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2022 Michigan Counterplan
Future Gens CP › Solvency › 2NC – Con-Con – AT: No International Modelling

[1] Amending sends a powerful and clear global signal

Sarah P. Herlihy 6, J.D. from Chicago-Kent College of Law, “Amending the Natural Born Citizen Requirement: Globalization as The Impetus and The Obstacle”, Chicago-Kent Law Review, 81 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 275, Lexis

7. The Signal this Amendment Would Send to the Rest of the World

Americans may oppose a Constitutional amendment because of the international perception that it would create. Even though the increase of globalization dictates that America should amend the natural born citizen requirement, Americans may oppose a Constitutional amendment because this type of change would signal to the rest of the world that America is willing to be one country of many and that Americans are interested in becoming part of a global world culture. Commentators refer to the symbolic nature of the law as the "expressive function of law" and recognize that Constitutional amendments may have a dual effect. For example, a Constitutional amendment to ban flag burning may not only deter people from burning American flags but also signal how important patriotism is to America. Similarly, opponents of a Constitutional amendment to amend the natural born citizen clause may believe that such an amendment would have dual effects. In addition to allowing naturalized citizens to become president, this amendment would signal to the global community that Americans want to become integrated with the rest of the world and that Americans no longer feel the need to be the leading country in the world but are content in being on equal footing with every other country. Although some Americans may believe that the expressive function of a Constitutional amendment is a positive signal to send, United States foreign [*296] policy indicates otherwise. Specifically, the United States government, led by the President who is elected by the people, takes great care in preserving its position as the world's only superpower. In light of this consistent policy, it is doubtful that Americans will support an amendment to the presidential eligibility clause because this could send the wrong signal to the rest of the world.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
Future Gens CP › Solvency › 2NC – Con-Con – AT: Courts Overturns

Amendments are key – judicial action is often incoherent

Vermeule 4 (Adrian, Professor of Law – Harvard Law School, “Constitutional Amendments and the Constitutional Common Law,” Public Law and Legal Theory Working Paper No. 73, University of Chicago Law School, September, )

I shall not question (iii) here, although there is much to be said in praise of incoherence in law, especially in constitutional law. Good coherence is better than incoherence, but bad coherence is worse than incoherence; coherence raises the stakes of constitutional decisionmaking by propagating either good or bad decisions through the legal system. Nor shall I question the dubious historical premise of the argument—that the framers designed a coherent constitutional scheme, as opposed to aggregating competing values and preferences, through horse-trading, into a patchwork document. Those issues aside, the rationale offered in (ii) exemplifies the nirvana illusion that underpins the generic case against amendments. The comparison between the framers’ globally coherent design, on the one hand, and piecemeal amendment on the other is not the right comparison to make. The principal substitute for formal amendment is not formal constitutional conventions, but judicial updating of constitutional law through flexible interpretation. The question, then, is whether piecemeal amendment produces greater incoherence than piecemeal judicial updating, carried out in particular litigated cases, by judicial institutions whose agenda is partly set by outside actors.

There is little reason to believe the latter process more conducive to coherence than the former, and much evidence to suggest that judicial decisionmaking produces a great deal of doctrinal incoherence. We should disavow any implicit picture of judgemade constitutional law as an intricately crafted web of principles whose extension and weight has been reciprocally adjusted. Precisely because judicial updating requires overrulings, reinterpretations, and other breaks in the web of prior doctrine, a system that relies on judicial updating to supply constitutional change—the system that the generic case tends to produce—generates internal pressures towards incoherent doctrine. Constitutional adjudication in America, let us recall, has produced both Plessy v. Ferguson and Brown v. Board, both Lochner v. New York and West Coast Hotel v. Parrish, both Myers v. United States and Humphrey’s Executor, both Dennis v. United States and Brandenburg v. Ohio, both Wickard v. Filburn and Lopez v. United States, both Bowers v. Hardwick and Lawrence v. Texas. Whatever else can be said about this judicial work-product, and whatever other justifications can be given for judge-made constitutional law, deep inner coherence does not seem either a plausible description of the terrain or even a plausible regulative ideal for the system.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
Future Gens CP › Solvency › 2NC – Con-Con – AT: Courts Overturns

Constitutional convention solves, remains limited, and spurs congressional follow-on.

Thomas H. Neale, 3-29-2016 - Specialist in American National Government at the Congressional Research Service; “The Article V Convention to Propose Constitutional Amendments: Contemporary Issues for Congress,” Congressional Research Service, https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R42589.pdf

