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2022 Michigan Kritik
Aff --- Disability --- K lab › Case › 2AC --- Humanism

Reject humanism- mad blackness overdetermines one’s ability to be a human in the first place.

Pickens 19 [Therí Alyce Pickens, Professor of English, specializing in African American, Arab America and disability literatures and theories at Bates University, June 7, 2019 “Black Madness :: Mad Blackness”, Duke University Press, Durham and London, pgs. 36-41, JMH]

In Butler’s drafts of Fledgling, she toys with the way Shori’s Black madness structures her interactions with the Gordons and the text writ large. Each instantiation of the novel evinces Butler’s commitment to depicting Blackness and madness as destabilizing forces, which heighten and problematize privilege because they shift the contours of the multiability, interracial encounter. The two discourses work together and, in that sense, remain coextensive, but they also function at cross-purposes. For instance, Shori speculates that the Gordons test her when they allow her to question the human agents responsible for the arson that killed her family.In Butler’s drafts, she experiments with how to split the questioning between Shori and the Gordons, and, in the final version, Butler settles on Shori’s silence. In the published version of Fledgling, Shori is only present to reassure the human agent and persuade him to tell the truth.46 The effect of these changes—displacing the Gordons as the primary interrogators—suggests that the difference is not merely about the space given to the Gordons but rather how Blackness and madness operate. In one draft, Shori interrogates the human agent. Here, her Blackness functions as a discomfiting presence for the human, a reminder and remainder of her difference that forces him to reveal the identity of the Ina agents. Making her the interrogator does not disappear her madness, but it does emphasize a soundness of mind that does not appear to be consonant with her understanding of being Ina, undermining her general authority over her amnesiac experience. In another draft, the Gordons serve as the primary interrogators. Here, her Blackness performs a similar discomfiting function. Her amnesia bolsters her authority over her own experience, even as it forms the basis for her being surveyed by the Gordons. Her madness, invisibilized though it may be, structures the interaction since the Gordons’ familiarity with other Ina allows them to ask leading questions of the human agent. By virtue of her amnesia, this s not an interrogation skill she can use. As a result, her silence in the face of her amnesia lingers as an answer to the Gordons’ skepticism about her, creating two interrogations. In these drafts, splitting the questions between Shori and the Gordons reorganizes how and why information about the attacks is given, clarifying that Shori’s Blackness and madness work on the interaction differently than the Gordons’ whiteness and presumed sanity. In the final version of Fledgling, since she is largely silent, Shori’s Black madness functions as a sustained pressure for the interrogation, emphasizing the Gordons’ privilege in relation to her. Whereas her Blackness shores up her utility during the questioning, her madness strips away her authority and autonomy because the Gordons take over the interrogation of the human agent and, without saying a word about her amnesia, create an interrogation of her. Though her race is recognized in both the draft and the final copy as a boon to helping them catch and coerce the human agents, the difference in interrogation technique allows for her madness to reveal the Gordons’ relationship to privilege. Recall that thinking about Blackness and madness as mutually constituted leads us toward reading the two identities as an avenue toward agency when they are located on the same body. I objected to this line of thought because it requires that Blackness operate as a stepping stone for imagining agency only available under certain material conditions and assumes that mere knowledge of one’s condition suffices as emancipatory. Butler’s novel and archive theorizes about this in contemplating the interplay of desire and madness. Butler writes several drafts of an interaction between Shori and Daniel Gordon where Daniel, lost in his own desire for Shori, invites her to bite him.47 In each draft, the invitation remains unspoken at first, functioning only as a matter of scent. He allows her to crawl all over him while they smell each other. The olfactory plays a large part in Ina attraction to either possible symbionts or other Ina. So, Daniel’s invitation to smell—especially since he has to keep himself from acting on sexual arousal caused by her scent—is dangerously coercive. It suggests sexual agency for Shori, but in fact it jeopardizes her life. Butler writes what appears in the final version: Daniel’s admission that he had hoped Shori’s memory was impaired enough to let her bite him. He says, “I half-hoped you would [bite], that maybe with your memory gone, you would simply give in to my scent, my nearness. If you had, well . . . If you had, no one could prevent our union. No one would even try.”48 What keeps her from such an action is her understanding that it might threaten her good standing at the Council of Judgment. In these scenes, Daniel remains silent at first and, later, forthcoming about his desires/intentions. His invitation is a test, one Shori must pass to prove her Ina-ness to other council members, a perception of her identity dependent on both her race and her impairment. This is not merely about Daniel’s desire but rather how his desire manifests as a form of ability that takes advantage of Shori’s impairment and bears repercussions for the perception of her identity. Operating along the axis of desire, Daniel’s craving of Shori microaggresses her by circumscribing her within parameters that facilitate her erasure. Microaggressions as a series of environmental, verbal, and nonverbal slights often fall into the category of unintended discrimination and often occur in intimate and/or interpersonal spaces. At times, this discrimination also comes from an affective space of benevolence, where one intends to be nice but instead reveals one’s own biases, ignorance, and desires. To read a microaggression, to understand it, is to analyze the break in the everyday since those moments prove revelatory about the microaggressor. Daniel intends to demonstrate desire and create intimacy, become Shori’s Ina lover, and concretize what he views as the eventual mating between their families. However, Shori is not old enough in Ina society or physiologically mature enough to mate, and her impairment renders her ignorant of social customs regarding interaction between Ina males and females. In addition, Daniel has made a decision about his desire to mate with Shori, whereas Shori’s ability to make such a decision must be—by virtue of her circumstances— delayed. Note the issue of time. Despite her enjoyment of Daniel’s scent, Shori does not control the marketplace of desire, making murky the possibility of consent. Daniel’s solicitation encourages her to break the rules and flirts with disaster given that they are on the cusp of a Council of Judgment meant to decide her fate.

2022 Michigan Kritik
Aff --- Disability --- K lab › Case › 2AC --- Root Cause

We control root cause- ableism and antiblackness are foundational to the creation of gender hierarchies and capital accumulation. Their analytic can only explain one form of violence while our 1AC takes a more wholistic approach against anti-black and ableist histories.

Pickens 19 [Therí Alyce Pickens, Professor of English, specializing in African American, Arab America and disability literatures and theories at Bates University, June 7, 2019 “Black Madness :: Mad Blackness”, Duke University Press, Durham and London, pgs. 24-29, JMH]

The second critical impulse, retrieval projects that read against ableism to find agency, attempts to locate spaces of resistance where race and disability meet. Here again, I turn to the critical conversations to read where the distillate reveals the material to itself. An analysis of resistance surfaces as part of projects undertaking Bell’s “representational detective work” that “uncovers the misrepresentations of Black, disabled bodies and the missed opportunities to think about how those bodies transform(ed) systems and culture.”19 As such, it offers a way to think through the cultural and political contours of structural ableism as intersected with structural racism. So far, this scholarship concludes that Black disabled bodies loosen the grip of ableism by resisting cultural norms of both disabled and Black communities: scholars explore this dynamic within Blackness and madness from a wide variety of critical angles, including Black women and depression (Anna Mollow), melancholia and poverty (Éva Tettenborn, Anne Cheng, Paul Gilroy), cognitive disability and civil rights redress (Stacie McCormick), rehabilitation and Black queerness (Robert McRuer), and popular music (Nicole Fleetwood, La Marr Jurelle Bruce, Moya Bailey, Anna Hinton). Usefully, this body of scholarship opens up the critical space left closed when we aver that discourses of Blackness and madness compete. Each points out that the workings of structural racism and ableism do not complement each other. In fact, the cultural logics that mandate Blackness as abject can depose those that maintain disability as such. This strategy is not the only or primary way to read challenges to racism and ableism. The problem exists (pace Hortense Spillers) at the level of grammar. These projects tend to have one vector: they “transform(ed) systems and culture.”20 Note that transform operates as transitive where Black, disabled bodies perform the work of transformation rather than undergo the process of transformation. Yet Black, disabled bodies will not always behave as agents that transform or those who are transformed in equal measure or, as noted above, with a degree of reciprocity. Allowing for more than one vector between Black, disabled bodies and the systems in which they operate clarifies the following: it is inaccurate that the only critical relationship between Blackness and disability (specifically, madness) is one of liberation from ableism. At times, Blackness exacerbates the presence of ableism, or cultural norms facilitate ableism.21 In accounting for these moments, I trouble the corollary of the logic above: namely, that whiteness withal the privilege embedded in it lacks the tools for its own liberation and must rely on Blackness to acquire its release. Here, Blackness becomes a reduced space where whiteness enacts its privilege by instrumentalizing Blackness. In this paradigm, Blackness for all its cultural complexity becomes another reactionary space that exists to indict whiteness, rather than a culture and system of thought all its own.22 We must consider the spaces when mere exposure of oppression is not only not emancipatory but can also be detrimental, where demonstration and acknowledgement of one’s various intersecting socially marginalized positions does not equal political agency. We must also consider what happens when Black cultural locations refuse whiteness as an interlocutor in favor of intraracial conversations. In short, when madness is “a Black thang” (with all that evokes in terms of exclusivity and ableist objectification). I take up the question of intraracial context and conversation in the next discussion. For now, I turn to another foundational moment in the study of Blackness and disability to read in the breaks of the critical material. I continue the conversation about the critical impulse of mutual constitution that looks to retrieve agentive stories of Black disabled folks as instantiations of anti-ableist radicality. Rosemarie Garland Thomson’s Extraordinary Bodies (1997) includes a chapter on physical disability in Ann Petry’s The Street, Toni Morrison’s oeuvre, and Audre Lorde’s Zami. Though Thomson’s discussion does not explicitly discuss mental disability, cognitive impairment, or crazy-as-insult, I find it instructive for this conversation. Madness shadows each of the texts under scrutiny since the characters deviate from intracultural norms by being Black women who seek class ascension despite the odds (Petry) and wider American cultural norms by participating in and identifying with communities labeled deviant (and crazy) by the dsm IV (Lorde). Of course, Morrison’s characters are literally haunted by their actions and kinfolk, which always forces the question of whether Morrison’s characters could be labeled crazy. It becomes useful to think about Morrison’s, Petry’s, and Lorde’s work (especially as part of Garland Thomson’s project) from the perspective of Octavia E. Butler: namely, that sanity is communally defined and anyone who deviates from agreed upon norms is treated as mad. The characters’ desires for themselves (and the methods they use to achieve them) exceed the racialized and gendered boundaries drawn for them. Indeed, because they also have physical disabilities, their behavior trespasses the boundaries drawn based on ability as well. Madness cannot be cleaved from these conversations. Thomson’s claims about the representation of physical disability as agentive and liberatory have implications for whether madness has similar representational possibilities.23 Thomson offers that the collective project of these Black women’s writings provides an antidote to white racist depictions. These powerful bodies— extraordinary, in Thomson’s lexicon—participate in a “collective project of cultural revision [that] challenges the African-American woman writer to produce a narrative of self that authenticates Black women’s oppressive history yet offers a model for transcending that history’s limitations.”24 Moreover, the primacy given to disabled women figures “reveals the shift in African-American literary representation from a modernist to a postmodernist mode, a change that parallels the ideological move of minority groups from assimilation to affirmation of cultural and ethnic differences.”25 While I partly agree that these representations “render oppression without reinscribing it,”26 I hesitate to read in them the triumph that Thomson affirms. On the one hand, Thomson rightly points out that these characters do not completely represent physical deviance. On the other, they do not, as she says, “repudiate such cultural master narratives as normalcy, wholeness, and the feminine ideal.”27 I would attribute this aspect of their representation to the way that the social model of disability upon which Thomson relies does not fully account for the way madness shows up in these texts.28 The social model privileges a particular kind of mental agility and cognitive processing to combat the stigma and material consequences that arise as a result of ableism. In turn, the model dismisses madness as a viable subject position, ensuring that those counted as such—either by communal consensus or psydisciplines—remain excluded from conversations about disability because they cannot logically engage. For the characters in Thomson’s study, this has the pernicious effect of erasing some of the master cultural narratives they work against: those that acknowledge their physical disability and link it to mental disability as a way to further disenfranchise and disempower them. Thomson’s work reads these figures (based on their representation of physical disabilities) as liberatory for the larger narrative and theoretical spaces of ethnic modernism. I hazard that these characters’ relationship to disability suggests an investment in internalized ableism, particularly visà-vis sexuality. For example, Thomson reads Ann Petry’s Mrs. Hedges, a tall, dark-skinned Black woman with avoirdupois who works as a madam, as one who refuses victimization. Important for this conversation is the way Mrs. Hedges is not only physically disfigured by burns but also read as ex ceeding the gendered and racialized boundaries the text’s Black community (voiced through the protagonist) circumscribes for her. Her madness is not biomedically defined, but it carries psychosocial repercussions given how she is treated. Thomson bases her reading of Mrs. Hedges as liberatory on Hedges’s sexualized gaze on the main character and her profession as a madam. Yet, there is no room for Hedges to acquiesce to or enjoy the sexualized attention she receives from the rich white man who controls the street. The novel makes it clear that part of Hedges’s rejection of the man’s sexual advances is financial. She cannot be in bed with him literally and economically. However, what the novel leaves open is that Hedges’s rejection of him is also about her own denigrated view of her sexuality.29 She is still limned as monstrous, grotesque, even if Hedges as a figure shifts the understanding of monstrosity. Inasmuch as Hedges’s physical disability allows her to move from one position in the economy to another more powerful one, she must rely on a chosen life of celibacy and a masculinized, monstrous appearance to secure and maintain her new economic position. Her celibacy also shores up her power by keeping the madness of her disfigured, disabled, interracial sexuality in check. That is, though the disability is no longer in the background of the text, the cultural baggage of internalized ableism appears in the foreground replete with eschewing sexual desire and limiting the association with traditional forms of femininity. Even if Petry’s project does—according to Thomson—pave the way for Black authors to shift from assimilation to affirmation and provide a challenge to the static representations of disabled figures in modernist texts, Mrs. Hedges’s refusal to engage in her own sexuality complicates a reading of this figure as liberatory vis-à-vis physical disability and the charges of madness that accompany her character. Reading Mrs. Hedges as agentive certainly poses challenges given the internalized ableism within Petry’s text, especially since the novel focuses on intraracial encounter. First, physical disability only liberates Mrs. Hedges from the intraracial economy of the street by providing an avenue for power. Yet, within intraracial encounter, she remains circumscribed by the discourses of madness because community members consider her mad for transgressing boundaries of race and gender. Second, the interracial encounter does not allow for her agency within the critical literature. Thomson claims that Petry’s text, as well as the others, counters the limited representations of disability within modernist texts. Implicitly, the logic of such a critical move—regardless of its truism—mandates that Blackness become the vehicle for (mostly white) others’ liberation from ableism in their reading practice. In that way, it is the presence of Blackness that shores up white liberalism by not only providing a representation of Blackness but also a complex rendering of white-centered notions of disability.

2022 Michigan Kritik
Aff --- Disability --- K lab › Case › 2AC --- Progress

Neoliberal notions of progress reconstitute themselves as Black debility becomes the antagonist of white racial progress.

Knadler 19 - ( Stephen Knadler; Stephen Knadler is an associate professor of English at Spelman College, where he teaches US literature and cultural studies. He has been published in American Literature, American Literary History, American Quarterly, Minnesota Review, and Modern Fiction Studies.; Originally published: August 6, 2019; “Vitality politics : health, debility, and the limits of black emancipation”; http://link.umsl.edu/portal/Vitality-politics--health-debility-and-the/n6SXiAQq3ac) Dōgen

In my original plan for this book, I had intended to say much more about the legacy of vitality politics in Michelle Obama’s “Let’s Move” antiobesity campaign, and to unpack its continued practice in Flint, Michigan’s lead-poisoned water crisis. While I was completing this book and meditating on the afterlife of these historical intersections of slow violence, Black debility, and fugitive justice, however, the 2016 presidential election occurred, and all seemed changed, changed utterly. I began to suspect that concluding with these stories of historical recurrence may not fully address the questions we need to ask about the long history of antiblackness and African American debility: what are the stories worth telling in our current twenty-first-century cultural moment and, as importantly, what are the questions we need to ask in telling these stories to intervene and to imagine alternative social, economic, and political possibilities? During and now after the 2016 election, as it has been frequently noted, the United States witnessed a resurgence of white nationalism (or at least its unabashed expression) and intensified antiblackness. But what interested me was how the material-semiotic sign of Black debility functioned as a key relationality within a less overt conservative white racism, which reconstituted white citizenship for a supposedly postrace multicultural America. However, this time questions of Black debility had a different valence. Although, as in an earlier post-Reconstruction period, Black debility was once again being invoked as part of a white backlash against racial progress, it had morphed. No longer was white America defining itself against a strategically constituted or permitted Black debility: it was both reappropriating this positionality as a sign of its own victimization while reauthenticating a decontextualized maiming of Black lives as a comparative sign of their inherent and implacable “noncompliant” debility. We can see this story of white America’s “rehabilitation” and the utility of Black debility most clearly in the current narratives about the opioid crisis that has caused political commentators on the right and the left to question white America’s decline and possible future, and also Black America’s intractability. In the remainder of this epilogue I will, therefore, offer a discursive reading of what I call “the gentrification of the drug crisis” narrative in public debates about white America’s needed rehabilitation in the face of the opioid crisis in order to trace out some final thoughts about Black America’s structurally necessary debility in U.S. citizenship-making stories. Then, as a way of demonstrating how this narrative has entrenched itself in Hollywood’s popular overcoming narratives, I will offer a brief analysis of the 2015 film Southpaw that, even though seemingly offering a typical sentimentalized story about cross-racial friendship in the boxing world, reveals the new logic of a white identity politics that, like the drug crisis itself, gentrifies a Black positionality and displaces its devaluation of Black life in order to circulate a dominant narrative about America’s “great (white) hope.” Specifically, in the 2015 film Southpaw, which stars Jake Gyllenhaal and is directed by the African American Antoine Fuqua, we see how the main character, Billy Hope, referred to as the boxing world’s “great white hope,” discloses how a liberal white antiracist narrative of America’s comeback story and contemporary prison reform still depend on the drug-addicted pain and suffering of an inherently different Black debility. During the 2016 presidential campaign there was a lot of talk about America’s—or at least white rural and suburban America’s—drug epidemic. As the candidates noted, citing the most recent available statistics, 37,000 Americans died of drug overdoses in 2013, but what captured headlines, as Vice News noted, was the fact that drug overdoses “killed white people more than anyone else,”14 or, as the New York Times reported on February, 2, 2016, “Addiction [Now] Has a White Face.”15 A study published in JAMA Psychiatry in July 2014 reported that nearly 90 percent of recent heroin users were white, and about 75 percent of these new users came from rural or suburban areas, many in states that are GOP strongholds.16 While campaigning in key primary states such as Iowa and New Hampshire, as a consequence, traditionally conservative law and order Republican candidates broke silences and confessed their own family histories with drug abuse. Jeb Bush shared his daughter’s struggle with addiction and the felony charges she had faced for “illegally possessing prescription drugs”;17 Carly Fiorina admitted her daughter’s struggle with alcohol and opiate addiction before her death from an overdose; and Ted Cruz disclosed his older half-sister Miriam’s similar overdose death, explaining, “[t]hese tragedies are happening in human lives all over this country—it’s the human journey” (emphasis added). Although not sharing personal family histories, Ohio governor John Kasich also addressed what he called (repeating the language of news stories in the New York Times as well as on NPR) the “gentrification of the drug crisis.” In 2014 Governor Kasich had passed in Ohio the first legislation to make naloxone available without a prescription because, at the time, the state had the second highest number of overdose deaths. I want for a moment to quote Governor Kasich’s comments before a Drug Addiction Forum in New Hampshire because they point out the troubling racialization, structuring antiblack debility and emergent white identity politics within various survivalist narratives about America’s drug epidemic and the push toward more humane responses, replacing incarceration with treatment. Speaking to a largely white audience in New Hampshire, a state still 96 percent white, according to the government census data, Kasich noted, “This disease knows no bounds, knows no income, knows no neighborhood; it’s everywhere. . . . And sometimes I wonder how African Americans must have felt when drugs were awash in their community and nobody watched. Now it’s in our communities, and now all of a sudden, we’ve got forums, and God bless us, but think about the struggles that other people had".19 As Kasich’s comments attest, drug addiction should be reframed as a colorblind disease, and five months later, in July 2016, Congress passed a landmark piece of legislation referred to as the Opioid Bill, or more officially as the Comprehensive Addiction and Recovery Act (CARA), that shifted low-level drug violations from the criminal justice system to treatment programs. The promotion of such a public health response represented a significant reframing and overturning of the nation’s response to addiction during the Reagan era “war on drugs,” and we should not minimize the importance of this shift toward rehabilitation. But such a therapeutic rethinking of policy also depends on a new race transcending and seemingly more civilized disability (or addiction) narrative that taps into a structuring antiblackness to rehumanize innocent white users, just as Black debility had functioned to legitimate white labor privileges and enfranchisement during the post-Reconstruction period. This “gentrification of the drug crisis narrative,” as we might call it, discloses not just a racist disparity between an earlier zero tolerance of Black crack users in the 1980s and 90s and a contemporary public health response to sympathetic white heroin users. It also offers insights more generally into an emergent dynamic of a Black debility within an unmarked white identity politics that often comes to stand in for contemporary liberal antiracist multicultural discourse. To begin to unpack how antiblackness structures the white identity politics of this seemingly more civilized “gentrification of the drug crisis” narrative, we need only look at the legacy of a long history of antiblackness and health that I have tried to recover throughout the previous chapters. As I have argued throughout this book, drawing on the work of Black Studies scholars such as Jared Sexton, Frank Wilderson, and Alexander Weheliye, antiblackness encompasses more than racial bias, discrimination, white privilege, and even violence. Antiblackness refers to a foundational structuring differentiation that continues to govern Black lives in the afterlife of slavery. Not only, thus, have white supremacists invoked antiblackness as a self-identifying racial difference, but U.S. liberal notions of personhood, citizenship, and agency have also depended on figurations of antiblackness, or of Black disposability and worthlessness and indifference to Black suffering and pain as a structuring force. In his comments before the Drug Addiction Forum, Kasich, on one hand, calls for empathy, but he also invokes the larger shaping logic of a post–civil rights white liberal identity politics (one that goes unmarked as “color-blind” amid the alarm over a more clearly vocal white supremacism): this white identity politics depends on, to borrow the language of the drug epidemic narratives, a white gentrification and appropriation of a Black positionality in the call for a universalizing empathy.20 As Kasich’s comments before the drug forum’s white audience note, whites are the new Blacks, for whites now share the suffering and pain historically associated with an abstracted Black experience, and as a consequence, the United Stated can now move beyond identity politics to embrace, as Ted Cruz indicated, a universal “human story.” But this supposed postrace, postidentity politics is its own white identity politics, one that although seemingly antiracist (built as it is around a common pain of addiction), obscures the structuring position of a differential Black debility.

