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2022 Michigan Kritik
Cybernetics K Supplement—Wave 1—FMPS › Topshelf › Impact—Interventions

The global north maintains power through digital management and algorithmic biopolitics – they cause exploitation and interventions

How alt resolves? Exploitation happens not because of simply digital capitalism, but rather because of the way that we view Africa through technical metaphysics that calculates its utility

Maybe a better aff card because it describes emerging tech broadly

Oppegaard 22 (Doctoral Research Fellow, Department of Sociology and Human Geography at , “The promise and peril of the digital economy”) //ansel is tired

2022 Michigan Kritik
Cybernetics K Supplement—Wave 1—FMPS › Topshelf › Impact—Horizontal Escalation

Horizontal escalation is more likely than vertical escalation.

Joque, 18—PhD from the European Grad School, researches philosophy, technology and media and is the visualization librarian at the University of Michigan, go blue (Justin, “Buffer Overflow: The Space and Time of Cyberwar,” Deconstruction Machines: Writing in the Age of Cyberwar, Chapter 1, 65-66, dml)

In one sense, this military investment in “metaphysical control” and new battle spaces is a continuation of ancient strategies of deception, sabotage, and manipulation, but still this contemporary explication seems to mark a qualitatively new level of abstraction and expansiveness. As DiNardo and Hughes, two military historians and theorists, have warned, this focus on a metaphysical battle space marks a military– strategic investment in the complete inversion of the Clausewitzean formula in which politics is war by other means.70 In a 1995 article in Airpower Journal, they worry that the military focus on information warfare and subduing the enemy outside of traditional fighting lends itself to a complete military intervention into politics and civilian life. Chun’s insight that software functions as ideology is thus important in another regard: both software and ideology, along with law and economics, become sites of intervention that risk their symbolic functioning being turned against them.71

Although war spills over into all aspects of everyday life, it is decidedly not total war. It is almost the opposite: a war so constrained and reserved that it nearly goes unnoticed. As is argued in Unrestricted Warfare, growing global interlinkages, including international law, the shared biosphere, a highly connected global economy, and the threat of global thermonuclear war, serve to constrain many global actors. This is not to suggest that these constraints are always or even often effective or that they are positive forces, but they add additional costs that complicate political and military calculuses. All of these serve to put political limits on military options. Instead of vertical escalations of conflict to ever more violence, we are witnessing a horizontal escalation to ever more varied modes of conflict. As war spreads, it escalates horizontally and strategists attempt to open new domains. Thus “fighting” begins to look little like previous conflicts. For instance, the existence of both domestic and international law opens the possibility that one force would be able to limit another force’s strategic options by litigation (a strategy occasionally referred to as lawfare).72 These global interconnections have raised the cost of military escalation, often forcing states to fight within specified rules and domains for fear of upsetting the global order and unleashing potentially more destructive forces or disconnections from global spaces of flow.

2022 Michigan Kritik
Cybernetics K Supplement—Wave 1—FMPS › Topshelf › Impact—Entropy

Technical systems are entropic - makes collapse inevitable.

Featherstone, 17 [Mark Featherstone Senior Lecturer in Sociology at Keele University. “Planet Utopia: Utopia, Dystopia, and Globalisation,” February 17, 2017]//Townes

This is exactly what Baudrillard (2012) means when he writes of ecstatic communication, which communicates nothing but the fact of communication itself, and Serres (1983) reflects upon when he explains that all technical systems point towards entropy, noise, and the black depths of the universe. What this means is that the absolute security of the market, the realisation of Platonic form in the financial utopia that led Ben Bernanke and others to speak of the great moderation, is also Badiou’s (2006) void, the black screen, the moment the numbers no longer seem to add up or make sense. For mathematician Benoit Mandelbrot (2004) the connection between these two moments, the point of total securitisation and the black screen of nonsense, runs through the accumulation of an endless number of small events that come together to create a systemic tipping point. In his view these small deviations occur because the logic of financial securitisation is fundamentally flawed. In his work on the unpredictability of markets he asks, for example, what happens when the trade in derivatives and options starts to feed back into the valuation of stocks and shares to such an extent that price becomes absolutely distorted? What happens when it becomes clear that probability is incapable of predicting the future because it is based on calculations premised on the fantasy that what has happened in the past will continue to happen in the future? Thus Mandelbrot’s (2004) point is that probability theory is ineffective in a highly complex system because there are too many variables and too many interactions to be able to base prediction about the future in an assessment of the past. In this way his fractal theory, which he names in reference to the Greek fractus that means ‘to break’, presents a picture of systemic uncertainty, unpredictability, and potential collapse that contradicts the standard picture of cybernetic economy where calculation and the ability to hedge against fluctuation enables the maintenance of stability and order.

2022 Michigan Kritik
Cybernetics K Supplement—Wave 1—FMPS › Topshelf › Impact—Dystopia

Dystopia outweighs everything.

Harel and Brownsword, 19—law professor at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem AND Professor in Law at King's College London (Alon and Roger, “Law, liberty and technology: criminal justice in the context of smart machines,” International Journal of Law in Context, Volume 15, Special Issue 2, June 2019, pp. 107-125, dml) [language modifications denoted by brackets]

Famously, Stephen Hawking (2018, p. 188) remarked that ‘the advent of super-intelligent AI would be either the best or the worst thing ever to happen to humanity’. At best, smart machines, smart policing and smart cities of the kind contemplated by Elizabeth Joh might signal the end of crime; but, at worst, we can imagine various dystopian futures where the existential and agential threats presented by AI have been realised. Given, in James Bridle's (2018, p. 2) words, that our technologies are complicit in ‘an out-of-control economic system that immiserates many and continues to widen the gap between rich and poor; the collapse of political and societal consensus across the globe resulting in increasing nationalisms, social divisions, ethnic conflicts and shadow wars; and a warming climate, which existentially threatens us all’, then Vincent Chiao might well be right in claiming that the turn to smart technology might not be the smartest [best] way of trying to achieve the end of crime.

In this collection, our contributors have not highlighted concerns of an existential nature. Nevertheless, we might fear that, in our quest for crime-free societies, for greater safety and well-being, we will develop and embed ever more intelligent devices to the point that there is a risk of the extinction of humans – or, if not that, then a risk of humanity surviving ‘in some highly suboptimal state or in which a large portion of our potential for desirable development is irreversibly squandered’ (Bostrom, 2014, p. 281, note 1; see also Ford, 2015). Our contributors have not yet recommended that we should follow the example of Samuel Butler's Erewhonians who, fearful for their liberty, destroyed their machines (Butler, 1872) – and who also, of course, inverted conventional wisdom by punishing those who fell ill while, by contrast, treating in hospital and sympathising with those who committed crimes such as forging cheques, setting property on fire or robbing with violence. Yet, the beauty of Erewhon is that, to some present-day readers – particularly readers who are familiar with, say, Harari's Homo Deus (2016) 15 or Häggerström's Here be Dragons (2016) – the practices of the Erewhonians might seem to be anything but benighted. Is it so ridiculous to think that, with the acceleration in technological development, machines might become much smaller and smarter, capable of reproducing themselves, communicating with one another and displaying various degrees of intelligence (if not consciousness as humans experience it) and agency? Most importantly, which policy would be the more crazy [imprudent]: to disregard machines as a threat to the human condition or to treat the threat as sufficiently serious to warrant at least some precautionary measures – albeit perhaps not precaution on the scale exercised by the Erewhonians, who destroyed ‘all the inventions that had been discovered for the preceding 271 years’ (Butler, 1872, p. 260)?

2022 Michigan Kritik
Cybernetics K Supplement—Wave 1—FMPS › Topshelf › Impact—Dark Pure War

The expansion of war beyond physicality enables dark pure war against the planet.

Towns, 19—associate professor in Communication and Media Studies, Carleton University (Armond, “(Dark) Pure War: Virilio, the Cinematic, and the Racial,” Media Theory, Vol. 3, No. 2, 145-160, dml)

In Pure War, Paul Virilio argued that war continued beyond the physicality of the battlefield. Outside of the violence of the fight lay a violence of industrial production toward the conditions for war. Put differently, pure war signified the new ways that war was now acted out ‘in infinite preparation’ (Virilio, 2008: 29). Pure war indicated the always already active preparation for war by the state, even when war was not being physically waged.

One could say that a cornerstone of Virilio’s research has been media’s relation to unending war. A central component of pure war, for example, is information, or the gathering of data to surveil and police populations that are always under the watchful eye of the war machine. Interestingly, Virilio concerns himself less with the racial implications of those who are open to surveilling and policing and more with the expansion of policing and surveilling as practices that are applicable to ‘everyone’. Yet, his examples of war have racial undertones that he often does not fully investigate: the Vietnam War, the Iraq War, and the Italo-Ethiopian War, to name a few, all creep toward the pure war. Even as Virilio (2002) acknowledged the racial implications of the Second World War, he had less to say about the recognition that the Nazis pulled their racialized strategies of death for the European Jewish population from the US state’s approach to black and indigenous people (Whitman, 2017). Each of these wars, between white and nonwhite people or between white and white people in relation to those who could never fully be white, suggest that the wars that Virilio found most interesting were not race neutral.

2022 Michigan Kritik
Cybernetics K Supplement—Wave 1—FMPS › Topshelf › Impact—China War

Cybernetic capitalism makes US-china war so inevitable

Dyer-Witheford and Matviyenko 19—associate professor of information and media studies at the University of Western Ontario; assistant professor of communication at Simon Fraser University (Nick and Svitlana, Cyberwar and Revolution: Digital Subterfuge in Global Capitalism) //ansel

These companies’ collaborations with the U.S. security apparatus include their acquiescence to the NSA PRISM surveillance program, an episode they are now energetically attempting to live down. It also includes their lucrative provision of services to U.S. military and intelligence agencies, ranging from massive data storage and processing facilities (Amazon and Google) to space-based “geospatial visualization services” (Google) to “wearable tech” for the armed services (Apple) as well as surveillance systems for the private military contractors that now constitute the sizable penumbra of Pentagon operations (Alexander 2015; Gregg 2017; Levine 2014a, 2014b).8 This reciprocity also involves the “revolving door” between high-level Silicon Valley and Pentagon managers and their shared culture of global “problem-solving” think tanks, typified by Google’s Jigsaw, and a willingness to censor internet material at the behest of the U.S. government, once only sporadically disclosed but now in full swing after the 2016 election hacking scandal (Assange 2014; Levine 2014c; Greenwald 2017b). Yet the United States has cyberwar vulnerabilities. Paradoxically, these result from its historically advantageous “home game” (Segal 2016; 35) advantage: a highly networked military and economy susceptible to hacker attack. This problem is intensified by the neoliberal form of capitalism the United States champions. Free market zealotry is at once governmentally embraced and on occasion makes it difficult for the U.S. state to enforce cybersecurity provisions on private capital, around issues ranging from the reporting of cyberattacks to mobile phone encryption. It is largely in reaction to U.S. strengths and weaknesses that Russia and China have developed their own capacities and strategies. In particular, rather than seeing cyberwar as a distinct sphere of military operations, it is for these nations’ military forces subsumed within a larger category of “information warfare” that comprehends forms of psychological operations and propaganda. This orientation, taken together with the different historic levels and paths of technological development, has led to distinctive approaches to conflict in cyberspace.