The Limited Convention The concept of a limited convention has commanded considerable support in the debate over the Article V alternative. A range of constitutional scholars maintains that, contrary to Charles Black’s assertion, quoted earlier, a convention may be limited to a specific issue or issues contained in state applications; in fact, some observers maintain that it must be so limited. A fundamental assumption from their viewpoint is that the framers did not contemplate a general or large-scale revision of the Constitution when they drafted Article V. The late Senator Sam Ervin, who supported the Article V alternative and championed advance congressional planning for a convention, expounded this point of view: ... there is strong evidence that what the members of the [original constitutional] convention were concerned with ... was the power to make specific amendments.... [The] provision in article V for two exceptions to the amendment power42 underlines the notion that the convention anticipated a specific amendment or amendments rather than general revision.43 Another commentator, championing state authority in the convention issue, asserted that the founders’ intention in establishing the alternative amendment process was to check the ability of Congress to impede proposal of an amendment that enjoyed widespread support. He claimed that a convention limited to an issue specified by the states in their applications would be constitutional, but that a convention could be limited by the states, but not by Congress: Congress may not impose its will on the convention.... The purpose of the Convention Clause is to allow the States to circumvent a recalcitrant Congress. The Convention Clause, therefore, must allow the States [but not Congress] to limit a convention in order to accomplish this purpose.44 The primacy of the states in this viewpoint thus suggests that a convention could be open and general, or limited, depending on the applications of the legislatures. For its part, Congress has historically embraced the limited convention. When considering this question in the past, it has claimed the authority to call the convention, but also asserted a constitutional duty to respect the state application process, and to limit the subject of amendments to the subject areas cited therein. For instance, in 1984, the Senate Judiciary Committee claimed Congress’s power both to set and to enforce limits on the subject or subjects considered by an Article V Convention to those included in the state petitions. The committee’s report on the Constitutional Convention Implementation Act of 1984 (S. 119, 98th Congress), stated: Under this legislation, it is the States themselves, operating through the Congress, which are ultimately responsible for imposing subject-matter limitations upon the Article V Convention.... the States are authorized to apply for a convention “for the purpose of proposing one or more specific amendments.” Indeed, that is the only kind of convention within the scope of the present legislation, although there is no intention to preclude a call for a “general” or “unlimited” convention.45 Twenty-six years later, a 2010 study by the Goldwater Institute reached a similar conclusion. Examining the contemporary documents from the time of the 1787 Constitutional Convention, author Robert Natelson asserted that the founders anticipated the Article V Convention device would serve chiefly as an agent of the states. The states would set a convention’s agenda by specifying the questions it would address, with the convention bound to respect the limits of this mandate.46 Congress, in this viewpoint, facilitates the will of the people acting through their state legislatures: if they call for a convention to consider one or more specific policy proposals, then Congress is obliged to call for an appropriately limited convention. Conversely, if the states were to apply for a general convention, then, by this reasoning, Congress would respect their intentions.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
Future Gens CP › Solvency › 2NC – Con-Con – AT: Courts Overturns

Amendments guarantee enforcement – no chance of circumvention

Denning and Vile 2 (Brannon P., Assistant Professor of Law – Southern Illinois University School of Law, and John R., Political Science Department Chair – Middle Tennessee State University, “The Relevance of Constitutional Amendments: A Response to David Strauss,” Tulane Law Review, November, 77 Tul. L. Rev. 247, Lexis)

D. Legitimization The Article V process is, as the Framers intended, rigorous. The supermajority provisions for both proposal and ratification almost always guarantee that additions will not be made to the Constitution without both deep and broad support. Though some have criticized the necessity of such supermajorities, n127 holding additions to the Constitution in abeyance until it is clear that support is broad generally prevents populous regions from dominating less populous ones. This, in turn, allows the amendment to become part of the Constitution with a near-conclusive presumption of legitimacy. This legitimacy, then, helps free the other branches (courts, for example) to enforce it vigorously; indeed, such enforcement would likely be expected after an amendment makes it through Article V's arduous process. And if, after popular expectations were raised through the debates over proposal and ratification, the amendment is not enforced, institutions responsible for the foot-dragging may again face costs for evasion. This legitimization element is so crucial that the examples Strauss cites of amendments that, he argues, did not do anything immediately (the Reconstruction Amendments) or are not likely to have a significant effect despite their eventual ratification (the Twenty-Seventh Amendment), n128 could be cited as proof of what [*279] happens when attempts are made to short-circuit (or play games with) Article V's procedural requirements. n129 E. The Publicity Function of Written Amendments Proposals for constitutional amendment inevitably attract publicity. The debates in Congress publicize the change and allow a forum for proponents and opponents of the change to make their case both to members of Congress and to those who will eventually be called upon to ratify the amendment, if passed. Even amendments that Strauss would characterize as "do-nothing" amendments (the Twenty-Seventh Amendment, for example) received the attention of Congress and the press n130 that only the most dramatic informal constitutional changes do. The educative function of the debate aside, if proposed and ratified, a formal amendment undeniably changes the Constitution in one significant respect: it adds language to the Constitution. Thus, to every person who bothers to look at a copy of the Constitution, the change will be noticed. This textual referent, being available and apparent, enables more people to understand the fact that there has been constitutional change and to take note of it than if the change comes informally, as the culmination of doctrinal evolution in the Supreme Court or by accretions that harden into custom in the other branches. The publicity accompanying the change may, in fact, increase public expectations that the change will be honored by the other branches, raising the costs of evasion or under-enforcement. n131

2022 Michigan Counterplan
Future Gens CP › Solvency › 2NC – Con-Con – AT: Congress Overturns

Constitutional convention solves, remains limited, and spurs congressional follow-on.

