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2022 CNDI Kritik
Affirmative › Framework › At: Epistemology – Case O/Ws

Epistemological critique may decrease our ability to know the future with certainty, but this only supports defaulting to any risk of impacts large in magnitude-these are more important than small structural factors

TYLER COWEN in 2006 The Epistemic Problem Does Not Refute George Mason University Consequentialism Utilitas, Dec2006, Vol. 18 Issue 4, p383-399

The epistemic critique increases the plausibility of what I call 'big event consequentialism'. In this view, we should pursue good consequences, but with special attention to consequences that are very important and very good, or correspondingly, very bad. This includes stopping the use of nuclear weapons, saving children from smallpox, making progress against global poverty, and maintaining or spreading liberal democracy. Big events, as I define them, typically are of significant practical importance, involve obvious moral issues, and their value is not controversial to benevolent onlookers. In contrast, consider 'small events'. Preventing a broken leg for a single dog, however meritorious an act, is a small event as I define the concept. Making American families wealthier by another $20 also would count as a small event. We should not count small events for nothing, but epistemic issues may well lower their importance in refiective equilibrium. Of course we do not need a strict dividing line between big and small events, but rather we can think in terms of a continuum. In some cases a large number of small benefits will sum up to a big benefit, or equal the big benefit in importance. It then can be argued that we should treat the large benefits and the small benefits on a par. If we lift a different person out of poverty one billion times, this is no less valuable than lifting one billion people out of poverty all at once. Here two points are relevant. First, sometimes we are facing a single choice in isolation from other choices, rather than examining a rule or general principle of behavior. In this case it does not matter whether or not the small benefits would, if combined in larger numbers, sum up to a greater benefit. The small benefits will not be combined in greater numbers, and we should still upgrade the relative importance of larger benefits in our decision calculus. Second, not all small benefits sum into equivalence with larger benefits. Sometimes one value has a lexical relationship to (all or some) other values. For instance arguably a large number of canine broken legs, even a very large number, do not sum in value to make a civilization. It does not matter how many dogs and how many broken legs enter the comparison. In other words, civilization may be a lexical value with respect to canine broken legs. And when lexical elements are present, the mere cumulation of numbers of broken legs does not trump the more significant value. Numerous value relationships have been cited as lexical. A large number of slight headaches, no matter how numerous, may not sum up in value to equal a smaller number of intensely painful deaths or personal tortures." A very large number of 'muzak and potato' lives do not sum to overtake the value of a sophisticated civilization.^^ Rawls put forward liberty and the difference principle as his lexical values for all political comparisons.^^ For our purposes, we do not require a very strict notion of lexicality for these designations to matter. A big value need not be lexical against a (multiplied) smaller value at all possible margins. Instead the big value need only be lexical across the comparisons that arise under relevant policy comparisons. Furthermore a big value need not be lexical in absolute terms against all other smaller values. We therefore receive further guidance as to which big events are upgraded in the most robust fashion. The big values that receive the most robust upgrading would be those values with some lexical importance, relative to possible comparisons against other smaller values.^" To sum up these pointsz, critics of consequentialism would like to establish something like the following: 'We find it hard to predict consequences. Therefore consequences do not matter very much, relative to other factors, such as deontology or virtue ethics. We should abandon consequentialist morality.' But so far epistemic considerations have yet to produce a strong argument for this view. The arguments support a different conclusion, namely downgrading the importance of minor consequences, and upgrading the importance of major consequences. The most robust major consequences are those which carry values with some lexical properties, and cannot be replicated by a mere accumulation of many small benefits.

2022 CNDI Kritik
Negative › Perm › At: Perm- Legal Solutions Fail

Reject the perm’s imperfect progressivism – the claim that legal solutions are compatible with the alt only religitimizes militarism by obscuring moral responsibility and other broader systemic violence.

Stavrianakis 16 [Anna Stavrianakis, Senior Lecturer in International Relations at University of Sussex, MScEcon in Security Studies from University of Wales, Aberystwyth and PhD in Politics from University of Bristol, author of Taking Aim at the Arms Trade, “Legitimizing liberal militarism: politics, law and war in the Arms Trade Treaty”. Third World Quarterly, 37 (5), pp. 840-865, 2016, ] ***Note: the ATT is the Arms Trade Treaty, a previous attempt at restricting arms sales led by the US and the UK

The analysis of the ATT advanced here suggests instead, however, that it is precisely the turn to law, the supposed compatibility between military preponderance and human rights protection, and the failure to move beyond direct use of weapons, that helps legitimise (particular forms of) war. Critical legal studies scholars advocate “a form of law-politics to develop humanitarian principles into a concrete, normative agenda:” 154 and yet this is exactly what humanitarian disarmers have been trying to do with the ATT and previous arms transfer control regimes. It is important to recognize “that some degree of complicity in previous social structures is inherent in social change.” 155 Price argues that scholars should not underplay the morally progressive significance of “practices that at once contain elements of progressive change … yet at the same time are predicated on or produce the conditions of possibility for other forms of exclusion, hierarchy, inequality, repression or violence.” 156 However, the widespread emphasis on the progressive, if imperfect character of the ATT in scholarship and policy, has failed to interrogate the justificatory claims around moral responsibility that so pervaded its negotiation. These claims contribute to obscuring a significant scale of human rights violations and the wider systems of war preparation that arms transfers are a part of. Further, such claims are part of what sceptical southern states are responding to and resisting, thus making wider normative change more difficult. The ATT negotiation process shored up liberal states’ actions whilst invoking their benevolence and assuming them to be distinct from illicit or irresponsible actors. The supposed effectiveness of normative change is muted by the existence of regimes that claim already to exceed the standards of the ATT. This may not be the ideological glorification of war that we tend to equate with the concept of militarism, but the ATT signals the contemporary mobilisation of legitimacy for liberal war-making and war-preparation nonetheless.

