations and embodied practices that so caught the attention of Enloe et al.9 These may continue to enjoy a nostalgic recirculation in the field of gender and security studies, but are no longer characteristic of antinu¬clear campaigning in the United States and UK today. For advice on text selection, Hansen is particularly help¬ful. Key to her schema is the poststructuralist assumption about the "intertextuality" of discourse, that is, the view that "texts build their arguments and authority through references to other texts," often across the boundaries of particular genres and across space and time, shifting the contours and nodes of a discourse as they do so (Hansen 2006:8, see also 55-72). She develops several models of intertextuality, the first focused on official discourse and documents, the second examining also wider foreign pol¬icy debates, and a third including either representations in popular culture, or the more "marginal political dis¬courses" of social movements and academic commentary (2006:59-64). All three models entail a preliminary focus on primary texts with the researcher then moving outward to secondary sources and conceptual histories, paying close attention to the rhetorical structures typical of the different genres examined (Hansen 2006:52-4, 65-72). The selection of texts for Hansen also depends on the temporal framing of a particular investigation (whether it examines a singular moment, historical development over time, or compares different time periods) and the num¬ber or type of "Selves" being studied, as well as on consid¬erations of textual clarity, popularity, authority, and availability (2006:73-87).10 Having thus identified a field of texts, the researcher should identify within them a handful of "basic discourses" that serve to structure politi¬cal discussion and imaginative possibilities (Hansen 2006:51-2). Then "one might subsequently (re)turn to a detailed study of the articulations of identity and policy within particular texts ... and situate them inside the con¬text of the larger political debate" (Hansen 2006:52). Shepherd focuses her methodological arguments more on techniques of textual analysis. She outlines two steps in this regard, the first focusing on the "rhetorical sche¬mata" of a text and involving a search for the linguistic structures that provide a sense of order in texts, thus constructing the meaning of the concepts ... In the identifica¬tion of representational practices specific to gender, for exam¬ple, I look for instances of gendered identities described "as" or "like", statements about gendered identities that can be problematized, and emphasis on aspects of gender provided by placement within the text. (Shepherd 2008a:30)” The second step involves an analysis of "predica¬tion/subject positioning" (Shepherd 2008a:26, 30-1), which requires unpacking both claims made about the gendered attributes of a person or thing by examining the associated adjectives and other descriptive words or qualifiers, and its position in relation to claims in the text about other persons or things. This chimes with Hansen's claim that a deconstructive reading illuminates identity construction in terms of a "process of linking," whereby a positive series of signifiers are connected to a particular subject, and a "process of differentiation" whereby signs gain their meaning from explicit or implicit contrast with their opposite (2006:19-21). As Hansen reminds us, the researcher should consider not only how discursive stabil¬ity is achieved, but also "instabilities and slips" in the articulation of relationships between identities (2006:42).12 These methodological arguments underpin the dis¬course analysis of antinuclear women's campaigning in the United States and UK that I present in the rest of the article. In Hansen's terms, this is a single Self enquiry, focusing on gendered constructions of the antinuclear activist. With regard to its temporal framing, it is the recent historical development of this Self which is under review, from the 1980s to the present. And with regard to its underlying model of intertextuality, my study examines the "marginal political discourses" of social movement activists, as well as academic commentary about them. In what follows, my reading of the material from and on activist circles in the UK and United States in the 1980s, ranging from pamphlets to academic books to Web documents, seeks to outline the "basic discourses" in circulation in this period, each mobilizing rival concep¬tions of gendered subjectivity and thus of the antinuclear campaigner. Turning to the post-Cold War period, in which the discursive field is sparser with little secondary commentary, I focus on texts by two well-known cam¬paigners that I suggest serve as sites of authoritative meaning-making among activists. A detailed deconstruc¬tion of the rhetorical structure and predicates in these texts is undertaken in order to expose continuities and shifts in the gendered constructions of the earlier period. Revisiting Cold War Discourses With the revival of the Cold War in the early 1980s and the accompanying resurgence of the peace movement around the world, and in the wake of the second wave of feminism, larger numbers of women than ever before mobilized against nuclear weapons. A new generation of all-women groups and women-led actions was launched: The United States, for example, saw the emergence of WAND—Women's Action for Nuclear Disarmament (Cal-dicott 1997:296-9)—and "the Ribbon," which involved 20,000 women and their male supporters wrapping embroidered cloth around the Pentagon (Pershing 1996). Moreover, many women did not confine them¬selves to ostensibly feminine or civil modes of political organizing, instead advocating changes in gender rela¬tions and participating in the revived direct action wing of the movement (Gusterson 1996:193-7, 213-4; Wittner 12 Shepherd advocates these strategies within the context of a Derridean double reading (2008a:28). This seems to be particularly suitable as a way of destabilizing texts that have ossified interpretations with wide authority. It may be, however, less helpful in initial efforts to uncover and unpack marginal political discourses. 2000). It is in this context that "Women's Pentagon Action" organized dramatic demonstrations and block¬ades, for example (Women's Pentagon Action 1982; Linton and Whitham 1989), and that the women's peace camp phenomenon arose. Women made their homes at Seneca Falls and Puget Sound in the United States (Paley 1989; Russell 1989a; Krasniewicz 1992) and at various nuclear bases across Europe, with Greenham Common camp in the UK remaining the earliest, largest, and most well-known example (Cook and Kirk 1983; Roseneil 1995, 2000; Hipperson 2005). Several basic discourses about gender and nuclear weapons helped structure this wave of mobilization. Such plurality has already been noted by academic commenta¬tors beyond IR: In the course of Hugh Gusterson's eth¬nography of the Livermore nuclear weapons laboratory and protests against it (1996:212-3), Roseneil's (1995): 4-7) analysis of the camp at Greenham, and Helen Lidd¬ington's (1991:6-8) overview of the historical antecedents of British women's peace mobilization, three main narra¬tives are identified, with each author naming and describ¬ing the three in varying terms. On my reading, however, six discourses can be distinguished, each giving rise to a different construction of the antinuclear activist. These discourses can be labeled, respectively, maternalist, antivi-olence, culturalist, materialist, cosmopolitan, and cosmo¬logical in character. To begin with, the maternalist discourse brought the fig¬ure of the "Mother-in-Action" to the fore as the key pro¬tagonist in antinuclear struggle (e.g., Caldicott 1986:236). Speaking to and from the reproductive capacities of women, and insisting on the importance of the caring responsibilities and values traditionally associated with them (Ruddick 1989), this discourse implied that a nuclear-free world required the reevaluation, reimagin¬ing, and extension of maternal values and practices, and the displacement of their masculine corollaries (Caldicott 1986:241-2). It thus provided a positive justification for women-led or women-only organizing, encouraging those who had previously been marginalized because of their association with caring responsibilities to make connec¬tions across the private and public realm and become a force for broader political change. The workings of this discourse can be seen in the repeated emphasis placed on motherhood in explanations given by individuals for their mobilization (Roseneil 2000:46, 56-9; Pettit 2006:24-6); in the decorative and symbolic use of photo¬graphs of and drawings by children at protest events (Cook and Kirk 1983:31; Pershing 1996:128-9); and in the revitalization and reworking in activist circles of crafts associated with white, middle-class feminine domesticity such as embroidery (Krasniewicz 1992:60-6; Pershing 1996). One complementary discourse could be termed antivi¬olence, focused as it was on the problematic masculinity of the mainstream political subject and its connection to nuclear politics. Here, masculinity was constructed either as intrinsically pathological or as structurally corrupted: Either way, nuclear weaponry was contextualized on a continuum of violence perpetrated by men and male-dominated institutions—from rape, through domestic violence, to war (Held 1988; Russell 1989b). Within the terms of this discourse, the roots of violence were located in male sexuality and an associated drive to dom¬inate women, nonwhites, and nature (Kokopeli and La-key 1982:233, 235-8; Easlea 1983), and/or to a larger system or structure of "patriarchy" (Warnock 1982; Zanotti 1982), both explanations bearing witness to the influence of radical feminist analyses (Koen and Swaim 1980:1; Roseneil 1995:6-7; 2000:34). Although it was pri¬marily concerned to critique pronuclear male subjectiv¬ity, this discourse had the effect of elevating existing models of femininity and womanhood, providing as it did a negative justification for women-only organizing against the bomb (Held 1988; Rosenbluth and Russell 1989:302-5). A generalized figure of the "Woman" became by default the bearer of antinuclear struggle, a world without nuclear weapons requiring variously the feminization of male psychology, the overthrow of male power and patriarchal structures by women, or even limi¬tations on the numbers of men born into the world (Gearhart 1982). The culturalist discourse, in contrast, had a distinctive emphasis on the cultural construction of hegemonic male and female subjects and the need for and possibility of challenging both. This discourse again positioned patriar¬chy as the structural context in which nuclear weaponry gained its symbolic resonance, but there was also some consideration here of the ways in which patriarchy over¬lapped with and was constituted by power relations such as heterosexism and racism (Smith 1989). This enabled the articulation of a more complex, intersectional cri¬tique of the ways in which dominant forms of masculinity underpinned and fed into Cold War nuclearism (see e.g., Hartsock 1989; Spretnak 1989; Strange 1989). It also allowed for an avowedly feminist "queering" of dominant models of femininity (as embodied, for example, in maternal tropes and their association with middle-class, white, heterosexual respectability) and advocacy of alter-native ways of being (Snitow 1989; Roseneil 2000: chap¬ters 7 and 10). Overall, the discourse hinged on the construction of the "Reflexive Activist," whose critical self-examination and insistence on the stratified, change¬able character of gender, was positioned as central to the struggle for change. As Gusterson (1996:212) indicates, culturalist arguments pointed ultimately to a vision of the postnuclear world as "androgynous," with gender differ¬ence no longer playing a politically meaningful role. The fourth discourse was materialist in character, emphasizing the impact of nuclear weapons and their cost. Widespread in the antinuclear movement (Roseneil 1995:5), when circulating in and through women's activ¬ism, this discourse was frequently typified by a preoccupa¬tion with the impact of nuclear weapons on female bodies and lives. The implications for the reproductive system of exposure to radiation were highlighted, for example (Koen and Swaim 1980), or the deleterious effects on health, education, and welfare budgets of pri¬oritizing spending on weaponry (Beneria and Blank 1989; Omolade 1989). Gender figured in this discourse as dif¬ferential embodiment and lived social roles rather than as an identity or form of power. But, gender was also interpolated in a more abstract way, in terms of a repeated emphasis on the impact and cost of nuclear weapons on human bodies, relationships, and the natural world. The abstractions of nuclear rationality, as pursued by a technocratic, Western, masculine subject, were thus confronted by the concrete, embodied mode of reason¬ing historically associated with feminine (and also non¬white, non-Western) subjectivity, but here assumed to be more widely shared (Buirski 1983; Pettit 1983). In this way, the discourse constructed a feminized but potentially inclusive figure of the antinuclear activist we could call the "Empath." A very different tack was taken in the cosmopolitan dis-course, which focused on women's political exclusion from the defense and political establishments of the nuclear state. Epitomized in British author Virginia Woolf s antiwar rallying cry from an earlier age—"As a woman I have no country. As a woman I want no country. As a woman my country is the whole world"—this dis-course was rearticulated in the Cold War period by radi¬cal feminists who, assuming an undifferentiated commonality of experience of oppression among women worldwide, aspired to a global sisterhood rather than entry into male-dominated institutions." The sense of sisterly connection can be seen, for example, in accounts of the international character of Greenham and the soli¬darity actions that took place around the world (Cook and Kirk 1983:32, 62), as well as in critiques of the loyal¬ties and symbols of mainstream patriotism in both the UK and United States (e.g., Krasniewicz 1992:chapter 8). In addition, security was reenvisioned within the parame¬ters of this discourse in ways that made it more inclusive of women's experiences and transborder relationships. Militarism and the supposed protection it offered were subjected to critical scrutiny (Ruehl 1983; Thompson 1983; Wood 1983); the counterproductive character of violence was documented (Cook and Kirk 1983); and empathetic connections were forged with the ostensibly threatening "Other" (Porter 1983; Mooney 1983:5, 14). In such ways, this discourse reconfigured community and the methods used to protect it, rather than gender. It effectively contrasted a compromised male political sub¬ject in the form of the citizen or politician to an ethical female subject, the "Sister," who transcended geopoliti¬cal specificities. Finally, the cosmological discourse mobilized gendered imagery as part of its holistic conception of the universe and the role of humans within it. In its ecological variant, this discourse drew on a self-conscious ecofeminism (Epstein 1991:176-8; Alonso 1993:246-7) and was mani¬fested in claims about women's connectedness to the nat¬ural world (Salamone 1982; Women's Pentagon Action 1982), in critiques of a dualistic masculine worldview involving separation from and mastery over nature (Grif¬fin 1989; Strange 1989), and in the images of nature pep¬pering women's life stories, poetry, and other texts (Linton and Whitham 1989:186; Pettit 2006:24, 27). In its spiritual variant (Epstein 1991:chapter 5), the discourse gave rise to widespread Goddess iconography (McAllister 1982:ix; Jones 1989:201) and pagan/wiccan narratives and rituals (Epstein 1991:183-92; Krasniewicz 1992:53-60). The antinuclear activist was constituted here as a potent feminine figure, either "Earth Mother" or "Goddess," and urged to exert her powers to usher in an alternative future for the planet. Although it is helpful analytically to delineate these six basic discourses about gender and (anti)nuclear politics in Cold War women's activism, they and the identities they constructed should not be misunderstood as inter¬nally monolithic and sharply distinct from each other in their empirical instantiation. To begin with, the dis¬courses were internally heterogeneous and conflictual. There were rival articulations of a cosmological frame¬work, as I have shown, and also of maternalism, with women's caring capacity rooted sometimes in biologically determinist accounts of their physiology and thereby seen 13 Which is why I think Liddington is incorrect to label this discourse "equal rights." as eternal (Caldicott 1986), sometimes in their socially constructed caring roles and thereby envisioned as chang¬ing and changeable (Ruddick 1989).14 Moreover, the boundaries between discourses were permeable. Thus, cosmological visions resonated with maternalism in their reimagining of femininity while, to take another example, the antiviolence and culturalist discourses both pointed toward patriarchy as the structural context in which men and masculinity gained their power and women and femi¬ninity were subordinated and oppressed. Finally, even the most divergent discourses were not indelibly associated with antithetical political projects and political subjects, but rather offered overlapping and competing sources of meaning-making and identity construction within the same action or text. This is made very clear in detailed ethnographies of the women's peace camps (Krasniewicz 1992; Roseneil 1995, 2000). As I will show in the next part of the article, instability, porousness, and simultane¬ity continue to characterize the six discourses as they have recirculated in the post-Cold War period, along with some notable shifts in content and in the activist identi¬ties thereby produced.