The People’s Republic of China (PRC) was until recently the main object of popular U.S. cyberwar anxieties: depictions of transpacific wars fought with digital weapons abound in both fictional entertainments and serious political scenarios (Singer and Cole 2015; McCoy 2017). Yet although China’s digital policies and practices have been presented in the most ominous terms in U.S. media, they may be as much a sign of weakness as of strength (Lindsay 2014; Lindsay, Cheung, and Reveron 2015). An important factor driving the leaders of the Chinese Communist Party to open their country to the world market at the end of the 1970s was the perception of massive and intensifying technological backwardness vis-à-vis the West. As the PRC confronts the question of whether, in the global market, it will be an economic “head servant” (Hung 2009) to the United States or risk conflict over issues of trade and political dominance in the Pacific, this awareness shapes China’s concept of cyberwar. Thus, for the Chinese state, a major concern is, notoriously, maintenance of ideological control over a population perceived as vulnerable to terrorism, to separatism, and to “foreign influences” of the sort projected by U.S. digital “soft power.” This control is exercised through the elaborate and continually evolving apparatus of digital censorship, surveillance, and preemption shorthanded as the “Great Firewall of China.” This system combines blackouts of proscribed websites, algorithmic filtering and monitoring of email, and interventions by internet militias (the so-called Fifty Cent Army, named for the alleged pay rate for each posting) or bureaucrats to divert or disrupt controversial discussions with pro-government cheerleading with digital surveillance of, and attacks on, overseas sites and groups attempting to evade censorship (Lindsay, Cheung, and Reveron 2015; Klimburg 2017). Administered via the collaboration of private-sector internet service providers with state authorities, the system has been characterized by a changing, erratic enforcement that by its very uncertainty increases the risk to dissenters. The Firewall, which has undoubtedly contributed to China’s unenviable record of large-scale imprisonment of social activists and journalists, has been a frequent target of Western criticisms for violations of internet freedom, though these have subsided somewhat post-Snowden. China’s possible larger plans for an extensive “social credit” system based on monitoring of internet practices and “scoring” of social and perhaps political behavior would represent the logical consolidation of this system (Economist 2016a).

2022 Michigan Kritik
Cybernetics K Supplement—Wave 1—FMPS › Topshelf › Impact—Algorithmic Warfare

Algorithmic warfare expands mass techno-inflicted violence across the globe and risks nuclear extinction.

Johnson, 18—Professor, Environmental History, Loyola University Chicago (Benjamin, “Coded Conflict: Algorithmic and Drone Warfare in US Security Strategy,” Journal of Military and Strategic Studies, Volume 18, Issue 4, dml)

The notion that people can be killed ‘incorrectly’ represents the dominant concern in military appropriation of civilian technologies and replicates the same troubling issue that is identified by post-colonial critiques of drone warfare: that implicitly there is a ‘correct’ and therefor ethical way to kill people at all. However, even the post-colonial focus on how surveillance and kill targets are ‘Othered’ and the violence encountered through that process is only part of a larger set of issues raised by the focus on algorithmic warfare. Given that security discourse is beginning to re-emphasize the importance of long-term interstate competition and a security strategy predicated on information-decision cycle dominance through algorithmic superiority, the implications posed go beyond the violence of surveillance and killing.

For one, the increasing militarization of everyday life supports the normalization of drones and weapons, which in turn legitimates their use in regimes of violence. This in and of itself is not a departure from the liberal way of war but a strengthening of its underlying rationality – that peace must be secured through force.

2022 Michigan Kritik
Cybernetics K Supplement—Wave 1—FMPS › Topshelf › Link—Undersea Cables

Their threat toward undersea cable systems is exaggerated and a form of fearmongering

Bueger 21 (Christian Bueger, Professor of International Relations at the University of Copenhagen, “Protecting hidden infrastructure: The security politics of the global submarine data cable network”, Contemporary Security Policy, 3/29/21, ) // EL

Cable security and the problem of threat inflation While the control and security of submarine communication infrastructure were a core issue and part of the security calculations during the two World Wars as well as the Cold War (Hills, 2002; Smith, 2018), in the post-Cold War environment such concerns were less prevalent. The uncontested U.S. naval hegemony and the primacy of non-state threats moved such issues to the margins. The new discourse on the protection of critical infrastructures influenced by the concerns over transnational terrorism of the 2000s did not change this substantially. It is only in the early 2010s, that scholars such as Sechrist (2012), Ross (2014), or Martinage (2015) called attention to the security of the submarine cable network. Since then, a number of studies have documented the relevance of cables for national and international security. Anchored in the wider geopolitical, strategic, and military discourses of the North Atlantic security community, contributors are concerned about the rise of hybrid warfare, the perceived hostility of Russia’s foreign policy, the fear of a large-scale cyber-attack, and the growing technical sophistication of terrorist groups. The focus of such studies is hence the vulnerability of the cable network emanating from deliberate attacks. Observations of Russian submarine activities in territorial waters and in proximity to cable routes, that became public in 2015, triggered much of this debate (Hicks et al., 2016, pp. 3–4). This raised concerns that the Russian navy might tap into the cables for espionage and surveillance, temper with or even cut them as part of a hybrid warfare campaign. Schaub et al. (2017, p. 37) stress that “cables and nodes would be prime targets in a hybrid warfare campaign” instigated by Russia. A former Supreme Allied Commander at the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) suggests that this seems obvious, as “in the case of heightened tensions, access to the underwater cable system represents a rich trove of intelligence, a potential major disruption to an enemy’s economy and a symbolic chest thump for the Russian Navy” (Stavridis, 2016). Similarly, a report by the British think tank Policy Exchange emphasizes that “whether from terrorist activity or an increasingly bellicose Russian naval presence, the threat of these vulnerabilities being exploited is growing” (Sunak, 2017, p. 5). Others suggest that undersea cables are inherently susceptible to attacks from non-state violent groups and terrorism, since their location is usually public, cables tend to be highly concentrated geographically and the level of technical expertise and resources required to damage them are limited (Martinage, 2015; Matis, 2012; Sunak, 2017). These studies are supplemented by governmental reports that examine and assess threats to the undersea cable network. NATO’s military leadership for instance warned that the Russian navy is threatening the undersea cable network (Birnbaum, 2017). It is, nevertheless, not clear whether NATO believes Russia has the capability or the intention of attacking cable networks (Hinck, 2017). In order to mitigate the threats to the undersea cable network, above studies situate cable security in the context of national security strategies and call for a military response. Increased naval patrols, surveillance activities and other measures of deterrence are the proposed responses (Martinage, 2015; Matis, 2012; Sunak, 2017). Other proposals concern national focal points, public-private coordination and the creation of cable protection zones (Davenport, 2015; Martinage, 2015; Schaub et al., 2017; Sunak, 2017). However, neither scholars nor public officials have provided much detailed information about the substance of a Russian or terrorist threat to the cable infrastructure. Hinck (2017), for instance, diagnoses a general lack of information regarding any threats to the undersea cable network, particularly when it comes to the alleged Russian intentions, plans and activities. So far, no intentional hostile disruptions to the submarine cable infrastructure have been reported publicly. The scenarios underpinning the threat discourse hence seem to be built not on prior incidents but on overall assessments of the geopolitical landscape. Arguably, this implies that the threat scenarios could be exaggerated and point to a substantial risk of threat inflation and fearmongering.

2022 Michigan Kritik
Cybernetics K Supplement—Wave 1—FMPS › Topshelf › Link—Security Cooperation

Security cooperation misses the point. War is transitioning – now operates through the computational redisclosure of the battlefield and predictive preemptive systems

Dyer-Witheford and Matviyenko 2019—associate professor of information and media studies at the University of Western Ontario; assistant professor of communication at Simon Fraser University (Nick and Svitlana, Cyberwar and Revolution: Digital Subterfuge in Global Capitalism) //ansel

What this reach grasps is the “datified subject” (Cheney-Lippold 2017, 35), that is to say, the identity constituted for individuals by their activity on digital networks. This is not to suggest an entire virtual translation of the person into the network but rather the collection of digital identifiers that converge on, add to, overlay, interpenetrate, and, in some contexts, supplant the multiple social codes and indicators of which corporeal individuality is composed. There is now an extensive literature on the various corporate and state “profiling machines” (Elmer 2004) that assemble and ascribe identities from the traces of digital searching, liking, browsing, shopping, chatting, and navigating, and, indeed, from the mere act of carrying location-transmitting mobile phones. And there is a similar series of investigations into the “black boxes” (Pasquale 2015; see also Amoore 2013; Finn 2017) of algorithmic processes that, from the accumulation of “big data,” predict future activities—and of the many biases and errors that enter this process (O’Neill 2016). This literature highlights the paradox that the mass volumes of big data enable increasingly precise, personalized mapping of an individualized “data subject” (Bauman et al. 2014) according to its conformity or deviation from a series of patterns. We will follow this idea through three different registers in which war touches the “datified subject”: battlefield intelligence, civilian surveillance, and digital propaganda, focusing particularly on examples from the United States. Shawn Powers and Michael Jablonski (2015, 81) observe that origins of data profiling lie in intelligence operations, where mosaic theory, the idea that “one can piece discrete bits of information together to predict the likely intentions or actions of others,” has been a core idea. Early in the so-called war on terror, mosaic theory was applied at the CIA’s black sites and U.S. military’s detention centers at Guantánamo, Bagram, and Kandahar, where captives were often held and interrogated solely on the basis of association with other suspects (Pozen 2005). The idea that big data can generate an “individualization” of war has become increasingly prominent in cyberwar doctrine. In 2014, Charles Dunlap, a retired U.S. major general (and one of the several authors who invoke the pseudoTrotsky aphorism we started with), suggested that anticipations of cyberwar as a series of “apocalyptic” infrastructure attacks might be less important than the “hyperpersonalization of war” based on data profiles. The possibility that particularly excited him was that of targeting specific members of an opponent’s forces, “primarily the leadership cadre but also critical technicians and experts,” with the primary example being the use of drones, both for information gathering and attack delivery from the skies over Afghanistan, Iraq, Pakistan, Yemen, and Somalia.

2022 Michigan Kritik
Cybernetics K Supplement—Wave 1—FMPS › Topshelf › Link—Remote Warfare

The affirmative’s obsession with the efficiency of remote warfare mystifies conflict into a “war without bodies” entrenching a cycle of violence

Wilson 20 (Neil Wilson, Master’s at Utrecht University, “Understanding the Battle for AI in Warfare through the Practices of Assemblage: A Case Study of Project Maven”, Utrecht University, 8/2/20, ) // EL

2.2. Remote Warfare The best indication of warfare’s near future can be found in its recent past. With this in mind, LAWS can be contextualised by the ascendancy of “remote warfare.” Defined as “a strategy of countering threats at a distance, without the deployment of large military forces,” remote warfare takes a variety of forms, including the use of technological (e.g. drones) or physical (e.g. partner forces, private military contractors) proxies. By considering remote warfare from strategic-political and tactical-technological perspectives, LAWS can be considered a natural continuation of technologically-enabled warfighting among risk-averse Western states. The technologies of remote warfare - particularly drones - cannot be fully understood without attending to the strategic and political impetus for their use. “Stand-off” warfighting runs deeper than any single technology. At the turn of the millennium, Ignatieff’s analysis of the “Virtual War” in Kosovo noted that Precision-Guided Munitions (PGMs) promised “speedy, risk-free victory.” Contemporaneously, others noted the ascendancy of of “riskless x warfare” and “risk-transfer militarism” establishing a trend towards the asymmetrical deployment of force in Western Military operations. Patterns of risk-aversion among Western forces observed at the turn of the millennium have since accelerated. A combination of past failures, budgetary constraints, and increased political and popular scrutiny mean Western militaries exercise even greater caution in their troop deployments today. Risk-aversion has not precluded military engagement entirely, but has prompted states to consider alternative means of projecting influence without committing large ground forces. In his conceptualisation of “vicarious warfare,” Waldman therefore notes the pre-eminence of delegating force (to proxies and partner forces) and danger-proofing personnel (through airstrikes and remotely-piloted weapons systems) in contemporary military interventions. Delegation and danger-proofing respectively constitute the social and material forms of mitigating risk to US troops. Similar dynamics have been observed among other NATO members. Put simply, the strategic appeal of remote warfare is perceived as efficiency: risking less and achieving more. From a tactical perspective, the efficiency engendered by remote warfare was made possible by technological innovation. For this reason, a burgeoning field of scholarship has emerged around the technologies of remote warfare, particularly drones - “the most visible application of the information age to contemporary warfare.” Chamayou’s seminal treatise on Drone Theory takes an expansive look at the political, ethical and legal implications of drone warfare, concluding that “remote war is a war of human machines against the human body… one side loses people; the other side loses toys.” While this analysis does consider the human impact of this technology, it remains overwhelmingly focused on the drone itself. Some argue this “fetishisation” of drone technologies (predominantly by military actors but also in academia) mystifies their human relations. Myopic focus on technologies alone thus risks presenting a false image of “war without bodies.” Scholars of remote warfare are not alone in their tendency to perceive technology deterministically. Despite the centrality of technology to IR, its study too-often assumes it is either entirely controlled by humans or distinctly separate from human agency. In line with Latour’s concept of the Black Box, “technical work is made invisible by its own success,” leaving us unaware of its broader significance. As Flusser quipped, however, “technology has become too serious a matter to be left to technicians.” There is thus a need to apprehend the complex socio-technical systems that produce and are served by technologies. Or, as Hoijtink and Leese invite, to “render them political” and consider “the politics that go into technology, as well as the politics that emanate from technology.” In such socio-technical systems, accounting for the interaction of humans, technologies and structures invites analysis of how agency and power may be produced, distributed and transformed.

