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2022 CNDI Kritik
Neg › FW › Epistemology First

Feminist epistemology for peacebuilding

Julian et al. 19 – Rachel Julian & Robin Redhead, School of Social Sciences, Leeds Beckett University; Berit Bliesemann de Guevara, Department of International Politics, Aberystwyth University. “From expert to experiential knowledge: exploring the inclusion of local experiences in understanding violence in conflict,” Peacebuilding, Volume 7, Issue 2. Routledge, 2019.

A feminist epistemology asks why socially marginalised groups are absent from the design and conduct of research about them and seeks to transform those political practices that legitimate this exclusion.23 This involves the inclusion of the researched in the research, revealing the power dynamics between researcher and researched and stressing the value of local knowledges or experiences.24 It demands scrutiny of our own practices as scholars as well as a commitment to transformative politics.25 Knowledge is understood as an intersubjective process, it is produced through encounters with others.26 This means that knowledge is ‘not just “out there”, but the result of a particular engagement in a particular context as a continuous way of “becoming”’, 27 highlighting the crucial role the researcher-researched relationship plays in (conflict) knowledge production – a role that is usually written out of conflict analyses. The feminist approaches we draw on highlight everyday experience as crucial to knowledge. Feminist ethnographies, for instance, consider the ‘everyday’ activities of people to show the complexities of local-global relations.28 They ‘listen to the unsaid’ 29 in the everyday and produce ‘sincere and reliable knowledge’. 30 The feminist approach accounts for embodied knowledge: how we make sense of the world based on our own experiences in it.31 While experience is universal in the sense that we all experience everyday social reality, it is also personal in that it cannot be generalised or categorised by an external actor. It incorporates what is of central importance to the person having the experience, including the perceptions, narratives, myths and relationships that surround it. In much the same way that the study of practice challenges the norms of institutionalised politics, an understanding of the importance of everyday experience challenges the dominance of the outside expert in creating knowledge about conflict, violence and peace in several ways. Inspired by these insights of feminist methodologies,32 underpinning the research agenda of ‘Raising Silent Voices’ was a strong commitment to developing and valuing experiential knowledge, which redefined what counted as ‘knowledge’ in understanding conflicts. Feminist approaches provide us with at least two reasons why including everyday experiences into our analyses of violent conflict enhances understanding. Firstly, experiences cannot be categorised by group (e.g. the experience of all women), but rather need to be treated as a set of narratives from which we can learn more and which may challenge the assumptions or systematising analyses of outsiders. Thus, understanding that there are different knowledges that emerge from lived experiences, and that all these experiences have value, is essential. This also means that not all specific or personal experiences can be represented solely by community leaders or civil society representatives. Civil society and community leaders are not interest-free conduits of knowledge, but their position is already a manifestation and a potential source of the power struggles in the conflict area. This is an important insight when considering that community and civil society leaders feature prominently in conflict analysis approaches, where these actors are often taken to be able to speak on behalf of those they represent. Feminist approaches remind us that we need many experiential knowledges in order to achieve a fuller picture, not all of which can be represented by ‘local elites’. Studying ‘ordinary people’ rather than starting with ‘local elites’ promises to unearth insights, knowledges and strategies that currently tend to remain hidden in conflict analysis which starts with outsider views. Indeed, what emerges from our research is that those who live amidst violence, seek to protect people, or create peace, are far from ‘ordinary’, but are courageous, creative and extraordinary people who have interwoven relationships and protection into their everyday lives in order to deal with the fears, insecurities and threats they face. Using a feminist conception of knowledge production opens up spaces to allow for different actors and actions to form part of the knowledge that is seen as valid in these circumstances. This may ultimately have a positive impact on everyday peace strategies, for when someone is recognised as an actor, they are empowered with the capability to act and with that comes recognition of the validity of their actions. In this idea of inclusion of local agency and people’s everyday actions, we are not following the much debated ‘participatory’ models, which can reproduce hierarchies of power and expertise in their own right, but rather the idea of ‘capacity recognition’, 33 which begins with the understanding that people already have agency, that their actions have value and importance in the local context, and that people’s everyday experiences based on these actions make them valuable holders of experiential knowledge that gives them the capacity to act knowingly (i.e. with an awareness of what they are doing). This form of empowerment-through-inclusion raises the significance of everyday activities to more than a local matter,34 and writes them into the dominant narratives and practices of peacebuilding. Secondly, experiences are important for conflict analyses because they are likely to defy any uncritical form of universal or generalizable narrative coherence. By their virtue, experiences are diverse, producing many knowledges. Including the diversity of experiences – including past, present and future thinking – into conflict analyses, reveals how people’s varied interpretations and perceptions create a set of different knowledges, which all contribute to understanding the web of conflict and potentials for peace. People living amidst violent conflict know the significance of details – that it matters what they wear, which symbols are of importance in identifying allegiances, which routes, roads and paths are safe and at which times, who is aligned with whom, and how to find safe escape routes when necessary. They see conflict and violence in their many forms, and they also know what peace looks like. Especially for work in the areas of protection and conflict transformation, such experiential micro-insights are invaluable. This leads us to the question of how to access experiential knowledge methodologically, without reproducing the power hierarchies inherent in outsider-expert knowledge production discussed above. While ethnographic approaches seem promising as a way of knowing experiences and are now used more frequently in peacebuilding studies,35 Macaspac has shown that most of this ethnographic research still revolves around the experience of researchers from the Global North, thus perpetuating the outsider-expert view on conflict at the cost of a more meaningful inclusion of local experiential knowledge.36 Furthermore, ethnography usually presupposes a longer-term engagement with ‘the field’ in which the ethnography takes place, thus making this methodology difficult to realise within the time and financial constraints of international organisations’ project work. Critical peace and conflict studies scholars have provided some ideas on how to foreground the centrality of local people’s knowledge and experiences (rather than that of the Northern researcher) in violent conflict and conflict transformation. These include approaches based on reflective practice,37 empowerment and emancipation through listening,38 and patience and humility.39 Lederach has used some of these approaches in his argument that some people in the midst of conflicts can become key catalysts and produce dramatic results, describing them as ‘critical yeast’, that is, people who are engaged in constant and growing ‘web-weaving’ (or building of relationships between people) to make them connected and stronger.40 Ideas of reflexivity, listening, critical yeast and web-weaving all provide clues for how we can re-think peace and conflict studies in ways that give primacy to local experiences and overlap with feminist epistemology. A shared insight is that revealing experiential knowledge requires research methods which involve trust and a recognition of the power or agency of the local everyday experience. Standard social science methods often find their limits when applied to topics that involve complex or strong experiences, emotions and/or cultural taboos and shame, which may resist objectification in language. For one, human knowledge constitutes more than just that which can be put into words, or as Polanyi writes about tacit knowledge: ‘The fact that we can possess knowledge that is unspoken is of course a common-place and so is the fact that we must know something yet unspoken before we can express it in words.’ 41 Furthermore, health and psychology research suggests that people may find it hard to voice traumatic or tabooed experiences, especially in front of others, or that they simply lack the words to describe how an experience makes them feel, to make the unheard and invisible heard.42 Sexual violence, torture and other common conflict-related experiences are prone to fall into this category, but also situations that do not constitute an unspeakable issue in one culture (e.g. that of the aid worker) may resist direct reporting in the context of different cultural conventions and norms.43 Methods to reveal experiential knowledge thus ideally need to create safe space for sharing and provide tools that empower people to do so.44 Exploring experiential knowledge also involves revealing and working to mitigate power relations between researcher and researched, since the use of methods that do not challenge power would risk perpetuating the norms created by ‘external experts’ and encourage local people to ‘just tell you want they think you want to know’. Therefore, overcoming the shortfalls of outsider/expert methods is the task of studies that try to include experiential knowledges of ordinary people living amidst violent conflict. In ‘Raising Silent Voices’ we have developed a methodology that achieves inclusion. It is to this we will now turn.

2022 CNDI Kritik
Neg › FW › Epistemology First

Prioritize feminist epistemologies—the aff’s urgency framing mystifies structural causes and creates serial policy failure

Enloe 14

Cynthia, Research Professor in the Department of International Development, Community, and Environment, with affiliations with Women’s and Gender Studies and Political Science, all at Clark University in Worcester, Massachusetts. “Conclusion.” Bananas, Beaches and Bases Making Feminist Sense of International Politics. Pg 348-359. LJS

One of the simplest and most disturbing feminist insights crafted in recent decades is that “the personal is political.” It is a profound theoretical statement that can be transferred to a T-shirt or bumper sticker. Asserting that “the personal is political” is disturbing, intentionally disturbing, because it means that relationships we once imagined were (and many of our friends and colleagues still prefer to think are) private or merely social are in fact infused with power. Furthermore, those allegedly private, personal relationships are infused with power that is unequal and backed up by public authority. But the assertion that “the personal is political” is like a palindrome, one of those phrases that can be read backward as well as forward. Read as “the political is personal,” the assertion suggests that politics is not shaped merely by what happens in legislative debates, voting booths, political party strategy sessions, court rooms, or war rooms. While men who dominate public life in so many countries have told women to stay in the proverbial kitchen (not travel to workshops in Manila, not organize, not theorize), those same men have used their myriad forms of public power to construct private relationships in ways that have bolstered their own masculinized political control. Without these deliberate gendered maneuvers, men’s hold over political life might be far less secure. Without these gendered maneuvers, moreover, most men’s seeming “expertise” in politics would look less impressive. A 2013 cross-national survey of citizens’ political knowledge found that in virtually every one of the ten countries studied, “women know less about politics than men regardless of how advanced a country is in terms of gender equality.”2 The authors of the study speculated that this gender gap in political information might be due to the fact that few women play prominent roles in news journalism and elite political life, which discourages many women viewers and readers from seeing how current news accounts are relevant to themselves. While this possible explanation for the country-by-country political information gaps appears feasible, a British feminist journalist analyzing the same ten-country study offered an additional explanation: perhaps the researchers’ definitions and measures of what counts as “politics” were too narrow.3 Perhaps what many women do pay attention to, and do store information about, is encompassed by a broader, some might say more realistic, map of politics—for instance, the availability of affordable child care, the condition of public parks, the accessibility of public transport, the readiness of police to treat a woman with respect when she brings a rape charge, the government’s willingness to use sexualized pictures of local women to lure foreign tourists, and the impunity with which employers abuse women on the job. That is, perhaps if the map of what is counted as political were redrawn by feminist-informed cartographers, the gap between women’s and men’s political knowledge would shrink dramatically. Explaining why any country has the kind of politics it does should motivate us to be curious about how public life is constructed out of struggles to define masculinity and femininity. Accepting that the “political is personal” prompts one to investigate the politics of marriage, the cheapening of women’s labor, ideologies of masculinity, sexually transmitted diseases, and homophobia—not as marginal issues but as matters central to the state. Doing this kind of research becomes just as serious as studying military weaponry or taxation policy. In fact, insofar as the political is personal, the latter categories cannot be fully understood without taking into account the former. To make sense of international politics, we have to read power backward and forward. Power relations between countries and their governments involve more than troop maneuvers and diplomatic emails. Read forward, “the personal is international” insofar as ideas about what it means to be a “respectable” woman or an “honorable” man have been shaped by colonizing policies, international trade strategies, and military doctrines. Today it has almost become a cliché to say that the world is shrinking, that state boundaries are porous: think of KFC opening in Shanghai, sushi eaten in Santiago, Cézannes hanging on walls in Doha, a Korean pop star drawing crowds in New York, and Russian weaponry propping up a Syrian autocrat. We frequently persist, nonetheless, in discussing personal power relationships as if they were contained by sovereign states. We frequently consider violence against women without investigating how the global trade in Internet pornography operates, or how companies offering sex tours and mail-order brides conduct their business across national borders. Similarly, we try to explain how women learn to be “feminine” without unraveling the legacies left by colonial officials who used Victorian ideals of feminine domesticity to sustain their empires; or we try to trace what shapes children’s ideas about femininity and masculinity without looking at governments’ foreign investment policies that encourage the global advertising campaigns of such giants as McCann Erickson, BBDO, or Saatchi and Saatchi. Becoming aware that personal relationships have been internationalized, however, may make one only feel guilty for not having paid enough attention to international affairs. “You should know more about the IMF,” “Don’t switch channels when experts start talking about climate change,” “Find out where Guam is.” While useful, this new international attentiveness by itself is not sufficient. It leaves untouched our conventional presumptions about just what “international politics” is and where it takes place. Coming to realize that the “personal is international” expands the politically attentive audience, but it fails to transform our understandings of what is happening on the multiple stages of international politics. The implications of a feminist understanding of international politics are thrown into sharper relief when one reads “the personal is international” the other way around: the international is personal. This calls for a radical new imagining of what it takes for governments to ally with each other, to compete with and wage war against each other. “The international is personal” implies that governments depend on certain kinds of allegedly private relationships in order to conduct their foreign affairs. Governments need more than tax revenues and spy agencies; they also need wives who are willing to provide their diplomatic husbands with unpaid services so those men can develop trusting relationships with other diplomatic husbands. They need not only military hardware but also a steady supply of women’s sexual services, as well as military wives’ gratitude, to convince their male soldiers that they are manly. To operate in the international arena, governments seek other governments’ recognition of their sovereignty; but they also depend on ideas about masculinized dignity and feminized sacrifi ce to sustain that sense of autonomous nationhood. Thus the international politics of debt, investment, colonization, decolonization, national security, diplomacy, trade, and military occupation are far more complicated than most conventional experts would have us believe. This may appear paradoxical. Many people, and especially women, are taught that international politics are too complex, too remote, and too tough for the so-called feminine mind to comprehend. If a Hillary Clinton, Angela Merkel, Ellen Johnson Sirleaf, Michelle Bachelet, or Christine Lagarde enters, it is presumably because she has learned to “think like a man.” Conventional analyses stop short of investigating an entire area of international relations, an area that feminist-informed researchers in the still-expanding fi eld of gender and international relations are pioneers in exploring: how states depend on particular artifi cial constructions of the domestic and private spheres to achieve their political goals. If we take seriously the politics of domestic servants, of women living on or near a military base, or of women who sew Gap and Zara apparel, we discover that international politics are more complicated than nonfeminist analysts imagine. This is worth saying again: explanations of international politics that are devoid of feminist questioning are too-simple explanations. Such nonfeminist explanations shy away from complexity. They underestimate power. A feminist investigatory approach exposes a remarkable assortment of the kinds of power it takes to make the complex international political system work the way it currently does. Admittedly, conventional analysts of interstate relations do talk a lot about power. In fact, they put power at the center of their commentaries. These are the sorts of commentaries that are presumed to be most naturally comprehended by manly men; women, especially those women presumed to be conventionally feminine, allegedly do not have an innate taste for either wielding or understanding power. However, feminist-informed explo rations of agribusiness plantation prostitution, foreign service corps sexism, and repeated attempts to tame outspoken nationalist women all reveal that, in reality, it takes much more power to construct and perpetuate international political relations than we have been led to believe. One result of feminists’ insight is that they do not erect false barriers between the fi elds of “security studies” and “international political economy.” Feminists realize that the actual workings of gendered politics routinely blur these artifi cial fi elds of investigation. This is why the ten politically savvy women who might come together for Theresa’s imagined Manila workshop start with their domestic lives. It has taken power to deprive women of land titles and pressure them to leave home to work as domestic workers abroad or to stay on banana plantations. It has taken power to keep women marginalized in their countries’ diplomatic corps and out of the upper reaches of central banks and fi nance ministries. It has taken power to exclude women from labor bargaining. It has taken power to keep questions of inequity between local men and women off the agendas of many nationalist movements in industrialized as well as developing societies. It has taken power to keep diverse women in their separate places for the sake of the smooth running of any military base. It has taken power to ensure that UN treaties do not recognize the rights of sexual minorities. It has taken power to ensure that the UN treaties that do take account of violence against women are not implemented. It has taken power to construct popular cultures—through fi lms, advertising, school curricula, television, books, music, fashion, the Internet—that reinforce, rather than subvert, globally gendered hierarchies. “The international is personal,” combined with a sustained feminist curiosity about women’s lives and the workings of masculinities, provides a guide to making sense of the WTO, the ILO, the IMF, the Group of Eight, the Group of Twenty, the World Bank, the EU Commission, the Vatican, the Qatar emirate, the Chinese Politboro, the UN Security Council, the International Crimes Court, the African Union, and the Arab League. “The international is personal” is a starting point for making sense of Gap, Apple, Disney, Foxconn, Chiquita Banana, Deutsche Bank, and H&M, as well as the International Committee of the Red Cross, CARE, OXFAM, and Human Rights Watch. To make realistic sense of international politics, we need thorough, feminist-informed gender analyses of each of these organizations—and more. One can do a feminist-informed gender analysis of anything. And each will make us smarter about how this world works, or fails to work. Taking seriously the assertion that “the international is personal” means that women—in all their diversity—must be made visible, analytically visible, in our investigations of every one of these organizations, and in the relationships between these organizations. If it is true that cooperative as well as hostile relations between governments, corporations, and international organizations rely on constructions of women as symbols, women as providers of emotional support, women as both unpaid and lowpaid workers, women as voters, and women as token participants, then it does not make sense to continue analyzing international politics as if women were a mere afterthought. It does not make sense to collect ungendered data on refugees, private security personnel, earthquake victims, militia members, corporate executives, factory owners, journalists, or peace negotiators. It does not make sense to treat women as if they made eye-catching photo images but do not need to be interviewed. International policy-making circles may at times look like men’s clubs, but international politics as a whole has required women to behave in certain ways. When enough women have refused to behave in those prescribed ways, relations between governments and between governments and corporations have had to change. That is, women are not just the objects of power, not merely passive puppets or unthinking victims. As we have seen, women of different classes and different ethnic groups have made their own calculations in order to cope with or benefi t from the current struggles between states. These calculations result in whole countries becoming related to one another, often in hierarchical terms. In search of adventure, the physical and intellectual excitement typically reserved for men, some affluent women have helped turn other women into exotic landscapes. In pursuit of meaningful paid careers, some women have settled in their governments’ colonies or hired women from former colonies. Out of a desire to appear fashionable and bolster their sometimes shaky self-confi dence, many women have become the prime consumers of products made by women working for low wages in dangerous factories. And in an effort to measure the progress they have made toward emancipation in their own societies, some women have helped legitimize international global pyramids of “civilization” and “modernity.” Therefore, when asking “Where are the women?”—and following up with “How did they get there?” “Who benefi ts from their being there?” and “What do they themselves think about being there?”—one should be prepared for complex answers. Acting out of a new awareness that women, especially in poorer countries, need to be made visible—and audible—on the international stage, one can risk painting over the important dif ferences between women. The widening economic class differences between Chinese, for instance, are alarming even Beijing’s male political elite. Those gaping inequalities are sharpening the differences between rural and urban women, between women married to politically connected businessmen and women working on the assembly lines in those men’s factories. Noting inequalities among women is not just a comparative statement—for instance, noting that urban girls are more likely to reach secondary school than rural girls, or that affluent women are more likely to have access to the Internet than working-class women do. It is a comparative statement with relational consequences. Women’s diverse experiences of social class—as well as of race and ethnicity—can translate into often surprising differences in understandings of femininity, in marital economics, in relationships with particular men, and in encounters with the state. In the United States, China, India, Turkey, South Africa, Vietnam, Mexico, Brazil, Malaysia, Iraq, and Egypt, these widening material and political inequalities between affluent women, middle-class women, urban poor women, and rural poor women, especially when exacerbated by racism and ethnocentrism, present daunting challenges for any women who are working to create and sustain a vibrant national or transnational women’s movement. Creating transnational women’s banana workers’ groups, launching the International Domestic Workers’ Network, building a transnational alliance to lobby for a gender-conscious arms-trade treaty, organizing a transnational network of women living near overseas American military bases, creating unions for women garment workers, sustaining a transnational network of feminists living under patriarchal religious laws, building a UN-focused alliance that can take on the “unholy alliance”— not one of these efforts has been easy. And every day there are those who act to defend their local or global stake in having diverse women lose trust in each other, withdraw support from each other. One might make a list of those patriarchal stakeholders, those people who have come to rely on women’s fragmentation. Not all the people on the list will be corporate moguls and political autocrats. Male officials who make foreign policy might prefer to think of themselves as dealing with high fi nance or military strategy, but in reality they have self-consciously designed immigration, tourism, labor, foreign service, cultural, and military-base policies in order to divide and control women. They rarely admit it, but they have acted as though their government’s or organization’s place in world affairs has hinged on how women behaved. Uncovering these efforts has exposed men as men. International politics have relied not only on the manipulation of femininity’s multiple meanings but also on the manipulation of ideas about masculinities. Ideas about adventure, modernity, civilization, progress, expertise, rationality, stability, growth, risk, trust, and security have been legitimized by certain kinds of masculinized values, systems, and behavior. That is one of the reasons that each of these ideas has become so potent. Frequently, male government officials and company executives seek to control women in order to optimize their infl uence over other men: men as husbands, voters, migrant workers, soldiers, diplomats, intelligence operatives, plantation and factory managers, editors, and bankers. Thus, understanding the international workings of masculinity is important to making feminist sense of international politics. Men’s sense of their own manhood has derived from their perceptions both of other men’s masculinity and of the femininities of women of different races and social classes. Thus a caveat: one cannot make adequate sense of the international politics of masculinity by avoiding paying close attention to women and femininity. Ideas about masculinities—the full array of masculinities—have been crafted out of ideas about, myths about, and uncertainties about femininities and about actual women. To conduct a reliable investigation of masculinity, one must take women seriously. Climate change, capitalist globalization, the new arms race, and widening gaps between rich and poor—it is tempting to plunge into the discussion of any of these contemporary issues without bothering to ask, “Where are the women?” In fact, the more urgent the issue—“New York will soon be under water!” “China’s military build up is going to set off a world war!”—the more reasonable it seems to not ask “Where are the women?” In patriarchal hands, “urgency” is the enemy of feminist investigation. The previous chapters suggest, however, that these urgent issues demand a gendered analysis precisely because they are urgent, because they call for the fullest, most realistic understandings. As feminist environmental researchers and activists already are revealing, the causes of climate change, for example, and not just its effects, can be realistically tracked only if one exposes the workings of ideas about manliness and femininity and the relations between women and men, each fostered by the deliberate uses of political power. So too can the causes of the new arms race, exploitive globalization, and the widening gaps between rich and poor. Theresa, Chobi, Takazato, Iris, and the other workshop participants are now, we can imagine, deep into their discussions. The deeper they dig, the more candid they become with each other. They have tried to create an atmosphere of trust, one that encourages each woman to be honest about her worries and puz zles. Together, they are on a journey to understand how banana plantations work, how garment subcontractors perceive women seamstresses, whose security a military base protects, and why women and men who employ domestic workers do not see them as real workers. Every time the conversation slips into abstractions, one of the women pulls it back to women’s complex everyday realities. This is what making feminist sense of international politics sounds like.

