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2022 Michigan Kritik
Policy Affs › SPACE ASSETS › L––ASATS

The 1ac’s drive to emerge into space is built off of American ‘transcendence’ – the way in which America centers itself as the centre while expanding is military and social project of imperial control

Sage 14 (Sage, Daniel (2014). Daniel Sage is a professor at the Institute of Geography and Earth Science, University of Wales. How Outer Space Made America: Geography, Organization and the Cosmic Sublime (1st ed.). Routledge. ) // JLHS AA

In the preceding eight chapters I have argued that some of the unique qualities of outer space—vastness, Otherness, sublimity, timelessness, spacelessness—are just as integral to extra-terrestrial projections of US geopower, as its well-known capacity (Arendt, 1963; Cosgrove, 2001; Dickens and Ormrod, 2007; Dolman, 2001; Macdonald, 2007) to function as an Archimedean high point to monitor and control the surface, and atmosphere, of the Earth. While the focus of my study has been the United States, and more specifically NASA, the implications of this cosmic projection of geopower—the American transcendental state—are global in reach, from enabling and shaping imperialistic ideologies (Chapters 1-3 and 7) to fuelling the extension of technocratic managerialism (Chapter 4-6 and 8). What is more, messianic hope in America remains a global commodity, consumed, for example, through the internationally franchised Star Trek television episodes and films (Penley, 1997: 98-99), multinational ‘Space 2.0’ corporations, like SpaceX (Chapter 6), worldwide audiences to the addresses of American presidents (Chapter 6) and global tourist attractions like the National Air and Space Museum and Kennedy Space Center Visitor Complex (Chapter 7). These global circulations suggest that while my empirical focus in this study has been on the extra-terrestrial assemblage of the American transcendental state, as viewed from within the borders of the US, the salience of my analysis is geo-political. The development of the American transcendental state through space exploration must also be viewed as an integral component of a far older geopolitical project—the production of an American identity defined in terms of the transcendence of limits, whether technological, economic, spiritual or territorial, enabling the moral aggrandizement of the past, present and future of a horizontal strata of sovereign territory and its peoples (McDougall, 1997; Noble, 2002; Nye, 1994; O’Brien, 1988; Ricard, 1999; Stephanson, 1995). Over the last decade or so, a growing number of scholars, including geographers, have turned their attention to how messianic-exceptionalist visions of America as the ‘Promised Land’ of ‘Chosen People’ have inflected various imperialistic projects including: the pursuit of democracy through military intervention in the ‘global south’ (Anthony, 2008); the technocratic ‘greening’ of Western global capitalism (Singer, 2010); the building of a ‘culture of war’ in foreign policy (Marsella, 2011), the circumvention of international institutions (Agnew, 2006); and most prominently perhaps, George W. Bush’s ‘war on terror’ where invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq became justified as a ‘cosmic struggle between good and evil’ (Agnew, 2006: 183; see also Barkun, 2010; Dijink, 2006; Strum, 2010; Wallace, 2006). All of this work indicates two points: first, the enduring Apocalyptic influence of dispensational pre-millennialism1 on both interventionist and isolationist currents within American (geo)politics (Strum and Dittmer, 2010: 18); and secondly, the rise of a religious cosmology that positions America at the moral, geographical, and spiritual, centre of the universe (Strum, 2010: 150). My analysis of American spaceflight adds to this body of work on religion and geopolitics by drawing attention to five less discussed conduits of this pious vision of American geopower: (i) the secular—museums, family theme parks, systems management; (ii) the sublime—astronomical artwork, Moon landings and distant Nebula; (iii); the profane—Nazi slave labor camps, technocratic patriarchy, and dead astronauts; the technological (iv)—rocket production lines, O-rings, electrical wiring; and (v) the revolutionary—female astronauts, May 1968, and Richard Feynman. Analytically, these diverse registers suggest the utility of working with a broader, less explicitly spiritual, set of theoretical assumptions, to address the cosmological aspects of American geopolitics. This is why I mobilized the concept of the ‘American transcendental state’, rather than ‘deified nation’ (O’Brien, 1988: 41) within this study. This deliberately hallucinogenic sounding term captures some sense that the messianic-exceptionalistic projection of American geopower is a more diffusive, experimental, fantasmic, embodied, and ostensibly secular, affair, than conveyed within much discursive analysis of the religious undercurrents inflecting American geopolitics (for example Agnew, 2006; Dijink, 2006; Strum, 2010; Wallace, 2006). I would like to suggest now that there is another benefit in bringing together these diverse practices under a broader analysis of the American transcendental state: their common geography becomes all the more obvious. That is, all these practices involve thinking, doing or resisting, celestial transcendence as an apparatus of American geopower; hence they can all be rightly considered ‘vertical geopolitics’ (Elden, 2013; Graham, 2004; Graham and Hewitt, 2013). This label has developed to identify a body of work addressing how the circulation of American geopower involves more than two-dimensional geographies of area. It currently includes analyses of; drone warfare (Gregory, 2011); aerial bombardment (Graham, 2004); police helicopters (Adey, 2010); satellite surveillance (Macdonald, 2007) and satellite drone navigation and targeting (Gregory, 2011). Elden (2013: 40) explains that ‘vertical geopolitics’ is mostly focussed upon how state political technologies allow diverse populations to be measured, calculated, controlled and killed, ‘from above’, and occasionally ‘from below’ (for example Elden, 2013; Graham and Hewitt, 2013). By contrast, the vertical orientation I have adopted here, while related, is different. Specifically, I have described how aspects of the projection of American identity, geopower, and territory, also involve a vertical spacelessness—a deterritorialization—a potential collapse into sublime, cosmic, insignificance; in short, rather than the ‘view from above’, the perspective I have traced has been a ‘view into the above’ (and back). In part, therefore, my study can be considered a response to Elden’s (2013) recent question: ‘How would our thinking of geo-power, geo-politics and geo-metrics work if we took the earth; the air and the subsoil; questions of land, terrain, territory; earth processes and understandings of the world as the central terms at stake, rather than a looser sense of the ‘global?’ (p49) I propose we add to this list celestial entities, including the Moon (Chapter 3), the Martian surface (Chapter 6) and the Eagle Nebula (Chapter 7), as well as God (Agnew, 2006; Dittmer and Strum, 2010; Strum, 2013). Thus, perhaps we should be cautious of Elden’s (2013b) rather geocentric call ‘about how geopolitics might be thought as earth-politics rather than simply a synonym for global politics’ (p59). Instead, it might be more useful to bear in mind Deleuze and Guattari’s (1988: 101) argument that even absolute deterritorialization—something akin perhaps to the mathematical cosmic sublime of Kant (Nye, 1994: 7-8)—always involves reterritorialization(s). Recall how Charles Bonestell (Chapter 2), William Clancey (Chapter 6) and the National Air and Space Museum (Chapter 7), respectively, and persuasively, associated vistas of the Moon, Mars and the Eagle Nebula with the American West, and by extension locate America at the centre of God’s universe (Boime, 1991; Stephanson, 1995). This analysis of American spaceflight also sheds light on seldom acknowledged connections between religious and vertical geopolitics and technocracy. The relation between critical analysis of geopolitics (O Tuathail, 1996) and technocratic management (Alvesson, 1987), remains remarkably undeveloped. Arguably this lacuna says more about the disciplinary separation between critical security studies and organization studies (Grey, 2009) than the various intellectual cross- fertilizations between organization studies and human geography (Clegg and Kornberger, 2006; Dale and Burrell, 2008; Parker, 2013). Nevertheless, there are, as Grey (2009) maintains, clear resonances: Indeed it could said that, in the same way that the development of security studies in particular, and organization studies to an extent, was shaped by geo- politics of wars both hot and cold, so too many current and future directions be in part a reflection of developments in contemporary geo-politics (p31). Some organizational practices are of course, very much on the ‘front line’ of practical geopolitics; that is, they comprise the ‘the foreign policy bureaucracy’ (Ó Tuathail and Dalby, 1998: 4) through which geographical concepts are deployed to aid ‘conceptualization and decision making’ in ‘everyday foreign policy’ (O Tuathail, 1999: 110). Examples here include the work of the US Air Force, the CIA (Central Intelligence Agency) and the UK’s Foreign and Common Wealth Office. There are also a host of other organizations that no doubt influence how practical geopolitics is produced, from security analysts like the RAND Corporation to global defense contractors like McDonnell Douglas. However, analysis of the relationship between organizational and geopolitical practices remains embryonic. For example, Anderson’s (2011) study of urban counter- insurgency and Gregory’s (2011) of drone warfare, do no more than merely infer that the rise of the ‘networked organization’ is reworking the projection of American geo-power. Correspondingly, two organizational studies of the military only hint that, for example, masculine discipline (Godfrey et al., 2012) and team identities (Corona and Godart, 2010) shape and are themselves shaped by grand geopolitical narratives like the ‘war on terror’. But the imbrication of geopolitical and organizational practice can also be more subtle and much less militaristic—concerning the anticipation and cultivation of geopower through shared national identities, that is ‘popular geopolitics’ (O Tuathail, 1999: 110). Here, the connection to organizational practices is no less significant, yet invisible in the literature. NASA offers a good example: from its inception, the space agency developed increasingly refined technocratic techniques that aligned people and machines to naturalize the pursuit of a popular geopolitics wedded to American geopower. Viewed in this way, imperialistic geopower and technocratic-managerialism are interwoven forces; hence the present study suggests the richness of more sustained critical analysis of organization and geopolitics. However, I am all too aware that in stressing the widespread application of this concept of the America transcendental state to understand American geopower— and, concomitantly, the fecundity of bringing together analyses of religion, verticality and now technocracy within critical geopolitics—I run the risk of constructing a totalizing, monstrous, edifice. The reader might rightly ask at this juncture, paraphrasing Nietzsche, have you not gazed into the cosmic abyss of American geopower for too long; are you not also reifying American geopower in the cosmos rather than challenging it? Indeed, throughout the preceding chapters I made reference to a rather singular sounding concept of the ‘American transcendental state’. But, as in the introduction, I must stress again here, that I took this decision for reasons of analytical clarity rather than to suggest I have revealed an independent, singular, definite and a priori reality (Law, 2006), some essence akin perhaps to what Agnew (2006: 184) refers to as ‘Americanism’. Instead, within each chapter I have traced the progressive assemblage of the American transcendental state—that is, nothing less than the divinely sanctioned, exceptional, and messianic, right and duty, of America, and its leaders in its name (Wallace, 2006: 225), to command cosmic space and time by evoking forces of ‘good’ and ‘evil’, ‘us’ and ‘them’ (Agnew, 2006; Strum, 2010). But the immutability of this cosmic vision (Strum and Dittmer, 2010; Wallace, 2006) belies the transformative, fragmented, heterogeneous components that sustain it, across landscape artwork, through Kennedy’s Moon Speech, to the O-rings of Space Shuttle Challenger. Throughout this study I have suggested countless relations through which this vision is not only produced (Dijink, 2006; McDougall, 1997; Noble, 2002; Nye, 1994; Ricard, 1999; Stephanson, 1995; Wallace, 2006) but circulated, maintained, resisted, repaired, transformed, and experimented with. How then to conceptualize this heterogeneous, but obdurate, cosmic being? Latour’s actor-network theory (1987; 2005; 2012) is useful to an extent here; first, we can conceptualize the transcendental state as an ‘immutable mobile’ that ‘ends up traversing the universe’ by ‘pay[ing] for each transport with a transformation’ (Latour, 2013: 127); it is ‘not displacement without transformation but displacement through transformation (Latour, 2005: 223); second, the transcendental state can be understood as offering a prophetic, but partial, ‘panorama’ of the ‘world [cosmos] to be lived in’ (p189) which must then, in turn, be: ... carefully situated inside one of the many Omnimax theatres offering complete panoramas of society—and we now know that the more thrilling the impression, the more enclosed the room has to be. [American] Society is not the whole ‘in which’ everything is embedded, but what travels ‘through’ everything, calibrating connections and offering every entity it reaches some possibility of commensurability. (p242) Read against Latour’s concepts of the ‘immutable mobile’ and the ‘localizable panorama’ it is easy to see why my analysis of American transcendental state has involved mapping circulations within as well as beyond our lives. And this is a political move too, because it suggests that opportunities to test and resist the American transcendental state are closer to hand than we might think. As revealed in Chapter 8, a great deal of effort is required to keep the transcendental state circulating because the heterogeneous conduits it passes through—electrical wiring, teleconferences, flight readiness reviews, budget decisions and O-ring joints—are capricious and experimental; that is, affective. Other Chapters acknowledged similar fragility accompanying the assemblage of the transcendental state, including; the partially-owned Declaration of Independence (Chapter 1), the globally unifying Earthrise photograph of Apollo 8 (Chapter 3) and the rusting rockets on display in the gardens of the Kennedy Space Center Visitor Complex (Chapter 7). Now located within this chain of heterogeneous transformations, what strategies might aid us in purposefully transforming this now confined totality? Or put differently, how might we engage outer space to resist this cosmic deification of America (O Brien, 1988)? In concluding this study, I propose three techniques but no doubt there are many more. First, we can expose the void at the heart of this messianic-technocratic projection of geopower (Wallace, 2006). This approach was evidenced in Chapter 1 by Derrida’s (2002) deconstructive reading of Declaration of Independence. Derrida (2002) emphasizes how signing the Declaration in God’s name entails no democratic ownership over America’s future, in outer space or elsewhere. Across the development of American spaceflight, the perils of messianic, free- floating, notions of ‘Progress’, ‘Exploration,’ ‘Frontier’ and ‘The Future’ are all too apparent, not least for NASA itself. Lester and Robinson (2009) suggest the emergence of this critique within the American space policy community: We should accept that “exploration” is a multivalent term, with many meanings, some of which are contradictory, and all of which have historical precedent. For too long we have looked at the history of exploration selectively, seeking to find the antecedents which justify our own vision of exploration: as science, as human adventure, as geopolitical statement. This is a definitional fight which cannot be won. Space policy must acknowledge the multiple visions for space exploration, developing a clear-eyed metric of value which avoids the vagaries of lofty “exploration-speak”, If the merits of human exploration of the Moon and Mars are primarily symbolic and geopolitical, what are these goals worth in terms of federal funding? I am unconvinced by the economically instrumentalist conclusions made by Lester and Robinson (2009) about putting a value upon even NASA’s ‘softer’ geopower, but the general caution about harnessing nebulous messianic mythologies to advance American space exploration is valuable. Of course the problem is this tradition of finding our God in the cosmos is long-established as Olsson (2007) suggests via this retelling of the Babylonian creation epic, Enuma elish: Marduk is the Lord of lords ... Hail to the Chief! Fifty were his names, so numerous that if ever attacked he could always hide behind another alias. Never catchable as the specific this or that, always on the move as an ambiguous this and that ... Ungraspable multiplicity. ... In this mist-enveloped region of religion naming is the name of the game, an exercise in ontological transformations where earthly people appear as projections of heavenly gods, social relations as signs in the sky. ... a signified meaning searching for its own coordinates (Olsson, 2007: 23). Perhaps a more modest approach is required: we should simply resist the urge to name, and tame, the cosmos as a Whole, by naming a celestial Godhead in it that we claim for ourselves (Wallace, 2006) but cannot ever fully own. ‘Evil is the disaster of a truth when the desire to force the naming of the unnameable is unleashed . ... Evil is not disrespect for the name of the other, but rather the will to name at any price’ (Badiou, 2004: 115-6; original emphasis). Challenging the cosmic aggrandization of America might therefore imply some attempt to resist naming our God/Future/Progress in the cosmos. Put simply, this all too easy act of cosmic de/reterroritalizaiton is too crude, too undemocratic, too costly. A second, related, strategy which can be adopted to resist the American transcendental state was discussed within Chapter 3; this is the capacity to push transcendence to another plane or refuge—to follow one line of flight of cosmic deterritorialization and then re-territorialize the Earth in a panorama that starts with a common human experience, rather than those of any particular nation/ God/future. The aim of this strategy is to mobilize a cosmic imagination that can register something of the shared experience of being human. In Chapter 3 I discussed how the Earthrise photograph from NASA’s Apollo 8 mission have stimulated new cosmic imaginations—including ‘spaceship’ Earth (Cosgrove: 2001, 257-262; Henry and Taylor, 2009; Ward, 1964), Noetic science (Benjamin, 2003: 60-61), global political ecologies (Connolly, 2002)—that defied nationalistic appropriations by inferring a human transcendence. However, as the American author Kurt Vonnegut explains such a transcendental image of humanity, emptied of territorial divisions and difference, is not itself without risk: ‘Earth is such a pretty blue and pink and white pearl in the pictures NASA sent me. It looks so clean. You can’t see all the hungry, angry earthlings down there—and the smoke and sewage and trash and sophisticated weaponry’ (Vonnegut cited in Burrows, 1998: 423). Similarly, Deleuze and Guattari (1988) suggest we should always remain sceptical that de-territorialization is a progressive act on its own: ‘Never believe that a smooth space will suffice to save us’ (p500). A third strategy is to augment different affects amid the assemblage of the American transcendental state. As described in Chapter 8, the American transcendental state depends upon the cultivation of confidence in technocracy allied to an affective becoming hopeful—a positive openness to the future as life enhancing—orientated around the transcendence of America in cosmic space and time. But, as Anderson (2006), explains, becoming hopeful does not necessarily need to operate in this transcendental manner: hopefulness can also emerge not to ward off suffering, but through every day sorrows, through diminishment of the body’s potential to affect and be affected. Consider, for example, how Dotty Duke refused to discuss her fears and anxieties with her astronaut husband as she kept the ‘house in order and [took] out the garbage’ (Duke 1990—Chapter 5). Dotty Duke epitomizes a different kind of becoming hopeful—a capacity to remain open-ended about the future in a life enhancing manner through diminishment—devoid of discussion of a better future in Earth or in the cosmos; this is hope that challenges ‘the easy equation between transcendence and a future elsewhen or elsewhere in favor of an imminent transcendence from within vectors of diminishment’ (Anderson, 2006: 749; for more analysis of immanent transcendence related to Space see Smith, 2009: 211). Another affect which is useful in short-circuiting the hopeful assemblage of the transcendental state is boredom. Anderson (2004) describes boredom as the moment when the ‘“forgetting” intrinsic to habit has been momentarily incapacitated. It is the unravelling of habit, a sudden realization of the again’ (p743). Boredom depresses the life enhancing capacity of ourselves to be open to the future, engendering stillness and slowness of thought-action in space- time, where, as Anderson (2004) puts it, the capacity to experience the ‘not yet’ (p749) is suspended. The evolution of American spaceflight might appear to some the antithesis of boredom, but, as Jorgensen (2009) suggests, the American humanization of outer space has gone hand in hand with endless repetition (of middle America): The August 1969 Life Special Issue, released to commemorate the landing, wants to produce sympathetic accounts of the astronauts. It is filled with glossy, high color photographs of the astronauts not only mastering outer space, but their domestic spaces as well. Neil Armstrong bakes pizza, Buzz Aldrin jogs through the suburbs, and Mike Collins prunes his garden. These images resonate with outer space itself, as the astronauts use tools in both terrestrial and extraterrestrial environments. The spatula and shears the astronauts use to cook lamb curry and prune roses with resemble the objects they hold while walking the moon, these being a laser reflector, seismometer and solar wind sheet (p179). There is no hopefulness on offer in Jorgensen’s (2009) reading of American spaceflight. Instead the boredom experienced in the cosmic repetition of middle America signals despair: ‘Apollo 11 represented an America that had become unhinged by its own technocracy, its middle class lifestyle, and television’ (p188). Jorgensen (2009) is not, of course, alone in identifying aspects of spaceflight repetitive, even boring. As the emergence of the Teacher in Space program demonstrated (see Chapter 8), NASA itself has historically attempted to introduce elements of excitement, even increased risk, to engage a global audience. Yet, of course, a balance has always had to be struck, as Parker (2009) explains of Apollo: ‘Everything was supposed to be boring, because boredom meant no surprises, and hence the possibility of the adventure in some sense rested on its denial’ (p326). Although fleeting, boredom is surely an unavoidable ingredient in NASA’s technocratic confidence, but when focused and channeled, it does suspend hope in the cosmos as a better place, perhaps providing an opportunity for us to pause and register something of the sublime Otherness of Space, where we concurrently repeat and differ ourselves into infinity: ‘Media representations of space travel turn the vastness of space into the similitude of domesticity, as human familiarity comes to stand in for the infinite. At the same time, the domestic attains the dimensions of the infinite, and in turn becomes strangely unfamiliar to the television viewer’ (Jorgensen, 2009: 179). These three techniques of cosmo-political intervention—refusal to name, human transcendence, and sensitivity to new affects—are all worthy of greater attention, especially when they can be connected up to, and interfere with, the assemblage of the American transcendental state. Clearly not all of those involved directly in the development of spaceflight will want or be able to practise these techniques. Nevertheless even among this group these techniques are intended to offer greater receptivity to new cosmographical imaginations which move beyond the cosmic aggrandization of messianic-imperialistic-technocratic impulses. If we have entered the Cosmic Age where all territorializing assemblages, all States, now derive vital energy from the Cosmos (Deleuze and Guattari (1988: 342), then the imperative becomes not to simply do cosmopolitics (Latour, 2005) but rather which cosmo-politics do we want to pursue? My favoured vision of a Geography of Space is one where this question is endlessly asked but never answered with absolute confidence.

2022 Michigan Kritik
Policy Affs › SPACE ASSETS › L––ASATS

we hate your satellites

Damjanov 15 (Damjanov, Katarina, School of Social Sciences, University of Western Australia, Perth, Australia The matter of media in outer space: Technologies of cosmobiopolitics. Environment and Planning D: Society and Space. 2015;33(5):889-906. doi:10.1177/0263775815604920) // JLHS AA

Satellite population and orbital security Over 6000 military, scientific and commercial satellites have arrived in Earth’s orbital space to take on a key role in advancing global production, distribution and consumption of media content.3 Designed to perform specific tasks, they have been disseminated across different orbital altitudes; Low Earth Orbit has been mostly occupied by the earth observation, remote sensing, communication and reconnaissance satellites, Medium Earth Orbit by those used for global positioning, Geosynchronous Orbit by broadcasting satellites and High Earth Orbit has been increasingly utilised for their disposal. More than 1200 of them are currently operational;4 arrayed around the planet as if to imprison it under omniscient technical armour, they provide a major logistic backbone for governmental practices that expedite what Deleuze (1992) identified as the ‘society of control’, extending Foucault’s ideas about ‘disciplinary societies’ onto the contemporary context of automated, multifaceted systems of ubiquitous global surveillance. Yet at the same time, satellites are themselves besieged by the same systems of control that they make possible. Their conduct in space is subjected to exhaustive diagnostic management via specialised schemes such as The United States Space Surveillance Network and the European Space Agency’s (n.d.) Space Surveillance and Tracking program, similar projects led by other states and space agencies, and independent expert groups such as the Union of Concerned Scientists. The orbital constellation of satellites necessitates another security layer around the global apparatus of biopolitics – the control of its control infrastructure, forging a double-bind diagram of networked governance. Satellite control is guided by the perspective of Space Situational Awareness (SSA), which, although central to orbital logistics, is thus far without an official definition (Kaiser, 2014). In essence, SSA is concerned not only with observation and surveillance of satellites as a way of knowing details of their orbital position, but also with collecting, aggregating and analysing a wide range of types of data about all objects and events in orbital space as a reference point from which to estimate the best courses in their management. One of the many descriptions of the SSA postulates it as the pursuit of ‘a comprehensive knowledge of the population of space objects, of the space environment, and of the existing risks and threats’ (European Security and Defence Assembly, 2009). While suggestive of the biopolitical agenda of securing human activities in the orbital milieu, this formulation symptomatically reveals a turn towards object-oriented governance: SSA focuses upon the ‘population of space objects’. On one hand, the term ‘space object’ is a legal classification of all human-made items placed in outer space, a nomenclature introduced by the OST and elaborated in the Liability Convention from 1972, which gives their legal owners exclusive rights to control and interfere with them. On the other, the phrase ‘population of space objects’ – an expression which is customarily used in expert vocabulary surrounding SSA5 – signposts a repositioning of the human-centered en masse purview of biopolitics to incorporate a population of technologies. The biopolitical use of the term ‘population’ originally specifies a mass of living humans; however, with its application to the assemblage of human-made satellites, biopolitics in outer space becomes central to attempts to manage a population whose bodies are neither human, not animate, but that of technology. This twofold satellite logistics which focuses upon both singular ‘space objects’ and a collective ‘space population’ to assess multiple variables that determine their productive capacity and manage risks associated with their occupation of orbital space, reinforces regimes of satellite management which operate parallel to that of humans. At both its administrative and executive levels, the governance of satellites regulates their material presence in space, managing their distribution, traffic, operations and decommission. Satellite launches require technical and procedural compliance with national and international protocols. Information about each satellite is stored in the United Nations Register of Space Objects Launched into Outer Space that functions as an inventory of their births and deaths, and while apparently excluding undisclosed missions,6 acts as an (always incomplete) global census on satellite population. Activities of satellites are continuously examined, evaluated and upheld via a multifaceted management system termed Tracking, Telemetry and Control (TT&C). TT&C enables ground control centres to monitor satellites via sensors and on-board computers with which they are equipped, telemetrically measure their ‘health’ by determining the ‘condition and performance of various subsystems such as fuel status, attitude and output of solar panels’, and adjust their trajectories, configurations and functions (U.S. Army Space Division, n.d.). Within satellite logistics, authority over each satellite is restricted to its owners and allows for its individual proprietary control, but the overall population of satellites is seen as a shared matter of global security, which necessitates cooperative collection and exchange of data between space agencies, commercial and space experts and enthusiasts. There is a range of satellite tracking software and databases, some with restricted access such as the US Space Surveillance Network that only provides data to subscribed governmental and commercial parties, and others which are freely available online such as the UCS Satellite Database or the website Heaven Above that enable the public to monitor the movement of satellites. Taken together, these examples of logistical inscription and calculated management suggest attempts to institute a global system of networked satellite control which corresponds with the twin-poled organisation of power over life. It simultaneously centres on an individual satellite (aiming to diagnose and restore its health and discipline its conduct in order to maximise its productivity) and their entire population (overseeing its demographic distribution and circulation and seeking to uphold its ‘public health’).7

2022 Michigan Kritik
Settler Colonialism K––K Lab › ALTS

Prefer the critique’s impact. There’s a cognitive bias to downplay settler violence.