Thomas H. Neale, 3-29-2016 - Specialist in American National Government at the Congressional Research Service; “The Article V Convention to Propose Constitutional Amendments: Contemporary Issues for Congress,” Congressional Research Service, https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R42589.pdf

The Limited Convention The concept of a limited convention has commanded considerable support in the debate over the Article V alternative. A range of constitutional scholars maintains that, contrary to Charles Black’s assertion, quoted earlier, a convention may be limited to a specific issue or issues contained in state applications; in fact, some observers maintain that it must be so limited. A fundamental assumption from their viewpoint is that the framers did not contemplate a general or large-scale revision of the Constitution when they drafted Article V. The late Senator Sam Ervin, who supported the Article V alternative and championed advance congressional planning for a convention, expounded this point of view: ... there is strong evidence that what the members of the [original constitutional] convention were concerned with ... was the power to make specific amendments.... [The] provision in article V for two exceptions to the amendment power42 underlines the notion that the convention anticipated a specific amendment or amendments rather than general revision.43 Another commentator, championing state authority in the convention issue, asserted that the founders’ intention in establishing the alternative amendment process was to check the ability of Congress to impede proposal of an amendment that enjoyed widespread support. He claimed that a convention limited to an issue specified by the states in their applications would be constitutional, but that a convention could be limited by the states, but not by Congress: Congress may not impose its will on the convention.... The purpose of the Convention Clause is to allow the States to circumvent a recalcitrant Congress. The Convention Clause, therefore, must allow the States [but not Congress] to limit a convention in order to accomplish this purpose.44 The primacy of the states in this viewpoint thus suggests that a convention could be open and general, or limited, depending on the applications of the legislatures. For its part, Congress has historically embraced the limited convention. When considering this question in the past, it has claimed the authority to call the convention, but also asserted a constitutional duty to respect the state application process, and to limit the subject of amendments to the subject areas cited therein. For instance, in 1984, the Senate Judiciary Committee claimed Congress’s power both to set and to enforce limits on the subject or subjects considered by an Article V Convention to those included in the state petitions. The committee’s report on the Constitutional Convention Implementation Act of 1984 (S. 119, 98th Congress), stated: Under this legislation, it is the States themselves, operating through the Congress, which are ultimately responsible for imposing subject-matter limitations upon the Article V Convention.... the States are authorized to apply for a convention “for the purpose of proposing one or more specific amendments.” Indeed, that is the only kind of convention within the scope of the present legislation, although there is no intention to preclude a call for a “general” or “unlimited” convention.45 Twenty-six years later, a 2010 study by the Goldwater Institute reached a similar conclusion. Examining the contemporary documents from the time of the 1787 Constitutional Convention, author Robert Natelson asserted that the founders anticipated the Article V Convention device would serve chiefly as an agent of the states. The states would set a convention’s agenda by specifying the questions it would address, with the convention bound to respect the limits of this mandate.46 Congress, in this viewpoint, facilitates the will of the people acting through their state legislatures: if they call for a convention to consider one or more specific policy proposals, then Congress is obliged to call for an appropriately limited convention. Conversely, if the states were to apply for a general convention, then, by this reasoning, Congress would respect their intentions.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
Future Gens CP › Solvency › 2NC – Con-Con – AT: Congress Overturns

Amendments guarantee enforcement – no chance of circumvention

Denning and Vile 2 (Brannon P., Assistant Professor of Law – Southern Illinois University School of Law, and John R., Political Science Department Chair – Middle Tennessee State University, “The Relevance of Constitutional Amendments: A Response to David Strauss,” Tulane Law Review, November, 77 Tul. L. Rev. 247, Lexis)

D. Legitimization The Article V process is, as the Framers intended, rigorous. The supermajority provisions for both proposal and ratification almost always guarantee that additions will not be made to the Constitution without both deep and broad support. Though some have criticized the necessity of such supermajorities, n127 holding additions to the Constitution in abeyance until it is clear that support is broad generally prevents populous regions from dominating less populous ones. This, in turn, allows the amendment to become part of the Constitution with a near-conclusive presumption of legitimacy. This legitimacy, then, helps free the other branches (courts, for example) to enforce it vigorously; indeed, such enforcement would likely be expected after an amendment makes it through Article V's arduous process. And if, after popular expectations were raised through the debates over proposal and ratification, the amendment is not enforced, institutions responsible for the foot-dragging may again face costs for evasion. This legitimization element is so crucial that the examples Strauss cites of amendments that, he argues, did not do anything immediately (the Reconstruction Amendments) or are not likely to have a significant effect despite their eventual ratification (the Twenty-Seventh Amendment), n128 could be cited as proof of what [*279] happens when attempts are made to short-circuit (or play games with) Article V's procedural requirements. n129 E. The Publicity Function of Written Amendments Proposals for constitutional amendment inevitably attract publicity. The debates in Congress publicize the change and allow a forum for proponents and opponents of the change to make their case both to members of Congress and to those who will eventually be called upon to ratify the amendment, if passed. Even amendments that Strauss would characterize as "do-nothing" amendments (the Twenty-Seventh Amendment, for example) received the attention of Congress and the press n130 that only the most dramatic informal constitutional changes do. The educative function of the debate aside, if proposed and ratified, a formal amendment undeniably changes the Constitution in one significant respect: it adds language to the Constitution. Thus, to every person who bothers to look at a copy of the Constitution, the change will be noticed. This textual referent, being available and apparent, enables more people to understand the fact that there has been constitutional change and to take note of it than if the change comes informally, as the culmination of doctrinal evolution in the Supreme Court or by accretions that harden into custom in the other branches. The publicity accompanying the change may, in fact, increase public expectations that the change will be honored by the other branches, raising the costs of evasion or under-enforcement. n131