2022 CNDI Kritik
Neg › Alt › S – Ukraine

We control uniqueness – peacebuilding efforts in Ukraine are incorporating feminist strategies and women’s involvement – the aff paternalistically delegitimates their attempts at a post-conflict transition

Tull et. al 17

Brian Lucas, Brigitte Rohwerder, and Kerina Tull. “Gender and conflict in Ukraine,” Knowledge for Development (K4D) Helpdesk Report. UK Department for International Development, 2017.

There has been virtually no civil society engagement with the peace process, ‘due to overstretch and capacity constraints as well as the lack of opportunities for participation’ (Kapur 2016, p. 6; WILPF 2014, P. 28). However, despite the lack of opportunity for formal participation in the peace process, ‘a small number of women activists living close to the frontline and in the eastern regions continue to undertake local outreach and confidence building activities’ (Kapur 2016, p. 6). Women’s civil society organisations have been found to be very interested in engaging in dialogue processes between people from western and eastern Ukraine and in re-establishing former relations with women’s groups in the Russian Federation, including soldiers’ mothers (OSCE 2015, p. 8). A number of initiatives were documented at the beginning of 2015, including the initiative of the Union of Ukrainian women to encourage women to be appointed to senior positions in conflict regions; and initiatives by prominent female singers and politicians to highlight the situation in the conflict areas (Zakharova 2015, p. 25). Women have also engaged in shadow peace talks, like those in 2015, organised by the Union of Women of Ukraine, which brought together activists, civil society leaders, volunteers, journalists, public servants and women directly impacted and displaced by the fighting to discuss ways to help end the conflict. The participation of women in politics and peace-making at the local level is slowly increasing (Fellin 2015, p. 5-6). WILPF (2014, p. 23) have also noted that there is little public space for Ukrainian men to adopt a non-violent position in opposition to war. Women’s groups engaged in conflict resolution and peacebuilding argue that they need more training for mediators and peer-to-peer training programmes for those involved in dialogues on women, peace and security, as well as regular meeting and exchanges of experiences and resources. A number of initiatives have supported women’s participation in peacebuilding activities. They include a project with the Women’s Information Consultative Center aimed at ‘increasing the capacity of women – especially internally displaced women and rural women – to protect themselves, increase women’s empowerment and participation in decision-making processes, and build and raise awareness about international documents on women’s peace and security and mechanisms to secure and protect women during war conflict and political, economic and social crises among decision-makers in Ukraine’ (Hanssen 2016, p. 59). Another initiative, implemented by La Strada in cooperation with the Ministry of Education and Science of Ukraine and relevant local authorities, aimed to build capacity in peace-building and conflict resolution and mediation efforts among conflict-affected groups and communities with a focus on women and IDP girls (Hanssen 2016, p. 79). Ukrainian women working towards peace have also engaged in a solidarity dialogue with women activists from Bosnia and Herzegovina in June 2016 to share experiences and gain a better understanding of women’s contribution to conflict and post-conflict transition (Kapur, 2016). The Ukrainian activists would like to professionalise their organisations and strengthen the Ukrainian feminist movement to help make women’s voices in Ukraine stronger (Kapur 2016, p. 8). They feel that ‘women must actively participate in the peace process to ensure inclusion of their voice, experience and perspective across all issues’ (Kapur 2016, p. 8). It was suggested that women’s organisations could help build local peace by working to create dialogue between host communities and IDPs, as well as reaching out to women in Donetsk and Luhansk, which could then link in with national, regional and international initiatives for peace (Kapur 2016, p. 23). At a formal level, Ukraine’s 2016 National Action Plan on Women’s Peace and Security aims to increase the participation of women in peacebuilding by improving the infrastructure and legal environment for women’s participation in international peacekeeping operations, and for their service in administrative and combat positions in the Armed Forces and other national security and defence institutions (Martsenyuk et al. 2016, p. 182). In addition it plans to conduct an assessment of gendered aspects of conflict prevention and resolution and promote the women’s role in peacebuilding, peacekeeping and negotiation processes in the media (Martsenyuk et al. 2016, p. 182).

2022 CNDI Kritik
Neg › Alt › S – US-China War

Only the alt deconstructs international patriarchy – that resolves the underlying and proximate causes for US-China conflict and encourages a space of dialogue between the two nations while creating unilateral responsibility.

Sjoberg 10

Laura Sjoberg, British Academy Global Professor of Politics and International Relations at Royal Holloway University of London. “Gendering Power Transition Theory,” Gender and International Security: Feminist Perspectives. 2010.

If (R3) is correct, then it is possible to envision great state equality without war in a non-patriarchal international system. In a system that values care and empathy, actors would be interested in the collective security of the world’s citizens. Such a system would prioritize understanding, communication, and community. A feminist perspective might imagine challenging great powers to engage in empathetic cooperation, and suggest that major powers take unilateral steps to transgress the cycle of violence in international politics.120 Each power would engage in purposive compromise of values and interests in order to create peace between them. In PTT’s scenario of potential conflict between the US and China, then, the US should not fear a dissatisfied China or attempt co-option. Instead, it should attempt to understand the interests, values, and needs of those challengers. If challengers took a similar approach, they would not have to choose between unattainable satisfaction and perpetual dissatisfaction. Along these lines, feminists suggest that the US should include China in deliberative dialogues, treat the Chinese government and people with empathy and understanding, and show China and other potential challengers by example that the strong can defy international system patriarchy unilaterally and stop the cycle of violence.121 Feminists have argued that inclusive understanding is key to peaceful coexistence. Spike Peterson clarifies that “feminists argue that the domination of women, nature, and all who are constructed as ‘other’ is not a matter of ‘essential,’ atemporal qualities but of socially constructed, historically contingent.”122 In other words, the voices of marginalization could serve as a bridge between hostile and masculinized states. In these terms, a dialogue which promoted understanding between the US and China (and their differentiated citizens) would go a long way towards decreasing the potential for conflict between the two great states. Analyzing the Chinese “overtaking” through gendered lenses These feminist reformulations of PTT’s key hypotheses provide both alternative understandings of the potential for conflict between the US and China and alternative futures. PTT suggests that the question of whether or not that rising will cause conflict between the two states depends on China’s satisfaction or dissatisfaction as it approaches parity with the US. A feminist approach suggests that a good deal of the possibility for conflict between the US and China might be explained by gender-related variables. The patriarchal nature of the international system provides an incentive for the US to attempt to maintain dominance. Such a system also gives China a motivation to seek not parity but supremacy. In addition, the cultural salience of masculinity in each society is manifested in each state’s desire to compete with the other. This alternative explanation for the potential competition between the US and China suggests alternative solutions. Realists like Mearsheimer suggest a combined strategy of economic containment and military presence,123 and power transition theorists suggest attempts to co-opt China into satisfaction with the existing order. Some International Relations scholars outside of the realist paradigm have suggested strategies like GRIT (graduated reciprocation of tension reduction) in order to establish trust between the US and China.124 If gendered competition and international system patriarchy underlie the competition between the two states, however, none of these strategies will be successful. Mearsheimer’s containment strategy will incite more competition; power transition theorists’ co-optation strategy is misdirected since dissatisfaction is endemic and would not be China’s main motive for making war; and trust-building solutions without the deconstruction of the masculine competition for superiority would just be read as weakness. Seeing gender-as-power both helps explain the potential for conflict between the US and China and provides a theoretical and practical alternative to that competition in recasting the genderings of the state and the international system. Some feminists prescribe the strong need to unilaterally deconstruct the cycle of violence and masculinized competition between great powers in the international arena. States would need to recognize conflict’s basis in competition, posturing, and subordination under patriarchy and deconstruct that in order to head off violence. Feminist theorists suggest that the US and China could come to terms with the gendered nature of their competition by dealing with each other in empathy and in dialogue to try to find a deeper sense of understanding if not common ground. The path to an empathetic reconstruction of the relationship between the US and China could begin with the rejection of PTT’s claim that hegemonic domination is empirically and normatively valuable. Domination and the resulting subordination, at the international level as well as at the personal level, are normatively problematic. Therefore, even if hegemonic dominance did decrease great power warfare, a feminist approach asks if that would be a sort of peace that the international arena would truly thrive under.