King 20, PhD, professor in the Liberal Studies department at Grand Valley State University (Sarah, “What We’re Talking about When We’re Talking about Water: Race, Imperial Politics, and Ruination in Flint, Michigan,” in The Wonder of Water, UMich Libraries)//BB

For many North Americans, reflecting on and analysing their role as settlers in colonial nations2 – and about their relationship to place in this context – is a fundamental challenge. The liberal discourse of equality often denies that racism is a systemic or everyday problem, promoting instead a “‘national story’ of benevolence and generosity” (Srivastava 2005, 35). Srivastava suggests that Canadians operate within “contemporary national discourses of tolerance, multiculturalism and nonracism” that mask ongoing racialized conflicts (35). Addressing the racialized structure of society is profoundly challenging because Canadian and American moral identity is so tied up in a vision of equality, a vision that, like all national visions, “requires not only sameness and communion but also forgetting difference and oppression” (Benedict Anderson, in Srivastava 2005, 39). This vision of sameness and nonracism is fundamental to the vision that the Canadian government sought to uphold in Esgenoôpetitj, and that the Michigan government used to frame its emergency manager laws. Confronting the racism inherent in North American relationships with Indigenous peoples requires confronting fundamental questions about the history and legitimacy of the colonial states of Canada and the US. Taiaiake Alfred, an Indigenist academic, argues that most Settlers are in denial. They know that the foundations of their countries are corrupt, and they know that their countries are “colonial” in historical terms, but they still refuse to see and accept the fact that there can be no rhetorical transcendence and retelling of the past to make it right without making fundamental changes to their government, society, and the way they live ... To deny the truth is an essential cultural and psychological process in Settler society. (2005, 107) Many settlers know Canada/the US as their only home, and wonder, as some of the people I interviewed in Burnt Church did, why they must pay for the sins of their forefathers. But the problems inherent in settler relationships with Indigenous peoples are not only historical; they exist in individual, social, and political lives in the present. The fundamental discomfort of reflection on race and racism makes it difficult for many to reflect upon their shared position in the colonial present.

2022 Michigan Kritik
Settler Colonialism K––K Lab › ALTS

Indigenous struggle can use technology to create international movements against settler society

Cleaver 98 (The Zapatista Effect: The Internet and the rise of an alternative political fabric, Harry M. Cleaver, Journal of International Affairs Vol. 51, No. 2, Technology and International Policy: Essays on the Information Age (Spring 1998), pp. 621-640 (20 pages), ) // JLHS AA

The role of the Internet in the international circulation of information on the indigenous rebellion in Chiapas developed quickly and has continued to evolve. Early on, the Internet provided a means for the rapid dissemination of information and organization through preexisting circuits, such as those which had been created as part of the struggle to block the NAFTA, or those concerned with Latin American and indigenous issues. These networks existed primarily at an international level, mostly in computer-rich North American and Western European countries. News reports on radio and television were complemented by first-hand reports in cyberspace from a record number of observers who flooded into Chiapas with hitherto unseen alacrity, as well as from more analytical commentators who could voice their opinions and enter into debates more quickly and easily in cyberspace. These few circuits were rapidly complemented by the creation of specialized lists, conferences and web pages devoted specifically to Chiapas and the struggle for democracy in Mexico. The breadth of participation in these discussions and the posting of multiple sources of information has made possible an unprecedented degree of verification in the history of the media. Questionable information can be quickly checked and counterinformation posted with a speed unknown in either print, radio or television. Instead of days or weeks, the norm for posting objections or corrections is minutes or hours. It is important to note that the EZLN has played no direct role in the proliferation of the use of the Internet. Rather, these efforts were initiated by others to weave a network of support for the Zapatista movement. Although there is a myth that Zapatista spokesman Subcommandante Marcos sits in the jungle uploading EZLN communiques from his laptop, the reality is that the EZLN and its communities have had a mediated relationship to the Internet. The Zapatista communities are indigenous, poor and often cut-oft not only from computer communications but also from the necessary electricity and telephone systems. Under these conditions, EZLN materials were initially prepared as written communiques for the mass media and were handed to reporters or to friends to give to reporters. Such material then had to be typed or scanned into electronic format for distribution on the Internet. Today, there are dozens of web pages with detailed information on the situation in Chiapas specifically and the state of democracy in Mexico more generally Several widely used news and discussion lists devoted to the daily circulation of information and its assessment are available. These various interventions operate from many countries and in many languages, and they are all the result of work by those sympathetic to the rights of indigenous peoples and to the plight of the Zapatistas. Some of these efforts were launched in Mexico. For example, the "chiapas-l" list is run through computers at the Universidad Autonoma de Mexico (UNAM) in Mexico City The Zapatista National Liberation Front (FZLN)16 operates both a list ("fzln1") and a series of voluminous multi-lingual web pages carrying news and documents regarding the negotiation process in Chiapas and more general discussions in Mexico. Other sites have originated outside of Mexico. The first unofficial FZLN webpage, for example, was implemented through the Swarthmore College web server in Pennsylvania.17 More recently, the Zapatistas have begun to craft their missives and adapt their public interventions as they have grown to better understand the effectiveness of the Internet in making their voices heard, communicating with supporters and forging new alliances. Today, through the intermediation of the FZLN or other friendly groups and individuals, Marcos and the EZLN regularly send messages to others around the world, including, for example, messages to a European-wide demonstration in Amsterdam against Maastricht and unemployment, to an Italian gathering in Venice against regional separatism or to a conference of media activists in New York. In these communications they make their position on various issues known and seek to create or strengthen ties with far away groups. The Internet is also playing an increasingly central role in particular organizing efforts initiated by the EZLN. While its role was limited in the formation of the meetings of the National Democratic Convention in 1994 and 1995, which drew together a wide variety of groups from all over Mexico, the Internet was employed to a greater extent in the subsequent national and international plebiscites. The Zapatistas used the Internet in those cases to seek feedback from their supporters regarding the direction their political struggle should take.l8 During the plebiscites, most participants in Mexico voted at booths set up throughout the country by Alianza Civica, a well-respected pro-democracy Mexican NGO. In addition, some 81,000 foreigners from 47 countries took part, mostly via the Internet.l9 According to Alianza Civica, total participation in Mexico was over one million persons.20 The most dramatic organizational efforts in which the Internet has played a central role are the joint cooperative efforts between the Zapatistas and other social movements linked to them. These efforts have included the organization of large-scale meetings in response to the January 1996 Zapatista call for continental and intercontinental "encounters" to discuss, among other things, contemporary global neoliberal (capitalist) policies, methods of elaborating a global network of opposition to those policies and formulas for interconnecting various projects for elaborating alternatives. The result of these organizing efforts included: a series of continental meetings in the spring of 1996;21 an intercontinental meeting in Chiapas in the summer of 1996; and a second intercontinental meeting in Spain in the summer of 1997. Through extensive E-mails and a small number of intermittent, face-to-face meetings, possible approaches to the organization of discussion were debated, agendas were hammered out and logistical arrangements were made. The results were stunning. Thousands came to the continental meetings-3,000 to the intercontinental meeting in Chiapas and 4,000 to the intercontinental reunion in Spain. Grassroots activists from over 40 countries and five continents attended both intercontinental meetings. Without the Internet, this turnout would never have been possible. It is only recently that such encounters have become regular features on the margins of meetings organized by supranational institutions like the United Nations. It has usually been governments, not poor villages of indigenous peoples, that have had the means to organize such gatherings. The Zapatistas, however, successfully organized these encounters on a scale that far exceeded anyone's expectations, and this fact alone warrants close attention by those interested in the evolution of international politics.

2022 Michigan Kritik
Settler Colonialism K––K Lab › ALTS

The alternative is incommensurability – decolonization is a project that requires the repatriation of indigenous lands, the abolition of slavery and property, and the dismantling of the imperial metropole.

Tuck & Yang 12 [Eve Tuck is Associate Professor of Critical Race and Indigenous Studies at the Ontario Institute for Studies in Education (OISE), University of Toronto. She is Canada Research Chair of Indigenous Methodologies with Youth and Communities. K. Wayne Yang writes about decolonization and everyday epic organizing, particularly from underneath ghetto colonialism, often with his frequent collaborator, Eve Tuck. Currently, they are convening The Land Relationships Super Collective, editing the book series, Indigenous and Decolonizing Studies in Education, and editing the journal, Critical Ethnic Studies. He is interested in the complex role of cities in global affairs: cities as sites of settler colonialism, as stages for empire, as places of resettlement and gentrification, and as always-already on Indigenous lands. *Sometimes he writes as la paperson, an avatar that irregularly calls.“Decolonization is not a metaphor,” Decolonization: Indigeneity, Education & Society Vol 1 No 1 (2012) //tjb]

Having elaborated on settler moves to innocence, we give a synopsis of the imbrication of settler colonialism with transnationalist, abolitionist, and critical pedagogy movements - efforts that are often thought of as exempt from Indigenous decolonizing analyses - as a synthesis of how decolonization as material, not metaphor, unsettles the innocence of these movements. These are interruptions which destabilize, un-balance, and repatriate the very terms and assumptions of some of the most radical efforts to reimagine human power relations. We argue that the opportunities for solidarity lie in what is incommensurable rather than what is common across these efforts. We offer these perspectives on unsettling innocence because they are examples of what we might call an ethic of incommensurability, which recognizes what is distinct, what is sovereign for project(s) of decolonization in relation to human and civil rights based social justice projects. There are portions of these projects that simply cannot speak to one another, cannot be aligned or allied. We make these notations to highlight opportunities for what can only ever be strategic and contingent collaborations, and to indicate the reasons that lasting solidarities may be elusive, even undesirable. Below we point to unsettling themes that challenge the coalescence of social justice endeavors broadly assembled into three areas: Transnational or Third World decolonizations, Abolition, and Critical Space-Place Pedagogies. For each of these areas, we offer entry points into the literature - beginning a sort of bibliography of incommensurability. Third world decolonizations The anti-colonial turn towards the transnational can sometimes involve ignoring the settler colonial context where one resides and how that inhabitation is implicated in settler colonialism, in order to establish “global” solidarities that presumably suffer fewer complicities and complications. This deliberate not-seeing is morally convenient but avoids an important feature of the aforementioned selective collapsibility of settler colonial-nations states. Expressions such as “the Global South within the Global North” and “the Third World in the First World” neglect the Four Directions via a Flat Earth perspective and ambiguate First Nations with Third World migrants. For people writing on Third World decolonizations, but who do so upon Native land, we invite you to consider the permanent settler war as the theater for all imperial wars: ● the Orientalism of Indigenous Americans (Berger, 2004; Marez, 2007) ● discovery, invasion, occupation, and Commons as the claims of settler sovereignty (Ford, 2010) ● heteropatriarchy as the imposition of settler sexuality (Morgensen, 2011) ● citizenship as coercive and forced assimilation into the white settler normative (Bruyneel, 2004; Somerville, 2010) ● religion as covenant for settler nation-state (A.J. Barker, 2009; Maldonado-Torres, 2008) ● the frontier as the first and always the site of invasion and war (Byrd, 2011), ● U.S. imperialism as the expansion of settler colonialism (ibid) ● Asian settler colonialism (Fujikane, 2012; Fujikane, & Okamura, 2008, Saranillio, 2010a, 2010b) ● the frontier as the language of ‘progress’ and discovery (Maldonado-Torres, 2008) ● rape as settler colonial structure (Deer, 2009; 2010) ● the discourse of terrorism as the terror of Native retribution (Tuck & Ree, forthcoming) ● Native Feminisms as incommensurable with other feminisms (Arvin, Tuck, Morrill, forthcoming; Goeman & Denetdale, 2009). Abolition The abolition of slavery often presumes the expansion of settlers who own Native land and life via inclusion of emancipated slaves and prisoners into the settler nation-state. As we have noted, it is no accident that the U.S. government promised 40 acres of Indian land as reparations for plantation slavery. Likewise, indentured European laborers were often awarded tracts of ‘unsettled’ Indigenous land as payment at the end of their service (McCoy, forthcoming). Communal ownership of land has figured centrally in various movements for autonomous, self-determined communities. “The land belongs to those who work it,” disturbingly parrots Lockean justifications for seizing Native land as property, ‘earned’ through one’s labor in clearing and cultivating ‘virgin’ land. For writers on the prison industrial complex, il/legality, and other forms of slavery, we urge you to consider how enslavement is a twofold procedure: removal from land and the creation of property (land and bodies). Thus, abolition is likewise twofold, requiring the repatriation of land and the abolition of property (land and bodies). Abolition means self-possession but not object-possession, repatriation but not reparation: ● “The animals of the world exist for their own reasons. They were not made for humans any more than black people were made for white, or women created for men” (Alice Walker, describing the work of Marjorie Spiegel, in the in the preface to Spigel’s 1988 book, The Dreaded Comparison). ● Enslavement/removal of Native Americans (Gallay, 2009) ● Slaves who become slave-owners, savagery as enslavability, chattel slavery as a sign of civilization (Gallay, 2009) ● Black fugitivity, undercommons, and radical dispossession (Moten, 2008; Moten & Harney, 2004; Moten & Harney, 2010) ● Incarceration as a settler colonialism strategy of land dispossession (Ross, 1998; Watson, 2007) ● Native land and Native people as co-constituitive (Meyer, 2008; Kawagley, 2010) Critical pedagogies The many critical pedagogies that engage emancipatory education, place based education, environmental education, critical multiculturalism, and urban education often position land as public Commons or seek commonalities between struggles. Although we believe that “we must be fluent” in each other’s stories and struggles (paraphrasing Alexander, 2002, p.91), we detect precisely this lack of fluency in land and Indigenous sovereignty. Yupiaq scholar, Oscar Kawagley’s assertion, “We know that Mother Nature has a culture, and it is a Native culture” (2010, p. xiii), directs us to think through land as “more than a site upon which humans make history or as a location that accumulates history” (Goeman, 2008, p.24). The forthcoming special issue in Environmental Education Research, “Land Education: Indigenous, postcolonial, and decolonizing perspectives on place and environmental education research” might be a good starting point to consider the incommensurability of place-based, environmentalist, urban pedagogies with land education. ● The urban as Indigenous (Bang, 2009; Belin, 1999; Friedel, 2011; Goeman, 2008; Intertribal Friendship House & Lobo, 2002) ● Indigenous storied land as disrupting settler maps (Goeman, 2008) ● Novels, poetry, and essays by Greg Sarris, Craig Womack, Joy Harjo, Gerald Vizenor ● To Remain an Indian (Lomawaima & McCarty, 2006) ● Shadow Curriculum (Richardson, 2011) ● Red Pedagogy (Grande, 2004) ● Land Education (McCoy, Tuck, McKenzie, forthcoming) More on incommensurability Incommensurability is an acknowledgement that decolonization will require a change in the order of the world (Fanon, 1963). This is not to say that Indigenous peoples or Black and brown peoples take positions of dominance over white settlers; the goal is not for everyone to merely swap spots on the settler-colonial triad, to take another turn on the merry-go-round. The goal is to break the relentless structuring of the triad - a break and not a compromise (Memmi, 1991). Breaking the settler colonial triad, in direct terms, means repatriating land to sovereign Native tribes and nations, abolition of slavery in its contemporary forms, and the dismantling of the imperial metropole. Decolonization “here” is intimately connected to anti-imperialism elsewhere. However, decolonial struggles here/there are not parallel, not shared equally, nor do they bring neat closure to the concerns of all involved - particularly not for settlers. Decolonization is not equivocal to other anti-colonial struggles. It is incommensurable. There is so much that is incommensurable, so many overlaps that can’t be figured, that cannot be resolved. Settler colonialism fuels imperialism all around the globe. Oil is the motor and motive for war and so was salt, so will be water. Settler sovereignty over these very pieces of earth, air, and water is what makes possible these imperialisms. The same yellow pollen in the water of the Laguna Pueblo reservation in New Mexico, Leslie Marmon Silko reminds us, is the same uranium that annihilated over 200,000 strangers in 2 flashes. The same yellow pollen that poisons the land from where it came. Used in the same war that took a generation of young Pueblo men. Through the voice of her character Betonie, Silko writes, “Thirty thousand years ago they were not strangers. You saw what the evil had done; you saw the witchery ranging as wide as the world" (Silko, 1982, p. 174). In Tucson, Arizona, where Silko lives, her books are now banned in schools. Only curricular materials affirming the settler innocence, ingenuity, and right to America may be taught. In “No”, her response to the 2003 United States invasion of Iraq, Mvskoke/Creek poet Joy Harjo (2004) writes, “Yes, that was me you saw shaking with bravery, with a government issued rifle on my back. I’m sorry I could not greet you, as you deserved, my relative.” Don’t Native Americans participate in greater rates in the military? asks the young-ish man from Viet Nam. “Indian Country” was/is the term used in Viet Nam, Afghanistan, Iraq by the U.S. military for ‘enemy territory’. The first Black American President said without blinking, “There was a point before folks had left, before we had gotten everybody back on the helicopter and were flying back to base, where they said Geronimo has been killed, and Geronimo was the code name for bin Laden.” Elmer Pratt, Black Panther leader, falsely imprisoned for 27 years, was a Vietnam Veteran, was nicknamed ‘Geronimo’. Geronimo is settler nickname for the Bedonkohe Apache warrior who fought Mexican and then U.S. expansion into Apache tribal lands. The Colt .45 was perfected to kill Indigenous people during the ‘liberation’ of what became the Philippines, but it was first invented for the ‘Indian Wars’ in North America alongside The Hotchkiss Canon- a gattling gun that shot canonballs. The technologies of the permanent settler war are reserviced for foreign wars, including boarding schools, colonial schools, urban schools run by military personnel. It is properly called Indian Country. Ideologies of US settler colonialism directly informed Australian settler colonialism. South African apartheid townships, the kill-zones in what became the Philippine colony, then nation-state, the checkerboarding of Palestinian land with checkpoints, were modeled after U.S. seizures of land and containments of Indian bodies to reservations. The racial science developed in the U.S. (a settler colonial racial science) informed Hitler’s designs on racial purity (“This book is my bible” he said of Madison Grant’s The Passing of the Great Race). The admiration is sometimes mutual, the doctors and administrators of forced sterilizations of black, Native, disabled, poor, and mostly female people - The Sterilization Act accompanied the Racial Integrity Act and the Pocohontas Exception - praised the Nazi eugenics program. Forced sterilizations became illegal in California in 1964.

2022 Michigan Kritik
Settler Colonialism K––K Lab › ALTS

Thus we endorse diversality – an orientation that recognizes the hybridity of alternative epistemologies that focuses on building mutual connections to build new forms of international relations centered around recognition and not dominance

Taylor 12 (Decolonizing International Relations: Perspectives from Latin America, Lucy Taylor, International Studies Review, September 2012, Vol. 14, No. 3 (September 2012), pp. 386-400 Published by: Wiley on behalf of The International Studies Association Stable URL: ) // JLHS AA