2022 CNDI Kritik
Negative › Perm › At: Perm- Negative Peace Incompatible

The alt’s positive peace is mutually exclusive from the aff’s negative peace – short-term solutions to war foreclose critical analysis of underlying systemic causes.

Pankhurst 3 (Donna-, May 1, Development in Practice, “The 'sex war' and other wars: towards a feminist approach to peace building”, Vol. 13 # 2&3, Infomaworld)

Turning to the meanings of the term ‘peace’, Galtung’s (1985) conception of negative peace has come into widespread use, and is probably the most common meaning given to the word, i.e. the end or absence of widespread violent conflict associated with war. A ‘peaceful’ society in this sense may therefore include a society in which social violence (against women, for instance) and/or structural violence (in situations of extreme inequality, for example) are prevalent. Moreover, this limited ‘peace goal’, of an absence of specific forms of violence associated with war, can and often does lead to a strategy in which all other goals become secondary. The absence of analysis of the deeper (social) causes of violence also paves the way for peace agreements that leave major causes of violent conflict completely unresolved. Negative peace may therefore be achieved by accepting a worse state of affairs than that which motivated the outburst of violence in the first place, for the sake of (perhaps short-term) ending organised violence. Galtung’s alternative vision, that of positive peace, requires not only that all types of violence be minimal or non-existent, but also that the major potential causes of future conflict be removed. In other words, major conflicts of interest, as well as their violent manifestation, need to be resolved. Positive peace encompasses an ideal of how society should be, but the details of such a vision often remain implicit, and are rarely discussed. Some ideal characteristics of a society experiencing positive peace would include: an active and egalitarian civil society; inclusive democratic political structures and processes; and open and accountable government. Working towards these objectives opens up the field of peace building far more widely, to include the promotion and encouragement of new forms of citizenship and political participation to develop active democracies. It also opens up the fundamental question of how an economy is to be managed, with what kind of state intervention, and in whose interests. But more often than not discussion of these important issues tends to be closed off, for the sake of ‘ending the violence’, leaving major causes of violence and war unresolved—including not only economic inequalities, but also major social divisions and the social celebration of violent masculinities.

2022 CNDI Kritik
Negative › Perm › At: Perm- Compartmentalizes

The aff’s attempt to reclaim security through the perm compartmentalizes understandings of militarism to believe progress is possible

James Eastwood in 2018

Queen Mary, University of London, UK, Rethinking militarism as ideology: The critique of violence afterSecurity, Security Dialogue1–13© The Author(s) 2018Reprints and permissions:sagepub.co.uk/journalsPermissions.navDOI: 10.1177/0967010617730949

The range of critical security studies literatures calling for desecuritization therefore do not yet offer a full account of militarism as I have elaborated it above, in which organized political violence is made desirable through ideology and thereby loses strategic impetus and restraint. This isimportant because it has also shaped the response of those seeking to reclaim security against thesecritiques. Revealingly, these responses tend either to reject the call for desecuritization as too pacifistor to develop safeguards against the specific effects that these critics identify with ‘militarization’, rather than engaging with the underlying ideological nature of militarism. While this has certainly left their analysis wanting, and reveals an equally unsatisfactory conceptualization of militarism, it also shows the limitations and vulnerability of critical security studies argumentscalling for desecuritization. For example, Booth argues that security should only ever be the ‘means’ for the ‘end’ of emancipation (Booth, 2007: 114–115) and that means and ends should be related ‘non-dualistically’ (i.e. the means should be consistent with the ends sought; see Booth, 2007: 428–441). He explicitly includes political violence as a means that must be subject to this rule (Booth, 2007: 429–431), and he even embraces aspects of Gandhian nonviolence (Booth, 2007: 115). Discussing the critique offered by securitization theory, he responds, ‘we would all presumably agree that the unnecessary securitisation (militarisation) of issues is to be deplored, but there are occasions when introducing a military dimension is sensible’ (Booth, 2007: 168). Booth’s ethical criteria for the use of force therefore givehim the confidence to respond that not all militarization is a bad thing, and that it can be used forprogressive ends. What is notable here is that Booth also invokes a thin notion of ‘militarization’, more or less reducible to the decision to use force, to establish his claim. He is quite comfortablewith the risks of militarization identified by securitization theory because he believes he has circumvented them. By contrast, the critique of militarism as ideology gives us more powerful tools to disagreewith Booth here. For Booth ignores the danger that, in conditions of militarism, war can beginto serve a wide array of non-strategic instrumentalities as a result of its ideological penetration ofsocial relations. Militarism can entrench a pattern of conflict by binding social relations, subjectivities and identities to the pursuit of war, thereby making war far less amenable to ethico-politicaldiscipline than he imagines. By setting up emancipation as an imperative that must be ‘secured’, including militarily, Booth opens a dangerous pathway to the entrenchment of violence.