2022 CNDI Kritik
Neg › Alt › S – Cybersecurity

The alt is key—patriarchal norms surrounding cybersecurity prioritize masculine institutions and incentivize victim-blaming, which creates serial policy failure

Millar, Shires, and Tropina 21

Katharine, Assistant Professor of International Relations at the London School of Economics and Political Science; James, Assistant Professor with the Institute of Security and Global Affairs at the Leiden University, the Netherlands, and a fellow with the Cyber Statecraft Initiative at the Atlantic Council; Tatiana, Assistant Professor in Cybersecurity Governance with the Institute of Security and Global Affairs at Leiden University. “Defence.” Gender approaches to cybersecurity: design, defence and response. United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research 2021. Pg 40-41. LJS

Incident response – organizational measures to handle network intrusions, attacks, data breaches and other malicious cyber acts – is characterized by a hierarchy of priorities. Studies have shown that the cybersecurity industry reports on and responds to certain victims (commercial organizations, governments) that are associated with “traditional” security and the activities of elite men disproportionately, and it has a blind spot for threats to civil society and human security (e.g. non-governmental organizations, educational institutions and individuals).116 As schools, non-governmental organizations and individuals are more likely to be concerned with issues of social power, harms and equality, this prioritization has knock-on gender effects. The composition, expected practices and working hours, and workplace culture of incident-response teams also require a gender analysis. There is some evidence that “tech support” teams, which are often the first line of response following a security incident, are predominantly staffed by men, compounding the association of technical expertise with masculinity.117 The composition and culture of Computer Emergency Response Teams (CERTs or CSIRTs) is also a part of cybersecurity response. Research indicates that CERTs have distinct political strategies and characteristics, especially at the national and international levels, and it is possible that these characteristics include gendered dynamics.118 Information sharing – the process of trusted exchange of information about attacks and other security incidents, vulnerabilities, and cybersecurity practices – is also an essential part of responding to cybersecurity threats. The same masculine, national defence norms may also impede States and organizations from sharing information about cyberattacks and system vulnerabilities. Studies suggest that informal “trust communities” are the basis for much cybersecurity information sharing, rather than formal lines of communication between individuals with similar roles.119 The informality of these communities, and the consequent unconscious bias that this permits, means that they may have lower participation from women and minoritized groups, even when adjusted for overall proportions in the industry. Cybersecurity response can also demonstrate an unfortunate gendered dynamic of victim-blaming, wherein organizations or individuals with cybersecurity defence or identity-protection measures that are deemed to be “insufficient” are framed as “asking to be hacked”, which shifts responsibility onto the party that has been harmed, rather than the one who committed harm.120

2022 CNDI Kritik
Neg › Alt › Feminist Foreign Policy

Vote negative to act from a feminist foreign policy – this stance takes principles of care, responsibility, and empathy seriously as a normative framework for how states should act. Abandoning the self-fulfilling prophecies of realism is a pre-requisite to creating a lasting peace between nations.

Aggestam et al. 19 – Karin Aggestam, professor of Political Science and holds the Pufendorf Endowed Chair at Lund University; Annika Bergman Rosamond, associate professor at the Department of Political Science, Lund University; Annica Kronsell, Professor of Political Science at School of Global Studies, Gothenburg University. [“Theorising feminist foreign policy,” International Relations, Volume 33, Issue 1. Sage Publishing, 2019.

Embedded in feminist notions of foreign and security policy is an ethical commitment to the care and nurturing of distant others, who reside beyond the confines of one’s own political community. As noted above, scholarship on ethical foreign policy is surprisingly void of gender analysis and feminist ethical engagement despite the fact that it is situated within the subfield of normative IR that engages widely with issues related to global justice and equality. We therefore propose that the ethics of care provides fertile ground for thinking through the analysis of feminist-inspired foreign and security policy discourse and practice as well as identifying the limits to such engagement. Ethics of care scholarship has been inspired by social psychology.51 Carol Gilligan argues that care is a form of moral development distinct from the justice-oriented moral dimension stemming from Enlightenment thinking. In the first generation of studies on ethics of care, there was an explicit association with female experiences as an alternative to maleled justice reasoning. A key contention here is that the mother’s distinct relationship with her child gives her a set of caring and nurturing skills that are transferrable beyond the immediate family and nation. Sara Ruddick, among others, suggests that maternal and caring relations can bring about peace.52 Still, while maternal care is strongly associated with women’s bodies, Ruddick insists that mothering is not a practice confined to women alone.53 Yet, in realpolitik, women, and mothers in particular, are frequently depicted as innately peaceful, which is an assumption that has been contested and rejected in feminist IR scholarship.54 Instead, feminist ethical theory has been attentive not to essentialise all women as peaceful, but instead to fully recognise the differences that exist between women. The second generation of care ethics scholars understand care in broader terms. For example, Joan Tronto defines care as ‘everything we do to maintain, continue and repair our world so that we can live in it as well as possible’.55 We find the broad range of scholarly efforts to globalise ethics of care56 useful to theorise feminist foreign policy because it can shed light on how care principles may be used in foreign policy in an effort to address global gender inequalities, violence and protection across borders. This necessitates taking issue with the assumption that ethics of care is inapplicable to the study of global gender politics because of its essentialisation of women’s experiences and universal lack of agency. Fiona Robinson rightly notes, concerns over the essentialism of care ethics must be taken seriously, I would argue that it is only a narrow, orthodox, ethics of care – the view of care as essentially a morality for women, belonging in the private sphere and valorising ‘dependence’ over ‘independence’ – to which these criticisms actually apply … clearly, the importance of an ethics of care, and its transformatory potential, does not, and indeed must not, rest on its association with women. While it is crucial to avoid undermining its feminist origins … the ethics of care is significant because it represents an alternative view of ethics which is relevant beyond the role of women within the family … ‘it’ extends beyond the personal to the political and, ultimately, to the global context of social life.57 In line with Robinson’s argument, we challenge orthodox conceptions of care ethics as a ‘morality for women’ only, while maintaining that its emphasis on dialogue and care is a useful approach to critically unpack the moral ambitions of a feminist and gender-based foreign policy-making. Moreover, we argue that the ethical foundations of feminist foreign policy, by and large, are consistent with the normative imperative of a globalised ethics of care, which contends that ‘those who are powerful have a responsibility to approach moral problems by looking carefully at where, why and how the structures of existing social and personal relations have led to exclusion and marginalization’.58 In contrast, orthodox notions of foreign policy do not consider the situatedness of the state within distinct cultural, political and ethical settings nor the intersectional subjectivities and moral preferences of the citizens inhabiting that sphere. However, an ethics of care approach to the study of foreign policy is sensitive to such variation because it is based on a relational ontology, which addresses the moral relations between human beings. Hence, an ethics of care approach to the study of feminist foreign policy takes into account the situated moral stories and experiences of individuals and in particular women whose voices have not been considered in traditional foreign policy analysis and IR.59 With an increasing number of states advocating pro-gender norms in foreign policy and principles of care and empathy, ethical foundations for the actual conduct of foreign policy become important to analyse. Yet, theoretical tools developed for such analysis need to embrace the criticisms that the ethics of care essentialises women’s aptness for care and nurturing, and, as such reduces their agency and actual engagements in global politics and participation public life.60 The emphasis on care and relationality also provide fertile ground for ethically unpacking the situated contents of a feminist foreign policy. As mentioned, an increasing number of states are resolutely pushing for a distinct feminist stance on foreign policymaking regarding the inclusion and representation of local women in world politics. Canada’s feminist development policy, for instance, is grounded in the assumption that women and girls have the ability to achieve real change in terms of sustainable development and peace, even though they are often the most vulnerable to poverty, violence and climate change. So we will work closely with local women’s rights groups, particularly in the areas of sexual and reproductive health … we will make sound decisions based on evidence and closely track our progress, but in a manner adapted to the needs of different stakeholders in different contexts.61 Swedish feminist foreign policy is grounded in a commitment to engage with distinct ethical reflections, experiences, needs and wants of local populations as a way of gaining insights and knowledge how to support local peace, conflict resolution and the eradication of gendered violence. Moreover, the Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs (2015) highlights the significance of ‘the participation of women and girls as actors in peace processes in conflict countries, including by encouraging parallels to the Swedish network for women mediators and supporting local women leaders, women’s rights activists, women’s organisations’ as well as ‘ensuring that women and girls are included and that their experience is taken into account in the design of mechanisms and systems for early conflict warning and in conflict analyses’.62 The unpacking of such discursive foreign policy statements enables a critical analysis of the presence of care values in states’ actual foreign policy practice. In this way, prevalent inconsistencies in the making of feminist foreign policy can be identified, which in turn can show in what ways they may impede its operationalisation in practice. For instance, both Canada and Sweden can be criticised for not sufficiently matching their care for distant other women living in conflict or poverty-struck zones with an empathetic commitment to their own indigenous or marginalised refugee populations. While feminist IR theory remains alert to and critical of the structural underpinnings of world politics, the ontological relationality of the ethics of care provides a key contribution because it takes stock of the experiences of the people at the receiving end of feminist foreign policy. In contrast with orthodox foreign policy practice and theory, which tends to disregard the lived histories of women and colonial subjects, an ethics of care approach would actively seek to uncover their stories to enable intersectional and situated analyses of foreign policy. This involves investigating whether states and other actors actually employ care and empathy as a normative ideal in their pursuit of foreign, security, defence and development policies. States tend to vary in their commitment to such dialogue, but this does not mean that a global ethics of care should be dismissed in the context of foreign and security policy analysis. Instead a critical analysis of feminist-oriented foreign policy should seek to address the ethical question how our view of security in global politics would change once we recognize and accept … the ways responsibilities and practices of care grow out of relations of dependence and vulnerability of people in the context of complex webs of relations of responsibility.63 This entails exploring to what extent the makers of feminist foreign policy take note of ‘the everyday’ and whether Robison’s notion of ‘a feminist ethics of security’ which centres on ‘marginalised sites’ has some resonance with actual policy-making.64 Ethics of care as foreign policy conduct is often expressed in notions of gender-just protection of such marginalised groups, in particular, the protection of women and children from gendered violence and discrimination. Here ethics of care scholar Joan Tronto highlights the shift in global relations from what previously was a ‘right to intervene’ and sovereign-based logic to ‘the responsibility to protect’ and an ethics of global care.65 We propose here that protection, though at times requiring military means, should always rest on the act of listening to marginalised voices – a diplomatic tool that is key to the successful conduct of feminist foreign policy. A foreign policy, which builds on the ethics of care as its foundation, rests on the idea of inclusive and ethical dialogues as well as acts of listening across borders and intersectional confines. Virginia Held holds that emotions, such as empathy, sensitivity and responsiveness, are sentiments that need to be cultivated as a significant element when making moral decisions.66 Central to the analysis of feminist foreign policy then is the extent to which care, the act of listening and dialogical engagement really are key norms in the implementation of gender-just external relations? Here we find Christine Sylvester’s67 concept of empathetic cooperation particularly useful and closely associated with the ethics of care.68 Empathetic cooperation challenges sovereign rights and national interests as the sole platforms for international interactions in favour of empathy across intersectional and ethical boundaries. Laura Sjoberg also suggests that emphatic cooperation is a fruitful platform for the development of a feminist international security ethic, which pays attention to care and justice as well as the gendered structures that have led to the marginalisation of vulnerable groups across international society.69 It may also lead to ‘a form of knowledge of other persons that draws explicitly on the commonalty of feelings and experiences to enrich one’s understanding of another in his or her own right’.70 If empathy is an expressed willingness and ability to appreciate the other then empathetic cooperation is ‘a process of positional slippage that occurs when one listens seriously to the concerns, fears and agendas of those one is unaccustomed to hearing’.71 In short, we argue that empathetic cooperation, as part of the making of a feminist foreign policy, may be a way of opening up for a global ethic and concrete expressions of politics, which do not privilege statist interests and notions of security. Moreover, it moves the agenda towards human security while respecting cultural difference.72 Thus, to explore the presence of empathetic cooperation in the conduct of feminist and genderbased foreign policy is key to the analysis of feminist foreign policy and to ethical investigations into ethically minded foreign policy more broadly.

2022 CNDI Kritik
Neg › Impact › War

Patriarchy is the root cause of violence—masculine norms require violent actions for membership into privileged groups

Acheson 21

Ray, Director of Reaching Critical Will, the disarmament programme of the Women's International League for Peace and Freedom (WILPF). “’Terminally Unserious’: Ideologies and Oppressions of Nuclear Weapons.” Banning the Bomb, Smashing the Patriarchy. 2021. Pg 26-30 LJS

Based on what I have seen over the past fifteen years working around the United Nations and even longer as an antinuclear activist, I believe—as several feminists have argued previously—that a significant part of why this knot is so hard to untie is patriarchy. In fact, as a feminist disarmament activist, I have come to believe that more than anything else, the association of weapons with power is one of the foremost obstacles to disarmament. And, as feminist scholars have articulated time and again, that this association is gendered. Patriarchy is a system of power. It is, in the barest sense, a hierarchical social order in which women are subordinate to men. But it is more than that. It is an order that shapes and entrenches gender as a cultural construction and system that endows the hegemonic conception of what is a “man” with the “right” to dominate and rule over others. Understanding how patriarchy works requires us to understand how gender works. Gender refers to the socially constructed expectations and norms about how we are supposed to perform as women, men, and others, or in relation to sexual orientations; that is, concepts of masculine and feminine and the normative demands of how to behave in order to “properly” represent the bodies we inhabit or are perceived to inhabit. It comes from a particular—and unfortunately, very dominant—understanding of masculinity. This is a masculinity in which ideas such as strength, courage, and protection are equated with violence. It is a masculinity in which the capacity and willingness to use weapons, engage in combat, and kill other human beings is seen as essential to being “a real man.”77 Feminists have long explored the ways in which gender norms, particularly militarized masculinities, drive conflict and violence and the acquisition and proliferation of weapons. These scholars and activists argue that the association of power and strength, coded as masculine traits, with the accumulation and use of weapons, has a negative impact on disarmament and peace.78 Militarized masculinity harms everyone. It harms those who do not comply with mainstream gender norms— queer-identified people, nonnormative men—and it harms women. It requires oppression of those deemed “weaker” on the basis of gender norms. It also assumes men to be inherently violent and inclined to participate in violent acts—and thus also more expendable.79 And it makes disarmament seem weak. It makes peace seem utopian. It makes protection without weapons seem absurd. When it comes to nuclear weapons, several dimensions to the connection between patriarchal power and militarist masculinities contribute to the difficulty in advocating for nuclear disarmament. We can start with the “ubiquitous weight of gender” throughout the entire nuclear weapon discourse and the association of nuclear weapons with masculinity that Carol Cohn described in her groundbreaking work in the 1980s mentioned earlier. Her analysis of the gendered symbolism of nuclear weapons developed through a discourse of “defense intellectuals” provided the foundations for a feminist analysis of nuclear war, nuclear strategy, and nuclear weapons. She described the “sanitized abstraction and sexual imagery,” including metaphors that equate military and political power with sexual potency and masculinity—such as “vertical erector launchers, thrust-to-weight ratios, soft lay downs, deep penetration, the comparative advantages of protracted versus spasm attacks,” and discussions about how “the Russians are a little harder than we are.”80 She and Sara Ruddick suggested that this type of highly sexualized language serves to “mobilize gendered associations and symbols in creating assent, excitement, support for, and identification with weapons.”81 It is also “a way of minimizing the seriousness of militarist endeavors, of denying their deadly consequences.”82 In later years Cohn, along with Ruddick and Felicity Ruby, expanded the inquiry into the sense of masculine strength afforded by nuclear weapons, tying this into some of the broader feminist analysis about violent and militarized masculinities discussed above. They listened to a nationalist leader after India’s 1998 nuclear weapon tests explain, “We had to prove that we are not eunuchs.” They argue that this statement is meant to “elicit admiration for the wrathful manliness of the speaker” and to imply that being willing to employ nuclear weapons is to “have the balls” or to be “man enough” to “defend” your country.83 This link between masculinity and the power of force persists today. Think of Trump “becoming presidential” by launching missiles at Syria84 or of Kim Jong-un and his massive parades of missile hardware in a literal showcase of “mine is bigger than yours.”85 Think of Theresa May giving a resolute yes to the question of whether she would be willing to “personally authorize a nuclear strike that could kill 100,000 innocent men, women and children.”86 It is, after all, women leaders as well as men who are conditioned to prove their capacity to lead by a “manly” show of force. Simply adding women to the situation is not sufficient to achieve nuclear disarmament. And “men” as a category are not specifically or exclusively the problem. Gendered norms, in particular violent or militarized masculinities, are the main problem. The structural imbalance of power among gender identities is also the problem. A recent study published by New America paints a portrait of the nuclear policy field in the United States, dominated as it is by cisgender heterosexual white men who compose a self-described “nuclear priesthood” that espouse normative masculinized perspectives on security and weapons. Seeking a place at the table within this space, women (mostly white, cisgender women) tend to be inclined to try to gain favor with and impress the priesthood, seeing it as an important challenge to fit in and prove that women are “not afraid of nuclear weapons.”87 As a case in point, the U.S. nuclear weapon team under the Obama administration included women in the roles of secretary of state (Hillary Clinton), undersecretary of state for arms control and international security affairs (Ellen Tauscher), assistant secretary of state for verification, compliance, and implementation (Rose Gottemoeller), special representative of the president for nuclear proliferation (Susan Burk), permanent representative to the United Nations (Susan Rice), and permanent representative to the Conference on Disarmament (Laura Kennedy). Yet the Obama administration pursued the biggest nuclear arms buildup since Reagan and vociferously opposed negotiations of a nuclear weapon ban treaty. Similarly, as of the beginning of 2019, the CEOs of four of the five biggest weapon producers in the United States—Northrop Grumman, Lockheed Martin, General Dynamics, and the military wing“Terminally Unserious” 29 of Boeing—are now women.88 These women are not challenging the patriarchal structures and systems that have created the militarized world order; they are actively maintaining it and profiting from it. The solution to the dominance of toxic masculinity in disarmament discourse or capitalism in the nuclear-industrial complex is not simply to include women. Liberal feminism is “dedicated to enabling a privileged few to climb the corporate ladder or the ranks of the military,” through which it “subscribes to a market-centred view of equality that dovetails with corporate enthusiasm for ‘diversity,’” Nancy Fraser, Tithi Bhattacharya, and Cinzia Arruzza have written for a new feminist manifesto. Rather than abolish social hierarchy, liberal feminism “aims to feminize it, ensuring women at the top can attain parity with the men of their own class.”89 As Cynthia Enloe says, “You can militarize anything, including equality.”90 To actually challenge policies and practices of the elite decisionmaking class, it is imperative to create space—inside but also outside of existing institutions—where women and others of diverse gender identities, races and ethnicities, backgrounds and experiences—who are willing and able to approach the issue from different perspectives, including feminist and human security perspectives—can be fully engaged. A lesson from feminist, queer, and Indigenous struggles, among others, is that appealing to the establishment for rights or equality or a seat at the table is at best insufficient to achieve change, and at worst serves to reinforce existing injustices by just making problematic institutions or processes appear more palatable or equitable without actually changing anything those institutions do. In order for true alternative perspectives to be treated as relevant, credible, and expert—to the same extent as the dominant, toxic, militarized masculinity perspectives—we don’t just need diverse participation in mainstream institutions. We must consider and create alternative spaces and relationships in order to engage in meaningful processes. Just as Indigenous struggles refuse to center or appeal to whiteness, and queer struggles refuse to center or appeal to the cisgendered or straight community, we need to work with others whose beliefs are outside the dominant, mainstream narrative of nuclear weapons to generate a new sense of what is normative and credible.91 This is important for the story of the nuclear ban and for nuclear abolition more broadly, because changing what people view as credible and normative about nuclear weapons is vital to achieving change in nuclear weapon policy. We need to not center the dominant frameworks of thought on nuclear weapons—which were created predominantly by white, cisgender, heteronormative men—but to bring a robust critical approach to these frameworks by centering the perspectives, ideas, and frameworks of thought developed by others who have traditionally been excluded from this area.