2022 Michigan Counterplan
Future Gens CP › Solvency › 2NC – AT: Illegal/Unconstitutional

[3] Independent oversight is legitimate and constitutional

Smith 15 [Graham Smith, Foundation for Democracy and Sustainable Development. The Democratic Case for an Office for Future Generations. April 2015. ] Note: OFG = Offices for Future Generations

It is a common refrain that democracies tend to privilege the short-term. Institutional solutions are needed to ameliorate such myopic tendencies. Offices for Future Generations (OFGs) - (quasi) independent bodies charged with promoting long-term thinking and the interests of future generations in the political process - are currently the focus of political interest at different levels of governance.

The Hungarian Ombudsman for Future Generations is the most well known example, the Israeli’s recently decommissioned their equivalent body and a Commissioner for Future Generations has nearly completed its legislative progress at the time of writing in Wales. Such an Office need not be restricted to the level of the nation state: FDSD has itself actively participated in debates about the creation of a UN High Commissioner for Future Generations (FDSD/World Future Council, 2012).

2022 Michigan Counterplan
Future Gens CP › Solvency › 2NC – AT: Illegal/Unconstitutional

Using an amendment solves debates over constitutionality and legitimacy challenges.

Tushnet 5 [Mark Tushnet, Felix Frankfurter Visiting Professor of Law, Harvard Law School; Carmack Waterhouse Professor of Constitutional Law, Georgetown University Law Center. Controlling Executive Power in the War on Terrorism. Harvard Law Review, 2005. Hein Online]

Perhaps we could be persuaded that this new institution’s design did indeed conform to the constraints on institutional innovation imposed by the existing Constitution. I am sure, though, that the discussion of the proposal’s soundness as a matter of policy would be polluted by discussions of whether the proposal, if enacted, would be constitutional.38 Those in favor of such an institution on policy grounds might find themselves arguing — perhaps somewhat disingenuously — that the innovation is indeed compatible with the Constitution. We could avoid such distractions if the proposal were cast as a constitutional amendment.39

The amendment process is a difficult one, of course, and the problems we face may seem so pressing that they need to be addressed immediately, such as through litigation under the existing Constitution. As I have observed elsewhere, however, at the time of this writing Jos£ Padilla remains incarcerated, uncharged and with only a single trial judge having evaluated the grounds for his detention, nearly three years after he was taken into custody.40 It is not obvious to me that the problems posed by Padilla’s detention would have been solved less promptly had we begun to consider constitutional amendments to deal with his circumstances — and, more generally, with the design of institutions to ensure the responsible exercise of power in the war on terrorism — as soon as he was detained. Waiting for the existing Constitution to solve the problems thrust on the nation, that is, may take more time than amending the Constitution.41

2022 Michigan Counterplan
Future Gens CP › Solvency › 2NC – AT: Exec Ignores

A fourth body can easily regulate the executive power through binding rules, but requires independence from existing branches

Tushnet 5 [Mark Tushnet, Felix Frankfurter Visiting Professor of Law, Harvard Law School; Carmack Waterhouse Professor of Constitutional Law, Georgetown University Law Center. Controlling Executive Power in the War on Terrorism. Harvard Law Review, 2005. Hein Online]

I confess that I am not particularly creative in imagining alternative institutional designs that would ensure that power be exercised wisely under modern circumstances. Simply to illustrate what I have in mind, though, suppose we engaged in a detailed policy analysis and concluded that it would be helpful to have a new institution to supervise modern exercises of military power, an institution that drew on the different forms of expertise now lodged in Congress, the Executive, and the judiciary. Perhaps we would want to design an institution in which a group of judges, legislators, military officers, and civilians elected by the nation as a whole promulgated legally binding rules for the conduct of military engagements — without the intervention of Congress or the President — and could sometimes issue immediately binding orders to U.S. citizens, enforceable by contempt sanctions imposed by the new institution itself. The constitutional problems associated with such an institution jump off the page: the Incompatibility Clause, Article III, the nondelegation doctrine, and much more. These constitutional problems, of course, would be largely independent of any normative policy arguments regarding such a proposal.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
Future Gens CP › Solvency › 2NC – AT: Delay

The most pressing problems are intangible – arguments about the immediacy and certainty of their impact are precisely why you should default to protecting future generations

Boston 14 [Jonathan Boston, Professor of Public Policy, School of Government, Victoria University of Wellington, Fulbright Fellow, American University. Governing for the Future: How to bring the long-term into short-term political focus. November 5, 2014. https://www.american.edu/spa/cep/upload/jonathan-boston-lecture-american-university.pdf]