So far, I have focused on politicizing binaries and exposing the colonial wound. This is an important step but it imagines the debate to take place in terms of the colonizer and colonized; what is missing is an appreciation of mixed-ness or mestizaje, a social fact which is integral to theorizing the coloniality of power in the Americas. Here, we return to the colonial difference but emphasize the lived experiences of ‘‘transculturation’’ and ‘‘border thinking.’’ Particularly in Latin America, the colonial wound has generated significant indigenous organizations right across the region, which assert their dignity and political capacity (Maldonado-Torres 2007; Quijano 2008). In doing so, they reveal the existence of the ‘‘colonial difference,’’ marking it as a space of political contestation, but this disjucture is not experienced in the same way by the colonizer and the colonized. While the colonizer, installed in a dominant position, views it as a gap of miscomprehension and disdain, which ‘‘he’’ is not obliged to cross, the colonized must operate in a world dominated by Occidental institutions, languages, and rationales (Mignolo 2000: 64–84). The colonized must incessantly negotiate the colonial difference and reconcile the demands of a colonized reality with cultural meanings embedded in an indigenous worldview. Politicizing this mestizaje is key to decolonial politics, and Gloria Anzaldu´a’s notion of ‘‘border thinking,’’ a Latin American response to hybridity, offers significant insights (Mignolo 2000: 49–90; Anzaldu´a 2007). Anzaldu´a’s vision of hybridity is rooted not in the intricacies of intellectual debate or psychoanalysis but draws on her real-life experiences of living between the labels which attach to the binaries so essential to Occidental thinking. Anzaldu´a grew up and lived on the US–Mexico border: she was a Chicana feminist daughter of share-croppers, a Marxist indı´gena mestiza and seventh generation lesbian citizen of the United States (Keating 2009: 1–15). Living at the intersection of so many boundaries (geographical, sexual, political, linguistic, racial) did not leave her feeling incomplete or dismembered, though; her response was to say: ‘‘They would chop me up into little fragments and tag each piece with a label. You say my name is ambivalence?... Who me, confused? Ambivalent? Not so. Only your labels split me’’ (Anzaldu´a 1984; quoted in Keating 2009: 17). By asserting her completeness, she demonstrates the fallacy of the labels. Anzaldu´a borrowed a Nahuatl word to express the space that she inhabited between these tagged categories: nepantla or (roughly) the place at the broken edges. She explained the technique of border thinking in one poem: ‘‘Because I, a mestiza, continually walk out of one culture, and into another, because I am in all cultures at the same time, alma entre dos mundos, tres, cuatro,...’’ (Anzaldu´a 2007: 99) This vision of human agency derived from inhabiting border lands serves to disempower the idea of the border as a stopping point controlled by the state. That the state which she traversed in real life was the US–Mexico border only heightens the powerfulness of her critique and the subversive potential of her work for both IR and the Americas. Equally important, though, is the concept of transculturation, which indicates that processes of hybridity have not only shaped the lives of subaltern groups, but have also conditioned Whiteness and the Western epistemological project in (Latin) American society (Pratt 2008). The concept of transculturation was devised by Cuban anthropologist Fernando Ortı´z in 1940 to understand how Cuban society was constituted. He focused on the relationship between slaves and slave owners, understanding that both had shifted from their native soil and that each was intimately influenced by the cultural heritage of the other and the experience of colonialism: ‘‘Each immigrant was uprooted from his native land in a double movement of adjustment and readjustment, of deculturation or exculturation and of acculturation or inculturation, and ultimately transculturation’’ (Ortı´z 1940: 255, italics in original, my translation). He was clear that this relationship of mutual influence was not equal or power-free––how could it be––but asserted that both the African and the European communities were full cultural agents, even though they were locked into a brutal and exploitative relationship (Millington 2007). By imagining cultural exchange to be a two-way street (albeit on a steep hill), Ortı´z highlights hybridity as a social experience of both the subaltern and the dominant. He urges us to consider transculturation as part and parcel of society-making, nation-building projects, and look beyond domination and appropriation to ask how Native American thinking, experiences, and practices have molded ‘‘the USA’’ as a global actor. Following this thinking, resistance to the coloniality of power therefore involves not only fighting against the colonizing logic, but also seeking to shake that logic from within by revealing the hybridity and diversity within what seems to be a unified and settled settler society. Border thinking, then, might elicit insights not only at the ‘‘periphery’’ or border but also at the ‘‘core’’ of global power, if we are willing to destabilize its foundations. A useful strategy which might help to unsettle ‘‘core’’ thinking has been proposed by Martinican Edouard Glissant in his Poetics of Relation (1997). He sets out an intellectual politics of diversality (rather than universality) inspired by Caribbean Creole consciousness. Diversality takes the idea of transculturation a step further by theorizing cultural interchange as not only a social fact but also a political strategy. Diversality assumes the existence of profound difference, but Glissant argues that ‘‘thought of the Other is sterile without the other of Thought’’ (1997: 154); that is, merely accepting that differences exist is not enough to generate deep change in our thinking. Rather, he calls for an ‘‘aesthetics of turbulence,’’ which breaks assumptions and allows one’s thoughts to be ‘‘prised open’’ in order to develop new imaginaries and fresh linkages between peoples. The ‘‘other of Thought’’ is thus created by confluences in which ‘‘each is changed by and changes the other’’ (1997: 154–5). Diversality involves not only being prepared to recognize difference on an equal footing but also a willingness to open one’s thoughts to ‘‘turbulence’’ which will destroy assumptions and rebuild hybrid modes of thinking in its wake. The Americas occupies a privileged role in this theorizing because, as Anzaldu´a, Ortı´z, and Glissant assert, social (and sexual) mixing is not a ‘‘new’’ process but rather it is deeply embedded in the Americas––in 500 years of colonial encounter and its resulting hybrid identities. A ‘‘mestizo Americas’’ approach could therefore play a crucial role in developing decolonial political struggle, not only by denouncing the injustice of colonialism but by prising open, shifting, and hybridizing conventional ways of understanding international relationships––and International Relations. The issue of how this might occur requires more time and space to explore, but I begin a discussion here by identifying three questions that a decolonial politics might ask of IR. 1. What other ways are there to understand the world? (And how might this influence our thinking about the international?) This question invites IR to acknowledge diversality. It assumes the completeness, complexity, and sophistication of non-western ontologies and epistemologies in a move which should be humbling. It opens up our minds to new ways of imagining human existence; to imagine time as being circular (King 1993), or that land does not belong to people but people to the land (Silko 2006), or that boundaries are delineated by walking ⁄ presence (Larsen 2006), or that the world is configured not through dualities but threes (Kusch 2010), or that colonialism is an illness (Momaday 1989; Burman 2009). This work has already started; Marshall Beier’s incisive critique of conventional IR conveys the immensities of the colonial difference in his discussion of Lakota life-ways which he contrasts to the ‘‘hegemonologue’’ of mainstream IR (2005). These differences might influence understandings of the international, not so much by adding new ideas but by destabilizing our mode of thinking––our aesthetics of thought, as Glissant might suggest. Encountering fundamental disjunctures of human experience should convey a sensation of difference experienced as a visceral confusion and disorientation. A decolonial IR project must, then, be prepared to approach non-occidental worldviews with a mind that is willing to be made uncomfortable, that is ready not to comprehend, and that is prepared to feel out of control. This is not just an exercise in submission though, because we can use the sensation of disorientation to heighten our awareness of the Occidental project and the contemporary coloniality of power. It helps us to map out the narrow limits of the Western imaginary and to perceive its contours, its regime of knowledge, and worldview more profoundly. An awareness of diversality shows the limits and fallacies of universal thinking, and by unsettling our certainties, it generates space for new thought. 2. What does IR not know? (And what has this got to do with the coloniality of power?) This question highlights the hidden side of knowledge––ignorance. It suggests that the chasm of colonial difference is far too deep and wide to be bridged, which means that single-vision understandings of world history or IR cannot possibly comprehend the experiences and worldviews of ‘‘others’’. Glissant reflects on the academic project and concludes that ‘‘no matter how many studies and references we accumulate, we will never reach the end...; knowing this in advances makes it possible for us to dwell there. Not knowing this totality [of experiences] is not a weakness. Not wanting to know it certainly is’’ (1997: 154). Perhaps counter-intuitively, then, this ignorance brings a number of intellectual benefits. Firstly, being aware of profound difference might act as a brake on drawing easy parallels without listening and thinking very hard first, promoting critical and complex thinking. Secondly, gaining a sense of just how different difference can be helps us to perceive the realm of possibilities because it is an orientation point in a vast galaxy of difference. However, the purpose of identifying deep difference is not to label or pin down with words ideas which are outside the realm of European imagination. Rather, it is to accept that the chasm cannot be closed––that such ideas are simply untranslatable into European languages and regimes of knowledge (Mignolo and Schiwy 2003). That is, a decolonial IR must accept its ignorance and learn what it can about the world not only by studying what is knowable but also by reflecting on what is beyond comprehension. The caveat reminds us, though, that this realm of thinking about the international takes place not on a level playing field of competing worldviews but on a pitch riven with geohierarchies conditioned by the coloniality of power. A decolonial IR project must foreground the colonial nature of this difference to expose the injustices that conventional approaches enact in the name of universalism. 3. How might conventional IR be ‘‘prised open’’ by difference? (And how is this linked to the USA?) This question asks what would happen if IR were to move beyond simply acknowledging diversality to generate an aesthetics of thinking Other-wise (Glissant 1997). This involves recognizing that the chasm of colonial difference is far from absolute, indeed that it is spanned, everyday and often, through processes of mestizaje. Thus, difference should be viewed as a border zone which acts as a space where new ideas and cosmologies might be imagined, emerging from transcultural meetings. One key way in which conventional IR might be opened up by difference is by refocusing attention on ordinary people’s experience of the international, as Te´treault and Lipschutz propose. This takes on a decolonizing role if the coloniality of power is highlighted, a move which not only creates awareness of difference but promotes border thinking––thinking inbetween categories and based on everyday lived experiences of negotiating coloniality ⁄ modernity. Such strategies complement attempts by Inayatullah and Blaney and many more to destabilize IR’s traditional building blocks such as nation-states, sovereignty, and the binary of war⁄peace. The USA as global actor, as Western beacon, and as home of the discipline is intimately entangled with IR. This is why border thinking at the binaried intersection of the Americas is particularly acute in its capacity to destabilize conventional thinking because it is a geographical metaphor for many of the boundaries which set out global hierarchies and help to structure IR. Not least of these is the First World ⁄Third World binary embodied at the US–Mexico border and its attendants, Whiteness⁄Blackness, and civilization⁄ barbarism. Shifting from thinking about the border itself to embrace border thinking invites us to step beyond the fence and its checkpoints to consider the USA as a profoundly hybrid place. We move beyond US hybridity as immigrant melting pot, to focus on mestizaje––a complex amalgam of settler, Native and African slave descendants whose relationships are vividly marked by the coloniality of power and the logics of modernity. A decolonial IR writing from a ‘‘prised open’’ USA not only looks for radical, destabilizing difference, such as Native American thinking but also recognizes hybridized connections which generate openings for dialogues. We should not assume that the USA, like the Cuban slave masters described by Ortı´z, is not profoundly conditioned by the colonial encounter. However, such interactions do not occur in a power-free zone. For this reason, a decolonial analysis of hybridity in the international must vigilantly foreground the presence of inequality, injustice, and the potential for violence in cultural interchanges conditioned by the coloniality of power. Border thinking in this broad sense, inclusive of IR perspectives, offers a realm of imagination, connection and intellectual opportunity from which to rethink and challenge dominant economic, racial and epistemological modes. The role of mainstream IR in such re-imaginings of intergroup relationships is crucial, not least because, as critical scholars like those cited in this article attest, conventional IR is a central mainstay of the unequal global order.

2022 Michigan Kritik
Settler Colonialism K––K Lab › Links––General › L––Oceans

The militarization of the ocean is emblematic of a broader project of globalization and erasure of indigenous bodies.

St. John 22[D.E. St. John ur Toxic Transpacific: Hydro-Colonialism, Nuclearization, and Radioactive Identities in Post-Fukushima Literature. American Studies, https://journals.ku.edu/amsj/article/view/16383]

In thus engaging material ecocritical, transpacific, and decolonial scholarship, this essay employs a reading practice indebted to Isabel Hofmeyr’s (2019) “hydro-colonial” neologism.3 In pursuit of new routes in oceanic studies, hydro-colonialism refers to the ongoing occupation, instrumentalization, and resource extraction of the seas, waters, and oceans by national or corporate powers. This hegemonic striation of the ocean takes the form of military bases, fishing conglomerates, penal colonies, aircraft carriers, plastic landmasses, and nuclear power plants. In reading hydro-colonialism in works of literature, I hope to contribute to the recent “oceanic turn” toward a “tidalectic consciousness”—a concept coined by Caribbean poet Kamau Brathwaite and mobilized by Elizabeth DeLoughrey to explore “the complex and shifting entanglement between sea and land, diaspora and indigeneity, routes and roots” (2007, 2). Hydro-colonial critique builds upon postcolonial and material ecocriticism while shifting focus away from terra-centric and historicist models of colonialism. This pivot creates space for the materiality of the sea to emerge as an agential force while simultaneously buoying postcolonial and Indigenous perspectives to the surface. Read in this light, 3/11 literature takes on a global significance. In addition to lamenting the staggering loss of life, the novels and poems produced postFukushima view the nuclearization of the Pacific as a continuation of Japanese and American colonization. These texts show how governmental oversight and failure to proactively respond to climate change–related disaster resulted in environmental injustice—where the fallout of 3/11 had specific consequences for poor Japanese and Japanese women, whose bodies have been metaphorically and literally altered. This essay navigates these hydro-colonial channels while placing them within the broader backdrops of material ecocriticism and globalization studies.4 I begin by forging connections between hydro-colonial nuclearization and global racial capitalism as depicted in Ruth Ozeki’s A Tale for the Time Being (2013), which has emerged as the preeminent “American” novel in response to 3/11.5 For Ozeki, both racist and deracializing aspects of hydrocolonialism are mitigated through entanglements with nonhuman animals and objects. I establish this theoretical groundwork before examining poems from Roripaugh’s 2019 collection Tsunami vs. The Fukushima 50, demonstrating how imagery of irradiation and toxicity present a posthuman response to the 3/11 disaster, global hydro-colonialism, and the ongoing climate crisis. Colonial Catfish: Folkloric Rectifications to Hydro-Colonialism in Ruth Ozeki’s A Tale for the Time Being Ozeki’s A Tale for the Time Being begins when Ruth, a novelist living on the coast of British Columbia, discovers a Japanese lunch box washed ashore, carried across the Pacific by the drift of oceanic gyres. Inside the box rests the diary of Naoko Yasutani, a Japanese schoolgirl living in Tokyo. Ozeki’s narrative leaps between these dual protagonists, crossing expanses of space and time in the process.6 As Ruth reads the journal, more of Nao’s story is revealed: how she set out to write the life story of her great-grandmother Jiko, a Buddhist nun, but was distracted by rampant bullying at school and her father’s depression and suicidal ideation. Meanwhile, the act of reading Nao’s journal raises questions for Ruth about the nature of writing, memory, and time. These dual narratives take place before and after the Tohoku earthquake with the disaster serving as a nondiegetic event that occurs outside the time of the novel, yet the disaster haunts the lives of both Ruth and Nao. For Ruth, the act of reading Nao’s diary is an act of recovery, in which she is able to bring both narratives to a satisfying resolution even as the aftermath of the 3/11 disaster is ongoing with some bodies never discovered and the long-term effects of the fallout remaining to be seen. Recent years have seen a number of analyses of the novel through the critical lenses of Asian American literature, Pacific Rim scholarship, and transpacific discourse. In Ocean Passages, Erin Suzuki describes how “transpacific” has become shorthand for studies of Asian and Asian American diaspora while the broad geographical swath cut by Pacific Rim studies can enact the same homogenizing of Indigenous persons and those from smaller Pacific islands of which the term “Asian American” itself is emblematic. Suzuki praises Ozeki for rendering the Pacific Ocean as a site of “submerged and belated histories that have been ignored or occluded by the capital-driven structures of contemporary transpacific politics, economy and policy” (2021, 1). This reading coalesces with Michelle Huang’s (2017), which focuses on Ozeki’s depiction of the 80,000 tons of floating plastic called the Great Pacific garbage patch, which lies at the center of the very gyres that prompt the transpacific journey of Nao’s diary.7 In imbricating environmental devastation, cultural erasure, a disproportionate impact upon raced bodies, and capitalist extraction, these existing readings of A Tale for the Time Being underscore the human and material costs of globalization. However, they do not explicitly address 3/11 or the symbolism of irradiation as a hydrocolonial by-product.8

2022 Michigan Kritik
Settler Colonialism K––K Lab › Links––General › L––Water

The affirmative is a hydrocolonial project that projects desires of dominance onto water.

Hofmeyr 17[Isabel Hofmeyr is a Ph.D, 1992, University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg, South Africa, “ACLA FORUM: OCEANIC ROUTES Oceanic Routes: (Post-it) Notes on Hydro-Colonialism,” Comparative Literature, ]

Another register in which to cast these themes, and indeed to think across them, is the neologism “hydro-colonial.” The possible meanings of the term could include (1) colonization by means of water (various forms of maritime imperialism); (2) colonization of water (occupation of land with water resources, the declaration of territorial waters, the militarization and geopoliticization of oceans); and (3) a colony on water (the ship as a miniature colony or a penal island).6 If modulated to “hydro-imperialism,” the neologism could point to the relation of the naming and labeling of oceans to maritime empires. In all of these usages, the preix hydro points to a material (or hydro-material) turn in recent Oceanic Studies that grapples with the seaness of the sea. The suixes — whether colonial or imperialism — signal an ainity with postcolonialism so crucial to the Southern regions we engage, while both terms in their entirety declare an intention to shift the intellectual center of gravity away from a purely land-focused one. The provocations collected in this forum straddle these “oceanic” and “routes” themes while exploring hydro-colonial poetics. The paper by Ashley Cohen takes an eighteenth-century transoceanic perspective that sutures the Atlantic and Indian Oceans, two arenas normally kept apart (the irst versus the second British empire; the plantation economy versus trade and commerce; the realm of “race” versus that of “caste”; Christian versus Muslim; West versus East). Instead, as she shows, these theaters were imagined as a continuous imperial sphere of the Global Indies: “everything east of Europe . . . the East Indies and everything west of Africa . . . the West Indies.” This worldview, “in which India and the Americas are consistently thought together,” produced literary igures, itineraries, and tropes that are unrecognizable today: slaves who could be both African and Indian, the “black poor” made up of both Asian lascars and destitute Africans in London. Cohen demonstrates the new alignments that come into view by factoring in oceans and oceanic regions, showing how tracing the routes immanent in literary texts and cultural artifacts can lead us to uncover historical “meta-geographies” that both structure conceptions of the world and help bring these worlds into being. Meg Samuelson begins a move from routes towards the ocean itself, arguing for littoral literature, coastal form, and an amphibian aesthetic. Her focus is on two writers concerned with the South-East African Indian Ocean coast: Mia Couto from Mozambique and Abdulrazak Gurnah, a British-Zanzibari writer. Both writers develop a hydro-poetics of the coast that unsettles the binaries of colonial and postcolonial rule. They do this by relecting thematically and formally a shifting “ecotone” of a shore — depicting it not as simply a meeting point of sea and land but as a site for an eddying of cultures and a complex more-than-human environment in its own right. The view from the littoral, Samuelson proposes, “levers open continental categories” and ofers new models for world literature. Pushing against an entrenched colonial mapping of the oceans and its cultural legacies in supposedly postcolonial times, and bringing us into the ocean through the languages and epistemologies of island peoples living there, Alice Te Punga Somerville takes a radical Oceania perspective to raise far-reaching questions about what we and others have described as an originally Atlantic Studies-based oceanic turn in literary scholarship, as well as the nature of Oceanic Studies in general. Our existing oceanic labels (in this case “the Paciic”) are imperially imposed, turning vast bodies of waters into blank and abstract spaces, a mode of imperial cartography that promotes the association of “land with presence, water with absence.” From the perspective of Oceania’s deep Indigenous presence, she suggests that there is no need for a “‘turn to the sea’ . . . because we were already there.” Hydro-poetically, this long-standing Indigenous engagement with the sea produces a series of forms and sensibilities that Te Punga Somerville tracks, arguing that engagement with this (here, largely Māori) writing is crucial to a “decolonial” Oceanic Studies.

2022 Michigan Kritik
Settler Colonialism K––K Lab › Links––General › L––DPT/Deterrence

DPT LInk

Dunn 08 [Kevin, Professor at Hobart & William Smith Colleges in Geneva, NY., Rethinking the Man Question: Sex, Gender and Violence in International Relations, chapter 2, Page 51-7, ] <Jericho>

Defining ‘normality’ and ‘abnormality’ The first step in interrogating white male privilege is to illuminate white maleness. This may seem obvious, but most white males do not actively think of themselves in those terms. White males tend to think of themselves as just people. The dominant racial and gender discourses in Western societies tend to powerfully bind whiteness and masculinity to assumed claims of realness (Halberstam 2002: 353). For example, in his work on whiteness, Richard Dyer (1997) begins by examining how white people are imagined within white cultural production. He argues that while other people are raced, white people are self-represented as being just people. ‘This assumption that white people are just people, which is not far off saying that whites are people whereas other colours are something else, is endemic to white culture’ (ibid.: 2). The often unreflective claim to be just a person is an attempt to define the bounds of normality. Such self-representations are both a manifestation of power and an assertion to power. As Dyer notes, ‘there is no more powerful position than that of being “just” human. The claim to power is the claim to speak for the commonality of humanity. Raced people can’t do that – they can only speak for their race’ (ibid.: 2). Often unreflectively, white males simultaneously seek to define what is normal and speak for humanity. Admittedly, this is not a particularly novel insight. Simone de Beauvoir observed in The Second Sex: ‘Representation of the world, like the world itself, is the work of men; they describe it from their own point of view, which they confuse with absolute truth’ (1952: 161). This obliviousness to gender and, I would argue, race is achieved because white males often assume that whiteness and maleness have little meaning. To refer back to Bourdieu, the social capital white males enjoy given their race and gender is largely invisible. As Harlon Dalton claims, such a disposition is largely ‘the natural consequence of being in the driver’s seat’ (Dalton 1995: 109). But this invisibility does not mean there is a failure to discuss white males as subjects. Most of the time white males speak about nothing else. Because white males frame the conversation in terms of people in general, however, they are everywhere in representation but rarely recognized as such (Dyer 1997: 3). This is a convergence of the simultaneous privileges of race and gender. Whites, in general, and males, in particular, often fail to recognize their own subject positions while seeking to represent all of humanity. At its root, this particular manifestation of white male privilege is about the power to define and lay claim to normality. The normal is the product of discursive practices, and the discourses defining normal in world politics privilege the white male subject position as the human one. Within the academic discipline and practice of IR, one can see a lengthy tradition of North American and western European white males writing about world politics from their own subjective position. Interrogating white male privilege 53 In doing so, they are both drawing from the dominant discourses from which they are privileged and also actively reproducing and entrenching those discourses through their habitus. That is, they are both products of discursive systems and active agents in the maintenance of those systems. To take but one simple example, much of IR theory relies on assumptions about human nature. These assumptions about human nature are manifested in myriad ways: from the myth of the stag hunt to various imagined state-of-nature scenarios. But in virtually all these cases, the actors are expressions of idealized white male subject positions. Introducing race, gender or class into the mythical stag hunt narrative, for example, produces a much more complicated and open story and, as such, a more varied discussion of human nature. Feminist theorists working within the IR discipline have done an excellent job of exposing the privileged yet hidden male subject positions in traditional IR texts. For example, J. Ann Tickner’s engagement with Hans J. Morgenthau’s Six Principles of Political Realism is an excellent study in how one IR theorist wrote from within a specific narrow structural/linguistic frame of masculinity, while claiming to generalize out to all people and humanity. As Tickner pointed out, the list of six principles ‘is a partial description of international politics because it is based on assumptions about human nature that are partial and that privilege masculinity’ (1988: 433). In some ways, the target is too easy, since Realists are so explicit in their claims to objectivity and universalism. There is a lack of self-awareness, since given the assumption that they are just people they can generalize from their own historical experiences and cultural values that are internalized and unquestioned. Thus, Realists like Morgenthau can claim to speak of and for people and humanity while other interpretations are characterized/categorized as being gendered, racialized, cultured and/or classed. This is not an exclusive characteristic of Realism but is representative of most IR theories in general, since Tickner’s tactic could be reproduced in countless white male theorists, from Kant to Keohane, Machiavelli to Marx.3 The normalizing discourses of whiteness and masculinity have enabled definitions and concepts that privileged this narrow segment of the world’s population to become accepted as the norm within IR theory and practice, such as power, the state, civil society, security, and so forth. These concepts are placed at the centre of our intellectual project, which often means that females and non-whites must employ them if they are to be taken as serious IR scholars. Moreover, the meanings and Two 54 normative values attached to these concepts are discursively bound to and typically nurture the needs and interests of the privileged white male subject position and dominant norms of masculinity. While this clearly has important implications for the construction of theory, it also has significant methodological repercussions. That is, white male privilege is not only embedded in our structures of knowledge, it also delineates acceptable systems of inquiry (Ackerly et al. 2006; Cohn 1987). Stephanie Wildman and Adrienne Davis observe, ‘The characteristics and attributes of those who are privileged group members are described as societal norms – as the way things are and as what is normal in society. This normalization of privilege means that members of society are judged, and succeed or fail, measured against the characteristics that are held by the privileged. The privileged characteristic is the norm; those who stand outside are the aberrant or “alternative”’ (1996: 14). This is extremely relevant for IR theory, particularly in its normative manifestations. For that reason, let me offer a few examples. Given the privileging of white male subject positions in the dominant discourses (doxa), the habitus generated by many IR theorists, who are predominantly white males, tend to create a system of dispositions positing their historical experiences and cultural values as the norm for the international community. As such, an idealized image of the Westphalian state serves as the norm. This is clearly articulated in the vast literature on state failure and state capacity. Taking an idealized North American/ western European state as the norm, much ink has been spilled about how and why many non-white experiences with the state are aberrant. Rarely does this literature engage in critical self-reflection, exploring how the assumed norm is the product of subjective experiences, values and imaginations. Thus, we are presented with a towering mass of work on failed or failing African states, for instance, but rarely is the assumed norm troubled or its racial and gender underpinnings exposed (Dunn 2001).4 In its most pronounced manifestations, this body of literature contains dangerous policy prescriptions. Often policies are constructed to make the non-white, non-male other more like us – for their own good. As Peggy McIntosh has observed, ‘whites are taught to think of their lives as morally neutral, normative, average, and ideal; thus, when we work to benefit others, it is seen as work which will allow “them” to be more like “us”’ (2005: 110; see also Eng and Kazanjiian 2002). Of course, it would be a mistake to assume it is always the goal to make others like us. A good deal Interrogating white male privilege 55 of energy has historically gone into the project of constructing and violently policing the boundaries between us and the deviants who challenge accepted understandings and practices of whiteness and masculinity. For example, during the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the racist and sexist discourses operating in western Europe engendered acts of colonial conquest and domination (McClintock 1995; Lindqvist 1992). Today, in its liberal humanitarian articulation, constructions of alterity have contributed to violent interventionist wars in Iraq and the Balkans. Informing these policies is a manifestation of white male privilege: white North American and western European male IR scholars and practitioners claiming to speak for all humanity because they believe their race- and gender-informed experiences and values are the norm. One can see this pattern repeated throughout mainstream IR theory. Democratic Peace Theory is firmly constructed on an artifice produced by race-, gender- and class-informed subject positions. As Ido Oren (2002) argues in Our Enemies and US, American political science in general, and the scholars advancing the idea of democratic peace in particular, are informed by the dominant discourses in which their own subject positions are privileged; in the case of Democratic Peace Theory, this has resulted in a fluid and historically contingent understanding of democracy shaped by America’s experience and its historical rivalries. The gap in Oren’s otherwise damning critique is his failure to adequately expose the racial and gender components so clearly present in the political science scholarship he investigates. The development sub-field of IR is also representative of how scholars operate under the assumption that their subject position is the norm and that they can speak for all humanity. One can see this within the modernization school, with its explicit attempts to make the non-white world more like the white one. But it is equally true for the neoliberal approaches to development, with their subjective agendas obscured behind claims of universalism. While neoliberalism is in principle gender and race neutral, R. W. Connell notes there has been a ‘sharp remasculinization [and racialization] of political rhetoric and a turn to the use of force as a primary instrument in policy’ (2005: 1815–16). Neoliberalism functions as a form of masculinity politics, and ‘[m]any mainstream policies (e.g., in economic and security affairs) are substantially about men without acknowledging this fact’ (ibid.: 1816). What is at play here is not merely the ability of white males to define the parameters of normality, but also the inability of white male IR theorists to deal with the problems that arise in the way they construct difference. Two 56 Naeem Inayatullah and David Blaney eloquently explore what they see as Western culture’s ongoing inability to deal with cultural difference in their International Relations and the Problem of Difference (2004). Drawing on the work of Tzvetan Todorov (1984), Inayatullah and Blaney claim that, since the discovery of the Americas, Western culture has engaged the other through a double movement: ‘difference becomes inferiority, and the possibility of a common humanity requires assimilation’ (2004: 10). In the first move, difference is regarded as the complete absence of commonality, which opens up the possibility of conquest, enslavement and eradication. The second move recognizes commonality, but only as a precursor to assimilation. The possibility of recognizing the other as both the same and different has yet to be realized. Inayatullah and Blaney chart this inability to deal with cultural difference through the foundational texts of IR to the neo-modernization approaches of contemporary IR, most notably in the literatures on liberal peace theory, global civil society and pluralistic global community (ibid.: 1116–21). The protagonist in Inayatullah and Blaney’s narrative is Western IR, but I would suggest the that fact that all the theorists they cite are white males is not immaterial.5 While I wholeheartedly agree with their critique, I would suggest that putting a finer point on Western IR’s inability to deal with cultural difference is both a manifestation of white male privilege and a mechanism for obscuring and maintaining that privilege. Inayatullah and Blaney’s discussion of the problem of difference and the double movement of conquest/assimilation brings to mind Herman Melville’s classic novella Benito Cereno. The protagonist is an American male captain who stumbles on to a ship that, initially unbeknownst to the American, has been taken over by the slaves it was transporting for trade. The story unfolds as the captain gradually sees the blacks he initially sees as docile and inferior childlike creatures who inspire both his pity and a desire to uplift become, in his eyes, bloodthirsty murderers and crazed killers. As Toni Morrison (1997) has pointed out, it is precisely this transformation of slaves from simple, friendly and childlike creatures deserving our help and sympathy into irrational violent monsters which displays the full spectrum of the racist gaze. The first impulse is one of assimilation (like contemporary neo-modernization IR theories), while the second is one of conquest and eradication, like traditional colonially informed understandings of power politics. Both positions deny the possibility of strategic, rational, calculated and intelligent action by those believed to be different from us. Melville’s narrator Interrogating white male privilege 57 is blind to his racism because it flows from his habitus, just as with most scholars. Like Melville’s narrator, white male scholars fail to see that the structures of power, in terms of both the structuring structures and the structuration of practices highlighted by Bourdieu, leave them in a position of privilege, from which they define what is normal and judge others who fail to meet that norm.