2022 Michigan Kritik
***NEG › Links › Terrorism Link

The affs articulation of anti-terrorism through NATO portrays women as victims needing masculine men to save them

Hurley 14 (Hurley, M E (2014) Gendering NATO: Analyzing the Construction and Implementation of the North Atlantic Treaty-Organization’s Gender Perspective PhD, Oxford Brookes University)

These feminist critiques of the War on Terror therefore exposed the construction and the useof ‘other’ (i.e. non-western) women within the narratives of this reinvigorated atmosphere ofwar and militarism. As Krista Hunt (2002) notes the gendered natures of narratives such as:“look at what they do to their women”, have ‘political currency’ (2002: 116); furthering a43contrast between the ‘civilised west’ and the ‘uncivilised Afghan society’ in need of saving(Ibid). Hunt identified ‘two-distinct but complementary images of Afghan women’ portrayedin the media and political discourse: Afghan women were portrayed as passive victims of theTaliban and on the other as vocal opponents of that regime (2002: 117), thus serving tolegitimise and ‘moralise’ the forceful overthrow of the regime and the subsequentoccupation (Ibid). The war on terror was then framed in large part by a notion of whatMiriam Cooke termed ‘saving brown women’ (2002: 468)21. Upon taking command of theInternational Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan, NATO took up this mantle.Indeed, Von der Lippe & Väyrynen (2011) suggest that the “saving brown women frombrown men” narrative combined with UNSCR 1325 to ‘facilitate a metamorphosis of themilitaristic and masculine-led NATO into a collective peacekeeper’ (2011:26) and championof women’s rights - See Figure 1. This notion of NATO as a paternal peacekeeper will bereturned to in Chapter 3, in a discussion of Iris Young’s (2003) notion of the ‘logic ofmasculinist protection’.Figure 1: “NATO: Keep the Progress Going!” – An Amnesty International Poster22The ‘gendering’ of the war on terror was not simply limited to an ‘othering’ of Afghanwomen and men and the ‘terrorist enemy’. Hunt (2002) notes that:“the media coverage and political discourse following the attacks on the USAexemplify the way that images of women…are being used to define the conflict; forthe most part women have been depicted as silent victims of the attacks…womenare cast as passive” (2002: 117).In this sense the feminist literature dealing specifically with 9/11 and its aftermath detailedthe gendered processes, and the reassertion of specific gendered orthodoxies (women as¶ passive victims in need of saving) necessary in the production of war narratives. In thisrespect their work draws interesting parallels with that of Susan Jeffords (1989) account ofthe ‘re-masculinisation’ of American culture following the Vietnam war (Section 3, below).In one respect the aims and findings of this thesis sit within this ‘historical-social-political’context. It can be argued that the effects of 9/11 are still being felt within the internationalpolitical system and especially in the western security infrastructure – at the time of writingthis thesis, NATO, is managing a ‘transition’ from Afghanistan.Detailed, experience-focused feminist analyses of the war on terror and its associatedconflicts (see also Enloe, 2010) built upon early feminist IR scholarship and helped to reinterrogate the gendered processes and sites of war and militarism in the first decade of thetwenty-first century. As Ayotte & Husain argue: “In the wake of the ‘war on terrorism’feminist analysis of international relations must broaden the concept of security to considerforms of violence beyond the statist security framework of realpolitik” (Ayotte & Husain,2005: 112); whilst I feel that Ayotte & Husain’s assertion somewhat neglects the importantcontributions of early feminist writing, that began to do exactly that (Tickner, 1992; Enloe1989; Squires 1998) it represents a continuation of that work as well as a shift in certainareas of feminist research towards centralising the study of war and security within a FSSagenda, and Christine Sylvester’s ‘new feminist war studies’ (2013: 49 – emphasis added).The research outlined above has detailed how Feminist International Relations research hasdeveloped. In troubling the existing boundaries of IR and Security Studies as an academicdiscipline the place and purpose of a distinctly Feminist IR is problematised. ShouldFeminist IR remain embedded within the disciplinary boundaries, concepts and language ofIR, seeking to carve out a distinctly feminist space? Some have argued that in doing so,Feminist IR would become defined by and produce work that was simply intelligible to,rather than challenging to IR’s mainstream (Lobasz & Sjoberg, 2011:574; Youngs, 2004;Squires & Welds, 2007; Zalewski, 2007). This debate is ongoing, yet what the researchoutlined above (and below) demonstrate is the value of feminist research both within andwithout IR in exposing the gendered nature of the international; in exposing theincompleteness of accounts that fail to address gender and experience, and that in the words¶ of Cynthia Enloe (1989) it is gender that makes the world go round. 

2022 Michigan Kritik
***NEG › Links › Syntethic Biotech Link

Synthetic biotech is projected as a masculine profession oppressing women and making them a minority

Schyfter 20 [Pablo, Doctor of Philosphy, Technology and Innovation Studies, University of Edinburgh, “Gender in synthetic biology: problems and potential,” https://www.embopress.org/doi/full/10.15252/embr.201949049]

Gender discrimination has been a problem in Western science and engineering since their start as masculine professions 234. Despite admirable progress, the association between STEM and masculinity persists 5. Women remain a minority in most STEM professions and face challenges not experienced by their male colleagues. Synthetic biology is not immune to these problems. One reason is the central role played by engineering as a template for synthetic biology. As a result, synthetic biologists model their field on those STEM professions that have been the least welcoming to women and are most strongly associated with men and masculinity. In 2015, the American Association of University Women 6 reported that women make up only 19% of US engineering bachelor's graduates and 23% of its doctorates. In the workforce, women make up proportions of only 6% (petroleum engineering) to 21% (environmental engineering). The US Department of Commerce 7, the European Commission 8 and the UK House of Commons 9 have released similar statistics. Widespread beliefs that engineering is masculine work contribute to such low representation. Building a new research field is about making choices. All choices have consequences, including unseen and unexpected ones. An engineering template might encourage synthetic biologists to shun projects or ideas that do not look enough like established engineering. Similarly, archetypes that portray engineering as a masculine profession might make women in synthetic biology appear incongruous or incapable.

2022 Michigan Kritik
***NEG › Links › Outer Space Link

Space exploration represents the fantasy of western colonialism. White valiant masculine representation of space programs excludes women and minorities

Lanius 08 (Roger D., Senior Curator Division of Space History National Air and Space Museum Smithsonian Institution, “Heroes in a Vacuum: The Apollo Astronaut as Cultural Icon.” The Florida Historical Quarterly, vol. 87, no. 2, Fall 2008, JSTOR, , pd)

In both fact and fiction, the space suit has been a core representation of the astronaut, essentially a knight's armor worn heroically as the individual conducts his noble mission. More than any other single artifact of the Moon landing program the Apollo space suit represented the values that supported Americans going into space in the first place. It symbolized and reified the Utopian desire to colonize the Solar System and make a perfect society at a new and pristine place beyond the corrupt Earth. It also stood, as cultural historian Debra Benita Shaw wrote, "as a metaphor for the transcendent power of scientific ingenuity and technological know-how....It is thus a significant icon in contemporary cultural representations of the body in both outer and terrestrial space."56 As an enduring icon of Apollo, the space suited astronauts on the Moon conjured images of power and masculinity far beyond that actually present. The anonymity of those astronauts, with their visors down similar to Medieval knights made them even more mysterious and attractive. Without intending it, the space suit became synonymous with a set of values referring "to heroism and thus to the Cartesian (masculine) subject identified by the Proper Name but the Name itself becomes curiously disconnected from the individual to which it actually refers."57 At some level, there fore, the Apollo astronaut in his space suit projected the image of the hardbody of masculinity that Susan Jeffords believes became so prevalent in the 1980s, anticipating that later development by twenty years.58 By being consumed by a space suit, as Donna Haraway has pointed out, the astronaut essentially became a cyborg as an iconic space suit established the relationship between human and machine. Cyborg ontology is a critical element of thinking about the duality of this relationship, confounding the sense in which bodies move in apposition to the technology.59 Megan Stern's analysis of visored astronauts in spacesuits suggest that they are essentially anonymous, a screen on which anyone might project any attribute from fantasies of heroism to submission. Therefore, the Apollo astronauts in their suits became screens for the whole of America to project its hopes, wishes, fears, and horrors. Each astro naut felt this keenly, as they have lived out the remainder of their lives in the glare of American fame and the sense of expectations never fully satisfied. Unable always to reflect the qualities of strength, authority, and rationality so often projected on them, the astronauts have displayed a fragility since Apollo that is both perplexing and troubling for many who see them in later years.60 Marina Benjamin described this best when she encountered three Apollo astronauts at a celebrity and collectors show. She wrote that they were "just like movie stars; they burned brightly in the glare of publicity when they were offered good parts to play and then, when the roles dried up, so did they." Their space suits, how ever, represented the triumph of technology over living organ isms.61 Those suits dominate the essence of what it means to be an astronaut; they have since Apollo and continue to do so today. The Apollo astronauts all had an image of hard-working, fun loving, virile representations of masculinity. The expression of public comfort with the white male establishment is palpable throughout the recounting of the story of Apollo. The quintessential company man worked for NASA during Apollo. The engineering "geeks" of Mission Control, with their short-sleeved white shirts, narrow black ties, slide rules hung on their belts like sidearms, and their pocket protectors complete with compass and ruler and myriad pens and mechanical pencils all personified a conservative America that many looked back on with fondness and nostalgia. Even Norman Mailer, as much an embodiment of the Sixties counter-culture as anyone, ranted about this aspect of Apollo while covering the Moon landings in 1969. Mailer expressed fascination and not a little perplexity with the time warp that he witnessed at the Manned Spacecraft Center in Houston. He railed against an overwhelmingly white male NASA steeped in middle class values and reverence for the American flag and main stream culture. Mailer grudgingly admitted, however, that NASA's approach to task accomplishment—which he viewed as the embodiment of the Protestant Work Ethic—and its technological. and scientific capability got results with Apollo. Even so, he hated NASA's closed and austere society, one where he believed out siders were distrusted and held at arm's length with a bland and faceless courtesy that betrayed nothing. For all of his skepticism, for all of his esotericism, Mailer captures much of interest concerning rocket technology and the people who produced it in Project Apollo.62 lo.62 Mailer's critique foreshadows by twenty-five years a powerful nostalgia that has grown up around Apollo as a program that was done right, in no small part because it took place within the cultur al confines of an era before the social revolution of the 1960s. Nothing captures this nostalgia more effectively than the feature film, Apollo 13. Set in 1970 when an explosion crippled a lunar landing mission and NASA nearly lost astronauts Jim Lovell, Fred Haise, and Jack Swigert, it has been recast as one of NASA's finest hours, a successful failure. At 56 hours into the flight an oxygen tank in the Apollo service module ruptured and damaged several of the power, electrical, and life support systems. People through out the world watched and waited and hoped as NASA personnel on the ground and the crew worked to find a way safely home. It was a close-run thing, but the crew returned safely on April 17, 1970. The near disaster served several important purposes for the civil space program—especially prompting reconsideration of the propriety of the whole effort while also solidifying in the popular mind NASA's collective genius.63 While one must give the NASA flight team high marks for perseverance, dedication, and an unshakable belief that they could bring the crew home safely, it is quite strange that no one seems to realize that the mission had already failed, and failed catastrophically, by the time of accident.64 The fact that Apollo 13 is now viewed as one of NASA's shining moments says much about the ability of humanity to recast historical events into meaningful morality plays. In this instance, Apollo 13 became a vehicle for criticism of the social order that emerged from the 1960s and a celebration of an earlier age. When the film appeared in 1995, reviewer John Powers, writing for the Washington Post, commented on its incessant nostalgia for "the paradisiacal America invoked by Ronald Reagan and Pat Buchananan America where men were men, women were subservient, and people of color kept out of the way." In addition, Powers wrote, "Its story line could be a Republican parable about 1995 America: A marvelous vessel loses its power and speeds toward extinction, until it's saved by a team of heroic white men." If anything, Powers underemphasized the white America evoked in Apollo 13. There were no people of color in the film and the only women with speaking parts of substance was Marilyn Lovell (Kathleen Quinlin), wife of the Apollo 13 command er, whose role is distinctly one of offering proud support while pri vately fearing the worst, and their daughter whose role seems to be as spokesperson for the social revolution then underway while con sistently reflecting its least important elements. For example, she complains in a shriekish voice that the Beatles had just broken up and that her world has accordingly collapsed. The heroes of Apollo 13 are the geeks of Mission Control, with the astronauts aboard the spacecraft as spirited but metaphorically emasculated characters to be saved. Lovell, Haise, and Swigert must wait to be rescued in a manner not unlike Rapunzel, as an active participant but unable to accomplish the task alone. As historian Tom D. Crouch wrote of this film's depiction of the "studs" in Mission Control: The real heroes of this film are either bald or sporting brush cuts; wear thick glasses; are partial to rumpled short sleeve shirts; and chain-smoke an endless string of cigarettes, cigars, and pipes. For all of that, these slide rule wielding technonerds solve all of the difficult problems required to bring the crew home. They are, in the words of one of the astronauts portrayed in the film, "steely-eyed missile men."65 Apollo 13 the film, accordingly, opens the possibility of the astro naut hero as helpless surrogate of a collection of really smart nerds on a mission. The Mission Control team, in an interesting transference of masculine power from the astronauts, assume in the best sense of American reverence for the underdog canonical status. It also venerates a long past era in American history. Indeed, it may have been an era already gone by the time of the actual mission in 1970. It is a hallowing of masculinity in a nostalgic context. A recent study completed for NASA concluded that representation of space exploration on film is highly nostalgic, and Apollo fuels that perception: As a group, the public entertainments we tend to buy into are either nostalgic visions of the "space race" period ("The Right Stuff," "Apollo 13," "From the Earth to the Moon") or fantasies reflecting the romantic imagination of the Flash Gordon/Buck Rogers era ("Star Wars" rather than "Star Trek"). These are the visions people support in the most meaningful way possible: with their time and dol lars....Boomers have a great nostalgic affection for NASA, but their own priorities have shifted from a future focus to maintaining what they have. They see money spent on space exploration as threatening their future entitle ments.66 At a sublime level, the Apollo astronauts may serve as a trope for a larger lack of interest in the future expressed by Americans at the beginning of the twenty-first century. As a country, a shifting cultural center of gravity toward maintenance of the status quo rather than looking to the future may have stalled. A shared national vision that energized earlier efforts