2022 Michigan Kritik
Cybernetics K Supplement—Wave 1—FMPS › Topshelf › Link—Innovation***

Innovation is unsustainable – the DOD’s pursual of the private industry and dismissal of technological expertise proves their sole intent is capitalist superiority

Wilson 20 (Neil Wilson, Master’s at Utrecht University, “Understanding the Battle for AI in Warfare through the Practices of Assemblage: A Case Study of Project Maven”, Utrecht University, 8/2/20, ) // EL

4.2.1. Military-Technological Complex From the Third Offset Strategy, AI technologies were clearly considered imperative to maintaining American military strength. Incapable of mandating cooperation between private industry and the military, however, the DoD had to rely on persuasion rather than coercion to acquire the technologies it sought. Accordingly, the “solution” for the DoD appeared to be becoming better in building relationships with contractors. And so it began courting tech companies with new contracting processes. In April 2015, then-Secretary of Defense Ash Carter delivered a speech at Stanford University - the first visit to Silicon Valley from a Secretary of Defense in twenty years. Centred around innovation, the speech culminated in the announcement of the Defense Innovation Unit Experimental (DIUx). This new DoD body, located in Silicon Valley (“a nexus of innovation”), would work to “strengthen existing relationships and build new ones; help scout for new technologies; and help function as a local interface for the department.” In addition to the DIUx, the Defense Innovation Advisory Board (DIB) was established the following year. This collection of Silicon Valley luminaries, chaired by Eric Schmidt (formerly of Alphabet Inc., the parent company to Google), were assembled to provide the Pentagon access to “the brightest technical minds focused on innovation.” Drawing industry voices like Schmidt into the assemblage suggested that with the right expertise, the challenges of developing AI for defence could be overcome. The role of the DIB in legitimising the DoD’s endeavours in this field will be elaborated in the following chapter: authorising knowledge & managing failures. Forging alignments with tech companies accelerated dramatically in 2017 with the creation of the Algorithmic Warfare Cross Functional Team (AWCFT). Better known as Project Maven, the AWCFT sought “to accelerate DoD's integration of big data and machine learning… to tum the enormous volume of data available to DoD into actionable intelligence and insights at speed” Specifically, its goal of automating the “Processing, Exploitation and Dissemination [PED] for Tactical Unmanned Aerial Systems” meant using Machine Learning to automatically analyse drone footage for objects of interest, freeing up human analysts for higher-level work. It is important to note that those leading Project Maven in the DoD were not selected on the basis of technological expertise but their skill in building relationships. Although the role of Google was not public at this early stage, a public “industry day” hosted by the DoD in October 2017 was attended by more than 300 industry and academic partners - a clear sign of DoD enthusiasm for forging alignments with the tech industry. Beyond the concrete goals of Maven, it had an important underlying purpose as a “pathfinder” mission, the “spark that kindles the flame front of artificial intelligence across the rest of the [Defense] Department,” according to its leader Lt. Gen. Jack Shanahan. Its founding memo emphasised agility: “after successful sprints in support of Intelligence, Surveillance, Reconnaissance (ISR) PED, the AWCFT will prioritize the integration of similar technologies into other defense intelligence mission areas” (emphasis added). The Pentagon was thus framing the solution as being to move faster and work closer with industry in adopting and integrating algorithmic technologies. For the DoD, then, just as the “problem” of integrating AI technologies was a logistical one, the proposed solution was equally practical. Initiatives like the DIUx, DIB and Project Maven indicated that with enough energy and skill, it could forge the necessary alignments with tech companies to acquire these technologies. Elements gathering around the problem of AI in defence from this perspective were thus already crystallising as its solution - closer cooperation.

2022 Michigan Kritik
Cybernetics K Supplement—Wave 1—FMPS › Topshelf › Link—Innovation***

The affirmative’s need for militaristic innovation upholds the drive for capital investment in harmful technologies

Wilson 20 (Neil Wilson, Master’s at Utrecht University, “Understanding the Battle for AI in Warfare through the Practices of Assemblage: A Case Study of Project Maven”, Utrecht University, 8/2/20, ) // EL

4.1.1. Military-Technological Complex “To overcome challenges to our military superiority,” declared the US Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel in 2014, “we must change the way we innovate, operate, and do business.” Noticing tides of change lapping at his feet, Hagel recognised that new ways of war required new ways of business. From his perspective, the problem of AI in defence was one of access: the technology existed, but was out of reach of the DoD. Cooperation with new industrial partners would be essential to developing these new technologies and, in turn, maintaining American military superiority. To understand why the Department of Defense needed to forge new alignments with industry, it helps to consider previous practices of military research and development (R&D) and their (un)suitability for purpose. In the post-WWII era, a “Military Industrial Complex” emerged among the civilian industrial conglomerates (e.g. Boeing and General Motors). Simultaneously, significant public investments into military R&D boomed and led to several technologies now commonplace in the civilian sphere, such as GPS. In fact, this cross-pollination of public funding and technological innovation between the military and civilian spheres transformed Silicon Valley’s from a “landscape of fruit orchards into a hub of electronics production and innovations.” At the conclusion of the Cold War, the Military-Industrial Complex lost its raison d’etre. Fifty-five billion dollars of acquisitions and mergers followed, as many engineering companies parted with their defence businesses, consolidating the defence industry into five “titans.” Concurrently, DoD procurement practices became cumbersome and convoluted, resulting in $46bn wasted between 2001 and 2011 on weapons systems that never entered production. Most acquisition programes took years or even decades to reach the battlefield. Tightening belts and a slow production line blunted the technical edge of the Military-Industrial Complex. Today, most R&D investments are dominated by the private sector. By 2014, when Hagel announced the Third Offset Strategy, it was clear that digital technologies were the future of defence. As the leader of Project Maven Jack Shanahan noted, “the future battlespace is constructed of not only ships, tanks, missiles, and satellites, but also algorithms, networks, and sensor grids.” Hagel obliquely referred to LAWS with his warning that the US army “could one day go into battle confronting a range of advanced technologies that limit our freedom of maneuver.” Deputy Secretary of Defense Bob Work, by contrast, was more explicit: “10 years from now if the first person through a breach isn't a fricking robot, shame on us” Moreover, the official DoD directive on LAWS declared its intention to develop autonomous weapons with “appropriate levels of human judgment” that would satisfy “the law of war, applicable treaties, weapon system safety rules, and applicable rules of engagement.” From this, it appears the problem was perceived not in the technology itself but in developing it to a certain standard. It could not do so alone. Technological innovation took centre stage in the Third Offset Strategy but would require new actors, by Hagel’s own admission: “[The] DoD no longer has exclusive access to the most cutting-edge technology or the ability to spur or control the development of new technologies the way we once did. So we will actively seek proposals from the private sector… those firms and academic institutions outside DoD’s traditional orbit.” Technology companies, by contrast, were not as public in their intentions of working with the DoD. Despite Silicon Valley’s government-funded roots, its radically different working culture of “disruption” and willingness to “fail fast, fail often” were institutionally alien to the DoD. Beyond these normative issues, many technology companies regarded the Pentagon as too small a customer to work with, especially given the bureaucracy involved. Similarly, the huge sets of training data required to make useful machine-learning algorithms are hard to come by for defence purposes. Notably, well before Project Maven was even established, Google was making significant inroads in robotics development but appeared unwilling to work with the Pentagon, however it was unclear whether this was driven by ideological or market considerations. Nevertheless, it was clear that for many tech companies the problem was perceived in a technical manner similar to the DoD: the issue was not necessarily developing the technology but establishing the partnerships.

2022 Michigan Kritik
Cybernetics K Supplement—Wave 1—FMPS › Topshelf › Link—Humanitarianism

Thinking is over. Hello calculation. The global computational turn renders the affs attempts to retract international imperialism a farce of modern technocapitalism. Empire no longer operates through traditional statecraft or <insert affs mechanism> but rather through the ontopolitics of adaptive design, a recourse to remote management and interconnected digitized finance as a means of simultaneously eliminating and recreating precarity. This design principle is the zeitgeist of late modernity and makes global interventions and security crises inevitable.

Duffield 19 (Mark Duffield is Professor Emeritus and former Director of the Global Insecurities Centre, University of Bristol, and an Honorary Professor at the Humanitarian and Conflict Response Institute, University of Manchester., Post-Humanitarianism: Governing Precarity Through Adaptive Design) //ansel