2022 Michigan Kritik
Settler Colonialism K––K Lab › Links––General › L––DPT/Deterrence

Deterrence theory invests in a theory of human nature that tends towards instability within anarchy, which posits counter-hegemony as criminal and capitulating to humanism

Jurgutis 18 [Jessica E., department of political science and international relations @ McMaster University “Colonial Carcerality and International Relations: Imprisonment, Carceral Space, and Settler Colonial Governance in Canada” , 22 nov 2018 ] <Jericho>

The Prison Industrial Complex (PIC) is a global phenomenon. Women worldwide, and especially poor women of colour are the fastest growing prison population and practices of imprisonment are implicated in upholding racialized, sexualized and classed hierarchies of power (Davis, 2003; 2005; 2012; Sudbury, 2005; 2008; Gilmore, 2007). At the same time this has garnered very little attention in a discipline whose founding narratives claim the Prison and Prisoner as their own. The significance of a growing carceral apparatus for questions of safety, well-being and global justice have seen little meaningful engagement in orthodox IR. On one hand, the reality of the PIC—a central formation within the global system—has yet to be engaged from outside a critical political economy tradition. On the other hand, critical IR’s engagement with imprisonment has largely been confined to an emphais on various modes of detention, surveillance and new governance practices, while less work has focused on more mundane practices of incarceration as a feature of colonial relations, and especially settler Ph.D. Thesis – J. Jurgutis McMaster University – Political Science 25 colonial states within empire.12 In this chapter I argue that the prison and prisoner are foundational to, and yet eclipsed by IR, and that the failure for IR to ‘see’ imprisonment has much to do with its inability to see (settler) colonialism. In the Canadian context, this requires taking seriously how Canada’s own history of employing systems of confinement as an everyday tool and strategy of settler colonial governance has largely been taken for granted by IR and the broader discipline of Political Science. Beginning from this starting point my aim is to show how the global political economic and state-making implications of these practices of punishment and carcerality are organized through gendered, racialized, sexualized and classed hierarchies that are reproduced and even transformed through these efforts. This means that I understand the prison and prisoner as categories that are upheld by white supremacy and heteropatriarchy within global capitalism. 13 This chapter will begin by examining the lineage of one of IR’s founding metaphors, the Prisoner’s Dilemma, to consider the work it does to order and discipline IR’s relationship to practices of imprisonment through claims to universalism and rationality, which serve as methods to “resolve” social conflict through the use of force. I trace its deeper intellectual commitments and lineages to modern liberal thought in order to consider the purpose and role of prison and punishment within the settler state, arguing 12 Here I am informed by Tuck and Yang’s (2012) discussion of internal and external colonialism where they argue that neither fully accounts for settler colonial contexts. They state, “Settler colonialism operates through internal/external colonial modes simultaneously because there is no spatial separation between metropole and colony” (p. 5). McCoy, Tuck & McKenzie (2017) point out that these are not mutually exclusive, especially as many settler states colonize other lands. 13 As stated in the introduction, this project also begins from the starting point that reproductive work is a terrain of struggle that must be taken seriously as the necessary underpinning of a transnational political economy of carcerality and carceral space. Ph.D. Thesis – J. Jurgutis McMaster University – Political Science 26 that the utility of imprisonment rests on its embeddedness within the social contract and methods of coercion and non-consent. In addition to providing insight into the extent to which the prison and prisoner are substantively under theorized in the field, by connecting the prison and prisoner to orthodox international and political theory, I argue that the prison and prisoner are indispensable to an imperial and settler colonial project, because they are integral to the theft of people’s bodies, land, and labour through practices of criminalization. This lends insight into how practices of imprisonment, as well as settler colonialism are substantively under theorized in the field. By examining the political philosophical foundations of imprisonment in social contractarian thought I show that the utility of the prison and prisoner and their corresponding logics resides in their attempt to hide and naturalize the violence required to maintain an international order reliant on the theft of bodies and lands. In doing so I establish connections between land, labour, criminalization and punishment, which links the histories of settler colonialism with the production of carceral space in order to understand the prison and prisoner as central to an imperial and colonial project through how it is required to reorganize relationships between bodies and lands. By establishing the foundations of IR’s ontological investment in prison and punishment as a method of resolving conflict we can more easily access assumptions about whose security, economic interests, well-being and ways of being are to be secured and whose can be criminalized. Finally, this chapter will begin to explore how to make sense of the land-labourpunishment and criminalization nexus within global context. There has been a number of important works that provide postcolonial critiques of the imperial foundations of modern Ph.D. Thesis – J. Jurgutis McMaster University – Political Science 27 political thought. My aim in this chapter is to build on them in order to help to make sense of the relationship between the production of carceral space and settler colonialism. Equally, in the chapters that follow, I provide a more sustained analysis of how these relationships and struggles took shape in what would become Canada. Thus, though tracing these histories in the global context is important, the historical context of a particular place and the land matter a great deal in how contemporary carceral projects can be realized, as well as how methods of criminalization continue to be used as strategies to suppress and quell these longstanding struggles that seek to disrupt their place within empire, and through that attempt to envision and build worlds otherwise. Unpacking and Interrogating the Prisoner’s Dilemma in IR The prison and prisoner have been marked with a conspicuous level of presence and absence in the discipline of International Relations (IR). Game theory, and the Prisoner’s Dilemma in particular, are central tenets of rational choice models in the discipline. The use of game theory became more pronounced in fields outside of economics in the latter decades of the last century and as part of a larger positivist tradition within IR and Political Science. What IR knows as the prisoner’s dilemma has come a long way from the initial intentions and questions of RAND Researchers, Merrill Flood and Melvin Dresher (Poundstone 1992, 106). Flood and Dresher hoped to understand why, if cooperation yielded higher payoffs, would rational actors choose selfdefeating strategies? The ‘pair of prisoners’ story was actually added later to provide a Ph.D. Thesis – J. Jurgutis McMaster University – Political Science 28 narrative structure to the model (Marks, 2004).14 Through its widespread deployment in IR it has become more emblematic of a desire to explain and predict the behavior of states as units of analysis and as a method of determining the impact of those outcomes. The way rational choice perspectives have been taken up in IR fails to recognize and grasp the very real presence of the global terrains of imprisonment and a growing carceral apparatus, and demonstratively does not consider them as a worthwhile and serious phenomenon of study. In this sense, there persists a curious level of visibility and invisibility when it comes to understanding the prison and prisoner in IR that intersects theoretical, empirical and methodological terrains. There has not only been a failure in recognition, but a gap in taking seriously its role in informing and reproducing contemporary relations of power in global politics. Presented as a hypothetical test ground for mathematical models and theory building within rational choice perspectives, the prisoner’s dilemma is a formative metaphor in theorizing and producing the international (Marks, 2004).15 The dilemma can be understood as a both a narrative strategy, or metaphor, as well as a model used to organize and predict the actions of rational actors in international politics based on judging and responding to the strategic moves of another in order to achieve maximum payoff. Similar to the other metaphors of game theory, the narrative argues that each rational actor will make decisions that are in their best interest in order to receive the 14 As Marks (2004) explains is not actually required for the ‘dilemma’ to manifest since game theory was never intended to replicate anyone’s lived experience. 15 For an elaborated discussion of the role of metaphors in IR, see Metaphors of Globalization: Mirrors, Magicians, Mutinies (2008). Ph.D. Thesis – J. Jurgutis McMaster University – Political Science 29 greatest reward. These approaches have sought to use the prison among other visual imagery as an illustrative scenario to demonstrate the validity and viability of the mathematical models rational choice theories are premised on for the purpose of prediction and explanation. The result is that that assumptions about how prisoners rationally choose their self-interest over collective cooperation for mutual benefit can help to predict the behaviors of states. The narrative says that two prisoners have committed a crime and have been caught, separated, and offered a deal from police that they cannot consult each other on. If one of the prisoners confesses to committing the crime while the other does not, the partner that has confessed will go free while the other that has not will go to jail for ten years. If both prisoners confess both will go to prison for five years, and if each prisoner denies, then both will go to prison for six months. Drawing on this scenario Realists have endeavored to show that in situations where there is instability, or when there is mistrust and information and communication is limited, the actor will logically choose self-interest and reward at the expense of mutual benefit and cooperation, whereas Liberals have been more apt to demonstrate that cooperation is possible and conflict is not the inevitable outcome (Krasner, 1983; Keohane, 1984; Stein, 1990). According to this model, our understanding of states and global structures are reduced to outcomes of conflict (anarchy) and cooperation (order) where states jockey to acquire gains and minimize losses, and where relative strategic success becomes defined in these terms.16 Perhaps the most well-known adoption of this model in IR is Deterrence Theory. 16 For a thorough critique of the limits of Game Theory and the Prisoner’s Dilemma see Marks (2004). Ph.D. Thesis – J. Jurgutis McMaster University – Political Science 30 Situated within a Realist framework deterrence theory states that in order to avoid the worst-case scenario, it may be in an actor’s best interest to defect even if it produces some consequences that are undesirable. The rationale for this is that, as outlined, these consequences will be better than an alternative scenario in which the other actor defects and we are left with more severe consequences (whether in the form of nuclear fallout or a longer sentence). This strategy is intended to create the conditions to avoid unwanted wars and, in situations of international crises, acting first is considered a strategic move to avoid the worst consequences (Jervis, 1976).17 As Snyder states, “[t]he central characteristic of the game is that, although the parties could enjoy mutual benefits by cooperating, the logic of their situation forces them into conflict and mutual loses” (1970, p. 67). Importantly, in this framework each actor will want to be first to confess even if they will still be punished, since this will still mean less punishment over all.18 What questions does the Prisoner’s Dilemma raise and attempt to resolve for IR? Here it is worth noting that the conditions within which states must act are ones of constraint—a detail that is both crucial for the model to work and exemplified fittingly in the use of the metaphor of the prison. For Liberals, the prisoner’s dilemma narrative implies the possibility of negotiation and cooperation through “collective security” achieved through international agreements and institutions (Snyder, 1971), and shared norms. However, in reality power is not shared equally. This means that although both Realist and Liberal interpretations suggest that their frameworks seek to preserve security 17 For example, as is the case with the security dilemma, arms races and Mutually Assured Destruction (Snyder, 1971; Jervis, 1976). 18 Snyder (1971) explains that within Realist thought this instability is generated from the international system itself, whereas within Liberalism it is generated by uncertainty about opponents’ intentions. Ph.D. Thesis – J. Jurgutis McMaster University – Political Science 31 and diminish violence overall, there are a number of assumptions at play that ensure the prison and prisoner cannot be substantively engaged as sites of study in international politics. Both Realists and Liberals ignore that the very presence of the prison and police already assume the use of force as necessary to manage societal conflict. Deterrence theory illustrates this and therefore it should come as no surprise that the idea of the prison would be subject to similar disciplinary conditioning. In a framework that already assumes the use of force and constraint, it is notable that the idea of punishment can become conceived of as a necessary evil or the least violent alternative to minimize and reduce overall harm within a conflict driven and constantly shifting international state system. Here it becomes evident that beyond a narrative or metaphor that becomes applied to the international realm, the prisoner’s dilemma is about producing and sustaining certain logics and practices of IR, which rest on both the material, discursive and knowledge production practices of carcerality. These are the same logics and narratives that eclipse the prison and prisoner as an analytical site in the field. These narratives of conflict or cooperation share a positivist epistemology and a “belief in the universal rationality of economic logic” (Waltz, 1979, as quoted in Ling, 2002, p. 115). Realists like Jervis (1970, p. 73) have aspired “to preserve the international system and the signals that lend it greater predictability” since it is this predictability that they claim will enhance the model’s function overall. For instance, claiming this will be achieved when “the actors value the system, prefer long-run over short-run gains, and have more in common than conflicting interests” (Jervis, 1970, p. 73). This means that the Ph.D. Thesis – J. Jurgutis McMaster University – Political Science 32 system functions better when everyone buys in to or trusts the rules of the game through the punishment and reward system. But as Agathangelou and Ling (2009, p. 15) expose, strong states that set “the rules of the game” that other states must then play by. They go on to say, “[s]hould compliance fail to ensue, or[…] outright violation occur, the Self [i.e. strong states] must discipline the Other” (2009, p. 15). Of course, the Prisoner’s Dilemma was never intended to model human interaction or experiences though it undeniably has implications for how we act, experience and create our worlds. It has come to reproduce assumptions about human nature in constrained conditions as extended and embodied by states in ways that deny the complexity and vast range of human experience within and beyond prison walls (Marks, 2004). Marks aims to rectify this by compiling a more accurate representation of prisoners and their experiences to build a more useful and exemplary metaphor for IR.19 As much as I concur that the metaphor of the prison shapes our actions and our worlds, prison is not simply a metaphor. An understanding of it as such, though certainly opening a valuable vantage point from which to examine prison from a more nuanced, institutional and empirically rigorous standpoint, does a disservice to those for whom it is daily reality and fails to bring us to a more politicized understanding of the global system of incarceration that helps to stitch the fabric of the contemporary neoliberal capitalist world order. That is, the prisoner’s dilemma is not only problematic because of the artificial limits imposed by the payoff structure and the ways this translates to the international 19 His Constructivist commitments lead him to this important argument, but it is also these same commitments that limit the extent of his critique. I am supportive of Marks’ desire to include prisoners’ experiences and to consider what a more sustained analysis of the prison system would yield us in global politics. See for example Der Derian (1998). Ph.D. Thesis – J. Jurgutis McMaster University – Political Science 33 (Marks, 2004), but because it takes for granted the full set of power relations that produce the prison itself.20 So despite the desire to shine a spotlight on the work outside the discipline that seriously complicates otherwise simplistic notions of prisons as institutions and the people within them, it fails to help us recognize the substantively material and ideological work that prison and prisoners do for us in global politics, or bring us closer to a more inclusive or transformative vision of justice. Thus, I approach this in a way that does not take the prison as a political-economic institution, set of practices and logics for granted, and which aims to make more explicit its role in sustaining global inequities and hierarchies advanced through colonialism, capitalism, and militarization. Another way of saying this is that the prison and prisoner have been glossed over in IR for many of the same reasons as settler colonialism. One of the implications of taking the Prisoner’s Dilemma seriously as a set of competing, though not substantively different logics, is that we can begin to see their deep and intertwined history with imperial thought. The focus of this dissertation is to examine what is exposed about settler colonialism when the prison and prisoner are made visible and unpacked as a feature of its inner workings. In particular, the specific ways that coercion and the use of force feature in the prisoner’s dilemma, as constituted through claims to universalism and rationality, indicates that the category of the prisoner is also crucial to the formation of racial hierarchies of superiority and inferiority. In doing so this work follows a tradition 20 So, although the use of force has already been assumed, the prison is likened to the international system and intended to illustrate a set of limited conditions that states face in making decisions about how to act within the international structure of states in order to produce the greatest number of rewards. If the state in question acts in ways that promote their self-interest as defined by the rules and norms of the international system they will reap rewards. This means punishment becomes a method to condition behavior towards the rules and norms of the system, as well as the interests of particular states. Ph.D. Thesis – J. Jurgutis McMaster University – Political Science 34 of challenging the idea that narratives can continue to be reproduced in mainstream IR literatures as a substitute for analyses of power (Grovogui, 2001). As Grovogui claims, often such “hermeneutics [of race]” depends on understanding “that Africa has served as the counterpoint to the European trajectory in order to provide a justificatory trope for the ontology of international relations, morality, hierarchies, and structures of authority and legitimacy” (p. 426, 427). This can also be said for the Americas and the complimentary, but distinct role that Indigenous peoples were scripted within the civilizational narratives of empire (Beier, 2002). Geeta Chowdhury and Sheila Nair (2002) argue for the interrogation of the power asymmetries and hierarchies that uphold states and their position within a global system, as well as the ways that the imperialist juncture and its related historical processes feature so prominently in these productions. Such an entry point unpacks questions of “the state, sovereignty, order and anarchy” in order to consider how the discipline’s mainstream, is premised on an understanding of power that privileges hierarchy, “rationality,” and a predominantly Eurocentric worldview, thus mystifying the ways in which states and the international system are anchored in social relations. (Chowdhry & Nair, 2002, p. 3). But further, bringing these social relations to light requires moving beyond critical approaches in order to account for the intersectionality of these erasures so as to theorize power in IR (Chowdhry & Nair, 2002). They advocate for the need to interrogate the Eurocentric, white, rationalist, masculine and elite assumptions of mainstream approaches and the coercive definitions of power and conditions of unfreedom they make possible. Ph.D. Thesis – J. Jurgutis McMaster University – Political Science 35 Thus, though the state has been interrogated in critical perspective,21 there remain important connections to the material and discursive ordering and operation of power made possible through (in)formal institutional, policy and socio-legal practices and arrangements and their enforcement. The ways the power relations of the prison must be erased in IR also gives us insight into the ways in which colonialism, and especially settler colonialism, must also be continually be eclipsed. Therefore, in this project I hope to provide an intervention that foregrounds an analysis of power and the ways colonial hierarchies work alongside methods and practices of settler colonial law and institutional formation in order to make possible the prison and prisoner as institutions, practices and categories of subjectivity on which settler colonialism and empire relies. When we take imprisonment for granted, we hide a crucial strategy and means by which colonial violence as harm to bodies and lands is made possible. These of course, are not only made possible through the punitive logic at the level of the international, but at the level of state-making. For settler states, the deployment of these logics has profound implications for the terms on which inclusion and exclusion are conceived. In the case of the Prisoner’s Dilemma, it produces a limited and clearly defined set of choices, punishments and payoffs. In this way, although the use of force has already been assumed, the prison is likened to the international system and intended to illustrate a set of limited conditions that states face in making decisions about how to act within the international structure of states in order to produce the greatest number of rewards. If the 21 Chowdhry and Nair (2002) provide a detailed discussion of the gaps in critical IR scholarship in pages 6- 10. Ph.D. Thesis – J. Jurgutis McMaster University – Political Science 36 state in question acts in ways that promote their self-interest as defined by the rules and norms of the international system, they will reap rewards. In such a framework, punishment additionally becomes a method to condition behavior towards the rules and norms of the system, as well as a means by which dominant power extends itself over the bodies and lands of others.22 Therefore, the logics which underpin this invisibility take for granted the use of force at the same time that they deny the invasive and transnational methods of governance that were required to make colonialism and settler colonialism possible.23 This is enabled by how the state is taken for granted as a unit of analysis, as others have argued elsewhere.24 However, I want to suggest that when we consider the ways these methods have implicated the prison and prisoner in IR it is possible to gain insight into how the struggle to get colonialism and settler colonialism seen in IR is also compounded by the inability to see the prison and prisoner as well. This means that it becomes difficult to separate practices of imprisonment from colonial and imperial projects historically and on an ongoing basis. Arguably, the prisoner’s dilemma rests on much more longstanding ontological and epistemological commitments in modern liberal thought regarding the centrality of the use of force to good government and governance, as well as the ways these philosophies have often been naturalized and obscured through their application within IR. Despite their differing levels of willingness to engage with questions of power and 22 Marks (2004, 113) has also shown, both prisoners and states have the ability to affect and alter the circumstances or conditions in which conflict or cooperation occur to demonstrate that the international system is not in fact a fixed reality. 23 This is reproduced when, for example, a game theory model is deployed to give an account of the scramble for Africa. 24 See for example, Walker (1997), Campbell (1998). Ph.D. Thesis – J. Jurgutis McMaster University – Political Science 37 violence, both Realists and Liberals take the prison as an institution and set of practices for granted: the reality of the prison and prisoner are assumed in the question itself. The implication of this is that practices of imprisonment as well as the prison and prisoner remain invisible and yet absolutely central features and figures in global politics. Marks identifies that, “what matters most in the application of game theory in international relations theory is not the unique imagery inherent in each game’s underlying metaphor but how all the games taken in their entirety convey the same picture about what international relations is about” (2004, p. 35-36, emphasis original). This is true; however, I would like to both broaden and add specificity to this statement by suggesting that the prisoner’s dilemma can be further unpacked by establishing how it is premised on and works alongside other deeply established ontological commitments and erasures in the field. In the following section I read the Prisoner’s Dilemma as a set of logics with deeper roots in modern political thought, and as adding insight into understanding the ways in which abstraction and erasure of the prison and prisoner have become enshrined in IR. By doing so I believe we can gain greater insight into the specific ways prison and prisoners have become both central to and absent in the discipline. Punishment and Criminal Subjectivity in Modern Political Thought Social contract theory rests on the premise that there is agreement to enter into society under certain conditions in exchange for security and protection from the sovereign or government. It is within this agreement that prison and punishment become possible and even desirable, since they are tools that allow the law to be upheld while also Ph.D. Thesis – J. Jurgutis McMaster University – Political Science 38 acting as a deterrent for future violations. But what can be gained by examining the role of punishment, constraint, and coercion within these frameworks? In this section I examine the role of punishment and property in social contractarian thought to highlight that their co-constitution has been under theorized. Paying particular attention to the role of punishment, I show how claims to rationality and universalism continue to structure processes of criminalization along racialized, gendered, sexualized and classed lines. I argue that ways of being in relation to land and labour perceived as deviant become criminalized, which subsequently provides the grounds for coercion and non-consensual inclusion, as well as the means by which the use of force is normalized against particular populations. Examining these relations indicates a more comprehensive lineage of erasure in how the prison and prisoner ensure punishment and criminalization as central strategies of the settler state within empire. Thomas Hobbes’ conception of the “state of nature” works alongside and informs the Prisoner’s Dilemma narrative to establish claims about human nature under anarchy and the behavior of states in an anarchic system. As Marks (2004) identifies, in the same ways Realists establish anarchy as the central problem of IR through the use of Hobbes’ ‘state of nature,’ they also make implicit assumptions about the prison. Namely, that despite an overarching and imposed structure, they are anarchic, violent and primitive— attributes that are easily scripted onto prisoners themselves. Though these assumptions are not widely shared beyond the mainstream of the field, they are difficult to escape and still inform the basis of the most powerful schools of thought within IR alongside other such metaphors (Marks, 2004). Ph.D. Thesis – J. Jurgutis McMaster University – Political Science 39 The Hobbesian story of human life in the state of nature as being “solitary, poor, nasty, brutish and short” (1981[1651], 186), is well known and not without problems in the way that it has been central in theorizing sovereignty and upholding the order/anarchy divide on which orthodox IR theories have been premised (Walker, 1993; Beier, 2002). For Hobbes, the state of nature is one of perpetual insecurity because under conditions of scarcity human beings will always need to seek their own self-preservation and causing the security dilemma to ensue (Walker, 1993). As Walker claims, Among (proto bourgeois) individuals, Hobbes argues, structural relations of insecurity demand a superior sovereign for an ordered polity to be constituted. Hence, the powerful resolution of the relation between sovereign individuals and sovereign states through a contract that is both freely entered into and yet necessitated by structural conditions. (Walker, 1993, p. 93). This conception of human nature necessitates a sovereign or Leviathan, since peace and order are impossible without. Walker suggests that Hobbes provides a way of negotiating claims of autonomous individuals with a political community since, …[A]ccounts of consent, participation and representation that came to be articulated as a way of holding apart, yet also reconciling, the claims of supposedly autonomous individuals with the claims of obligation to a broader collective, the community of citizens, the people, the nation, the state. (1993, p. 147-148) Beyond the fact that reconciling freedom with sovereign authority under capitalism naturalizes the acceptance of subjugation and asymmetrical relations of power, I want to suggest that Hobbes’ account be understood as one which argues that the social contract must be entered into under conditions of constraint. This is not only because structural conditions naturalize social hierarchy but because consent as described by Hobbes, is actually about coercive “agreement.” John Locke on the other hand, understood life in the state of nature, though Ph.D. Thesis – J. Jurgutis McMaster University – Political Science 40 insecure, to be relatively calm, cooperative and pleasant, so long as everyone followed the rules. Locke argues that though the state of nature is one of equality and liberty, it is not one of license as “no one ought to harm another in their life, health, liberty or possessions” (1980[1690], p. 9). Similarly, to Hobbes, Locke naturalizes his own conceptions of reason, morality, property and punishment through using the state of nature as a rhetorical device that adopts his theorizations about political society. Locke’s conceptions of property have been shown to be of central importance in understanding his theorizations “since the creation of property and its preservation constitute the foundation of the state of nature and civil society respectively” (Arneil, 1996, 60). At the same time, the question of punishment is actually one of the first subjects addressed in Locke’s discussion of the state of nature, where punishment and property are already married. Hobbes’ understanding of punishment follows rather predictably from his ideas of power, authority, order and obedience. Punishment is an action permitted by the sovereign in the event that the law is violated, since the right for security has been surrendered to the sovereign. Likewise, where there is no law, there is no crime: … that the Civil Law ceasing, Crimes cease: for there being no other law remaining, but that of Nature, there is no place for Accusation; every man being his own Judge, and accursed onely by his own Conscience, and cleared by the Uprightnesse of his own Intention. Then therefore his Intention is Right, his fact is no Sinne: if otherwise his fact is Sinne; but not Crime. […] That when Sovereign Power ceaseth, Crime also ceaseth: for where there is no Power, there is no protection to be held from the Law; and therefore, everyone may protect himself by his own power: for no man in the Institution of the Sovereign Power can be supposed to give away the Right of preserving his own body; for the safety where of all Sovereignty was ordained. But this is to be understood onely of those, that have not themselves contributed to the taking away of the Power that