2022 Michigan Kritik
***NEG › Links › Military Link

The military is the most fundamental representation of masculinity and justifies war in order to protect the women

Christensen 22 [Ann-Dorte, Professor of Sociology and Social work, Aalborg University, “From military to militarizing masculinites” NORMA]

In many societies, the military institution is discursively constructed as a key ‘masculinity maker’; compulsory military service is considered a disciplinary rite de passage that turns boys into men. Hence, the relationship between masculinities, warfare and the military as a social institution is an important field of inquiry for feminist research and critical masculinity studies (Connell, 1995). As such, it has provoked theoretical discussions about the reproduction of patriarchal gender relations and hegemonic masculinity as well as rich empirical work on the construction of military masculinities and the performances and experiences of being a soldier (Barrett, 1996; Do & Samuels, 2021). At the same time, critical scholarship within feminism, gender studies and military studies has widened the analysis of militarism and war to encompass cultural and institutional processes of militarization beyond the military as an institution, for instance in relation to violent masculinities, popular culture, social protest and changes (Woodward & Duncanson, 2017; see also NORMA Volume 10, Number 3–4, 2015)1 The American feminist theorist Cynthia Enloe (2000) has argued that the male soldier, represented as the hero and the warrior, is one of the most fundamental representations of masculinity, and R.W. Connell (1995) has argued that the military is the most important arena for defining hegemonic masculinity in a European and American context. This basic assumption about gender connotations, presenting men as aggressive and violent protectors and women as peaceful and non-violent caregivers, has characterized feminist studies and critical military studies during the last decades (Duncanson, 2015, 2020; Higate, 2003; Morgan, 1994; Sørensen 2015; Yuval-Davis, 1997; Woodward & Jenkings, 2011). Many feminist scholars have also used the concept of hegemonic masculinities to grasp the dynamic and the contradictions within militarized masculinities. Claire Duncanson, for instance, has argued that the concept has been an important analytical tool for critical scholars in highlighting the multiple, dynamic and contradictory character of masculinities in the military. It has underlined that the ideal of ‘combat-experienced commanding officer is not the only form of masculinity, but it is a very powerful model, which through consent, has dominated as one form of “ideal man”’ (Duncanson, 2020, p. 471). Some scholars have argued that while military studies and feminist research have given much attention to the construction of militarized masculinities within the military system, less scholarly attention has been paid to veteran masculinities in transitions from military to civilian life after deployment. This raises important questions about if, how, or to what extend militarized masculinities can be unmade and deconstructed, and how these processes interfere in family lives and social relations? (Bulmer & Eichler, 2017; Moelker, Andres, Bowen, & Manigart, 2015). War and military are closely connected to nationalist discourses. These are based on the classical distinction between citizen-the-mother and citizen-the soldier and the conceptualizations of men as aggressive and violent, fighting for the sake of women and children, and women as peaceful anti-violent mothers (Encloe, 1980; Pateman, 1988; Yuval-Davis, 1997). Even though these traditional constructions have been challenged in recent decades, they are still alive and often emerge in new forms, for instance in arguments for Western military international intervention (Messerschmidt James, 2010) as well as in presentations of women going into the army or returning from military service (Alexiyevich, 1988). In many historical and contemporary contexts, militarized masculinities are also closely related to political power and dominance. This has for instance been the case in the United States, where military position and experience have been important for political influence; for instance, the position as a war hero or the opposite – a ‘wimp’ – characterized the public image of the presidents George H.W. Bush and his son, George W. Buch (Ducat, 2004; Messerschmidt James, 2010). Important theoretical contributions have been made by critical scholars who study militarization of social and cultural institutions beyond the military (Enloe, 2000; Giroux, 2008). One of the most influential scholars, Catherine Lutz, argues that: Militarization is intimately connected not only to the obvious – the increasing size of armies and the resurgence of militant nationalisms and militant fundamentalisms – but also to the less visible deformation of human potentials into the hierarchies of race, class, gender, and sexuality, and to the shaping of national histories in ways that glorify and legitimate military action. (Lutz, 2007, p. 320) Scholars studying militarization have further explored how popular cultural representations of soldier and war romanticize and normalize violence, especially through Hollywood films (Behnke, 2006; Boggs & Pollard, 2017; Davies & Philpott, 2012; Stahl, 2010) but also through other media. Book markets have in recent decades become infused with war memories written by former soldiers (see Woodward & Jenkings, 2018). Of countless examples, two are Mark Owen – who claims to have been the one killing Osama Bin Laden – and Chris Kyle, who’s bestselling autobiography American Sniper also became a huge blockbuster movie. Persons with experience as Navy Seals have also had commercial successes in the self-help and leadership industry in recent years. An example is Jocko Willink, a highly decorated former Navy Seal commander of Seal team 3’ s Task Unit Bruiser (which included Chris Kyle) in Ramadi, Irak. Upon retiring in 2010, Willink has become somewhat of a media celebrity on YouTube, Ted-Talks, podcasts, as well as a business consultant and bestselling author of several leadership and children’s books. In these books and media appearances, Willink thus converted his embodied ‘war capital’ and military masculinity into a prospering business and in the process contributes to reproducing the symbolic relationship between military masculinity and hegemonic masculinity.

2022 Michigan Kritik
***NEG › Links › Language Link

US officials uses terms associated with gender sterotypes to describe other nations – lays foundation for hegemonic masculinity mindset of the U.S.

Costigliola ’97 – Frank, a Board of Trustees Distinguished Professor of History at the University of Connecticut, “The Nuclear Family: Tropes of Gender and Pathology in the Western Alliance”, Spring 1997, Oxford University Press,

Throughout the Cold War, metaphors of gender and of pathology re mained available to those officials or analysts who sought to emphasize the "Soviet threat." Just as Kennan at the onset of the Cold War employed emotive language to signify the Soviets as a hypermasculine, monstrous force, two decades later other officials used similar representations to delegiti mate what they feared as uncontrolled détente along the German-German border. As Foreign Minister Willy Brandt reached out to the German Demo cratic Republic, a U.S. State Department analysis in October 1968 characterized his nascent Ostpolitik as "the near-pathetic speeches and statem leaders overflowing with 'good will' and asking friend and foe and at least 'understanding.' " The State Department docum from this behavior that West Germans "are not only jittery and that they feel helpless." The language here - "near-pathetic," " ened," and "helpless" - coded the West Germans as emasculated suggested that West Germans had lost their self-discipline and uphold necessary boundaries. The position of the word "overfl "leaders" suggested that not only the statements and speeches o but also those officials themselves were spilling over with fem or sympatny, good win, ana understanding - not tne stun or reaipoiitiK. Furthermore, the document argued, the West as a whole had demonstrated "marked passivity," in the face of the August 1968 Czech invasion and appeared "rather soft" on the issue of access to Berlin. In language that recalled Kennan's long telegram, the State Department document contrasted the insufficient masculinity of the West with the invasive hypermasculinity of the East. "Coldly systematic and inexorable," the East Germans were becoming "harder and harsher" and appeared ready to "dem onstrate to Bonn its utter impotence and helplessness." East Germany would accomplish this final rape and emasculation "by sudden rapid thrusts" of "specialized forces" into West Berlin.'4 This characterization of détente as making the West vulnerable to emasculation did not mean that the U.S. government opposed détente as such. Rather, détente was a contested policy; this document represented thinking that remained locked in the Cold War paradigm; and even proponents of détente such as Elenry Kissinger wanted the United States to control the process and to prevent a race to Moscow. Although this essay focuses on the emotive language used by U.S. officials to naturalize their superiority and to depoliticize the Western allies' contrary points of view, such language was not, of course, an American monopoly. Rather, tropes of gender, pathology, and other figures of speech — which draw their emotional power from deeply felt notions about the body, the psyche, and the supposed immutable order of the most private aspects of life - are available to any people who believe themselves superior to, and able to judge, others. It is not surprising, therefore, to find that British Treasury and Foreign Office officials used such discourse, notably in 1945—46, when they still hoped to regain their prewar prominence and to guide their presumptively less sophisticated transatlantic cousins. British analysts clung to a structure of meaning based on the perceived opposition between their masculine rationality — "ripe and calm wisdom," as John Maynard Keynes put it — and the Americans' less-than-mas culine emotionalism. The British ambassador in Washington depicted Ameri can leaders as suffering from "uneasy bewilderment," "fear of the unknown," "baffled dismay," and "a constant disposition to prefer the emotional to the rational approach." Furthermore, the Americans were "nervous," "lackjed] stable purpose," and put their "faith in the magic of large words." To counter U.S. bragging about the atomic bomb - that "hubbub of emotional talk" - the United Kingdom would marshal its own masculine-coded superweapon, namedly "lucid ... appeals to reason and the logic of hard fact

2022 Michigan Kritik
***NEG › Links › Food Security Link (Long)

Women are the foundation of food security, patriarchal economics deny women their innovation towards agricultural biodiversity in their conquest to masculinize agriculture

Shiva 09’ [Vandana Shiva, Indian scholar, environmental activist, food sovereignty advocate, ecofeminist and anti-globalisation author, “Women and the Gendered Politics of Food” in Philosophical Topics Volume 37, Issue 2, Fall 2009 Global Gender Justice, pg. 17-32]