2022 CNDI Kritik
Neg › Impact › Hegemonic Masculinity

The aff’s lack of gendered analysis about NATO specifically reproduces hegemonic masculinity, creating violent hierarchies

Wright, Hurley, & Gil Ruiz 19

Katharine A.M., Lecturer in International Politics at Newcastle University, UK; Matthew, Lecturer in Politics at Sheffield Hallam University, UK; Jesus Ignacio, former Chief of the NATO IMS Office of the Gender Advisor. “NATO as an institution of international hegemonic masculinity.” NATO, Gender, and the Military: Women Organising from Within. Routledge Studies in Gender and Security. 2019. Pg 17-21. LJS

The concept of hegemonic masculinity was brought to prominence by Connell (1995) and refers to the particular set of masculine norms and practices that come to subordinate other masculinities, enabling the continued dominance of men over women. Hegemonic masculinity is never explicit and has primarily been built upon cultural norms (Connell and Messerschmidt, 2005: 832) and supported by institutional power (Kronsell, 2012: 45). The military occupies the most important position for the definition of hegemonic masculinity (Connell, 1995: 213). As a military alliance NATO is also a source of ‘normative conception of gender’, amplifying already dominant cultural norms but also actively participating in their construction (Carreiras, 2006: 40). This makes NATO, as a trans-Atlantic military alliance, a key site for the transfer of gendered values. The concept of hegemonic masculinity refers to a configuration or pattern of ‘idealised’ masculine characteristics that occupy a position of power and privilege within particular a social, cultural and temporal context (Connell, 2005: 78). Central to this formulation is the notion differentiation within masculinities, bound up with varying levels of power and privilege. Connell defines these as ‘hegemonic’, ‘subordinate’, ‘complicit’ and ‘marginalised’ masculinities (Connell, 2005: 79). Subordinate masculinities therefore are those which do not conform (or are not seen to conform) to hegemonic ideals. For Connell, (assumed) characteristics and practices of subordinated masculinities are often ‘blurred’ with femininity (Connell, 2005: 79) – ‘effeminate’, homosexual men for example – thereby allowing for them to be ‘symbolically expelled’ from the hegemonic representation of ‘masculinity’. Complicit masculinity encompasses Connell’s notion of the ‘patriarchal dividend’. In short, Connell (2005: 79)18 NATO as an institution asserts that whilst not all men represent the hegemonic ideal, the majority of men gain advantage from the overall subordination of women– that there is an inherent dividend attached to simply being born a man, into the one half of a socially constructed binary that is culturally more valued. As Via (2010: 43) argues: A man’s (or anyone’s) claim to masculinity … is a positional claim in opposition to a feminine other that society has constructed to be the lesser of the two binaries. Without the existence of an individual or group that can be labelled as the weaker party, masculine social norms would be without content. In addition to gender, ethnicity, class and other marginalised characteristics also have a part to play in how hegemonic masculinity is constructed. Here, it is necessary to consider ‘relations between the masculinities in dominant and subordinated classes or ethnic groups’ (Connell, 2005: 80). This is a linear relationship between the ‘authorisation’ of the hegemonic masculinity of the dominant group and the marginalised. So, while it is possible for some within marginalised communities to embody hegemonic masculinity, this does not necessarily correlate with an increase in social authority to the wider group. Indicative of this is the example of black men athletes in the United States who are seen to embody hegemonic masculinity, but this is not something extended beyond their elite grouping (Connell, 2005: 81). Hegemonic masculinity is plural and variable. It is therefore necessary to centralise the ‘relationality’ of gender relations. This means considering the relationship both within and between masculinities and femininities. No masculinity (or femininity) arises except in a complex system of gender relations that are fluid and contextually specific (Connell, 2005: 73). Therefore ‘masculinity, like femininity, is always liable to internal contradiction and historical disruption’ (Connell, 2005: 73). To state that particular manifestations of masculinity are hegemonic is not to suggest that all, or even most, men enact or embody hegemonic masculinity; indeed, it can be argued that most men do not (see Demetriou, 2001: 342). Hegemonic masculinity can therefore be seen to represent normative ideals about the conduct, embodiment and enactment of masculinity in any culturally specific context. However, Connell posits the question: ‘What is “normative” about a norm hardly anyone meets’? (Connell, 2005a: 70). It is normative then, not in the numerical sense, but in that it culturally accepted and legitimised via particular cultural practices and through institutions. Hegemonic ideals are therefore conditional and intrinsically linked to institutional power; they are constructed via process rather than existing as a fixed or static ‘type’ and intimately linked to context: Hegemony is likely to be established only if there is some correspondence between cultural ideal and institutional power, collective if not individual. So the top levels of business, the military and government provide a fairly convincing corporate display of masculinity, still very little shaken by feminist women or dissenting men. It is the successful claim to authority, more than direct violence that is the mark of hegemony (though violence often underpins or supports authority). (Connell, 2005a: 77) In this conceptualisation, hegemonic masculinity is bound up with the legitimation of authority and claims to power and privilege in a particular gender order or gender regime. This legitimation and claims to authority within institutions and cultural practices produce a façade of unitary masculinity which determine the standards against which other masculinities (and femininities) are then defined (Cornwall and Lindisfarne, 1994: 20). In the example of the military, constructions of hegemonic masculinity are drawn upon to construct uniformity within the soldiers and conformity to particular organisational priorities. That the unitary nature of hegemonic masculinity may be ‘illusionary’ does not negate the powerful, dominant effects it has upon ‘other’ masculinities and femininity, more broadly defined. As Sandra Via (2010: 43) notes: The dominance of hegemonic masculinity relies on its opposition to and competition with subordinated masculinities and femininities. Hegemonic masculinities at once promote a particular organisation of the political order and reinforces unequal relationships between men and women in order to promote the legitimation of masculine authority. Hegemonic masculinity therefore has powerful ‘organisational’ effects (and indeed, can be drawn upon as a particular organisational resource) through which unequal patterns of gender relations can be ordered and maintained. One of the main critiques of the concept of hegemonic masculinity – indeed of a hierarchical gender order, more generally – is that it can imply a rigidity or a static representation, a ‘type’ or ‘essence’ of masculinity; further, that this was a negative type or a toxic assemblage of traits (Connell and Messerschmidt, 2005: 840). Ultimately, that there was an inherent ‘descriptive tendency’ within the concept of hegemonic masculinity that resulted in essentialised characteristics being applied to particular groups of men. Connell and Messerschmidt rejected this critique and re-emphasised the importance placed on social context (2005: 832–3), asserting that just as masculinity and femininity is not a fixed entity in the body or personality traits of individuals – masculinities are configurations of practice that are accomplished in social action and therefore can differ according to the gender relations in a particular social setting. (Connell and Messerschmidt, 2005: 836) Indeed, it can be argued that the various usages and application of the term across a wide variety of empirical and theoretical research (including Feminist International Relations – see Kronsell, 2005 below) necessitate periodic critical evaluation as the concept ‘must mutate’ as it ‘finds applications in other settings and by other hands’ (Connell and Messerschmidt, 2005: 854; Tickner and Sjoberg, 2011: 227–9; Messerschmidt, 2012). A level of appropriation or co-option, of elements from subordinate or marginalised masculinities and indeed of femininities, is necessary for hegemonic masculinities to remain hegemonic in changing social or cultural settings (Connell and Messerschmidt, 2005: 848). Hegemony can be accomplished through ‘the incorporation of such masculinities into a functioning gender order rather than by active oppression in the form of discredit or violence’ (Connell and Messerschmidt, 2005: 848). Both co-option and oppression can, and often do, occur together (Connell and Messerschmidt, 2005: 848). They are ‘to a significant degree constituted in men’s interaction with women; therefore the commonalities in women’s gender practices also produce convergence’ (Connell and Messerschmidt, 2005: 848). This notion of ‘hybridisation’, through appropriation, rather than overt violence, is a key theme in critical masculinities studies that sought to theorise the contested, contradictory, yet ultimately variable relationships between the masculinities of Connell’s gender order (for example: Messner, 1992, 1993, 2007; Anderson, 1993; Demetriou, 2001; Bridges, 2014). Messner (2007) puts forward a notion of a culturally ascendant hybrid masculinity that combines toughness and tenderness, but in specific ways which obscure (and perpetuate) power and inequality (Bridges, 2014: 61). Anderson (2010) has formulated a theory of ‘Inclusive Masculinity’ to explain what he sees as a (Western) cultural shift in declining homophobia and greater sexual and gender equality – though the extent of Anderson’s ‘inclusivity’ within contemporary Western masculinity in regard to homosexuality is contested (O’Neill, 2015). Demetriou (2001: 345) critiques an inherent elitism within Connell’s conceptualisation of hegemonic masculinity, in that it downplays – or neglects entirely – the agency of individuals within subordinated masculinities and women generally, something Connell and Messerschmidt acknowledge (2005: 847). Demetriou’s work focuses on the appropriation of elements of gay culture into a ‘contemporary hegemonic bloc’ that reproduces rather than challenges patriarchy. What these studies (Anderson’s excluded) note is that the malleability of hegemonic forms or manifestations of masculinity does not suggest that patriarchal power is undermined. Indeed, it is suggested that transformation, appropriation and hybridisation of particular hegemonic forms of masculinity are essential for them to remain hegemonic and therefore do nothing to advance gender equality. As this discussion highlights, hegemonic masculinity is the norm and is normative, but it is never explicit and although this hegemony could be supported by force, it has primarily been built upon cultural norms (Connell and Messerschmidt, 2005: 832) and supported by institutional power (Kronsell, 2012: 45). For example, Connell (1995: 213) argues that the military (in Europe and the US) occupies the most important position for the definition of hegemonic masculinity. As a military alliance, NATO is also a source of ‘normative conception of gender’, amplifying already dominant cultural norms but also actively participating in their construction (Carreiras, 2006: 40). This makes NATO, as a trans-Atlantic political and military alliance, a key site for the transfer of gendered values and a valuable space for the study of military masculinities.

2022 CNDI Kritik
Neg › Perms › A2 Perm – Co-Optation

The perm merely incorporates women and feminist policy into systems of militarized violence—prefer the alt alone

Wright 2015

Hannah, phd, Research Officer at the LSE Centre for Women, Peace and Security, a Visiting Fellow at the LSE Department of Gender Studies and a Seminar Tutor in the School of Education, Communication and Society at KCL. “The High-Level Review on Women, Peace and Security: A tale of two viewpoints.” Saferworld. 10/21/2015. LJS

The Global Study rightly notes that women peace activists who lobbied for 1325 “were seeking a fundamental shift” in how international security is pursued; a “rollback of the escalating levels of militarization making homes, communities and nations less rather than more secure”. Yet since the passage of 1325, many Member States, UN agencies and civil society actors have tended to prioritise adding women and their concerns into existing militarised systems for maintaining peace and security, whilst deprioritising efforts to challenge the very nature of those systems. This is evident in the fact that many of the states championing women, peace and security on the global stage also continue to pursue militarised foreign policies. The UK, for example, has recently been working hard to push for faster implementation of 1325 internationally, whilst providing political and military support for the Saudi-led coalition’s bombing of Yemen, fuelling a rapidly growing humanitarian crisis in that country. In preparation for the Global Study, Saferworld and others highlighted this trend and called for the agenda to prioritise preventing violent conflict by address its underlying structural causes. The Global Study – authored independently by Radhika Coomaraswamy, in consultation with UN agencies, Member States and civil society – makes a call for greater use of non-violent approaches to conflict prevention as its very first recommendation, and states that “a militarized view of conflict prevention sells resolution 1325 short of its transformative vision”. Yet, perhaps unsurprisingly, UNSCR 2242 does not reflect this bold message, making only passing reference to the need to “invest more in conflict prevention”. The provisions of the resolution – which include, among other things, higher targets for numbers of female peacekeepers, better inclusion of gender-based violence in sanctions regimes, and more gender advisers within the UN system – may well bring some positive outcomes for women and girls living with conflict and violence. But they present technical fixes, filling gaps in the previous resolutions, rather than an attempt to rethink how we approach international security and turn back the tide of militarisation. The Global Study also notes that, “Militarism and cultures of militarized masculinities create and sustain political decision-making where resorting to the use of force becomes a normalized mode for dispute resolution”. Questions around men and masculinities have often been neglected in policy and practice around 1325: activists have competing perspectives on the the politics of focusing attention and resources on men and boys as part of an agenda that seeks to put an end to male dominance in the field of peace and security. Saferworld advocates for the transformation of militarised masculinities as part of efforts to prevent conflict, and strongly welcomes the Global Study’s recommendation to support the training of men, women, girls and boys which “reinforces and supports non-violent, non-militarized expressions of masculinity”. As with the other recommendations on conflict prevention and demilitarisation, however, recommendations on masculinities were not reflected in 2242 beyond a brief mention of “engagement by men and boys as partners” - a much weaker message. Perhaps the issue where the fault lines have appeared most strikingly in recent months has been the role of women in countering violent extremism, which features prominently in UNSCR 2242. The Global Study calls for the promotion of women’s rights to be detached from counter-terrorism and military planning processes, noting that counter-terror strategies, and their instrumentalisation of the women’s rights agenda, can be directly harmful to women and girls in fragile contexts. For example, restrictions on financial transfers to areas subject to counter-terror measures prevent women’s organisations from receiving funding, while attempts to justify military interventions based on concerns about women’s rights risk provoking a violent backlash against women‘s rights activists. Saferworld’s research underlines that counter-terror strategies also frequently serve to deepen conflicts and undermine efforts to build peace. While women can and do play important roles in preventing radicalisation in their communities, simplistic notions that empowering women is the key to ending violent extremism risk placing a huge burden of responsibility on individual women without addressing the many other injustices and failures of governance which so often drive conflict and radicalisation. Despite the Global Study’s words of warning, UNSCR 2242 calls for greater integration of the women, peace and security and counter-terror agendas. The broad language of the resolution is, like most such documents, open to varying interpretations. More positively, it does call for research on “the impacts of counter-terrorism strategies on women’s human rights and women’s organizations”. The news that counter-terrorism is officially on the women, peace and security agenda (and vice versa) will be welcomed by some women peace activists as evidence that women’s roles are being taken seriously, but will no doubt garner concerned reactions from others, including many in countries that are the focus of counter-terror efforts.