2022 CNDI Kritik
Negative › Alts/Framework › FW At: Policymaking Key

Their policy only framework is a link- it papers over key questions about the nature and structure of society- these are the backdrops that shape the very terrain of what ‘policy’ is

Matt Wood and Matthew Flinders in 2014

University of Sheffield, UK; Rethinking depoliticisation: beyond the governmental; Policy & Politics • vol 42 • no 2 • 151-70;

At first glance, our third face appears remarkably similar to societal depoliticisation, in the sense that it can be initiated both from within and outside the state, it primarily relates to debate and deliberation, and it focuses on the tools through which debates concerning political choice and contingency are closed down. The point of departure, however, lies in discursive depoliticisation’s focus, not on institutions, arenas or actors but on ideas and language. It therefore offers a decentred approach that cuts across conventional boundaries (that is, public/ private) and instead recognises the manner in which any speech act which seeks to form ‘necessities, permanence, immobility, closure and fatalism… concealing, negating or removing contingency’, is itself a powerful tool of depoliticisation (Jenkins 2011, 160). As such, depoliticisation occurs when the debate surrounding an issue becomes technocratic, managerial, or disciplined towards a single goal, and hence changed in content. (A process of discursive politicisation would therefore involve the promotion of a topic as a public issue where competing interpretations exist as choices.) The promotion of an issue, but alongside a single interpretation and the denial of choice would, therefore, create a form of depoliticisation from this discursive perspective. Moral panics, for example, serve to politicise certain issues in an explosive manner, while at the same time tending to depoliticise those issues by focusing attention on specific ‘folk devils’, alongside a grossly simplified narrative that posits a simple solution (constrain, reject, kill the folk devil) to a complex problem. The demonisation of social groups therefore adds a new twist to our understanding of depoliticisation, in the sense that a dominant sociology of knowledge rapidly emerges that tends to create an intense social reaction, while also succeeding in closing down debate and deliberation (see Cohen, 2002). At the centre of this third ‘face’ is therefore what might be termed a ‘Gramscian’ intellectual perspective, with an emphasis on radical thinking and the role of language and culture in relation to political debates. Analyses of the discursive ‘face’ of depoliticisation developed from radical theoretical literature during the post-Cold War period, which highlighted how the dominant ‘anti-political’ culture transcended certain political divisions, thereby creating the illusion of ‘consensus’. Scholars, such as Pierre Bourdieu (2003), Slavoj Žižek (2002), and more recently Chantal Mouffe (2005), argued in favour of new forms of radical democratic action that exposed the existence of antagonism and ‘difference’. Jacques Rancière (1995, 5) sums up the attitude of this literature to the post-Cold War world, arguing that politics ends ‘as a secret voyage to the isles of utopia’ to become ‘the art of steering the ship and embracing the waves, in a natural, peaceful movement of growth’. In other words, grand ideological clashes give way to technocracy and acceptance of neoliberal discourse. The value of identifying the existence of discursive depoliticisation is therefore simply the manner in which it exposes the power and capacity of certain political actors to promote ‘the politics of denial’ but, more importantly, the manner in which it seeks to re-politicise certain issues. Put slightly differently, the scholars who work within this approach tend to be critical social and political theorists who seek to challenge hegemonic interpretations of the ‘end of history’ and seek to promote the existence of antagonism, conflict, difference and choice (see for example Mouffe, 2005). ‘Politics’ from this perspective is therefore distinct from ‘the political’, as Žižek (2002, 193) explains: The difference [is] between ‘politics’ as a separate social complex, a positively determined sub-system of social relations… and ‘the political’ [le politique] as the moment of openness, of undecidability, when the very structuring of society, the fundamental form of the social pact, is called into question – in short, the moment of global crisis overcome by the act of founding a ‘new harmony. ‘Politicisation’, in this sense, is a radical act of recognising ‘the political’; the possibility that society can be constituted differently; it is the opposite of fatalism and denial. Discursive perspectives on depoliticisation therefore resonate with Bauman’s In search of politics (1999), in the sense that they are concerned with how language and a careful approach to the ‘framing’ of issues can serve to close down certain options by making any opposition appear almost ‘irrational’. This is an approach that has some traction in the governance literature, informing Rogers’ (2009a, 2009b) analysis of British economic policy making in the mid-1970s, Kerr et al’s (2011) study of David Cameron’s approach to statecraft ,and Flinders and Buller’s (2006) emphasis on discursive ‘preference shaping’ (the weakness of these studies being their exclusive focus on the discourse of politicians). Discursive depoliticisation therefore brings with it a powerful set of methods, theories and insights that reflect an intellectual history, including Habermas’ (1996) analysis of ‘scientism’ and its capacity to depoliticise both language and decision making, not to mention Foucault’s (Burchell et al, 1991) analysis of the depoliticising capacity of neoliberal ‘governmentality’ (see also Dean, 1999; Lemke, 2001). These meta-theoretical positions have come to inform governance studies in several ways. The ‘interpretive turn’ in political science has, for example, emphasised the role of beliefs and traditions, as well as dilemmas and competing narratives, and how these can politicise certain issues while depoliticising others (for example, Bevir and Rhodes, 2010). Within International Relations, by contrast, constructivist approaches have been deployed to expose the depoliticising power of discourse and language around global governance and international institutions, as illustrated in the work of Widmaier et al (2007) and Schmidt (2010).