2022 Michigan Kritik
Aff --- Disability --- K lab › Case › 2AC --- Accountability Good

Intimacy requires accountability and inclusion- their move to discount the role of non-disabled debaters only locks in the status quo and prevents change.

Pickens 19 [Therí Alyce Pickens, Professor of English, specializing in African American, Arab America and disability literatures and theories at Bates University, June 7, 2019 “Black Madness :: Mad Blackness”, Duke University Press, Durham and London, pgs. 35-36, JMH]

So, the critical task before us is not to dismiss mutual constitution but rather to develop a more robust analytic that does not remain stagnated between recuperation and resistance. We must consider how recuperative projects assume a simultaneity and reciprocity of creation not always present within linear history and interracial encounter. We must be wary of projects that locate resistance on Black mad bodies solely in service of white bodies (regardless of ability status), avoiding the seduction of ascribing agency at the cost of ignoring material reality. The critical literature foments its analysis based on characters or people’s relationships to structures and institutions; yet, within each lurks the possibility of analyzing another set of relationships, the interpersonal. Without parsing structural violence and history from intimacy, Octavia E. Butler’s consideration of kinship and intimate relationships offers a space to consider the quotidian and erotic praxis that undergirds the relationships and analytical possibilities of Blackness and madness. A move to the quotidian and the erotic prioritizes the import of “the discretionary acts and, yes, racist [and ableist] practices that each of us make in everyday decisions such as choosing someone to sit beside on the subway, selecting a mate or a sperm donor, or developing a list of subjects or an academic study.”32 Not only should we rethink the “autonomy usually attached to erotic choices” but also how “racism [and ableism] orders some of the most intimate practices of everyday life.”33 Obviously, proximity and intimacy offer no curative function for racism and ableism and can, in point of fact, exacerbate the wounds they create. Yet, the contours of how we discuss intimacy reverberate beyond the individuals it includes, revealing a limited threshold for complex interpretation.34 When we do not excuse the behavior of allies, friends, family, and sexual partners as representative of a culture, poor impact of good intention, or part of a learning curve, they offer another way to think through the constellation of relationships between Blackness and madness, circumventing the inclination toward limited readings of either resistance or recuperation.

2022 Michigan Kritik
Aff --- Disability --- K lab › Case › 2AC --- Presumption

Reject presumption- it relies on the logics of productivity and goal-oriented approaches that prevent other modes of being within debate.

Pickens 19 [Therí Alyce Pickens, Professor of English, specializing in African American, Arab America and disability literatures and theories at Bates University, June 7, 2019 “Black Madness :: Mad Blackness”, Duke University Press, Durham and London, pgs. 57-59, JMH]

Considering Black cultural contexts where mental illness and cognitive disability occur, the two major Western modes of interpretation—ocularity and (drawing on our earlier conversation) linear time—no longer retain the exclusive right to interpret meaning. The Black mad are, in some sense, no more. They becomce the mad Black. I theorize mad Black and mad Blackness as a formulation that disrupts the ocular and linear legacies of the West’s conception of space and time, respectively. To theorize the concept of the mad Black or mad Blackness opens up critical space to consider how the discourses of madness and Blackness not only operate in intraracial spaces but also intensify and dismantle common understandings of each other. When mad becomes a modifier for Black it carries with it the charge of excess (i.e., more Black, really Black, unapologetically Black, Blackity Black), anger, and insanity as it simultaneously functions as an intensifier for Blackness itself. In some ways, madness amplifies Blackness in this conception, pushing it to excess, but it also has the potential to dismantle it. Said potential lies precisely in the disruption of Western space and time. Sight no longer acts as the dominant mode of sense making. Linear progressions of time no longer capture the movement of subjects and objects through narrative. Mad Blackness fills in the gaps heretofore created by reading strategies (i.e., mutual constitution) that rely on these two Western modalities of interpretation. For instance, Octavia E. Butler’s mad Black character cleaves time from space with her very existence, such that the linear progressive narrative plane is disrupted. She also foregrounds the lie in thinking of the impeachability of sight as the dominant mode of interpretation. Her allies cannot see her illness. Their understanding based on sight—no matter its superlative quality— is impoverished. The mad Black then is not solely disruptive because of its embodiment. But also, the mad Black figure and mad Blackness stage a narratological intervention in how we analyze and tell stories about race and disability writ large. Mad Blackness describes the aesthetics of a text that refuses to adhere to ocularcentrism or linearity. In these texts—including but not limited to the ones in these conversations—madness and Blackness pervade the structure of the text such that linear renderings of the narrative always do a disservice to the text and an emphasis on sight forecloses interpretive possibility. To be clear, it is not that ocularcentrism and linearity are wholly inappropriate, but rather that they are explicitly incomplete due to the influence of madness and Blackness in the structure and characters of the text. As a result, mad Blackness necessarily critiques texts that de bnigrate madness or Blackness or both. Despite, and perhaps owing to, this disruptive quality, I would not define mad Blackness as a revolutionary force, nor would I expect mad Black figures to offer solutions. Their disruption—of interpretation, of narrative—does not require that they provide solutions, since that contrasts their suspicion of linearity and teleology, nor does it require that they be benevolent, since that often requires they be in service of those that create and maintain antiBlack ableist and sanist structures. This book, Black Madness :: Mad Blackness, is one such example of a mad Black text. As I mentioned, the conversations herein reveal critical conversations to themselves, and seek to perturb some of the foundations upon which Black studies and disability studies rest all while yoking them irrevocably together Nalo Hopkinson’s work in Midnight Robber (2000) theorizes this concept through her two mad Black figures (one who experiences mental illness and another, cognitive impairment) and her aesthetic commentary on narrative structure. Midnight Robber is not her only novel that explores the mad Black. Hopkinson’s oeuvre includes a variety of characters and plotlines influenced by or experiencing some form of madness peculiar to the worlds they inhabit. In Sister Mine (2013), one of Hopkinson’s main characters has a congenital magic defect. In The Chaos (2012), the entire world randomly changes so that rules of physics, metaphysics, climate, thermodynamics, and electricity no longer apply. Brown Girl in the Ring (1998) features a cadre of characters who do not share the reality of the community. The New Moon’s Arms (2007) wades into the territory of madness within a subplot about the main character’s origins. Hopkinson’s short stories in Skin Folk (2001), particularly “Tawny Bitch,” which depicts a woman in an asylum, also feature (and I mean that in the vernacular sense) mad Black characters and aesthetics.13 For the characters for whom this is an embodied reality, madness can be real or imagined. It tends to divide into the two categories described and parsed above: cognitive disability and mental illness. Cognitive impairment within the world of Hopkinson’s novels carries with it a sense of responsibility to the person experiencing the impairment. Those who have been perceived as having mental illness tend to be sequestered or isolated from a larger community either physically or emotionally. Determining soundness of mind crystallizes in our logophilic obsession with the book and the insistence on the unimpeachability of sight. Here—in this break—is where Nalo Hopkinson’s work becomes instructive.

2022 Michigan Kritik
Aff --- Disability --- K lab › 1AC › 1AC --- Black Cyborg

The role of the negative is to offer novel creative epistemologies that reorients modernity’s understanding of subjectivity

Manning 20 [Erin Manning, she received her Ph. D in Political Philosophy from University of Hawaii in 2000. She currently teaches in the Concordia University Fine Arts Faculty, “For a Pragmatics of the Useless” (pgs 289-297) published in November 2020 by accessed on July 13, 2022 by AP]

Neurodiverse qualities of attention can make getting going an issue; spaZe emerged as a technique for activating study. How we practice matters, and no change can occur without practice. This includes practicing value differently. What we most want to avoid with 3e is any return to the service economy and any kind of transactional economic politics. 3e is about asking how else we can value beyond the economy of credit that orients education today. What is the credit we exchange in the name of neurotypicality, of whiteness? What kind of sociality can be crafted that honors that debt, too immense to ever repay, turning it into the gift of Glissant’s poetics of relation, a living practice that reminds us at every turn that we must consent not to be a single being (1997, 5, 27)? We invite those of you who want to participate, who care to invent with us what else learning and living can be, to practice three modes of entry. We ask that you bring to the platform of exploratory learning one of these techniques: knot: a paradox or temporary impasse in one’s work, life, thinking, or creative practice that might become newly productive if staged in a way that opens it to a collaborative exploration, in language or between language and other modes of expression. juncture: a known conjunction reopened for further exploration through new techniques reconfiguring its potential; the juncture might be a theoretical perspective, a set of established techniques informing a particular practice, an already-operating collaboration or project, or an existing disciplinary, interdisciplinary, or intermedia platform, restaged with a new inflection. vector: a move out from known junctures into a wander line that is oriented by a proposition, and in that sense directionally constrained, but is at the same time open-ended in way that invites new takings-form on the fly. Platforms for relation are never set in stone. We only propose to begin here. Together we will see where the practice leads. What we know is this: platforms for relation are everywhere active in our everyday lives. We need to learn how to seed them across undercommoning environments. Through these platforms we need to germinate new practices, and to practice failing together. Content delivery is not what changes the conditions of experience. There is no production of desire there. What moves experience are practices that reorient the place of knowledge in experience, practices that ask how the being of relation produces the kind of transformative justice livingloving requires.

2022 Michigan Kritik
Aff --- Disability --- K lab › 1AC › 1AC --- Black Cyborg

The role of the judge is to be an immediator not a mediator, mediation is undergirded by logistical whiteness that seeks out the destruction of the excessive share. Immediation is not a neutral process, rather a subjective force of thirdness that interjects between the two in the name of liberation from the logistical path of existence.

Manning 22 [Erin Manning, she received her Ph. D in Political Philosophy from University of Hawaii in 2000. She currently teaches in the Concordia University Fine Arts Faculty.“Out of the Clear” published in March 2022 by e-flux Journal accessed on July 12th, 2022 by AP]