Agriculture, the growing of food, is both the most important source of livelihood for the majority of the world people, especially women, as well as the sector related to the most fundamental economic right, the right to food and nutrition. Women were the world's original food producers, and they continue to be cen- tral to food production system in the Third- World countries in terms of the work they do in the food chain. The worldwide destruction of the feminine knowledge of agriculture evolved over four to five thousand years, but a handful of white male scientists in less than two decades have not merely violated women as experts; but since their expertise in agriculture has been related to modeling agriculture on nature's methods of renewablility, its destruction has also gone hand in hand with the ecological destruction of nature's processes and the economic destruction of the poorer people in rural areas. Agriculture has been evolved by women. Most farmers of the world are women, and most girls are future farmers. Girls learn the skills and knowledge of farming in the fields and farms. What is grown on farms determines whose livelihoods are secured, what is eaten, how much is eaten, and by whom it is eaten. Women make the most significant contribution to food security. They produce more than half the world's food. They provide more than 80 percent of the food needs of food-insecure household and regions. Food security is therefore directly linked to women's food-producing capacity. Constraints on women's capacity leads to erosion of food security, especially for poor households in poor regions. From field to kitchen, from seed to food, women's strength is diversity. Women's capacities are eroded when this diversity is eroded. Diversity is the pattern of women's work, the pattern of women's planting and sowing of food crops and the pattern of women's food processing. The dominant systems of economics, science, and technology have conspired against women and girls by conspiring against diversity. Economics has rendered women's work as food providers invisible because women provide for the household and perform multiple tasks involving diverse skills. Women have remained invisible as farmers in spite of their contribution to farming. People fail to see the work that women do in agriculture.. Their produc- tion tends not to be recorded by economists as "work." And agriculture as a future vocation for girls is thus closed. These problems of data collection on agricultural work arise not because too few women work but too many women do too much work. There is a conceptual inability of statisticians and researchers to define women's work inside the house and outside the house (and farming is usually part of both). This recognition of what is and is not labor is exacerbated both by the great volume of work that women do and the fact that they do many chores at the same time. It is also related to the fact that although women work to sustain their families and communities, most of their work is not measured in wages. Science and technology have rendered women's knowledge and productivity invisible by ignoring the dimension of diversity in agricultural production. As the Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO) report on Women Feed the World men- tions, women use more plant diversity, both cultivated and uncultivated, than agri- cultural scientists know about. In Nigerian home gardens, women plant 18-57 plant species. In Sub-Saharan Africa women cultivate as many as 120 different plants in the species left alongside the cash crops managed by man. In Guatemala, home gardens of less than 0. 1 half acre have more than ten tree and crop species.4 In a single African home garden more than 60 species of food-producing trees were counted. In Thailand, researchers found 230 plant species in home gardens. In Indian agriculture women use 150 different species of plants for vegetables, and health care. In West Bengal 124 "weed" species collected from rice fields have economic importance for farmers. In the Expana region of Veracruz, Mexico, peasants utilize about 435 wild plant and animal species of which 229 are eaten. Women are the biodiversity experts of the world. Unfortunately, girls are being denied their potential as food producers and biodiversity experts under the dual pressure of invisibility and domination of industrial agriculture.5 While women manage and produce diversity, the dominant paradigm of agri- culture promotes monoculture on the false assumption that monocultures produce more. Monocultures do not produce more, they control more. As FAO's World Food Day report, a study in eastern Nigeria found occupying only 2 percent of a household farmland accounted for h total output. Navdanya's studies on biodiversity-based ecologica that women-run farms produce more food and nutrition than in farms.6 Quite clearly, if women's knowledge was not being rendered invisible, the use of the 2 percent land under polyculture systems should be the path followed for providing food security. Instead, these highly productive systems are being destroyed in the name of producing more food. Just as women's ways of growing food produce more while conserving more resources, women's ways of food processing conserve more nutrition. Hand pound- ing of rice or milling rice with a foot-operated mortar and pestle preserves more protein, fat, fiber, and minerals in rice. Thus when mechanical hullers replace hand pounding by women as in the case of Bangladesh where 700 new mills supplanted the paid work of 100,000 to 140,000 women in one year by reducing the labor input from 270 hours per ton to 5. They not only rob women of work and livelihoods, they also rob girls of essential nutrients. Yet this process of food value destruction is called "value addition" in patriarchal economics. Feeding the world requires producing more food and nutrition with fewer resources - i.e., producing more with less. In this, women are experts and their expert- ise needs to filter into our institutions of agricultural research and development. However, instead of building on women's expertise in feeding the world through diversity, the dominant system is rushing headlong into destroying diver- sity and women's food-producing capacities, the pirating the results of centuries of innovating and breeding through patenting. Lack of women's property rights are a major constraint on women's capacity to feed the world. These property rights include rights to land, and common prop- erty rights to common resources like water and biodiversity. Women have been the custodians of biodiversity. New intellectual property rights are alienating women's rights to biodiversity and erasing their innovation embodied in agricultural bio- diversity. If the erosion of women's capacity for feeding the world has to be prevented, I PR regimes need to evolve sui generis systems that recognize and protect women's collective and informal innovation. While women are being denied their rights to resources and we are seeing the feminization of subsistence agriculture, the dominant agriculture is showing increasing signs of masculinization as it appropriates resources and rights from women in subsistence agriculture and presents itself as the only alternative for feed- ing the world.

2022 Michigan Kritik
***NEG › Links › Great Power War Link

Aff positions great powers as a dangerous alien threat, which perpetuates neo-realist method that deems all violence acceptable as long as large nations are in harmony. Focus is on escalation rather than prevention. Turns case, aff thinks of other nations as enemies first — root cause of all violence. Alt solves — feminist conflict resolution rejects war as a means for peace.

Scheyer and Kumskova 19 (Victoria and Marina, graduating from Master’s degree Studies at the University for Peace mandated by the United Nations, Master degree in Human Rights from Columbia University, “FEMINIST FOREIGN POLICY: A FINE LINE BETWEEN “ADDING WOMEN” AND PURSUING A FEMINIST AGENDA”, 2019, Journal of International Affairs Vol.72 No.2 Spring/Summer, , pd)