2022 CNDI Kritik
Negative › Alts/Framework › FW- Epistemology First

The lenses with which we view war and peace influence the policy options we consider – means epistemology is a prereq to effective policy options

Pedagogy should come first- when researching IR the aff makes assumptions about what kinds of violence matters- ie) war in [ ] - but they ignore the ongoing structural violence that creates the conditions of those problems

Debate become valueless without epistemological evaluation bc people can just defend false arguments and we never actually learn anything

2022 CNDI Kritik
Negative › Alts/Framework › FW- Epistemology First

The lenses with which we view war and peace influence the policy options we consider

Cady 10 (Duane L., prof of phil @ hamline university, From Warism to Pacifism: A Moral Continuum, pp. 115-117)

The very notion of restraint in war— common to all positions along the full continuum in varying degrees— puts the burden of proof on going to war and on how the fighting is done. These are the activities in need of justification. The moral presumption should be to peace, positive peace, rather than the pervasive presumption of warism and negative peace. Recognizing the grip that warism has on dominant culture may be the most formidable task of genuine peacemaking for the fore- seeable future because it is warism that blocks evolution toward more pacifistic societies. Only occasionally will individuals back into the most absolute form of pacifism; the cultural predisposition to warism confines most of us to a narrow range of options toward the war- realist end of the scale. This brings us full circle and we end this consideration of a moral continuum on the morality of war and peace where we began, confronting warism. The normative lenses of warism, the spectacles through which we in modern culture tend to see and interpret all that happens, turn out to be as much like blinders as lenses because they restrict our vision to a narrow range of options. Nietzsche said that if the only tool you have is a hammer, everything begins to look like a nail. Under such conditions it is pretty hard to resist hammering. Analogously, if the only vision we have is warist and the only tools we build are weapons, then every conflict invites military intervention and it is hard to resist war- ring. Unless we envision a wider value perspective than the warist, we will not see the nonviolent options before us. But to see more widely we need to acknowledge and remove the blinders. Peace education is a small, struggling, but growing segment of contemporary education. The dominant presumption of warism has made it difficult for those committed to peace education to develop and establish it as a legitimate discipline devoid of the image of mere anti- militarist propaganda. Some scholars call themselves peace educators while many within the traditional disciplines are reluctant to be so labeled; they may be sympathetic with genuine peace research and teaching but afraid of the stigma that goes with the label. Those scholars interested in applying their professional training and skills to peace issues face a monumental task. Education at all levels must address warism, just as they have had to address racism, sexism, ageism, classism, homophobia, and other forms of domination.4 There is increasing academic interest in what scholars call “institutional violence”— social structures like racism, sexism, and poverty that involve constraints that injure and violate; systems that have entrapping, coercive effects. Institutional forms of violence tend to be more covert than overt; nonetheless pacifists— peacemakers—of various sorts tend to work toward the recognition and abolition of these forms of oppression as the natural manifestation of their commitment to positive peace. Such work involves recovery of lost or neglected history, consideration of a full range of options beyond traditional social constraints holding the forms of domination in place, and serious, systematic, and legitimized study of conditions constituting positive peace. Preparing for war in an effort to prevent war and preserve the status quo must be distinguished from preparing for genuine positive peace in an effort to en- courage cooperation and preclude a resort to war. Unless such issues are entertained routinely across all educational levels— including the recognition of how the various forms of domination are entangled in and reinforced by warism— the presumption of warism will continue to drive us toward war realism and prevent progress toward an evolving positive peace.5 Easing the grip of warism may be unlikely, but then racial integration in public schools, abolition of slavery, women voting and holding public office, the end of apartheid in South Africa and the Iron Curtain in Europe, the election of an African American as U.S. president, all were exceedingly unlikely not long before they became realities. People imagine, work for, and sacrifice for important goals even if they never are achieved. To the wonder of us all, unlikely goals are sometimes reached. Martin Luther King, Jr., believed that “the arc of history bends toward justice.” He knew th

at racial segregation would end . . . some- day . . . so he called on Americans to “plan for the inevitable.”6 Similarly, pacifists envision a broad cultural evolution from warism toward (and eventually, to) pacifism, so pacifists ask us to prepare for the inevitable by recognizing and backing away from warism and by working to create and sustain the conditions of genuine positive peace. While education is crucial, peace educators cannot bear the burden of the wider cultural failure to see beyond warism. Scholars and teachers in traditional disciplines must address the relevant warist/pacifist issues of their fields just as feminist scholarship has been undertaken by academics in all fields, and just as racist claims have been tested and dispelled by research in all disciplines. Anti-warism work and positive peace making cannot be ghettoized in token departments and journals and dismissed for pushing an agenda; they must be undertaken across every curriculum, not marginalized but central, if we are to assist in preparing for the inevitable. It is remarkable how low peace research is among government and foundation priorities. The moral continuum here may prove useful in eroding warist obstacles to taking peace positively if only because it recognizes gradual variations among views within a single moral tradition rather than encouraging polarized views. Peace research and study need not lead to any conversion experiences; it would be surprising were they to do so, despite popular fears.

2022 CNDI Kritik
Negative › Alts/Framework › FW- Epistemology First

Justifications for the plan are a key site of analysis- leads to an improved understanding of arms control

NEIL COOPER in 2011

Humanitarian Arms Control and Processes ofSecuritization: Moving Weapons along theSecurity ContinuumContemporary Security Policy, Vol.32, No.1 (April 2011), pp.134–158ISSN 1352-3260 print/1743-8764 online