The War on Terror imposed limitations. Compared to the 1970s and 1980s, humanitarian agencies found their political room for manoeuvre significantly restricted (BOND, 2003). At the same time, despite agency growth and extensive efforts to professionalise relief work, there was little commensurate increase in effectiveness (Fiori et al., 2016). Growing risk aversion and recourse to remote management, moreover, created problems of distancing and loss of familiarity (Healy and Tiller, 2014). Distracted by debt-fuelled uncertainty, rather than an indignant citizenry, Western publics now present as so many disillusioned, ironic spectators (Chouliaraki, 2013). Diplomatic influence has also declined (Mair, 2013). While NGOs lay claim to a ‘nongovernmental’ status, direct action thrived when donor sovereignty was, paradoxically, still able to cast a shadow. Given the refugee crisis, few can today contemplate the wretched state of ‘official’ humanitarianism without some disquiet. Despite what we may wish or demand, however, it is unlikely that significant improvement will occur any time soon. But to then conclude that humanitarianism is dead would be a mistake. While autonomous international direct action lies buried in the rubble of the West’s urbicidal wars, a new optimistic, less direct but technologically updated humanitarianism has confidently stepped forth. More de-risked and requiring less professional expertise than the labour-intensive direct engagement of the past, it is a cheaper Western humanitarianism designed for connectivity rather than circulation. Often called humanitarian innovation (ALNAP, 2009; Betts and Bloom, 2014), a feature of this new humanitarianism is its enthusiastic embrace of adaptive design (Ramalingam et al., 2014; HPG, 2018). Moreover, unlike autonomous direct action, which reached its peak in the late 1980s, humanitarian innovation sits comfortably with private partners and corporate sponsorship (Zyck and Kent, 2014), a necessary recalibration given its dependence upon what can be called the computational turn – that is, since the 1990s, the seamless penetration of commercial information and communication technologies, software platforms, automating apps and screen interfaces into all aspects of personal, social, national and international life tout court. Humanitarian innovation is politically safe, logoed, glitzy and smart. Besides establishment acceptance, humanitarian innovation draws positivity from its disavowal of past failures and commitment to a future of ‘failing-forward in a spirit of honesty’ (HPG, 2018: 132). Transparency regarding current systemic ‘pathologies’ like institutionalising selfinterest or neglecting the agency of the disaster-affected (ibid.: 22–3) is part of the self-cleansing necessary to birth a humanitarianism 2.0. This paper, however, questions whether humanitarian innovation can be any more effective than the past relief efforts it now disavows. Rather than system failure, just as important is that the world has changed. Societies are more fragmented and unequal than before (Piketty, 2014). International space has striated into fast, slow and stopped lanes (Brown, 2010) as debt, precarity and anger have flourished (Mishra, 2017). Rather than correcting past mistakes, humanitarian innovation is embarked on a wholly different project. It is helping create the systems and structures to govern global precarity. Important here is its privileging of the design principle over the need for, or even the possibility of, political change. Design Not Politics The computational turn and societal dependence on digital technologies has changed the way the world is understood and the status of humans within it (Chandler, 2018). The privileging of the design principle is central to this change. Besides the spatial shift from circulation to connectivity, an ontological, epistemological and methodological translation has also taken place (Duffield, 2018). While anticipating late-modernity, the spirit of 1970s direct humanitarian action was fabricated from a deductive process of knowledge formation framed by narratives of history, causation and reciprocity. Reflecting the rise to dominance of a cybernetic episteme, this register has been replaced by a reliance on inductive mathematical data and machine-thinking for sense-making (Rouvroy, 2012). Thinking has been transformed into calculation (Han, 2013).1 The current dominance within the academy of empiricism and behaviourism reflects this change in world-experience. What is often called post-humanism (Braidotti, 2013) brings several contemporary positivist stands together. These include the new empiricism, speculative realism and actor network theory. Posthumanist thought draws on process-oriented behavioural ontologies of becoming. These privilege individuals understood as cognitively limited by their unmediated relationship with their enfolding environments (Galloway, 2013; Chandler, 2015). An individual’s ‘world’ reduces to the immediate who, where and when of their changing network connections and disconnections. The overlap here with neoliberalism’s necessarily ignorant subject is returned to below. Importantly, the pure factuality of a post-humanist existence casts doubts on the distinction between a lived reality and a wider world, a distinction that is central to knowledge and the narrative of history. Without this separation there is no space, as it were, for a political commons of contrasting life-chances, contestation and critique that is essential if we are to successfully share the world with Others. In its absence, as Bruno Latour approvingly argues, the whole becomes smaller than the sum of its parts (Latour et al., 2012). Rather than a shared world of circulation, we have the endless personalised and separate worlds of connectivity. Post-humanism problematises the possibility of a shared or collective politics. Indeed, Latour (Latour, 2008) goes further in suggesting that design has now replaced politics. Building on his earlier rejection of grand narratives and critique (Latour, 2004), Latour claims that since encountering the scale of the ecological crisis, we are all now designers rather than modernisers. Across a wide arc of operational discourse, empathetic design attitudes reflecting such feminine sentiments as ‘attachment, precaution, entanglement, dependence and care’ have all but replaced earlier, more masculine Promethean commitments to ‘emancipation, detachment, modernization, progress and mastery’ (Latour, 2008: 2). In place of political change, Latour asserts the primacy of a conservative design-based ontopolitics. That is, the need to accept and work with the world as is – rather than how it ought to be. In celebrating the positive demand for empathy, humility and resilience, adaptive design supplants the call for systemic change. This conservatism 16 is an example of how a progressive neoliberalism (Fraser, Journal of Humanitarian Affairs (2019) 1/1 Downloaded from manchesteropenhive.com at 04/06/2019 01:04:08AM via free access 2017) is dissolving and sapping the powers of resistance (Han, 2010). The excessive positivity of adaptive design, its endless willingness to happily fail-forward into the future, suits the economic logic of late-capitalism.2 To draw this out, it is necessary to first review the latter’s greatest achievement. Global Precarity A characteristic of late-modernity, at least in relation to the global North,3 is what Nikolas Rose has called the ‘death of the social’ (Rose, 1996). This demise is usually equated with the roll-back of the welfare state. Originally meant as a collective insurance-based shield against market forces, since the 1980s the welfare state has been residualised through means-testing, privatisation, cuts and the politics of austerity. Companies and businesses, however, have also shed their former social-democratic responsibilities (Boltanski and Chiapello, 2005). Jobs for life, intergenerational career structures, apprenticeships, subsidised canteens, social clubs, sports facilities and company pensions have disappeared. In the mid twentieth century, for the white working class at least, welfarism together with a Fordist employment culture provided a high degree of protection against market forces. Indeed, this was a defining political feature of the West’s racial- and gender-inflected Cold War socialdemocratic settlement (Streeck, 2017). Over the last two or three decades, driven by the neoliberalism of the conservative counter-revolution, this social protection has largely evaporated. Insurance- and company-based social protection has historically been limited or absent in the global South. Late-modern precarity begins here first (Munck, 2013). Encouraged by the imposition of structural adjustment, the South’s informal economies began to rapidly expand from the end the 1970s, absorbing the surplus population thrown off as public-sector employment and services contracted (Cornia, 1987). Moving to catch up, so to speak, by the 1990s a ‘post-social’ economy was consolidating in the global North. While marked differences remain, the North and South have drawn together around the economic logic of precarity. In the latter, fuelled by jobless growth, for several decades a selfreproducing informal sector has been by far the largest employer and supplier of goods and services (Meagher, 2016). For the North, precarity has taken the form of the disappearance of ‘good’ jobs as the casualisation of work has increased. This includes the growth of insecure, poorly paid temporary work and marginal forms of selfemployment (TUC, 2017). Wages have stagnated, and social mobility stalled. Moreover, it is widely accepted that today’s young no longer enjoy the life chances of their parents (Corlett, 2017). Given this downturn, living the dream has meant a massive expansion of debt financing (Streeck, 2017). The acceleration of economic informality in the global South has been matched by the residualisation of market protection in the North. As this conjuncture suggests, the greatest achievement of late-capitalism has been to author an expanding post-social global precariat. While progressive neoliberalism celebrates the exchange of ‘nanny-state’ security for a contingent freedom to consume (Boltanski and Chiapello, 2005), latecapitalism is fraught with contradictions. Reversing a hitherto world-historical trend, since the ‘long boom’ ended in the 1970s there has been a secular decline in the rate of profit. Every recovery from the periodic business cycle has, from this period, been feebler than the last (Brenner, 2006). Recovery from the 2008 financial crisis, for example, has been the weakest and most prolonged on record (Streeck, 2017). Reflecting the realities of the downturn, the new freedom to consume has, to a remarkable degree, been unequally distributed (OECD, 2008; Oxfam, 2016). Precarity is a by-product of the long downturn. It emerges at that historic moment when the economy becomes a site of permanent emergency (Streeck, 2011). A human surplus coexists with the ‘jobless’ growth resulting from the systemic urge to deepen automation at a time of declining profitability (Smith, 2017). Within a post-social world, risk and security have been individuated. Compared to the normative welfare systems of the past, a new disaggregated and personalised biopolitics has emerged. If biopolitical regimes could be likened to animal species, the welfare state catered for the herd. Today, it is the turn of the predator. 4 Rather than share risk, there is a new emphasis on individual responsibility. In the global North, the downturn has spawned a narcissistic culture of bodily fitness, healthy lifestyles and making good choices, while in the South, a post-humanitarian ethic has disaggregated, medicalised and reduced precarity to the basic nutritional, energy, health, sanitation, education, financial and psychic requirements needed to maintain bodily functioning (Jaspars, 2015). Everywhere, resilience, or the injunction to endlessly adapt before unmediated market and environmental forces, has become the zeitgeist of late modernity (Evans and Reid, 2014). As the uncertainty of active unemployment becomes the global work norm, the chronically poor and the disaster-affected have blurred. In an unmediated relationship with their environments, they are both subject to permanent emergency. They constantly change place and, at a time when economy and disaster have blurred, from a post-humanitarian perspective, they become indistinguishable. Since resilience is now equally required of the poor and exposed – as well as the ‘first Post-Humanitarianism 17 Downloaded from manchesteropenhive.com at 04/06/2019 01:04:08AM via free access responders’ – the traditional distinction between developmental and humanitarian relief has also lost its meaning. Disasters are developmental; so development has been set the task of re-wilding a post-social world. Within the economic logic of precarity, however, the global South has a special place. Able to utilise the relatively unregulated conditions existing there (Hosein and Nyst, 2013), rather than eradicating poverty, the role of humanitarian innovation is to experiment, trial and anticipate the means to govern an emerging global precariat (Jacobsen, 2015). In particular, the challenge is to sustain precarity in the sub-prime conditions of the South by optimising its social reproduction. Having devoured, since the 1970s, the last areas of economic and institutional autonomy still outside of itself (Sloterdijk, 2013), other than profitably recycle the precarity it now produces in abundance, so to speak, late-capitalism has no other future.

2022 Michigan Kritik
Cybernetics K Supplement—Wave 1—FMPS › Topshelf › Link—Hacking

Hacking is integral to digital capitalism – corporations lie to achieve surveillance

Burkart 19 (Patrick Burkart, Asistant professor in the Department of Communication @ Texas A&M, “Why Hackers Win: Power and Distribution in the Network Society”, University of California Press, 2019, ) // EL