The proliferation of feminist foreign policies has become a sign of commitment to another world order. Governments that adopt such action envision a world where women’s rights are equally important to those of men. They commit to empowering women and ensuring their meaningful participation across various issues. Such commitments, therefore, are understood as the objectives of a feminist foreign policy. This article explains that, while a commitment to women’s rights is important, the current practices of purportedly feminist foreign policies do not reflect an authentically feminist approach. We look into the theoretical background of feminist analysis in international relations, propose criteria for a feminist foreign policy based on feminist theory, and use these criteria to analyze and conduct gap analysis of existing feminist foreign policies. Overall, this study helps unpack the definition of feminist foreign policy and highlight areas that can be addressed by those willing to commit to redefining security and peace in the current world order. The state of the current world order depends on the lens through which one looks at it. While some suggest that gender considerations are starting to play a bigger role in international relations, others claim that gender analysis continues to be ignored and even pushed back against.1,2,3 While politicians paint either one of these pictures, there is a general consensus about the situation on the ground: In many places, the principles of democracy and multilateralism are being questioned, the rights of women, queer, indigenous, and rural groups, among others, are threatened, and conflicts are becoming more complex and are extending beyond the borders of states and regions. Mostly, the current world system still operates in a neo-realist way, in which states try to operate according to the principle of sovereignty and competition for world power.4 As the recent 2019 Munich Security Conference demonstrated, the worldwide increase of military and defense budgets, especially in the United States, China, and Russia, and the growing tensions between these states, indicate the rising competition for power.5 At such conferences, the idea of incorporating gender analysis or some feminist principles is artificial. Fortunately, there are a number of states that care to some degree about the principle of “We The People” enshrined in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the way social groups and members of the international community fit into the current world order. The last few years have also shown that the number of such states is increasing, supposedly in response to the ongoing failure of the “superpowers” to address violence and crises of their own making. At the same time, states that were peripheral to the establishment of the United Nations now act as megaphones of multilateralism, promoting the ethical norm of equal treatment among states and empowering each other in the process.6 One example of this is the multilateral action to adopt the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in 2017, in which states have united not around the principle of power but on the principle of opposing the security scheme that has not been working for everyone. The process showed the nine countries that possess nuclear weapons, and think of themselves as the world’s superpowers, that there is another means to security, one based on the principles of multilateralism, common morality, human rights, and extraterritorial accountability.7 In some scholarship, states that promote human rights and multilateralism are known as “good states.”8 Good states are those that use foreign policies to improve global justice beyond their borders and transform global politics through the pursuit of good international citizenship, which requires sensitivity to the needs and wants of “others.” The states that take on a similar view on global politics and their responsibility on the global scale rely on an alternative vision of global politics, looking at the drivers of conflict and the root causes of violence in communities, societies, and institutions. Feminist analysis represents another component of an alternative view on global politics, not an idealistic departure from it. This analysis provides a welldefined and augmented alternative to the neo-realistic framework. All three of the 2015 United Nations Reviews have admitted that the absence of gender analysis is a key challenge for peace.9 Feminist foreign policy is one that includes whole populations, appreciates diversity, inspires comprehensive analysis, and leaves no one behind. This article explains that striving toward a feminist foreign policy and having one are not the same. We look into the theoretical background of feminist analysis in international relations, propose criteria for a new understanding of feminist foreign policy, and apply these criteria to analyze and conduct a gap analysis of existing feminist foreign policies. Overall, this study helps unpack the definition of feminist foreign policy and highlight areas that can be addressed by those willing to redefine security and peace in the current world order. Theoretical Background: What is a Feminist Foreighn Policy? Traditional international relations theory defines foreign policy as both the relationships between states and the structural organization of a government and its foreign affairs.10 Currently, states’ relationships and governing systems are structured through a neo-realist method: These relationships and systems are organized hierarchically and situated within a security dilemma; they serve national interests; and they are based on the principle of sovereignty.11 With a few exceptions, the top ranks of these hierarchies are occupied by men and generally dominated by masculine principles. This is often overlooked because “gender is difficult to see when only the masculine is present.”12 This represents what is referred to as “patriarchy.” Feminist Critique Of Traditional Approaches To Security Patriarchal systems and practices in foreign policy are highly criticized by feminist international relations theory.13 The foundational basis of this theory is that “gender is an integral, not an accidental, feature of the worldwide structure of diplomatic, military and economic relations.”14 As Acker claims, the feminist method is not about adding women into the system but revealing how the concept of gender is incorporated into it.15 Such a method shows that current principles of foreign policy are highly dependent on gender norms, roles, and structures, and that all institutions are inherently gendered.16 Acker asserts that gender in institutions could be understood in two ways: either as a gender-neutral structure that tries to adjust women to the existing systems of power and applies principles of representational gender equality or as gender-integrated structures that apply equality and justice within the structures, norms, and ruling ideology.17 Acker agrees with the second understanding and claims that gender is an integral part of all structures.18 For us, therefore, a feminist foreign policy requires rethinking and re-envisioning gender structures of institutions and governance systems. It cannot be equivalent to a foreign policy that merely aims to ensure equal representation or meaningful participation of women in the position of power. Using Gender Analysis True, Tickner, and Enloe deconstructed the main concepts of foreign policy and international relations using gender analysis.19, 20, 21 They revealed the gender bias of security, power, and sovereignty, claiming that these concepts are made by and for men on the basis of their experiences.22 Hence, the concept of hegemonic masculinity was established to describe gendered power distribution in hierarchies. Hegemonic masculinity is understood as a “culturally idealized form” of power, mainstreamed in personal, collective, and institutional spheres of life, and expressed through hierarchy, violence, and aggression.23 Hegemonic masculinity expresses an unequal gender structure, which should be challenged by integrating feminist principles into national and foreign policy.24 Understanding Feminist Foreign Policy What does feminist foreign policy look like? Indeed, there is no agreed upon definition of a feminist foreign policy. What we have learned from feminist theory is that gender parity and attempts to make women visible in international relations are not enough to realize a comprehensive feminist foreign policy. Such an approach, according to Enloe, only implies an attempt to embed women firmly inside a patriarchal system and fails to challenge the underlying gender norms that fuel violence and conflict.25 The claim that gender parity in foreign policy will also bring about more peace and harmony in international relations is not as effective as women’s meaningful participation achieved through structural change.26 The study by UN Women and Inclusive Peace and Transition Initiative shows that, despite the fact that women’s inclusion improves opportunities for peace, the number of women present at the negotiating table does not assure a better outcome for women: “it is the level of influence that women can assert on the process that makes a difference, not only their presence by numbers.”27 In her book Bananas, Beaches, Bases, Enloe provides deep insights into how women from diverse backgrounds play an important role in international politics but are systematically excluded, ignored, and often forgotten.28 When analyzing the qualities and characteristics embodied by those in power, one will find a surprisingly homogenous group of world leaders in economics and politics. However, it is also the case that there exist female members of parliament who vote for military conflict solutions or uphold the patriarchal militarized system; they also serve as leaders of major military institutions.29 These are the manifestations of the traditional neo-realist security system, and its comparatively easy application drives both women and men into making decisions and setting their priorities.30 The feminist approach to foreign policy is not as easy; it demands a shift in how individuals within the system make political decisions and set priorities. It is about advancing peace and development for everyone, not through striving for the absence of conflict or serving the interests of individuals within the government, but through reimagining governance and social structures, as well as promoting nonviolent conflict solutions. We propose that the guiding principles for a feminist foreign policy framework should include intersectional analysis and inclusion, complete disarmament, security concepts centered around the wellbeing and safety of the individual, the inclusion of civil society, the promotion of international solidarity through dialogue, and the fostering of communities based on empathy. Indicators Of A Feminist Foreign Policy The guiding principles of feminist foreign policy can be practically visualized through the following set of indicators: political dialogue, feminist political economy, individual safety and wellbeing, empathic communities, inclusivity, and a gender analysis based on intersectionality. The following section elaborates our assumptions about what feminist foreign policy should look like based on the feminist international relations theory. Political Dialogue Political dialogue should be the basis of all aspects of foreign policy, including diplomacy, trade, conflict prevention, and conflict resolution. Unfortunately, practitioners in the field of international relations continue to emphasize militarized or forced solutions to the world’s security problems and trade politics. Feminist scholars criticize this approach and start their analysis with the question “where are the women?” and end by highlighting the need for a shift of the entire approach of security and militarism toward an inclusive dialogue.31 Feminist conflict resolution approaches reject war as a means to peace, viewing war as a result of institutionalized violence and a battle for power over the counterpart.32 Feminist scholars seek to prevent violence and identify root causes of conflict.33 Addressing the drivers of conflict instead of superficially fighting the symptoms, such as physical violence, differentiates military security from feminist approaches focused on safety and wellbeing. Feminist conflict resolution starts with a gender analysis of power, the inclusion of marginalized voices and local people through dialogue, and the commitment to disarmament.34 Safety and Wellbeing In traditional foreign policy approaches, security is given high priority. Concepts such as national or human security represent understandings of governments on what to target or how to achieve security. Feminists have criticized both concepts because these approaches ignore or overlook the gendered dimension of security.35 Feminist security studies emphasize and elaborate the importance of asking questions such as “security for who, by whom?”36 It is the questioning of the militarized security that is not able to protect women, children, civilians, migrants, among others, neither in times of conflict nor in times of peace.37 Feminist security studies emphasize the need to rethink traditional concepts of security. Putting the security issues of all intersectional groups and individuals at the center of security, the usefulness of the military industrial complex will have to be questioned.38 Buying tanks or fighter jets are not preventing children from dying of hunger, stopping preventable diseases from spreading, or averting genderbased violence. Instead, this form of security often perpetuates these situations.39 In an ever-changing society featuring dynamically evolving conflicts, Sylvester emphasizes that there is a need to always review, reframe, and reflect on current approaches of security and avoid the formulation of universal, timeless, and fixed security concepts.40 With this in mind, we refrain from unpacking the concept of security, and we support feminist ideas of shifting the focus from security toward the peace, safety, and wellbeing of the gendered individual. Wellbeing, in this vein, includes physical safety in addition to the social and political security of people and the fulfillment of basic social needs. We argue that the way problems are framed inherently influences the way solutions are found. While defining security not through the absence of violence but through the foundations of peace, world leaders can commit to peace through, for example, renaming the United Nations Security Council into the United Nations Peace Council. Feminist Foreign Policy demands shifting toward a positive peace model and away from security. Empathic Communities The third indicator we have identified is based on the building of empathic communities. We differentiate between alliances based on military or defense strategies and communities based on empathy and friendship. Alliances such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), or even the current structure of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), serve the goal of engaging in alliances to advance militarized security and national interests. These coalitions further capitalize on the fundamental values of neo-realism in international politics and represent the hegemonic security model. Because these alliances always come with implicit assumptions such as the presence of an enemy, a threat, and power conflict, violent escalation often proves inevitable. Feminism claims that there are more reasons for building communities, which are not about military and power, but rather about common goals such as peace, mutually beneficial trade agreements, or agreements on disarmament. Those can eventually build trust and dependencies so that attacks and war would seem illogical. Communities such as the Group of Friends of 1325, the Informal Expert Group on Women, Peace, and Security, and Friends of Gender Parity are built on agreements that open dialogue builds trust and empathy. Inclusion and Intersectional Approach While there is not yet diverse and inclusive representation of the heterogeneous society we live in, civil society groups, grassroots organizations, and local organizations offer key forums through which diverse experiences can be integrated in international relations. Feminist foreign policy needs to identify these forums and include these actors in policy making. This could be achieved through making space for gender lobbyism, regularly hearing and consulting with civil society, reaching out to grassroots and local organizations and refraining from supporting traditional hierarchical structures through a reference to a “bottom-up” approach, which is inherently hierarchical. Gender Analysis Feminist methodology as the overarching umbrella of all indicators represents a critical examination of power. Foreign policy and international relations are an amphitheater for power relations, and gender analysis represents a tool to change the script. Asking questions such as “who is involved?,” “why are certain decisions made?,” “who is affected?,” and “who controls resources?” represents the shared practice of feminist gender analysis, which aims to reveal underlying power relations and to deconstruct the discrimination, silencing, and marginalization of groups that do not fit existing gendered identities.41 Gender analysis reveals what is behind social and political norms and assists in providing alternative solutions. Moreover, it elucidates the experiences of different groups of people, which can help detect root causes of inequality as a starting point of correcting discriminatory policies and laws.42 As discussed above, a gender analysis needs to be applied to existing security concepts, military alliances, and militarism. Gender analysis is crucial to understand why people lack access to resources, why some communities are more prone to violence, or how policies affect different groups of people. Gender analysis, hence, is a basic tool and methodology for a feminist foreign policy. What Is “Feminist” In Current Foreign Policies? A small number of countries have already announced their adoption of feminist policies and programs within their foreign policy frameworks. With the announcement of its feminist foreign policy in 2014, Sweden is seen as the pioneer of feminist foreign policy and a norm-setter on how gender matters in international relations.43 Gender equality has also been featured prominently in some parts of British foreign policy since 2009, and the UK International Development (Gender Equality) Act adopted in 2014.44,45 Between 2011 and 2015, the Australian government also made a commitment to global gender equality and women’s empowerment as a core foreign policy goal.46 Following these examples, Canada’s government announced its adoption of feminist international assistance policies.47 In February 2016, Australia adopted a comprehensive foreign policy gender strategy.48 Similarly, Norway adopted a gender strategy within its foreign policy in October 2016.49 The latest addition to the list is Germany, which promised to take the issue of women, peace, and security seriously in its 2019-2020 tenure in the UN Security Council, and it has important political leaders, including Stefan Liebich of Die Linke and the Green Party, pushing for slightly varied definitions of a feminist foreign policy.50,51 Many of these policies are focusing disproportionately on the rights and experiences of women. If having a focus on women’s empowerment is what constitutes a feminist foreign policy, then the United States qualifies, too. The State Department, under Secretaries of State Hillary Clinton and John Kerry, crafted a collection of issue-specific foreign policies on various gender issues, including the U.S. Strategy to Prevent and Respond to Gender-Based Violence Globally, the National Action Plan on Women, Peace, and Security, and a Global Strategy to Empower Adolescent Girls.52 Feminist scholars and activists have many issues with calling any of the above-mentioned policies “feminist.” First, these policies are often criticized for being inconsistent in the feminist approach to international relations. Second, in many situations, gender considerations are not being put at the center of all of the foreign policy decisions that these countries undertake. Lastly, every single policy from this list focuses disproportionately on the situation of women, their rights, and needs, instead of addressing gendered power structures, identifying silenced groups, building empathic communities, and rethinking important concepts, such as sovereignty, militarism, and nationalism. Sweden’s “Handbook on Feminist Foreign Policy,” for example, defines a feminist foreign policy as a transformative agenda that aims to change structures and enhance the visibility of women and girls as actors.”53 In theory, feminist foreign policy should be about looking into the structures, addressing gendered power relations, building gender inclusive institutions and pursuing policies that incorporate the interests of and seek to benefit all. Our analysis of the nature and implementation of existing feminist foreign policies revealed the following key gaps, thus challenging the “feminist” label given to them. The Political Economy Of War The traditional approach to security supports the idea that international conflict is best solved through war and violence.54 One goal of feminist foreign policy should be to change this ideology and advance security based on individuals’ wellbeing, disarmament, and political dialogue. Militarism, Enloe claims, is both ideology and worldview: having enemies is a natural situation, that violence is a part of human nature, and that the masculine needs to protect the feminine. The military and the military-industrial complex are known to marginalize femininity, which is seen as a weakness. In this vein, the military-industrial complex exists to show the prevalence of some over others, to defeat what is seen as a weakness by what is perceived as power. Therefore, by simply addressing the situation of women, feminist foreign policies would not be able to achieve what feminism stands for, which is re-envisioning security through the understanding of power and the masculinity-femininity nexus. However, it is well known that a source of income for many governments is its arms trade and the mining of “conflict minerals,” such as wolframite and cobalt.55 This list includes the United States, the United Kingdom, Australia, Canada, Sweden, and many others. All of these countries are engaged in the political economy of war—the context in which the relationship between production, labor, trade, law, policy, and the distribution of national income are gender-blind and militarized.56 The Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom (WILPF) conducted a series of studies exposing the impact of arms transfers from Sweden and the United Kingdom to Saudi Arabia on the lives of women in Yemen.57 Similarly, WILPF also exposed how the production and mining of minerals by Canada, for example, clearly prioritizes systems of monetary profit over citizens’ human rights and governmental accountability.58 Women, in this context, are negatively and disproportionally affected. For example, gender-based violence in the mining industry is often disproportionately connected to the socioeconomic conditions in which women find themselves.59 Women are forced to work in the mines as cooks and cleaners because of the absence of jobs available to them, and the militarized atmosphere at mining sites often negatively impacts the way women are treated. Therefore, countries that claim to be pursuing feminist foreign policies are not making sincere efforts to reimagine governance and security, instead contributing to the escalation of violence and the promotion of a masculine military ideology. One rare exception is the Government of Costa Rica, which, while not having yet adopted a feminist foreign policy framework, has made great strides in reallocating its entire government defense budget to health and public services.60 In the majority of countries, however, a feminist foreign policy becomes nothing more than a label. The policies that states choose to roll out cannot be separated from the lived and highly gendered experiences of conflict, and from the new and often more complex and overlapping needs that emerge as a result of that conflict. Heteronormativity And Exclusion The concept of heteronormativity refers to the constructed norm of heterosexuality in society, and the concomitant notion that other gender identities are deviant or “abnormal.”61 The problem lies in the fact that a certain set of norms and rules determine the domination of one gender over another, including deciding over identity groups and having different rights and social recognition, a situation that highly influences the way policymaking is carried out. Some of the gender analysis toolkits across various fields assessed for this research are based on the binary definition of gender.62 In this system, lesbians, gays, bisexuals, transgender, and queer identities have been excluded from the political sphere through discrimination in law and in practice.63 Laws exert significant control over sexuality, marriage, and identity, and are also used to maintain the current distribution of power in the international system. These social norms are also reflected in institutions and organizations, the majority of which are set up according to specific gender norms. Connell calls this phenomenon “the gender regime of an institution” and claims that it creates an enabling environment for exclusion.64 The complaint brought in 2014 by W.H. v. Sweden at the European Court of Human Rights shows how far the gendered regime of an institution can go. W.H., who applied for asylum because she tried to escape a forced marriage in Iraq, was determined as not having a plausible case for a refugee status in Sweden. The Migration Board of Sweden noted that she would not lack a “male network” to protect her in Iraq because her brother had also been refused asylum in Sweden.65 The European Court has upheld Sweden’s decision to reject the applicant’s application for asylum. This is but one example of how institutions of law can be highly gendered. At the same time, Germany, which has yet to develop a feminist foreign policy, has demonstrated first steps towards challenging gender-blind governance by, among other initiatives, opening a series of investigations into gender-based violence crimes committed by ISIS against Yazidi women.66 In this regard, Belgium has also made great strides. The Belgian justice system exercises what is known as “universal jurisprudence,” allowing its national courts to prosecute anyone who has committed genocide, war crimes, or crimes against humanity anywhere in the world.67 Although other countries have similar laws, Belgium’s are particularly broad, and its judges are unusually willing to use them.68 A feminist foreign policy or a policy guided by a feminist approach should start with a gender analysis that addresses gender norms, roles and relations through the inclusion of marginalized voices and experiences into institutions and sectors such as health, education, and security, among others. Security In the neorealist worldview, national security and sovereignty, the protection of borders, and the control of trade represent core security concerns. This security is often provided through standby military defense mechanisms and migration laws. While this concept seems to fail protecting people from violence and the impact of wars, feminist scholars have raised questions concerning who are the main beneficiaries of traditional security frameworks and what groups are excluded.69 Having revealed the focus on upholding sovereign power structures and state systems, feminist security studies claim that to understand security, one needs to understand power, which itself is gendered.70 Shepherd demands a shift toward security for the individual, including stateless people and migrants and the development of comprehensive positive models for peace rather than security.71 Australia, one country that faces major gender security issues related to border control and immigration detention, is one example where the concept of security has yet to be transformed through a foreign policy gender strategy. True argues that government actors in Australia have interpreted the state’s responsibility to prevent violence and protect against gender-specific crimes, primarily in relation to military, diplomatic, peace-building, and aid presences, “outside” Australian borders in conflict-affected and post-conflict states.72 They have not recognized the responsibility to include non-citizens inside or outside Australian borders who have fled conflict zones and gender-based oppression. In this context, Australia’s National Action Plan on Women, Peace and Security 2012-18, which focuses on women’s protection and prevention of sexual and gender-based violence, does not have a mandate to incorporate the protection of women and their dependents fleeing conflict zones or gender oppression and crossing Australian borders as irregular migrants or asylum-seekers.73 At the same time, Germany has made the safety of women and children refugees a priority.74 There are various programs that help refugee women obtain skills and employment, integrate within communities, and get necessary support.75,76,77 Similarly, Jordan continues to demonstrate humanitarian leadership in the Syrian refugee crisis, providing multi-sectoral services that build women’s resilience and empowerment in the support of UN Women.78 In a feminist foreign policy, the wellbeing of a population needs to be the biggest concern of a state. A feminist method, therefore, demands that the norms of women’s rights and international law be strengthened and that the focus be shifted from escalation to prevention. This implies a conceptual reorientation from a narrowly defined security policy to a comprehensive gender-responsive policy. Sovereignty And Hierarchy The logic of militarism, security, and hegemonic masculinity implies a closed hierarchical organizational and social structure. This structure distributes power to specific groups or individuals, with others submitting to it.79 Hierarchy is only one out of many forms of organization, but it is often presented as the most effective and logical one. Former civilizations even called hierarchy the “holy structure.”80 Sovereignty, in this vein, is what sustains hierarchy. As a term that came about with the Treaty of Westphalia and capitalized its importance with the signing of the United Nations Charter, it is often used as the ultimate claim to authority both domestically and internationally.81 Hierarchy and the monopoly on authority are the core characteristics of hegemonic masculinity.82 By maintaining the principles of sovereignty, masculinity is upheld through multilateral agreements such as the United Nations Charter and the creation of a common identity referred to as nationalism.83 These principles further maintain hierarchy. When we analyze the structure of the United Nations, the hierarchical structure is clearly visible in the organization of the United Nations Security Council, where the five permanent members have the privilege of the veto and the nonpermanent members are subordinate.84 Furthermore, the international peace model is oriented around the hegemonic peace theory, in which a hegemon retains disproportionate power over resources and armaments to deter conflict.85 However, there are several states that are willing to subject themselves to international accountability to build partnerships for peace. The EU Common Position on Arms Exports requires an export license to be denied if, among other things, there is a clear risk that the equipment to be exported might be used for violations of human rights or international humanitarian law.86 This signals a very important attempt to commit to protecting human rights and preventing sexual and genderbased violence at the expense of potentially having their sovereignty subjected to questioning.87 Overcoming hierarchical and sovereign structures requires a commitment to be part of the collective process of determining how governments can create a more sustainable and just world based on empathy. Governments must be committed to a long-term vision, but they must also be flexible with the initiatives they pursue, understanding that all strategies will be subject to constant change as they strive together for a more just world. Conclusion A comprehensive feminist foreign policy remains a theoretical aspiration. In theory, feminist foreign policy aims to address gender power structures and reframe traditional concepts of security and peace, sovereignty, sexuality, governance, and nation-building. Despite criticism, feminism is not a utopian concept. It is an alternative explanation of the international system and guidance for how it can be restructured to prevent a constant state of securitization and crisis. A feminist foreign policy can build a peaceful international state system based on community-building, inclusion, gender analysis, and political dialogue. Feminism will stand on the margins of current foreign policy debates for a long time if governments continue to pursue power by traditional means and only attempt to embed women into the system rather than adopting a comprehensive feminist policy. The current examples of feminist foreign policies are often seen as gender binary, and the concept of a feminist foreign policy is operationally misunderstood. The current implementation of feminist foreign policies is yet to follow the feminist approach as it is seen by key academics in this field. Such policies focus on putting more women in decision-making positions and bringing more support to women’s rights and needs, while leaving behind numerous intersectional groups of people, references to whom are rarely included in foreign policy due to its gendered nature. At the same time, even women’s rights are not necessarily fully integrated into feminist foreign policies because governments often differ in their understanding of whose women’s rights they are protecting. They are generally less concerned about the impact of arms trade on women’s rights or security, as the government may not be directly involved in the conflict. In other cases, governments only worry about women who are nationals of their state or women who are located outside of the state, therefore once again leaving a large group of refugees, stateless individuals, and migrants vulnerable to violence and discrimination. For us, the feminist approach to foreign policy demands a shift in how states make political decisions and set priorities. It is about reaching for sustainable and inclusive peace and development for everyone—not striving for the mere absence of conflict but reimagining governance, especially social and governmental structures. The following key indicators can serve as a baseline for a feminist foreign policy: gender analysis; safety and wellbeing; peaceful models of conduct through a political dialogue; community-building based on empathy and common goals, and inclusive policymaking by integrating intersectional approaches. Gender analysis is required to respond to gender inequalities by addressing gender norms, roles, and relationships, and to thereby drive reform of governance and state institutions. Through partnerships, governments can operationalize nonheteronormative visions of organization in foreign policy. The current approach to feminist foreign policy has no capacity to challenge political economies of war, exclusion, militarized security, sovereignty, and hierarchy. The focus remains on increasing gender equality through representation, leaving no commitment for structural change. In this way, the current world order manages to deflect feminist challenges to the existing order without altering the dominant neorealist structures. Without changes—and, as we have shown, there are indications that some change is underway—this approach threatens to make a feminist approach another short-term and artificial solution that is unlikely to lift the world out of its current crisis.