One of the features of the post-Cold War arms control agenda has been the emergenceof a set of control initiatives that are increasingly being categorized under the rubric of humanitarian arms control (HAC)1 or humanitarian disarmament.2 This includes the 1997 Ottawa convention on landmines, the 2008 Convention on Cluster Munitions, various initiatives to restrict the trade in small arms and light weapons, and current attempts to negotiate an Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) by 2012. This article focusses, in particular, on the issue of landmines and cluster munitions but also discusses the issue of small arms and the putative ATT. The article has a number of aims. First, to interrogate the claims of proponents that such initiatives representa novel and benevolent post-Cold War turn in conventional arms trade control, one that illustrates the ability of global civil society to exercise bottom-up power by successfully interjecting human security concerns into a policy field previously dominated by the national security concerns of states. Second, to undertake a criticalhistorical political economy of both pariah weapons regulation in particular and conventional arms transfer regulation in general with a view to highlighting the elements of continuity and change represented by contemporary humanitarian arms control initiatives in comparison with previous eras. Third, to frame this more criticalreading of past and current regulation in relation to current debates about therelationship between moments of securitization, the everyday practices of (in)securityexercised by the professionals and networks of security, the ability of the powerlessto speak security, and the consequences arising from processes of securitizationand desecuritization.The first section of the article will outline the Copenhagen School’s (CS) concept of securitization as well as highlighting particular critiques of the concept relevant to the subsequent analysis of humanitarian arms control. The following section will then summarize the key elements in conventional accounts of the post-Cold War HAC agenda and particularly the campaigns on landmines and cluster munitions. The next section will locate such campaigns in the much longer history of attempts at pariah weapons regulation that has included attempts to ban various weapons technologies such as the crossbow, the gun, the dum dum bullet, and the submarine. It will be suggested that four factors are crucial in determining the nature of pariah regulationand its relationship to the broader regulatory frameworks governing the conventional defence trade. These are the relationship between regulation and the political andmaterial interests of powerful actors, the relationship between pariah weapons andlegitimized military technology, the relationship between economic philosophy andthe approach to arms regulation, and the relationship between regulation and thedominant framing of threats. The article will outline how these different factorshave influenced conventional weapons regulation in different eras in order to locate contemporary HAC initiatives within this much broader historical political economy of regulation. This provides the basis for a more critical, and historicallyinformed, reading of the HAC agenda, particularly the claim that it represents anovel and benign post-Cold War expression of bottom-up power that has successfullychallenged traditional arms control practices that privilege the military security ofstates over human security considerations. The final section will discuss the relevance of the preceding analysis for both the current debates on the concept of securitization and the campaigning practices of arms trade Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs).

2022 CNDI Kritik
Negative › Alts/Framework › FW- Epistemology First

Epistemology is prerequisite to any of their scenarios- all of their impacts rely on specific beliefs about violence that naturalize military power

Tyner and Henkin in 2015

James A Tyner and Samuel Henkin, Kent State University, Kent, OH, USA; War and Terrorism, Geography of; International Encyclopedia of the Social & Behavioral Sciences (Second Edition), 2015

Geography as an academic discipline has a long history of peace-related research. Two early efforts include The Geography of War and Peace (Pepper and Jenkins, 1985) and The Quest for Peace: Transcending Collective Violence and War Among Societies, Cultures and States (Vayrynen et al., 1987). In part, the promotion of more peaceful geographers was in response to the specter of nuclear annihilation. More recently, geographers have critiqued not only the naturalness and necessity of war (Kobayashi, 2009; Loyd, 2009a,b, 2011, 2012; Gregory, 2010; Koopman, 2010, 2011; Ross, 2011; Williams and McConnell, 2011), but have also promoted a more normative vision of geography as an academic discipline (Megoran, 2008, 2010, 2011; Inwood and Tyner, 2011). Such efforts have not been easy. As Williams and McConnell (2011: 927) highlight, “our understanding of what peace looks like, and how to research it, remains underdeveloped and analysis of its complexities and contradictions problematically lacking.” Indeed, considerable discussion has centered around the politics and contestation over the ‘meaning’ and ‘definition’ of peace; this work has been spurred, partially, out of a recognition of the false dichotomy between ‘war’ and ‘peace’ as well as ‘violence’ and ‘nonviolence.’ Drawing inspiration from Galtung’s (1969) influential separation of ‘direct’ and ‘structural’ violence, many geographers have destabilized the epistemological foundations of a range of artificial, socially constructed binaries, including but not limited to war, peace, violence, nonviolence, conflict, and postconflict (Kirsch and Flint, 2011; Ross, 2011; Loyd, 2012). Flint (2011: 31) accordingly calls for an approach that views the spaces of ‘peace’ and ‘war’ as intertwined; he suggests that social relations are basis of construction of both and concludes that instead of discrete categories, it is more productive to think of a continuum of social settings in which power relations and political differences always exist, but in varying degrees of consensus and nonviolence compared to disagreement and violence. Much of this work has, subsequently, drawn attention to the ways in which such false dichotomies fetishize the unremitting processes of the ‘production of violence’ under the current mode of global militarization (Farish and Vitale, 2011). For Williams and McConnell (2011: 929; see also Loyd, 2012), it is necessary to understand peace as a social and spatial process, such as “shifts attention towards issues of power and politics and opens up questions on contingency, agency and embodiment .. Subsequently, the spectrum of violence and non-violence is exposed for investigation and peace revealed to be a highly differentiated landscape.” By extension, Springer (2011, 2012) has challenged geographers to consider ‘violence’ also as a process. For Springer (2012: 138) “to treat the material expression of violence only through its directly observable manifestation is a reductionist appraisal” and “ignores the complexity of the infinite entanglements of social relations.” It is more appropriate, therefore, to conceive of violence not as ‘thing’ or ‘event’ or even ‘act’ but rather as a process; violence as moment implies momentum. In other words, the imposition of political-economic structures designed to ‘make life’ are carried forward with a momentum far beyond the initial act. Violence conceived as such therefore redirects attention toward those actions and relations that are hidden from empirical observation. Those scholars working in the areas of peace have enlarged the discussion to address other forms of conflict (and terrorism) that have traditionally been neglected in the geographic study of war and terror. Both feminist and critical geographers, in particular, have highlighted the violence directed toward (especially) women’s bodies – as manifest, for example, in the geographies of intimate partner violence and rape (Katz, 2007; Fluri, 2009; Tyner, 2012). This research has, by extension, documented how the violence of sexism, racism, classism, genderism, ableism, ageism, homophobia, and xenophobia – to name but a few – continue to be legitimized through the production of militarized and normalized geographical imaginations. As Loyd (2009a: 865–866) concludes, “to understand who is made most vulnerable where and how socially produced harms are naturalized discursively and materially, it is necessary to theorize specific economic, political, and social relations of oppression and domination and how they articulate (or intersect) in particular historical, geographic moments.”