We already know how the story ends. On May 29, 2021, the headline reads: “Canada mourns as remains of 215 children found at indigenous school.”8 It wasn’t an indigenous school, of course. It was a residential school, a Canadian school, in the clearing. The picture says it all: sparse trees growing in the background, empty yard, an architecture completely at odds with the environment, cleared of life, of all that immanently interconnects. The violence of logistics is inscribed in the ghost trees of its whitened surround. How we organize bodies, we who sidle whiteness, how we excise (from clear sight) the ravages of an earth desecrated, of a people brutally murdered—these are the workings of logistics. Logistics mediate existence by keeping it at arm’s length, soothing us into believing that we are not responsible. The deaths are newsworthy, and we’re sorry, but we must move on. It’s not really about us and in any case, there’s nothing we can do about it. Let’s get a mediator and sort this out! At arms length, we see these workings—the cleared forest, the dying planet, the dead children—as somehow disconnected. We do not acknowledge the felling of the trees as the wanton destruction of all that transversally connects. And yet logistics, in its power of mediation, is all about the forests. It’s all about the cotton planted in their wake. The ghostly outline of Proulx’s pine table haunts the residential school, its absence equal to the absence of education. Because what the residential school really does is unteach. Taking the place of pedagogy, what is practiced here is theft. Theft of thought, of imagination. This theft is a rape. A physical rape, a sexual aggression, but also a conceptual rape, a clearing—“to snatch, to grab, to carry off by force”—of all that lives in the abyss of what has been left behind.9 Rape, relation severed, cuts the fragile interwoven threads of existence, wresting life from life-living, from the more-than that gives it its spirited and spiritual contour. If body is land, if bodying is only ever worlding, what residential school does, in this most recent form of clearing, is sever this imbrication, leaving the body lifeless. All that remains is the clearing. And a mess. But this can be handled. This is how mediation does its work, in the name of and as logistics. From here on in, things will be managed. Managers will be appointed to organize, to administer, the now-reduced environment. This science of loss—“which is to say the science of whiteness, or logistics”—is predicated on the end of sharing, on the destruction of the excessive share, the annihilation of that which exceeds the one-two form whose dramaturgy relies of the intervention of the mediator.10 The mediator will take the form of the “yellow eyebrows” in Proulx’s account, but it also need not take a simple human form. Repetition of the same is the form it takes in a dramaturgy of extinction. Scene 3 Clearing produces property. Property produces dispossession. “All property is loss because all property is the loss of sharing.”11 The accursed share of all that exceeds interpersonality, mediation, whiteness, logistics, all that cannot be accounted for, sickens the field. And sometimes rejuvenates it. The force of the transindividual, of all that exceeds and precedes the individual, does rewild. But its vitality is weakened, and as perception is honed to single out the individual over the field, the human increasingly becomes the focal point, becoming synonymous with life. This is how the logistics of genocide—the genocide of relation—does its work. The genocide of relation can never be traced back, quite. Relation cannot be propertied. What is lost cannot be parsed. The yellow eyebrows have a role to play, of course, and we could call on the archbishop for that missing apology, but the truth is, it was never just one. He was never just the one. He is a logistical pattern, a commitment to the dramaturgy of (white) man as self-centered orchestrator of existence cleared. Logistics: the slave ship, but also the body-as-individual. “The first odious vessel produced by and for logistics is not the slave ship, but the body—flesh conceptualized—which bears the individual-in-subjection.”12 In the clearing, man is revealed as the loss of relation. Humanism is born here, in the empty space of the stolen land, in the vast expanse of the 1+1, the infinite regress of nothing-in-between. How to fill the emptiness? How to create an account for all that is lost and yet claimed? Mediation offers to fill the shape of the between. Mediation as the figure of what comes between, of what fills that “empty” space. The adjuster, the divorce lawyer, the priest, the government agent. A quick intervention to make sense of all that has become unclear, to fill in the lines, to provide context. And perhaps this does make things clearer, perhaps we understand each other a bit better now that we’ve mediated all we couldn’t make sense of in the vast emptiness of our difference. But the problem is: mediation never goes away. It sits there, inert but active, facilitating the ongoing impoverishment relation by adhering to all that takes the shape of the 1+1 of body-as-individual, of interpersonality. Because in advance of the gesture of inserting the mediating influence, he is already there. Long before the divorce, he hovers, betweener, judging, parsing, condoning, condemning. His take doesn’t really matter. What matters is that he remains in the offing, holding things apart. Mediation is the father of the control society. It is the way surveillance takes on a personality from the outside in. Whether formally or informally, mediation sets the tone for an interpersonality that, by definition, can only be lived at a distance. Playing at impartiality, mediation haunts the surround, reducing it to what is already known, what is already valued, what is already within the scope of the expressible. 2+1, always less than 3, mediation is passive aggressor, poised for judgment, always in the know (while it listens carefully). Because its role is to keep existence in its track, on its logistical path. It doesn’t really matter who is right. It matters that it needs mediation. Mediation knows best, trampling on any detail of middling, sewing interactivity into a twoness without excess. Hardening the between of interpersonality into the amplification of the self-same, mediation lodges at the interstice, cutting it into a hyphen, setting up its colony on the bridge. Settler, it speaks from a place it has never had to truly encounter because its role is only to order things apart. Harney and Moten might speak of mediation with the same disdain as they do of logistics, which they call the “science of whiteness.”13 Mediation is the logistic category par excellence of whiteness. It has no content, is not in itself an agent of transformation, does nothing but cannibalize the life it parses. Its intervention happens in the beat of enter and retreat, leaving the uneasy twoness of existence to sort itself out. In the name of property and propriety, mediation solves all uncertainties of zoning. That it never actually leaves is its dirty secret. But the logistics of mediation can only fail. The interface is shaky—we know this both from the endemic code 404, page not found, and from the impossibility of truly domesticating our surrounds. Ultimately, the squirrels, the black flies, the birds, the worms, the fungi, the weeds, the viruses, the hackers cannot be kept in their place. The disarray is handled, of course, with more mediation, with more logistics. The interface claims a distance, a secure between-two that repeats the refrain of nature colonized, of culture denatured. It promises a security of inhabitation, a zone that can be controlled, a slip through which we can safely enter, we who claim the place. Here, in the logistics of passage that beats at the cadence of the one-two, me-you, the outcome is always the same. Police to subjugate. Code to organize. Clear to colonize. Logistics aims to straighten us out, untangle us, and open us to its usufruct, its improving use; such access to us, in its turn, improves the flow line, the straight line. And what logistics takes to be the shortest distance between us requires emplotting us as bodies in space where interiority can be imposed even as the capacity for interiority can be denied, in the constant measure and regulation of flesh and earth.Scene 5 Deleuze and Guattari speak of man as the white wall of the black hole of existence.15 Think landscape painting, especially the kind that excises that very life that breathed it into existence. If you’re not familiar, search for “Canadian art.” And if you don’t know the history of the mansplaining of the Canadian landscape, search for the Group of Seven, the early twentieth-century Canadian landscape painters, and notice not only the ubiquity of the vast open, uninhabited space, notice the clearing. Very little has changed over the last hundred years. We still see Canada through the clear, in the emptiness of nature cultured. The denuded land, the empty north, is how we art ourselves still today, we who property the land. The Group of Seven, those painters of the land pristine, of the great white north, the painters of the land of the (single) pine and of the distant ridges, they are still with us, still managing the imagination, orchestrating the field, playing the dramaturgy of extinction. Logistics are also aesthetic (if not artful). The white man is a specter. That is to say, the white man is without content, without shape. He is the shift in form that allows all takings-place to be propertied inhabitations, which is to say, sites already claimed. This is whiteness: the pretense that the lines that demarcate the boundary between me and you protect you, protect me, from the wilderness of all that cannot be contained (and must be kept at bay). The truth is, the wilderness was cleared, but never quite colonized. And that is why whiteness is alive and well. To police a job half-done. Scene 6 Mediation makes many promises. It promises clarity: think, drop-down menu. It promises fairness: think, divorce court. It promises health: think, therapy. The gesture is cast as innocuous. A simple third, a neutral agent. A little bit of reason. A moment of distance. An interlude so that things can be tied up again and smooth functioning can resume. A representation of the useful.16 But what is it to insert distance into a field of relation if not violence of the highest degree? Whose distance? At what cost? To what ends? Guattari fights against this at every turn, refusing mediation either in politics or in psychiatry. Schizoanalysis is the proposition, a call for a transversal operation that breaks the pretense of neutrality in the encounter. A therapeutics of transversality. No more triangle. No more transference. Schizoanalysis is the event of the encounter itself, the practice of encountering. To be in the relation is to have been changed by it. What this looked like: a years-long institutional arrangement housed at a clinic called La Borde in the north of France whereby to be in the therapeutic encounter was to live with the effects of encounters in the everyday and to learn from them how to continue to live. Nothing very complicated, really. But infinitely complex in its transversality. Because to live in the encounter, to allow ourselves to be changed by it, is to be continuously undone, and to be sensitive to all that comes alive in that undoing. Who we are is a question that can only really be asked (and answered) by the mediator. The mediator, after all, looks in from outside to tell us how our actions are affecting the world. Without the mediator there is no steady external gaze, no calm interface for the mirroring. That’s why “who we are” is always a white question, a question of whiteness, of colonization. Blackness, write Harney and Moten, is not a thing, or a state (of being). It is the way the doing expresses. It is not a subject, not a person, not a property. It is a field. It is the excess on itself of a body claimed, blackened by hate. Blackness is the celebration of refusing to claim, to be claimed. “Meanwhile, Michael Brown is like another fall and rise through man—come and gone, as irruption and rupture, to remind us not that black lives matter but that black life matters; that the absolute and undeniable blackness of life matters; that this is not a judgment of value but a description of a field of activity that obliterates the worldly distinction between the organic and the inorganic.”17 Blackness is not the simple descriptor of what has been enfleshed. Blackness cannot be mediated into a form imposed (exposed). Blackness is the force of living that exceeds colonization, its accursed share. And in that sense, the wildness of the surround, it too is black. As is the earth. This is what Guattari means when he entreats us to move from schizoanalysis as a therapeutic-political dispositif, an agencement more than an apparatus, a moving-forth of encounterings afield, toward the transversality of what he calls the “three ecologies.”18 These three ecologies, the mental/conceptual, the environmental, and the social, are the overlap, as I see it, of a commitment to a blackening of the earth, out of the clear. (Necessarily European) man, in and as the exception, imposes speciation upon himself, in an operation that extracts and excepts himself from the earth in order to confirm his supposed dominion over it. And just as the earth must be forcefully speciated to be possessed, man must forcefully speciate himself in order to enact this kind of possession. This is to say that racialization is present in the very idea of dominion over the earth; in the very idea and enactment of the exception; in the very nuts and bolts of possession-by-improvement. The world is posed as the way to live on the earth as the individual is posed as the way to live in the world. To live in the world as an individual is therefore to be logistic, and to be logistic is to settle into a rhythm that kills, to beat out that rhythm over the undercommon track that keeps (giving away) its own measure.19 Scene 7 Guattari wrote The Three Ecologies in what have come to be known as his winter years. The winter years came after a sustained attempt at working with the Green Party in the aftermath of the terrible letdown of post-1968 politics in France. This attempt to connect to state politics left Guattari with a sour taste. He knew better, of course, than to trust state politics to be a site of transformation. Schizoanalysis had been the wager that there were other ways—that to work “in common,” “toward the common” is, ultimately, always to commit to the logic of mediation. In The Three Ecologies, he makes a plea to invent new ways of being committed to and involved in the urgent call to transversalize experience, ways that move beyond how the state lays claim to existence: In the domain of social ecology there will be times of struggle in which everyone will feel impelled to decide on common objectives and to act “like little soldiers,” by which I mean like good activists. But there will simultaneously be periods of resingularisation in which individual and collective subjectivities will take their marbles and go home without a thought for collective goals, and in which creative expression as such will take precedence. This new ecosophical logic—and I want to emphasize this point—resembles the manner in which an artist may be led to alter his work after the intrusion of some accidental detail, an event-incident that suddenly makes his initial project bifurcate, making it drift [dériver] far from its previous path, however certain it had once appeared to be.20 There is an echo in this ecosophic call to Moten and Harney: Rather than dissipate our preoccupation with how we live and breathe, we need to defend our ways in our persistent practice of them. It’s not about taking the streets; it’s about how, and about what, we take to the streets. What would it be and what would it mean for us jurisgeneratively to take to the streets, to live in the streets, to gather together another city right here, right now?21 Ecosophic logic is a refusal of the clearing, of the ways in which we seek to inhabit the space already colonized. It recognizes the lure, and understands the commitment to change that the gesture of taking the streets embodies. But ecosophic logic asks a different question: What if instead we practiced living by creating new conditions that didn’t center us, that didn’t inadvertently redeem that central and self-centering figure of man and its mediating logistics? What if we painted into the dérive of artfulness’s angle on experience? What if we moved at the pace of that accidental detail tangled with the weeds we have been wasting so much time clearing? Ecosophic logic is an urgent call to refuse the ongoing clearing that denies, decries, and violates the force of blackness in the ongoing genocide of all that resists the count. To refuse does not mean to face and challenge. Frontality, the neurotypical activity par excellence, only cements into place what is already there, what is already claiming the ground of existence. To refuse means to move into the accursed share of life-living twisting in the troubled interstice, to move with that anarchic share of existence that keeps giving life. For life-living to thrive, life has to be activated at those interstices that exceed man. Life’s expression as tangle has to be attuned to from the edges in. Conditions have to be crafted to honor what is not about us. This is what the First Nations in Barkskins of course already knew. And for this they were cleared. To see, to feel, what was always already there, to pulse with a force of life-living that cannot be claimed—owed or owned—this was always the crime. Scene 8 The many years Guattari spent practicing schizoanalysis, which is to say, living at La Borde and encountering, daily, the shape of an existence unmediated, an existence committed, always, to a refusal of normopathy—these are what he takes into the project of the three ecologies. And it is specifically the orientation of La Borde toward neurodiversity, I believe, that makes it necessary to underscore what he calls the mental, or conceptual, ecology as the inflecting force that must, and will, change the contours of the environmental and the social. La Borde taught him this: to skirt the question of the subject leaves the black hole wide open, filled to the brim with neurotypicality, whiteness. In the sickness that has befallen the earth—the ongoing genocide of all that eludes the count—subjectivity, too, has fallen ill. Replaced by the face of man, given the guise of whiteness in all its logistical powers of mediation, subjectivity has been swallowed, engulfed by the subject. “The main feature of the colonial-capitalistic unconscious is the reduction of subjectivity to its subject’s experience.”22 But subjectivity, as Guattari understands it, is nothing other than its ongoing production. It is not the subject. It is the transversal, the emergent unmediated middle, the collectivity that must never be reduced to the one. This is why, for a renewed project of the earth, or as Moten and Harney would have it, for the blackening of the earth—“we are the moving, blackened, blackening earth”23—“it will be a question of literally reconstructing the modalities of ‘group-being’ [l’être-en-groupe], not only through ‘communicational’ interventions but through existential mutations driven by the motor of subjectivity.”24 To construct modalities for group-being is a call for an aesthetics of sociality which exceeds the 1+1 of interpersonality. Group-being, or what Guattari refers to as the “group subject,” is not countable. The group subject is never the sum of its parts. As solitary as it is multiplicitous, the group subject makes felt how subjectivity is produced in the excess on itself of coming into relation. The group subject is how the more-than of the relational field finds expression. It is the emergent collectivity of an expression of life-living shared (in its accursed excess), expression irreducible to the one, always beyond consensus. Without mediation, the group subject is activated in the renunciation of summing up. To produce the modalities for this excess of existence requires a mutation on existence itself, a mutation that in every sense rethinks subjectivity as a position. The group subject reminds us that what we produce is never solely ours. We are not simply our-selves. We are fieldings of complex imbrication. Any other account of experience is subjected to mediation, organized by logistics. Anarchival to the core, the production of subjectivity is not an account of a life contained. It is not condensable to something like identity. It is not reducible to the form of the human. It is always more-than, always in movement, a motor or conduit of a worlding. The production of subjectivity bodies in the same gesture that it refuses to be a body, an “individual-in-subjection.”25 That is to say: in the production of subjectivity the bodying is always a being of relation. Always in movement, it does its living in the unlimited exposure that exceeds any body-world separation. Subjectivity is not inside. It is not in me. It is out of me. Rather than speak of the “subject,” we should perhaps speak of components of subjectification, each working more or less on its own. This would lead us, necessarily, to re-examine the relation between concepts of the individual and subjectivity, and, above all, to make a clear distinction between the two. Vectors of subjectification do not necessarily pass through the individual, which in reality appears to be something like a “terminal” for processes that involve human groups, socio-economic ensembles, data-processing machines, etc. Therefore, interiority establishes itself at the crossroads of multiple components, each relatively autonomous in relation to the other, and, if need be, in open conflict.26 “That abolition starts with the self.”27 In the drift, subjectivity’s dérive is irreducible to the human. Active in the interval of worlds making themselves, subjectivity is never reducible to a subject. The production of subjectivity is the activity of the interstice: vector, not form. Schizoanalysis works at this uneasy juncture. The task of schizoanalysis is not to get between body and world, between-two. Its task is to make way for all that already populates the between, and to agitate, from within the field of relation, orientations already in germ. Fostering the germination, tending the field, schizoanalysis vectors the inflection. The vectoring requires a subtraction from the open field of all that is still in potentia. Schizoanalysis culls from potential a shape, a way. This excision from process is a subtraction from infinitude to the finite. From the side of infinitude, in the field of immanence, Whitehead calls this activity that sparks a standing out of experience “importance.” From the side of finitude, in the field of activity, Whitehead calls it “expression”: Expression is founded on the finite occasion. It is the activity of finitude impressing itself on its environment. Thus it has its origin in the finite; and it represents the immanence of the finite in the multitude of its fellows beyond itself. The two together, namely importance and expression, are witnesses both to the monistic aspect of the universe and to its pluralistic character. Importance passes from the world as one to the world as many; whereas, expression is the gift from the world as many to the world as one.28 Importance and expression function as intensifiers of experience, bringing into activity the singularity of a life that nonetheless continues to carry its anarchic share. In this account, the human is not singled out. There is no externalizing voice, no mediator. Arrows of experience are their own force, importance not a question of what matters to me, but of what actually (but always also in potentia) makes a difference. Importance makes way for precision in experience. That is to say, importance is what fosters a certain specific angle of existence, allowing certain qualities of experience to take precedence over others. We have come to believe that mediation is necessary to parse experience. But as Whitehead emphasizes, the world is always in its own pursuit of amplification. Incessant clearing, colonialism without end, in the afterlife of slavery, results in systems out of kilter. Ecological destruction has finally begun to register, centuries too late. The question of how to bring things into a metastability that is conducive to life-living must involve a reckoning with the deadening force of mediation. We don’t need another apology. We need to get out of the way. The blackening of the earth requires the production of something entirely other than me, or you.The infraface29 of the three ecologies—“the world as one to the world as many … the world as many to the world as one”—is immediating.30 Immediation is not the opposite of mediation. Rather, it is the force of a thirdness irreducible to a between-two. Immediation is the more-than, the n+1 that is by necessity n-1, one as many, many as one, the qualitative force of an uncountability that diagonalizes to give rise to what else moves in the relation. The production of subjectivity is immediating to the degree that it is not produced by something outside itself. Immediating, always at once body and world, its own perspective. That is to say, its angle on existence is not ours, cannot be reduced to us. The production of subjectivity is a making-conceptual of existence. It is an attuning to the deadly violence of the body-world split produced in the wake of the clearing.31 There are not three ecologies. There is one ecology multiply intertwined. To get to the potential of what the three ecologies in their transversality offer, the production of subjectivity must be attended to. We have failed each other at the juncture of the production of subjectivity in particular, and nothing will be possible without that shift. In the words of The Invisible Committee, the exhaustion of natural resources is probably much less advanced than the exhaustion of subjective resources, of vital resources, that is afflicting our contemporaries. If so much satisfaction is derived from surveying the devastation of the environment it’s largely because this veils the frightening ruin of subjectivities. Every oil spill, every sterile plain, every species extinction is an image of our souls in rags, a reflection of our lack of world, of our intimate impotence to inhabit it.32 To become in excess of a person, to activate the conditions for a life-living that worlds in the bodying, is a social and environmental act. The emergent sociality of becoming-environmental never happens through the clearing. In happens in the midst, black flies and all. The production of subjectivity in the transversality of the three ecologies is the way the more-than of nature naturing crafts a sociality ecosophically. A sociality, as Harney and Moten might say, all incomplete. Guattari calls the ecology he associates with the production of subjectivity “mental.” I prefer conceptual, to produce a stronger sense of how the world itself is alive with the movement of thought. A turn to Whitehead brings the two together. For Whitehead, the conceptual share is that excess of experience that tunes the occasion to its potential. All activity in the world has a conceptual share, but it is true to say that some aspects of existence make use of it more emphatically. Whitehead calls this “mentality.” Mentality, as in Guattari, is not reducible to the mind. Mentality is the force of existence. It is the world’s capacity to exceed itself. All incomplete, the world continuously renews itself. Scene 10 We don’t need to look to some far off lands: it’s already here. Isn’t that what Tommy Orange means when he says, “Being Indian has never been about returning to the land. The land is everywhere or nowhere”?33 The work has already begun. The accursed share of life-living is too unwieldy, too uncountable, to be mediated. It cannot be governed. This is its potency, but also its fallacy. The work is not where we’ve been taught it is. And the tools we need are not the ones we own. a nascent subjectivity a constantly mutating socius an environment in the process of being reinvented34 The three ecologies are a proposition. They are not a place. To follow the artist-architects Arakawa and Madeline Gins, we might call them an architectural procedure.35 An architectural procedure is not an architecture. It is a fielding of potential that brings into constellation enabling constraints for the construction of a world. Procedurality is key. An architectural procedure must produce itself propositionally. This means that what emerges will never be a thing, a site. It will undercommon itself into existence, perhaps—as Arakawa and Gins once said—“only making an appearance indirectly.”36 Because to see-feel it is to have created the conditions for feeling, conditions that were never reducible to a subject as given in advance. The event of the three ecologies is here, in the productive looping of a field of experience that is at once constitutive of its expression and constituted by it. Because when importance and expression meet, it is never at our bidding.

2022 Michigan Kritik
Aff --- Disability --- K lab › 1AC › 1AC --- Black Cyborg

The conceptualization of the black cyborg ruptures whiteness’s frame of technology as the tool of the colonial master. Theorizing through the black cyborg is a tool for the becoming resists the assumption that technology is the province of white ingenuity and that technological engagement is incompatible with Black culture.

Gunn 20 [Caitlin Gunn is a feminist educator, researcher, and equity and diversity consultant currently operating in Minneapolis, Minnesota. She earned her doctorate in Feminist Studies from the University of Minnesota, Twin Cities. “Black Cyborgs: Blackness Narratives in Technology, Speculative Fiction, and Digital Cultures” published in June 2020 accessed on July 13, 2022 by AP]