Similarly, particular kinds of policy problems pose especially serious challenges for prudent long-term governance. The most difficult problems are those exhibiting one or more of the following characteristics: high complexity; low predictability and causal certainty; spatially dispersed effects; impacts that are mostly experienced in the future and/or are largely invisible and intangible (thus reducing the apparent urgency to respond); impacts that fall predominantly on politically weak or marginalized groups; and, as noted earlier, problems which require investment-type solutions (i.e. up-front costs are required in order to secure long-term benefits). Human-induced climate change exhibits most, if not all, of these features, which helps account for the difficulty of securing prudent policy responses. But many policy problems also exhibit investment-type payoff structures, thus creating a temptation for inter-generational buckpassing. Such temptations will be all the greater when the short-term costs are direct, specific, certain, tangible and visible while the long-term benefits are more generalized, less certain and more intangible.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
Future Gens CP › Solvency › 2NC – AT: Certainty

Amendments solve durable legal change -- they’re superior to legislation– our evidence is also comparative

Jackson 15 (Vicki, Thurgood Marshall Professor of Constitutional Law, Harvard Law School, The (myth of un)amendability of the US Constitution and the democratic component of constitutionalism, International Journal of Constitutional Law, Volume 13, Issue 3, July 2015, Pages 575–605, )

3.2. Arguments in favor of amendments as response to judicial decisions I move now to arguments in favor of considering amendment as a response to judicial decisions that seem importantly wrong. While there are reasons to be concerned about too frequent amendment, so, too, are there reasons to be concerned about too infrequent use of the Article V amending power. There are some significant benefits of amendment, as compared to reliance on adjudication (or ordinary legislation), to respond to a perceived need for legal change. First, constitutional amendment focuses more political attention on the object of the amendment once it gains momentum. In its early phases, an amending process focuses proponents’ attention on identifying the constitutional principle at stake. As it moves forward, and positions are articulated, areas of consensus on possible legislative solutions may emerge; greater identification of sources of opposition will also emerge; and—at least in theory—a better deliberative process can result. This process is likely to be more costly than the process of adjudication, or of ordinary legislation. But precisely because of its more diffuse and iterative processes, constitutional change by virtue of the amendment process of Article V may be more likely to be treated as final by those opposed and more likely to endure than contested judicial decisions. 99 (For these reasons, some scholars have suggested that even though the initial decision costs of adjudication are lower than of amendment, over the longer run, amendment may end up being a more efficient way to assure enduring constitutional change. 100 ) To be sure, the more incremental processes of constitutional adjudication—what Heather Gerken refers to as “informal constitutional amendments”—have some countervailing advantages, including their open-ness to continued contestation about meaning. 101 But just as not everything needs to be resolved by an authoritative text, so too not everything needs to be as open-textured as adjudicated constitutionalism may tend to be. Second, amendment in response to judicial error is an important check on the judiciary, particularly given the unlimited tenure for the Article III judiciary and the absence of a mandatory retirement age. Retired Justice John Paul Stevens recently called for six different amendments, each to respond to six lines of judicial decisions he argues are in need of correction. 102 The role of amendment in maintaining the democratic roots of a constitution may be more important in a country like the United States, where great stability in judicial attitude can persist across multiple presidential elections, depending on contingencies of aging, than in countries with more regular turnover in their constitutional courts. And correction by amendment is, arguably, more consistent with the rule of law and with the legitimacy of courts than judicial overruling. 103 Opponents of amendment seem to assume that judicial overruling poses no threat to the rule of law; but I am not sure why this would be so: any authorized changes from existing rules—whether by amendment, statute, or new judicial decisions—holds some threat to stability and rule of law values. 104 Third, as Adrian Vermeule has argued, it is sometimes a benefit that broader ranges of people participate in determining fundamental legal constraints. 105 Legislators, themselves, are likely to be representative of a broader range of views than the nine justices who sit on the US Supreme Court, thereby providing more “public” involvement even in the proposal for amendment. 106 Moreover, the US amending process draws on a much wider range of the public than those who can participate in litigation, and offers different kinds of opportunities for participation than does participation in social movements. Moreover, the proposal of an amendment by Congress and subsequent responses in the states—even if not in the end sufficient to ratify—may influence jurisprudence in directions similar to those of the amendment itself. 107 Adjudicated results may be unstable unless supported by political mobilizations; thus, adjudicatory decisions are likely to work best when they harmonize with more broadly held views. Even unsuccessful amendment proposals can sometimes shift constitutional understandings: the unsuccessful fight for the Equal Rights Amendment (ERA) (first introduced in 1923, but not sent out to the states by Congress until 1972), may have contributed to—or could be seen as of a piece with—social movements leading to changed understandings of gender that underlay the Court’s change in equal protection jurisprudence to provide a substantial part—though probably not the whole—of what the adoption of the ERA would have accomplished. 108 Reva Siegel has drawn attention to the way in which ERA proponents envisaged that the political mobilization for the amendment could have positive effects on adjudicated understandings of gender equality. 109 Thus, focusing only on the difficulty of formal amendment may understate the capacity of those amending procedures to influence constitutional development even when the formal requisites are not met. Finally, some use of the amending process would be consistent with recognizing the idea of constitutional imperfection and the roots of the Constitution in more active forms of democratic consent. 110 The amendment provisions of the Constitution represent an important reminder that instruments made by human beings are imperfect (as may be judicial decisions interpreting those provisions), and of the need for humility about quality of existing law. Thus, “absent flagrant disregard for constitutional language, some amendments will be required as defects become apparent, or changes are desired.” 111 Some use of the amending process should be possible without threatening public attachment or affection towards the Constitution as a whole. 112 Refreshing the Constitution, through resort to amendments to clarify and put into the basic law a fundamental public norm—possibly, for example, towards reducing the role of highly concentrated forms of wealth in elections—might even increase public attachment, especially as those amendments are announced and solemnized through appropriate formalities. 113 This is not to suggest that judicial development and change of constitutional law over time is illegitimate or anti-democratic. The legitimacy of judicial review is beyond question at this point in the United States—legally, morally, and sociologically. But judicial review is connected through much more indirect processes to developing public views about constitutional values, and long time lags may exist depending on accidents of the appointment process and medical histories and life spans of those appointed. And while the standard interpretive approaches of constitutional law have over time looked not only at text, original meaning, and precedent but also at developing values, historic practice, and pragmatic consequences, 114 the application of constitutional law is a place where tradition meets present needs; by virtue of its embeddedness in a common law system of adjudication judicial review is likely to proceed incrementally; the past can thus prevail over present understandings for long periods. It is not an indictment of judicial review to suggest that some direct use of the tools of political democracy—i.e., voting on proposed constitutional changes in Congress and in the states—is valuable in sustaining a healthy balance among institutions and processes in the authoritative articulation of constitutional law. 115 This conclusion is reinforced by considering more generally the elements of constitutional legitimacy.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
Future Gens CP › Solvency › 2NC – AT: Certainty