2022 CNDI Kritik
Negative › Alts/Framework › Alt- Judge Solves

The judge has agency to prevent depoliticization- it’s an iterative process between speaker and audience- voting neg prevents the depoliticizing frame from succeeding

Matt Wood and Matthew Flinders in 2014

University of Sheffield, UK; Rethinking depoliticisation: beyond the governmental; Policy & Politics • vol 42 • no 2 • 151-70;

But – to continue a by now familiar pattern – if a focus on technical, managerial and scientific discourses provides a relevant but not particularly original set of insights, then a focus on security, risk and resilience arguably provides a more imaginative and contemporary perspective. Put simply, securitisation theory has in recent years identified a distinct pattern of depoliticisation that tends to involve the identification of an existential threat that requires emergency executive powers, and, if the audience accepts the securitising move, the issue is depoliticised and is considered a ‘security’ issue outside the rules of normal politics (Balzacq, 2005; Salter, 2008; 2011; Salter and Piche, 2011). As such, security studies often regard the politicisation of an issue as representing a form of ‘desecuritisation’ (Kinnvall and Nesbitt-Larking, 2010; Salter and Piche, 2011). This discursive process may be called ‘securitisation’ in the sense that it makes issues ‘more firmly constrained… decisions about them are taken in technical terms’ (Edkins, 1999, 11). Such an interpretation goes against the influential view of Buzan et al (1998, 120) that securitisation represents a form of hyper-politicisation, due to the manner in which it creates heightened public attention around a social issue (compare Salter, 2011, 120; Buofino, 2004). The theory of moral panics and the concept of a ‘folk devil’, however, provide a way of reconciling these positions. In essence, the creation of an intense political controversy (that is, hyper-politicisation) is little more than a tool through which to then impose a definitive position that closes down political debate (thereby depoliticising the issue). It is in exactly this vein that scholars have examined the ‘war on terror’ (De Goede, 2008a; 2008b; Balzacq, 2008; Salter, 2011), illegal immigration (Huysmans, 2000; 2006), financial security (De Goede, 2004), fear of crime (Parnaby, 2006), as well as climate change and resource depletion (Carvalho and Burgess, 2005; Trombetta, 2008; Corry, 2012). Possibly the most novel insights delivered by this perspective are the manner in which discursive depoliticisation must engage with different types of audience that each require a specific language type (generally identified as popular, elite, technocratic and scientific), and how the process of securitisation through which an issue is depoliticised is rarely passive or static, but is generally an iterative process between speaker and audience. This, in turn, brings us back to wider issues concerning depoliticisation, governance and the state which in themselves encourage us to engage with Mary Douglas’ (1999) work on the depoliticisation of risk, Ulrich Beck’s (2001) analysis of ‘new’ risks, Frank Furedi’s (2005) writing on the ‘politics of fear’, or even some comment on the link between politicisation and depoliticisation in the context of Bauman’s (2001) ‘liquid modernity’. But for now these temptations must be denied in favour of a more focused account of why this paper’s attempt to ‘rethink depoliticisation’ actually matters.

2022 CNDI Kritik
Negative › Alts/Framework › Alt k 2 Policymaking

Our alternative is a prior question to any policy making- we must examine hegemonic struggles over empty signifiers to understand the relationship between social groups and power

Joscha Wullwebera in 2015

a Political Science Department, University of Kassell, Kassel, Germany, Global politics and empty signifiers:the political construction of hightechnology, Critical Policy Studies, 9:1, 78-96, DOI:10.1080/19460171.2014.918899