In her article, “New Genres of Being Human: World Making through Viral Blackness,” Ashleigh Greene Wade’s approach is similar to Puar’s with its shared roots in assemblage theory and commitment to thinking through new frameworks for being. From an explicitly Black feminist framework, she calls in Sylvia Wynter and Wehilye to a discussion of assemblage in order to power her central argument: we have shifted into a new way of experiencing our own humanness and subjectivity, and it is an experience that fundamentally weaves our physical selves with our digital experiences. Weaving together Black techno-social practices and Black feminist notions of the human, Greene Wade produces a significant development toward theorizing the virtual-physical assemblage. Central to Greene Wade’s analysis is the idea of virality and viral Blackness. She names virality as “an affective condition in which content spreads widely, changing both the form of the original content and the channels through which it passes.” She calls upon Puar and Patricia Clough as interlocutors in the conversation of virality, citing their introduction to the Women’s Studies Quarterly volume devoted to the concept of virality which notes the spread of “viral” as a descriptor for things happening in biological, physical, financial, linguistic, and cultural realms. Greene Wade notes the fear that the word “viral” can evoke; the dominant use of viral is in discussion of spreading disease. While she urges us to expand beyond this fear and critically engage with the viral as a generative concept, I like to linger on the fear component of Black virality. The fear is essential for understanding how the Black viral has been tracked, surveilled, and covered: the white gaze looks upon Black viral phenomena with equal parts intrigue, confusion, and fear. Its effects are visible: social movements spring up, hashtags trend, bodies show up, information is shared. The methods remain opaque, rendered as invisible as a virus. As Greene Wade notes, the most terrifying aspect of viral Blackness is its uncontrollable nature: “Within the carceral state, containment is extremely important for maintaining control, but the viral cannot be contained. While the source of viral content can be located, once it is released, control societies cannot dictate how or where it spreads.” This uncontrollable, mutable, spreading form of viral Blackness manages to blend the boundaries between the virtual and physical, to muddy binaries, and to resist legibility to whiteness. The subversion of control found in viral Blackness is part of what I will argue makes Black feminist cyborgs so effectively able to travel worlds. When mutability and shape-shifting themselves assist, viral Blackness becomes a powerful tool for achieving and maintaining a sense of cultural control. The most critical aspect of the functioning of viral Blackness is the political force we are able to exert in digital spaces and manifest offline. Greene Wade asks us to consider the emergence of viral Blackness through #BlackLivesMatter (among other associated hashtags) and place it in the context of Black technological activism. She cites the mobilization efforts in 2014 around Ferguson, particularly organizing buses of protestors and funds and resources for protestors on the ground. She points to pre-social media periods, referencing events as far back as 1997, when Black women honed early Internet resources to organize the Million Woman March. In this project, I place this work in the framework of Anna Everett’s “Black technophilia,” the basic concept that Black people’s love for and skill with technology is neither rare nor deficient but is part of the tradition of Black people’s innovation in finding and creating tools for survival. In Greene Wade’s analysis, hashtags, viral videos, and images from Black protests and demonstrations are not only tools, but also “material artifacts of viral Blackness.” Greene Wade concludes her article by making the case that weak, appropriative, derivative hashtags stemming from #BlackLivesMatter serve to highlight the ways viral Blackness disquiets and disrupts white supremacy. #AllLivesMatter and #BlueLivesMatter, for instance, rest on outmoded and fixed identity categories. She issues a call: “We have to release Blackness from essentialism so that it may be deployed toward liberation within a multiplicity of subjectivities.” Moving toward conceiving of a Blackness that operates as a virtual-physical assemblage is part of that vision. Though Greene Wade does not mention cyborgs, I place this essay and Puar’s essay in conversation to illuminate my vision of the makeup of the cyborg: the Black feminist cyborg is a virtual-physical becoming-intersectional assemblage, slinking and changing from one world to the next, armored on digital platforms and able to shapeshift beyond the rigid grids of identity politics on technosocial platforms. This theory demands that we re-think what a cyborg is. In the intellectual tradition of Puar, conceptualizing a cyborg as humanity and technology gracelessly mashed together leaves us with an indelicate and relatively worthless metaphor. If we think about a cyborg as a new genre of being, the way Sylvia Wynter via Greene Wade ask us to think about humans, it prepares us to imagine the cyborg as a virtual-physical assemblage equipped to both travel through and make worlds for Black feminists who seek refuge, feminist discourse, and methods for moving through online spaces. The part-time Black feminist cyborg is able to move as Black women so often do: as part of a side-hustle, as part of an informal, widespread Black aesthetic devoted to hustling in the margins, seeking and performing community support and maintenance, gaining insight from other places and people to be repurposed toward Black excellence. The Black feminist cyborg side-hustle is one which pays in security, heightened ability, heightened perception, and occasionally heightened suffering. Though the “side hustle” is a language of labor, it is labor performed for self and community. I take Joy James’ critique of Black cyborgs operating as super-human seriously, and argue that the part-time nature of this aesthetic allows for breaks, rest, and centering of the self rather than super-human strength and performance to please and serve whiteness and white people. The part-time hustle allows for anonymity: no one need know about your alternate cyborg mode of being. If we are all to embody a new genre of being human and become virtual-physical assemblages, the part-time Black feminist cyborg theory serves as a method, a tool for the becoming. This concept quickly falls apart if there is commitment to the tool of technology as it has been traditionally discussed, even among feminist thinkers, as dominance and conquest through mechanical and digital means. Black feminist speculative fiction authors can offer us an alternative way of thinking through definitions of technology, often advocating a reassessment of what technology is, can be, and has been in the hands of Black people. In the interviews I conducted, I asked each participant two main questions related to the nature of technology: how have you conceived of or grappled with themes of technology in your speculative fiction work? And what would you consider the most dominant messages about Black people, bodies and technology that come from popular culture or mainstream speculative fiction? In response to the first question, participants frequently mentioned cyborgs, the steampunk genre as a space to toy with our preconceived notions, and expansive definitions of technology. Tempest K. Bradford responded: I mean, technically, again, the novel I’m writing now, it’s steampunk, so there is a technology in it even though it’s in the past. The technology is what is driving the commentary about social change[,] my commentary on 71 inequality[,] because in this story, it’s set in ancient Egypt. The steampunk elements are copper scarab beetles that are really big. People ride around in them and they run on the power of steam generated by sunlight. adrienne maree brown noted that she had grappled with themes of technology in her speculative fiction work “sort of flailingly? Like, I mostly imagine futures where technology is invisible or inside of us, cyborgish, enhancements. I also think of technology as how we do everything.” Encapsulating both themes, Walidah Imarisha comments on the whitewashing of the definition of technology and steampunk as a site of reproducing racist and colonial narratives, and as a means of expanding and responding to definitions of technology for Black survival: I think having conversations about what technology is, is also really important from the beginning. I think that we think of technology in a very Western, European white-centered frame. And so, I think that it’s important to recognize that a lot of the ways we think about technology... I think that steampunk is a genre [that] actually is a really useful way to sort of externalize the implicit conversations that often happen about technology— the way... that technology is intimately linked to colonialism and the global spread of white supremacy [in] this sort of white racist utopian fantasy that white folks create when they create steampunk. So. You know, I think, again, if technology is not a useful term, then we just don’t use that term. I do think it’s useful to challenge that idea and saying, well, what is our definition of technology? Technology is actually much broader than just externalized robotic gadgets that often are what we think of when we think of technology. So I think that’s one thing. I think the other thing, I definitely feel like I think about technology a lot. [I have] a couple pieces that center around [technology] that I’m working on. I’m actually working on developing a workshop that takes current developments and technology that folks think of as science fiction, but that are here now, and then has folks kind of imagine how this might be used against us in the future as folks try to change the world, because it will. And then develop potential strategies to challenge that… I don’t think we can deny the digital technological advances that exist in this world. I think we do so at our own peril. 72 In line with their thinking about expanding both ideas of technology and “cyborgish” ways of being, I find something productive and playful about imagining taking on the label of a cyborg, which requires being built, shaped, taken apart, and re-imagined in the face of oppression. There are deep resonances between descriptions of the cyborg and the experiences of being a Black woman: feeling like a being both out of time and somehow advanced, forced to travel worlds the way Lugones describes, continually being drawn both into the past and the future, losing limbs and gaining playfulness along the way. The cyborg concept has been considered by many feminist theorists in the decades since Haraway’s introduction and is increasingly relevant in the face of continuing technological advances. In TechnoFeminism, Judy Wajcman calls our attention to this fascination with the cyborg when she notes, “The cyborg has fired the feminist imagination. It crystalizes our pleasure in, desire for, and anxiety about technological transcendence. Perhaps this, and the infinite flexibility of what has become the postmodern icon, explains its rhetorical force.” Cyborg metaphors about the Black body and Black experience are present in literature, art, popular culture, and academic theory; indeed, Haraway specifically mentions the Black speculative fiction endeavors of Samuel Delany and Octavia Butler in her manifesto, appreciating them among other prolific feminist science fiction writers as “storytellers exploring what it means to be embodied in 73 high tech worlds,” and that they operate as “theorists for cyborgs.” Women of color is the category of coalition that Lugones writes about, framing their unique ability for worldtraveling as a result of marginalized positionality. The cyborg in Haraway’s conception is also portrayed as an ideal creature for moving “between worlds,” as Lugones describes them, or, into and out of the margins. Fused with technology and flesh, the vulnerability and adaptability of the cyborg allows for the variety of shifts in perspective required for moving between worlds—perception, vulnerability, and adaptability being kinds of technologies of their own. Moving into Digital Worlds The Black feminist cyborg resists the assumption that technology is the province of white ingenuity and intelligence, and that technological engagement is incompatible with Black people and Black culture. Claiming space in discourses of social technologies can push back against the limited kinds of knowledge production that people of color can produce that is legible within white supremacy. A modern cyborg still lives in a humandominated world with a very narrow conception of humanity. As Haraway acknowledges science fiction writers as cyborg theorists, I also turn to the writers I interviewed for their reflections on Black bodies and technology. Their contributions offer vital insights into both the genre of science fiction and real-world digital landscapes. Black women 74 operating as part-time cyborgs must move through these digital worlds, which provide new conditions for loving perception. A Black feminist cyborg is continually adapting to digital worlds where physical safety is less likely to be threatened and our access to one another is unprecedented. A Black feminist cyborg practical aesthetic is ideal for traveling to these worlds mediated through social media platforms, where we extend our Blackness beyond our physical bodies and simultaneously become aware of the embodied ways technology mediates and fuses with our lived realities. Black Cyborgs Moving Forward I have positioned the Black feminist cyborg as an ontological approach and a creature of fiction, but I would be remiss if I did not mention the rapidly closing gap between the cyborg as fiction and the cyborg as reality. In my interview with speculative fiction author Walidah Imarisha, the subject of bio-hacking was discussed in relationship to some of her latest writing and activist work. For example, she is in the process of developing a workshop which has participants think about concepts like bio-hacking, the import of technological and mechanical tools into one’s body, often imagined as science fiction but already part of reality, and strategize ways to combat their inevitable use against Black bodies. Her upcoming fictional work incorporates bio-hacking themes to underscore both the anxiety about technological additions to bodies and Black resistance 75 to methods of white social control over Black bodies. Citing facial recognition software newly employed in airports and the recent trend of corporations bio-hacking willing employees with identifying chips, she tells an oppositional story of a dystopic world in which characters are guided by self-implanted chips that point them in the direction of the North Star. In the interview, she describes the research she conducted for background in her story. She says, with both the excitement and trepidation that the idea of fusion with technology, especially for Black people, can bring: “The piece I was reading about was folks, like, bio-hacking themselves and becoming cyborgs! And getting superhero powers, basically. I was like, this shit is real, y’all, people are cyborgs right now!” Imarisha calls our attention to the narrowing divide between the cyborg as a creature of fiction and a creature of reality and imagines the way Black people can use technology to combat white supremacy. This speculative work through a Black feminist lens is imperative, because it challenges the notion that Black people can only interact with technology to serve white supremacist aims, and it rejects the erasure of Black people’s long, rich relationship with science and technology. It is transgressive in that it rejects the notion that Black people’s bodies and minds operate as machines and tools, having technology used on and through them. As I demonstrate in chapter four, Black people 76 harness the technological tools available to them and created by them. As social media drives much of Trump-era political discourse, Black people use it to facilitate cultural conversations, strategize for livable and desirable futures, and center the experiences of marginalized people. The Black feminist part-time cyborg aesthetic is a way to visualize the experience of moving in between the digital and physical, with room for both worlds. In the following chapter, I assess examples of world-traveling Black part-time cyborgs from popular media. These examples from Star Trek: Deep Space Nine and the discography of Janelle Monáe illuminate the way loving perception partnered with cyborg theory can provide a method for fruitful Black feminist world traveling, selfexpression, and play

2022 Michigan Kritik
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Thus, we affirm the black cyborg – a project of imagination, memory, longing, aversion. A diplomatic strategy that is alive, insurgent. A human being that no longer is, at least temporarily

Joy James 13 [“Concerning Violence”: Frantz Fanon’s Rebel Intellectual in Search of a Black Cyborg, Winter 2013, The South Atlantic Quarterly, doi 10.1215/00382876-1891233, accessed 7/13/22, -ekh-]

The essential duty of the one is to struggle for the realization or consciousness of the cyborg. The cyborg is born at that moment in which the convergence of interests among anyone and everyone seeking or dodging freedom is inescapable and inescapably recognized; the cyborg glimpses the possibilities of permanent revolution, as the veil descends. This convergence is cemented in more than blood and rational choice. It is shaped by imagination and memory, longing and aversion.

Fanon’s 1960s writings about the Algerian war of liberation from the French illuminate aspects of the 1980s Cold War’s détente. The first, like all of the post–World War II battles for freedom in Africa, Asia, Latin America, the Caribbean, and Middle East (and the “internal colonies” in the Americas and beyond), was asymmetrical warfare. The Cold War was not. Both forms of warfare, hot or cold, were in the postwar era largely fought on or against the bodies of the colonized.2

2022 Michigan Kritik
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Everyone can do something, can’t they?

Butler, 79 [Octavia Estelle Butler was an American science fiction author. A multiple recipient of both the Hugo and Nebula awards, she became in 1995 the first science-fiction writer to receive a MacArthur Fellowship. Born in Pasadena, California, Butler was raised by her widowed mother, “Positive Obsession,” edited for racialized language / -ekh-]

MY MOTHER read me bedtime stories until I was six years old. It was a sneak attack on her part. As soon as I really got to like the stories, she said, “Here’s the book. Now you read.” She didn’t know what she was setting us both up for.

“I think,” my mother said to me one day when I was ten, “that everyone has something that they can do better than they can do anything else. It’s up to them to find out what that something is.” We were in the kitchen by the stove. She was pressing my hair while I sat bent over someone’s cast-off notebook, writing. I had decided to write down some of the stories I’d been telling myself over the years. When I didn’t have stories to read, I learned to make them up. Now I was learning to write them down.

2022 Michigan Kritik
Aff --- Disability --- K lab › 1AC › 1AC --- Black Cyborg

The embracement of Black speculative fiction through our 1AC creates agentive forms of intimacy and resistance within white spaces that crowd out discussions of black life. This intervention counters logics of whiteness that seek to desire but terminally destroy Black disabled persons.

Pickens 19 [Therí Alyce Pickens, Professor of English, specializing in African American, Arab America and disability literatures and theories at Bates University, June 7, 2019 “Black Madness :: Mad Blackness”, Duke University Press, Durham and London, pgs. 36-41, JMH]

Both frustrating and fascinating, Black speculative fiction writer and pioneer Octavia E. Butler renders intimate, personal relationships with an eye toward complexity and compromise.35 Her characters’ investment in each other does not necessarily equate to a divestment from the oppressive ideologies that buoy their power. Most important for this inquiry, Butler’s work foregrounds the spaces of discomfort and erasure that accompany Black madness. As noted in the preface and introduction, I view Butler as a theorist working in the medium of fiction. I analyze her archive and her final published novel Fledgling (2005), interpreting the intimate relationships she depicts. Here, I invest in the “politics of the possible” regarding modes of interpretation that function as alternatives to mutual constitution.36 Elsewhere I have discussed the enemy relationships in Butler’s Fledgling, pinpointing that the protagonist’s enemies “[mobilize] racist rhetoric subsequent to failed ableist rhetoric.”37 Their motives and their ideas are easily understood as a threat to the protagonist’s life, a desire for her erasure, since their engagement with Blackness and disability relies on a denigration of both. This discomfort and erasure flows from the protagonist’s lovers, friends, and family as well. Here, the discourses of madness and Blackness vie for importance, a competition of sorts in which neither can win, but where the decision to prioritize one over the other shifts the emotional and ideological terrain, particularly in the interracial, multiability encounter. Butler theorizes that Black madness creates a crisis of the self in which subjectivity and identity is destabilized and the conception of the future altered. Butler conceptualized Fledgling as a coming-of-age and chase narrative that follows the structure of a crime procedural. In a letter to her editor she writes, “This one is essentially Shori’s [the protagonist’s] struggle to rebuild her life in spite of her lost family and memory—and, of course, she can only rebuild if she finds those who are hunting her and her love ones and stop them. In Law and Order fashion, she does this first through physical action— looking for answers, finding them, getting surprised, fighting to stay alive. . . . Then there’s the trial—a less physically active part of the story, but one just as involved in its own conflict and drama.”38 The first third of the novel follows Shori as she awakes with amnesia, learns that she is a vampire (called Ina) from her father, Iosif, and finds human companions, including Wright, Celia, and Brooke (called symbionts, abbreviated as syms) to survive. During this time, she learns that what separates her from other Ina is genetic experimentation with human blood that grants her melanin and the capacity to remain awake during the day. The middle third of the novel depicts her adjustment to her new symbionts, including three same-gender loving relationships with syms Theodora, Celia, and Brooke, and her alliance with the male Ina family to whom she was/is betrothed (the Gordons). The final third delineates the trial, or Council of Judgment, which determines truth and consequences for those Ina who attempted to murder her, and successfully murdered her family (Silk family, Dahlman family). Butler’s notebooks and journals reveal that she conceptualized several sequels to Fledgling. She completed five chapters of a novel tentatively called Asylum or Flight. In it, she introduces a new symbiont, a newfound archive from Shori’s mothers, and the drama of being kidnapped by unmated male members of the Silk family. In the journal entries months before her death, Butler rethinks the story line of kidnapping and considers the story of a seduction, where Shori must build a family of symbionts and Ina sisters.39 Within Fledgling, several intimate relationships—the Gordon family, Daniel Gordon, Shori’s symbionts—clarify how Black madness disrupts the ideological field: their behavior clarifies that the reading strategy of mutual constitution elides the competition between Blackness and madness for narrative space, the impossibility of linear progressive understandings of history and time, and the fiction of Black mad resistance as always agentive. As a family, the Gordons remain in thrall to their able-bodied and race privilege, such that it governs their interpretations of Shori. They “deploy an evaluative gaze that assesses Shori’s ‘fitness’ based on their own criteria— shaped as it is by abled embodiment. The Gordons constitute fitness based on criteria that demonstrate their ignorance about the systemic effect whiteness and ability have had on their lives.”40 Since they do not distinguish between her amnesia as impairment and Ina cultural and traditional customs as fomenting disability, they exude a paternalism that becomes taxing for Shori to navigate. She must consistently remind them that her impairment has practical implications to which their cultural structures (such as the Council of Judgment or mating rituals) must adapt.41 She reminds them, “My memory goes back a few weeks and no further,” and the narration explicates her emotional response, “And because I was annoyed. I let my tone of voice say, You should all realize this. I’ve explained it before.”42 Further, they neglect to think of her Blackness as more than just the genetic engineering experimentation that allows her to be awake during the day. They consider her melanin useful as part of her physiology but do not think through the implications of how it creates her outsider status. The Gordons rank her identities: her Blackness as more beneficial, her amnesia as more pitiable, her Blackness as less important, her amnesia as less desirable. Their logic views the two identities as competitive in their narration of events: only one category requires their attention at any given time. Their priorities reveal how one identity, disability, is a problem for them that they can articulate. Her other identity, Blackness, is a problem to be sure, but one about which they cannot answer a word.43 Further, it stresses that their deliberate problematizing of one identity parses Blackness and madness for their own comfort. When Butler portrays Shori as frustrated in addition to misunderstood, she debunks the idea that all one must do is fuse the identities together. In other words, it is not necessarily a problem that the Gordons must strategize about Shori’s disability (especially since doing so will help save her life), but rather that they seek to strategize without fully understanding the disability itself (and how it is shaped by Blackness) and without her input. In this instance, Black madness cannot be agentive or radical or resistant all by itself. Shori’s mere presence cannot bear the weight of reorienting the narrative all on its own, nor can her behavior automatically shift the ideologies that govern her circumstances or change the people who helped create and sustain them (which, by default, includes the Gordon family). Instead, Butler’s work suggests that allies themselves must reconcile the competing tension between their own privileged positions and their desires for inclusivity. Though Shori can marshal her embodied knowledge to instruct others, she has limited success. The Gordons’ gaze functions similarly to that of Shori’s enemies. Their intimate interaction highlights that the difference between the two—that is, good intention—requires more labor on Shori’s part (which by itself curtails agency). She cannot dismiss the Gordons because they are not antagonists; instead, she must reframe the conversation to emphasize her position as potential daughter-in-law in need of assistance. When Shori reminds them, “So far [her] problem is ignorance, not dishonesty,”44 she splices impairment from disability and suggests listening as an integral facet of engagement. Yet her interactions with the older Gordons remain taxing and frustrating because their good intentions do not match the impact of their behavior. Their remarks—she is “somewhat arrogant” or she must “seem more Ina than [the antagonists],” or she is “both very attractive and very frightening”45—belie their weddedness to ableism, even as they attempt to help her navigate institutionalized barriers. It is up to them to shift their thinking, and it is not clear that ever occurs by the end of Fledgling. In Butler’s drafts of Fledgling, she toys with the way Shori’s Black madness structures her interactions with the Gordons and the text writ large. Each instantiation of the novel evinces Butler’s commitment to depicting Blackness and madness as destabilizing forces, which heighten and problematize privilege because they shift the contours of the multiability, interracial encounter. The two discourses work together and, in that sense, remain coextensive, but they also function at cross-purposes. For instance, Shori speculates that the Gordons test her when they allow her to question the human agents responsible for the arson that killed her family.

2022 Michigan Kritik
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What does literature do in the face of obsession?

Butler, 79 [Octavia Estelle Butler was an American science fiction author. A multiple recipient of both the Hugo and Nebula awards, she became in 1995 the first science-fiction writer to receive a MacArthur Fellowship. Born in Pasadena, California, Butler was raised by her widowed mother, “Positive Obsession”/ -ekh-]

There seems to be an unwritten rule, hurtful and at odds with the realities of American culture. It says you aren’t supposed to wonder whether as a Black person, a Black woman, you really might be inferior—not quite bright enough, not quite quick enough, not quite good enough to do the things you want to do. Though, of course, you do wonder. You’re supposed to know you’re as good as anyone. And if you don’t know, you aren’t supposed to admit it. If anyone near you admits it, you’re supposed to reassure them quickly so they’ll shut up. That sort of talk is embarrassing. Act tough and confident and don’t talk about your doubts. If you never deal with them, you may never get rid of them, but no matter. Fake everyone out. Even yourself.

I couldn’t fake myself out. I didn’t talk much about my doubts. I wasn’t fishing for hasty reassurances. But I did a lot of thinking—the same things over and over.