States are looking to incorporate future generations in water law now but only the counterplan’s codification legitimizes it and spills over

Spijkers 21 [Otto Spijkers, Professor of International Law at Wuhan University’s China Institute of Boundary and Ocean Studies (CIBOS) as well as its Research Institute of Environmental Law (RIEL) and Founding Staff Member of its International Water Law Academy (IWLA). He is also a member of the Committee on the Role of International Law in Sustainable Natural Resource Management for Development of the International Law Association. “Equity across Generations in Implementing International Law on Water.” Future Trends. (2021). In M. Cordonier Segger, M. Szabó, & A. Harrington (Eds.), Intergenerational Justice in Sustainable Development Treaty Implementation: Advancing Future Generations Rights through National Institutions (Treaty Implementation for Sustainable Development, pp. 703-791). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.]

This chapter first examined the relationship between the principle of intergenerational equity and the two most fundamental principles of international water law – the no harm rule and the principle of equitable utilization – as reflected in the UN Watercourses Convention. It then looked at how this relationship between intergenerational equity and water law’s foundational principles played out in specific agreements regulating a particular transboundary watercourse. Many of these agreements use the Watercourses Convention’s proclamation of the principles as starting point, but then add more intergenerational elements to them. It appears that States are more and more confident in doing so, and thus the principles slowly evolve into more sustainable, intergenerational versions of themselves.

We also see this evolution in domestic law and policies. All examples referred to above have attempted to find a way to share the burdens and benefits of freshwater resource management and utilization among the present and future generations. The exact formulation of this balance differs. Sometimes the present generation has an obligation to ensure that future generations have at least as many resources and opportunities as the present generation currently has. Sometimes the present generation is asked only to keep the interests of future generations in mind when utilizing the freshwater resources. Very few legal frameworks give a role to representatives of future generations as participants. It is more common for the present generation to simply accept an obligation for itself to take into account the interests of future generations, without giving the latter any means to ensure compliance with this commitment. If we take all these examples together, we find an interesting laboratory of intellectual experiments, most of them of very recent date, which may provide a source of inspiration. The question of how to ensure compliance with these water laws remains beyond the scope of this chapter, but the next step is to faithfully carry out those plans and to respect the commitments that have been made to present and future generations.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
Future Gens CP › Solvency › 2NC – AT: Certainty

DURABILITY – only the cp solves solvency in the future – inevitable political pressures down the road causes circumvention and undermine signal of durability

Boston 14 [Jonathan Boston, Professor of Public Policy, School of Government, Victoria University of Wellington, Fulbright Fellow, American University. Governing for the Future: How to bring the long-term into short-term political focus. November 5, 2014. https://www.american.edu/spa/cep/upload/jonathan-boston-lecture-american-university.pdf]

To compound matters, the long-term governance problem has two of the three characteristics associated with ‘super-wicked’ problems, at least as defined by Richard Lazarus (2009). For one thing, those endeavouring to solve the problem are also amongst the very people who are causing it. Hence, they are likely to face contradictory pressures. For another, there is no inter-temporal authority or governance structure enduring across multiple generations that is able to enforce lasting solutions, ensure that costly long-term policy investments are properly implemented or hold recalcitrant governments to account. Accordingly, whatever policy farsightedness the current generation of policy-makers may be able to muster at any given juncture they face two related, ongoing challenges. First, there the long-term assurance or compliance problem: how can policy makers ensure that their successors also exercise farsightedness? Second, there is the problem of‘dynamic inconsistency’ or ‘time inconsistency’ - that is, a person’s preferences in Time 1 may diverge from their preferences in Time 2, and their future actions may undermine their earlier decisions. In terms of policy consistency, how can political leaders bind their future selves to remain committed to a prudent long-term strategy, especially if there are powerful, electorally-driven temptations to defect? If such problems cannot be overcome, there is an obvious risk that prudent, long-term policy investments will not deliver their hoped-for gains. This risk, in turn, poses a further challenge: what is the logic of making costly policy investments today if the long-term payoffs are highly uncertain? After all, there is little point making hard choices in the short-term if there is little prospect of future benefits. The immediate question posed by such a dilemma is whether policy-makers can bind themselves and their successors in order to increase the chances of desirable long-term goals being achieved. Is some kind of commitment device available and, if so, what particular sort of device might be most appropriate and effective? I will return to this matter shortly.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
Future Gens CP › Solvency › 2NC – AT: Certainty