The conceptualization of the general interest as an empty space opens up an analyticalperspective that sheds light on the different political struggles to occupy that space. In this respect, the concept of the empty signifier and its use for political analysis is not just about the power of certain political terms. More fundamentally, it is about the construction ofpolitical identities. The concept of the empty signifier, then, enables a refined operationalizationand, hence, analysis of the way certain political identities are constructed. Its very starting point is the assumption that naming is a hegemonic operation and identityconstruction, a political process. Based on this assumption, and as shown in the foregoing analysis, the political processes that (seek to) launch or convey certain empty signifiersand the political ‘selection processes’ are of interest for policy analysis. Once a universalpolitical term becomes hegemonic, struggles arise around this empty signifier: Who will be able to fill the empty signifier with what kind of meanings; by which means it is possible to broaden the chain of equivalence that points to this empty signifier? ‘To hegemonize something is exactly to carry out this filling function’ (Laclau 1996a, p. 44). Based on the assumption that it is only the exclusion that enables a stable identity, it becomes analytically interesting to scrutinize the politics of exclusion. This raises the question: Which meanings are excluded from that chain of equivalence? As stated above, a privileged and positive relation of the empty signifier vis-à-vis the (hegemonic) common good must be present. This implies that the empty signifier has to have a positive connotation within the discourse formation in question (Torfing 1999, p. 152). As has been shown, this is by no means self-evident, as an empty signifier can also become the expression of deficiency and evil. In fact, the same empty signifier canrepresent the common good for one discourse community and simultaneously constitutethe incarnation of evil for another (as in the case, e.g., of socialism and capitalism). It is a task for the protagonists of a certain empty signifier to strengthen the relation to the hegemonic common good within the discourse of interest. At the same time, alternativesto the hegemonic project have to be presented as inconceivable and impracticable. Hence, for an empty signifier to become established, it has to have strong repercussions within the respective global discourse formation. Accordingly, it is imperative for empirical purposes to analyze and assess the global political context. Obviously, this is not just a struggle over words. On the contrary, these political terms convey meaning, they structure the political arena and national policies; they privilege some meanings, interests and practices over others, thereby excluding other politicalalternatives. It is the claim of this contribution that empty signifiers matter for globalpolitics. Even more, empty signifiers are the very basis of and for (global) politics. Theygive orientation, structure the horizon of truth and guide political practices. Meaning, identity and social practices are in a permanent state of flux: ‘As society changes over time this process of identification will be always precarious and reversible’ (Laclau 1996a, p. 46). While we can reflect on a ‘snap-shot’ of ongoing global politics and analyze such a ‘frozen picture’ of political relations and practices, these practices continuously change over time. In this way, objectivity becomes social objectivity whose truth is in a state of permanent negotiation. More generally stated, the very existence of agap between particular meaning and universal meaning, and between particular interestsand universal interests makes it not only possible but also necessary for political strugglesto fill that gap. This is an essential condition for vibrant democracy.

2022 CNDI Kritik
Negative › Alts/Framework › Alt Structural Focus

Our alt’s theory of language allows an understanding of the relationship between discourse and socioeconomic structures.

Joscha Wullwebera in 2015

a Political Science Department, University of Kassell, Kassel, Germany, Global politics and empty signifiers:the political construction of hightechnology, Critical Policy Studies, 9:1, 78-96, DOI:10.1080/19460171.2014.918899

Some words, phrases or slogans have their own set of dynamics and special importance within international politics. They convey a global problem or threat such, as the Cold War, the war on terror, or global warming and climate change. They label politicaldevelopments such as perestroika, the alterglobalization movement or the Arab Spring. They articulate desired political and social developments and visions such as sustainable development, social security, global justice and world peace. Some phrases accompany and propel social change, including examples such as Liberty, Equality, and Fraternity during the French Revolution, Bread, Peace and Land in the Russian Revolution, or We are the 99 percent, the slogan of the Occupy movement (Laclau 2005, p. 97). Other terms designate political programs, such as social market economy, neo-liberalism, green economy, socialism and, of course, democracy. Drawing on theorists such as Foucault, Derrida or Butler, many scholars in the field of international relations (IR) theory have pointed out the importance of discourse for reality construction (George 1994, Edkins 1999, de Goede 2006). Such approaches emphasize the production of reality byway of articulatory practices while underlining the connection between language, knowledge and power. Studies based on a Foucauldian genealogy (Foucault 1976, 1979, 1985) or Derrida’s method of deconstruction (Derrida 1976, 1978, Cornell and Rosenfeld 1992), for example, point to power relations that shape social reality. In this respect, post-structural studies in IR are concerned with the construction of political identities. Given the centrality of specific terms in global politics, it is surprising that the theory of empty signifier proposed by Ernesto Laclau (1996a, 2005) has not been taken up widely and systematically within IR theory. In fact, only very few studies at all draw on the discourse theory of Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe (Laclau and Mouffe 1985, see Daly 2004, Howarth and Torfing 2005, Wæver 2005, Hansen 2006). And of those that do, even fewer make reference to the concept of the empty signifier (Neumann 1999, Methmann 2010, Herschinger 2012). Although a number of such contributions have successfully addressed a variety of political issues, none have systematically exploredthe concept of the empty signifier or its analytical possibilities for global policy studies. I argue that engaging with this concept provides fruitful insights for IR and critical policy studies by opening up new dimensions for analysis. First, it accounts for the politicaldimension of the centrality of certain terms; second, it highlights the very process ofconstructing these terms and third, it foregrounds the political struggles which seek tolaunch certain terms and define their content. More precisely, an empty signifier can givemeaning and hence identity to a policy field, a political process or a socioeconomicprogram while at the same time being shaped by ongoing politics. The concept makes itpossible to explain, on the one hand, how some words or phrases take on political importance, and, on the other hand, how ongoing political struggles seek to establishthe definition of certain terms, giving them a specific relevance for social processes. Political identity construction is conceptualized with political strategies and dynamics, which make the concept of the empty signifier interesting for gaining a better understanding of different issues associated with global politics. The concept emphasizes theimportance of considering references to general public interest in global politics and theway in which such interest is constructed. It strengthens the possibility of examiningpolitical strategies in the process of developing policy programs.1 It also provides a foil for scrutinizing the interplay between universal and particular interests.