2022 Michigan Kritik
***NEG › Links › Geopolitics Link

The aff describes the opposition in tacitly gendered terms; the aff is inherently enforcing hegemonic masculinity

Costigliola ’97 – Frank, a Board of Trustees Distinguished Professor of History at the University of Connecticut, “The Nuclear Family: Tropes of Gender and Pathology in the Western Alliance”, Spring 1997, Oxford University Press,

Kennan was only one of many U.S. officials who depicted the allies as partially incapacitated and needing direction, not just because the Europeans' military and economic power could not match America's but also because their rationality, health, or masculinity seemed in some way impaired. In many episodes of the Cold War, American officials juxtaposed images of the allies as effeminate, effete, or otherwise lacking in robust masculinity, with depictions of the Soviets as aggressively hypermasculine. Representing the danger as one of seduction and/or rape, U.S. officials expressed and reinforced gendered conceptions that naturalized America's predominance in the alliance. For example, at the 1954 Berlin Conference, Soviet Foreign Minister Vyacheslav Molotov made an appeal to French Foreign Minister Georges Bidault. Molotov argued that on the basis of Russia's and France's common trauma from German militarism in the world wars, the two nations should oppose the rebirth of the German military under the guise of the proposed European Defense Community. Moscow and Paris had much to cooperate about, Molotov stressed, and their "difference in social systems need not serve as [a] barrier between them." Recording this appeal, C. D. Jackson, a special assistant to President Dwight Eisenhower, wrote that Molotov "practically wooed Bidault in public." Jackson "slipped" Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs Livingston Merchant "a note saying 'I didn't think he would get his hand above Bidault's knee so soon.' " Jackson added that "Merchant laughed and left the note in front of him where it was solemnly read by JFD[ulles] a while later. He turned around and winked."" We get an insight into the power dynamics encoded in Jackson's language when we consider the effect of hypothetically switching the positions assigned to Bidault and to Dulles. If the Soviet minister had been appealing to U.S. interests, it would have seemed strange — and highly transgressive — for Jackson to represent that move as Molotov placing his hand above Dulles's knee. Yet Jackson's discourse assumed that taking liberties with the French was to be expected: the mock surprise was that Molotov would "get" to an intimate part of Bidault's body "so soon." A key point here is that Jackson's sexualizing of this political episode both drew on preexisting gendered stereotypes about French susceptibility and reinforced those stereotypes. Jackson's cheerful obscenity made the vulnerability and subordination of France seem natural and inevitable, grounded in the body and in emotion. Although it is unclear rrom the text, and perhaps was unclear to Jackson, whether Molotov's advance was to be coded as heterosexual or homosexual, in either case the French leader was positioned by jackson's discourse as passive and open to penetration. Merchant's laugh and Dulles's wink signaled that they got the point of Jackson's analogy. Moreover, the laugh and the wink marked a brief abatement in the formality and tension of the conference, a moment when the boys, including the usually straitlaced Dulles, bonded together on the basis of reinscribing the familia partly raping, partly seducing Soviets and the vulnerable French.

I should note that while the juxtaposition of Soviet power weakness suggested the metaphor of sexual overmastering, a com rape and seduction, another section of this document coded differently. In praising a speech in which Bidault had endorsed A on Germany and on the EDC, Jackson depicted him as "a hero" Jackson's language demonstrated, the governing logic or pattern metaphors is not that a person, nation, or policy is always masculine or feminine. Rather, writers or speakers generally code as masculine they understand to be positive, and they generally code as feminine they understand to be negative. In the context of the Atlantic alli policies, actions, or statements are generally those with which t agrees. An action by Bidault in accordance with U.S. purpos perceived them, was a masculine action, requiring "guts" and ev the other hand, an action suggesting that the French were incli Soviet policy — or acting independently — was somewhat parad as an effeminate non-action, a position of passive, sexualized Molotov had his hand above Bidault's knee. Through this con ments of rape and seduction in an overarching metaphor, Bidault agency and knowledge: He is both overpowered and duped.

2022 Michigan Evidence
NEG – China AI Leadership Good – Classic HJV › 2ac – China isn’t transparent

Chinese tech giants pose harms to consumers – steal personal data for profit

Murphy and Tong 21 – [Flynn Murphy and Qian Tong. Caixin Global provides the latest China news headlines on politics, economy, business and finance with insight and in-depth analysis. 1-14-2021, "In Depth: Pushback Against China Tech Giants Grows With Accusation of Algorithmic ‘Bullying’," No Publication, /kch]

BEIJING (CAIXIN GLOBAL) - A government-backed Chinese consumer group has accused the nation's tech giants of using their data-based algorithms to "bully" consumers and put them at a disadvantage. At a symposium on the topic held by the China Consumers Association (CCA) on Jan. 7, the group released a three-section, 14-point document outlining the ways data-driven algorithms impinge the rights of consumers in their interactions with large tech platforms, and calling for beefed up powers for regulators. It's the latest sign that the technology broadly described as "artificial intelligence" - and specifically algorithm-based advertising and sales - is shaping up as a new front in the country's push to control big tech. And it comes amid a broader national conversation about how tech giants use their technology to control the information available to individual consumers, and leverage their access to personal data for profit.

Among the grievances listed by the CCA are complex sales promotions that obscure the true costs of a product, targeted search results that create information asymmetry, and the practice of hiding negative reviews, which it says leaves consumers "squeezed by algorithms and the targets of technological bullying." Of particular concern to the group is the practice of "algorithmic price discrimination," where the personal data of an online shopper is used to calculate different prices for different individuals based on what they might be willing to pay. The CCA proposed a series of remedies, including establishing a special organisation to police algorithmic ethics and investigate "unfair algorithms," and equip government departments with the ability to regulate them. It also controversially calls for tech giants to be forced to turn over what has been described as their "secret sauce" - the proprietary algorithms which underpin their businesses - to regulators in the case of disputes. The document released by the government-backed group is seen as the latest evidence China is preparing to publish a draft regulation on artificial intelligence and algorithms. The CCA called on "all sectors of society to work together for … the fair and reasonable application of algorithms, and prevent operators from using algorithms to do evil."

2022 Michigan Evidence
NEG – China AI Leadership Good – Classic HJV › 2ac – China isn’t transparent

Unlike China, the US establishes reports to address the transparency and trustworthy of AI with ethical standards

Ota 20 [Yasu Ota has more than 30 years of journalism experience; has spent more than half of career as foreign correspondent in Washington DC and Frankfurt, Germany, covering major business and financial events, including the Asian Economic Crisis, the US-Japan trade dispute and European economic integration.,, 8-23-2020, "China's AI tech leaves aside questions of ethics," Nikkei Asia, /kch]

TOKYO -- Artificial intelligence, like other forms of technology, reflects the culture and values of the people who create it and those who provide the data frameworks upon which it is built. AI technology developed in different countries or organizations may thus offer different answers to the same problem.