2022 Michigan Kritik
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Emerging technologies create disinformation campaigns, expanding state influence to justify its mistreatment of racialized and disabled subjects through the weaponization of cognitive dissonance in algorithmic fashion

Zach Naqvi 21 [Department of Political Science, University of Alberta, Madness, Migration and Media in the Modern Digital Age, April 14th 2021, pg.2-7, -ekh-]

Citizenship, migration and international relations informing how we conceptualize policy get inextricably tied to sovereign states that determine the fate of refugees. The framework that facilitates this process has followed a chaotic trajectory in recent years. Understanding the rise of populist rhetoric emerging in North America and Europe, among others, points to recent developments in international relations requiring greater scrutiny, with specific practices necessitating a closer look by communities at home and abroad. I argue that we have fallen short of our collective humanitarian promise of dignity and fundamental human rights for everyone, regardless of race, gender, religion, class, or country of origin. Unsurprisingly, the sovereignty of the state and a universal humanitarian aim have had difficulties getting reconciled. In theory and practice, pragmatism and utopia and things related to realist necessity versus a more utopian idealism – international relations are plagued with a disconnect between what ought to be and what is. The reason is that states, unlike individuals, families and communities are not concerned primarily with such lofty ideals as human dignity, fraternity, equality, and the like. Instead, they get inseparably linked with the fundamental objective of consolidating, maintaining, and executing powers that we as individuals upon the grounds of elections, citizenship and birth or connection have authorized the state to have. Furthermore, many view frameworks of citizenship and migration from a privileged standpoint, concerned with realist undertones of security, sovereignty, and the success of their state above all else. The dire question here is whether those immigrating, seeking asylum or even completely stateless can reasonably expect to be accommodated by sovereign states.

First, alternative facts or the designation by some that we are entering a post-truth world, amplified by improvements in technology moving us collectively towards increasingly interconnected existence, lay bare for all to see a new power dynamic playing out over the past decade. The aim of alternative facts is “to establish power: they are lying to flaunt power. They are saying to us: ‘we know that you know that this is a lie, and we don’t care, because there is absolutely nothing you can do about it’ … over years, ceaseless propaganda and spectacle, exacerbated by corrections and retractions, can destroy your sense of reality. Time spirals forward and lurches backwards.” (Kendzior, 2020, p.18) Take Franz Fanon, for example. Despite his death decades ago, his lived experience then provides critical insight now. Fanon was a doctor and the acclaimed author of Black Skin, White Masks. Despite his subjective personhood being complex and multifaceted, not constrained simply to role or race, when practicing medicine, it is a mistake made as a black doctor if he made a mistake. Similarly, refugees, migrants, and asylum seekers are broadly categorized as if the totality of their being constitutes race – and nothing more. Other times, we simply view things based on monetary or pragmatic conditionality. As Fanon notes, it is society, unlike biochemical processes, that do not escape human influence. Yet, it is us that brings society into being. (Fanon, 2008, p. XV) We saw this media makeover take place in society with the portrayal of Muslims, migrants and more recently with the Chinese during COVID-19, among a myriad of other examples through the ages. Kendzior notes how, “a media makeover is a peculiar wound. It is a terrible feeling to be in pain and ignored – as a place, as a person. It is worse to be given a mask and told it’s your face.” (Kendzior, 2020, p. 22) In other words, alongside ordinary people behaving rationally according to human psychology, some behave pathologically according to inhuman psychology. (Fanon, 2008, p. 15) We have forgotten sense from nonsense and implemented it ubiquitously as if it held any semblance of truth.

2022 Michigan Kritik
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The role of the negative is to offer novel creative epistemologies that reorients modernity’s understanding of subjectivity

Manning 20 [Erin Manning, she received her Ph. D in Political Philosophy from University of Hawaii in 2000. She currently teaches in the Concordia University Fine Arts Faculty, “For a Pragmatics of the Useless” (pgs 289-297) published in November 2020 by accessed on July 13, 2022 by AP]

Neurodiverse qualities of attention can make getting going an issue; spaZe emerged as a technique for activating study. How we practice matters, and no change can occur without practice. This includes practicing value differently. What we most want to avoid with 3e is any return to the service economy and any kind of transactional economic politics. 3e is about asking how else we can value beyond the economy of credit that orients education today. What is the credit we exchange in the name of neurotypicality, of whiteness? What kind of sociality can be crafted that honors that debt, too immense to ever repay, turning it into the gift of Glissant’s poetics of relation, a living practice that reminds us at every turn that we must consent not to be a single being (1997, 5, 27)? We invite those of you who want to participate, who care to invent with us what else learning and living can be, to practice three modes of entry. We ask that you bring to the platform of exploratory learning one of these techniques: knot: a paradox or temporary impasse in one’s work, life, thinking, or creative practice that might become newly productive if staged in a way that opens it to a collaborative exploration, in language or between language and other modes of expression. juncture: a known conjunction reopened for further exploration through new techniques reconfiguring its potential; the juncture might be a theoretical perspective, a set of established techniques informing a particular practice, an already-operating collaboration or project, or an existing disciplinary, interdisciplinary, or intermedia platform, restaged with a new inflection. vector: a move out from known junctures into a wander line that is oriented by a proposition, and in that sense directionally constrained, but is at the same time open-ended in way that invites new takings-form on the fly. Platforms for relation are never set in stone. We only propose to begin here. Together we will see where the practice leads. What we know is this: platforms for relation are everywhere active in our everyday lives. We need to learn how to seed them across undercommoning environments. Through these platforms we need to germinate new practices, and to practice failing together. Content delivery is not what changes the conditions of experience. There is no production of desire there. What moves experience are practices that reorient the place of knowledge in experience, practices that ask how the being of relation produces the kind of transformative justice livingloving requires.

2022 Michigan Kritik
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The role of the judge is to be an immediator not a mediator, mediation is undergirded by logistical whiteness that seeks out the destruction of the excessive share. Immediation is not a neutral process, rather a subjective force of thirdness that interjects between the two in the name of liberation from the logistical path of existence.

Manning 22 [Erin Manning, she received her Ph. D in Political Philosophy from University of Hawaii in 2000. She currently teaches in the Concordia University Fine Arts Faculty.“Out of the Clear” published in March 2022 by e-flux Journal accessed on July 12th, 2022 by AP]

We already know how the story ends. On May 29, 2021, the headline reads: “Canada mourns as remains of 215 children found at indigenous school.”8 It wasn’t an indigenous school, of course. It was a residential school, a Canadian school, in the clearing. The picture says it all: sparse trees growing in the background, empty yard, an architecture completely at odds with the environment, cleared of life, of all that immanently interconnects. The violence of logistics is inscribed in the ghost trees of its whitened surround. How we organize bodies, we who sidle whiteness, how we excise (from clear sight) the ravages of an earth desecrated, of a people brutally murdered—these are the workings of logistics. Logistics mediate existence by keeping it at arm’s length, soothing us into believing that we are not responsible. The deaths are newsworthy, and we’re sorry, but we must move on. It’s not really about us and in any case, there’s nothing we can do about it. Let’s get a mediator and sort this out! At arms length, we see these workings—the cleared forest, the dying planet, the dead children—as somehow disconnected. We do not acknowledge the felling of the trees as the wanton destruction of all that transversally connects. And yet logistics, in its power of mediation, is all about the forests. It’s all about the cotton planted in their wake. The ghostly outline of Proulx’s pine table haunts the residential school, its absence equal to the absence of education. Because what the residential school really does is unteach. Taking the place of pedagogy, what is practiced here is theft. Theft of thought, of imagination. This theft is a rape. A physical rape, a sexual aggression, but also a conceptual rape, a clearing—“to snatch, to grab, to carry off by force”—of all that lives in the abyss of what has been left behind.9 Rape, relation severed, cuts the fragile interwoven threads of existence, wresting life from life-living, from the more-than that gives it its spirited and spiritual contour. If body is land, if bodying is only ever worlding, what residential school does, in this most recent form of clearing, is sever this imbrication, leaving the body lifeless. All that remains is the clearing. And a mess. But this can be handled. This is how mediation does its work, in the name of and as logistics. From here on in, things will be managed. Managers will be appointed to organize, to administer, the now-reduced environment. This science of loss—“which is to say the science of whiteness, or logistics”—is predicated on the end of sharing, on the destruction of the excessive share, the annihilation of that which exceeds the one-two form whose dramaturgy relies of the intervention of the mediator.10 The mediator will take the form of the “yellow eyebrows” in Proulx’s account, but it also need not take a simple human form. Repetition of the same is the form it takes in a dramaturgy of extinction. Scene 3 Clearing produces property. Property produces dispossession. “All property is loss because all property is the loss of sharing.”11 The accursed share of all that exceeds interpersonality, mediation, whiteness, logistics, all that cannot be accounted for, sickens the field. And sometimes rejuvenates it. The force of the transindividual, of all that exceeds and precedes the individual, does rewild. But its vitality is weakened, and as perception is honed to single out the individual over the field, the human increasingly becomes the focal point, becoming synonymous with life. This is how the logistics of genocide—the genocide of relation—does its work. The genocide of relation can never be traced back, quite. Relation cannot be propertied. What is lost cannot be parsed. The yellow eyebrows have a role to play, of course, and we could call on the archbishop for that missing apology, but the truth is, it was never just one. He was never just the one. He is a logistical pattern, a commitment to the dramaturgy of (white) man as self-centered orchestrator of existence cleared. Logistics: the slave ship, but also the body-as-individual. “The first odious vessel produced by and for logistics is not the slave ship, but the body—flesh conceptualized—which bears the individual-in-subjection.”12 In the clearing, man is revealed as the loss of relation. Humanism is born here, in the empty space of the stolen land, in the vast expanse of the 1+1, the infinite regress of nothing-in-between. How to fill the emptiness? How to create an account for all that is lost and yet claimed? Mediation offers to fill the shape of the between. Mediation as the figure of what comes between, of what fills that “empty” space. The adjuster, the divorce lawyer, the priest, the government agent. A quick intervention to make sense of all that has become unclear, to fill in the lines, to provide context. And perhaps this does make things clearer, perhaps we understand each other a bit better now that we’ve mediated all we couldn’t make sense of in the vast emptiness of our difference. But the problem is: mediation never goes away. It sits there, inert but active, facilitating the ongoing impoverishment relation by adhering to all that takes the shape of the 1+1 of body-as-individual, of interpersonality. Because in advance of the gesture of inserting the mediating influence, he is already there. Long before the divorce, he hovers, betweener, judging, parsing, condoning, condemning. His take doesn’t really matter. What matters is that he remains in the offing, holding things apart. Mediation is the father of the control society. It is the way surveillance takes on a personality from the outside in. Whether formally or informally, mediation sets the tone for an interpersonality that, by definition, can only be lived at a distance. Playing at impartiality, mediation haunts the surround, reducing it to what is already known, what is already valued, what is already within the scope of the expressible. 2+1, always less than 3, mediation is passive aggressor, poised for judgment, always in the know (while it listens carefully). Because its role is to keep existence in its track, on its logistical path. It doesn’t really matter who is right. It matters that it needs mediation. Mediation knows best, trampling on any detail of middling, sewing interactivity into a twoness without excess. Hardening the between of interpersonality into the amplification of the self-same, mediation lodges at the interstice, cutting it into a hyphen, setting up its colony on the bridge. Settler, it speaks from a place it has never had to truly encounter because its role is only to order things apart. Harney and Moten might speak of mediation with the same disdain as they do of logistics, which they call the “science of whiteness.”13 Mediation is the logistic category par excellence of whiteness. It has no content, is not in itself an agent of transformation, does nothing but cannibalize the life it parses. Its intervention happens in the beat of enter and retreat, leaving the uneasy twoness of existence to sort itself out. In the name of property and propriety, mediation solves all uncertainties of zoning. That it never actually leaves is its dirty secret. But the logistics of mediation can only fail. The interface is shaky—we know this both from the endemic code 404, page not found, and from the impossibility of truly domesticating our surrounds. Ultimately, the squirrels, the black flies, the birds, the worms, the fungi, the weeds, the viruses, the hackers cannot be kept in their place. The disarray is handled, of course, with more mediation, with more logistics. The interface claims a distance, a secure between-two that repeats the refrain of nature colonized, of culture denatured. It promises a security of inhabitation, a zone that can be controlled, a slip through which we can safely enter, we who claim the place. Here, in the logistics of passage that beats at the cadence of the one-two, me-you, the outcome is always the same. Police to subjugate. Code to organize. Clear to colonize. Logistics aims to straighten us out, untangle us, and open us to its usufruct, its improving use; such access to us, in its turn, improves the flow line, the straight line. And what logistics takes to be the shortest distance between us requires emplotting us as bodies in space where interiority can be imposed even as the capacity for interiority can be denied, in the constant measure and regulation of flesh and earth.Scene 5 Deleuze and Guattari speak of man as the white wall of the black hole of existence.15 Think landscape painting, especially the kind that excises that very life that breathed it into existence. If you’re not familiar, search for “Canadian art.” And if you don’t know the history of the mansplaining of the Canadian landscape, search for the Group of Seven, the early twentieth-century Canadian landscape painters, and notice not only the ubiquity of the vast open, uninhabited space, notice the clearing. Very little has changed over the last hundred years. We still see Canada through the clear, in the emptiness of nature cultured. The denuded land, the empty north, is how we art ourselves still today, we who property the land. The Group of Seven, those painters of the land pristine, of the great white north, the painters of the land of the (single) pine and of the distant ridges, they are still with us, still managing the imagination, orchestrating the field, playing the dramaturgy of extinction. Logistics are also aesthetic (if not artful). The white man is a specter. That is to say, the white man is without content, without shape. He is the shift in form that allows all takings-place to be propertied inhabitations, which is to say, sites already claimed. This is whiteness: the pretense that the lines that demarcate the boundary between me and you protect you, protect me, from the wilderness of all that cannot be contained (and must be kept at bay). The truth is, the wilderness was cleared, but never quite colonized. And that is why whiteness is alive and well. To police a job half-done. Scene 6 Mediation makes many promises. It promises clarity: think, drop-down menu. It promises fairness: think, divorce court. It promises health: think, therapy. The gesture is cast as innocuous. A simple third, a neutral agent. A little bit of reason. A moment of distance. An interlude so that things can be tied up again and smooth functioning can resume. A representation of the useful.16 But what is it to insert distance into a field of relation if not violence of the highest degree? Whose distance? At what cost? To what ends? Guattari fights against this at every turn, refusing mediation either in politics or in psychiatry. Schizoanalysis is the proposition, a call for a transversal operation that breaks the pretense of neutrality in the encounter. A therapeutics of transversality. No more triangle. No more transference. Schizoanalysis is the event of the encounter itself, the practice of encountering. To be in the relation is to have been changed by it. What this looked like: a years-long institutional arrangement housed at a clinic called La Borde in the north of France whereby to be in the therapeutic encounter was to live with the effects of encounters in the everyday and to learn from them how to continue to live. Nothing very complicated, really. But infinitely complex in its transversality. Because to live in the encounter, to allow ourselves to be changed by it, is to be continuously undone, and to be sensitive to all that comes alive in that undoing. Who we are is a question that can only really be asked (and answered) by the mediator. The mediator, after all, looks in from outside to tell us how our actions are affecting the world. Without the mediator there is no steady external gaze, no calm interface for the mirroring. That’s why “who we are” is always a white question, a question of whiteness, of colonization. Blackness, write Harney and Moten, is not a thing, or a state (of being). It is the way the doing expresses. It is not a subject, not a person, not a property. It is a field. It is the excess on itself of a body claimed, blackened by hate. Blackness is the celebration of refusing to claim, to be claimed. “Meanwhile, Michael Brown is like another fall and rise through man—come and gone, as irruption and rupture, to remind us not that black lives matter but that black life matters; that the absolute and undeniable blackness of life matters; that this is not a judgment of value but a description of a field of activity that obliterates the worldly distinction between the organic and the inorganic.”17 Blackness is not the simple descriptor of what has been enfleshed. Blackness cannot be mediated into a form imposed (exposed). Blackness is the force of living that exceeds colonization, its accursed share. And in that sense, the wildness of the surround, it too is black. As is the earth. This is what Guattari means when he entreats us to move from schizoanalysis as a therapeutic-political dispositif, an agencement more than an apparatus, a moving-forth of encounterings afield, toward the transversality of what he calls the “three ecologies.”18 These three ecologies, the mental/conceptual, the environmental, and the social, are the overlap, as I see it, of a commitment to a blackening of the earth, out of the clear. (Necessarily European) man, in and as the exception, imposes speciation upon himself, in an operation that extracts and excepts himself from the earth in order to confirm his supposed dominion over it. And just as the earth must be forcefully speciated to be possessed, man must forcefully speciate himself in order to enact this kind of possession. This is to say that racialization is present in the very idea of dominion over the earth; in the very idea and enactment of the exception; in the very nuts and bolts of possession-by-improvement. The world is posed as the way to live on the earth as the individual is posed as the way to live in the world. To live in the world as an individual is therefore to be logistic, and to be logistic is to settle into a rhythm that kills, to beat out that rhythm over the undercommon track that keeps (giving away) its own measure.19 Scene 7 Guattari wrote The Three Ecologies in what have come to be known as his winter years. The winter years came after a sustained attempt at working with the Green Party in the aftermath of the terrible letdown of post-1968 politics in France. This attempt to connect to state politics left Guattari with a sour taste. He knew better, of course, than to trust state politics to be a site of transformation. Schizoanalysis had been the wager that there were other ways—that to work “in common,” “toward the common” is, ultimately, always to commit to the logic of mediation. In The Three Ecologies, he makes a plea to invent new ways of being committed to and involved in the urgent call to transversalize experience, ways that move beyond how the state lays claim to existence: In the domain of social ecology there will be times of struggle in which everyone will feel impelled to decide on common objectives and to act “like little soldiers,” by which I mean like good activists. But there will simultaneously be periods of resingularisation in which individual and collective subjectivities will take their marbles and go home without a thought for collective goals, and in which creative expression as such will take precedence. This new ecosophical logic—and I want to emphasize this point—resembles the manner in which an artist may be led to alter his work after the intrusion of some accidental detail, an event-incident that suddenly makes his initial project bifurcate, making it drift [dériver] far from its previous path, however certain it had once appeared to be.20 There is an echo in this ecosophic call to Moten and Harney: Rather than dissipate our preoccupation with how we live and breathe, we need to defend our ways in our persistent practice of them. It’s not about taking the streets; it’s about how, and about what, we take to the streets. What would it be and what would it mean for us jurisgeneratively to take to the streets, to live in the streets, to gather together another city right here, right now?21 Ecosophic logic is a refusal of the clearing, of the ways in which we seek to inhabit the space already colonized. It recognizes the lure, and understands the commitment to change that the gesture of taking the streets embodies. But ecosophic logic asks a different question: What if instead we practiced living by creating new conditions that didn’t center us, that didn’t inadvertently redeem that central and self-centering figure of man and its mediating logistics? What if we painted into the dérive of artfulness’s angle on experience? What if we moved at the pace of that accidental detail tangled with the weeds we have been wasting so much time clearing? Ecosophic logic is an urgent call to refuse the ongoing clearing that denies, decries, and violates the force of blackness in the ongoing genocide of all that resists the count. To refuse does not mean to face and challenge. Frontality, the neurotypical activity par excellence, only cements into place what is already there, what is already claiming the ground of existence. To refuse means to move into the accursed share of life-living twisting in the troubled interstice, to move with that anarchic share of existence that keeps giving life. For life-living to thrive, life has to be activated at those interstices that exceed man. Life’s expression as tangle has to be attuned to from the edges in. Conditions have to be crafted to honor what is not about us. This is what the First Nations in Barkskins of course already knew. And for this they were cleared. To see, to feel, what was always already there, to pulse with a force of life-living that cannot be claimed—owed or owned—this was always the crime. Scene 8 The many years Guattari spent practicing schizoanalysis, which is to say, living at La Borde and encountering, daily, the shape of an existence unmediated, an existence committed, always, to a refusal of normopathy—these are what he takes into the project of the three ecologies. And it is specifically the orientation of La Borde toward neurodiversity, I believe, that makes it necessary to underscore what he calls the mental, or conceptual, ecology as the inflecting force that must, and will, change the contours of the environmental and the social. La Borde taught him this: to skirt the question of the subject leaves the black hole wide open, filled to the brim with neurotypicality, whiteness. In the sickness that has befallen the earth—the ongoing genocide of all that eludes the count—subjectivity, too, has fallen ill. Replaced by the face of man, given the guise of whiteness in all its logistical powers of mediation, subjectivity has been swallowed, engulfed by the subject. “The main feature of the colonial-capitalistic unconscious is the reduction of subjectivity to its subject’s experience.”22 But subjectivity, as Guattari understands it, is nothing other than its ongoing production. It is not the subject. It is the transversal, the emergent unmediated middle, the collectivity that must never be reduced to the one. This is why, for a renewed project of the earth, or as Moten and Harney would have it, for the blackening of the earth—“we are the moving, blackened, blackening earth”23—“it will be a question of literally reconstructing the modalities of ‘group-being’ [l’être-en-groupe], not only through ‘communicational’ interventions but through existential mutations driven by the motor of subjectivity.”24 To construct modalities for group-being is a call for an aesthetics of sociality which exceeds the 1+1 of interpersonality. Group-being, or what Guattari refers to as the “group subject,” is not countable. The group subject is never the sum of its parts. As solitary as it is multiplicitous, the group subject makes felt how subjectivity is produced in the excess on itself of coming into relation. The group subject is how the more-than of the relational field finds expression. It is the emergent collectivity of an expression of life-living shared (in its accursed excess), expression irreducible to the one, always beyond consensus. Without mediation, the group subject is activated in the renunciation of summing up. To produce the modalities for this excess of existence requires a mutation on existence itself, a mutation that in every sense rethinks subjectivity as a position. The group subject reminds us that what we produce is never solely ours. We are not simply our-selves. We are fieldings of complex imbrication. Any other account of experience is subjected to mediation, organized by logistics. Anarchival to the core, the production of subjectivity is not an account of a life contained. It is not condensable to something like identity. It is not reducible to the form of the human. It is always more-than, always in movement, a motor or conduit of a worlding. The production of subjectivity bodies in the same gesture that it refuses to be a body, an “individual-in-subjection.”25 That is to say: in the production of subjectivity the bodying is always a being of relation. Always in movement, it does its living in the unlimited exposure that exceeds any body-world separation. Subjectivity is not inside. It is not in me. It is out of me. Rather than speak of the “subject,” we should perhaps speak of components of subjectification, each working more or less on its own. This would lead us, necessarily, to re-examine the relation between concepts of the individual and subjectivity, and, above all, to make a clear distinction between the two. Vectors of subjectification do not necessarily pass through the individual, which in reality appears to be something like a “terminal” for processes that involve human groups, socio-economic ensembles, data-processing machines, etc. Therefore, interiority establishes itself at the crossroads of multiple components, each relatively autonomous in relation to the other, and, if need be, in open conflict.26 “That abolition starts with the self.”27 In the drift, subjectivity’s dérive is irreducible to the human. Active in the interval of worlds making themselves, subjectivity is never reducible to a subject. The production of subjectivity is the activity of the interstice: vector, not form. Schizoanalysis works at this uneasy juncture. The task of schizoanalysis is not to get between body and world, between-two. Its task is to make way for all that already populates the between, and to agitate, from within the field of relation, orientations already in germ. Fostering the germination, tending the field, schizoanalysis vectors the inflection. The vectoring requires a subtraction from the open field of all that is still in potentia. Schizoanalysis culls from potential a shape, a way. This excision from process is a subtraction from infinitude to the finite. From the side of infinitude, in the field of immanence, Whitehead calls this activity that sparks a standing out of experience “importance.” From the side of finitude, in the field of activity, Whitehead calls it “expression”: Expression is founded on the finite occasion. It is the activity of finitude impressing itself on its environment. Thus it has its origin in the finite; and it represents the immanence of the finite in the multitude of its fellows beyond itself. The two together, namely importance and expression, are witnesses both to the monistic aspect of the universe and to its pluralistic character. Importance passes from the world as one to the world as many; whereas, expression is the gift from the world as many to the world as one.28 Importance and expression function as intensifiers of experience, bringing into activity the singularity of a life that nonetheless continues to carry its anarchic share. In this account, the human is not singled out. There is no externalizing voice, no mediator. Arrows of experience are their own force, importance not a question of what matters to me, but of what actually (but always also in potentia) makes a difference. Importance makes way for precision in experience. That is to say, importance is what fosters a certain specific angle of existence, allowing certain qualities of experience to take precedence over others. We have come to believe that mediation is necessary to parse experience. But as Whitehead emphasizes, the world is always in its own pursuit of amplification. Incessant clearing, colonialism without end, in the afterlife of slavery, results in systems out of kilter. Ecological destruction has finally begun to register, centuries too late. The question of how to bring things into a metastability that is conducive to life-living must involve a reckoning with the deadening force of mediation. We don’t need another apology. We need to get out of the way. The blackening of the earth requires the production of something entirely other than me, or you.The infraface29 of the three ecologies—“the world as one to the world as many … the world as many to the world as one”—is immediating.30 Immediation is not the opposite of mediation. Rather, it is the force of a thirdness irreducible to a between-two. Immediation is the more-than, the n+1 that is by necessity n-1, one as many, many as one, the qualitative force of an uncountability that diagonalizes to give rise to what else moves in the relation. The production of subjectivity is immediating to the degree that it is not produced by something outside itself. Immediating, always at once body and world, its own perspective. That is to say, its angle on existence is not ours, cannot be reduced to us. The production of subjectivity is a making-conceptual of existence. It is an attuning to the deadly violence of the body-world split produced in the wake of the clearing.31 There are not three ecologies. There is one ecology multiply intertwined. To get to the potential of what the three ecologies in their transversality offer, the production of subjectivity must be attended to. We have failed each other at the juncture of the production of subjectivity in particular, and nothing will be possible without that shift. In the words of The Invisible Committee, the exhaustion of natural resources is probably much less advanced than the exhaustion of subjective resources, of vital resources, that is afflicting our contemporaries. If so much satisfaction is derived from surveying the devastation of the environment it’s largely because this veils the frightening ruin of subjectivities. Every oil spill, every sterile plain, every species extinction is an image of our souls in rags, a reflection of our lack of world, of our intimate impotence to inhabit it.32 To become in excess of a person, to activate the conditions for a life-living that worlds in the bodying, is a social and environmental act. The emergent sociality of becoming-environmental never happens through the clearing. In happens in the midst, black flies and all. The production of subjectivity in the transversality of the three ecologies is the way the more-than of nature naturing crafts a sociality ecosophically. A sociality, as Harney and Moten might say, all incomplete. Guattari calls the ecology he associates with the production of subjectivity “mental.” I prefer conceptual, to produce a stronger sense of how the world itself is alive with the movement of thought. A turn to Whitehead brings the two together. For Whitehead, the conceptual share is that excess of experience that tunes the occasion to its potential. All activity in the world has a conceptual share, but it is true to say that some aspects of existence make use of it more emphatically. Whitehead calls this “mentality.” Mentality, as in Guattari, is not reducible to the mind. Mentality is the force of existence. It is the world’s capacity to exceed itself. All incomplete, the world continuously renews itself. Scene 10 We don’t need to look to some far off lands: it’s already here. Isn’t that what Tommy Orange means when he says, “Being Indian has never been about returning to the land. The land is everywhere or nowhere”?33 The work has already begun. The accursed share of life-living is too unwieldy, too uncountable, to be mediated. It cannot be governed. This is its potency, but also its fallacy. The work is not where we’ve been taught it is. And the tools we need are not the ones we own. a nascent subjectivity a constantly mutating socius an environment in the process of being reinvented34 The three ecologies are a proposition. They are not a place. To follow the artist-architects Arakawa and Madeline Gins, we might call them an architectural procedure.35 An architectural procedure is not an architecture. It is a fielding of potential that brings into constellation enabling constraints for the construction of a world. Procedurality is key. An architectural procedure must produce itself propositionally. This means that what emerges will never be a thing, a site. It will undercommon itself into existence, perhaps—as Arakawa and Gins once said—“only making an appearance indirectly.”36 Because to see-feel it is to have created the conditions for feeling, conditions that were never reducible to a subject as given in advance. The event of the three ecologies is here, in the productive looping of a field of experience that is at once constitutive of its expression and constituted by it. Because when importance and expression meet, it is never at our bidding.