protected them: for that was a Crime from the beginning (Hobbes, 1985[1651], p. 337) In other words, there is a hierarchy of violence and crime is only possible when there is a law to violate. Even though in the state of nature the use of force can be used against Ph.D. Thesis – J. Jurgutis McMaster University – Political Science 41 another for self-preservation, the difference is that no one has an obligation to submit. At the same time Hobbes locates the making of sovereignty in the preservation of life in the state of nature. When the law is broken his position is that the state has no obligation to uphold the social contract with criminals since they, as the initial violator of the law (the social contract), become enemies of the state (Brettschneider, 2007). This is consistent with his position that the punishment for many crimes should be the alienation of citizenship.25 Since criminality depends on a “defect in Reasoning” and is “Of the Passions” (Hobbes, 1985[1651], p. 339, 341), unreasonableness is a criterion of criminality and vice versa. Though Hobbes projects that since rational and reasonable men enter into the contract on agreement, this ignores the structural conditions of constraint that make up the state of nature and necessitate the sovereign. Thus, when violators of the law are inevitably accused of unreasonableness and the punishment justified, this is simply an extension of the coercion and violence that is naturalized in the state of nature and foundational to the contract itself. Although Hobbes and Locke come to different conclusions about the conditions and circumstances with which citizens authorize the just use of force in society, I argue that both try to reconcile freedom with conditions of constraint. Hobbes attempts to reconcile freedom and right with supreme and excessive sovereign authority under 25 Brettschneider (2007) also points out that not all social contractarians take such an extreme position. He says, “Whereas Hobbes labels criminals “enemies” outside the social contract, contractualist justification views even the worst offenders as citizens and requires that the coercion they face be reasonably acceptable to them” (2007, p. 181). Ph.D. Thesis – J. Jurgutis McMaster University – Political Science 42 capitalism to achieve peace and order, whereas Locke attempts to settle it with a form of collective agreement that claims to be more measured in the use of force, but still rests on the naturalized marriage of property and punishment. Therefore, both Hobbes and Locke argue that the social contract must be coercively entered into in different ways. This means that political community and state formation are about non-consensual relations even on their own terms.26 According to Brettschneider (2007), social contractualism is a not a theory of actual consent, since “[c]ontractualism aspires to be a theory of legitimate coercion” (p. 182). He goes on to argue that, “Never is a state more coercive than when it punishes, [making] punishment a paradigmatic example[…] contractualism hopes to justify.” I however want to suggest that the criteria of assessing the extent to which social contract theory attempts to legitimate coercion may be more effectively perceived by looking to the more insidious forms of its operation and contractualism’s core assumptions. Of course, the moment of punishment lends crucial insight into the operation of power and authority because of the explicitness with which personal, physical, emotional, and psychological boundaries are violated, but this moment is connected, and indeed made possible by the earlier erosion of autonomy and freedom through coercion, constraint and non-consent. Likening the state of nature and the role of punishment for Hobbes and Locke to Realist and Liberal revisions of the Prisoner’s Dilemma suggests that more baggage may 26 Those with the option to enter in to even this coercive agreement included white bourgeois men with an interest in maintaining their security of person and property. Ph.D. Thesis – J. Jurgutis McMaster University – Political Science 43 be at play than an understanding of game theory alone makes room for. If the question the prisoner’s dilemma suggests is not if force will be used, but when and how (to what degree), I want to suggest that referring to Hobbes and Locke can give us some indication about the underlying assumptions that are necessary to answer this question. By making the case for the right to punish as foundational to order and good government, the assumption of punishment by force is certainly not exclusive to IR alone, but to Political Science more broadly. In this sense, the concepts of conflict, cooperation and order become illuminated, since punishment resolves any tension, or non-cooperation towards these ends. For Realists and Liberals alike power and cooperation through coercion is the answer that the prisoner’s dilemma provides for IR. This is not simply present when the law has been violated but has a foundational purpose in the formation of political society informed by social contract traditions. Despite the fact that Realists have selectively drawn on Hobbes for theory building purposes, the state of nature metaphor has become established in the field by the theoretical mainstream. Drawing from the work of Peter Hulme and Ludmilla Jordanova, Beier (2002) points out that social contract theorists relied on accounts from European travelogues of the “New World” to formulate the ontological basis of their theories— namely their conceptions of the state of nature.27 Though Locke’s articulation of the state of nature differed from his predecessor, both rested on many of the same racist and Eurocentric ideas (Beier, 2002). If Hobbes has been a staple influence in the discipline’s mainstream theoretical debates, it is not to say other conceptions of the state of nature 27 See for example, Farr (2008). Ph.D. Thesis – J. Jurgutis McMaster University – Political Science 44 have not come to bear. Acknowledging Hobbes’ regard among Realists and others alike should be read within a broader context of the discipline’s indebtedness to the foundational assumptions of social contractarian thought and the Westphalean state system, as well as the ways even critical approaches within the field take this foundational colonial and racist violence for granted.28 Locke’s ideas about the state of nature may not have been as readily picked up by IR theorists; however, as others have pointed out, Locke was involved in colonial missions himself and his work has been shown to make arguments that provide much of the intellectual groundwork that formed modern Liberal thought and that would justify colonial conquest in the Americas (Tully, 1993; Arneil, 1996; Hsueh, 2006; Farr, 2008). Locke is also instructive here because, though he shares with Hobbes a propensity in drawing on gendered and racist interpretations of the “New World” and its inhabitants, we can read his argument as a political-economic one explicitly because of the centrality that property takes in his theorizations. In their naturalizing of contractarian theories of property, both Locke and Hobbes’ claims about the state of nature also served to diminish the life ways of the Indigenous peoples of the Americas (Nichols, 2005). In other words, social contract theory provided both the justification for their indigenous removal and the means by which this could be accomplished. In his piece, The Colonialism of Incarceration, Nichols (2014) indirectly follows 28 For example, this has become especially prevalent in the post 9/11 era where, in an attempt to draw attention to the profound violation of civil, political and human rights, a large body of critical scholarship reproduced the notion that extending rights makes it possible for the liberal democratic state to regain its moral and just status. This in effect serves to erase the violence at its foundations and within ongoing practices and institutions. Ph.D. Thesis – J. Jurgutis McMaster University – Political Science 45 on this point to argue that it is for this reason that Indigenous claims provide a critique of practices of imprisonment that are based on a different normative foundation than other over-incarcerated racialized populations in the Americas. Despite the accuracy of the statement that critical prison studies has “insufficiently attended to the centrality of colonialism to the origins, scope, scale, and legitimation techniques of carceral power in North America,” he does not develop an analysis of carceral power that takes account for its transnational dimensions and therefore replicates its domestication within the bounds of the state.29 Thus, though he is able to take account for the role of imprisonment in dispossession, through this framework we none the less lose access to a way of understanding relationships between punishment and property as ones that rest beyond territorialized sovereignty. This changes our understanding of carcerality itself. An analysis of property without acknowledging punishment presents a partial image of Locke’s theorizations and what we can infer from them about the way dominant power became secured. For Locke (1980[1690], p. 19), anything that occurs in nature could be possessed by adding one’s labour to it for its improvement: “Whatsoever then he removes out of the state of nature that hath provided, and left it in, he hath mixed his labour with, and joined to it something that is his own, and thereby makes it his property.” As scholars have shown, Locke’s notion of property—specifically the conceptualizations of land and labour that it relies on—have a number of deeply 29 This would in turn alter the distinctions he outlines in his formulation of the critique that Indigenous peoples’ claims provide about carceral power, including whether it can be contained to the notion of critique. Similarly, though Nichols’ (2014) discussion challenging the difference between the logic of war and social pacification is helpful and a discussion to which I hope this project contributes, we miss a chance to explore the role that capitalism plays making a more nuanced theorization of violence and carcerality necessary. Ph.D. Thesis – J. Jurgutis McMaster University – Political Science 46 problematic implications for Black and Indigenous peoples (Armitage, 2004). These assumptions include viewing slaves as property (i.e. owned labour that could be used as a tool to accumulate property for the owner), and Indigenous peoples as part of the state of nature (since they were considered as having no government or recognizable way of working and thus owning the land).30 This latter move was particularly useful to Locke and his involvement in colonial settlement in the Carolinas, since it produced both an economic and ethical justification for English colonialism in the Americas, and land theft in particular (Arniel, 1996).31 Locke highlights that land—the earth itself—“is the chief matter of property” and makes clear the superiority of European ways of working the land (i.e. agriculture, cultivation, enclosure) and relating to the land (a hierarchical and asymmetrical relationship in which white men own and control land, labour and all that comes from it) (1980[1690], p. 21, emphasis original). The fact that Indigenous peoples’ lifeways were not understood as meeting this criteria was utilized to provide the intellectual justifications for delegitimizing Indigenous claims to the land where they have resided since time immemorial. Informed by the doctrine of terra nullius, these ideas contributed to the depiction of Indigenous lands vacant and empty, or as Bonny Ibhawoh has put it, “that aboriginal land was in effect no man’s land and that by conquest and “improvement,” European settlers could make legitimate claims to them” (Ibhawoh, 30 Locke makes these claims by both using Amerindians as examples to justify this theory of property and diminish any indigenous claim to land through this framework (Arneil, 1996). 31 Though the emphasis in this project is on the Canadian context, at this moment in history the Carolinas were embedded in the British imperial project. Ph.D. Thesis – J. Jurgutis McMaster University – Political Science 47 2013, p. 8; Weaver, 2003).32 Although enclosure has been documented as one of the primary tools of extending colonialism in the Carolinas (Arneil, 2006), this would not be possible without the first move of universalizing settler claims and rationalizing settler possession via terra nullius and hierarchies of value which ascribed European ways of relating to land as superior. 33 Though Locke’s state of nature is less popular among orthodox IR, it is necessary for understanding the economic rationality that is assumed by them. For Locke, the state of nature not only provides the justification for a more responsible or measured version of sovereignty in comparison to Hobbes, but at its center is the necessity of a centralized authority to uphold preconceived moral and political standards for the right to punish and the right to property. It is made clear in his claims about the state of nature that both are crucial in forming the foundations of political society, yet this relationship seems to be sorely under theorized.34 For Hobbes and Locke criminality is a major criteria of assessing reasonableness because, as previously mentioned, those who break the law are understood to do so because they do not possess the capacity to reason.35 It is on these 32 Terra Nullius was a legal doctrine whereby indigenous lands were constructed as unoccupied or ‘empty space’ as a means of facilitating European occupation and theft (Ananya, 1996; Stewart-Harawira, 2005). Whereas terra nullius was used in the case of colonization of North America as justification for land theft, in the scramble for Africa it was used to refer to whether a territory was occupied by other Europeans and ultimately “served the role of international law in prescribing ways to avoid conflict between rival European powers” (Ibhawoh, 2013, 6; Keal, 2002). I will discuss the specificity of terra nullius in the context of Canada in Chapter 3. 33 For example, requiring Amerindians to erect fences around their land and to provide land allotments and boundaries to settlers (Arneil, 1996). 34 It is beyond the scope of this project to fully theorize the relationship between punishment and property in social contractarian thought. My intent is to point out this omission in order to establish some of the intellectual foundations for the presence and absence of prison, punishment and settler colonialism in the discipline of IR. 35 In addition to the power relations previously outlined, the connection that is established in social contractarian thought between criminality and reason also maps on to ableist discourses as well. Ph.D. Thesis – J. Jurgutis McMaster University – Political Science 48 grounds that it becomes possible to identify when the use of force is normalized as justifiable, acceptable, rational and measured. In short, when the mundane use of violence by the state is both made invisible and naturalized. The ways in which Liberal conceptions of punishment become secured through Locke’s formulations of political society are telling precisely because they, alongside property, provide justification for criminalization, slavery and Indigenous erasure and land theft in the Americas. If Indigenous life ways were made to be null and void and if the “New World” was a blank space, then there was never any room or purpose for Indigenous peoples and knowledge on the way to progress, according to Locke. Without mixing one’s land and labour in what resembled European agriculture, proof of right would be difficult to establish (Arneil, 1996). Thus, this was part of the political and economic justification for why Indigenous peoples of the Americas were argued not to own the land on which they lived. In light of the under examined connections between the naturalization of punishment alongside property in social contractarian thought, it is instructive to consider how ideas of private property (and the assumptions of land and labour on which they rely) require enclosure, objectification and possession through the control and/or criminalization of undesirable people and deviant ways of life. Locke’s theories about labour are equally important here, since his writings indicate that not all human beings are afforded life in the same ways. Since human beings could become property according to Locke, his theories simultaneously produce an intellectual justification for slavery alongside that of the land theft required for settler colonialism. If criminality is determined based on the acceptability of particular ways of being Ph.D. Thesis – J. Jurgutis McMaster University – Political Science 49 and relating to land and labour, and not only when breaking the law, then the practice of criminalization is connected to law, but not solely grounded in it.36 And given charges of irrationality and inadequacy, we can also see how diffuse the idea of “reasonableness” and “rationality” is. For Hobbes, Locke and other social contract theorists criminality is a major criterion of assessing reasonableness because those who break the law must be without critical faculties to understand that they are challenging authority and “asking” to be punished. It is on these grounds that the use of force is deemed as required since those who are irrational cannot cooperate or respond to dialogue. As such, force becomes justifiable, acceptable, and naturalized. The IR orthodoxy has done very well to draw on the “state of nature” and its corresponding assumptions as described by Hobbes and Locke to make claims about the international state system. Indeed, social contract theories have been central to the development of the modern western state. The depth with which these analogies and their suppositions permeate the discipline is part of why they come to matter when reading the Prisoner’s Dilemma. Examining their role in the intellectual and material constitution of the international can work towards demonstrating how the foundational disciplinary and positivist frameworks of Realism and Liberalism have understood prison and prisoners all along. This reading of the prisoner’s dilemma not only makes this stark empirical absence visible, but also highlights a much longer lineage of utilizing assumptions about the necessity, purpose and centrality of punishment by the privileged in the service of 36 In Chapters 3 and 4 I will discuss the complexities around settler colonial claims to ‘law’ in the Canadian context, especially in light of the erosion of the treaties and longstanding international agreements between Indigenous and European nations as a result of Canada failing to uphold its responsibilities. Ph.D. Thesis – J. Jurgutis McMaster University – Political Science 50 universalist claims about the world. The additional context reading Hobbes and Locke provide is to suggest that questions of land and labour, through questions of colonialism and imperialism, are in fact central to how violence, constraint and coercion is constitutive the of the international system, and yet must continually be hidden and erased. Reading Punishment and Criminalization as Features of Settler Colonialism Instead of treating punishment as secondary to other concepts like freedom, right and equality, Andrew Dilts (2012, p. 60) asks what we can learn from Locke’s Second Treatise of Government from the point of view of the centrality of punishment? He points out that it is especially the social contractarian cannon of political philosophy that presumes “the seeming inevitability of punishment” in order to ground and operationalize its conceptions of the social contract and natural rights, since they “have no empirical referent” (Dilts 2012, p. 58-59; McBride, 2007, p. 122). The usefulness of punishment for Liberalism according to McBride lies in the way it serves as an instrument “to establish itself as a political order” (Dilts, 2012, p. 59). The logical purpose of punishment resides in being able to produce criminality in contrast to innocence, and therefore its power lies in its confounding and slippery qualities, so much so that even those who seek to deal with this as a central feature of Locke minimize the tensions it raises or attempt to resolve the contradictions punishment presents (Dilts, 2012). The utility of the question of punishment for Locke is in the ways it comes to embody the inherent instability and unknowability of political life. This excess and instability is displaced onto the criminal in order to make possible the production of stable subjects with the ability to enter into the social contract on the grounds established (Dilts, 2012). In other words, the production of stable subjects is only possible against those who are not: criminals, savages and other degenerates. By making criminals, (Dilts primarily discusses the figure of the thief), to carry the “burden of danger and irrationality” they not only become a physical threat that plagues the state of nature with uncertainty, risk and violence towards one’s property and oneself, but presents an ontological threat as well (Dilts, 2012, p. 61). As figures beyond reason or ability they are unknowable and must be judged through their status with the label and identity of criminal, which simultaneously allows us to know them by their past actions while controlling the uncertainly imposed by the future threat they necessarily must embody. This threat of unknowability and risk of theft and violence, having the potential to spiral out of control in the state of nature, is what necessitates Locke’s foundational claim for the commonwealth, since it is grounded only through making the distinction between the State of Nature and State of War and “the attempt to stabilize the unstable right to punish” (Dilts, 2012, p. 62). In this conceptualization of crime as the use of force and as subjugation the thief is likened to tyrannical power and argued to produce an existential threat to one’s property and oneself simultaneously. 37 Whereas in the state of nature acts of crime may easily veer into a state of war through reciprocal punishment and slavery, within the commonwealth civil society is maintained when a crime has ended since at that moment the use of force has ceased and it becomes possible to categorize the offense and 37 Tyranny is defined as the use of force without right. In this sense, the thief becomes indistinguishable from the murderer and crime is an act of war within the state of nature (Dilts, 2012). Ph.D. Thesis – J. Jurgutis McMaster University – Political Science 52 determine proportionality (Dilts, 2012). Society therefore becomes restored in the just use of force in the form of punishment. Slavery is intimately tied to Locke’s logic and rationality of punishment as a liberty of the transgressed, since a transgressor may remain under their master’s power indefinitely.38 The slave, according to Locke, was someone who was “biologically alive” but without the “rights and powers” of humanity (Norris 2005, as referenced in Dilts, 2012). This echoes Rousseau’s own crude articulation: “In taking an equivalent of his life, the victor did not spare it: instead of killing him unprofitably, he killed him usefully” (Rousseau as quoted in Dilts, 2012, p. 67). Indeed, for Locke, the unstable position of punishment and slavery within the State of Nature provide the drive for civil society. Here it is worthwhile to note that it is in this context of having no resolution to justified punishment and slavery that a government must exist to restrain the right to punish criminals and identify aggressors in exchange for protecting one’s life, liberty and property: “[t]his is done by producing the criminal as necessarily beyond reason, as animalistic and dangerous, and constitutively defining the obedient subject as rational, innocent, and, above all, free” (Dilts, 2012, p. 72). Thus, the Lockean project was already about the production of subjects devised to determine who is a rational actor by nature, 38 Dilts argues that, Proportional punishment, on these terms, has no boundaries, and generates the disorder and chaos that characterizes the State of Nature. While the possibility of crime might make the State of Nature unstable and dangerous, the practice of punishment makes it unacceptable. As suggested by Farr, Locke’s argument in favour of slavery follows a “just war” tradition emphasizing action (2008) and in this sense differs from naturalistic accounts (1980). Ph.D. Thesis – J. Jurgutis McMaster University – Political Science 53 but also through the foundational act of punishment.39 This determination marks out the conditions of inclusion for both bodies and land. The rational actor is the only fully human figure in Locke’s framework. The slave and property-owning white man’s innocence is secured at a rate higher than all else in this account and by virtue of criminalizing deviants. Therefore, the work of punishment is that the criminal must not just be managed in light of their actions, but for a way of being (Dilts, 2012). It is exactly this ‘way of being’ that makes space to consider how the identity of the criminal maps on to the other identities that become vilified through claims to rationality which racial, gendered, classed, sexualized and colonial hierarchies have already been established in relation to. These figures are either incapable (i.e. deficient) or uncooperative (i.e. unwilling) to enter into the social contract on the terms set out, and therefore must be coercively included through performing distinct roles that are constructed to legitimate its existence: the slave, the Indian, the criminal, and so on. What this demonstrates is that it is also the substantive difference in the claims to land and labour other ways of being suggest that threatens the legitimacy of the contract. But beyond thinking about this as exclusion from the social contract, criminalization presents the means by which both labour and land, (property in addition to territory), are required through methods of coercion and extraction to make the capitalist settler state possible. Recalling Audra Simpson’s (2017, p. 20) words at the outset of this chapter: 39 This included, “Lunaticks and Ideots,” children, “Innocents,” “Madmen” etc. Criminals are also referred to as “wild Savage Beasts”—as animals, which places them in the state of nature and with others who never leave nature (Locke, 1980[1690], p. 34). On this point, we can begin to contextualize the relationship between criminality, madness and ableism, and how it overlaps with other relations of power through claims to rationality. Ph.D. Thesis – J. Jurgutis McMaster University – Political Science 54 “For Native people, this ruse of consent marks the inherent impossibility of that freedom after dispossession, a freedom I argue is actually theft.” Simpson exposes how claims Indigenous people are free through inclusion are impossible and untrue, because of the theft of Indigenous bodies and lands on which the settler state rests. Thus, the social contract is made possible by legalized theft, (and the continued erasure of that theft), both at its founding and in perpetuity—though it can never be acknowledged as such—at the same time that punishment provides the mechanism by which claims that challenge any such reality as legitimacy become criminalized, managed and contained through the explicit use of force. Colonial Carceral Erasures This reading highlights that Realist and Liberal uses of the Prisoner’s Dilemma through claims to universalism and rationality actually serve to make invisible the role and function of the prison and prisoner within IR. Constructivists, like Marks, may be able to question how these institutions and subjectivities produce the international, but they do not offer a way to interrogate the prison and prisoner as providing the material requirements of land and labour that has driven and continues to compel imperial and colonial expansion in the current moment. Critical scholars in IR, though directing attention to imprisonment and carceral space, often do so in a limited way that often reproduces this same erasure of land and/or labour in varying capacities.40 In order to avoid this in this project I strive to take account for the role of the prison and prisoner, 40 I will elaborate on this discussion in Chapter 2. Ph.D. Thesis – J. Jurgutis McMaster University – Political Science 55 and thus a reading of carcerality and criminalization, at an imperial juncture that rests on the widespread theft of bodies and labour through the transatlantic slave trade and external forms of colonization, at the same time that it birthed forms of settler colonialism that require the theft of land that continue today in ways that cannot be captured in an extractive model. Doing so requires a refusal to take the prison and prisoner as a political economic institution, form of subjectivity, set of practices, and logics for granted, and aims instead to make more explicit its role in sustaining global inequities and hierarchies advanced through colonialism, capitalism, and militarization. The ways the power relations of the prison are eclipsed in IR gives us a great deal of insight into how the power relations of settler colonialism are elided as well. The use of force is not only present during the act of punishing the prisoner, as the Prisoner’s Dilemma seems to imply. Here we can recall that the prisoner who does not cooperate or act within the terms set out for them receives the harshest punishment in the form of a ten-year sentence. Social contract theory gives us insight into the ways claims to universalism and rationality undergird cooperation through legitimate coercion, while providing the grounding necessary to disavow the use of force and non-consensual forms of inclusion. These claims also ensure that the making of criminal subjectivity is informed by racialized, gendered, sexualized and classed hierarchies of power. This means that contrary to the story the Prisoner’s dilemma supplies for IR, punishment and the use of force are not exceptional actions introduced periodically or where necessary in order to diminish violence. Rather, violence in the form of the theft of bodies and lands are necessary for the myth of sovereignty, global capitalism, and the making states within the international system itself. Indeed, you cannot steal people’s bodies, labour and land without carcerality. But because the imperial and colonial power relations must necessarily seize bodies and land as property or as targets of elimination, these erasures are in fact (settler) colonial ones which are continually evidenced in the ways carceral institutions are required to manage the relationships between bodies and land.41 Examining the political philosophical foundations of imprisonment in social contractarian thought shows how practices of punishment and criminalization become a method of erasing and “resolving” social conflict within ‘the international,’ as well as settler state contexts. In doing so land, labour, criminalization and punishment are mutually constituted in ways that link the prison and prisoner as central to an imperial and colonial project. By establishing the foundations of IR’s ontological investment in prison and punishment as a method of resolving conflict we can more easily access assumptions about whose security, well-being and life ways are secured through innocence and whose ways of being must be criminalized. We have reason to interrogate the unquestioned status of the prison and prisoner as a central institution and figure in IR, as well as the roles they play in society and in our lives. Indeed, the very presence of the prison, its foundational assumptions, and status as an uncontested and under examined institution in IR can be understood as ones to ensure conditions of the international system continue to be founded on colonial violence and maintained though forceful constraint in the contemporary moment. Settler states continue to rely on the production of criminality and carceral space in order to redefine and reorganize relationships between bodies and lands. These ongoing histories are ones that must be historicized in place in order to fully unpack the lineage of settler state and capitalist expansion in ways that illuminate how carceral logics, imprisonment and the production of carceral space developed as a settler colonial governance strategy on Turtle Island. In the end, the Prisoner’s Dilemma can tell us very little about prison and prisoners as an everyday occurrence in IR. It can tell us little about how and why so many poor and racialized people are killed or in an increasingly privatized and expanding global prison system, or why it is predominately poor and racialized women who are increasingly criminalized or at the very least made to bear the entire burden of work and grief when their loved ones are. Prisoners cannot be conceived as citizens and workers, or even on their own terms and both the land on which prisons are built and the ways in which bodies, labour and resources are organized in order to re-constitute power and accumulate wealth and profit can be linked to ongoing settler colonial projects within political systems that still embody assimilationist, genocidal and master-slave narratives, even if not explicitly. Asking questions of the prison and prisoner in this way is central to moving towards a transnational and decolonial feminist engagement with questions of imprisonment and carceral space, which is the subject I turn to in Chapter 2. There I will draw on feminist interventions in global politics and IR to further theorize the relationship between land, labour and criminalization for the purpose of working towards a reading of imprisonment and carceral space that relies on ongoing colonial violence.