INTERNATIONAL SIGNAL -- Basing policy on protections for future generations is unique

MRF 17 [Mary Robinson Foundation, a centre for thought leadership, education and advocacy on the struggle to secure global justice for those people vulnerable to the impacts of climate change who are usually forgotten – the poor, the disempowered and the marginalised across the world. Global Guardians: A voice for future generations. Position Paper | Third Edition – April 2017. https://www.mrfcj.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/08/Global-Guardians-A-Voice-for-Future-Generations-April-2017.pdf]

Intergenerational equity, understood as fairness between generations, is a universal concept across the world and across cultures. It is a principle that informs constitutions, international treaties, economies, religious beliefs, traditions and customs1. Sustainable development is grounded in the concept of fairness between generations, meaning that the needs of present generations are met without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their needs2. Within the UN System, the need to safeguard the wellbeing of future generations is well established and is recognised as a guiding principle in many fora including the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development (1992), the Declaration of the UN Conference on Sustainable Development (2012), the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development (2015) and the Paris Agreement on Climate Change (2015). In total, the needs of future generations are recognised in as many as 203 UN General Assembly Resolutions3. Despite these commitments, there is currently no mechanism in the UN system through which the needs of future generations is represented in decision making processes.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
Future Gens CP › Solvency › 2NC – AT: 4th Mech Specifics

Randomly-selected mini-publics – they encourage citizen deliberation to challenge actions that harm future generations – there’s plenty of evidence that outperforms existing institutions

Smith 15 [Graham Smith, Foundation for Democracy and Sustainable Development. The Democratic Case for an Office for Future Generations. April 2015. ] Note: OFG = Offices for Future Generations

A second form of democratization could be specifically constituted mini-publics that enable citizens to play a deliberative role in investigating and judging the veracity of such civic complaints. Contestatory courts (in the language of Pettit) do not have to be the sole preserve of legal or technical specialists appointed by the OFG. There is plenty of evidence that citizens are capable and willing to deal with complex issues within deliberative forums. Randomly-selected mini-publics in particular typically outperform more traditional political institutions in terms of orientating decision making towards the long-term (Smith, 2003; 2009; Hobson and Neimeyer, 2011; Parkhill etal, 2013; Mackenzie and Warren, 2012).

2022 Michigan Counterplan
Future Gens CP › Solvency › 2NC – AT: 4th Mech Specifics

Creating explicit policies to protect future generations catalyzes broader support for wider safeguards

Graham 17 [Hilary Graham, J. Martin Bland, Richard Cookson, Mona Kanaan, and Piran White -- Department of Health Sciences and Environment Department at the University of York. Do People Favour Policies that Protect Future Generations? Evidence from a British Survey of Adults. Journal of Social Policy, 2017. https://www.cambridge.org/core/services/aop-cambridge-core/content/view/D722EA2340DB8139FA2476E00E4612EC/S0047279416000945a.pdf/div-class-title-do-people-favour-policies-that-protect-future-generations-evidence-from-a-british-survey-of-adults-div.pdf]

How to represent the interests of future generations in policy decision-making has long been recognised as a central challenge of policy evaluation. The accelerating pace of environmental and climate change is adding urgency to this issue (Steffen et al., 2011; Stern, 2006).

Our study of adults in Britain raises questions about a core assumption underpinning standard policy evaluation: that people prefer policies that most benefit their generation. The study points, instead, to a strong preference for policies bringing greater benefit to the generations that follow. These findings accord with sociological evidence that concern for future generations is among the values that many people hold in common.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
Future Gens CP › Solvency › 2NC – AT: 4th Mech Specifics

The petition system

Smith 15 [Graham Smith, Foundation for Democracy and Sustainable Development. The Democratic Case for an Office for Future Generations. April 2015. ] Note: OFG = Offices for Future Generations

Third, involving citizens in the work of an OFG builds political capital for the body. Providing evidence that citizens are willing and able to deal with complex issues and to consider broad time horizons, further enhances the democratic legitimacy of the OFG’s activities and actions. Participation - and the broader public support this can engender - is one way for an OFG is to build a strong political profile. If the ‘default’ position of citizens tends to be a positive time preference, then providing evidence that time horizons shift when citizens consider long-term issues collectively is critical: to ensure resonance with the public, counter sectional interests and build pressure on political decision-makers.