growth hacks The extent of corporate espionage (or “corporate intelligence”) through hacking is unknown, although Fortune 500 companies use it to maintain defenses against IP theft (Bailey 2016).19 As a byproduct of “digital capitalism” (Schiller 2000), hacking markets flourish at numerous levels (Burkart and McCourt 2017). In addition to markets for exploits and packaged cyber-defense tools, other “growth areas” include insurance against corporate hacking and identity theft (whether these insurance products add or reduce risk is another question). Markets for risk can diminish trust in social and sociotechnical systems, resulting in what Jürgen Habermas (1975) terms a “legitimation crisis.” Although attempts to offload risk have worked for now, we can already see how legitimation problems in cybercrime law and policy are converging with escalating social risk toward catastrophe. As Ulrich Beck proposes, “risk is not synonymous with catastrophe. Risk means the anticipation of the catastrophe. Risks concern the possibility of future occurrences and developments; they make present a state of the world that does not (yet) exist. Whereas every catastrophe is spatially, temporally and socially determined, the anticipation of catastrophe lacks any spatiotemporal or social concreteness” (2009, 9). We address the institutional shaping of social norms in the next chapter. Three cases, in which transnational corporations hacked trusted systems to engage in deceptive and anticompetitive behavior, illustrate the way in which “growth hacks”—a Silicon Valley euphemism “that describes breaking legal or moral rules in a quest for scale” (Roberts 2017)—have migrated from start-up culture to big business. We distinguish growth hacks from “deep hacks” (see chapter 2), which can emanate from outside the marketplace and which reverberate through the systems of technology, law, and society. The first example of a growth hack involves Uber Technologies, which secretly built the Greyball and Hell software tools into its drivers’ smartphone app, enabling the company to operate in markets where its services had been restricted. Uber’s Android rider app “phoned home” to send sensitive user data back to the company (Khandelwal 2014). News Corporation (News Corp) hacked voice-mail accounts and intercepted private communications to generate sensationalized stories for its News of the World tabloid newspaper—which it then tried to cover up. Finally, Volkswagen’s software hack was created to mask excessive emissions by their diesel vehicles, in clear violation of environmental protection rules in the United States and abroad, even as the company sued researchers who had discovered a way to hack its vehicle’s locks. These examples illustrate the ways in which corporations have relied on hacks of trusted systems as a standard business tactic while sometimes using antihacking law to slow discovery of vulnerabilities in their own systems.20 Uber has a particular “reputation for ruthlessness” (Estes 2017). Its business model, based on a trusted-system software platform shared by drivers and users, uses real-time surveillance to match rides more efficiently than taxicabs. To expand into areas where its operations were prohibited, in 2014 the company surreptitiously added the Greyball function to its smartphone app for riders. Greyball allowed Uber to identify and evade potential authorities through practices such as “geofencing,” in which a digital map would locate city government offices and enable drivers to avoid riders from those areas. Besides deceiving regulators, Greyball also allowed Uber to survey social media and mine credit card databases to identify and flag potential government or police employees (Isaac 2017, A1). Another module on the driver app, known by Uber executives and engineers as “Hell,” allowed the company “to track drivers using its biggest competitor in the US, Lyft, and to monitor which of Lyft’s drivers also drove for Uber” (Cook and Price 2017). The Hell and Greyball programs exploited the surveillance features of smartphones on both sides of its platform—driver and rider—to seek anticompetitive advantage in labor markets for drivers and to evade government regulations. Although these deceptive growth hacks contributed to Uber’s business plan by adding scale to its overall market, they also added to a growing list of legal problems (including sexual harassment and antilabor practices) attributed to Uber’s former management. As of this writing, the company is under investigation by the U.S. Department of Justice for Greyball and by the FBI for both the Greyball and Hell initiatives. But Uber remains “unrepentant.” The firm’s response to getting caught deploying Greyball was to denigrate the public investigators and law enforcement who caught them, while at the same time implying that Uber was entitled to pursue hacking its employees’ and customers’ phones as a proprietary business strategy. It employed a classic hacking rationale to protect its trusted system (its private property) from trespass (theft): “This program denies ride requests to users who are violating our terms of service, whether that’s people aiming to physically harm drivers, competitors looking to disrupt our operations, or opponents who collude with officials on secret ‘stings’ meant to entrap drivers,” an Uber spokesperson stated (Estes 2017). Uber was itself breached, as evidenced in May 2014, when two sellers on the anonymous Tor network offered thousands of Uber usernames and passwords that would allow buyers to log in and book rides (Gibbs 2015b). Uber first issued a denial, but in November 2017 the company admitted that it had hidden the breach, in which fifty-seven million driver and rider accounts were stolen from a third-party server, for over a year. After paying a $100,000 ransom, Uber tracked down the hackers and pushed them to sign nondisclosure agreements forbidding them to tell regulators or users that the information was stolen. The company then concealed the ransom by calling it a “bug bounty,” in which hackers are hired to test the security of systems (Isaac, Benner, and Frenkel 2017, B1; Larson 2017b). Yet, as the New York Times noted, “The issue is not legally clear cut. Laws concerning bug bounties are ambiguous. The Justice Department weighed into bug disclosure programs for the first time in July and largely left it to organizations to decide what access they will authorize for hackers and what they can do with the data. . . . Breach disclosure laws also differ state to state. The state laws most relevant to Uber’s case require disclosure if names are exposed in with driver’s license numbers in a ‘breach of security’” (Perlroth and Isaac 2018, A1).21 At News Corp illicit hacking teams appear to have operated regularly under the direction of its board of directors and subsidiaries, depending on the business needs of the day. To bolster readership of News Corp’s well-known tabloids, its journalists have turned to innovative means of gathering information, including brute-force password hacking of voice-mail boxes to access and delete messages. One voicemail box belonged to a teenage UK girl at the center of a missing person’s case, who was later discovered murdered; others belonged to victims of 9/11. A former News of the World employee (Paul McMullan, deputy features editor) offered a wildly bent rationale for his team’s illegal phone hacking. He claimed that surveillance and privacy violations are necessary to acquire exclusive sources for any story: “Phone hacking is a perfectly acceptable tool, given the sacrifices we make, if all we’re trying to do is get to the truth. . . . Privacy is for pedos” (qtd. in Lyall 2011). By 2017 News Corp’s newspapers had settled with more than a thousand phone-hacking victims (Ruddick 2017). That same year News Corp’s News Group apologized in court to a former British intelligence official whose computer had been infected with eBlaster spyware by a “private investigations” firm operating under News Group’s direction (2017a). The legal record strongly suggests that hacking for business advantage is normal operation in News Corp’s TV distribution division as well. Although the company claims to have disproved all allegations of illegal hacks, their extensive computer hacking, including that in the service of “predatory piracy” (Sauer and Tepper 2008), has been traced to roughly 1997. Four separate lawsuits, accusing News Corp firms of hacking copy-protection schemes, revealed a News Corp team dedicated specifically to developing such “black ops” in support of its DirecTV operations. Following a 2011 shareholder action against the company, a court found News Corp’s subsidiary NDS guilty of hacking Vivendi and Echostar TV smart cards and recruiting hackers to distribute counterfeit NagraStar cards to pirate Dish Network signals, beginning in 1997. Specifically, NDS “was accused by satellite company EchoStar of illegally extracting software code from competitors’ cards and posting the information online, allowing hackers to create counterfeit cards that could be used to intercept television programming. A federal jury found that NDS’s practices were illegal and the court subsequently granted EchoStar an injunction preventing NDS from intercepting its satellite signal” (Pilkington 2011). NDS won on appeal to the U.S. Ninth Circuit Court in 2010 and eventually collected $18 million from EchoStar. But in the testimony a witness claimed to have been paid more than $20,000 in cash concealed in CD and DVD players from HarperCollins (a News Corp division) to “develop a pirating program to make DirecTV more secure, not to sabotage rival systems” (Zetter 2008). Researchers have noted that News Corp’s News America Marketing division “has been the subject of five lawsuits alleging anti-competitive behavior . . . [forcing] the company to pay out more than $650 million in settlements to three competitors” (Longstreth and Hals 2011). One suit involving a competitor, Floorgraphics, claimed that “on at least eleven separate occasions between October 2003 and January 2004, News intentionally, knowingly and without authorization breached FGI’s secure computer system and repeatedly accessed, viewed, took and obtained [Floorgraphics’] most sensitive and private information concerning its past and upcoming advertising and marketing programs” (Edwards 2009).22 News America Marketing settled the lawsuit by purchasing Floorgraphics’ contracts midtrial, before the company had finished presenting its case. The claims involving News Corp cluster around breaches of trusted systems, for corporate espionage (theft of intellectual property), hacking news makers and public officials, and circumventing digital-rights management (conditional access controls for competitors’ satellite TV channels). Their pattern begins with News Corp–owned (or majority-owned) companies instigating hacks against competitors, continues with defensive litigation, and typically resolves with a corporate takeover, settlement, or (in the case of News of the World) restructuring.23 As UK regulators evaluate the Murdoch dynasty as “fit and proper” in News Corp’s bid for total ownership of Sky (Sweney 2017), its hacking victims have undermined News Corp’s claims that its standards and practices are, to use British military parlance, tickety-boo. Volkswagen’s software hack enabled cars marketed as “clean diesel” vehicles to “pass” emissions tests despite dirty exhausts, and its discovery triggered international regulatory reforms for car emissions. Installed inside the car, Volkswagen’s defeat device informed the emissions-testing computer when a testing cycle was activated and changed the vehicle’s emissions accordingly. Researchers at West Virginia University discovered cars with hacked chips emitted pollutants almost forty times what was allowed by U.S. regulations (Glinton 2015). After pleading guilty to federal fraud and conspiracy charges, Volkswagen paid $15 billion in fines for software installed in cars made from 2009 to 2015 (McCarthy 2017). It also agreed to compensate individual owners and repair all affected models. An engineer pled guilty to participating in the scheme and was sentenced to a forty-month prison sentence in 2016. New York and Massachusetts attorneys general have pursued a civil case against Volkswagen, claiming that “this was a widespread conspiracy involving many, many people,” including the company’s CEO, who resigned when the scandal went public (Isidore 2016). At the time of this writing, German authorities arrested and held the CEO of Volkswagen’s Audi branch for over three months in an ongoing criminal investigation into emissions-test cheating. With the discovery of its “defeat devices,” Volkswagen found itself on the wrong side of its own hack. But Volkswagen was not charged with creating and deploying defeat devices; it was instead charged with conspiracy to defraud the United States and its customers and to violate the Clean Air Act. However, two years prior to the emissions-hack revelations, Volkswagen sued Flavio Garcia, a computer science security researcher at the University of Birmingham (and his team), to prevent disclosure of a vulnerability in the antitheft system of some Volkswagen vehicles, including high-end sports cars. In this case Volkswagen asked the UK government to censor research findings that the wireless autoignition system was easily hackable by thieves or others with criminal intent. The lawsuit prevented Garcia and his team from presenting their findings at the USENIX Security Conference in Washington, DC, in August 2013 (Trotman 2013).24 Publication of the research (Garcia, Verdult, and Ege 2013) was delayed two years by the suit but was soon followed by a new paper, whose findings were even more serious (Garcia et al. 2016): “Volkswagen left not only its ignition vulnerable but the keyless entry system that unlocks the vehicle’s doors, too. And this time, they say, the flaw applies to practically every car Volkswagen has sold since 1995.” These cars numbered about a hundred million units. With Volkswagen’s security system disclosed as a potential attack vector, the company faces extensive recalls and repairs and possibly other large expenditures related to the vulnerability (although none are reported at the time of this writing). The hack used a cheap, off-the-shelf microcomputer kit (called an Arduino). The suit against the Birmingham researchers raised concerns that the company may have known about the security vulnerability for years. The chip manufacturer that served Volkswagen and other companies noted that VW’s chip uses “a legacy security algorithm, introduced 18 years ago. . . . Our customers are aware” (Greenberg 2016). The UK court’s 2013 order against Flavio Garcia’s team quashed the news of the vulnerabilities and placed an embargo on their publication. The ruling reduced VW’s short-term financial risk in the conflict but potentially increased security risks to the public through vulnerabilities that were known but unfixed for at least two years. These three cases of corporate “growth hacks” are known through their failures; we must ask how many other cases –successful or not— have gone undiscovered and unreported. Each company has offered a unique response to its resulting public-relations nightmare. Volkswagen launched advertisements titled, “Keeping Your Promises” with the tagline, “It’s more than just a car. It’s keeping your promises” (Slater 2016), a campaign seemingly designed to exploit audience ignorance or shortterm memory loss. News Corp’s Rupert Murdoch (sort of) apologized to the family of the dead thirteen-year-old girl whose voice mail was hacked: “As the founder of the company, I was appalled to find out what happened” (“Murdoch Begins” 2011). Uber claimed to have deployed Greyball in charity, “because it was ‘deeply concerned that its driverpartners would be penalized financially’ or otherwise for their driving” (“Uber Faces” 2017). The cases of Uber, News Corp, and Volkswagen share a corporate realpolitik: turnabout is fair play when hacking is part of corporate strategy. Hack your customers, your employees, your competitors, your regulators, and, if expeditious, retaliate if you’re hacked. Deny, disclaim, or even cover up as needed, and offer a counternarrative for plausible deniability. Use antihacking law to your advantage if others find bugs in your trusted systems. None of these cases demonstrates negligence as clearly as they demonstrate hubristic anticompetitiveness. As giant corporations caught abusing trust, their growth hacks add social risk, complexity, and extra layers of secrecy and suspicion to the economy, politics, and the law. They signify the impetus to manipulate trusted systems, a form of “soft power,” to compete for advantage. A hacker’s successful exploit of a trusted system is not the sort of news willingly shared by a company whose reputation and business depends on that system. News of hacking cases bubbles up from industry trade magazines, hacker forums, security email listservs, and other sources removed from the business pages of newspapers and magazines. Hacking tools and techniques allow states and corporations to manipulate sociotechnical systems for advantage, sometimes illegally through outright fraud but more commonly through legal “gray zones.” Nurtured by legal fictions, aporias, and other vagaries, hacking can blur the boundaries between military and corporate intelligence programs, between national and international legal systems, and between corporations and clients. Hacking can catalyze changes in multiple domains and across related subsystems, often in a “cascading” fashion that can escalate the scale of their effects (Landau 2013, 160). Since interconnected networks increasingly are essential to the state’s political and economic functions, they are considered to be among the state’s strategic defense interests. Yet national legal regimes are riddled with inconsistencies that reduce their effectiveness in coordinating social systems and may even exacerbate social risks of hacking.

2022 Michigan Kritik
Cybernetics K Supplement—Wave 1—FMPS › Topshelf › Link—Hacking

Hacking is a corporate tool used to control social realities – it’s intrinsic nature to the cybernetic system means the alternative is the only option

Burkart 19 (Patrick Burkart, Asistant professor in the Department of Communication @ Texas A&M, “Why Hackers Win: Power and Distribution in the Network Society”, University of California Press, 2019, ) // EL