2022 Michigan Kritik
Settler Colonialism K––K Lab › Links––General › L––Linear Time

Conceptualizations of utopia are complicit in the universalizing logics of Western progressivism – resolution demands a perpetually incomplete “pursuit of the ideal” that necessitates the repetitive elimination of indigeneity, the “primitive” and “anti-utopian” other, in service of colonial modernity’s emergence.

Hardy ’15 -- (Karl Joseph Hardy, 6-10-2015, "UNSETTLING HOPE: SETTLER COLONIALISM AND UTOPIANISM," Queen’s University, https://qspace.library.queensu.ca/bitstream/handle/1974/13154/Hardy_Karl_J_06095600_PhD.pdf;jsessionid=4D4185E83446511624E096AB43CCE454?sequence=1, accessed 12-30-2021)//nikki

The experience of contact between the European newcomers and Indigenous peoples was broadly diverse and was inflected by the respective metropoles’ own circumstances, especially in relation to their experiences of contact with non-Europeans. Consequently, there were a variety of disparate ways in which the European metropoles conducted their respective colonial endeavors.23 Ultimately, however, where Europeans sought to establish what were conceived of as decidedly modern and utopian colonies in the New World, Indigenous peoples and their land-based spiritual, epistemological, and ontological orientations were, broadly speaking, narratively represented as bygone, primitive, or pre-modern—as indicative of anti-utopia. It follows that such narratives contributed to justifications for attempts at subjugating or eliminating Indigenous peoples via dislocation (forced removal from traditional lands), annihilation (murder), and assimilation (strategies for bringing the Indigenous “up” or “forward” to the level of the European standard or incorporating them as new category of person in the case of the mestizo in Spanish colonies). While the pre-contact narratives of desirable social change of both Europeans and Indigenous peoples are an important consideration—among other things, they may facilitate an understanding of the bases for evolution and change resulting from contact— it is also crucial to recognize the imposition of such supremacist narratives immediately inspired corresponding Indigenous narratives of Indigenous resistances. Furthermore, contact between the Indigenous and the European impacted the self-conceptions of both. From 1492 to the present day, narratives created by both Indigenous and non-Indigenous peoples living in what is now Canada and the US continue to necessarily involve substantial degrees of co-creation and enduring dynamism. To date there are relatively few direct, specific, substantive Indigenous scholarly engagements with discourses of utopia. However, the late historian John Mohawk (Seneca) offers one notable critical treatment in his Utopian Legacies: A History of Conquest and Oppression in the Western World.24 Here Mohawk offers a conceptual distinction between notions of “utopia” and what he refers to as the Western “pursuit of the ideal.”25 Mohawk understands utopianism, as he conceives it, to have existed “since antiquity in most if not all of the world’s cultures,” and to “propose that there has existed, now exists somewhere, or could exist in the future a perfect society, an existence in which all human needs are satisfied, all problems are solved, and everyone’s life is fulfilled.”26 Utopianism, Mohawk maintains, is related but distinguished from what he argues is “the pursuit of the ideal,” a “theme in Western culture” which “articulates all reasonable human beings who have access to an adequate base of information will pursue an identical concept of what is ideal or good.”27 Western utopianism, according to Mohawk, “is dominated by a certainty that an ideal world is possible, that such a world would be in the best interest of all human beings, and its conception and production will inevitably be the product of Western thought.”28 Consequently for Mohawk, Western utopianism historically operated and continues to operate as a self-aggrandizing and humanist ideology based in futureoriented notions of modernity and progress, which, crucially, never fully arrive— therefore providing a basis for its ongoing and continual renewal. In contrast, Mohawk writes of “many ancient societies, [where] utopias were envisioned as located in a distant past when human beings and nature existing harmoniously in blissful unity.”29 Moreover, as a consequence of the oppression imposed by Western utopianism, Mohawk’s brief discussion of the utopianism of Indigenous peoples of Turtle Island is based in notions of an idealized pre-colonial past, one that explicitly rejects notions of transcendental progress: …North American Indians were, with few exceptions, coerced or driven by military force from their ancestral lands. These Indians saw the fowl, fish, and animals of their homelands driven to near extinction; their people decimated by disease; and their land made off limits to them by a relentless invader. For them, utopia would be a place where all things lost would be restored and the material culture of their ancestors could be enjoyed.30 Mohawk’s articulation of this notion of Indigenous utopianism is decidedly a form of “paradise lost” that could be recognized as essentializing insofar as it is interpreted as a call to a “return” to an Indigenous cultural ideal. However, Mohawk later describes traditional Haudenosaunee stories … of the past depicting a time when people were clear about the desires of the spirits who created life on the earth, and found a sense of security and grace in that knowledge. Among the Iroquois myths is a story of human beings becoming forgetful of their obligations for the great good fortune of the gift of life; when this happened, unhappiness, misfortune, and anomie befell them. Therefore, ceremonies of thanksgiving are given by the people to the Creator of Life so they will always remember to be grateful. But, the story continues, someday in the future people will once again become forgetful, the earth itself will grow old, and life will change. Iroquois cosmology is in a sense utopian, but the utopia—the perfect world—is in a shrouded and very ancient past during which the relationship between human beings and the spirits who support life was very strong and cooperative, and even the animals and birds participated along with human beings in the continuous drama of life. As time passed, according to this myth, things changed and continue to change. Even before the European expansion and the end of the fifteenth century and long before the beginning of the Age of Extinction at the end of the seventeenth century, Iroquois storytellers described a perfect age in the distant past and urged the necessity of carrying on traditions to preserve as much of the relationships and knowledge of those times as possible in a present that was becoming ever more distant from that utopia.31 So, while Mohawk states “all societies have had their utopian dreams,” he is explicit in characterizing Western utopianism as progressive, universalizing, implicitly anthropocentric, and continually renewing a sense of modernity. At the same time, he offers a radically different understanding of an Indigenous utopianism that is traditional and embedded within a wider earth-based cosmology. Mohawk approaches these concerns as a historian and so his referencing of notions of “pluralism” as an alternative anti-colonial, quasi-utopian project is understandably brief. While he avoids a more direct and explicit evocation of what he might hold personally as an ideal or utopian vision, he does assert that “[to] the degree a people or nation can be taught to respect the principles of pluralism and tolerance, the prospects of militias committing slaughters and armies participating in wholesale ethnic cleansing are diminished.”32 The growing body of contemporary Indigenous critical theory reflects the development of varied concepts, discourses, and practices that are indicative of the diversity of their respective backgrounds and experiences.33 Therefore, I wish to recognize the dangers of appearing to collapse Indigenous narratives surrounding settler colonialism, Indigenous decolonization, or those otherwise concerned with proposing alternatives to the modern utopian tradition of white settlers. I wish to emphasize that Indigenous critical theories and their narrative proposals cannot be reduced to singular concepts, discourses, or practices that may have the effect of appearing to condense a vital diversity of thought and practice. Moreover, as I discuss below, Indigenous critical theorists and their narrative proposals ought not be reduced to mere alternatives or counters to those of the settler colonial societies they are now situated within. Just as there is danger in reducing the diversity of Indigenous thought to singular concepts, discourses, or practices, there is a similar problematic in a reductive understanding of Indigenous critical theories and narrative proposals as merely defensive or reactive in their inspiration and articulation.

2022 Michigan Kritik
Settler Colonialism K––K Lab › Links––General › L––Linear Time

The development discourse inherent in the 1AC’s political project is a weapon of epistemic genocide used to dehumanize and antagonize indigenous communities while valorizing expropriation and instrumentalization -- utopianism is the tool through which the settler replaces the native via the construction of stolen lands as a “blank slate” upon which an ideal society can be built.

Hardy ’15 -- (Karl Joseph Hardy, 6-10-2015, "UNSETTLING HOPE: SETTLER COLONIALISM AND UTOPIANISM," Queen’s University, https://qspace.library.queensu.ca/bitstream/handle/1974/13154/Hardy_Karl_J_06095600_PhD.pdf;jsessionid=4D4185E83446511624E096AB43CCE454?sequence=1, accessed 12-30-2021)//nikki

This dissertation begins with the first body chapter concerned with contemporary Indigenous critical theory, tracing several key theoretical concepts to establish the critical framework used to intervene in utopian discourses. Primarily I am concerned with demonstrating how Indigenous scholars have endeavored to establish what Robert Warrior (Osage) has termed Indigenous “intellectual sovereignty,” while, importantly, avoiding notions of a romanticized, fossilized authentic Indigeniety. In particular, I draw on Byrd’s work to highlight the potentialities associated with Indigenous studies’ engagement with postcolonial, poststructural and cultural studies, such that Indigenous critical theory is both potentially enriched by and a contributor to critical theories. Following Lina Sunseri, I locate the contemporary assertions of Indigenous nationhood as an affirmation of Indigenous peoplehood apart from the development discourses of modernity, progress, and rationality that were used to dehumanize and disenfranchise. Indigenous communities. I also engage with concepts drawn from Indigenous literary studies, including the work of Grace L. Dillon (Anishinaabe) to locate what she terms “Indigenous Futurisms” and “Indigenous Science Fiction.” It is from this basis in Indigenous critical theory and literary studies that I turn in the second chapter to a close reading of More’s Utopia. Here I develop the notion of utopian settler modernity and trace the pre-figurations of white settler colonialism, including the emergent valourization of labour and instrumental rationalization of landas-resource, as well as the (proto)racialization of human difference as one of the means utilized by More to conceptualize turning Abya Yala into the Modus Novus, the remaking of the New World into a “no place,” a blank slate available for projecting notions of the ideal commonwealth. Ultimately, I argue that Utopia serves as a clear touchstone for colonialist discourses that, in many ways, persist to this day even amongst the most ostensibly radical utopian fiction. I then turn to emergent discussions in utopian studies regarding notions of the “postcolonial utopia” and utopianism from outside the West. I engage with prominent conceptualizations of utopia and utopian theory, including that of educative desire in the work of Miguel Abensour, Ernst Bloch, and Ruth Levitas. Here I am concerned with gaps in utopian studies discourse that has heretofore neglected Indigenous peoples and appears predisposed towards the sort of “add-and-stir” inclusion that Hall’s re-articulation explicitly seeks to avoid. I raise the question of the efficacy of notions of postcolonial utopias to describe Indigenous peoples’ desires for making a better world and, ultimately, raise the issue of the appropriateness of “utopian” language and discourses given their clear relationship with colonialism. In the fourth chapter I survey recent examples of utopian literature created by white settler authors, noting the apparent evidence of desire for indigeneity. I develop the notion of settler ecotopianism to describe the utopian narratives of white settlers that generally involve the instrumental appropriation of Indigenous culture as means of escape from the alienation experienced by the urban industrial white settler society. I engage with a variety of utopian texts ranging from Edward Bellamy’s Looking Backward to Ernest Callenbach’s Ecotopia to the novels of Ursula K. Le Guin, Kim Stanley Robinson, and Starhawk. My central focus in this chapter is the simultaneous desire for an indigenous future combined with the naturalized evasion of decolonial concerns. I then turn to a discussion of contemporary Indigenous sf (speculative fiction) as a means of exploring the re-articulation of utopia in light of the concerns and experiences of Indigenous peoples. I draw on the work of both Byrd and Dillon to demonstrate the emergent scholarship on Indigenous sf as distinct from but also in some ways congruent with the category of “postcolonial.” Ultimately, I argue the decolonial Indigenous Futurisms articulated in the Indigenous sf of Leslie Marmon Silko, Daniel Heath Justice, and others ought be understood as simultaneously proffering an immanent critique of the modern utopian tradition, while utilizing aspects of its conventions to do so. I also discuss how the mixed identities of some authors, including Nalo Hopkinson and Zainab Amadahy provide for a rich basis for transgenre narratives that simultaneously engage Indigenous and postcolonial themes, alongside, for example, ecological and feminist concerns. Ultimately, I argue that today’s social dreaming is increasingly subjected to dynamic, educative, and intersectional critical analyses that evokes Byrd’s notion of “cacophony,” and portends further complexity, humility, and relationality for the human and the other-than-human alike.

2022 Michigan Kritik
Settler Colonialism K––K Lab › Links––General › L––Linear Time

Utopian narratives are a methodological tool of settler modernity that forwards progressive rationality as a means of rationalizing and reconstituting the genocidal project of the New World -- indigeneity is constructed as the constitutive “other” to the unified social desire built around Western progressive rationality

Hardy ’15 -- (Karl Joseph Hardy, 6-10-2015, "UNSETTLING HOPE: SETTLER COLONIALISM AND UTOPIANISM," Queen’s University, https://qspace.library.queensu.ca/bitstream/handle/1974/13154/Hardy_Karl_J_06095600_PhD.pdf;jsessionid=4D4185E83446511624E096AB43CCE454?sequence=1, accessed 12-30-2021)//nikki

There is a claim, repeated often in utopian studies discourse, which holds that the past thirty plus years of neoliberal globalization have contributed to a growing sense of pessimism, which accounts for an alleged dystopian turn. That is, the content of what Lyman Tower Sargent terms “social dreaming” is said to have turned nightmarish.14 The potential for utopia is thought to be increasingly unavailable. Instead, it is argued that dissatisfaction with the trajectories of a globalizing society has resulted in the popularity of cautionary, pessimistic expressions of “what ought not be” understood here as dystopia, literally “the bad place.” While recognition of the prevalence of dystopian expressions of warning may appear reasonable and substantially accurate, it must also be recognized that any notion of social dreaming is not monolithic or singular. Utopias, conceived of as social dreaming or expressions of desire for a better way of being, are here understood to be fundamentally social. As such, they are plural, enabled or constrained by context. Moreover, the historical specificities of culture, place, and of existing hierarchical social stratifications each have a substantive impact on who comes to be included, collapsed within, or entirely excluded from the implicit “we” or, alternatively, “they” embedded in each expression of utopia, or dystopia for that matter. It follows that the content and character of utopias are educated, and co-emergent with the location and processes of socialization. Similarly, the ability to realize desires for a better way of being is also educated. And, perhaps more crucially, the selfconfidence of an individual or group of individuals to realize desires for a better way of being is also educated. Given existing social inequalities, elites are clearly positioned to anticipate utopia, to demonstrate willful striving towards the potential concrete realization of their utopian propositions, in contrast to those in subordinate social positions. This notion of the education of desire emerges from the work of Miguel Abensour and Levitas, and may be considered alongside and, in many ways, as drawing upon Ernst Bloch’s related concept of docta spes, or the education of hope. Using the above example of the alleged dystopian turn, it is certainly the case that there are those who do not, in fact, maintain dystopian outlooks on the merits of neoliberal globalization. To the contrary, for some, the contemporary condition may represent the substantial realization of utopia, an “end of history,” which only requires refinement rather than wholesale reconstitution. However, accepting the premise of pervasive dystopianism at the current trajectory of global society, it is also necessary to acknowledge a variety of existing bases for such dystopianism. These may be antithetical to one another, fundamentally troubling the potential for a revitalization of utopianism. Conceived of as social dreaming or expressions of (social) desire for a better way of being, utopias as proposals appear doomed to an inevitable failure. It seems impossible to construct a unified “we,” without stepping outside of history and neglecting the realities of difference. Utopia, or more accurately, eutopia (“the good place”) for some appears to be inescapably dystopian, or, minimally, less-than-eutopia, for others. Recognition of this apparently inexorable condition, however, is the basis of Levitas’ re-conceptualization of utopia as method. Here utopia operates as an educative heuristic, as an enduringly and emphatically dialogical, processual, provisional, and critically-self-reflexive “imaginary reconstitution of society.” Proposals for a better way of being effect an estrangement from the here and now, allowing for a remove that facilitates critical “archaeologies” of the historical present. Simultaneously, the “architectural” construction, the alternative proposal to the here and now, is subject to judgment. Whether described as social dreaming or expressions of desire for a better way of being, the social dimension to utopia as method may facilitate critical understandings of power, of hierarchies of difference, of relationships of domination and oppression: it may constructively educate desire.15 Clearly, scholarly conceptualizations of utopianism as a transhistorical and intercultural meta-category facilitate comparative study. Equally clear is the existence of social dreaming, expressions of desire for a better way of being, or “texts both in the West and outside it that pre-date More’s Utopia that describe a non-existent society identifiably better than the contemporary society.”16 However, I agree with Krishan Kumar’s contention that “utopia proper” ought be differentiated as “the modern utopia that was invented in Europe in the sixteenth century.”17 More’s Utopia, published in 1516, invented the word “utopia,” (often translated as “no place” or “the good place [which is] no place”) and the etymology is itself reflective of a historically- and culturally-bounded conceptualization and expression of desire.18 The notion of a “no place” as a transcendental “good place,” apart from the immanent sphere of existence, reveals a culturally-specific epistemology and ontology. Moreover, Utopia is indeed a profoundly settler colonial text. Put another way, Utopia articulated a narrative—a distinctively utopian narrative—which operated in a variety of ways to rationalize to the genocidal project of the settler colonization of the socalled New World. Following Kumar and others, I also situate utopia as a decidedly modern phenomenon, or, more precisely, as co-constituitive with the creation of early modern narratives, in particular conceptions of a utopian settler modernity. The condition of white supremacist settler colonialism that characterizes what is now understood as Canada and the US was prefigured, in part, by the narrative proposal put forth in More’s Utopia. Furthermore, the utopian traditions of the white settlers of Canada and the US have been, and largely continue to be marked by the naturalization of white settler colonialism within their imaginary reconstitutions of society. The social dreaming of white settlers of Canada and the US has most often implicitly, but at many times explicitly, excluded Indigenous peoples and racialized non-Natives from their proposals for a better way of being. Thus, utopia as a distinct cultural and historical phenomenon has operated to educate the social dreaming of the peoples who have come to live within the white settler colonial societies of Canada and the US. The potential of unsettling utopia, or put another way, centering Indigenous decolonization and ending white supremacy in proposals for a better way of being, requires addressing the contributions that utopia has made to inspire and sustain the naturalized condition of white supremacist settler colonialism in what is now Canada and the United States.

2022 Michigan Kritik
Settler Colonialism K––K Lab › Links––General › L––Linear Time

Timelines of completion are weaponized by settler governance in political and academic spheres to classify indigeneity as “other” and preclude discussions of indigenous interrleationality – the 1AC is an instantiation of the quest for resolution that you are ethically obligated to reject on an a priori level.

Strakosch and Macoun ’12 -- Elizabeth Strakosch is a senior lecturer in public policy and governance at the University of Queensland, and her work focuses on Indigenous policy, colonialism, political relationships, bureaucracy and new public management. Her research explores the connections between political relationships and policy systems in Australia and other settler contexts. contexts. Alissa Macoun is a Lecturer in the School of Justice at Queensland University of Technology. She is interested in the politics of race and contemporary colonialism. (Elizabeth Strakosch and Alissa Macoun, 8-14-2012, "The vanishing endpoint of settler https://d1wqtxts1xzle7.cloudfront.net/30618693/Arena_Journal_Vanishing_Endpoint-with-cover-page-v2.pdf?Expires=1641292909&Signature=ChuVXBZ8Rm1bur5JH2dQc5JWgaB7MbFAPs1cNeI35Eh1XzeGWPa2rtYC2dUiBrNmekVJBkim0VJNQ7YbXkuur3yBbhPhZix1z0n7k9n1JqxPcxK6tucFsuicP6kp9dPeEF23gClX26-9QbmukrpidEVgb6x4ysdi8c0JcSd1GQYnOTHpYngupZDn3NV-s1GCe5so8pVOrrOaPKVg5LXydJJkIb9tYKnZV1TGPophuk21rXLXZczrr6~GcwSYxIZw9uWVt8MNgCV6zh9H5edp~CWh-gA6cuCny-bACDvjQB~F7eluH5ooNGx-J7u4YPQsh3m-uIeMR8zhhZDQwxa81g__&Key-Pair-Id=APKAJLOHF5GGSLRBV4ZA, accessed 1-4-2022)//nikki

The above analysis suggests that rather than disputing where the nation and Indigenous peoples should be located relative to the moment of colonial transformation, it may be more productive to contest this temporal narrative altogether. Instead, we might ask how and why policy-makers come to have the authority to locate Indigenous lives in settler time. More importantly, we can begin to understand and contest the impacts of these continual temporal classifications of Aboriginality on Indigenous lives, and to consider whether there might be ways that settlers and our structures can engage more appropriately and mindfully with Indigenous peoples and with Indigenous political difference. If settler colonialism is indeed a structure rather than an event, and the moment of radical break functions at least partly as a colonial technology of temporality, then the quest for (re)solution of the colonial relationship through a significant decolonizing event is brought into question. The political challenges we face in Australia are reconfigured as part of an ongoing task involving the identifi - cation of the ways this structure shapes our shared existences, and of finding ways of living together better. Paul McHugh argues that there are often two simultaneous approaches to colonizing/ decolonizing tools such as a treaty and native title.85 Settlers, even progressive settlers, approach them as one-off and definitive moments of change, capable of erasing a problematic past and regulating a new and certain future. For many Indigenous peoples, he suggests, they are instruments in a toolbox of strategies to manage the ongoing relationship between settler and Indigenous residents. Rather than seeking to end this encounter, many have sought rather to make it more just, sustainable and compatible with diverse Indigenous aspirations. As we have suggested, the ways in which academic and political approaches mobilize timelines of colonial completion may foreclose more productive debates about coexisting and interrelating across time.

2022 Michigan Kritik
Settler Colonialism K––K Lab › Links––General › L––Linear Time

Settler colonialism operates through a logic of constant deferral that locates indigeneity as “vanished”, or an atemporal relic of the past cast aside in service of a settler modernity – the 1AC’s commitment to progressive development as a method of redress for colonial violence is nothing more than a cacaphony of assimilative liberalism that drowns out “backwards” indigenous thought in favor of settler misappropriation.