Fourth, such a participatory approach provides an avenue for what Scott (2000) terms ‘downward accountability’ - from the agency to citizens - again potentially strengthening the legitimacy of the OFG and its interventions.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
Future Gens CP › Solvency › 2NC – Future Gens Standard

The CP applies the future generations standard – that’s better than trying to decide now whether the plan is beneficial across deep time

Kuroda 21 [Masashi Kuroda, Michinori Uwasu, Xuan-Thanh Bui, Phuoc-Dan Nguyen, and Keishiro Hara, * Faculty of Social and Environmental Studies, Tokoha University, “Shifting the perception of water environment problems by introducing “imaginary future generations”—Evidence from participatory workshop in Ho Chi Minh City, Vietnam,” 2021, Futures, Vol. 126, https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0016328720301622, EA]

Sustainable water management is essential for sustaining a fruitful and stable living environment. While developed countries, including Japan, have previously experienced serious water contamination due to rapid economic growth, those countries faced the problem by implementing a suitable legal framework and appropriate technology, and today they maintain good water environments (Bai & Imura, 2000; Kuroda, Hara, Takekawa, Uwasu, & Ike, 2018; Okada & Peterson, 2000). Nonetheless, these countries have been recently facing different challenges, such as renewal and maintenance of old water supply and sewage systems, and a myopic perspective cannot aid in properly maintaining and managing this infrastructure. Meanwhile, various Asian cities, including Vietnamese cities, are now undergoing rapid economic and population growth and are facing water quality and quantity problems caused by urbanization and industrialization. Moreover, the long-term environmental impact of various economic activities cannot be ignored. Groundwater is used widely for industrial and agricultural activities, as well as for domestic purposes, because it is relatively cheap compared with surface water treatment, and the water quality is stable. In these regions, due to the expanding use of groundwater triggered by socio-economic growth, some social problems are surfacing, including falling groundwater levels caused by excessive water consumption and the resulting land subsidence and saltwater intrusion (Hara, 2006; Ngo, Lee, Lee, & Woo, 2014). Once such land subsidence occurs, it is irreversible, posing threats and conveying disadvantages to subsequent future generations. Furthermore, the pollution of groundwater is increasing due to industrialization and urbanization. Groundwater is retained for extremely long periods, ranging from several years to several decades, so once such water becomes polluted, it has a lasting impact on future generations as well. These phenomena stand as examples of how unrestrained consumption and use of water resources to fulfill the short-term needs of present generations are making it difficult to realize sustainable management and stable use of groundwater resources. To make full use of limited water resources in a sustainable manner, it is indispensable to address water resources management by accounting for the benefits to future generations and integrating the perspective of intergenerational equity.

Meanwhile, Saijo (2018) argues that it is difficult to make decisions in a long-term context under the given natural human characteristics such as impulse (Sapolsky, 2012) and optimism (Sharot, 2011), as well as the fundamental systems in modern society, such as markets, which function to satisfy the needs of the present. These factors lead to shortsighted decision making that conflicts with the interests of future generations (Saijo, 2019). Therefore, it is important to create a framework and methodology that can be used to practice long-term decision making and implement measures that reflect the perspectives of future generations and their needs, as well as an appropriate intergenerational balance.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
Future Gens CP › Perms › 2NC – AT: Perm Create a Branch

Only a legitimate body solves

Smith 15 [Graham Smith, Foundation for Democracy and Sustainable Development. The Democratic Case for an Office for Future Generations. April 2015. www.fdsd.org/site/wp-content/uploads/2015/04/Office-for-Future-Generations-FDSD-format.81.pdf]

The idea here is that an OFG acts as a champion for systematic public engagement on future-orientated policy assessment, in so doing increasing its legitimacy in the eyes of the public and political decision makers. Enhancing such an agency’s standing is critical for its capacity to effectively challenge the myopic dysfunctionalities of democratic systems.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
Future Gens CP › Perms › 2NC – AT: Perm Create a Branch

It must have veto power over other branches – the perm is just an extension of the advisory system

Tremmel 6 [Joerg Chet Tremmel is a Professor for "intergenerationally just policies" at the University of Tuebingen. He is Editor-in-chief of the Intergenerational Justice Review and a visiting lecturer at the Johann-Wolfgang-Goethe-University Frankfurt, the University of Stuttgart and the Heinrich-Heine-University in Dusseldorf, Germany. Establishing intergenerational justice in national constitutions. Handbook of Intergenerational Justice. 2006. profs-polisci.mcgill.ca/muniz/intergen/Tremmel%20-%20Establishing%20intergenerational%20justice%20in%20national%20constitutions.pdf]

These kinds of new institutions make sense if they really have the competencies to protect future generations. This means, for instance, that these institutions can veto or at least freeze laws or that they can propose laws themselves. Without this responsibility the advisory system is merely extended. In Germany, for instance, there are already four institutions: the German Advisory Council on the Environment (Sachverstandigenrat fur Umweltfragen, www.umweltrat.de), the German Advisory Council on Global Change (Wissenschaftlicher Beirat der Umweltregierung fiir Globale Umweltveranderungen, www.wbgu.de), the German Council for Sustainable Development (Rat fur Nachhaltige Entwicklung, www. nachhaltigkeitsrat.de) and the Parliamentary Advisory Council on Sustainable Development (Parlamentarischer Beirat fiir nachhaltige Entwicklung, www.bundestag.de/parlament/parl_beirat/) which was appointed in 2004. They all do not have the necessary power to stop laws which threaten the well-being of future generations.