2022 Michigan Kritik
Aff --- Disability --- K lab › 1AC › 1AC --- Mad Blackness

The 1AC operates as an intervention against white able-bodied structures that seek to bracket out forms of black. Absent this analysis, whiteness will always seek to control the uncontrollable of mad black life.

Pickens 19 [Therí Alyce Pickens, Professor of English, specializing in African American, Arab America and disability literatures and theories at Bates University, June 7, 2019 “Black Madness :: Mad Blackness”, Duke University Press, Durham and London, pgs. 50-54, JMH]

As I mentioned, I deploy the term madness because of the critical possibilities it offers in its vagueness. It operates as a way to describe impairments such as cognitive disability or mental illness as well as a catchall phrase designed to reference those not behaving according to culturally prescribed norms. Here, I harken back to the idea that madness is maddeningly everywhere with biopsychological and sociocultural valences. Within Black cultural contexts, madness not only has this critical purchase but also carries with it the vernacular appeal of excess (e.g., mad as equivalent to very) and anger. For the purposes of this discussion, I loosely bifurcate madness into two categories, keeping in mind that each carries with it the cultural valences of excess: cognitive impairment (read: autism, Down syndrome, traumatic brain injury, dementia, etc.) and mental illness (read: bipolar, depression, schizophrenia, etc.). I split these experiences in order to attend to the differences in the way madness writ large is treated within Black cultural contexts.3 There are overlapping concerns, to be sure, but the reactions within Black communities shift depending on the particular kind of madness one demonstrates. Lurking within each discussion of madness— cognitive impairment or mental illness—is the idea, simply put, that Blackness changes things. A Black cultural context mandates a different set of interpretive strategies because of the confluence of structural racism from the outside and its impact on the intracultural community, and structural patriarchy and ableism emanating from within the community. Parsing mental illness and cognitive disability allows for a certain type of granularity when discussing Black cultural contexts and madness. The conversation that follows relocates the discussion of Blackness and madness outside the confines of the interracial encounter in order to under stand what may constitute disability cultures within Blackness. What analytics become necessary when examining madness within Blackness? There are of course two caveats to this discussion. First, it is not entirely possible to get outside the confines of white cisheteropatriarchy, since it structures so much of what is possible within Black contexts. For that reason, I turn to Nalo Hopkinson’s work because she dares to theorize a set of Black cultural contexts that are largely independent from white cisheteropatriarchal structures. Hopkinson’s theorizing about intraracial contexts relies on the particular tools of Black speculative fiction, even though her ideas resonate outside of that creative context.4 I also focus on cultural narratives because of what they offer in terms of theorizing from below, especially since “through analysis, texts on disability can be made to reveal the texture of community life.”5 The second caveat is that there are a wide variety of Black cultural contexts available to examine. The intention of this discussion is not to provide a rubric that suits all of them but to provide an inroad to examination, one that exists as a set of overarching analytical possibilities until others develop. As a way to develop this schema, I read the current strategies for discussing madness within Blackness. Again, the critical literature reveals itself to itself through the gaps it leaves unattended. I propose the mad Black as a way to reimagine and reread. Nalo Hopkinson, as an artist-theorist, creates mad Black characters—one with a cognitive disability and another with a mental illness—in her mad Black novel Midnight Robber (2000). The two narratives twin each other and open up the possibilities for interpreting madness within Black communities. In considering mental illness within Black communities, two interpretive moments in the critical literature open up the parameters to think through how madness lays bare common culturally accepted narratives about Blackness. For example, in Anna Mollow’s meditation on Meri Nana-Ama Danquah’s Willow Weep for Me: A Black Woman’s Journey through Depression, A Memoir (1998), Mollow concludes that Danquah’s narrative of depression foregrounds her race, class position, and immigrant status as a barrier to receiving adequate health care for her depression. Contrary to most within the ex-patient/survivor/consumer movement, Danquah’s concern is not overmedication or forced medication but a lack thereof. Not only do health care professionals demonstrate a lack of competence in discussing the influence of racial discrimination on Danquah’s depression, but Danquah also has to combat the following ideas: that depression is not real, that she is particularly strong as a Black woman, and (specific to her identity as an immigrant) that she only need work harder to overcome her sadness. Mollow reads Danquah’s narrative as a structural critique of the medical establishment’s tendency to ignore and/or underestimate Black women’s pain. I would add that Danquah’s memoir is a cultural critique of intraracial dictums that diminish Black women’s experiences with mental illness. What Mollow’s reading reveals is that Danquah’s depression exceeds the parameters in which she is expected to operate as a Ghanaian immigrant woman in the United States, parameters set by both dominant cultures and her own. To my mind, Danquah becomes circumscribed by her inability to appropriately perform the scripts of Black womanhood because of her mental illness. Here, the critical gap lies in the space between how Danquah’s depression indexes structural critique and how it also points to sociocultural critique. Whereas Mollow’s reading of Danquah’s narrative reveals how structural racism materially compounds the assault of oppressive intracultural narratives, literary interpretations within African American Studies unmask the limited space available for Black characters who experience madness. When discussing August Wilson’s oeuvre, which includes his cadre of cognitively disabled characters, Harry Elam describes “racialized madness” as a “trope that became operative in clinical practice, literary creation, and cultural theory in the modern period as artists, critics, and practitioners in all these arenas identified social and cultural roots for Black psychological impairment.”6 Elam usefully locates this trope in Frantz Fanon’s and W. E. B. Du Bois’s work as a diagnosis of what ails African descended people. The solution with August Wilson’s (and others’) work is to upend the social, cultural, and discursive elements that comprise a world hostile to Blackness. Elam argues that August Wilson creates characters that experience madness to clarify how much social and spiritual change would be necessary for a group of people who have already been driven mad by a mad world. This is a sociogenic madness, madness without pathos.7 I reference Elam and his work in African American literary study because of the way sociogenic theories have particular critical purchase for this field. They denounce the pathologization of Black people for being Black yet embrace the understanding of the world as anti-Black. Yet, this is also madness without the multidimensionality that accompanies embodiment or aesthetic intervention: madness in service of sanity. Mollow, Elam, and others abide by one delimited script: madness is not a biological or psychosocial impairment with experiences all its own. Rather, those who are Black and mad are societal bellwethers. Their madness either presages or pinpoints putative larger issues at stake. This idea rests on the politicization of both Blackness and madness, where either or both are primarily or solely political identities. Black madness then becomes revelatory for the rest of the world and the Black mad folks—real or imagined—stand in for an examination of what is happening. Their existence functions as an analysis tout court, an explication de texte that the world operates according to antiBlack logics. This script is of course not new. We have consistently thought of people who occupy marginalized social positions as markers of whether our governments, cultures, and communities fulfill ethical or moral obligations of caretaking. However, we cannot completely shunt aside the way the idea of a societal bellwether objectifies and distances the Black mad, stripping them of the multidimensionality that would emerge within a communal context. Critics attend to this conceptual problem by considering these characters or people within intraracial communities, but often these communities embrace this script as well. From this critical impulse follows the erroneous idea that the Black mad do not have community, or they operate as lone soldiers. Here, their existential or ontological homelessness becomes a vehicle for other (sometimes, non-Black or non-mad) characters or people to discover their own missing humanity. Or, said homelessness results in death. Read in the fold, in the break. The Black mad as societal bellwether moves according to a linear progression of time, where their existence must be incorporated or excised in order to demonstrate progress of some sort. (Billy Ray Johnson echoes here.) Typically, that results in an erasure of either their Blackness or their madness. Removing the impulse to view the Black mad as living analyses, they become invaginated into the moments of a text and do not function in the service of others but rather have their own plotlines and, sometimes, create their own resolutions. Or don’t. Narrative time no longer stands still, but it also does not operate strictly in linear fashion, preferring to intussuscept itself or create gaps and pauses.

2022 Michigan Kritik
Aff --- Disability --- K lab › 1AC › 1AC --- Mad Blackness

Our embracement of Black madness :: mad blackness operates as a discursive move against the imposition of whiteness and being able bodied through speaking on realities that are inherently unspeakable. Absent this mode of analysis, logics of white eugenics will lock mad blackness into a position of unfreedom.

Pickens 19 [Therí Alyce Pickens, Professor of English, specializing in African American, Arab America and disability literatures and theories at Bates University, June 7, 2019 “Black Madness :: Mad Blackness”, Duke University Press, Durham and London, pgs. 24-29, JMH]