2022 CNDI Kritik
Neg › Perms › A2 Perm – Co-Optation

The perm is worse than the alt alone—NATO’s history of co-optation allows it to defang feminist demands and insulate itself from criticism

Wright, Hurley, & Gil Ruiz 19

Katharine A.M., Lecturer in International Politics at Newcastle University, UK; Matthew, Lecturer in Politics at Sheffield Hallam University, UK; Jesus Ignacio, former Chief of the NATO IMS Office of the Gender Advisor. “Gendering NATO’s core tasks Collective defence, crisis management and cooperative security.” NATO, Gender, and the Military: Women Organising from Within. Routledge Studies in Gender and Security. 2019. Pg 107-109. LJS

Feminist goals are always inherently vulnerable to co-option. This occurs when institutions use feminist rhetoric selectively ‘to promote their own agenda irrespective of the consequences for women’s lives’ (D’Costa and Lee-Koo, 2013: 2). Co-option as a practice ‘absorbs the meanings of the original concepts to fit into the prevailing political priorities’ (von der Lippe, 2012: 19). On one level co-option occurs when these original feminist concepts interact with hegemonic strategic policy priorities and objectives, neutralising their transformative praxis (von der Lippe, 2012: 20). Our discussion in Chapter 5 on the meaning of a ‘gender perspective’ draws attention to this. However, the implications of cooption are arguably far more severe for feminist praxis when they are used as an alibi for neutralising positive action or opposition. This sees institutions ‘appropriate the language of advocacy in order to co-opt social movement resistance’ (True, 2003: 379). A public commitment to feminist goals can therefore become resistance to feminism. For example, at the national level, large corporations which adopt legislative recommendations before they are binding are likely to do so because they are vulnerable to criticism if they are not seen to be proactively engaged (Martin, 2000: 213). The public commitment may indeed loosely correlate to certain specific actions taken by the institution. However, ultimately it allows the institution to co-opt the issue and use it to support an alternate message (Martin, 2000: 213). Initiatives which on the surface appear progressive then come to sit against both sexist and racist institutional structures which are left unchallenged. For example, research on UK universities’ implementation of the 2010 Race Relations Act finds a disjuncture between the image of the university presented in an implementation policy and the reality (Ahmed, 2007: 594). Ahmed’s concept of ‘documents as performance’ is helpful here (2007: 594). Ahmed asks us to consider how documents become ‘forms of institutional performance in two senses. Both the ways in which institutions perform an image of themselves through the document and how institutions perform presenting an image of “doing well”’ (Ahmed, 2007: 594). International Women’s Day provides another example of an event with radical and transformative foundations which is now being marked by global108 Gendering NATO’s core tasks corporations, the UN and other international actors, including NATO. The first International Women’s Day was organised by internationalist socialist women in the USA in 1907 with the aim of bringing attention to their fight for equality in every aspect of life (Kaplan, 1985: 166). In Europe, the inaugural event was held in 1911 to draw attention to the cause of women’s suffrage (Kaplan, 1985: 166). It was the celebration of International Women’s Day in Russia in 1917, where women were joined by men from the metal works in protests on the breadline and in factories,2 which really served to root the day in its transformative socialist origins (Kaplan, 1985: 166). The protests and the response of the Czar (who ordered his generals to shoot if necessary) precipitated the February revolution (Kaplan, 1985: 166). Despite these origins, the increasing neo-liberalisation of International Women’s Day is evident through its adoption by global corporations. This has been accompanied by a shift to understand the day as about women’s empowerment, rather than women’s rights (Grosser and McCarthy, 2018). Ultimately, this has led to its distancing from the transnational feminist activism which is at its core (Grosser and McCarthy, 2018). To mark International Women’s Day 2018, NATO launched a Facebook and Instagram campaign posing the question: ‘Did you know that NATO has more women in leadership positions than ever before? Together – men and women – we are stronger! #IWD2018’. While this may be true, as we discuss in Chapter 1, this belies the reality of the continued and significant marginalisation of women from decision-making roles within NATO. There has been progress, but it has been slow. This presents the possibility that International Women’s Day has been co-opted as a public diplomacy tool to promote a linear picture of progress of women’s empowerment, one removed from the reality of women’s positions within these institutional structures, whether global corporations or NATO. Rather than reflect on existing institutional challenges to gender equality, again as we outline in Chapter 1, NATO has marked the day by presenting a positive picture of a gender-sensitive employer. This supports the argument that one outcome of the commodification and co-option of feminist agendas (e.g. gender equality and women’s rights) can be that they lose their transformative potential (Acker, 2006: 460). At the international level, the implications of co-option are epitomised in the relationship of feminists to the World Bank. Following the 1995 Beijing Fourth World Conference on Women, a ‘Women’s Eyes on the Bank’ initiative was established to monitor and attempt to transform the World Bank (True, 2003: 379). The women’s movement shifted from challenging the World Bank to viewing it ‘as a potential ally in dialogues between women’s groups and their own governments’ (O’Brien et al., 2000). This resulted in women’s needs and goals being framed as compatible with the neoliberal logics underpinning World Bank programmes (Bergeron, 2001: 1002). The relationship between local women’s movements and the World Bank has therefore facilitated the appropriation of the ‘language of advocacy’ by the institution (True, 2003: 379). The very real danger of the co-option of feminist agendas by international institutions necessitates critical feminist knowledge of how such institutions operate. Gender mainstreaming is one policy initiative which states and international institutions have engaged with, which has transformative potential. Gender mainstreaming refers to ‘efforts to scrutinize and reinvent processes of policy formulation and implementation across all issue areas to address and rectify persistent and emerging disparities between men and women’ (True and Mintrom, 2001: 28). It has its origins in the UN conferences on women (True and Mintrom, 2001: 28), and is also called for in UNSCR 1325 (United Nations, 2000). It is a core part of NATO’s implementation of WPS. For example, the 2018 NATO/EAPC Women, Peace and Security Policy and Action Plan 2018 brochure states that ‘gender equality is considered as an integral part of NATO policies, programmes and projects guided by effective gender mainstreaming practices’ (NATO/EAPC, 2018). Gender mainstreaming initiatives are retroactive in the sense that the organisational structure as well as the practices, norms and behaviours of individuals within that structure predate gender mainstreaming as a policy initiative (Benschop and Verloo, 2006: 20). They can therefore be characterised as ‘disruptive’ because of an inherent tension and competition between a ‘new’ focus on ‘gender’ and the institutional ‘mainstream’ (Benschop and Verloo 2006: 20). If implemented correctly, such initiatives should seek to address the persistence of gender inequality within organisations and through doing so asks ‘new’ things of the institution. They therefore have the potential to address ‘the genderedness of organisations: the material and discursive constructions of masculinity and femininity that shape and are shaped by organisations’ (Benschop and Verloo, 2006: 19). As Walby (2005: 322) argues, pre-existing institutional priorities (in the case of NATO, the ‘core tasks’ outlined in the NATO Strategic Concept) ‘compete with goals of gender equality for prioritisation, which makes gender mainstreaming an inherently contested process that is never simply about adopting new policy’. Instead, the process involves a ‘negotiation’ between the ‘dual agenda’ of the established institutional practices and gender equality (Walby, 2005: 322). Here it is ‘new’ policy that is struggling with the existing organisational norms; disrupting them and rendering them visible. Analysing the effects of particular ‘disruptive’ policy initiatives within NATO provides insight into the pervasiveness of gender norms and hierarchies. However, contextualising NATO’s concern with gender issues against its core tasks, collective defence, crisis management and cooperative security, brings into question whether they were ever ‘disruptive’ or can bring the change expected of them in terms of transforming NATO’s role as an institution of international hegemonic masculinity.

2022 CNDI Kritik
Neg › Perms › A2 Perm – Co-Optation

Attempting to achieve gender equality through policy initiatives reinforces protective masculinity and the subordination of the feminine within NATO

Wright, Hurley, & Gil Ruiz 19

Katharine A.M., Lecturer in International Politics at Newcastle University, UK; Matthew, Lecturer in Politics at Sheffield Hallam University, UK; Jesus Ignacio, former Chief of the NATO IMS Office of the Gender Advisor. “NATO, women, and gendermen.” NATO, Gender, and the Military: Women Organising from Within. Routledge Studies in Gender and Security. 2019. Pg 91-95. LJS

As the above has demonstrated, gender work at NATO has largely been the domain of women. This has provided an opportunity for women to advance their own and other’s interests, but also serves to further a conflation of gender with women, or women’s issues, that can have restrictive effects on how the role and92 NATO women and gendermen place of women – and the utility of a gender perspective – is understood within NATO, as our analysis in Chapter 5 demonstrates. Drawing on the work of Hurley (2018a), here we want to explore what happens when military men start to engage in gender work within NATO. This is a relatively recent occurrence, there are still relatively few men working in senior positions to advance NATO’s engagement with WPS or working as gender advisors – though this number is growing at a significant rate. These developments are also complemented by an increased willingness by high-profile and senior men within NATO, including the Secretary General, to publicly advocate WPS and the work of the NCGP; for example the 2018 annual meeting of the NCGP was opened by a keynote address from Jens Stoltenberg. Though, as we have identified above, this is not the first time a Secretary General has expressed support and provided important influence in advancing NATO’s gender agenda. Here we conceive of the men ‘doing gender work’ as ‘gendermen’; and occupying a distinct position within NATO. They are men, working in predominantly female-occupied job roles in an organisation dominated by men (Hurley, 2018a). In many ways they challenge or transgress what are deemed to be ‘appropriate’ or acceptable norms within NATO. Here we explore how these perceived transgressions are policed and controlled by those same institutional structures and norms and can reinforce a masculinist protection logic (Young, 2003) that we argue in Chapter 1 underpins NATO’s broader engagement with WPS. Yet, we also argue that men engaging with gender work can offer opportunities for positive, incremental changes in the ways in which militarised masculinities are understood (Duncanson, 2013, 2015) and by extension an opportunity to expose and push for broader changes within NATO’s institutional structures that continue to privilege men and masculinity (Hurley, 2018a, 2018b). Men doing gender work at NATO identified some of the key challenges that they faced in advancing that work. Some of these challenges were informal, yet powerful ways of highlighting difference and reinforcing what was perceived to be acceptable: other people are not convinced, even my colleagues make a lot of jokes about me: ‘You are “genderman”, have you shaved your legs?’ These are jokes, but sometimes, inside their brains, there is some kind of truth. They don’t believe in this. Now seeing a man [doing this work], I think they will open their eyes a little bit more. Interview with NATO Official, 2012 in Hurley (2018) Lazar (2005, 2007) suggests that these sorts of ‘gender crossings’ – the transgression of expected gender norms, in this case a military man working on gender issues – emphasise the underlying dualism of the gender structure within any given organisation. Deviations from these gender-appropriate norms are often policed through criticism and containment, in both formal and informal ways – such as jokes and humour (Lazar, 2005: 8–9). Hearn has argued that ‘trivialisation through humour’ is one of myriad social and psychological resources that military organisations provide for the reproduction and changing of individual psychologies (in Higate, 2003: xiii). And yet, it is a particular form of trivialisation; one that seeks to feminise both the individual and the work that he is doing. This joke serves to both feminise the individual man and, by extension, identify his work as feminine and therefore unimportant within NATO as an institution of international hegemonic masculinity. The joke is used to link gender work at NATO with (a culturally specific) feminine practice – the shaving of legs – reinforcing an implicit and persistent conflation of gender with ‘women’s issues’. Women shave their legs, men do not; therefore gender is a woman’s concern, not a man’s (Hurley, 2018a). In this example, through working on gender issues, by addressing and highlighting the merits of the Women, Peace and Security agenda to other men within the organisation, the masculinity of the gendermen is questioned. As Duncanson (2015) notes, one of the ways in which hegemonic masculinity achieves its hegemonic status is through the feminisation of ‘other’ groups of men (in Hurley, 2018a: 13). And yet the response to this challenge is important too. The distinct and highly visible position that gendermen have is understood as an opportunity to change minds of other resistant men and, in doing so, increase the importance of gender within NATO: Some of them just don’t see the practical use. They just can’t get beyond the idea that women, approaching them, understanding them and that addressing their security needs matters at all … I know some men here will tell me, and they wouldn’t tell her [his female colleague], that they don’t quite buy the concept. So, I can have conversations with them as far as that goes and both they and I gain a better insight into the concept. Interview with NATO Official, 2012 in Hurley (2018) So, gendermen can use their distinct positions, and (re)negotiate their identities in the context within which they find themselves and in response to challenges, to change the minds and perspectives of these resistant colleagues. Yet what is highlighted here is the importance of men speaking to, listening to and being influenced by other men (rather than their women colleagues). This reinforces an understanding of whose voices – and what messages – are afforded respect and credibility within NATO, a point we develop further in Chapter 5. In addition to the risk of feminisation, a common concern of men involved or interested in gender-equality initiatives across a broad range of institutions was a perceived challenge to or misunderstanding of their heterosexuality. In their study of gender mainstreaming within EU member states, Ruxton and Van der Gaag (2013: 169) identify that there was ‘absolute terror in individual men [of] coming across as gay, as female and so on’. This conflation of gender and sexuality was also evident at NATO: I speak with my friends, and I say I work in gender and they start shouting about the gays and the lesbians and you have to say: ‘I don’t have anything to do with gays and lesbians, it is gender’. The thing is, what I do mainly is work to protect men and women, boys and girls who suffer the effects of operations, missions and worse; and in that moment people change their perspective and say: ‘oh my God’; and I say: ‘you can literally help them’. Here, then, there is a fear of feminisation and subordination through a perceived association of working on WPS at NATO with homosexuality (Hurley, 2018a). Interestingly all of the men we spoke to made explicit reference to their wives, girlfriends or children, often at the beginning of conversations, something that the women we spoke to very rarely did. Others made clear references to being ‘OK with gay men’ – even when the focus of the discussion was on a seemingly unrelated topic – with some even suggesting that a focus on LGBT rights should become part of NATO’s broader WPS engagement. Hurley (2018a; in Holmes et al., 2019: 25) has speculated that this might be one mechanism gendermen use to affirm their heterosexuality and to dispel any misperceptions or ambiguity regarding their sexuality, and/or be used as a bonding ploy when in conversation with other men (Conway, 2008; Schwalbe and Wolkomir, 2001). There was also a common articulation that engaging in gender work and promoting the WPS agenda at NATO was a way to protect the vulnerable, most commonly, though not exclusively, women and children. Chapter 1 has shown how masculine norms at NATO reinforce a particular hegemonic regime that becomes built into the structures of the alliance and are transmitted to member and partner states through NATO’s role as a ‘teaching machine’. Informing these norms is a logic of masculinist protection. There is broader evidence of this logic in the way that NATO framed its engagement with WPS under the banner of Protection, Participation and Prevention, as we have explored in Chapter 2 and go onto discuss further in Chapter 5. What the quotes above, and the accounts of the gendermen, highlight is an individualisation of this broader masculinist protectionist narrative: I tend to think that we work for men and women, boys and girls. You focus on the weakest part, the people that are suffering the most. So maybe men don’t suffer, but then I think that is happening more and more. In that way our objective is much more interesting and your work is much more rewarding, let’s say. Interview with NATO Official, 2012 in Hurley (2018) Here, then, gender work is framed as work that helps and is informed by a desire to protect. In similar ways to Young’s (2003) conceptualisation, this account of masculinist protection is expressed in benign terms yet a hierarchy between vulnerable, predominantly non-Western civilians, and a powerful Western military organisation acting a protector is established nonetheless: ‘the role of the masculine protector puts those protected, paradigmatically women and children, in a subordinate position of dependence’ (Young, 2003: 2). The masculinist protection narratives as a response challenges these individual gendermen face draws upon and reinforces broader constructions of hegemonic masculinity at NATO writ large. They provide a further mechanism through which the disruption of their ‘transgression’ can be normalised.