Hardy ’15 -- (Karl Joseph Hardy, 6-10-2015, "UNSETTLING HOPE: SETTLER COLONIALISM AND UTOPIANISM," Queen’s University, https://qspace.library.queensu.ca/bitstream/handle/1974/13154/Hardy_Karl_J_06095600_PhD.pdf;jsessionid=4D4185E83446511624E096AB43CCE454?sequence=1, accessed 12-30-2021)//nikki

The work of contemporary Indigenous critical theorists evidences a collective refusal to be erased, a demand for attention to the ways in which many academic (and non-academic) concepts and discourses ignore the experiences and concerns of Indigenous peoples. It is vital, therefore, to first recognize and situate the manifesting of a body of Indigenous critical theory and Indigenous-led scholarly communities as existing within the academic infrastructure supported and regulated by the white settler nationstate. With this reality in mind, the proliferation of Indigenous studies programs and the work of Indigenous critical theorists, as such, may be generally observed as acts of resistance. Chickasaw critical theorist Jodi Byrd refers to what she terms the “deferral” of Indigenous peoples’ experiences and concerns within the prominent threads of critical theory within the (settler) academy.36 An attending to Indigenous concerns and experiences in discourses such as human rights, postcoloniality, or sustainability rarely occurs, if it can be said that it has ever occurred in a substantial or sustained way. These continual deferrals operate as a means by which the white settler academy, again itself understood here as an adjunct of the wider capitalist settler societies in which it is embedded, can avoid confronting the fundamental contradictions and violence underlying the very condition of settler colonial societies. As Byrd writes, “indigenous peoples are located outside of temporality and presence, even in the face of the very present and ongoing colonization of indigenous lands, resources, and lives.”37 According to Byrd, one of the more prominent means of such acts of deferral is the assignment of Indigenous peoples and their concerns and experiences to the past. This acts to relegate of Indigenous peoples to a state of invisibility and irrelevance in the contemporary world. Colonial narratives represent Indigenous peoples as having vanished or as having otherwise been passed by as part of a linear and teleological notion of human development. This allows for, and indeed perpetuates, deferrals from direct and sustained contention with the genocidal violence of settler colonialism by understanding colonization to have always-already taken place. Settler colonialism is therefore understood as complete, with Indigenous peoples and their nations, cultures, languages, knowledges, governance structures, and spiritualities viewed as mere remnants pushed to the margins, as contradictions that require (temporary) management. These narrative deferrals also often involve an imposed notion of “authentic” Indigeneity to have been fundamentally and irrevocably lost at some point in the past. The supposed loss of authenticity furthers a sense of the inevitability of Indigenous peoples’ assimilation into settler society. This to say that if Indigenous peoples ceased to be authentically Indigenous at some point in the past, then their capacity to be recognized by settler societies as fully human, and as Indigenous nations, rests primarily on their assimilation, the termination of the their Indigenous identities. Obviously, this operates, in part, as a means of deferring engagement with the enduring and ongoing genocidal character of settler colonialism. This includes, but is not limited to, the ongoing reservation and reserve system, the gendered and sexualized violence, and the mass settler state interventions into Indigenous communities (e.g. the removal of children from their families). Furthermore, the ongoing legacy of broken treaties between the erstwhile colonial metropoles, the settler nation-states that Byrd refers to as “breakaway settler colonialisms,” and Indigenous nations, requires the subsuming of Indigenous peoples within the settler nation-state, undermining Indigenous sovereignties and denying Indigenous nationhood.38 While it appears that, to date, the largest non-Indigenous audience for much of contemporary Indigenous critical theory has been in area studies and critical studies of race, gender, and sexuality, the work of Byrd in Transit of Empire offers a wide-ranging set of critical interventions, aimed at postcolonial and poststructural scholarship, as well as cultural studies. Byrd’s arguments focus on the construction of the notion of what she calls “Indian” and “Indianness,” which, in some ways mirror Anishinaabe writer and theorist Gerald Vizenor’s similar characterization of the “Indian” as an imposed nonIndigenous caricature. For Byrd the “Indian” …becomes a site through which U.S. empire orients and replicates itself by transforming those to be colonized into “Indians” through continual reiterations of pioneer logics, whether in the Pacific, the Caribbean, or the Middle East.39 Thus, for Byrd, “indigenous peoples must be central to any theorizations of the conditions of postcoloniality, empire and death-dealing regimes that arise out of indigenous lands.”40 Similarly, Byrd also situates the deferrals of Indigenous concerns in the proliferation of postructuralism, arguing that Indigenous peoples become an “absent referent” on which much contemporary postructural theory is constructed. She argues, “…the Indian is simultaneously, multiply, a colonial, imperial referent that continues to produce knowledge about the indigenous as “primitive” and “savage” otherness within postructuralist and postcolonial theory and philosophy.”41 According to Byrd, even in critical theories that interrogate hegemonic constructions of colonial modernity and which implicitly or explicitly acknowledge the dichotomization of modern versus pre-modern cultures or “civilizations,” there is a tendency to locate Indigenous peoples in the past—as though the pre-modern peoples were all killed or assimilated: vanished. Byrd argues …indigeniety as an ontological prior challenges postcolonial and critical theories because it serves as a significant parallax view—though certainly not the only one—along the baseline of colonialism through which to trouble the dialectical processes that underwrite colonialist hegemonies of racializations and normativities., subjectivities and subjectifications.42 The goals of the Transit of Empire are thus to critically intervene in existing nonIndigenous discourses with the intention of compelling attention to the contemporary presence and experiences of Indigenous peoples and a critical recognition of the effects of the naturalized deferrals of ongoing lived contemporary concerns of Indigenous peoples. Byrd is claiming that a caricatured Indian as subhuman is continuously redeployed as the means of the “transit” of American imperialism, but also that the Indian as pre-modern-and-vanished is deployed as the alternative to hegemonic notions of modernity in critical theory. Byrd also proposes a conceptualization of “cacophony” as means of understanding how liberal multiculturalism defers Indigenous concerns in part via “the noise of competing claims, recognitions, and remediations.”43 Here she is naming the “contradictorily hegemonic and horizontal struggles” within contemporary multicultural settler nation-states as another means of deferring the concerns of Indigenous peoples.44 Byrd’s argument is for an attending to the ways in which the efforts at rights and recognition from the nation-state has the consequences of pitting marginalized populations against one another in a competition that has the effect of further marginalizing and reinforcing the deferrals of Indigenous concerns. In doing so, Byrd’s Transit of Empire represents one of the foremost contemporary examples of contemporary Indigenous critical theory explicitly positioned as critical interventions within non-Indigenous discourses.

2022 Michigan Kritik
Settler Colonialism K––K Lab › Links––General › L––Linear Time

Indigeneity exists in a temporal regime antagonistic to that of the settler state – the genocidal violence of the past accumulates in the present and ensures that the benevolent future offered by the settler state will never arrive. The politics of reformism is a ruse of consent that consigns native being to a perpetual state of half-life -- vote negative to reject debate’s progressive linearity – what good is incremental transformation to the one who expects to die tomorrow ?

Dillon ’13 -- associate professor of queer studies, holds a B.A. from the University of Iowa and a Ph.D. in American Studies with a minor in critical feminist and sexuality studies from the University of Minnesota. (Stephen Dillon, 5-23-2013, "“It's here, it's that time:” Race, queer futurity, and the temporality of violence in Born in Flames," Women & Performance: a journal of feminist theory, Vol. 23, No. 1, 38–51, http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/0740770X.2013.786277, accessed 1-6-2022)//nikki

This is our time: death and the future Throughout Born in Flames, countless members of the Women’s Army declare: “This is our time.” The time of the revolution was not the time to abolish anti-blackness, white supremacy, and heteropatriarchy. It was a time that left behind and captured poor (queer) women of color through the progress of democracy and equality. In this way, “our time” and state time are two antagonistic temporalities of violence in the film. As James Scott argues, the modern state’s utopian aim is to reduce the disorderly and chaotic social order under its purview into a mirror of the administrative knowledge central to its observations and governance. The state works to produce temporal and spatial intelligibility with the goal of manufacturing the orderly administration and regulation of the nation’s population, resources, and infrastructure. By disrupting and dismantling spaces, populations, and epistemologies that are illegible to its regimes of knowing and governance, the modern state creates a utopia of visibility and legibility that is open to policing and control (Scott 1998, 82). The management of time is central to this process. “Our time” is what the state seeks to capture. In Born in Flames, state time extends and expands the violence of the past, while “our time” is a temporal regime that exceeds and undoes state time. Again, Fanon proves useful for understanding these differences. In The Wretched of the Earth, Fanon describes a “time lag, or a difference of rhythm, between the leaders of a nationalist party and the mass of the people” (Fanon 1963, 107). According to Fanon, the rank and file of anti-colonial rebellions demand the complete and utter immediate destruction of the forms of power that render them “more dead than alive,” while both colonial and nationalist governments attempt to manage, temper, and restrain the demands of those who have no more time to give to the promises of a future that is always coming, but never arrives (51). For example, in the film, the state promises that “in the future” there will be jobs, an end to sexual violence, and racial and gender equality. But for Fanon, the “hopeless dregs of humanity” (or the wretched of the earth) are filled with an “uncontrollable rage” and thus exist in a temporal regime apart from that of the party or the nation. This is a time of intensity and immediacy (“the slaves of modern times are impatient”), where the future of the present as it is means no future at all (74). Like the financial, epistemological, and racialized legacies of slavery Baucom sees intensifying in our current moment, Fanon diagnoses the future of colonialism as the accumulation of the social, biological, and living death of the native. The native lives a death in life produced by the racism of slavery and colonialism. The future’s horizon is the accumulation of past forms of racial terror and violence. In this way, Baucom and Fanon draw connections between race and time that are crucial to questions of queer futurity. The relationship between race, gender, death, and the future is central to the immediacy and spontaneity of the Women’s Army and is foundational to the film’s critique of the future. We can 44 S. Dillon turn to the Fanonian-inspired prison writings of George Jackson to further explore the relationship between death, race, and the future. In his 1972 text Blood in My Eye, published shortly after he was shot and killed by guards at San Quentin prison, Jackson writes of racism, death, and revolution: Their line is: “Ain’t nobody but black folks gonna die in the revolution.” This argument completely overlooks the fact that we have always done most of the dying, and still do: dying at the stake, through social neglect or in U.S. foreign wars. The point is now to construct a situation where someone else will join in the dying. If it fails and we have to do most of the dying anyway, we’re certainly no worse off than before. (Jackson 1972, 6) Here, Jackson argues that the social order of the United States is saturated with an anti-blackness that produces, in the words of Ruth Wilson Gilmore, “the state-sanctioned or extralegal production and exploitation of group-differentiated vulnerability to premature death” (2007, 28). Jackson’s text is littered with a polemic that links race and death in a way that preemptively echoes Michel Foucault’s declaration that racism is the process of “introducing a break into the domain of life that is under power’s control: the break between what must live and what must die” (Foucault 2003, 254). When Jackson, Gilmore, and Foucault define race as the production of premature death, they make a connection between race and the future. Race is the accumulation of premature death and dying. For Jackson, race fractures the future so that the future looks like incarceration or the premature death of malnutrition, disease, and exhaustion. The future was not the hopefulness of unknown possibilities. It was rather the devastating weight of knowing that death was coming cloaked in abandonment, neglect, incarceration, or murder. In other words, according to Jackson, death was always and already rushing towards the present of blackness. In the last line of No Future: Queer Theory and the Death Drive, Lee Edelman similarly connects the future to premature death when he references the murder of Matthew Shepard. He writes: “Somewhere, someone else will be savagely beaten and left to die – sacrificed to a future whose beat goes on, like a pulse or a heart – and another corpse will be left like a mangled scarecrow to frighten the birds who are gathering now, who are beating their wings, and who, like the death drive, keep on coming” (Edelman 2004, 154). For Edelman, the future will necessarily continue to produce a world that is unlivable for queer people. In this way, the polemics of black liberation and Edelman’s anti-social thesis share an affinity around the theorization of the future as overdetermined by premature death, yet they diverge in how they imagine death’s relationship to race and power. For Edelman, the future looks like repetition of the death of Matthew Shepard (a white gay man), while for Jackson, it looks like the premature death of incarceration, the ghetto, and chattel slavery’s haunting contortion of the present. In other words, the state and anti-blackness were central to the anti-sociality of the black liberation movement. Within Jackson’s analysis, the state is the primary mechanism for unevenly distributing racialized regimes of value and disposability. Following the writing of Fanon, Jackson argued that for this relationship to be abolished: “The government of the U.S.A and all that it stands for, all that it represents, must be destroyed. This is the starting point, and the end” (Jackson 1972, 54). Jackson’s polemic crescendos when he describes the future he desires: Women & Performance: a journal of feminist theory 45 We must accept the eventuality of bringing the U.S.A to its knees; accept the closing off of critical sections of the city with barbed wire, armed pig carriers criss-crossing the city streets, soldiers everywhere, tommy guns pointed at stomach level, smoke curling black against the daylight sky, the smell of cordite, house-to-house searches, doors being kicked down, the commonness of death. (Jackson 1972, 55) If the past and present have produced the accumulation of the premature death of black people, then Jackson imagines the complete undoing of the social order as the way out of temporal capture. The future of the social order means no future, and so the future must come to an end. Fanon similarly imagines the relationship between the native and the future of the social order: “They won’t be reformed characters to please colonial society, fitting in with the morality of its rulers; quite on the contrary, they take for granted the impossibility of their entering the city save by hand grenades and revolvers” (Fanon 1963, 130). Here, the invitation to the safety and security of the city (or the social order as it is) is an offer to continue a life that is a half-life. Possibility comes from a starting point that is an end. In her writing from captivity, Angela Davis articulates this logic in relationship to the prison. In the 1971 essay “Political Prisoners, Prisons, and Black Liberation,” Davis argues that the sole purpose of the police was to “intimidate blacks” and “to persuade us with their violence that we are powerless to alter the conditions of our lives” (39). Davis theorizes the violence of police and prisons as pervasive and unrelenting. Throughout the essay, Davis names the complicity between an anti-blackness as old as liberal freedom and new forms of penal and policing technologies that emerged in the 1970s in response to political upheaval and insurrection. Davis calls for the abolition of what she terms the “law-enforcement-judicial-penal network” in addition to arguing for the construction of a mass movement that could contest the “victory of fascism” (50). Yet, in line with the political imaginaries at the time – an imaginary articulated by Born In Flames – Davis wanted more than an end to the prison and the violence of the police. Like other early black feminist writing, Davis did not just call for the overthrow of one form of state power so that a new one may take its place. Instead, Davis implied that the social order itself must be undone. For Davis, the prison was not the primary problem. The prison was made possible by the libidinal, symbolic, and discursive regimes that actualized the uneven institutionalized distribution of value and disposability along the lines of race, gender, and sexuality. Davis called for the total epistemological and ontological undoing of the forms of knowledge and subjectivity that were produced by the racial state. In short, hope, for Davis, meant that the prison could not have a future, and more so, that a world that could have the prison would need to end as well. Critically, Jackson did not understand the end of the future of the social order as particularly different from his present because “I’ve lived with repression every moment of my life, a repression so formidable that any movement on my part can only bring relief” (1972, 7). Jackson’s understanding of the future arose from his critique of reform. Derived from his correspondence with Davis, Jackson argued that the essence of fascism was reform or more specifically “economic reform” (118).11 Every reform that modified or improved the operations of global capitalism and white supremacy only extended the life of the 46 S. Dillon social order. And the life of the social order, according to Jackson and Fanon, is parasitic on the control, exploitation, incarceration, and premature death of black people. The creation of a new world could not rely on “long term politics” because patience, reform, and change meant nothing to “the person who expects to die tomorrow” (10). For Jackson, the future is a time those without a future cannot risk. The future was not coming and so the present could not wait. The temporal break between those without a future who demand this is “our time” and the time of the state that declares your time is the future, is most striking in the final scenes of Born in Flames. Towards the end of the film, the president of the United States delivers a national televised address to announce a new reform that will pay women for housework. Simultaneous with the announcement, a cadre of the Women’s Army storms the state-run TV station and interrupts the president’s address with a video that exposes the imprisonment and murder of their leader, Adelaide Norris. Norris was murdered, in part, because of how she understood the relationship between time and violence. This is evident in internal discussions within the Women’s Army concerning the use of violence. When Hilary Hurst and Norris, the two leaders of the Women’s Army (according to the FBI), discuss the role of violence in the actions of the Women’s Army, they have competing visions of the relationship between time and violence. When Hurst tells Norris, “The reality of having to deal with taking up arms, Adelaide, is really heavy, I mean whether we can accept or be responsible for the potential violence thrust upon us, from our own violence thrust out ...” Norris simply replies, “I’m telling you it’s already happening. It’s here. It’s that time.”12 Norris’s response invokes two forms of violence. First, she implies that the state violence Hurst is concerned will come if they take up arms has already arrived (indeed Norris will be imprisoned and murdered within a few days of this conversation). She also indicates that the time is right to intensify their efforts through the deployment of violence. The time is right for counter-violence, because state violence is already the past, present, and future. Norris mobilizes a black feminist analytic where there is no outside to the forms of violence, terror, and subjugation produced by white supremacy, anti-blackness, and heteropatriarchy. As a queer black woman, Norris does not encounter violence in isolated moments of exceptional transgression. Space nor time will bring relief because there is no contingent relationship between blackness and violence (Wilderson 2010, 88). This fact leads to a politics of impatience, immediacy, and spontaneity by the Women’s Army. When the future is not relief, but intensification and accumulation, then the present is all that is left. “Our time” is a time of the present, an anticipatory time that sees the no future of the future as it is.

2022 Michigan Kritik
Settler Colonialism K––K Lab › Links––General › L––Linear Time

Settler colonialism mobilizes temporality itself in service of the consummation of white settler sovereignty – this operates through liberal narratives of progressivism that rely upon a vanishing endpoint of a “better world” achieved through the completion of the project of settler modernity. Normative debate is structured by the imperative of forward motion that locates the plan as a transformative break with colonial society that relegates the backwardness of indigeneity to the past and envisions a settler utopia in its place.

Strakosch and Macoun ’12 -- Elizabeth Strakosch is a senior lecturer in public policy and governance at the University of Queensland, and her work focuses on Indigenous policy, colonialism, political relationships, bureaucracy and new public management. Her research explores the connections between political relationships and policy systems in Australia and other settler contexts. contexts. Alissa Macoun is a Lecturer in the School of Justice at Queensland University of Technology. She is interested in the politics of race and contemporary colonialism. (Elizabeth Strakosch and Alissa Macoun, 8-14-2012, "The vanishing endpoint of settler https://d1wqtxts1xzle7.cloudfront.net/30618693/Arena_Journal_Vanishing_Endpoint-with-cover-page-v2.pdf?Expires=1641292909&Signature=ChuVXBZ8Rm1bur5JH2dQc5JWgaB7MbFAPs1cNeI35Eh1XzeGWPa2rtYC2dUiBrNmekVJBkim0VJNQ7YbXkuur3yBbhPhZix1z0n7k9n1JqxPcxK6tucFsuicP6kp9dPeEF23gClX26-9QbmukrpidEVgb6x4ysdi8c0JcSd1GQYnOTHpYngupZDn3NV-s1GCe5so8pVOrrOaPKVg5LXydJJkIb9tYKnZV1TGPophuk21rXLXZczrr6~GcwSYxIZw9uWVt8MNgCV6zh9H5edp~CWh-gA6cuCny-bACDvjQB~F7eluH5ooNGx-J7u4YPQsh3m-uIeMR8zhhZDQwxa81g__&Key-Pair-Id=APKAJLOHF5GGSLRBV4ZA, accessed 1-4-2022)//nikki

Time, decolonization and colonial completion Critical geographers use Foucault’s insights to unsettle modern understandings of space as a fixed environment in which politics takes place. Instead, they show that political projects construct, naturalize and respond to particular spatial understandings.30 In relation to Indigenous policy, critical analysts are quick to identify these political deployments of space. SuvendriniPerera, for example, shows that policy-makers represent remote Indigenous communities as ‘set apart from the body of the nation, and as the locus of unspeakable violence and abjection’.31 As part of the discourse of the Northern Territory Intervention, the metaphor of the distant frontier — or vulnerable centre — is pervasive. Remote Aboriginal communities prescribed for Intervention are para - digmatically referred to in media reports as ‘remote Aboriginal societies’, ‘this other Australia’, ‘the remote world’ and as ‘a distinct domain’.32 Unsettling dominant understandings of time is equally important. In his work ‘The End of the Passing Past’, Walters aims to ‘think about change in ways that refuse the obligation to side with or against continuity… and resist the temptations of progressivism and reductionism’.33 He draws on Bruno Latour’s examination of the modern temporal imaginary, and his denat - uralizing of modern political timelines: We have never moved either forward or backward. We have always actively sorted out elements belonging to different times. We can still sort. It is the sorting that makes the times, not the times that make the sorting.34 This interrogation is especially useful in relation to understanding settler colonialism and Indigenous policy-making. Barry Hindess, Elizabeth Povinelli and N. Sheehan, for example, reflect on Western temporal constructions of Aboriginality and indicate how these relate to liberal political agendas. Barry Hindess argues that liberalism tends to locate different cultures in its own past, even when they coexist with liberal societies in the present.35 Indigenous groups, in particular, are located prior to the transformative moment of sovereign agreement, which in turn is read as an indication of their incapacity to enter into this superior, rational political future. Norm Sheehan maintains that settler colonialism in Australia is deeply invested in these kinds of temporal logics: In contrast to previous colonial contexts which tended to focus on constructing difference based on inherent racial traits the antipodean designation as primitive defines this specific other as non-other. The antipodean aborigine is by definition from the origin of (all) mankind which positions this primitive as an earlier and therefore lesser version of European self.36 Elizabeth Povinelli briefly makes a similar point in her analysis of recent Australian Indigenous policy: [E]ven as liberalism came to accept its fate as a culture among other cultures it differentiated the tense and orientation of its cultural difference from other cultures. The West as a general idea would claim the future and claim the potentiality of individuals and assign the past and the constraint of individuals to others — or, it would recognize that these were the values of non-liberal cultures.37 She refers to these patterns of political temporal positioning as ‘technologies of temporality’. Drawing together the work of Walters, Hindess, Sheehan and Povinelli, it becomes apparent that colonialism does not just take place in time. It constructs narratives of time, in ways that create particular political relationships in the present, and attempts to move itself through time to a certain political future. In the remainder of this section, we compare the temporalities of post-colonial and settler-colonial political formations, and argue that both anchor themselves to some sort of transformative ‘endpoint’. This radical political break separates a problematic past from a completed future and, in settler-colonial societies, involves a strange assemblage of ideas about decolonization, revolution, full colonization and sovereign exchange. The term post-colonial implies ‘the notion of a movement be - yond’;38 ‘the “post” in “post-colonial” suggests “after” the demise of colonialism, it is imbued, quite apart from its user’s intentions, with an ambiguous spatio-temporality’.39 In a number of former colonies (both extractive, such as India, and settler, such as Algeria), the formal colonial project has indeed ended. The term postcolonial captures something about the complex political realities of these nation-states today. A dramatic, and often violent, moment of structural decolonization separates these state’s colonial pasts from their post-colonial presents. However, even in relation to those nations which have undergone such institutional transformations, scholars contest the use of the term. Ella Shohat suggests that it erases the ongoing structural imperialisms that persist: ‘How then does one negotiate sameness and difference within the framework of a “post-colonial” whose “post” emphasizes rupture and deemphasizes sameness?’40 Some scholars use the term neocolonialism to indicate political continuity, and to contest the understanding that critical post-colonial work seeks to put out minor spot-fires of inequality left by ‘real’ colonialism.41 If the temporal narrative of post-colonialism is problematic in relation to former extractive colonies, it is altogether inaccurate when applied to ongoing settler colonies such as Australia. Yet post-colonial scholarship has dominated international academic [T]he lack of historical specificity in the ‘post’ leads to a collaps - ing of diverse chronologies … It equates early independence won by settler colonial states, in which Europeans formed their new nation-states in non-European territories at the expense of Indigenous populations, with that of nationstates whose indigenous populations struggled for inde - pendence against Europe.42 Australia has not, and most probably will not, undergo the kind of institutional transfer of control to the Indigenous population that could justify the application of the term post-colonial. And yet it is quite common to see Australia identified as a post-colonial or decolo nizing nation in cultural studies, literary theory and policy analysis.43 One of the greatest contributions of the emerging field of settler-colonial studies is the fact that it provides clear conceptual tools to articulate exactly why it is that nations like Australia and Canada should be understood differently. However, it is important not to overstate the uniqueness of settlercolonial studies in Australian scholarship. Critical Indigenous the - orists are carrying on their own conversation regarding Australian colonial conditions, and have long contested the relevance of the term post-colonial. Irene Watson, for example, argues: I understand the contemporary colonial project as one that has continued unabated from the time of the landing and invasion by the British in 1788 … the Australian state retains a vested interest in keeping the violence going, and the inequalities and iniquities that are maintained against Aboriginal peoples for the purpose of maintaining the life and continuity of the state. A question the Australian state is yet to resolve is its own illegitimate foundation and transformation into an edifice deemed lawful. Within this unanswered questionable structure the Australian state parades as one which has obliterated the ‘founding violence’ of its ‘illegitimate origins’ and ‘repressed them into a timeless past’.44 Aileen Moreton-Robinson instead uses the term post-colonizing, capturing the ambiguous and shifting temporal technologies deployed in settler-colonial Australia. These new conceptual models have grown productively out of the object of our study: the postcolonizing world we inhabit. Our respective geographical locations are framed by nation states such as the USA, Canada, Australia and New Zealand where colonization has not ceased to exist; it has only changed in form from that which our ancestors encountered.45 While settler-colonial studies proceeds from a conceptual distinction between extractive and settler colonialism, Indigenous scholarship is based in the lived experiences of ongoing colonization.46 Settlercolonial studies would benefit from connecting to this existing academic conversation that runs parallel to and intersects with its own ideas in important ways. In particular, it draws attention to ongoing Indigenous contestation of colonial projects, and counters the tendency towards totalizing, structural accounts of settler colonialism. As Watson observes: Today our voices are still talking while the colonial project remains entrenched and questions concerning identity politics, and the ‘authentic native’ are constructed and answered by those who have power.47 Up to this point, we have been drawing together points made by other scholars. Settler colonialism has an ongoing, structural temporality, which is generally unacknowledged and contrasts with the linear colonialism–decolonization–post-colonialism narrative. However, we suggest that the application of a unidirectional, progressive temporality to the settler-colonial context is not just an analytical mistake, but a ‘technology of temporality’. This conception is taken up within the settler-colonial project in ways that work towards the consummation of settler sovereignty. The borrowed notion of a ‘radical break’ is variously located in settler colonialism’s past, present or future. By harnessing the decolonizing resonances of this concept of colonial transforma - tion, the settler-colonial project obscures the very different political effects of its own ‘vanishing endpoint’.48 What is this vanishing endpoint, which seems to lurk in all of our imaginations, our policy projects and our political debates? Instead of the moment of decolonization, it is the moment of full colonization — or rather, it is both, because in this imagined moment colonial relationships will dissolve themselves and settler authority will be naturalized. This transformative event is both an impossible colonial dream, premised on the disappearance of Indigenous political difference, and a concrete political project that justifies all manner of tactics in the present. But what are the political con - sequences of such a preoccupation? And do Indigenous participants in the colonial relationship seek the same kind of resolution and dissolution? Significantly, the Western colonial narrative of transformational change maps onto another Western imaginary — the moment of sovereign transformation encapsulated in the social contract. This is the moment that a group of people transition from collective social ‘status’ into individualized freedom and contractual person - hood.49 It is also the movement out of a constraining ‘history’ into an atemporal, rational present. As Hindess argues, liberalism con - signs its Indigenous contemporaries to its own past, and imagines this location in the past to be ‘a kind of moral and intellectual failure’, revealing the incapacity and disinclination to enter into a social contract and join the present.50 Therefore, the movement through time, via a radical transformative moment, is also the developmental movement from incapacity to capacity. An unstable but productive dichotomy emerges between, on the one hand, Indigenous political difference-incapacity-status-injustice-lack of sovereignty, and on the other, colonial completion-capacitycontract-freedom-sovereign inclusion. These oppositions are separated by an image of a single, interchangeable and undefined threshold — the transformative event. This temporal narrative belongs to both progressive and conservative articulations of the settler-colonial future; the settler colonial endpoint is variously positioned as an inevitable global trend,51 a past achievement yet to be fully recognized,52 and a future goal for which Aboriginal people must prepare.53 As Povinelli notes, these conceptions are not only temporal, but also teleological: [T]hese tenses are in turn articulated to other discourses of time and event such as teleological discourses that apprehend events ‘as the realization of an already given end or telos and eschatological discourses that wait for ‘extreme’ or ‘ultimate’ moments and events which immediately precede or accompany ‘the end of history’ and ‘its reversal into eternity’.54 The transformative event is positioned as part of an inevitable and inescapable trajectory (although it may be consistently deferred or delayed). In this way, the eventual legitimacy and stability of the settler-colonial project is always-already assumed. Through this a priori assumption, settler colonialism is able to entrench and sustain itself on the basis of its eventual demise. The following section traces the appearance and temporal location of this settler-colonial end - point in recent Australian Indigenous policy phases.