Seemingly in answer to Bell’s work, scholars developed a reading strategy that clarifies how race and disability operate: mutual constitution. Specifically, mutual constitution impresses upon readers how these two discourses operate as interrelated and simultaneously present. This reading strategy performs several useful functions within the scholarship. In the interest of carving space to examine our critical conversations and open them up with the work of artists-theorists, I turn to several key moments in our use of mutual constitution to think through when it works and when it does not. This critical reading strategy becomes useful when understanding how disability has been used as a discursive tool. For example, racial and gendered groups have tended to justify their cases for civil rights in opposition to individuals with disabilities. The rhetorical invocation of disability here only functions to undergird the validity of another people groups’ personhood (at the expense of the personhood of the disabled).4 Disability, in this case, does not quite exist as a material reality but rather as a hauntological presence that helps create race and gender, sometimes as superlative. In thinking of race and disability as material, one must consider that contexts of oppression and war create disability, often with detrimental effects on those already disenfranchised by institutional racism.5 In this case, disability shores up the physical evidence of institutionalized racism and systemic injustice, helping to define race as a matter of life and death. In addition to highlighting the discursive and material effects of race and disability in tandem, such mutuality also serves an argumentative function. Since it is a critical reading practice, it also shapes how critics write about the two subjects. This project, in its interest in openoing up the critical literature to itself, invests in discussing this as a writing and reading strategy for how it roadmaps intellectual possibility (and, as the metaphor goes, closes off certain avenues). Within Ellen Samuels’s monograph Fantasies of Identification: Disability, Gender, Race (2014), she pinpoints that “the mutual entangled and constitutive dynamic of disability, gender, and race in modern fantasies of identification determines the shape and trajectory of [her] book” and, in articulating her main argument, states that “if, at times, one of these embodied social identities comes to the foreground, such that parts of the book address disability or race or gender more centrally, the overarching argument remains structured around the inseparability of their meanings.”6 An incredibly useful proposition. Samuels’s caveat guarantees that readers do not miss the way that all discussions heavily rely on each other. Historically speaking, the creating of disability, race, and gender occurs at the same time. The strands of what would become modern medicine worked to differentiate bodies from each other, specifically normal bodies from abnormal ones, where abnormal was constituted in gendered, raced, and abled terms. These fantasies of identification found their justification in what Samuels terms “biocertification,”7 a process that further links the construction of abnormality (and with it the construction of Blackness and disability) to objective science, aspiring to some semblance of truth. What becomes clear is not just that one cannot read race without disability nor disability without race, but that their entanglement requires a robust critical armature that grapples with them both. When I trace the use of mutual constitution, two critical reading practices emerge: first, recuperation projects that seek to historicize, and, second, retrieval projects that read against ableism to find agency. In this way, mutual constitution performs as scholarly shorthand for “It’s complicated.” Intussuscepted (that is, enfolded) in these readings are several challenges to the practices themselves: specifically, scholarship is stagnated between recuperation and resistance. What of the projects that are neither? Is there a space between these or next to them, narratologically speaking? How can we read the moments when race and disability have a wider range of relationships? In what follows, I read the spaces where the critical material breaks open the possibilities for new readings of Blackness and disability in tandem. Though much of this material analyzes Blackness and disability broadly, I find that the distillate reveals the critical material to itself, suggesting that madness, Black madness in particular, troubles the impulses of retrieval and radicality. First, Blackness and madness encounter the problem of existing on the same temporal plane, particularly when whiteness is a factor. The Black mad subject gets evacuated from history while the white able subject or white disabled subject dictates the terms of history’s narration. Second, Black mad subjects cannot always serve as the prompts for others’ freedom from ableism. It is possible for Black individuals, institutions, and cultural spaces to be ableist. Moreover, when Black spaces function as examples of freedom for others, they do not exist on their own terms, a logical concern that lands us back in the terrain where whiteness instrumentalizes Blackness for its own ends. Later in this conversation, I turn to Octavia E. Butler’s Fledgling (2005) and her archive for how she theorizes Blackness and madness.8 Butler’s texts and her archive offer alternative analytic strategies to the problems posed by mutual constitution in its current form. Recuperating, Historicizing Mutual constitution attends to the fiction of fixity often ascribed to race and disability writ large. Reading race and disability in this way yokes the discourses to each other, since they typically cannot be pinned down elsewhere. When Ellen Samuels traces the way this mutual constitution functioned within the nineteenth century, she finds that the discourses that created and sustained ideas about race and ability were not only created at the same time but also reliant on each other for validity. These national fantasies were created by physicians who scrupulously searched the body for clues about its difference.10 Both the physically or mentally abnormal body and the racially abnormal body were understood as close cousins, demonstrating in their difference the validity and supremacy of the white able body by contrast. Samuels writes, “At the core of the fantasy of identification lies the assumption that embodied social identities such as race, gender, and disability are fixed, legible, and categorizable. This assumption, by now deeply naturalized in our social and ontological structures, in fact required elaborate construction and ongoing policing through the nineteenth century and early twentieth.”11 The very mutability of these social categories makes necessary the fiction of their fixity and the necessity of their policing by parties for whom that mutability causes concern. Mutual constitution offers a conceptual corrective, given the discursive history, and allows for an analysis to take shape around that history and the cultural context of its object(s) of inquiry. Ensuring that this corrective attends to history authorizes critics to acknowledge the plasticity of Blackness and madness in tandem. Consider that the United States census of 1840 was the first to provide statistics about mental illness. The faulty statistics counted a higher incidence of madness among Blacks in the North at numbers that far exceeded the amount of Black people full stop. This pseudoscientific evidence not only arrogated madness to Blackness generally but also provided putative proof that Blacks were unfit for freedom, claiming that free Blacks were eleven times more likely to have mental illness than the enslaved or white populations.12 The postbellum environment does not undergo a dramatic shift in this regard; the definitions of Blackness available hinge on definitions of sanity. Kim Nielsen’s A Disability History of the United States (2012) traces the early conception of citizenship as tied not only to enslavement but to mental illness as well.13 This connection and its mutability continue into the mid-twentieth century when wider public scrutiny of mental health institutions (and some scandal), advocacy from the family of president John F. Kennedy, and civil rights discourse made it possible to imagine integrating mentally ill and cognitively disabled people into public spaces.14 This integration effort occurs simultaneous to that which occurred for Black people, linking the two populations in the public sphere. This history pertains mostly to those categorized as mentally ill or cognitively disabled. Though the definition of madness for this text is more expansive than that (given the healthy skepticism of psy-disciplines based on this history), sketching the relationships between the two discourses and social identities over time permits a closer look at how Blackness and madness rely on each other for concretization. Such an analysis also reveals how tenuous they are. This history makes clear that within the United States’s cultural zeitgeist, there is no Blackness without madness, nor madness without Blackness. Yet, the discourses’ fragility suggests that the two have been forced together out of political convenience and presumed abjection. Notwithstanding the utility of mutual constitution as a historicizing tool, it cannot—as a methodology—fully account for how race and disability interact on a body or between bodies. To be mutually constituted implies a reciprocity of creation. I put pressure on reciprocity because mutual implies simultaneity while occupying the temporal plane. I put pressure on creation because constitution assumes that, where discourses or material conditions related to race and disability exist, they develop and are sustained completely and consistently. In other words, the phrase mutual constitution implies race and disability announce themselves at the same time and both exert pressure in constant fashion. Case in point: Michelle Jarman’s work exposes this fold. In her hermeneutic reading of lynch mobs and eugenic discourse, she writes that the two discourses are “not equal or competing” but rather “dynamic social and discursive processes that inform each other.”15 What her rhetorical sleight of hand allows is the possibility that one discourse will occupy more space than another or affect the material reality more than the other particularly within interracial encounter. Jarman pinpoints the hefty pull of eugenics discourse on the eventual castration of Benjy Compson (in Faulkner’s The Sound and the Fury). Because the action of the novel takes place during the early twentieth century, she links this eugenics discourse to the pervasive nature and likely rationales for lynch mob murders. Though her link to lynch mobs undergirds her argument by positioning the two discourses as reliant on each other, her readings reveal that they do not affect material reality equally. For instance, Jarman’s opening gambit points to a tragic illustration of when both ableist and racist discourses collide in the real life beating of Billy Ray Johnson, a Black cognitively disabled man, and its aftermath. Here, the full force of racist eugenics comes to bear on the availability of justice for Johnson. There is a slippage in the way these two discourses occupy space: news outlets, civil rights organizations, and law enforcement could not conceptualize Johnson as both Black and cognitively disabled (I say more about this invisibility in the second discussion). He was either one or the other in their imagination. The material consequence— suspended sentences and probation for his assailants instead of jail time— exacerbates the violence already inflicted. What Jarman’s example reveals is that race and disability do vie for narrative space and, in this instance, determine material consequence based on which narrative is told and which is believed. Billy Ray Johnson’s story ghosts that of Faulkner’s Benjy because it undermines how we read the interlocking ideas about Blackness and madness within Sound and the Fury Here lies the critical lacuna we have yet to address. The historicization approach to discussions about race and disability presumes a linear progression of time, an unfolding that takes place at a pace to which we have become accustomed delineated by demarcations of second, minute, hour, day, month, and year. However, as calendars themselves often lay bare, few cultures think of time in the same way. Which New Year do you celebrate? Is your calendar lunar or solar? Time does not progress in the same fashion for everyone. It becomes useful to think of history in terms of the fold. Here, I yoke Spillers’s concept of the flesh with Deleuze’s understanding of the fold (a point of connection between ideas where one begets the other) to Fred Moten’s conceptualization of being, living, writing, meaning “in the break” (where history and narrative converge—invaginate or intussuscept to use his terms—as a requisite part of being intertwined). If we are to linger in the fold, in the break, then we must reckon with the way madness and Blackness force us to render history countermnemonically: attending to gaps, mistakes, deferrals, silences, glitches. It is in this break, cut, fold that the relationship between Blackness and madness becomes most clear. Here is the relationship between Blackness and disability writ large, a relationship sutured at times by its connections, but also turned in and turned out by missed connections, erasures, and gaps.16 Despite the fact that both disability and race as ideas emerged at the same moments in history, they do not necessarily occupy the same temporal plane when conjoined in quotidian interaction. In thinking of interracial encounter for instance, Sharon P. Holland reminds us of a “persistent problem in the Black/white encounter,” specifically that we must question “what happens when someone who exists in time meets someone who only occupies space?”17 As she delineates, Blackness appears as the antithesis of history, its excretion, whereas whiteness stands in for progression, being in time. Our sense of the two interacting in the same moment then is skewed by the fact that Blackness is not meant to be a part of history but rather its object. Black cultural production has consistently expanded upon this idea through its skepticism of linear progressive narratives that assume Western origins, choosing instead to position Africa (usually the continent, broadly conceptualized) as a futuristic space or elide Western notions of time and space.18 Thinking through the Black mad subject, we must consider that this person is meant not only to occupy space but to be consistently removed from space in order to make room for the more recognizable subject: the white able body. It is this body that dictates the terms of history and narrative. In the case of Billy Ray Johnson, the criminal justice system determined that his assailants were allowed to move on with their lives regardless of the violence and damage done to his body. If we are to consider Bell’s modest proposal, the Black mad subject is removed from time to make space for the white disabled body as well. In other words, the Black disabled subject exists only to shore up the value of others. So, when the Black/white encounter is divided along ability lines such that the disabled body is white and the able body is Black, what emerges is a dynamic of relationships that force Blackness and disability into the realm of unspeakability, troubling the idea that both are created and sustained at the same time.

2022 Michigan Kritik
Aff --- Disability --- K lab › 1AC › 1AC --- Mad Blackness

Moves towards progress through an embracement of a collective humanity relies on an Enlightenment reading of humanism that is incoherent for accounting for black disabled life. Black life is not locked into the position of being fully human nor fully slave; instead you should understand black life as lived within social death.

Pickens 19 [Therí Alyce Pickens, Professor of English, specializing in African American, Arab America and disability literatures and theories at Bates University, June 7, 2019 “Black Madness :: Mad Blackness”, Duke University Press, Durham and London, pgs. 74-78, JMH]

The ideological conceit of the human materializes at every turn. It operates as the main thrust of an argument about the (in)validity of Black and mad subjects’ existence. As it becomes an appeal to or for a purported universal experience, it ironically denies some humans a humanity according to Western European ideals, which are fundamentally anti-Black and sanist. Since it masquerades as normalcy, it insidiously functions as an apparition—ghosting a text or an event. Conceptually, humanity separates the human from flora and fauna and ostensibly guarantees that a human will be thought of as an autonomous subject, operating with agency and securing the legal, social, cultural, political, and material conditions to do so. For mad Black subjects, this definition of the human does not apply. This understanding of humanity, forged in the crucible of the Enlightenment period, undergirds our analytic praxis as well. Its materiality affects the access Black mad subjects are granted to particular conditions and, as a discursive construct, adherence to it affects the theoretical paradigms with which we work in literary criticism. This is the break where the criticism reveals itself to itself: this notion of humanity lingers in the criticism that art—exclusive to humans, of course—must have specific characteristics (formalism). As the previous conversation intimates, it subtends our attention to and preoccupation with ocularity and the logos (deconstruction, structuralism). It assumes that readers’ seldom autonomous interpretations evince the value of meaning in a text (reader-oriented criticism). It occupies our concerns about interiority (psychoanalysis) and labor (Marxism) since it finds critical purchase in the energy expended by certain human bodies and minds (feminist criticism, queer studies, disability studies, ethnic studies, etc.). Sedimented within our interpretive strategies and invested with promise— so much so since we refer to ourselves as humanists—the concept of the human becomes nearly impossible to critically examine. The ideology of the human carries with it an exclusivity: namely, that the category of human belongs solely to a figure Rosemarie Garland Thomson terms the normate. Such a figure—white, male, cis gendered, straight, able-bodied, Protestant— excludes multiple identity categories on its face.1 Because of its origins in the Enlightenment and entanglement with the Middle Passage, eugenics, imperialism/colonialism, and the carceral system, the human poses a set of ontic and narratological problems for Black madness and mad Blackness. In the previous conversations within this text we’ve seen how the concept of the human could be opened up, the cut widened, when an artist-theorist places Blackness and madness at the center rather than the periphery. For instance, Butler uses Ina to theorize about the constellation of intimate relationships available when Blackness and madness form the crux of a new identity. Hopkinson’s cognitively disabled and mentally ill characters shift the narratological terrain when their specific minds become the locus of the novel. Each artist-theorist questions how capacious the category of human can be. What boundaries keep humans fundamentally human? If remaining human is possible or preferable, what exactly does it mean to be one? How might we read and interpret if we cannot assume the validity of the human? Following a politics of curiosity,2 I conjecture about what it might mean to unmake madness and Blackness, detract from the critical and narrative power each has accrued as derogatory. Though I consider that both discourses were fomented in the Enlightenment as a way of defining and disciplining nonnormative bodies, I am not interested in turning to con versations between Enlightenment thinkers (or those wrestling within that tradition). I am much more interested in the critical gaps and folds explored by Black studies and disability studies thinkers. Their analyses invaginate our discussions, forcing us to examine how we think about madness and Blackness in a world hostile to them. This discussion comes from two strains: one, from the previous conversations in this project in which nonhuman characters populate the landscape, and, two, from a larger conversation beyond this project about the potential of madness and Blackness to be disruptive once one divests from the human as a category or concept. I turn to those in disability and Black studies who have theorized about the creation of human and humanity as a concept vis-à-vis madness and Blackness. I purpose to trace their understanding of this concept and, since the two have often implicated but not involved each other, I also aim to find the common conceptual ground between them.3 Last, I turn to artist-theorist Tananarive Due’s African Immortals series as a mad Black text that operates as a heuristic, questions the validity of human as a concept, and explores the repercussions of abandoning it. Though I read the text as a set of experiments, I concentrate on a few overarching story lines—desiring Blackness, understanding the ideology of ability, and forming new interpretive strategies—that question whether the conception of the human has particular narrative power. Other F-Words: Fugitivity, Fungibility, & Futility Scholars within Black studies have long contested the category of human for Black people. Sylvia Wynter’s oeuvre contains a rigorous and adroit critique of this concept, designating the human as a localized Judeo Christian concept that she terms Man.4 She traces it through the Enlightenment to the late twentieth-century Caribbean, citing that the human was ideologically designed to exclude Indigenous people and Blacks.5 There could be no room for those whose subjugation made colonial and imperial life possible. To be clear, this subjugation was not simply about putting those bodies to work, and harnessing their labor, but also about the intellectual subjugation and cultural denigration of those bodies. They had to be deployed in service of the colonial and imperial subject physically, and simultaneously disregarded as a space of intellectual and cultural complexity. The prohibitions against reading, gathering, and marriage (just to name a few) ensured that the Black cultural and social institutions developed did not carry with them the validating stamp of approval from social institutions that had power. Excising Blackness from histories (read: time) makes permissible the kind of erasure that facilitates thinking of Blacks as outside the realm of the human. Moreover, the emphasis on labor sustained a set of practices that sought to create a permanent underclass from the antebellum period to the present. Blackness then not only bears the mark of being thought of as having a fundamental lack of humanity, but that lack is determined, and circumscribed, by fungibility and fugitivity. Race, then, and Blackness specifically, determines who lives and who dies.6 As a result of this thanatological constraint, Blackness remains exteriorized, consistently unaccounted for in the construction of the modern world.7 Even after Man, to deploy the term in Wynter’s lexicon for the human, definitions of Blackness must contend with abjection. The analytical praxis consistently turns and returns to the areas where Blackness has a circumscribed agency, limns a limited radicality, and remains enmeshed with histories of violence and degradation. Scholars differ on their responses to abjection such that some attempt to maneuver out of it, and others accept it as part of the experiences of Blackness. To be clear, accepting abjection is not equivalent to accepting institutionalized racism. Instead, it requires viewing Black social life as lived in light of social death,8 or finding freedom in unfreedom. Jared Y. Sexton’s notion that Blacks live in light of social death dovetails with Fred Moten’s understanding of freedom in unfreedom in one crucial way: that abjection must be circumnavigated if one exists. The difference between the two scholars’ arguments resides in how that navigation takes place and with what affective residues. That is, radicality and resistance evince an ontology circumscribed by the discourses of fugitivity and fungibility. Locating the origins of these discourses in the antebellum period, some scholars also find that abjection must be understood as a fundamental aspect of Black life post–Middle Passage. These scholars— among them Kimberly Juanita Brown, Saidiya Hartman, Christina Sharpe, Hortense Spillers, and Alexander Weheliye—all understand the long reach of the antebellum period as having direct repercussions to how Black life functions currently. Slavery as a vast hemispheric project fundamentally shapes how Blacknesses operate discursively and materially.9 The residues of unspoken, ethical grammars force those who find some degree of maneuverability possible to wrestle with some exigencies, such as the queered and erotic Black/white encounter or the presumed degradation of male rape as a locus of Black radical power.10 Man tethers itself to Blackness through abjec tion, requiring Blackness to make meaning through a grammar that enfolds within it the resistance to itself. Abjection becomes the facet of Blackness (not Blackness in toto) typified by the fact that “you can’t win. You can’t break even. And, you can’t get out of the game.”11 Whereas the field of Black studies has chosen to question the validity of the human as a concept, disability studies has taken a decidedly different strategy. Disability studies makes a particular claim on the human even as it acknowledges that the category excludes disability as a matter of course. For instance, myriad scholars clarify that the conception of health and ability determines who is included and who is worthy of living. Lives thought to be too painful, deformed, or requiring too much medical intervention often fight for the right to live at all.12 The typical disability studies response has been to depict disability as a part of human variance, a part of the spectrum of human experience. This particular formulation correlates to the idea that if one lives long enough, one will become disabled. The kingdom of the sick, as Sontag puts it, always welcomes new visitors and permanent residents.13 Undergirding this idea is the conception of the human as potentially inclusive of disability, where disability can function as an absent presence. According to disability studies scholars, this absent presence surfaces in narrative, art, and rhetoric, among other cultural and social spaces. For instance, the Venus de Milo makes its current claim to beauty based on its amputee status.14 In Keywords for Disability Studies, the entry on aesthetics positions disability as hopeful prospect despite its position and history: “The close proximity of aesthetic judgment to carceral isolation and rationalized euthanasia is the darker side of Enlightenment knowledge, even as the increased visibility of the disabled body creates the occasion for its liberation.”15 Narrative relies on intellectual disability even when it is not named as such or embodied within a character.16 Communication requires the disabled body to establish itself not only as coherent but also saleable in terms of diversity.17 In each of these instances, the human is a category to which disabled people already belong, albeit in abjected and absented form. The idea is not only that the human relies on disability to perform conceptual work but also that enfolded into the human is the experience of disability.

2022 Michigan Kritik
Aff --- Disability --- K lab › 1AC › 1AC --- Mad Blackness

Disability is not solely a material codification but operates on invisible registers which doom its subjects to endless encounters with ableism.