2022 CNDI Kritik
Neg › Perms › A2 Perm – Co-Optation

Incorporating so-called feminist principles into inherently masculine institutions waters down feminist politics—WPS proves

Wright, Hurley, & Gil Ruiz 19

Katharine A.M., Lecturer in International Politics at Newcastle University, UK; Matthew, Lecturer in Politics at Sheffield Hallam University, UK; Jesus Ignacio, former Chief of the NATO IMS Office of the Gender Advisor. “The long view.” NATO, Gender, and the Military: Women Organising from Within. Routledge Studies in Gender and Security. 2019. Pg 46-49. LJS

The realisation of UNCR 1325 was premised on a network of actors working both within UN structures and outside. Importantly, civil society were present through the NGO Working Group on WPS, an umbrella organisation which brought together interested NGOs to lobby for, draft and redraft the final Resolution (Hill, Aboitiz and Poehlman-Doumbouya, 2009: 1258–60). They envisaged the transformative potential of UNSCR 1325 not as a tool to ‘make war safe for women’, but through acknowledging the different and disproportionate impact on women, and women’s role in conflict prevention and resolution (Cook, 2009: 126). The role of feminists, including those working through the NGO Working Group on WPS, meant UNSCR 1325 was championed as a ‘feminist achievement’ (Cockburn, 2011). Some later went onto question whether the Resolution was a ‘trick or treat’, arguing that despite some weaknesses, it should be seen as a new global gender norm in the making (Tryggestad, 2009: 552). More recently, and despite some progress in the adoption of National Action Plans (NAPs) to support the implementation of WPS, a growing cynicism has emerged in relation to its transformative potential (Duncanson and Woodward, 2015: 8). Member states, civil society, academics and critical actors within the UN itself were critical to the realisation of the Resolution. The formation of such a coalition of interested parties working together at the Security Council was unprecedented (Cockburn, 2011). Despite this, the politics of the Security Council meant certain compromises were necessary to realise the Resolution. This has resulted in silences and omission within the WPS agenda more broadly. It remains unclear if the lack of ‘feminist’ conceptualisations in policy can be attributed to a knowledge gap among those formulating policy (Cook, 2016: 22). Rather, given the diversity of the coalition supporting UNSCR 1325 it could be that even those fully equipped with sufficient understanding may struggle to get such language adopted because of wider institutional pressures or specific resistance (Cook, 2016: 22). For example, the NGO Working Group on WPS had feminist and anti-war members but they were not in the majority, there was therefore a lack of consensus on the extent to which UNSCR 1325 should challenge existing practices (Cohn, 2011: 12). As a result any discussion of the arms trade and militarism was off the agenda because some members found the topics ‘too political’ (Cohn, 2011: 12). As a result, there is an absence from UNSCR 1325 of the Security Council’s own responsibility within the UN Charter to support the establishment of arms regulations systems (Otto, 2004: 12). Another key silence is any mention of ending war, despite this being a foundational part of the Security Council’s brief (Cockburn, 2007: 147). These omissions and silences draw attention to the contradiction between the Security Council with an implicit support for a militarised interstate system, and the normative underpinnings of UNSCR 1325 on women in armed conflict. As Basu (2010: 289) argues, this dissonance has emerged precisely because of the challenges to women’s security which result from the current set-up of the international arena. The language of the WPS resolutions is also worth considering. UNSCR 1325 relies on comparatively weak language for a Security Council Resolution. This includes the repetition of ‘urges’, ‘encourages’ and ‘calls’, rather than stronger language demanding action from states (Tryggestad, 2009: 544). It also associated ‘gender’ with ‘women’, which means the calls for gender mainstreaming can be read as only applicable to the concerns of women. Gender is therefore transformed into a ‘safe idea’ for policy makers leaving behind its radical potential to produce change (Puechguirbal, 2010: 184). Gender also comes to signify a ‘need/want/lack’ (Shepherd, 2011: 515, 2008: 171–2). UNSCR 1325 also presents a victim-agent dichotomy. The Resolution frames women both as having ‘special needs’ and in need of protection in conflict situations, but also as agents ‘stressing the importance of their equal participation and full involvement in all efforts for the maintenance and promotion of peace and security’ (United Nations Security Council, 2000). For some, there is no contradiction here and it is possible to acknowledge both the disproportionate impact of war on women, while still ‘making women’s agency vibrantly visible’ (Cohn, Kinsella and Gibbings, 2004: 139). For others, the language of the Resolution has missed an opportunity to challenge myths that sustain beliefs about women’s helplessness in the face of sexual violence by also acknowledging their capacity to be agents of change (Otto, 2010: 117). UNSCR 1820 presents something of a shift away from this victim-agent understanding, and while UNSCR 1888 returns to the dual track approach, it does refer to civilians as victims of Conflict-Related Sexual and Gender-Based Violence (CRSGBV), rather than women specifically (Shepherd, 2011). The passage of the WPS Resolutions through the Security Council has not always followed the same pattern as UNSCR 1325. In 2009 the next WPS Resolution, UNSCR 1820, was initiated by the US State Department, rather than civil society advocacy, and designed to complement the Bush Administration’s antitrafficking agenda (Otto, 2010: 109). However, the draft of the Resolution was leaked to NGOs who sought to respond critically in attempt to tone down the focus on women as powerless and vulnerable victims (Otto, 2010: 109). Unsurprisingly, UNSCR 1820 received a mixed reception from scholars and activists. Some welcomed it as a long overdue engagement by the Security Council with CRSGBV. Others criticised the resolution for reducing the broad scope of UNSCR 1325 and holistic nature of the WPS agenda to the issue of women as victims of war (Otto, 2010: 101; Cook, 2009b). In treating CRSGBV as a separate issue from violence against women in peacetime, there is a danger that the latter become normalised. Further, sensationalising sexual violence in war may reinforce the beliefs which make rape a powerful weapon of war (Cook, 2009b:48 The long view 129; Meger, 2016). Sam Cook (2009b: 129) argues that it is necessary to question the idea that experiencing sexual violence in conflict is the very worst thing that can happen to a woman and is unrecoverable from. This reinforces the notion that raping a woman in war is equivalent to ‘raping a nation’, with women seen as a resource, and closes down avenues to ending violence (Cook, 2009b: 129). The third WPS Resolution, UNSCR 1888 adopted in 2009, also addressed the issue of CRSGBV and was again sponsored by the US. However, the Obama administration sought to break from the Bush legacy on the issue (Otto, 2010: 110). The Resolution made a significant departure from UNSCR 1820 by treating the issue of CRSGBV as one of structural inequality, not women’s inherent vulnerability (Otto, 2010: 103). Five days after the adoption of UNSCR 1888, Vietnam sponsored the adoption of UNSCR 1889. The fourth WPS Resolution returned the focus of the WPS agenda to women’s participation, reinforcing and strengthening the provisions of UNSCR 1325 with measures to address women’s structural inequalities. UNSCR 1889 joined UNSCR 1325 in introducing new language acknowledging women as agents and displacing representations of women as victims (Otto, 2010: 103). In 2010, the adoption of UNSCR 1960 created a set of institutional tools to combat impunity and steps towards the prevention and protection from CRSGBV. Two further WPS Resolutions were passed by the Security Council in 2013: UNSCR 2016; and UNSCR 2122. UNSCR 2106, adopted in June, was proposed by the UK as part of their Preventing Sexual Violence in Conflict Initiative (PSVI) and became the fourth resolution to focus on CRSGBV. As a result there was again concern that the WPS agenda had narrowed to focus on CRSGBV at the expense of women’s participation (Krause and Enloe, 2015: 329). The adoption of UNSCR 2122 in 2013, which acknowledged the salient role women do and should play in contributing towards sustainable peace, was therefore significant because it represented the return of the WPS agenda to its wider and more comprehensive origins (Björkdahl and Mannergren Selimovic, 2015: 20). The Resolution also embodies the strongest language on women’s agency of all the WPS Resolutions (Miller, Pournik and Swaine, 2014: 51). The penultimate WPS Resolution, UNSCR 2122’s focus on monitoring the implementation of the WPS agenda through increased briefings to the Security Council from various UN entities, represented a radical departure from previous WPS Resolutions (Shepherd, 2014: 22). The Resolution called on member states, regional actors and UN entities to review their existing implementation of the WPS agenda and revise existing targets in preparation for the High-Level Review mandated by the Resolution in 2015. In addition, the Secretary General commissioned a Global Study led by Radhika Coomaraswamy, former Special Representative of the Secretary- General on Children and Armed Conflict and former Special Rapporteur on Violence against Women. The study was intended to review the progress made towards achieving the goals set out in the WPS Resolutions and to outline a global policy agenda to inform WPS efforts going forward (UN Women, 2014).The long view 49 Fifteen years on from the adoption of UNSCR 1325, Spain sponsored the adoption of a further resolution, UNSCR 2242. This resolution is the most recent in the WPS framework and the main focus is a call for WPS to be a cross-cutting issue within the Countering Violence Extremism agenda. This is a departure from the recommendations of the Global Study on UNSCR 1325, which recommended that CVE be separated from women’s rights, noting that the instrumental use of women’s rights can be harmful in fragile situations (Wright, 2015). More positively, as Wright (2015) notes, UNSCR 2242 does call for research into the impact of CVE on women’s rights. In addition to CVE, UNSCR 2242 makes a number of other contributions to the WPS agenda. These include the creation of an Informal Expert Group on WPS at the UN Security Council (a recommendation of the Global Study) and a call for WPS to be incorporated into all country-specific situations on the Security Council’s agenda. As Table 2.1 points out, the WPS Resolutions can be broadly categorised into those addressing CRSGBV and those addressing WP. The CRSGBV Resolutions have been critiqued for being reductive in framing the rationale for women’s participation as a means to address CR-SGBV (Heathcote, 2018: 380). The paradigm also presents men from conflict-affected states as the perpetrators of CRSGBV, deflecting from the inadequacies within other ‘peacetime’ states’ approach to the issue (Heathcote, 2018: 380). CRSGBV is understood as the archetypal experience of women during conflict. As Heathcote (2018: 380) argues, this could deflect ‘attention from economic needs, Gender-based Violence and the role of gendered power relations in producing the myriad of gendered harms that communities experience’. As Meger (2016: 153) contends, this has resulted from the ‘securitization’ of CRSGBV which has entailed presenting the issue as a threat to the state with the assumption that restoring state authority and bringing perpetrators to justice will decrease CRSGBV. In separating CRSGBV from the broader continuum of violence against women, evident through peacetime and in conflict, women’s insecurity is not adequately addressed. UNSCR 1889 and UNSCR 2122 focus on substantive representation, developing further the call for women’s participation in UNSCR 1325. As Heathcote (2018: 381) cautions, while this is a welcome development it has also been accompanied by a shift to the use of indicators as a means to ‘measure’ the success of WPS. As she notes, indicators are never neutral or objective tools and there is a risk that WPS will become a means to count women, rather than to meaningfully address the ‘the substantive and structural disadvantages that hinder women’s full participation within any community’ (Heathcote, 2018: 381). UNSCR 1889 also lacks nuance in considering just which women are represented and assumes women are a homogenous group able to speak for all. Both Resolutions also fall back on emphasising the need to consult women’s civil society groups as a solution to WP, rather than considering how to promote women as decision makers (Heathcote, 2018: 380).

2022 CNDI Kritik
Neg › Perms › A2 Perm – NATO Has Gender Policy

Despite rhetoric geared towards gender equality, NATO continues to be a male-dominated organization—no reason the aff’s specific example of a gender-centered policy matters

Harrison 14

Lauren, a German chancellor's fellow at the Global Public Policy Institute in Berlin and a nonresident fellow at Harvard Kennedy School's Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs. “The Men-Only Club.” Foreign Policy. 4/3/2014. LJS

For all of NATO’s rhetoric about engaging in a "continuous process of reform, modernisation and transformation," the composition of its top leadership looks downright anachronistic. With the March 28 designation of Jens Stoltenberg as the next secretary general, it seems certain that at least 70 years will pass without a single woman serving at the very top of the organization. The problem is not confined to the position of secretary-general. In 65 years, there has also never been a female deputy secretary-general, and Croatia’s Kolinda Grabar-Kitarovic is the first and only woman to ever serve in one of the assistant secretary-general positions. Unsurprisingly, the imbalance is every bit as pronounced within the military delegations to NATO. There has never been a female supreme allied commander Europe, and all of its 56 current chiefs of defense and military representatives are male. Its organizational chart of top civilian and military leaders shows 80 men and three women smiling gamely at the camera. Individual member states, meanwhile, are increasingly sending women to top positions within their own governments, outpacing NATO in the slog toward gender equality. At the moment, eight of the alliance’s 28 member states have at least one woman representing the country’s security and foreign-policy priorities in Brussels or serving as a defense minister, and over half of its members have or have previously had a female head of government. As senior stateswomen with expertise in collective defense, many of these women are qualified candidates for NATO leadership positions, yet they are not making it to that top echelon. There are doubtlessly those who question whether a gender imbalance even matters, particularly in a defense-oriented organization. Given the alliance’s challenging agenda, from countering Russian President Vladimir Putin’s aggression to making the most with increasingly strained military resources, the composition of its leadership may seem like an auxiliary concern. In fact, the types of challenges with which NATO contends would especially benefit from more representative leadership. Ample research suggests that female leadership brings about positive change for organizations, particularly in the domain of conflict resolution. Women leaders have been shown to have a more democratic and collaborative leadership style — an important attribute when trying to build consensus in a large organization such as NATO. When women play an active role in discussions about post-conflict reconstruction, research has shown that the resultant peace agreements and operational policies are less likely to marginalize parts of society and more likely to endure. Recent literature about women in the private sector has hailed the diversity of perspective and problem-solving techniques that women bring — surely those same benefits also apply in the context of the alliance. At a time when NATO is trying to address 21st-century challenges without slipping back into a 20th-century mindset, more diversity at the top could go a long way toward keeping the organization and its thinking modern. Beyond these practical benefits, the other reason that increasing the number of women in top NATO positions matters is, quite simply, a question of values: A collective security organization that only represents 50 percent of the population in top leadership jobs is inconsistent with the contemporary Western values the alliance espouses.

2022 CNDI Kritik
Neg › Perms › A2 Perm Do Both

Perm do both eschews gender analysis by tacking the alt onto the aff without doing any of the work the alt requires

Sjoberg 15

Laura, British Academy Global Professor of Politics and International Relations at Royal Holloway University of London. “’I know there’s stuff I don’t talk about’ and other annoying responses to feminist analysis.” Relations International. June 25th, 2015. LJS

There’s nothing ground-breaking about my response – it repeats things feminists have been saying for decades. It suggests that seeing the US government as the location of relevance may be not only wrong but morally insidious, then makes the argument that the notion of objective knowledge and scientific process that Desch shares with the quantitative work he criticizes might be the root of a differently understood ‘relevance problem’ for Security Studies – hierarchy and exclusion. Even though this response is, in my view, strikingly unoriginal – it seems to be getting the same reaction it got 20 years ago. Desch was able to write a response to the response – well, a response to other people’s responses anyway. All of the other pieces (including the other two in the sentence below) are addressed substantively. My piece is mentioned in one sentence. Brace yourself. “Finally, Tutton, Voeten, and Laura Sjoberg all make an important point about policy-relevance involving much more than government policy-makers.” Yep. That’s it. I say: gender analysis shows your conception of Security Studies is normatively harmful and intellectually counterproductive. He says: oh, nice of you to tell me that we need to pay attention to policy-making outside of government. I meant that, I just didn’t say it. But my catch-all point applies to that. In other words, I know there’s stuff I didn’t talk about, and that’s enough to dispense with the gender critique. My colleagues from outside of the United States often wonder why I engage with the American mainstream of IR, and, when I first read Desch’s response to the response, I’ll admit, I got on the skeptical bandwagon. But then I thought – that response is exactly why it has to keep getting said. There, and then here, and then anyplace else that it can be. Gender analysis is not just something you mean but don’t say, and then can get away with saying “I know there’s stuff I didn’t talk about.” It affects how you think about a project, ontologically, epistemology, and methodologically. It affects it whether or not you think so – your work is as impacted by implicit masculinized gender assumptions as mine is by explicit feminist assumptions. And I’m talking about it even if you won’t.