Contemporary geopolitics are in flux as their norms shift and institu- tions realign. Information increasingly is employed as both hard and soft power in struggles that cross the social and technical boundaries of long-standing networks. These struggles are central to what we term the “Network Society.”1 Why Hackers Win: Power and Disruption in the Network Society examines the pressures that have driven global law and policy into ambiguous territory. While many popular and scholarly accounts posit hacking as a means to wobble the trajectory of late capi- talism, we argue the inverse is true. Hacking (offensively through exploits and defensively through cybersecurity) extends and deepens state and corporate proclivities to control social realities. We define “hacking” as unauthorized trespass, breach, or bypass of “trusted sys- tems” for purposes of surveillance and potential theft, manipulation, or destruction of information.2 These systems are based on communica- tion networks in which service providers and users must be authenti- cated to access goods and services. Therefore, user trust in their secu- rity and reliability is essential.3 We focus on the hacking of trusted systems—and not other kinds of readily accessible systems—because the template for their protection has been refined in key areas of law, technology, and society. We posit hacking as a generalized symbolic medium, like power and money, which can be collected and mobilized to influence communica- tion systems. In the process hacking affords opportunities to bypass exist- ing law and policy through force. Our purpose in Why Hackers Win is to examine hacking as a corporate and state strategy for managing risk. Ulrich Beck claims that “being at risk is the way of being and ruling in the world of modernity; being at global risk is the human condition at the beginning of the twenty-first century” (2006, 330). Given the immense complexity of the Network Society, state and corporate actors seek greater self-awareness and certainty. Hacking enables these actors to seek out their blind spots in online boundaries and activities. This knowl- edge is valuable for maintaining systems and exposing risks. Hacking (offensively through exploits or defensively through cybersecurity) reflects common social impulses to survey, to measure, to model, and to predict. While hacking often is viewed as essentially disruptive to social structures, we argue the inverse is true. States and corporations seek to maintain their standing and seek competitive advantage through hacking campaigns. The creation of markets for exploits and cybersecurity also affords new opportunities to develop and exchange commodities. Conse- quently, to preserve national-security prerogatives and develop global markets for hacking technologies, states have resisted legal regimes to contain hacking by institutions—even as they have enacted draconian laws against hacking by individuals. We find that hacking and cybersecurity reinforce and accelerate each other in trusted systems. While ostensibly antagonistic, both increasingly share a common grounding in intellectual property. For hackers the value of hacking victims, or “data subjects,” is not so much in their personally identifiable information, which is gathered and com- modified by trusted systems. Instead, hackers exploit the “intellectual property” that gathers and commodifies this information within these systems to squeeze revenues through phishing and fraud. A secondary value is that hacking provides data for valuing insurance products and refining cybersecurity products already in use. In turn, cybersecurity offers possibilities for developing intellectual property in the military and civilian sectors, particularly in software and services. Both private security firms and state military and police forces claim to have evolved cybersecurity and cyber warfare into a “science,” in which knowledge and expertise are increasingly institutionalized in higher education and corporate management. Both markets and militaries view offensive hacking techniques (intrusion software like malware and botnets) and defensive countermeasures as new opportunities to generate power and money and manage risk. Much like the “dual-use” nature of exploits themselves and consist- ent with other domains in the Network Society, the boundaries between private and public are blurred and indeterminate. In the neoliberal era the economic system has assumed more and more responsibility for allocating risk through the market function of pricing, and the state has turned more areas of social welfare over to markets in an elaborated process of risk management and deregulation.4 Similarly, states increas- ingly outsource both hacking and cybersecurity as a means of manag- ing risk. Internet service providers perform state surveillance by proxy, and states (including the United States) frequently employ independent spyware and hacking firms to supplement their operations. Innovations such as insurance against corporate hacking and identity theft also reflect the commodification of hacking risks. When these responsibili- ties are outsourced to the market, risks are distributed in patterns that can reinforce social inequalities. The economy provides markets for risk management, but “with the economic exploitation of the risks it sets free, industrial society produces the hazards and the political potential of the risk society” (Beck 1992b, 23). Through all these means hacking represents an interface between technical code (the structure of trusted systems), legal code (the laws that govern their access and use), and social code (their impact on soci- ety, particularly in terms of privacy and sanctioned activity). As a grow- ing portion of the global economy is based in digital trusted systems, we find a proportional growth in the vulnerabilities inherent to these systems: the buggy software, the unprotected account access, and the availability of personally identifying information to others on the inter- net. Although hacking ostensibly undermines their own security, corpo- rations and states paradoxically use hacking for gain. Hacking can suit a broad spectrum of purposes, including gathering intelligence, managing crises, and accumulating competitive advantages over rivals. Some “exfiltration” hacks have successfully stolen data such as business plans, while some failed episodes have landed spies in jail (Landau 2013). The “hack-back,” an attempt by victims of cyberattacks to get into the hack- er’s computer, can try to ascertain the fallout from the initial breach, as well as knowledge about any new schemes and risks of future breaches. While examining abuses of power through computer vulnerabilities and exploits, we have not found “master conspiracies” of surveillance and espionage, or even a systematic imposition of will, in coordinated hack- ing campaigns. Instead, we see a proliferation of agents contributing to offenses and defenses played in long games and embedded in global net- works. In our view hacking has become a mundane, “business as usual” application of force for many enterprises. The development of hacking and cybersecurity together also fore- grounds paradoxes for social systems. Hacking is now integrated into state and corporate activities, especially where business or security interests are invested in maintaining trusted systems. Organizations may hack for advantages over rivals by exploiting vulnerabilities in trusted systems. At the same time organizations may hack their own trusted systems or invite others to hack them (sometimes called penetration testing or “pen testing”) for purposes of cybersecurity. “Red Team v. Blue Team” exercises take pen testing to active warfare levels— one team trying to break in while the other defends. (In cybersecurity gospel “Red team ALWAYS wins eventually. Blue just holds on as long as they can.”) “Red teaming” is embraced and institutionalized by the U.S. Department of Defense, where “in the cyber world, offense and defense stemmed from the same tools and techniques” (Kaplan 2016, 260). In all these scenarios hacking activity provides recursive knowledge about trusted systems and the communication systems in which they are embedded. In turn, these reflexive processes can exercise coercive force in these systems. Whether or not they encounter defenses, an exploit delivered through the right attack vector can contribute to cybernetic feedback loops within systems. These loops appear to be generated with increasing frequency, as hacking campaigns (or cyberat- tacks) proliferate together with mass data breaches. Our approach to technology foregrounds the role of human agents and institutions in communication. We argue that technologies are socially constructed rather than deterministic and autonomous. Not- withstanding the impact of technological change on the economy and society, even our most powerful technologies do not operate independ- ently of human controls such as market exchange, law, policy, and cul- tural norms. Why Hackers Win takes a sociological perspective on hack- ing, viewing it as one of many activities that constitute communication in social systems. If we view the cybernetic arena as a social system, hacking serves to differentiate the components of this system, which then adapts accordingly. The system as a whole is reconfigured, with consequences for political, economic, and legal systems, among others. Hacking and its codependent, cybersecurity, therefore contribute to encoding communication in social systems rather than undermining them. This idea is informed by Jürgen Habermas’s (1984, 1987) theory of communicative action and his dualistic “system and lifeworld” analysis of modern societies. Accordingly, hacking is related to digital piracy as a means of cultural reproduction (Burkart 2011, 2014). In the absence of a tightly regulated market for cybersecurity and component exploits, hacking has greater freedom to “steer” interactions between states, markets, and laws. If the legal system were to suppress the proliferation of commercial hacking tools and spyware, the risks perpetuated by cyber insecurity might improve. But the legal system is not designed to do this; in fact, it contributes to systemic risk by enabling legal or gray markets for vulnerabilities. We argue that the conjoining of intellectual property and cyber defense in copyright law and policy adds additional levels of risk for society as a whole. This is in part because hacking and data breaches are not just episodic bugs; rather, they are routine and institutionalized features of the system. The growth of cybersecurity software and related industries also impact these institutions and rou- tines, contributing social effects in the process. Although social-technical systems for media, business and finance, and defense are increasingly globalized, the nation-state still provides the basis for law and policy governing hacking. But the coherence and continuity of law and policy within nation-states can fall on a contin- uum from anarchic to totalitarian. Hacking therefore illustrates “gov- ernance in areas of limited statehood” (Risse 2013). The relative depend- ence or independence of hacking on law and policy can turn on a variety of factors. Why Hackers Win addresses cases where new laws on hacking have conflicted with both received policy traditions and emer- gent policy regimes and where hacking still occupies legal gray areas. Judicial review is not fully incorporated into many decision-making processes; broad categories of hacking remain the privilege of the state and therefore are exempted from the rule of law. Even hacking by pri- vate firms may be absolved by the state (such as when telecommunica- tions carriers received retroactive immunity from illegal wiretapping violations).5 Secrecy and self-regulation are the rule for states and firms, with little concern for values and norms for personal privacy. Numerous national and international legal systems have categorized piracy and hacking as cybercrimes, which has intertwined their history and led us to consider them as distinct but related aspects of communica- tive social action. As with piracy, the conflicts surrounding trusted sys- tems center on issues of ownership and control, based on the right to share private property or exclude others from access. It remains as unlikely today as it did in 2006, when we wrote Digital Music Wars, that a universal standard for digital-rights management will be adopted by even a single industry. But the reprising of digital-rights–management models for managing cybersecurity risks and the securitization of intellectual property in military cybersecurity policy suggest that guidelines for ntellectual-property theft will dominate discourse over how to define and prioritize cyber threats. We also anticipate that enterprises depend- ent on trusted systems will employ technology practices, legal activities, and political lobbying to strengthen pecuniary rights at the expense of the public good. However unjust they may be, “consumption norms” already have gelled for trusted systems—along with their bases in sur- veillance and intellectual property (Burkart 2010, 2014). In the aggregate of digital dirty tricks and the attack vectors that enable them, we find an unfolding, alternative history of technological development and its impact on society. We conclude our study with a reflection on the overt and covert applications of hacking and cybersecurity by states and cor- porations and the importance of research and activist groups in drawing attention to these activities. Without their efforts the question of who is responsible for guarding the public interest in the Network Society seems to answer itself: no one. The development of hacking and its dou- ble star, cybersecurity, offers another example of how ostensibly resistant technologies and practices may be contained, controlled, and repurposed to suit the instrumental purposes of state and corporate power.

2022 Michigan Kritik
Cybernetics K Supplement—Wave 1—FMPS › Topshelf › Link—DOD

The DOD technologizes war and expands it across the globe while enabling it to boomerang home in the form of domestic repression.

Wilson 20( Neil, Masters in Conflict Studies and Human Rights and Utrecht University, “Understanding the Battle for AI in Warfare through the Practices of Assemblage: A Case Study of Project Maven”, Section 6.3, CS)

Examining the practices of antipolitics and reassembly in this context reveal a new form for the Military-Technological Complex. Bridging the divide between the material power of the DoD and social power of civil society, a new breed of “defence-tech” companies like Anduril have carved out a niche as bespoke contractors. Having drawn engineering talent from both traditional defence companies and Silicon Valley, they exclusively but openly court defence contracts, invoking a discourse of patriotism without risking the alienation of a wider consumer market. The ease and speed with which they began providing this work speaks to the significant power of the DoD and, in turn, the resilience of the Military-Technological Complex as an assemblage. Underlying this entire process is a constant tension between the predominantly compulsory power of the DoD and the predominantly productive power of civil society. Sizeable contracts provide a compelling material incentive for many tech companies to provide the technologies sought by the DoD, but are in conflict with the ethical pitfalls publicised by civil society. In some ways, each mimics the other. As the DoD has adopted a discourse of patriotism to assuage ethical concerns, civil society has underlined the material risk to businesses with large consumer markets seen to be enabling these developments in warfare. As a result, the civil-military industrial divide appears more porous than ever, raising valuable questions about contemporary warfare. Project Maven exemplifies a certain fluidity, in that its technologies were originally developed for the consumer market, weaponised by the DoD for drone footage analysis, and are now being “re-legitimised” through their transfer back into the civilian sphere for humanitarian and public health purposes. Such a process arguably reflects a late-modern - or liquid modern - blurring of the boundaries between war and peace, military and civilian, public and private. A blurring civil-military distinction in this regard must be understood in the context of a geographically and temporally expanding militarism observed in the rise of “unending” and “everywhere” wars. Similarly, in Graham’s conceptualisation of the “battlespace” of cities, he observes it “has no front and no back and no start or end… the concept… thus works by collapsing convention al military-civilian binaries.” Common to these suggestions that conventional ties between war, space and time are coming undone, however, is a focus on their practice. The ascendancy of the Military-Technological Complex suggests that the nebulous expansion of warfare across space and time not only pertains to how it is practiced but also how its means are developed and procured. It is not a stretch to suggest that this expansion, in turn, risks normalising new imaginations of violence. And given that “violence needs to be imagined in order to be carried out,” one wonders where this normalisation may lead. Conceptualising the Military-Technological Complex as an assemblage is particularly appropriate in the context of liquid modernity. Absent of rigid, ‘arboretic’ structures, it takes shape in a manner consistent with Bauman’s interpretation of sociality, “spreading rhizomically and sprouting formations of varying degree of durability, but invariably unstable, hotly contested and devoid of foundation to rely on.” Fluidity of formation and re-formation in this regard, however, should be regarded as “a feature of state power, not a bug.” Instead of the state standing separately to the private sphere, it is intimately embedded within it and continually reproducing its power through it. Lastly, directly relevant to this “undoing” of conventional warfare and fluidity of the military-civilian divide is Foucualt’s ‘boomerang’, which suggests the practices - and technologies - of peripheral subjugation inevitably return to the centre. Or, as Marx suggested, the scenario of “war [being] developed earlier than peace.” Indeed, many have noted the ways in which the United States’ war on terror has already “come home to roost” in the form of widespread surveillance and militarised police forces. One of the most overt and egregious examples can be seen in the recent use of an MQ-9 Predator drone for surveilling Black Lives Matter protests in Minneapolis. It is not known whether this drone was utilising the technologies developed in Project Maven. But nor is it hard to imagine.