On June 25, the National Security Commission on Artificial Intelligence, an independent U.S. government body, released, "The Role of AI Technology in Pandemic Response and Preparedness: Recommended Investments and Initiatives." The report makes 10 recommendations, including calls for the creation of a federal "Pandemic Preparedness Dataset" and investment in "the digital modernization of state and local health infrastructure required for effective disease surveillance." It was the commission's third report published since May 6 on AI and the government's response to the COVID-19 pandemic. The commission's so-called COVID-19 White Paper Series deals with fundamental ethical issues related to the use of AI in policy responses to the crisis, including privacy and the responsibilities of software developers. The commission has tried to help establish clear government positions on these issues, and to present them to Congress and the American people. This is time-consuming, but despite the urgency of the pandemic, the government must follow democratic processes when deciding how to spend taxpayer money. China, by contrast, has been very quick to wield AI in its battle against the disease. AI has been used to identify individuals in contact tracing and to predict how the virus spreads. Infection rates for the novel coronavirus are far over 15,000 per million people in the U.S. and Brazil, as of Thursday. The official figure for China, where the pandemic started, is 62, although there is some doubt about the credibility of the Chinese data. There is no denying that a society that puts the collection of personal data needed to track a virus ahead of the protection of privacy can, in theory, do a better job containing an outbreak of infectious disease. The pandemic has brought to the fore wide differences in values and cultural norms between nations. Shigeo Kawashima, an associate professor at Aoyama Gakuin University who studies the interaction between society and technology, believes the world has reached a historical crossroads with regard to the evolution of AI. The question, Kawashima says, is "which country will be able to build an AI-driven society where people, not machines, play the central role."

2022 Michigan Evidence
NEG – China AI Leadership Good – Classic HJV › 2ac – US ahead now

Chinese business ecosystem cannot keep up with US AI specialists

Reshetnikova 21 (Marina S. Reshetnikova, Professor (Associate) at the Department of Economic and Mathematical Modeling, Peoples' Friendship University of Russia, Research and Innovation Forum 2021, “Future China: AI Leadership by 2030?”, September 21, 2021, Springer Link)//SW

Also, Chinese scholars published 28% of all works in different AI techniques (for scholars from the European Union, this figure is 27%, and for the United States, 23%) []. However, the scientific value of the Chinese AI research shaft is not great. American publications in this area have a citation index of 50% higher than Chinese. Among the patents filed, 87% are for utility models and industrial designs, and only 2% for fundamental research []. Moreover, the number of national AI talents does not satisfy even the Chinese government. According to the MIIT, about 5 million specialists are needed to successfully solve the national AI sector’s tasks [].

Nevertheless, it will be impossible to solve scientific and especially practical competence lag so quickly. The reason is the immaturity of the Chinese AI business ecosystem. American AI talents have gone through many project cycles. The number of American specialists employed in AI with over ten years of experience is approaching 30% and amounts to 850 thousand people []. There are only 50 thousand such specialists in China, and 43% came from the United States []. The practice of attracting foreign came from the United States []. The practice of attracting foreign specialists to improve the national innovation sector’s scientific competence started in 2008, with the launch of the “Thousand Talents Plan”.

2022 Michigan Evidence
NEG – China AI Leadership Good – Classic HJV › 2ac – US ahead now

US maintains AI lead against China with strong universities, private sector, investment and start-up culture

Tony Bertuca 18 (Tony Bertuca, Chief Editor of Inside the Pentagon, Inside Washington, “Inside the Army”, March 19, 2018, Vol. 30, No. 11, JSTOR)//SW

The United States has a “healthy,” but tenuous lead over China in artificial intelligence and quantum computing, according to the head of the Intelligence Advanced Research Projects Activity. Jason Metheny, the director of IARPA, an organization within the Office of the Director of National Intelligence tasked with running advanced research programs for the U.S. intelligence community, said the United States has a tendency to be “alarmist” when it comes to other nations’ technological advancements. “I’m not a catastrophist when it comes to this race between the U.S. and China,” he told reporters at breakfast in Washington. “I think the United States does have a healthy lead. It doesn’t mean that we’re guaranteed to have that lead forever and regardless of policy or investment,” he continued. “This is a lead that was earned through it being a priority within the science and technology organizations. We need to continue recognizing it’s important to maintain the lead.” Metheny said China is the United States’ strongest competitor globally in machine learning and has a “very thoughtful” AI strategy, which calls for becoming a global leader in the arena by 2025. “It’s basically a Chinese translation of the U.S. AI plan, which I worked on -- there were a lot of familiar passages,” he said. “But they’ve also introduced an implementation plan for that AI strategy that includes quantitative milestones in speech recognition, imagery analysis, video analysis that are, I think, realistic, but also ambitious.” China also enjoys tighter civil-military integration than the United States does, which combines to provide a whole-of-nation effort. Still, Metheny said, such government-directed integration can be a disadvantage. “I think that the United States has an advantage in its competitive landscape,” he said. “We have the strongest universities by far. We have the strongest start-up culture and we also have risk-tolerant companies like Google and Microsoft and Amazon and Open AI that are willing to fund very high-risk research that may not pay out for five to 10 years.” Additionally, Metheny said all of IARPA’s unclassified research contracts are awarded competitively. “We engage our researchers in tournaments in which multiple research teams compete against one another toward a common set of technical goals that have highly ambitious milestones,” he said. IARPA is also the world’s largest source of academic research funding in quantum computing, which could lead to leap-ahead technological advancements in everything from global food production to data encryption and code breaking. “This is an area where I think the United States has a lead,” he said. “China is investing, but not at the levels the United States is.”

2022 Michigan Evidence
NEG – China AI Leadership Good – Classic HJV › 2ac – US ahead now

US is the most dominant in AI, and will continue in the future

Naomi Davies, 11-18-2021, an FDI consultant at Investment Monitor"Index shows US is winning the AI race – but for how long?," Investment Monitor, https://www.investmentmonitor.ai/ai/ai-index-us-china-artificial-intelligence

The  is the leading country in Investment Monitor‘s first ranking assessing investor friendliness within the AI space. The US holds first place in eight out of 17 indicators analysed, including metrics such as e-participation, investment in emerging technologies and software spending as a percentage of GDP.

According to figures from GlobalData, more than 8,300 AI deals were recorded in the US in the five years up to November 2021. This is more than triple the amount of its closest competitor , which recorded approximately 2,500 deals during the same period.

2022 Michigan Evidence
NEG – China AI Leadership Good – Classic HJV › 2ac – Central Investment Fails

Chinese firms lack incentive to innovate and are stifled by uncertain regulation and business environment

Li et al. 21 (Daitian Li, Assistant Professor at the University of Electronic Science & Technology of China, Harvard Business Review, “Is China Emerging as the Global Leader in AI”, February 18, 2021)//SW

By many indicators, China is now on the global frontier of AI in terms of technological development and market applications. The unique technological, market, policy environments that Chinese firms face in the emerging AI sector have given them a window of opportunity to catch up with global leaders rapidly.

But, paradoxically, while China may have caught up in record time, the conditions that have allowed it to do so may impede its further development in AI.

2022 Michigan Evidence
NEG – China AI Leadership Good – Classic HJV › 2ac – Central Investment Fails

China’s approach to AI development creates spending issues and careless mindsets with no accountability

Roberts et al. 20 (Huw Roberts, Oxford Internet Institute, “The Chinese Approach to Artificial Intelligence: an Analysis of Policy, Ethics, and Regulation”, June 17, 2020, AI & Soc 36, 59-77, Springer Link)//SW

Concerning local governments, the political structure within China creates a system of incentives for fulfilling national government policy aims. Short term limits for provincial politicians and promotions based on economic performance provide strong incentives for following centrally-defined government initiatives (Li and Zhou ; Persson and Zhuravskaya ). Thus, local governments become hotbeds for testing and developing central government policy. The strength of this incentive system can be seen in the decision made by the administration of the city of Tianjin to establish a $5 billion fund for the development of AI, around the same time as the publication of the AIDP (Mozur ). At the same time, it is important to recognize how the absence of an effective accountability review of local government spending creates problems within this system. Notably, it has facilitated a mindset in which local politicians know that the central government will bail them out for failed projects, leading to poor budget management (Ji ). A clear example of this is the large-scale port building initiatives developed by provincial governments in East coast provinces that were based more on prestige than any economic rationale, and which led to overcapacity and disorderly competition (Zhu ).

These incentive structures contain a subtle distinction. A national team has been selected to lead the research and development in a handful of designated strategic areas. Beyond these selected companies, there are few specific guidelines provided to industry and local state agents as to which items to pursue on the AIDP’s ‘wish list’. This enables companies to cherry-pick the technologies they want to develop and provides local governments with a choice of private sector partners for integrating AI into city infrastructure or governance (Sheehan ). Subsequent documentation has emphasised the importance of strengthening organisation and implementation, including between provinces and ministries, yet it is unclear how this coordination would function in practice. Thus, the AIDP may work as a ‘wish list’, but the exact guidance, incentivisation and risk differ depending on the type of stakeholder.

2022 Michigan Evidence
NEG – China AI Leadership Good – Classic HJV › 2ac – US AI better

US is the best country to lead in AI and must create global norms.

Beier and Cunningham 19, David Beier and Nelson Cunningham, David Beier is the Managing Director of Bay Capital City. Previously Chief Domestic Policy to Vice President Al Gore. Senior corporate officer DNA and Amgen. Nelso is the President of McLarty Associates, global strategy firm. Former Clinton and Biden aide, former AUSA in SDNY, 10-26-2019, “America Must Lead the Global Charge on Artificial Intelligence,” , OJ

When the world’s first power plant switched on in 1882 — steam engines, fired by coal, lighting lower Manhattan — policymakers probably didn’t ask what this breakthrough would mean for America’s rivalry with Germany, the rising industrial and military power of the day. This century’s breakthrough technology is artificial intelligence, as consequential today as electricity was to the 19th century. Which nation leads on AI will lead on, well, everything. And that brings us to America’s rapidly escalating conflict with today’s rising power, China. AI will profoundly improve human society, affecting the daily lives of people in every corner of the world. If you’ve ever tried Google Translate and been frustrated (or amused) by the results, you can imagine the benefits of truly intelligent translations that communicate the full cultural or social meaning into a new language. AI researchers are on the path to achieving this sort of breakthrough, which will revolutionize the ease and clarity with which we communicate across borders, cultures and societies. And that’s just a start. Artificial intelligence is more important than any single country’s agenda. It’s a breakthrough that transcends national rivalries. And yet, we can be sure AI will be weaponized both literally and figuratively. The US and China are racing to establish AI advantage, economic and military alike. An early flashpoint in the fight is Huawei. The US is determined to prevent its allies from partnering with the Chinese telecommunications giant to build next-generation 5G wireless networks. We are fast entering a new Cold War where a modern-day bamboo curtain may separate Chinese AI systems from Western systems. It’s Betamax vs VHS with military reinforcement. Whose technology will dominate the AI era? Here’s the bottom line: no country is in a stronger position to craft a framework for global AI norms than America. We have the world’s largest economy, the most advanced military and competitive advantage in AI research and education. No country has played a more important role in establishing the rules governing global policymaking than America. A Center for Data Innovation study out this summer found that the United States is indeed ahead on AI — for now. But China is rapidly closing the gap. What next? It’s time for America to step up and create a global framework for AI. What we do in America should set a course for the rest of the world to follow. China included. Some politicians and policymakers in Washington and Silicon Valley believe the government should regulate AI as little as possible, leaving markets alone. This instinct is a useful counterweight to excessive regulation, but a simplistic view of the government’s economic and industrial contributions. And, we can be sure the Chinese approach will not be laissez-faire. The truth is the public sector plays multiple roles. In the case of new products or services, it acts as regulator, promoter, standard-setter, purchaser and rule-maker of global policy. Only the government can outline a comprehensive strategy for when and how to engage in all these AI policy parameters. Despite early efforts by the Trump Administration to call attention to AI, fitful steps by individual members of Congress and ad hoc contributions from cities and states, most of the policy framework for AI is not yet mature. For instance, there is no agreement about how to prepare for the adoption of AI in the workplace and no national privacy policy. We have no uniform rules for how consumer data must be safeguarded and how it may be used. We have no plan for multilateral coordination with other countries. Above all, there is quite literally no one in the United States in charge of its national AI policy. The time has come for a policy architecture that permits the United States — through its federal government, cooperating with business and civil society — to speak definitively, ethically and with detail about AI rules for everything from workers’ rights to responsible uses of facial recognition technology and autonomous drones in armed conflict. The US needs this not only for its own needs, but to provide a path for the rest of the world to follow. With thoughtful action, we can shape whose vision of the public interest will infuse AI: the liberal Western vision, or the Chinese, collectivist, authoritarian vision? For a Western definition of public interest to prevail, we need a set of international trade rules to guide the AI era. These rules should help open markets, protect intellectual property, minimize coerced tech transfer and do away with unfair government subsidies for AI. The Paris-based Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development has made initial, think tank-style recommendations and the World Economic Forum is helping keep AI on the agenda among global business leaders. These are a good start, but not sufficient. The American agenda should focus on the adoption of a uniform framework that protects users’ data without stifling commerce. It should include the right of citizens to learn what data is being collected on them, the right to say “no,” and sensible and workable rules for correcting and deleting data. Further, a new global AI standard should place strict limitations of the use of AI tools for intrusive government surveillance. A new AI framework should mandate accountability through mandatory disclosures to assure fairness, reliability, accuracy and assurance of diversity of data collection. This American agenda will pave a path for like-minded countries to follow. We can resist Chinese pressure, but only if we come together in common cause. The alternative to US leadership may be a Balkanized constellation of policies and regulations. Or, worse, a Manichean world where nations are forced to pick between the United States and China. It is time for the US to lead on AI in a way that the world will follow. The first step is to get behind a push at home for a national AI policy. We can’t afford to let others write the rules for this critical component of the global economy while we debate — or sleep.