2022 CNDI Kritik
Neg › Links › Security Cooperation

Security cooperation legitimizes irredeemable institutions like NATO, allow them to continue patterns of masculine colonization

Basticka and Duncansonb 18

Megan, School of Law, University of Edinburgh, Edinburgh, UK; Claire, School of Social and Political Science, University of Edinburgh, Edinburgh, UK, “Agents of Change? Gender Advisors in NATO Militaries.” International Peacekeeping. 2018. Pg 5-6. LJS.

Militaries are viewed by many feminist scholars as fundamentally inimical to feminism, institutions of destructive power and inherent misogyny.13 Militaries perpetrate devastating violence in war, which disproportionately affects women when the long term impacts, including of forced migration, and sexual and gender-based violence are considered.14 Even where described as ‘pacifying’ or ‘liberating’ missions, military interventions remain violent, for some feminists, often ‘wars of extraction’15, involving the logic of all war: ‘opposition, differentiation and the othering of peoples’.16 As well as perpetrating direct physical violence, militaries are implicated in equally pernicious structural violence. States’ military-industrial complexes organize economies around producing weapons rather than civilian goods and absorb vast amounts of funding that could otherwise be spent on achieving human security.17 The Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom (WILPF) highlights the opportunity-costs at play: the world’s total military expenditure in 2013 was estimated to be $1.747 trillion.18 Only a small fraction of that would be required to fund the measures to achieve the Millennium Development Goal for gender equality, such as women’s economic empowerment, family planning, and women’s participation and leadership. A feminist vision of peace and security, as articulated by WILPF and reflected in feminist scholarship, is for ‘a world free from violence and armed conflict in which human rights are protected and women and men are equally empowered and involved in positions of leadership at the local, national and international levels’, hand in hand with universal reduction and elimination of weapons,19 suggesting a vastly reduced (if any) role for armed forces and military alliances. Militaries are, moreover, viewed by many feminists as an institution where hegemonic forms of masculinity privileging practices of violence and misogyny, combined with myths of heroic protection of vulnerable civilians, are produced and reproduced.20 Militarized masculinity, constructed within militaries but with effects rippling through society, is theorized as focused upon domination of women (and subordinate males) and the denigration of the feminine.21 Indeed, many scholars argue that the capacity of women within the military to be agents of change of institutional culture or of military operations is limited, as they adapt their performance of femininity to fit their hyper-masculine environment.22 They likewise question claims that women make a distinct contribution as military peacekeepers: to protection of women and girls, prevention of sexual exploitation and abuse, or as role models for local women.23 As Heineken says, ‘Clearly one cannot bring about a different perspective to war and peace if women [in the military] are expected to embrace masculine norms and values and where gender difference is not recognised and valued’.24 As such, it is unsurprising that some feminist scholars and activists are sceptical of military engagement with the Women, Peace and Security agenda. They suggest that when taken up by militaries, the Women, Peace and Security agenda risks being used to lend legitimacy to the ‘war system’ rather than challenge it,25 even ‘militarizing feminism’.26 NATO is regarded with particular suspicion, by ‘Women Against NATO’, as ‘an ambitious, expansionist and belligerent war-machine, primarily serving the economic and strategic interests of the more powerful among its member states’.27 From this perspective, NATO invoking women’s rights is not progress, but the co-optation of feminism for militarist ends. More specifically, some feminists allege that NATO’s gender work too often carries the implication that gender is only relevant for the host country, as if western institutions had achieved gender equality; that it perpetuates colonial assumptions about the superiority of the west as the bearer of civilization and humanitarian values.28 One imagines that anti-militarist feminists would argue that Military Gender Advisors are either not-feminist or feminists wasting their time, legitimizing fundamentally problematic institutions.

2022 CNDI Kritik
Neg › Links › Russia-Ukraine

The ‘realpolitik’ of the 1AC elides feminist analysis of Russia’s invasion in Ukraine and continues the exclusion of feminist discourse from NATO

Wright 22

Katharine A., Senior Lecturer in International Politics at Newcastle University. “A feminist perspective on the Russian-Ukraine War: Implications for NATO.” Centre for Women, Peace, and Security. 3/8/2022. LJS

Russia’s intervention in Ukraine seemingly caught the international community and many International Relations scholars by surprise. It has been heralded as a return to ‘realpolitik’ leading to a (re)focus on the state as the primary referent point of international politics. Yet while feminist IR scholars have made important inroads into the discipline in recent decades, demonstrating how the personal is not only political but international too, at this time of crisis we again find feminist insights marginalised from mainstream discussion of the war and its consequences (with a few notable exceptions, including work by Jenny Mathers and a subsequently postponed RUSI event). Feminists IR scholars have much value to add to the discussion to aide our understanding of the war and its gendered impact. For example, how masculinities and femininities are invoked in constructing Russia and Ukraine in geopolitical imaginaries, the absence of women from both Ukranian and Russian negotiation delegations, or in the gendered silences of just who is seen to fight/be protected in Western media coverage, to name just a few of examples. However, the purpose of this blog is to focus on the implications of the war for NATO through a feminist lens. Feminist IR scholars’ primary concern with NATO stems from a premise that it functions as an institution of international hegemonic masculinity. This has included a focus on how NATO shares lessons on the value of the Women, Peace and Security (WPS) agenda and a gender perspective, constituting both through a militarist lens, even if gender work often remains under resourced and not fully utilised within the alliance and its operations. Feminist IR scholars have also examined how gendered narratives are invoked to shape NATO, its value, and purpose, both internally through storytelling and the interactions of ‘gendermen’ (and women) and externally through the projection and reception of strategic narratives. The value of women, and more recently gender perspectives, to the alliance is nothing new and NATO has long been concerned with the integration of women into its armed forces in relation to balancing ‘manpower’ shortages and supporting operational effectiveness. More recently, in 2019, NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg stated that “Gender equality is an integral part of all NATO policies, programmes and Projects.” Likewise, the NATO/EAPC Policy and Action Plan on WPS makes it clear that “NATO aims to address gender inequality and integrate WPS through the Alliance’s three core tasks of collective defence, crisis management and cooperative security [emphasis author’s own]”. Even if ‘nations have the primary responsibility’ in respect to collective defence, it is these nations which makeup NATO and agree its response, they are therefore responsible for ensuring “the provision of trained troops and experts on gender issues, as well as a better gender balance in NATO-led forces depend entirely on national decisions”. The NATO WPS policy has “encouraged [member and partner states] to make WPS an integral part of their defence and security.” The test of whether they have or not comes now. Despite such a commitment, we have yet to see NATO, or its members or partners, articulate the relevance of gender in their response to the Russian intervention in Ukraine. While there remains a lot we don’t know about NATO’s reaction, we would expect, if it were in place, for NATO to have made the case for the relevance of a gender perspective publicly. If the response to Russia’s actions has seen NATO return to its Article 5 collective defence founding purpose, it has also, yet again, drawn attention to the disjuncture between the rhetoric and reality of NATO’s commitment to the WPS agenda. This also further undermines and demonstrates the hollowness of recent calls for NATO to adopt a Feminist Foreign Policy. As feminist IR scholars, we should be asking not only where are the women but where are the gender advisors and where is the gender expertise? Is the NATO Special Representative on Women, Peace and Security being included in all high-level discussions? Are Gender Advisors being deployed with the NATO Response Forces? Has a gender perspective been incorporated into NATO’s strategic communications? Is a gender perspective being included in all decision-making processes? Has a gender perspective been part of the briefings at the NATO extraordinary meetings on Ukraine? Which (if any) member and partners states (including those with Feminist Foreign Policies, such as Canada, France, Germany, Sweden, Luxembourg and Sweden) are raising NATO’s commitments under WPS as something to be taken into consideration at these meetings? And what gender expertise are they contributing substantively? Moreover, given in the last decade NATO has begun engaging civil society formally on its WPS work, we must ask where are their voices and perspectives now? This short contribution has sought to raise questions and provocations related to the WPS agenda and how it has (or hasn’t) been invoked in NATO’s response to the Russia-Ukraine War. It has also demonstrated that feminist knowledge and attention to NATO is needed now more than ever. It is just one take, and there remains more than one feminist perspective on NATO, while feminism remains a broad school, even if feminist IR scholars remain united by a commitment to emancipatory praxis. It has shown how, even at times such as these, we need to make space to hear voices outside of the mainstream discourse, which might make us uncomfortable or challenge the accepted status quo, because doing so keeps alive the possibility that another world is possible. Asking feminist questions of NATO specifically can contribute to a better understanding of the alliance’s role in the global power order, in particular how it engages with and shapes ‘new’ security threats, including the Russian intervention in Ukraine.

2022 CNDI Kritik
Neg › Links › Rational Actors

The aff perpetuates gendered hierarchy by depicting Western countries as “rational” actors which dictate which weapons are justified and who gets to wield them – this legitimates military spending and programs which fuel warfare

Cohn 3 – PhD from The Union Graduate School, director of the Consortium on Gender, Security and Human Rights at the University of Massachusetts. [Carol, “A Feminist Ethical Perspective on Weapons of Mass Destruction”, 2003,

Thus, use of the term “proliferation” tends to locate the person who uses it within a possessor state, and aligns him or her with the political stance favoring the hierarchy of state power enshrined in the current distribution of WMD. The framing of Question Four. “... is it proper to deny [WMD] possession to others for the same purposes?”, seems similarly based in a possessor state perspective, as it is presumably the possessor states who must decide whether it is proper to deny possession to others. As we have already stated, we find WMD themselves intrinsically morally indefensible, no matter who possesses them, and we are concerned about the wide array of costs to any state of development and deployment. We therefore reject the discourse’s implicit division of “good” and “bad,” “safe” and “unsafe” WMD, (defined as good or bad depending on who possesses them). Our concern is to understand how some WMD are rendered invisible (“o urs”) and some visible (“theirs”); some rendered malignant and others benign. Here, we join others in noting that the language in which the case against “proliferation” is made is ethno-racist and contemptuous. Generally, in Western proliferation discourse as a whole, a distinction is drawn between “the ‘Self’(seen as responsible) vs the non-Western Unruly Other.” 36 The US represents itself as a rational actor, while representing the Unruly Other as emotional, unpredictable, irrational, immature, misbehaving. Not only does this draw on and reconstruct an Orientalist portrayal of third world actors 37; it does so through the medium of gendered terminology. By drawing the relations between possessors and non-possessors in gendered terms – the prudential, rational, advanced, mature, restrained, technologically- and bureaucratically- competent (and thus “masculine”) Self, versus the emotional, irrational, unpredictable, uncontrolled, immature, primitive, undisciplined, technologically-incompetent (and thus “feminine”) Unruly Other – the discourse naturalizes and legitimates the Self/possessor states having weapons which the Other does not. By drawing on and evoking gendered imagery and resonances, the discourse naturalizes the idea that “We” / the US / the responsible father must protect, must control and limit “her,” the emotional, out-of-control state, for her own good, as well as for ours. This Western proliferation discourse has had a function in the wider context of US national security politics. With the end of the “Evil Empire” in the late 1980s, until the attacks of September 11th , 2001, the US appeared to be without an enemy of grand enough proportions to justify maintaining its sprawling military-industrial establishment. This difficulty was forestalled by the construction of the category of “rogue states” – states seen as uncontrollable, irresponsible, irrational, malevolent, and antagonistic to the West. 38 Their unruliness and antagonism was represented as intrinsic to their irrational nature; if it were not in their “nature,” the US would have needed to ask more seriously if actions on the part of the West had had any role in producing that hostility and disorder. The discourse of WMD proliferation has been one of the principal means of producing these states as major threats. To say this is neither to back away from our position opposing weapons of mass destruction, nor to assess the degree to which WMD in the hands of “Other” states actually do threaten the US, the “Other” states’ regional opponents, or their own population. But it is an assessment of the role of WMD proliferation discourse in naturalizing and legitimating otherwise-difficult-to-make-appear-rational programs and expenditures such as National Missile Defense. 39 Within the logic of deterrence theory and proliferation discourse, the phenomenon of WMD proliferation is understandable in two main ways. States either acquire WMD for purposes of aggression – i.e., to use WMD or to threaten their use in acts of aggression, intimidation and/or coercion against other states or populations within their own state. Or states acquire WMD to enhance their own security by deterring an opponent from attack. Within a strategic calculus, either is understood as a “rational” motivation for WMD possession, even if not everyone would view these reasons as equally morally defensible.

2022 CNDI Kritik
Neg › Links › Negative Peace

The realist conception of “negative peace” leaves much to be desired – the aff’s flawed approach to containing conflict perpetuates the gendered status-quo and excludes non-state actors

McLeod and O’Reilly 19

Laura, Politics, lecturer in International Politics at the University of Manchester, UK; Maria, Postdoctoral Research Fellow in the School of Politics and International Relations at Queen Mary University of London. “Critical peace and conflict studies: feminist interventions,” Peacebuilding, 7:2. 2019.