Kattari et al. 18 – Shanna K. Kattari, PhD, is an associate professor at the, the Department of Women and Gender Studies, and Director of the . Their practice and community background is as a board certified sexologist, certified sexuality educator, and social justice advocate. Dr. Kattari’s focuses on understanding how power, privilege and oppression systematically marginalize, exclude, and discriminate against people regarding their identities/expressions through negative attitudes, policies reinforcing oppression, oppressive actions and isolation. (Shanna K. Kattari, Miranda Olzman, Michele D. Hanna, “‘You Look Fine!’: Ableist Experiences by People With Invisible Disabilities”, Sage, Journal of Women and Social Work, 2018, pgs. 1- 4, ) || PZ

In the literature on diversity, a significant amount of work has been undertaken on issues of racism, sexism, and more recently, heterosexism, and their corresponding privileges. However, despite discussion on disability being more than decades old, with the mainstream disability rights movement gaining momentum in the 1960s and 1970s (Wolbring, 2012), and the Americans with Disabilities Act having been enacted in 1990 (United States Code, 2008), notably less academic literature has addressed ableism, particularly within the field of social work. Even disability policy as an area of focus in the literature is relatively new, given the large number of disabled individuals in the United States (Schriner, 1990). This study examines whether and how the experiences of ableism by people with invisible disabilities (someone who might not be assumed to be disabled at first meeting, such as individuals with chronic pain, traumatic brain injury, multiple sclerosis, HIV, etc.) are disparate from those whose disabilities may be more evident to others. Although members of this community use both identity-first (disabled people) and person-first (people with disabilities [PWD]) language (Dunn & Andrews, 2015), this article will focus primarily on identity-first language, as this language comes from a self-determination paradigm in line with both social work and feminist values (Ladau, 2014; National Association of Social Workers, 2017). The United States Census Bureau (2012) reported that in the 2010 Census, 21.3% of those of age 15 years and older had a disability or impairment. From these statistics, it can be inferred that approximately one fifth of U.S. residents are currently living with a disability or impairment. Disability in and of itself is a community with blurred lines—people can acquire disabilities (both short term and long term) throughout their lives, making the concept of membership to the disabled community one that is frequently difficult for other marginalized groups to understand (Davis, 1999). Although individuals with “invisible” disabilities (those that are not always, or ever, apparent to others) may not receive as much overt or explicit social stigma as those with more apparent disabilities, they are still exposed to forms of rejection, ableism, and discrimination; in fact, they may even have more trouble accessing support services than their visibly disabled counterparts due to being expected to prove their disability (Davis, 2005). Disabled individuals with invisible disabilities may struggle with “passing” as nondisabled persons in many settings (Samuels, 2003). While passing may be seen as a privilege, it can also be a challenge for these individuals to find community and be validated by disabled people. The decision on whether to pass or not comes with not only personal implications of stigma and discrimination but also more societal and political implications of outing themselves as disabled (Brune & Wilson, 2013). They may also have issues in accessing the services, support structure, and even physical spaces that they need, given assumptions about what their bodies and minds are able to do, and whether those given the power to make the distinction decide whether they are “disabled enough” (Lightman, Vick, Herd, & Mitchell, 2009). Therefore, it is possible that members of this community experience ableism in different ways than those who have apparent disabilities. Ableism is the overarching act of prejudice and/or discrimination against disabled people and the devaluation of disability (Hehir, 2002) and corresponds with able-bodied/neurotypical privilege, the set of unearned privileges held by nondisabled individuals. They are both interconnected systems that maintain stratification around disability. Ableism values physical, emotional, and mental capital, following socially constructed expectations of ability (Loja, Costa, Hughes, & Menezes, 2013). Queer/disability theorist McRuer (2006) posits that like the ideal of compulsory heterosexuality, ableism results in a compulsory able-bodiedness, demanding that disabled individuals do whatever it takes to enact a nondisabled identity however possible. While sexism, racism, and other isms certainly are prevalent in all types of systems and interactions, Wolbring (2008) argues that ableism is one of the most accepted and widespread isms in society and works in conjunction with many other isms. Because of the lack of conversation around ableism and able-bodied/neurotypical privilege, prejudice against disabled people may at times be more prevalent and socially acceptable than many others types of prejudice (Ford, 2009). Although ableism is insidious and apparent in all aspects of society, little research has been conducted to understand the lived experiences of ableism by disabled individuals, nuanced disabled identities (such as those who have invisible/less obvious disabilities), and intersections of other marginalized identities with disability identities. Moreover, while there have been some publications in the field of social work around ableism, much of it focuses on policy (El-Lahib & Wehbi, 2012), sanism (discrimination around mental health) specifically (Poole et al., 2012), or the general need for better culture competency in social work practice and education regarding disabled populations (Carter, Hanes, & MacDonald, 2012; Dupre´, 2012). Disabled individuals also experience higher rates of poverty and chronic health issues than their nondisabled counterparts (Hehir, 2002; Roux et al., 2001; Storey, 2007), and there are few instances of social work around the experiences of disabled people of color, transgender disabled people, and the ways that other marginalized identities interplay with disability and ableism. Feminist disability scholars in particular have brought up the need for intersectional frameworks and connecting disability to conversations around diversity (Kafer, 2013; McRuer, 2002; Olkin, 2002). In Feminist, Queer, Crip, feminist disability studies, scholar Kafer (2013) explains that not only did feminist theory gave her the ability to critically examine notation of disability but also emphasizes the bridge between theory and practice, something incredibly relevant to the discussion of disability and ableism in social work. Microaggressions: Death by a Thousand Papercuts The concept of microaggressions is used to explain the phenomena of the implicit perpetuation of racism, sexism, heterocentrism, transphobia, anti-Semitism, and other forms of power and oppression in society (Sue, 2010). Microaggressions are everyday interactions that perpetuate inequalities and stereotypes against people who belong to marginalized communities (Solo´ rzano, Ceja, & Yosso, 2000; Sue, 2010). They are perpetuated against many individuals holding many different identities, including race, gender, sexual orientation, religion, and disability (Solo´ rzano et al., 2000; Sue, 2010). Frequent exposure to microaggressions, including ableist microaggressions, can result in higher incidence of negative mental health outcomes, feelings of being excluded, and lower positive outcomes including reduced academic performance (Khattari, 2017; Nadal, Griffin, Wong, Hamit, & Rasmus, 2014). Microaggressions are a common means of perpetuating ableism. These may include telling someone that they speak very well for a deaf person, telling someone they are lucky to get to bring their dog everywhere with them, asking a group of people to all stand for an activity (making the assumption that everyone can stand), or making a joke about how fast someone can go in their wheelchair (Storey, 2007). Many of these microaggressions are a result of assumptions about disabled people. Storey (2007) found that perpetuation of these microaggressions and assumptions result in disabled people feeling excluded or unwelcome in educational settings and produce outcomes including anger, frustration, and other feelings that can be harmful to an individual’s engagement with their community. Invisible Disabilities People with invisible disabilities or illness may be more likely to experience ableism indirectly, including through ableist microaggressions. For example, while someone might not use language like “lame” in front of someone they perceive to be mobility impaired, they may be less reticent to use such language in front of those they identify as nondisabled, whether or not those individuals actually are. Additionally, people with invisible disabilities may experience ableism when using adaptations for PWD, such as disability-designated parking spaces or elevators, when others view them as nondisabled individuals. It is possible that this is a result of unintentionally fulfilling the role of compulsory able-bodiedness suggested by McRuer (2006), simple by not having disabilities that might make themselves visibly distinct as disabled to outsiders. Disabled bodies are frequently othered and feared by society at large (Hirschmann, 2013), but there is little knowledge on how this may be experienced by those with invisible physical disabilities. Mad studies, a subset of disabilities focusing on mental health and sanism, have noted similarities in the “coming out and facing stigma/not being out and facing different marginalization” decision as faced by other individuals with sometimes invisible identities (Pilling, 2012). Therefore research is needed to help understand how disabled individuals who may not be read as disabled experience ableism in their lives. Bridging the theoretical understanding of ableism into the lived experiences of this community is a crucial move forward in creating more disability inclusive social work practice. This study explores the experiences of ableism specifically for individuals with invisible disabilities because, given that this invisibility often prevents these individual from being viewed as disabled, it is likely that their experiences may differ from disabled individuals with more apparent disabilities.

2022 Michigan Kritik
Aff --- Disability --- K lab › 1AC › 1AC --- Mad Blackness

Disability studies is essential to their paradigm of bioethics – without it biotechnology will inevitably regress onto the structures of disability that pathologize and normalize unequal power relations.

Pitts 22 – Andrea Pitts is an Associate Professor of Philosophy at the University of North Carolina at Charlotte and they are affiliate faculty of the university’s Department of Africana Studies, Latin American Studies Program, School of Data Science, Social Aspects of Health Initiative, and Women’s and Gender Studies Program. Their research interests include Latin American and U.S. Latinx philosophy, critical philosophy of race, feminist philosophy, disability studies, and critical prison studies, and they have taught graduate and undergraduate courses on topics such as carceral medicine, Latina/x feminist philosophy, queer migration studies, prison abolitionism, critical transgender politics, and feminist epistemology. (Andrea J. Pitts, “Disability Bioethics and Race”, Routledge, Taylor and Francis Group, The Disability Bioethics Reader, 1st Edition, 2022, pgs. 235-241, DOI: 10.4324/9781003289487-30 ) || PZ

Disability studies and biomedical ethics have each been criticized for their respective omissions of the experiences, concerns, and contributions of people of color. Throughout the 1990s and 2000s, scholars began demonstrating that the first-person accounts, normative guidelines, and framings of embodiment within these interdisciplinary fields tended to prioritize the experiences of disability, pain, illness, health, and clinical treatment from a white perspective (e.g., Myser 2003; Bell 2006). In response, both fields have attempted to transform the focus of their research, activism, and clinical guidelines to include historical and present patterns of neglect, oversight, and harm impacting communities of color. Both fields have also begun to highlight insights, methods, and political strategies employed by people of color within disability activism and clinical settings. The cross-pollination of these fields of study occurred during the mid-1990s through the development of disability bioethics, even prior to coinage of the term “disability bioethics.” This new area of research urged practitioners to understand the importance of insights and methodologies from disability studies within the formation and regulation of ethical guidelines and clinical practices in biomedicine. Such insights included, specifically, that the experiences and contributions of disabled people are necessary in the field of bioethics. Regarding race, founding theorists of disability bioethics engaged race and racism to varying degrees in their respective writings. For example, Rosemarie Garland-Thomson has been described by Sami Schalk as “one of the first disability studies scholars to provide sustained race and disability analysis in the final chapter of her book Extraordinary Bodies, published in 1997” (Schalk 2018, 10). Accordingly, disability bioethics, as this volume suggests, from its inception has attempted to examine the intricacies and structural conditions of race and racism within the biomedical sciences. As a brief caveat, it is important to note that, although the focus of this chapter is on race, disability, and bioethics, the study of the intersection of race and disability exceeds the scope of the biomedical sciences. That is, as Shelley Tremain (2017) has cautioned her readers, to reduce disability to biomedical and health discourses is to potentially reify the broader societal and historical conditions that shape the pathologizing and/or normalizing relations of power that negatively impact disabled people. For this reason, although the focus of this volume is on disability bioethics, uncovering the broader relevance of the intersection of disability and race beyond medical and health discourses remains an important ongoing project. Accordingly, the analysis offered here will be limited, but will serve as a piece of a broader scholarly and political movement focusing on the relationships between race and disability more generally. To foreground a disability bioethics that grapples with the structural and intimate presence of oppression in its many valences and that emphasizes the lives and work of disabled people of color, this chapter focuses on two overlapping areas that thread together disability studies, bioethics, and critical approaches to race. First, the chapter examines work addressing the existential and conceptual relationships between race and disability. This section underscores writings by authors who analyze embodied experiences of community belonging, illness, pain, motility, madness, desire, futurity, and barriers to affirmation and care, all of which are in conversation with processes of racialization. Building on this discussion, the second section shifts to a focus on race and institutions. This section includes an examination of the functions of disability and race in contexts of clinical diagnosis and treatment, medical education and research, as well as disability and health activist movements that have challenged systemic oppressions impacting communities of color. I Existential/Conceptual Analyses of Race and Disability within Biomedical Ethics As noted above, recognizing the necessity and value of the perspectives of disabled people has been a critical turn that distinguishes disability studies more generally, and has surfaced within bioethics more recently. The common English-language refrain within disability rights activism since the 1990s “Nothing about us without us” presents a demand for policymakers, theorists, and organizers to prioritize the experiences, worldviews, and resources of people who identify as disabled or who may be socially marked as disabled or debilitated. Likewise, critical race studies and Indigenous studies have long recognized the need to prioritize the perspectives of people of color and Indigenous peoples to avoid the exoticizing, commodifying, or otherwise misinformed views developed within the anthropological, biological, and medical sciences. Social epistemologist, Charles Mills (1998), for example, considers the novel Invisible Man by Ralph Ellison a classic illustration of the existential conditions of Black Americans who have experienced patterned epistemic erasure and invalidation by white Americans. Or, as Anishinaabe theorist and literary author, Gerald Vizenor (1994) proposes, the fact that vastly distinct Indigenous societies of the Americas have been placed under one homogeneous label “Indian” has required Native peoples to devise “postindian” strategies to subvert and survive the damage caused by settler colonial imaginaries. Given this shared methodological stance across these fields, we find the study of race, disability, and the biomedical sciences similarly taking on such a priority. As such, we can turn to accounts of the relationship between race and disability that explore the existential and conceptual conditions of encounters with clinical, research, and other medical settings. First, regarding existential conditions that frame the interconnected relationships between race and disability within biomedical contexts, a number of theorists have explored the differing forms of medical treatment, attitudes and expectations of medical providers, and the everyday forms disregard for people of color within clinical settings. Notably, women of color authors of the 1970s–1990s utilized descriptions of embodied pain, illness, and disability to critique heterosexual norms and post-racial framings of “color blindness” within medical settings. Works of fiction, nonfiction, and poetry by authors such as Gloria Anzaldúa, Audre Lorde, Evelyne Accad, and Leslie Marmon Silko (Laguna Pueblo) each respond, in differing ways, to conditions of pathologization and debilitation impacting communities of color. For example, Lorde’s The Cancer Journals (1980) analyzes the author’s experiences of breast cancer, including biopsy, diagnosis, and mastectomy, and the text documents her refusal to be objectified or shamed within the clinical encounters that she endures. She describes her experience of breast cancer as stemming explicitly from a Black lesbian feminist perspective, and the text is framed throughout by excerpts from the author’s journal from the years 1978–1980. Seizing control of her narrative, Lorde opens The Cancer Journals by describing the “transformation of silence into language and action” (18). Specifically, she outlines the double binds often experienced by Black women, including their hypervisibility and simultaneous invisibility within allied political movements with white women. Within such settings, Black women, she writes, have had to fight and still do, for that very visibility which also renders us most vulnerable, our blackness. For to survive in the mouth of this dragon we call america [sic], we have had to learn this first and most vital lesson—that we were never meant to survive. (21, 17) Against this deathly tendency, she states, survival depends on “teach[ing] by living and speaking those truths which we believe and know beyond understanding” (22). In the context of The Cancer Journals, she intimates that writing about her experiences with breast cancer, including the patterned harms that she underwent within the clinical setting, is vital to her own survival and to the survival of other Black women. Additionally, “know[ing] without understanding” appears to refer to the inchoate existential awareness of one’s own sensations, emotions, and other embodied experiences, experiences that are not fully transparent to oneself or others. According to Lorde, the act of bringing such pre- or non-discursive forms of awareness, including experiences of pain and illness, into expression becomes a method to reshape personal and collective possibilities. On this point, Therí A. Pickens (2014) notes that Lorde “wrestles with the appropriate ethical response to her pain” and configures her writings as a means “to move toward awareness, discussion, and activism” (130–131). The importance of highlighting such a relationship between pain and expression is that Lorde is able to demonstrate the many ways in which Black lesbian women struggle through cancer and amputation. Among the themes that emerge in Lorde’s work is the dominance of the medical establishment over patients’ own narrative descriptions. Thus, describing her pain through evocations of joy and sensuality, including phantom pains, becomes a resistant act against the power of clinical medicine’s force relations. For example, after her mastectomy, Lorde writes that “the pain returned home bringing all of its kinfolk” (Lorde 2014, 31–32). Through drawing on familiar vernacular, Lorde’s description serves as a response to the insufficiency of medical discourses to describe the experiences of Black American women in pain (Pickens 2014, 132). The Cancer Journals also underscores Lorde’s decision not to wear a prosthesis following her mastectomy. Specifically, nurses and volunteer staff encourage her to wear a pink prosthetic breast following her surgery, and the reasons offered are that such a prosthesis will make Lorde and others around her feel more comfortable (1980, 42). The artificiality of the pink prosthetic contrasts with Lorde’s descriptions of her own “soft brown skin” after surgery, and her remarks critique the white aesthetic norms that exist within biomedical technologies of the flesh (44). Pickens also notes the heteronormative encounters Lorde describes while being encouraged to wear the prosthesis, including the suggestions by medical staff that wearing the prosthesis would allow her to remain attractive to men (2014, 135). In these ways, Lorde’s writings refuse these tendencies to foreclose her own appreciation of her body and desires, and her descriptions reopen a discursive space for a distinctively Black lesbian response to the misunderstandings and erasures that stem from the medical world around her. As such, Lorde’s writings offer a counternarrative to the whiteness of clinical medicine, and provide a descriptive opening for the existential conditions of illness, pain, and pathologization experienced by queer women of color. Alongside the pivotal work by Black, Indigenous, and other women of color in the 1970s and 1980s, more recent scholarly and activist work operating through framings of disability justice has focused on the specific existential and conceptual tools necessary for disabled, queer and trans people of color. For example, although authors like Lorde and Gloria Anzaldúa wrote extensively of experiences of illness, medical intervention, pain, and blindness, these authors were often reluctant to interpret themselves in terms of “disability” or as “disabled.” Along these lines, Moya Bailey and Izetta Autumn Mobley (2019) and Aurora Levins Morales (2013) have respectively explored the relationships between race and disability, examining the reasons why people of color may choose not to politically organize around disability rights or through identification as “disabled.” Namely, Bailey and Mobley note that tropes of the “crazy Black woman” are weaponized against Black women leading to high rates of violence committed against them, and that such violence occurs while simultaneously failing to address the needs of Black people with psychiatric or physical disabilities (2019, 31). Additionally, they point out that: Black women and other women of color do most of the labor in the service of disability despite the impact on their ability to care for themselves or their families. Caregivers are often engaged in debilitating work for disabled people and become disabled themselves. (32) These concerns, along with others, may thus complicate political and personal mobilization through a framing of disability for people of color. Bailey and Mobley also note, however, that growing work is currently being done among Black authors and activists to explore the terms of a disability within Black communities, including as their work attests, developing a Black feminist disability framework from which to theorize and mobilize. Along similar lines, Morales notes that for Gloria Anzaldúa, as a “dark-skinned working class Tejana lesbian,” to have affirmed disability as an identity would likely have required “a strong, vocal, politically sophisticated, disability justice movement led by queer working class women and trans people of color who understood [her] life” (2013, 5). From this insight, Bailey and Mobley, as well as disability justice activists have resisted individualist rights- and autonomy-based models of justice to focus on collective resistance to ableism in its many instantiations. Instead, disability justice activists and scholars demand a recognition of the interdependence of shared struggles against systemic oppressions and how disability functions across all forms of oppression—all of this while foregrounding the desires, joys, and networks of care among disabled people who are fighting against those systemic oppressions. For example, disability justice organizers Talila A. Lewis and Dustin P. Gibson, through their social media, workshops, and collective public actions, offer powerful critiques of the forms of systemic ableism that undergird US prison systems and policing, while also dedicating time and energy to curate Black disability solidarity music, art, film, and history (Lewis 2020; Gibson 2020). Additionally, Sins Invalid, founded in 2005 by disability justice activists Patty Berne and LeRoy F. Moore, is a performance-based artist collective composed of artists of color and LGBTQ/gender-variant artists that explores themes of sexuality, the non-normative body, and social and economic justice through their performances and workshops (Sins Invalid 2020). These examples of disability justice activism thus illustrate the important point made by Bailey and Mobley that there are creative aesthetic, embodied, and political contributions founded in the experiences of disabled people of color, and that organizing work done within a disability justice framework celebrates both the lives and experiences of disabled people of color while also critiquing the very systematic patterns of harm that would seek to erase, reduce, or eliminate their very existence. Lastly, regarding the relationship between disability and race, Nirmala Erevelles (2011) explores the “racialization of disability” and the “dis-abilization of race,” a process that Erevelles offers to bring both categories into material relation. Specifically, she argues that whiteness, defended as a form of property right, is “the ideological discourse that has been used to justify the racial superiority of white people over people of color by using the logic of dis-ability (e.g., inferior genes, low IQ) to decide who has the rights to citizenship” (166). By this, Erevelles suggests that the racialization of disability is the process by which white, able-bodied heterosexual cisgender men become centered as the most productive (and thereby valuable) citizens within capitalist societies. In this, the productive possibilities of such white citizens are protected through institutions such as the law, education, and health care. Regarding education, for example, the criminalization and pathologization of Black children in k-12 settings, as well as the segregation of educational institutions by “cognitive ability” seeks to shore up protected educational resources for those deemed more deserving or more capable of making “positive” contributions to society. Regarding the dis-abilization of race, Erevelles notes that people considered outside the productive metrics of advanced capitalism are often relegated to the welfare state, and thereby stigmatized as burdensome on the civic body. The responses to such so-called “dependency” on social welfare programs, however, is also a lucrative business, she argues. Testing companies, metrics and measurements for success, juvenile detention facilities, and other programs designed to manage or “uplift” children of color effectively foreground a life marked by pathologization and deviance for many people. Moreover, Erevelles proposes that the debilitating conditions of labor for many people of color in the USA also lead to increased marginalization, vulnerability, and medical precarity for such populations within advanced capitalism.