2022 Michigan Evidence
NEG – China AI Leadership Good – Classic HJV › 2ac – US AI better

Recent funding from the NDAA lifts US standards on AI development – programs are specifically created to check for ethics, education, security, privacy and rights

Capezza et al 21 – [Michelle Capezza is an executive compensation lawyer with more than 25 years of experience advising clients on ERISA, benefits, and executive compensation matters, including in connection with corporate transactions. Nivedita B. Patel provides legal counsel and strategic business advice on state and federal health care fraud and abuse laws and regulations, including HIPAA, the Stark Law, and the Anti-Kickback Statute. She served as Associate General Counsel of the largest independent, nonprofit, multispecialty physician practice in Washington, DC. In that role, she worked closely with executive leadership to structure and negotiate a variety of complex arrangements with hospitals and physician practice partners. Alaap B. Shah is a certified CSF Practitioner, by the Health Information Trust Alliance (HITRUST); a Certified Professional in Healthcare Information and Management Systems (CPHIMS), by the Healthcare Information and Management Systems Society (HIMSS); and a Certified Information Privacy Professional in the United States, by the International Association of Privacy Professionals (IAPP). He provided legal counsel and support to all agencies and programs under the Public Health Division of HHS. 2-8-2021, "U.S. Advances AI Innovation with NAIIA," Health Law Advisor, /kch]

After a Congressional override of a Presidential veto, the National Defense Authorization Act became law on January 1, 2021 (NDAA). Notably, the NDAA not only provides appropriations for military and defense purposes but, under Division E, it also includes the most significant U.S. legislation concerning artificial intelligence (AI) to date: The National Artificial Intelligence Initiative Act of 2020 (NAIIA). The NAIIA sets forth a multi-pronged national strategy and funding approach to spur AI research, development and innovation within the U.S., train and prepare an AI-skilled workforce for the integration of AI throughout the economy and society, and establish a pathway to position the U.S. as a global leader in the development and adoption of trustworthy AI in the public and private sectors. Importantly, the NAIIA does not set forth merely lofty goals, but rather, legislates concrete matters of critical importance for economic and national security. With a new Administration in place, and increasing global competition to develop AI and related guidelines, this is undoubtedly a pivotal time in history. AI will continue to transform every industry and workplace, and every facet of our day-to-day lives. It is important to become familiar with the NAIIA and consider its long-term impact for society, including the legal and ethical ramifications if the goals are not met. To understand the legal, regulatory and business challenges associated with AI, all organizations should gain a better understanding of the NAIIA and keep apprised of developments as the newly formed governing bodies created under the NAIIA begin their work.

National AI Initiative

2022 Michigan Evidence
NEG – China AI Leadership Good – Classic HJV › 2ac – Democracy ! Defense

China will use lethal AI to act against the US and its allies

Alex Stephenson and Ryan Fedasiuk 22, Alex Stephenson is a China military technology research assistant at Georgetown University’s Center for Security and Emerging Technology and former surface warfare officer in the U.S. Navy. Ryan Fedasiuk is a research analyst at Georgetown University’s Center for Security and Emerging Technology and an adjunct fellow at the Center for a New American Security.5-3-2022, “How AI Would — and Wouldn’t — Factor Into a U.S.-Chinese War,” , oj

How AI Could Enhance Chinese Capability The most likely sources of a potential U.S.-Chinese conflict, such as a Chinese invasion of Taiwan or a contest over some South China Sea feature, would likely feature the full spectrum of civil and military information operations aimed at deterring U.S. intervention and degrading U.S. allies’ will to fight. AI could play a dominant role in each of these missions. The Network Systems Department of the People’s Liberation Army, for example, may try using generative language models to synthesize and amplify content on Facebook and Instagram, as it has done using botnets and other non-AI tools around Taiwanese elections. The Chinese military is also likely to wage a similar campaign to discredit U.S. military activities or sow division with partners, including Australia and Japan. Soon after the start of a conflict, the People’s Liberation Army would likely attack U.S. sensor and communication networks, and several different kinds of machine-learning applications could aid this task. A cadre of scientists at the People’s Liberation Army National University of Defense Technology, for example, specializes in “fuzzing,” using machine learning to identify vulnerabilities in an adversary’s computer networks. Experts also point to AI’s role in attacking or defending critical infrastructure in Taiwan, Japan, Australia, or the United States. Chinese planners also aim to use AI for electronic countermeasures and operations across the electromagnetic spectrum. For example, analysts from anquan neican (a Chinese journal for cybersecurity research) are optimistic about cognitive electronic warfare — using AI to analyze incoming radar signals, and then automatically adapting one’s own output to optimize jamming. But several other applications of AI also play a role in electronic spectrum operations. In 2020, for example, the People’s Liberation Army awarded equipment contracts for swarms of drones equipped with modular radar-jamming systems, which could be flown near U.S. carrier strike groups, military installations in Japan and South Korea, or shared facilities in the Philippines. Many systems under development by Chinese universities and military research institutions are explicitly designed to counter U.S. drone systems and swarm concepts. Chinese companies have already exported drones to Nigeria, the United Arab Emirates, and Egypt, among others. However, while some People’s Liberation Army experts contend that these drones have been “battle tested,” others are less sanguine about their capabilities in a real conflict. Moreover, the People’s Liberation Army may attempt to use AI to enhance the lethality and reach of its surface ships and anti-access and area denial systems, which could hold U.S. forces at risk during a crisis. China’s current approach to territorial defense relies on hundreds of short- to long-range ballistic missiles that would target U.S. aircraft carriers and strike aircraft based in mainland Japan, Okinawa, South Korea, and as far away as Guam. As early as 2016, Wang Changqing, director of the General Design Department of the China Aerospace Science and Industry Corporation, claimed that the company’s next generation of cruise missiles would use AI to adapt to specific combat conditions, being capable of adjusting flight profiles and even warhead yield. Chinese defense industry engineers appear inspired by the U.S. Long-Range Anti-Ship Missile, which uses AI to improve accuracy and achieve more flexible targeting. Finally, the People’s Liberation Army is building a wide array of autonomous vehicles and extensive undersea sensor networks that make use of AI and big-data analytics. These systems may be useful in recording and transmitting the locations of U.S. undersea vehicles, and would be crucial to overcoming the Chinese military’s disadvantages in undersea warfare. Large unmanned submarines, such as the HSU-001 and Haishen-6000, could be equipped with sea mines to deny the U.S. Navy access to undersea space between the first and second island chains, or to restrict access to the Taiwan or Luzon Straits. Of course, AI has the potential to revolutionize Chinese operations in countless other ways, including through predictive maintenance, logistics, and back-office tasks not discussed in depth in this article. In any case, it is clear that the People’s Liberation Army is banking on the technology to create asymmetric advantages vis-a-vis the United States.

2022 Michigan Evidence
NEG – China AI Leadership Good – Classic HJV › 2ac – Democracy ! Defense

Absolutely no chance of extinction from disease

Adalja 16 [Amesh Adalja, infectious disease physician at the University of Pittsburgh] “Why Hasn't Disease Wiped out the Human Race?” June 17, 2016 (http://www.theatlantic.com/health/archive/2016/06/infectious-diseases-extinction/487514/) - MZhu

But when people ask me if I’m worried about infectious diseases, they’re often not asking about the threat to human lives; they’re asking about the threat to human life. With each outbreak of a headline-grabbing emerging infectious disease comes a fear of extinction itself. The fear envisions a large proportion of humans succumbing to infection, leaving no survivors or so few that the species can’t be sustained. I’m not afraid of this apocalyptic scenario, but I do understand the impulse. Worry about the end is a quintessentially human trait. Thankfully, so is our resilience. For most of mankind’s history, infectious diseases were the existential threat to humanity—and for good reason. They were quite successful at killing people: The 6th century’s Plague of Justinian knocked out an estimated 17 percent of the world’s population; the 14th century Black Death decimated a third of Europe; the 1918 influenza pandemic killed 5 percent of the world; malaria is estimated to have killed half of all humans who have ever lived. Any yet, of course, humanity continued to flourish. Our species’ recent explosion in lifespan is almost exclusively the result of the control of infectious diseases through sanitation, vaccination, and antimicrobial therapies. Only in the modern era, in which many infectious diseases have been tamed in the industrial world, do people have the luxury of death from cancer, heart disease, or stroke in the 8th decade of life. Childhoods are free from watching siblings and friends die from outbreaks of typhoid, scarlet fever, smallpox, measles, and the like. So what would it take for a disease to wipe out humanity now? In Michael Crichton’s The Andromeda Strain, the canonical book in the disease-outbreak genre, an alien microbe threatens the human race with extinction, and humanity’s best minds are marshaled to combat the enemy organism. Fortunately, outside of fiction, there’s no reason to expect alien pathogens to wage war on the human race any time soon, and my analysis suggests that any real-life domestic microbe reaching an extinction level of threat probably is just as unlikely. Any apocalyptic pathogen would need to possess a very special combination of two attributes. First, it would have to be so unfamiliar that no existing therapy or vaccine could be applied to it. Second, it would need to have a high and surreptitious transmissibility before symptoms occur. The first is essential because any microbe from a known class of pathogens would, by definition, have family members that could serve as models for containment and countermeasures. The second would allow the hypothetical disease to spread without being detected by even the most astute clinicians. The three infectious diseases most likely to be considered extinction-level threats in the world today—influenza, HIV, and Ebola—don’t meet these two requirements. Influenza, for instance, despite its well-established ability to kill on a large scale, its contagiousness, and its unrivaled ability to shift and drift away from our vaccines, is still what I would call a “known unknown.” While there are many mysteries about how new flu strains emerge, from at least the time of Hippocrates, humans have been attuned to its risk. And in the modern era, a full-fledged industry of influenza preparedness exists, with effective vaccine strategies and antiviral therapies. HIV, which has killed 39 million people over several decades, is similarly limited due to several factors. Most importantly, HIV’s dependency on blood and body fluid for transmission (similar to Ebola) requires intimate human-to-human contact, which limits contagion. Highly potent antiviral therapy allows most people to live normally with the disease, and a substantial group of the population has genetic mutations that render them impervious to infection in the first place. Lastly, simple prevention strategies such as needle exchange for injection drug users and barrier contraceptives—when available—can curtail transmission risk. Ebola, for many of the same reasons as HIV as well as several others, also falls short of the mark. This is especially due to the fact that it spreads almost exclusively through people with easily recognizable symptoms, plus the taming of its once unfathomable 90 percent mortality rate by simple supportive care. Beyond those three, every other known disease falls short of what seems required to wipe out humans—which is, of course, why we’re still here. And it’s not that diseases are ineffective. On the contrary, diseases’ failure to knock us out is a testament to just how resilient humans are. Part of our evolutionary heritage is our immune system, one of the most complex on the planet, even without the benefit of vaccines or the helping hand of antimicrobial drugs. This system, when viewed at a species level, can adapt to almost any enemy imaginable. Coupled to genetic variations amongst humans—which open up the possibility for a range of advantages, from imperviousness to infection to a tendency for mild symptoms—this adaptability ensures that almost any infectious disease onslaught will leave a large proportion of the population alive to rebuild, in contrast to the fictional Hollywood versions. While the immune system’s role can never be understated, an even more powerful protector is the faculty of consciousness. Humans are not the most prolific, quickly evolving, or strongest organisms on the planet, but as Aristotle identified, humans are the rational animals—and it is this fundamental distinguishing characteristic that allows humans to form abstractions, think in principles, and plan long-range. These capacities, in turn, allow humans to modify, alter, and improve themselves and their environments. Consciousness equips us, at an individual and a species level, to make nature safe for the species through such technological marvels as antibiotics, antivirals, vaccines, and sanitation. When humans began to focus their minds on the problems posed by infectious disease, human life ceased being nasty, brutish, and short. In many ways, human consciousness became infectious diseases’ worthiest adversary.