2022 Michigan Kritik
Settler Colonialism K––K Lab › Links––General › L––Distaster Colonialism

NATO is an organization structured by colonialism. From Kosovo to the AFF the construction of narratives of “urgency” and “humanitarian necessities” justifies NATOs colonial ambitions and reentrenches an international order that is structurally positioned against those it claims to help.

Erfani 21[Ava Erfani graduated from UNC Chapel Hill in 2021 with majors in Political Science and Interdisciplinary Studies (IDST) as well as a minor in Asian Studies, “Disaster Colonialism: The United Nations Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK),” North Carolina Journal of European Studies, https://cdr.lib.unc.edu/downloads/c821gv324#page=28]

The international involvement in Kosovo since 1999 serves as a unique, contemporary case of what I refer to as “disaster colonialism,” borrowing from Naomi Klein’s conception of “disaster capitalism.”5 In Klein’s vocabulary, “disaster” refers to the vulnerable condition of a populace wherein it is unable to express its popular will against undemocratic economic neoliberal reforms, usually due to its focus on survival and recovery following a widespread crisis. Disaster colonialism in Kosovo, I argue, was a project, one which needed the fabrication of a “disaster,” (based on the historical event of the 1999 War of Independence) for a series of international organizations to establish missions that would proliferate following the end of the war. The conflict between Kosovo and Serbia over the ownership of territory was seized by the international community as a “disaster,” catalyzing a self-justifying mechanism that foreclosed the expression of popular democratic will in post-conflict Kosovo. Without the watchword of “disaster,” I claim, the interventions in Kosovo, by NATO, the UN, and the European Union (EU) would not have been possible. Understood in this way, disaster colonialism is a programmatic, top-down method of building a state following a crisis that undemocratically implements techniques of governance imported by a colonizing power, bypassing the will or the consent of the populace. By manufacturing a “disaster”—which declares a populace no longer capable of deciding the future of their government or the shape of their own society––the international community was able to format a legal, economic, and political system in Kosovo that served the interests of a Western, liberal-democratic power structure. Disaster colonialism, then, attempts to diagnose the ways in which a foreign governing body is established, exercised, and multiplied in post-crisis situations using universally accepted norms of international human rights discourse to justify the wide-scale modeling of a society to serve not so much the interests of the governed, but rather the interests of the global order. In the case of Kosovo, the 1999 NATO intervention began the project of disaster colonialism by claiming a stake in the future of Kosovo. The UN continued the project for eight years via direct governance over Kosovo. After Kosovo declared independence in 2008, the UN transferred the remainder of its authority to the EU which utilized indirect methods of control––financial imperatives, Kosovo’s lack of alternative sources of growth and aid––to finalize the mission of disaster colonialism.6 The origins of international involvement in Kosovo did not begin with NATO, but the NATO intervention allowed for the colonial mission to take place. It established that the conflict was out of the control of Milošević, Kosovo President Ibrahim Rugova, the KLA, and other regional actors. As it had done in Bosnia-Herzegovina only a few years prior, the international community coalesced around the new governance and peacekeeping project: Kosovo. Thousands of international staff members relocated to the new missions in Kosovo in the direct aftermath of the destruction from the 1999 war. Many Kosovar Albanians as well as Kosovar Serbs faced extreme brutalities during the war, including murder, assault, rape, and forced removal as part of the ethnic cleansing campaign. It was in this environment that the UN and other organizations stepped into Kosovo. UNMIK, the OSCE mission, the EU mission, and the permanent NATO presence combined to create the longest and most expansive trusteeship mission in history.7 Kosovo as a post-conflict site gave the international community a center to focus their operations. For organizations like the EC/EU, state-building was a new field in which they could test their power and efficacy. If the post-conflict missions in Kosovo could be successful in creating a European-oriented, stable state, the international organizations could gain greater reputation and power in their global endeavors. Each major international organization was placed into separate spheres of operation termed “pillars.” Pillar I, “Humanitarian Affairs,” originally fell under the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and was responsible for the return and replacement of refugees; Pillar II, “Civil Administration,” was run by the UN and consisted of daily administrative management of the territory; Pillar III, “Democratization and Institution Building,” was led by the OSCE; Pillar IV, “Economic Reconstruction,” fell under the jurisdiction of the EU.8 Each partition of tasks made clear the primary objectives of UNMIK in terms of the type of society it aimed to create in Kosovo: a human rights-respecting, bureaucratic, and democratic government (UNHCR, UN, OSCE) as well as an investment-friendly market economy (EU). This level of state-building had not been undertaken before by the UN, making Kosovo the site of the largest modern experiment in government planning and control. The “disaster” of the 1999 war provided the grounds for this colonial experiment, the purpose of which was to prove the efficacy and hegemony of the liberal-democratic humanitarian style of “good governance” and development. In this paper, I will trace the points in which the UN’s disaster colonialism, administered by technocratic governance experts, reveals the costs of occupation, the collateral damage that is part of the state-building mission, and the tensions between expert rule––even from a human rights-centered organization like the UN––and democracy. The International Commission on Kosovo’s 2000 report on the Kosovo crisis found that the intervention was “illegal but legitimate… because the intervention had the effect of liberating the majority population of Kosovo from a long period of oppression under Serbian rule.”9 The uncertainty surrounding the legality and morality of NATO’s actions in Kosovo was quelled by this consensus, paving the way for the international community’s colonial project to establish its roots in Kosovo.10 The UN was able to establish UNMIK without request from Kosovo, bypassing its traditional insistence on consensual missions due to the “urgency” of the post-conflict situation which made its power as a humanitarian organization necessary, at least according to the international community.11 It is my argument that UNMIK’s administration was fundamentally colonial: the international community worked to control and shape the people and society of Kosovo, implementing Western governance and economic styles, while working against and around the very systems that they implemented. The difference between the colonialism of “old” and the disaster colonialism of the UN in Kosovo is that the UN’s hypocrisy between its rhetoric and action was due to its prevailing belief in its own mission rather than an ulterior motive to attain economic wealth. Those in charge of UNMIK and international organizations in Kosovo could accept the fact that many of their policies went against European and international legal conventions––some costs were necessary, according to their logic, in order to build a stable state for the people of Kosovo. It is this axiom, I argue, which guided UNMIK and other missions in Kosovo and which made colonialism possible as a humanitarian system of governance in the 21st century. The NATO intervention in Serbia and Kosovo was officially terminated on June 9, 1999 when NATO and the FRY government signed the Kumanovo Technical Agreement in Kumanovo, Macedonia. The document created a framework for dispelling Serb troops from Kosovo and for the establishment of a NATO security presence in the province.12 However, in terms of addressing the roots of the territorial conflict, the agreement was much weaker than the agreement at Rambouillet. Milošević rejected the Rambouillet Agreement before the war began largely because of its proposal that a referendum on the issue of independence would be carried out after three years of foreign international intervention in Kosovo. The Kumanovo Agreement focused more on the establishment of international administration rather than on questions popular will or sovereignty. Prior to international intervention, the KLA aimed to gain national sovereignty and independence for Kosovo; this was, however, irreconcilable with the goals of the North Atlantic organizations. As Ray Murphy writes, “The ultimate goal of the KLA was independence, but this was inconsistent with European Union and United States policy. The latter considered that political autonomy and guaranteed minority rights formed the only internationally acceptable solution to the status of Kosovo.”13 The Kumanovo Technical Agreement focused on the security apparatuses in Kosovo, stating that a UN mission would be deployed under a Security Council resolution and that all Yugoslav military forces would be removed from Kosovo’s territory and air space. The agreement established NATO’s sole authority over the use of force in Kosovo, banning any return of the Yugoslav and/or Serbian militaries. The following day, the UN would establish sole governing authority in the region. On June 10, 1999, the UN Security Council (UNSC) adopted Resolution 1244 under Chapter VII of the UN Charter.14 Article 11 of the Resolution gave UNMIK its main objectives: 11. Decides that the main responsibilities of the international civil presence will include: (a) Promoting the establishment, pending a final settlement, of substantial autonomy and self-government in Kosovo, taking full account of annex 2 and of the Rambouillet accords (S/1999/648); (b) Performing basic civilian administrative functions where and as long as required; (c) Organizing and overseeing the development of provisional institutions for democratic and autonomous self-government pending a political settlement, including the holding of elections; (d) Transferring, as these institutions are established, its administrative responsibilities while overseeing and supporting the consolidation of Kosovo’s local provisional institutions and other peace- building activities; (e) Facilitating a political process designed to determine Kosovo’s future status, taking into account the Rambouillet accords (S/1999/648); (f) In a final stage, overseeing the transfer of authority from Kosovo’s provisional institutions to institutions established under a political settlement; (g) Supporting the reconstruction of key infrastructure and other economic reconstruction; (h) Supporting, in coordination with international humanitarian organizations, humanitarian and disaster relief aid; (i) Maintaining civil law and order, including establishing local police forces and meanwhile through the deployment of international police personnel to serve in Kosovo; (j) Protecting and promoting human rights; (k) Assuring the safe and unimpeded return of all refugees and displaced persons to their homes in Kosovo;15 Resolution 1244 was the basis of the UN’s power in Kosovo. It ensured that the functions of Kosovo’s society as well as the design of its future would be in the hands of international staff. The scope of the mission was unprecedented; with no clear terminating clause, UNMIK would be responsible for both administration over Kosovo as well as the facilitation of the territorial dispute.16 In the span of two days, Kosovo lost local authority to self-govern as well as establish its own armed forces. The Resolution was seen as the ex post facto endorsement of the NATO intervention––the subject of legal and ethical debates on foreign intervention and sovereignty among international law experts––by the UNSC which had not initially approved the intervention.17 However, some scholars of international law who did not accept the humanitarian premise of the NATO intervention also questioned the legal validity of post-intervention involvement in Kosovo. They argued that the Kumanovo Agreement, which Resolution 1244 refers to as part of its legal basis, was made in violation of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties which states that “a treaty is void if its conclusion has been procured by the threat or use of force in violation of the principles of international law embodied in the Charter of the United Nations.”18 The crux of the critical argument centered on the use of unsanctioned force by NATO which was in violation of the UN Charter. Legal debates notwithstanding, the UN mission was able to expand its legal and executive reach after the passage of Resolution 1244.

2022 Michigan Kritik
Settler Colonialism K––K Lab › Links––General › L––Fiat

The settler state is structured by the erasure of indigenous political difference through spatiotemporal exclusion – the aff’s reliance on state-centric fiat as the basis for debate is a reification of eliminatory violence.

Strakosch and Macoun ’12 -- Elizabeth Strakosch is a senior lecturer in public policy and governance at the University of Queensland, and her work focuses on Indigenous policy, colonialism, political relationships, bureaucracy and new public management. Her research explores the connections between political relationships and policy systems in Australia and other settler contexts. contexts. Alissa Macoun is a Lecturer in the School of Justice at Queensland University of Technology. She is interested in the politics of race and contemporary colonialism. (Elizabeth Strakosch and Alissa Macoun, 8-14-2012, "The vanishing endpoint of settler https://d1wqtxts1xzle7.cloudfront.net/30618693/Arena_Journal_Vanishing_Endpoint-with-cover-page-v2.pdf?Expires=1641292909&Signature=ChuVXBZ8Rm1bur5JH2dQc5JWgaB7MbFAPs1cNeI35Eh1XzeGWPa2rtYC2dUiBrNmekVJBkim0VJNQ7YbXkuur3yBbhPhZix1z0n7k9n1JqxPcxK6tucFsuicP6kp9dPeEF23gClX26-9QbmukrpidEVgb6x4ysdi8c0JcSd1GQYnOTHpYngupZDn3NV-s1GCe5so8pVOrrOaPKVg5LXydJJkIb9tYKnZV1TGPophuk21rXLXZczrr6~GcwSYxIZw9uWVt8MNgCV6zh9H5edp~CWh-gA6cuCny-bACDvjQB~F7eluH5ooNGx-J7u4YPQsh3m-uIeMR8zhhZDQwxa81g__&Key-Pair-Id=APKAJLOHF5GGSLRBV4ZA, accessed 1-4-2022)//nikki

The elimination of Indigenous political difference Settler colonialism is a powerful contemporary force that continues to structure the Australian state’s relationship with Indigenous peoples and to obscure this structuring. It is distinct from postcolonialism, which refers to those large sections of the world that have undergone decolonization by European powers and now face highly mediated global systems of imperial control.8 Colonial theorizing has been dominated by scholars from post-colonial contexts, and this has led to ‘an oddly monolithic, and surprisingly unexamined, notion of colonialism’ that operates problematically in relation to Australia.9 Post-colonial concepts of colonialism assume a moment of transformative restructuring which has not occurred in settler colonies such as Australia, Canada and New Zealand. This locates ‘real’ colonialism in the past, and assumes that now policy must deal with the ‘legacies’, ‘heritage’ or ‘reverberative after math’ of colonialism in today’s world — a language that is powerfully present in Australian policy analysis.10 Patrick Wolfe identifies settler colonialism as operating through the ‘logic of elimination’. Settlers aim to replace Indigenous peoples on their land, not to simply exploit natural resources or extract surplus value from Indigenous labour.11 This means that ‘all the Indigenous person needs to do to get in the way of the settler colonial project is to stay at home’.12 Elimination can be physical, but need not be. It can also involve eliminating officially recognized Aboriginal people through ‘blood quotas’, or assimilating them into white society in ways that sever connections to their Aboriginality.13 This conception of elimination resonates with Indigenous observations about the particular disregard that Aboriginal peoples have been subject to in Australia. Norm Sheehan claims that (contra post-colonial theory) Aborigines have not been positioned as ‘the other’ but as ‘the non-other’.14 Irene Watson points to the continual ‘negation of Aboriginal identity’.15 Lyndon Murphy identifies all Australian social policy as ‘terra nullius social policy’ because ‘it operates from a premise of nonrecognition’.16 However, while many agree upon the operation of this eliminatory logic, its object is less clear.17 Is it Indigenous people, Indigenous culture or Indigenous connections to land? The reason that identifying the structural target of the settlercolonial logic of elimination is difficult may simply be that this target shifts. At different historical points, Australian policy-makers have defined different targets of elimination and mobilized the appro - priate policy strategies. While independent Aboriginal existence clearly poses some sort of problem for settler-colonial society, mem - bers of that society have always contested the level and aspects of Indigenous existence that it can tolerate and successfully absorb.18 Recognizing that this logic is always in operation, and is always directed at some aspect of Indigenous existence, seems to capture an important dimension of settler-colonial policy-making. Govern - ments since the 1800s have used the language of ‘the Aboriginal Problem’.19 While the definitions of the specific nature of this problem rapidly change, there is an underlying recognition that the existence and character of Aboriginal people constitute some sort of ongoing political difficulty and that ‘government, rather than citizens, is expected to “do something about it”’.20 Using this approach it is possible to identify patterns in policymaking without searching for the definitive structural target of the logic of elimination. Patrick Wolfe identifies the Indigenous connection to land as particularly threatening to settler-colonial society,21 and others have also traced recurring policy attempts to sever these connections.22 This is because in Western polities land is simultaneously a physical commercial resource and a marker of the boundaries of sovereign authority; land is also territory. Sovereignty is understood to mean supreme and indivisible authority over all within a territory.23 Therefore, the existence of independent or unknown Indigenous polities within territorial boundaries automatically exposes colonial sovereignty, and hence the contemporary settler-colonial project itself, as incomplete. However, we identify another aspect of Aboriginal existence regularly targeted for elimination, at once more limited and more expansive: Indigenous political difference.24 Indigenous people continue to be framed as a political problem, even in instances when they are permanently dispossessed of their traditional lands. Indigenous political difference that cannot be contained or expressed within the confines of the settler state cannot be tolerated by the settler-colonial project, even if this project can absorb some elements of Indigenous society, culture and even land ownership. There are a number of ways to eliminate Indigenous political difference: by physically eliminating Indigenous people; by severing their physical connections to lands that lie at the heart of their political systems; by breaking down families and communities; by drawing Indigenous polities into the state and reforming them; and by entering into explicit, contractual exchanges (such as treaties) which publicly erase the political distinctions between colonizer and colonized. Patrick Wolfe argues that, overall, ‘settler colonialism is an inclusive, land-centered project that coordinates a comprehensive range of agencies, from the metropolitan centre to the frontier encampment, with a view to eliminating indigenous societies’.25 However, identifying the target of the logic of elimination as political difference allows a more nuanced understanding of contem porary Australian Indigenous policy-making. A number of settler-colonial policy strategies, such as self-determination, work by investing resources in Indigenous peoples and cultures. There is a tendency among analysts towards identifying these in clusive policies as somehow less colonial than obviously assimilatory strategies such as the Northern Territory Intervention. In the years before the Intervention, for example, Wolfe claimed that settler colonialism in Australian seemed ‘mercifully’ to be in abeyance (although not thereby a thing of the past).26 Alternatively, we would argue that self-determination policies can constitute ‘the most successful practices’ of settler-colonial political assimilation.27 By separating Indigenous culture and community from Indigenous political existence, and supporting and absorbing the former while erasing the latter, self-determination and more radical liberal strategies, such as treaty-making, work towards the com - pletion of settler colonialism.28 By achieving definitive ‘reconciliation’ and permanently resolving questions of sovereign authority in the settler state’s favour, such strategies seek to erase the political differences of Indigenous peoples and pursue the (perhaps impossible) project of fully consummating settler ownership and legitimacy. However, we commonly understand these to be decolonizing political projects, and focus our critical attention on more easily identifiable colonial ‘re-eruptions’ such as the Northern Territory Intervention. If settler colonialism truly is a structure not an event, identifying Indigenous political difference as the target of the logic of elimination allows us to trace its presence throughout all phases of contemporary Australian Indigenous policy-making. Emphasizing this analytical shift from Indigenous society to Indigenous political difference partly comes from our attempt to extend the debate on settler colonialism into political theory and policy analysis. Mainstream Australian political scholars have generally avoided the productive (if sometimes acrimonious) internal debate around their own implication in Indigenous–settler politics that has occurred in other fields, such as anthropology.29 Here, we rearticulate settler-colonial concepts in the terms of our own discipline of political studies — sovereignty, polity, policymaking, liberalism and consent — as an invitation to other political scholars to consider the ramifications of the settler-colonial model.

2022 Michigan Kritik
Settler Colonialism K––K Lab › Links––General › L––Fiat

Settler colonialism operates through temporal technologies of linearity that relegate indigeneity to “primitivity” and “pastness” while locating the “solution”, i.e. a radical break from the incomplete conditions of colonialism, as a vanishing endpoint that never arrives – interrogating settler timelines that infiltrate the structure of debate is a prior question to the post-fiat consequences of the 1AC.

Strakosch and Macoun ’12 -- Elizabeth Strakosch is a senior lecturer in public policy and governance at the University of Queensland, and her work focuses on Indigenous policy, colonialism, political relationships, bureaucracy and new public management. Her research explores the connections between political relationships and policy systems in Australia and other settler contexts. contexts. Alissa Macoun is a Lecturer in the School of Justice at Queensland University of Technology. She is interested in the politics of race and contemporary colonialism. (Elizabeth Strakosch and Alissa Macoun, 8-14-2012, "The vanishing endpoint of settler https://d1wqtxts1xzle7.cloudfront.net/30618693/Arena_Journal_Vanishing_Endpoint-with-cover-page-v2.pdf?Expires=1641292909&Signature=ChuVXBZ8Rm1bur5JH2dQc5JWgaB7MbFAPs1cNeI35Eh1XzeGWPa2rtYC2dUiBrNmekVJBkim0VJNQ7YbXkuur3yBbhPhZix1z0n7k9n1JqxPcxK6tucFsuicP6kp9dPeEF23gClX26-9QbmukrpidEVgb6x4ysdi8c0JcSd1GQYnOTHpYngupZDn3NV-s1GCe5so8pVOrrOaPKVg5LXydJJkIb9tYKnZV1TGPophuk21rXLXZczrr6~GcwSYxIZw9uWVt8MNgCV6zh9H5edp~CWh-gA6cuCny-bACDvjQB~F7eluH5ooNGx-J7u4YPQsh3m-uIeMR8zhhZDQwxa81g__&Key-Pair-Id=APKAJLOHF5GGSLRBV4ZA, accessed 1-4-2022)//nikki

Firstly, Australian settler colonialism holds on to the postcolonial image of a single, transformative moment of a radical political break marking decolonization. While its exact nature is not specified, this change will somehow draw a line under the problem atic colonial relationships of the past and mark the nation’s movement into a newly certain future. Settler colonialism circles around this moment, variously locating it in the past, the present and the future. And yet, in settler-colonial formations, no such radical break ever seems to come — ‘invasion is a structure not an event’. The vanishing endpoint that is continually pursued is, in effect, the moment of colonial completion. That is when the settler society will have fully replaced Indigenous societies on their land, and naturalized this replacement. Secondly, the more widely known temporal narrative of postcolonialism is deployed within settler colonialism in ways that assist this project of full colonization. The settler-colonial project identifies its own endpoint with the moment of decolonization. However, decolonization and settler-colonial completion have very different political effects. The linear narrative of colonization–decoloniza - tion–post-colonialism reflects the very specific histories of subcontinental Asia and Africa. Applying this post-colonial story of linear progress to the settler-colonial project is not only inaccurate, it actually assists the settler-colonial project by obscuring the very different transformative moment to which it aspires. Merging the moment of decolonization and the moment of colonial completion, these narratives can mobilize conservative and progressive settler voices towards colonial goals. Overall, we seek to open up discussion of temporal and teleological narratives within settler-colonial policy-making, and suggest that we need to contest our currently unacknowledged stories of the colonial future. By seeking resolution through extinguishment, these narratives tend to foreclose more productive debates about how settler and Indigenous people might live together differently across time. The first section of this article considers the relationship between settler colonialism and time. It gives a brief account of settler colonial - ism, its relationship to post-colonialism and its sovereign goals. We then consider the limited scholarship dealing with time as a political phenomenon, and argue that political temporality needs to be denat - u ralized and interrogated. The final part of this section explores the temporal technologies of settler-colonial political formations. The second section of this article is an attempt to trace some of these ideas in contemporary Australian Indigenous policy. For heuristic purposes, we identify three recent policy approaches: reconciliation, neo-liberal contractualism and intervention. Each of these phases tells particular stories about the unfolding of settler colonialism through time. We aim to identify and interrogate these stories in order to open up a more focused discussion on the role of political temporality in our colonial present.