Conflict management approaches – associated with international negotiation, mediation, and traditional peacekeeping – are largely inspired by the realist belief in the inevitability of conflict and the impossibility of achieving resolution.18 These focus narrowly on managing conflict situations and achieving ‘negative peace’19 by halting overt violence. The aim is to reinforce international order and security by ‘isolating’ and ‘containing’ conflict.20 There is shared agreement between critical and feminist PCS regarding the inadequacies of conflict management approaches for building sustainable peace. Traditional peacekeeping missions, for example, hold a mixed record in limiting armed conflict, and are ‘virtually uniform’ in their failure to achieve conflict resolution.21 They rarely created the conditions for peace, and worked largely to ‘freeze’ rather than resolve conflict.22 Women and gender issues were largely excluded from traditional peacekeeping missions: for instance, between 1957 and 1989, the number of women participating in the military component of peacekeeping missions was a mere 0.1%.23 Furthermore, the coercive power wielded by armed peacekeepers is criticised by feminists – for reproducing violent masculinities which (re)create gendered forms of insecurity,24 and for perpetuating relations of domination which are at the root of violent conflict.25 Traditional diplomacy, meanwhile, frequently produced settlements based on ‘peace without justice’ and often found it difficult to address the rising number of intra-state conflicts due to its state-centric view of conflict.26 Feminist scholars have documented the long-standing absence of women from formal peace negotiations.27 Obstacles include highly gendered norms and practices of diplomacy, which associate negotiations and mediation with men, masculinity, and military affairs.28 The lack of recognition of women as significant peace-making actors is another factor; as is the priority afforded to high-level political and military actors (usually men), at the expense of women’s interests and demands.29 From a feminist perspective, conflict management approaches, in theory and in practice, reflect and sustain a ‘cult of power’ within peace research – one which marginalises the perspectives and contributions of relatively ‘powerless’ non-state actors, including many women, girls, and non-binary people.30 Furthermore, the goal of promoting negative peace, is strongly criticised by feminists, who point out that this leaves (gendered) forms of direct violence (e.g. gender-based violence), structural violence (patriarchy), and cultural violence (militarism) unaddressed.31

2022 CNDI Kritik
Neg › Links › NATO

NATO’s militarism serves to reinforce violent gendered and racialized logics—FETs prove

Wright, Hurley, & Gil Ruiz 19

Katharine A.M., Lecturer in International Politics at Newcastle University, UK; Matthew, Lecturer in Politics at Sheffield Hallam University, UK; Jesus Ignacio, former Chief of the NATO IMS Office of the Gender Advisor. “Gendering NATO’s core tasks Collective defence, crisis management and cooperative security.” NATO, Gender, and the Military: Women Organising from Within. Routledge Studies in Gender and Security. 2019. Pg 112-115. LJS

The conclusion is that – as NATO goes global, women are a critical asset for NATO’s new missions.… Particularly in certain cultural contexts, like in Afghanistan, female troops and mixed-gender units are essential toGendering NATO’s core tasks 113 carrying out such tasks as house searches, or establishing ties with the local population. As former CWINF Chair, Lieutenant Colonel Kristin Lund draws attention to above, as NATO became a crisis management organisation, military women became essential operational assets (NATO, 2004). NATO defines crisis management as ‘military and non-military measures to address the full spectrum of crisis – before, during and after conflicts’. Three years before NATO produced a policy on WPS, the 2004 CWINF conference outcomes included a call for the greater involvement of women in NATO militaries as ‘force multipliers’ (NATO, 2004). So, while NATO’s later engagement with UNSCR 1325, WPS and a gender perspective (as discussed in Chapter 5) would further articulate the ‘added value’ of women, WPS did not provide the impetus. Rather, WPS has mapped onto NATO’s pre-existing concern with women and in NATO Forces, and NATO’s involvement in Afghanistan. NATO’s involvement in Afghanistan came in December 2001 with the creation of the ISAF. This was to become NATO’s largest and most challenging crisis management operation to-date. Until the draw-down of forces December 2014, over 51 states drawn from NATO members and partners contributed to the mission (NATO, 2018). The complexities of the conflict saw gender (or women) become central to Western understandings of Afghanistan (Daulatzai, 2008) and shaped NATO’s subsequent engagement with the WPS agenda (Wright, 2016: 356). Gender, or specifically women, became beneficial not just in rhetorical justifications for the action, but in both doctrine and practice to population-centric counterinsurgency (Dyvik, 2013: 412). For example, the gendering of counterinsurgency through the use of FETs became part of efforts to sell the intervention to a war-fatigued audience framing it as a ‘gentler (feminine) option’ (Mcbride and Wibben, 2012: 200). We return to this when we discuss the gender perspective ‘in action’ in Chapter 5. FETs are far from representative of the experience of women in NATO Forces. Nevertheless, FETs captured the imaginaries of the media and broader public, as this Daily Mail headline exemplifies: ‘The British Army’s secret weapon in Afghanistan? It’s the seven female officers in Helmand Province gaining the trust of the locals’ (Daily Mail, 2012). FETs have also caught the attention of NATO, for example, the NCGP has continued to address the issue at conferences, despite their decreasing use (e.g. in 2004, 2018). Academia has also become fixated upon FETs, contributing to their exceptionalising, and leading the Navy War College in a call for papers for its regular academic conference on WPS to ban papers addressing them (US Naval War College, 2018). In operations, including in Afghanistan, FETs have been used to engage and ‘win over’ local women, or the half of the population out of reach to male soldiers. They were developed by the UK, US and others. However, ISAF forces also formed informal FETs drawn from ‘tactical and provincial reconstruction teams, civil affairs forces and agribusiness development teams’ (Holliday, 2012). Despite this, many of these efforts remained ‘ad hoc and disorganized and114 Gendering NATO’s core tasks training and employment are not standardized’ (Holliday, 2012). This is reinforced through the reflections of a former FET deployed in Afghanistan: ‘I couldn’t do anything for them,’ my medic told me. And I responded, ‘Neither could I.’ We were tourists, unable to solve problems with units that changed every 12 months. Everything was temporary, except Afghanistan. Although we did other programmatic work like husbandry training and a literacy program, none were sustainable. Where there were few roads and doctors, we attempted to hand out pudding and toothpaste. When the next team came to replace us, their commander refused to conduct FET missions. (Ricks, 2016) Centralising gender in our analysis of FETs as a crisis management tool points to some of the broader implications of their use. As Mcbride and Wibben (2012: 211) found in their study of FETs, there was an irony that ‘their effectiveness is limited more by U.S. commanders than patriarchal Afghans’, leading them to question just ‘who is shielding their women from Afghan society more: Pashtun men or U.S. Commanders?’. Ultimately the deployment of FETs mobilised as a counterinsurgency tool rested on gendered and racialised logics. This is what Spivak originally articulated as ‘white men saving brown women from brown men’ (Spivak quoted in Cooke, 2002). Here, this problematic reasoning has morphed to become ‘white women saving brown women from brown men’ (Cooke, 2002; Mcbride and Wibben, 2012). Gender and security in Afghanistan have been understood within a masculinist protection logic (Partis-Jennings, 2017: 414). As we argue in Chapter 1, a core part of NATO’s role as an institution of international hegemonic masculinity is the projection of a masculinist protection role. Gendered norms become apparent when women join the military. This occurs as the ‘women soldiers’ subjectivity is formed against the norms of masculinity embedded in the organisation’ (Kronsell, 2012: 43). The increasing presence of women in the military therefore has the potential to be ‘disruptive’ (Duncanson and Woodward, 2016: 12). Military women can be disruptive in the sense that their mere presence means the institution is no longer exclusively occupied by men’s bodies. But also in the sense that the perspective and presence of these women disrupt the masculine norms that pervade such institutions. The presence of women challenges the naturalness and invisibility of masculine norms; the relational nature of gender and the dominance of masculinity are therefore exposed. The use of women soldiers in FET roles brings this disruptive potential into question. In addition to their symbolism, FETs frame women as of ‘added value’ to the military, thus separating them from the homogenous military whole. Their use therefore is a potential obstacle to women into the military presenting a ‘disruption’ to established gender hierarchies and structures. For example, the foundation of military training is to strip a recruit’s individuality from them, making them an obedient part of the military whole and able to respond to command structures (Whitworth, 2004: 158). Adding women because they are perceived to bring something different is problematic because it accentuates difference and rests upon the premise that the ‘different’ individuals can, and will, provide the diversity expected of them (Kronsell, 2012: 67). In so doing, the existing majority is normalised and constructed ‘as homogenous and naturally associated with the organization’ (Kronsell, 2012: 67). Far from challenging the hegemonic masculinity militarism is built upon, the diversity argument reinforces an essentialist view of women as in opposition to the norm (Whitworth, 2004: 154). It also contradicts the foundation of military training, whereby recruit’s individuality is stripped from them so that they become part of an obedient military whole able to respond to command structures (Whitworth, 2004: 158). The use of FETs fits a wider pattern of the recruitment of military women, where they are often assigned to particular, often times subordinate, roles (Mathers, 2013: 134).

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NATO adoptions gender policy to insulate itself from criticism and to serve pre-existing militarist agendas

Wright, Hurley, & Gil Ruiz 19

Katharine A.M., Lecturer in International Politics at Newcastle University, UK; Matthew, Lecturer in Politics at Sheffield Hallam University, UK; Jesus Ignacio, former Chief of the NATO IMS Office of the Gender Advisor. “The long view Situating NATO’s engagement with women, peace and security.” NATO, Gender, and the Military: Women Organising from Within. Routledge Studies in Gender and Security. 2019. Pg 55-58. LJS

The first iteration of the NATO/EAPC Policy is a brief document. It acts more as a normative aspiration for what NATO can achieve through engagement with the WPS agenda, rather than as a detailed policy action plan. It quotes verbatim from NATO’s foundational values outlined in The Washington Treaty, and is presented as a tool to promote ‘democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law’ (NATO, 2007). The policy focuses primarily on operational aspects, with the intention that further work would take place to identify the wider applicability of WPS. Specifically, it calls for NATO Military Authorities to take the lead in developing practical proposals for engagement with the agenda. The broader context is key to understanding the operational focus. At this time, the NATOled ISAF Operation was in a particularly difficult stage as a result of Taliban insurgency (Johnson and Mason, 2007). There was an emerging realisation that gender was key to understanding Afghanistan, and there was a need to engage the whole population. This was evidenced in the deployment of Female Engagement Teams (FETs) (Mcbride and Wibben, 2012). The additional need to improve dialogue among a wide pool of contributors (Mattelaer, 2011: 598) provided another incentive for NATO’s engagement with WPS. This also contributes to explaining the centrality of partners to NATO’s engagement with WPS. WPS offered a shared starting point for NATO to foster a ‘community of practice’ with partners (Wagnsson, 2011: 598). The 2007 NATO/EAPC Policy on UNSCR 1325 was never intended as a transformative document, rather it was intended as a catalyst for further engagement with gender as an operational imperative. It took four years for the NATO/EAPC Policy to be revised and extended. The 2011 version moves beyond a narrow focus on operational issues. It outlines a six-track approach for the implementation of UNSCR 1325. This includes a commitment to mainstream WPS across policies, programmes and documentation in order to benefit the ‘daily work of the organisation, its staff and committees’ (NATO, 2011). WPS is also outlined as a means to foster cooperation with international organisations and civil society, including ‘exchanges of information, best practices and expertise, as well as practical cooperation’ (NATO, 2011). This supports and extends Enloe’s (1983) conception of NATO as a ‘teaching machine’ in respect to gender, sharing lessons among member states on the integration of women into NATO Forces. Here, we see NATO’s role as a ‘teaching machine’ extending to include other actors, as well as relating to WPS specifically (Wright, 2016). It also demonstrates the ‘added value’ of WPS for NATO as a means to bring in civil society, a group of actors the alliance had previously not sought meaningful engagement with (Mayer, 2008: 117). As well as other international organisations, such as the EU, which while NATO has had a long-standing ‘strategic’ partnership with, it has been beset with ‘long-standing political blockages’ (Smith and Gebhard, 2017: 305). The understanding of both women’s bodies, and a gender perspective as a means to support operational effectiveness supports the broader context against which this policy was adopted. NATO’s involvement in Afghanistan, where gender (or women) became beneficial in rhetoric, doctrine and practice (Dyvik, 2013: 412), contributed both to NATO’s engagement with WPS but also supported a very particular understanding of gender (Wright, 2016: 356). Of particular note, is the aim for WPS ‘to become an integral and complementary part of NATO’s corporate identity’ (NATO, 2011c). This is interesting in two respects. First, the adoption of UNSCR 1325 is implied as something a ‘good’ institution would do and frames NATO’s adoption of UNSCR 1325 as a means to bolster perceptions of NATO. Second, it goes against the intentions of the feminist activists who supported the realisation of UNSCR 1325 in the Security Council, with the Resolution intended to challenge, rather than support the militarism NATO embodies (see discussion in Chapter 1). The alliance has a track record of instrumentalising gendered narratives, and specifically targeting women. For example, the use of symbols of women’s liberation to demonstrate the superiority of Western countries during the Cold War (Risso, 2009: 509). More recently and following the adoption of the 2011 NATO/EAPC Policy, the alliance’s showcase digital diplomacy initiative to commemorate the draw-down of NATO-led forces from Afghanistan in 2014, titled Return to Hope, instrumentalised Afghan women to ‘sell’ NATO’s intervention to publics back home. The narratives included also supported a very particular gender understanding of the intervention and were underpinned by a masculinist protection logic (Wright, 2019: 10). At the same time as NATO had publicly committed to integrating WPS concerns into public diplomacy, a core part of the agenda being the better representation of women, we see women marginalised from a key public diplomacy initiative (Wright, 2019: 11). The 2011 NATO/EAPC Policy also endorses national initiatives to promote women’s participation their armed forces. This situates UNSCR 1325 within NATO’s long-established concern with the status of women in NATO Forces, formalised in the recognition of the CWINF in 1976 and discussed in Chapter 4. Some feminist advocates of WPS have been critical of this association, critiquing the motivation as stemming not from NATO’s support for gender equality, but to support pre-existing objectives to modernise and professionalise NATO Forces (Cockburn, 2011). Three years later, the 2014 NATO/EAPC Policy represented a significant development in NATO’s approach to WPS. This was reflected in the creation of the of Secretary General’s Special Representative on WPS in 2012 who became the figurehead for NATO’s engagement with WPS (discussed below). Most pertinently, there is a shift away from the emphasis in previous policies on the ‘added value’ of UNSCR 1325 to bolster NATO’s existing agendas, to a focus on how NATO can support the broader WPS agenda. For example, the implementation of UNSCR 1325 is framed ‘within the context of NATO’s wider policy objectives core tasks’, rather than as an add-on. The policy also applies for the first time to NATO’s own human resource policies (civilian and military), stating that ‘gender balance within our institutions is a goal in itself, and is also a means for improving performance’ (NATO, 2014a). In addition, the monitoring and reporting mechanisms are also strengthened and provide greater transparency to enable outside scrutiny of NATO’s implementation of UNSCR 1325, with the NATO/EAPC Action Plan being released publicly for the first time (see discussion below). The latest iteration of the NATO/EAPC Policy was released in autumn 2018. It is the first revision of the policy to have been formally consulted on with external actors through the Civil Society Advisory Panel (CSAP) established formally in 2016 (NATO, 2016a). NATO has previously been an outlier among international institutions because it has had no formal mechanisms to consult civil society in the policy-making process. CSAP therefore represents a significant change. The 2018 NATO/EAPC Policy also calls for NATO to develop ‘specific mechanisms to prevent and respond to SEA’ because ‘it causes disproportionate harm to women and girls and undermines NATO’s credibility and operational’ (NATO/EAPC, 2018). This is a significant development and could be an example of NATO seeking to reflect on how WPS relates to its own structures and practices. NATO Action Plans on UNSCR 1325 Beyond policy commitment, the actual implementation of the NATO/EAPC Policies on UNSCR 1325 has remained a key challenge for NATO. To support this, NATO has mobilised corresponding action plans with practical tasks assigned to institutional actors. In 2010, the first Action Plan was adopted by the NAC (Oudraat et al., 2015: 5), and was intended ‘to provide an overall framework for NATO’s practical implementation of the Resolutions with its Partners’ (NATO, 2011). This is referenced in the 2011 revision of the NATO/EAPC Policy, which includes provision for monitoring and accountability mechanisms. The stakeholders involved in the Action Plan are the International Staff, IMS, NATO Military Authorities, and member and partner states. However, this is all the information available on this version of the implementation plan because it remained classified due to the sensitive and operation-specific information it contained (NATO Official, 2014). This meant it was not a document which could be used to hold NATO to account for its implementation of the WPS agenda. Since the NATO/EAPC Policy was revised in 2014, the accompanying Action Plan has been made public and also included Afghanistan, Australia, Japan, Jordan, New Zealand, and the United Arab Emirates (Oudraat et al., 2015: 5). This increased transparency is welcome and brings NATO into line with the global approach to WPS which has seen 79 states adopt public-facing National Action Plans (PeaceWomen, 20184). However, it is far from practical for an international security institution, where, particularly in regards to operations, a level of secrecy is necessary. For practical reasons in certain areas, NATO Officials may therefore need to develop an additional classified and more detailed action plan (NATO Official, 2014). On the surface, the 2016 NATO/EAPC Action Plan seems to support the increased representation of women in NATO. One of the core outcomes is the ‘improved gender balance at all levels at NATO allies and partners’ defence and security institutions’. Yet, if we dig a little deeper into this statement, we find it omits mention of the representation of women within the International Staff or IMS. So, while increasing the representation of women in allies’ own forces, if realised, is likely to have some trickle-down impact on gender balance within delegations to NATO and staff seconded from member and partner states, it will not address the gender imbalance among those employed directly by the alliance. The gender imbalance within NATO should be a pressing issue for the alliance given its stated commitment to the WPS agenda. The 2018 NATO/EAPC Action Plan seems to offer a significant development then. It commits NATO under its pillar of ‘inclusiveness’ to ‘Map the obstacles and implement activities to increase the number of women in NATO, especially in leadership roles’ (NATO/ EAPC, 2018). Yet NATO has not released figures on gender balance at NATO HQ since 2012, an important part of achieving this aim is to provide transparency and therefore accountability on this issue. This indicates it is not a high priority for NATO and therefore an issue with considerable political sensitivities among the allies.