2022 Michigan Kritik
Cybernetics K Supplement—Wave 1—FMPS › Topshelf › Link—Diplomacy

Our interpretation evinces the new era of geopolitics – the figure of the diplomat is no longer the representative of nation-states, but rather collectivizes epistemological production. Our understanding of IR formulates a new diplomat that promotes a planetarization based around technodiversity.

Guinard et al 20 (Martin, curateur in charge of conferences and publications, LUMA Arles; Bruno Latour, a French philosopher, anthropologist and sociologist; Ping Lin, e-flux editors; “Editorial: You and I Don’t Live on the Same Planet” December 2020) //ansel is hungry

On the occasion of the Taipei Biennial 2020 and together with the Taipei Fine Arts Museum (TFAM), this special issue of e-flux journal will also be available to read in Chinese in 2021. Titled “You and I Don’t Live on the Same Planet,” the issue deals with an increasingly pressing situation: people “around” the world no longer agree on what it means to live “on” earth—to such a radical extent that the foundational material and existential categories of “earth” and “world” are profoundly destabilized. It was often said at the beginning of Trump’s time in office that he had no coherent strategy. But today we can see that, on the contrary, he had an extremely coherent strategy that unfolded over four years without fail: privatization, deregulation, and isolating the US from any international project. The message of this strategy was clear: “You and I don’t live on the same planet.” What becomes of politics when opposing parties are taken as aliens occupying separate earths altogether? It is as if the question no longer concerns different visions of the same planet, but the composition and shape of several planets in conflict with one another. Pluralism has taken a much more explicit ontological shape, as if we are literally living on different earths—and earths that are at war with each other, as the essay in this issue “Coping with Planetary Wars” explores. Successive “world orders” have treated planet earth as a fairly homogeneous place where different kinds of resources, different kinds of interests, and different kinds of sovereignties are all unified by one homogenous and overarching concept of Nature. This issue explores the consequences of what Eduardo Viveiro de Castro calls a shift from multiculturalism to “multinaturalism.” As we approach a series of tipping points, we simultaneously witness a division between those who seem to have abandoned planet earth, those who try to make it more habitable, and those whose cosmology never fit within the ideals of the globalizing project in the first place. This state of division flies in the face of many twentieth-century strategies of political ecology—especially the principle that the high stakes of political ecology justify bypassing the tedious process of negotiation and deliberation typical for political action. Unanimity was supposed to rally the masses in a strong revolutionary push to “save the planet.” However, for the last forty years, we have seen that ecology does not unify. Instead, ecology divides. It divides the generations who will deal with its failures from those who will escape its consequences; it divides the regions already affected by climate disasters from those that are protected; within each region, it divides the classes that suffer disproportionately from decisions made by other classes; furthermore, it divides each one of us at the personal level: for each decision we face, we know there are cascades of unintended consequences that make it hard to distinguish the right actions from the wrong ones. What Bruno Latour has elsewhere called the “New Climatic Regime” poses problems at every magnitude of scale and blurs the classical political cartography.1 As Chun-Mei Chuang writes in this issue: “Our place is neither conservative nor progressive. It is molecular and planetary.” To characterize this new spatial configuration, Dipesh Chakrabarty offers a brief history of ways of conceiving of the planets, while Eduardo Viveiros de Castro and Déborah Danowski explore the consequences of the turn from a philosophy of history to a philosophy of space, epitomized by the dismantling of the Axial Age thesis.2 In which direction should we go once these divisions are established and assumed? The objective here is to try to imagine procedures that would allow these incommensurable worlds not so much to “dialogue”—which is not sufficient for the enormous differences in ways of inhabiting the world—but to enter into diplomatic negotiations. The diplomacy that is evoked here does not lie within the existing framework of nation-states, which have, to say the least, many limitations with regard to the New Climate Regime. At the international level, the various UN Conferences of the Parties (COPs) have shown only moderate efficacy. The state may be relevant for choosing whether to shift away from coal or to impose regulations prohibiting the consumption of single-use plastics, but when it comes to managing “trans-boundary hazards” or reducing CO2 produced outside a state’s borders, a framework other than that of the nation-state and intergovernmental negotiations needs to be imagined. In this issue, John Tresch, through his research on “cosmograms,” searches for a representation of this space to be invented, while Erika Balsom looks at how documentary cinema can depict those encounters at the “third register.” As Adam Tooze argues in his essay, diplomacy must be understood here as a mode of negotiation in a world without arbiters, without a higher authority capable of regulating the actions of the various collectives concerned. Of course, being horizontal rather than vertical in its mode of operation does not mean that there is no balance of power. Taiwan is perfectly positioned to explore this theme. Due to its particular exclusion from the international order, the Taiwanese government has constantly created innovative ways of asserting its existence. For example, in the 1990s it funded the University of the African Future, an elite pan-African university in Senegal whose history is traced in this issue by artists and curators Hamedine Kane, Stéphane Verlet-Bottéro, Olivia Anani, and Lou Mo. But Taiwan is also a place where geological power is felt: an island that trembles, where erosion is severe and typhoons common, and which does not escape the problems of dependence on coal and extractivism. In short, Taiwan is the ideal place to explore geopolitics in both senses of the word: geological and political. It is on the basis of the cleavages arising from this new geopolitics that a new form of diplomacy can be formulated. As Isabelle Stengers writes in this issue, the statement “‘we are divided’ should first be understood … in an active sense, pointing to what divides us, that is, to what has destroyed the feeling of interdependence as an operative political affect.” In this sense, the figure of the diplomat is changing: it is no longer a representative of a state, but rather an investigator of collective dependencies who has the capacity to help these collectivities formulate their obligations towards what must be maintained. In other words, the diplomat is an “epistemic messenger,” as Paul B. Preciado writes in this issue. What remains to be explored is how to set up such collectives and how to grant oneself the right to represent them. When one world vampirically preys upon the resources of another, diasporas may play the mediating role of stitching together torn geographies, as Nadia Yala Kisukidi proposes. She emphasizes the modalities of living in several worlds at the same time rather than assigning a place-based identity to diasporas. By exploring this form of geopolitics, Kisukidi traces a path away from the “poor dialectic” that binds France and the Democratic Republic of the Congo. For Yuk Hui, the figure of the diplomat mutates into that of the “knowledge producer,” promoting a planetarization based on a diversity of ways to understand technology. A new appreciation of technodiversity might help us break out of the global hegemony within which planetarization has become stuck. And with a concern that this situation may result in new forms of “techno-molecular colonialism,” Achille Mbembe draws the contours of an ethic that is not based on a “diaphanous universalism,” but on “commonality and incalculability” among the living. Relying on a more traditional definition of inter-state diplomacy, Pierre Charbonnier urges ecological discourse to change its moralist tone and develop a realpolitik approach. The author sees China’s announcement that it will achieve carbon neutrality by 2060 as a way of asserting its power on the international stage. An undemocratic ecology is on the march. Such a context can be instructive for European environmental movements advocating ecological justice by consensus in ways that limit their ability to defend concrete interests. Even with such a “realist” approach to the situation, can we truly envisage negotiating with everyone? As the well-known doctrine goes, “You can’t negotiate with terrorists.” But what of the state-subsidized terror of preventing legal abortion? Preciado identifies a set of countries, from the US to Afghanistan, that shares a set of repressive policies on abortion. The diplomacy to be invented in this case must be one that incorporates the logic of resistance, otherwise the opponents of this techno-patriarchal bloc will lose all their leverage.

Adam Tooze, for his part, wants to clarify the modalities that make it possible to speak between opposing camps: one cannot negotiate with the hyper-privileged who abandon earth to fly towards “planet escape.”3 An irresponsible project that places so little value on the lives of the masses can only be a crime against humanity, whose adequate response is not diplomatic (horizontal) negotiation, but a hierarchically organized (vertical) trial. According to Tooze, the growing concern about a world that may become uninhabitable makes ecology less a question of superior metaphysical force than an increasingly credible cause. Tooze concludes: “Let us look for every chance for ‘diplomatic encounters.’ But let us reckon with the pervasive force of the emergency that our instruments so clearly register and let us not ignore complementary action” in the realm of traditional politics

2022 Michigan Kritik
Cybernetics K Supplement—Wave 1—FMPS › Topshelf › Link—Death?

Foucault kindly and shyly, in his style, tells Deleuze: you know, I must confess to you that the word “desire” disgusts me. I would prefer to use the word “pleasure,” would you agree? Deleuze does not agree at all.

Bifo 20 (Franco “Bifo” Berardi, founder of the famous Radio Alice in Bologna and an important figure in the Italian Autonomia movement, is a writer, media theorist, and social activist, “Desire, Pleasure, Senility, and Evolution”) // ‘ansel’

This essay is short and inconsistent. It grew out of a talk I gave at the e-flux conference “Art After Culture” in June 2019. When I was invited to speak, the subject I proposed was: “Desire, Pleasure, Evolution.” I will begin with a few things about those topics, but will move on to other things, namely senility and evolution.

So, desire and pleasure. I recently discovered that somewhere—I don’t remember exactly where—Gilles Deleuze recounts the story of an exchange between himself and Michel Foucault. Before leaving the house of Deleuze, Foucault kindly and shyly, in his style, tells Deleuze: you know, I must confess to you that the word “desire” disgusts me. I would prefer to use the word “pleasure,” would you agree?

2022 Michigan Kritik
Cybernetics K Supplement—Wave 1—FMPS › Topshelf › Link—Cyber—Securitization

Cybersecurity logics are false – threats stem from unpredictability of cyber itself which the aff reproduces

Hansen & Nissenbaum 9 (Lene Hansen & Helen Nissenbaum, IR scholar and Professor at University of Copenhagen & Professor of Information Science at Cornell Tech, “Digital Disaster, Cyber Security, and the Copenhagen School”, International Studies Quarterly, Volume 53, Issue 4, 12/2/9, ) // EL

Securitizing Digital Systems: The Referent Objects of Cyber Security The history of cyber security as a securitizing concept begins with the disciplines of Computer and Information Science. One, if not the first, usage of cyber security was in the Computer Science and Telecommunications Board’s (CSTB) report from 1991, Computers at Risk: Safe Computing in the Information Age which defined ‘‘security’’ as the ‘‘protection against unwanted disclosure, modification, or destruction of data in a system and also [to] the safeguarding of systems themselves’’ (CSTB 1991:2). Security comprised technical as well as human aspects and ‘‘it has significant procedural, administrative, physical facility, and personnel components’’ (CSTB 1991:17). Crucially, threats to cyber security do not only arise from (usually) intentional agents, but also from systemic threats. These systemic threats, defined by Hundley and Anderson (1995 ⁄ 1996:232) as ‘‘cyberspace safety’’ stems from the inherent unpredictability of computers and information systems which by themselves ‘‘create unintended (potentially or actually) dangerous situations for themselves or for the physical and human environments in which they are embedded.’’ Threats arise from software as well as hardware failures and cannot be corrected through perfecting digital technology and programming; there is, in short, an inherent ontological insecurity within computer systems (Edwards 1996:290–2; Denning 1999:12). ‘‘Computer security’’ would not, however, in most cases by itself qualify as a security concept according to the Copenhagen School. As Helen Nissenbaum points out, the majority of computer scientists adopt a technical discourse that is focused on developing good programs with a limited number of (serious) bugs and systems that are difficult to penetrate by outside attackers. In the move from ‘‘computer security’’ to ‘‘cyber security,’’ this technical discourse is linked to the securitizing discourse ‘‘developed in the specialized arena of national security’’ (Nissenbaum 2005:65). ‘‘Cyber security’’ can, in short, be seen as ‘‘computer security’’ plus ‘‘securitization.’’ In the 1991 CSTB report it is argued that ‘‘We are at risk’’ and in a remarkable mobilization of securitizing prose that ‘‘Tomorrow’s terrorist may be able to do more damage with a keyboard than with a bomb.’’ No major attacks have been launched so far, but it is a key element of securitizing discourse to argue that if action is not undertaken then serious incidents will materialize in the near future, thus ‘‘there is reason to believe that our luck will soon run out’’ (CSTB 1991:7–8). The constitution of a much too complacent audience that does not realize the magnitude of these dangers is another key staple of securitizing discourse, and the CSTB laments that ‘‘Very few individuals not professionally concerned with security … have ever been directly involved in or affected by a computer security incident. … most people have difficulty relating to the intricacies of malicious computer actions’’ (CSTB 1991:159–61). Eleven years later, most Americans have been exposed to (scares of) computer viruses, worms, and hackers, yet the Board complains that in spite of the reports produced over the past years, ‘‘not much has changed with respect to security as it is practiced.’’ As the threats to cyber security have increased while the countermeasures have not, ‘‘our ability and willingness to deal with threats have, on balance, changed for the worse’’ (CSTB 2002:2). In another attempt to stress the urgency and wake up policy makers and the broader public, the report is titled Cybersecurity Today and Tomorrow: Pay Now or Pay Later. A similar tone is struck a year later in the so-far most authoritative and comprehensive statement of US cyber security policy: President Bush’s The National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace which opens by asserting that ‘‘In the past few years, threats in cyberspace have risen dramatically.’’ Although a large-scale cyber attack has not yet taken place, this is no time to ‘‘be too sanguine’’ as ‘‘the attack tools and methodologies are becoming widely available, and the technical capability and sophistication of users bent on causing havoc or disruption is improving’’ (The National Strategy 2003:viii). Key to understanding the potential magnitude of cyber threats is the networked character of computer systems. These networks ‘‘control physical objects such as electrical transformers, trains, pipeline pumps, chemical vats, and radars’’ (The National Strategy 2003:6–7) and attacks—or ‘‘cyberdisasters’’—would ‘‘compromise systems and networks in ways that could render communications and electric power distribution difficult or impossible, disrupt transportation and shipping, disable financial transactions, and result in the theft of large amounts of money’’ (CSTB 2002:6). Although not necessarily directly connected, the magnitude and simultaneity of these attacks would have cascading effects and thus networked consequences for referent objects beyond networks themselves. Networked computers have also dissolved the traditional boundary protecting the territorial nation state, ‘‘the infrastructure that makes up cyberspace—software and hardware—is global in its design and development’’ and cyber attackers may operate at a distance obfuscating ‘‘their identities, locations, and paths of entry’’ (The National Strategy 2003:7; Yould 2003). To give an indication of how an attack transgresses territorial boundaries, RAND’s ‘‘The Day After… in Cyberspace II’’ exercise in 1996 drew up a list (Anderson and Hearn 1996:4–5) including electronic looting of European and American banks by (unspecified) Russians, software computer viruses causing financial havoc and plane and train crashes, power grid fall-outs at airbases, malfunctioning of ATMs and news broadcasts, and stock market manipulation. RAND’s scenario shows aptly how cyber security discourse moves seamlessly across distinctions normally deemed crucial to Security Studies: between individual and collective security, between public authorities and private institutions, and between economic and political-military security. The private sector’s fear of hackers stealing large sums of money, intellectual property owner’s worry that file sharing compromises their rights and revenues (Nissenbaum 2005:68), and public, private, and civil society scares that bugged software and computer viruses will have damaging consequences produce a powerful blending of private-economic and public-national security concerns. Not only are large parts of the networks, hardware, and software privately produced and owned and thus governed by financial considerations, but the security logics of the economic and the cyber sector have crucial similarities. The economic sector is also ‘‘rich in referent objects, ranging from individuals through classes and states to the abstract and complex system of the global market itself’’ (Buzan et al. 1998:100), and in liberal economies instability and risk taking is built into the logic of capitalism itself. The modern economic system is, like the cyber network, constituted by trans-border flows, and authority and sovereignty is more ambiguously located than in traditional national-military security. It is in both sectors often difficult to identify where an attack originated, and with the global reach of the Internet⁄world economy, tricky questions of responsibility and enforcement are continuous sources of fraught cross-border and international treaty negotiations. That said, cyber security does not fully mirror the economic sector either: its securitizing potential exceeds that of the economic sector as strictly defined (Buzan et al. 1998:116–7) and this in turn allows—or is an indication of—a much stronger link to national military security. Cyber security is not left to the liberal market, but implies a complex constellation of public-private responsibility and governmental authority. Drawing upon the individual-collective resolution laid out above, the government consistently holds the private sector co-responsible for cyber security: not only does the latter own major parts of the computer network, it also possesses the knowledge—‘‘In general, the private sector is best equipped and structured to respond to an evolving cyber threat’’ (The National Strategy 2003:ix). Mobilizing civil liberties discourse further invokes a crucial balance between the public and the private that should not be violated: ‘‘The federal government should likewise not intrude into homes and small businesses, into universities, or state and local agencies and departments to create secure computer networks’’ (The National Strategy 2003:11). To the government this allows for a distribution of the financial and political burden and it strategically engages critics who point to privacy violations. To the private sector, these securitizations boost its calls for the protection of intellectual property rights, for vigilant prosecution of cyber crimes, and for combating digital anonymity (Nissenbaum 2005:68). Negotiation of the boundaries between the public and the private and between the economic and the political thus couples the network-fragmentation implied by ‘‘cyber’’ with an understanding of business and government as sharing the same goal. At the same time the political center still constitutes the private sector as responsible for major parts of the digital realm. This academic and policy discourse articulates in sum a wide array of threats to government, business, individuals, and society as a whole perpetuated by hackers, criminals, terrorists, commercial organizations, and nations that adopt cyber strategies for financial, ideological, political, or military gain (Hundley and Anderson 1995 ⁄ 1996:232). Yet obviously not all political or societal actors concur with the manner in which official American cyber security discourse has attempted to keep the public-private and individual-state resolutions in place. As Ronald J. Deibert (2002) and Diana Saco (1999) have argued, cyber security is a terrain on which multiple discourses and (in)securities compete.6 Privacy advocates and cyber libertarians point to governmental violations of personal security (Saco 1999), and authoritarian (and not so authoritarian) regimes securitize transborder information flows as threats to regime ⁄state security and national (societal) identity in a way that expands the threat-referent object constellation considerably (Deibert 2002). The question is therefore how we incorporate this complexity into our theoretical framework without loosing the sense of cyber security discourse as a distinct phenomenon? Deibert (2002) argues that cyber security is constituted through four separate discourses with distinct referent objects, threats, policy options, and world orders: national security, state security (comprising external threats to state sovereignty as well as internal threats to regime security), private security, and network security, and Saco holds that national and personal security compete (Saco 1999:270, 286). We agree with Deibert that cyber security should be theorized as a sector where multiple discourses may be found, yet we think that understanding this multi-discursivity as arising from competing articulations of constellations of referent objects, rather than separate referent objects, better captures the securitizing and political dynamic of the field. To see cyber security discourse as fragmenting along the lines of distinct referent objects downplays the ways in which cyber security discourse gains its coherence from making connections between referent objects rather than operating at separate tracks. Particularly crucial in the case of cyber security is the linkage between ‘‘networks’’ and ‘‘individual’’ and human collective referent objects. Thus it is not the case that a private security discourse constitutes the individual as its referent object, but rather that ‘‘the individual’’ of this discourse is linked to societal and political referent objects. Take the example of post-September 11 battles between governmental discourses legitimizing digital surveillance and data-mining through securitizing reference to the War on Terror and citizen groups fighting this legislation through reference to basic civic liberties and privacy issues. These are not two separate discourses with unrelated referent objects, but competing articulations of the appropriate individual-state contracts of the liberal state (Saco 1999:271). Moreover, it is not fully clear from Deibert’s and Saco’s accounts whether private security discourse operates through the political rather than the semantic modality of security. This does not mean that cyber ‘‘privacy’’ cannot be securitized, but this has to be mediated through a collective referent object, either a political-ideological one, questioning the appropriateness of the individual-state balance, and⁄ or a national-societal one, mobilizing the values held to be the core of the community’s identity. Similarly, a securitization of the network cannot, and does not, stop at the network itself: it is the implications of network break-downs for other referent objects, ‘‘society,’’ ‘‘the regime,’’ or ‘‘the economy’’ (which is, again, in turn linked to ‘‘state’’ and ‘‘society’’) that makes cyber securitization a plausible candidate for political and media attention. Securitization works in short by tying referent objects together, particularly by providing a link between those that do not explicitly invoke a bounded human collectively, such as ‘‘network’’ or ‘‘individual,’’ with those that do. Contestation and multidiscursivity is thus found between competing articulations of linked referent objects as well as by tracing the potential internal instability of each discourse.

2022 Michigan Kritik
Cybernetics K Supplement—Wave 1—FMPS › Topshelf › Link—Cyber—Securitization

The aff’s hypersecuritization of cybersecurity stems from itself – disasters of cyber systems happen as a result of their initial investment

Hansen & Nissenbaum 9 (Lene Hansen & Helen Nissenbaum, IR scholar and Professor at University of Copenhagen & Professor of Information Science at Cornell Tech, “Digital Disaster, Cyber Security, and the Copenhagen School”, International Studies Quarterly, Volume 53, Issue 4, 12/2/9, ) // EL

Hypersecuritization The first concept, hypersecuritization, has been introduced by Buzan (2004:172) to describe an expansion of securitization beyond a ‘‘normal’’ level of threats and dangers by defining ‘‘a tendency both to exaggerate threats and to resort to excessive countermeasures.’’ This definition has an objectivist ring to it in that to identify ‘‘exaggerated’’ threats implies that there are ‘‘real’’ threats that are not exaggerated. Moreover, the question of whether a securitization is seen as ‘‘exaggerating’’ concerns the degree to which it is successful (unsuccessful securitizations are seen as ‘‘exaggerating’’) and is not part of the grammatical specificities of sectors. Thus we suggest to drop the ‘‘exaggerated’’ from the definition of hypersecuritization and to apply it to the cyber sector to identify the striking manner in which cyber security discourse hinges on multi-dimensional cyber disaster scenarios that pack a long list of severe threats into a monumental cascading sequence and the fact that neither of these scenarios has so far taken place. All securitizations do of course have an element of the hypothetical in that they constitute threats that must be countered, and thus mobilize an ‘‘if-then’’ logic, but what distinguishes hypersecuritizations from ‘‘mere’’ securitization is their instantaneity and inter-locking effects (Denning 1999:xiii). This combination draws critically from the securitization of the network (Deibert 2002), yet the power of hypersecuritization stems not only from a securitization of the network itself, but from how a damaged network would cause societal, financial, and military break-down hence bringing in all other referent objects and sectors. Securitizations always mobilize the specter of the future to some extent, but most nevertheless articulate the past as a legitimating reference that underscores the gravity of the situation. Looking to the Cold War, the logic of nuclear deterrence relied upon projections of a nuclear exchange that had not taken place, yet there were the devastations of Hiroshima and Nagasaki to be used as a yardstick for what nuclear war would imply. Cyber securitizations on the other hand have no similar history of founding incidents to base themselves on but try to conjure historical analogies such as ‘‘electronic Pearl Harbors’’ (Bendrath 2003:50).7 The combination of cascading disasters and the absence of a prior incident of that magnitude creates a crucial ambiguity within cyber security discourse. The extreme reliance on the future and the enormity of the threats claimed at stake makes the discourse susceptible to charges of ‘‘exaggeration,’’ yet the scale of the potential catastrophe simultaneously raises the stakes attached to ignoring the warnings.8 Turning the absence of prior incidences in the opposite direction, the difficulty of saying that it could not happen also creates a powerful space for the projection of the (im)possible. The hypersecuritization of the entire network in cyber security creates an obvious resemblance to environmental security discourse where the fate of the planet is claimed at stake. Both discourses also emphasize irreversibility: once a species is extinct or a digital system gone, they can never be recreated in full. Yet, there are also crucial differences between the two discourses. First, the speed of the threat scenarios differ with cyber security gaining its power from the instantaneity of the cascading effects whereas environmental security usually allows for a gradual accumulation of threats and dangers until a certain threshold may be reached and events accelerate. This establishes different modalities of urgency and hence different spaces for political intervention.9 Second, there is a crucial difference in terms of the possibility of visualizing threats, and hence for how securitizing actors communicate to their audiences (Williams 2003). The digital, networked character of cyber security—and the absence of prior disasters—is hard to represent through images, whereas environmental security discourse may mobilize for example endangered and extinct species as well as melting ice caps and forests devastated by acid rain or clear-cutting.