2022 CNDI Kritik
Negative › Alts/Framework › Alt- Structural criticism

Beginning with a widened structural criticism of militarism is a pre-requisite to effective critical ethico-political interventions – voting aff crowds out critical readings of militarism

Eastwood, 18 – James, Professor in the School of Politics and IR at the University of London. “Rethinking militarism as ideology: The critique of violence after security,” Security Dialogue, Vol. 49 (1-2) – Special issue on Militarism and security: Dialogue, possibilities and limits. 44– 56, doi: 10.1177/0967010617730949, p. 52-54 – KLab

The range of critical security studies literatures calling for desecuritization therefore do not yet offer a full account of militarism as I have elaborated it above, in which organized political violence is made desirable through ideology and thereby loses strategic impetus and restraint. This is important because it has also shaped the response of those seeking to reclaim security against these critiques. Revealingly, these responses tend either to reject the call for desecuritization as too pacifist or to develop safeguards against the specific effects that these critics identify with ‘militarization’, rather than engaging with the underlying ideological nature of militarism. While this has certainly left their analysis wanting, and reveals an equally unsatisfactory conceptualization of militarism, it also shows the limitations and vulnerability of critical security studies arguments calling for desecuritization. For example, Booth argues that security should only ever be the ‘means’ for the ‘end’ of emancipation (Booth, 2007: 114–115) and that means and ends should be related ‘non-dualistically’ (i.e. the means should be consistent with the ends sought; see Booth, 2007: 428–441). He explicitly includes political violence as a means that must be subject to this rule (Booth, 2007: 429–431), and he even embraces aspects of Gandhian nonviolence (Booth, 2007: 115). Discussing the critique offered by securitization theory, he responds, ‘we would all presumably agree that the unnecessary securitisation (militarisation) of issues is to be deplored, but there are occasions when introducing a military dimension is sensible’ (Booth, 2007: 168). Booth’s ethical criteria for the use of force therefore give him the confidence to respond that not all militarization is a bad thing, and that it can be used for progressive ends. What is notable here is that Booth also invokes a thin notion of ‘militarization’, more or less reducible to the decision to use force, to establish his claim. He is quite comfortable with the risks of militarization identified by securitization theory because he believes he has circumvented them. By contrast, the critique of militarism as ideology gives us more powerful tools to disagree with Booth here. For Booth ignores the danger that, in conditions of militarism, war can begin to serve a wide array of non-strategic instrumentalities as a result of its ideological penetration of social relations. Militarism can entrench a pattern of conflict by binding social relations, subjectivities and identities to the pursuit of war, thereby making war far less amenable to ethico-political discipline than he imagines. By setting up emancipation as an imperative that must be ‘secured’, including militarily, Booth opens a dangerous pathway to the entrenchment of violence. Responding to critiques of securitization in their cosmopolitan approach, Burke, Lee-Koo and McDonald are more sensitive to these dangers, admitting that the use of force can entrench conflict and thus impair the longer term pursuit of global security (Burke et al., 2014: 19–21). In response, they argue that the ultimate aim of security practice should always be nonviolence, ‘a gradual but determined demilitarisation of global politics’ in which force is permissible under strict conditions but always regrettable – ‘a pacifism of ends rather than means’ (Burke et al., 2016: 74). They place their confidence in a set of detailed principles restricting the use of force in different circumstances, which they hope will help to avoid these risks (Burke et al., 2014: 71–97, 119–145). Again, however, the ambition for nonviolence rests on the thin basis of an aspiration for ‘demilitarization’, something that they in fact derive from the critique of securitization, rather than an understanding of militarism as ideology. As I have explained above, what characterizes militarism is not violence with a lack of a true justification but an ideological desire for war and military activity. Militarism is therefore fully compatible with a credible justification for violence, and may even draw strength from it. Burke, Lee-Koo and McDonald’s criteria for the use of force may well be stricter than available alternatives, therefore, but this is still no guarantee against militarism. Even if they succeeded in preventing some wars, they would still not ensure that the remaining, apparently justified wars did not indulge in and encourage militarism. Cosmopolitan theories therefore do not disrupt the ideological factors making war desirable; rather, they risk supplementing them with additional justifications. A more effective critical intervention against cosmopolitan security is therefore to highlight the dangers of militarism as ideology, rather than simply to call for demilitarization. Conclusion What the above arguments stress is the importance of embracing a critical concept of militarism, one premised on the explicit ambition to disrupt its ideological effects. With this in mind, it is worth considering why most critical security studies scholars prefer to adopt the term ‘militarization’ rather than ‘militarism’. ‘Militarization’ in this usage seems to imply the process of making something a military concern. In this way, it is similar to Shaw’s account, in which militarization implies an increase in the penetration of social relations in general by military relations – or, in other words, the process by which more and more things are made military concerns. For Shaw, the concept of militarism functions as a measure of this penetration. But this is not the same as a critical concept of militarism, in which the specific kind of penetration being analysed is an ideological penetration and in which the intention is to disrupt this penetration through critique. Like Shaw, critical security studies has also understood militarism as a measure (of ‘militarization’) rather than as a critical concept, with the result that its analytic and political potential has been blunted when engaging in the critique of violence. However, this may also be a reflection of an underlying tendency in critical security studies itself. For we could argue that neither security nor securitization are critical concepts in the sense intended by ideology critique. Instead, they are more like measures, in that they measure either how secure something is or how securitized an issue has become. One consequence of this, which is particularly problematic for scholars seeking desecuritization, is that these concepts therefore also actively participate in the process they seek to critique: they name things as ‘security’ issues, even when the argument is that these issues should not be security issues at all. This proliferation of security concerns, encouraged as much by scholarship as by practitioners, results in the ‘crowding out’ of other frameworks that may more accurately reflect the underlying dynamics – concepts such as war (Barkawi, 2011) or neoliberalism (Montesinos Coleman and Rosenow, 2016) – and that may be more appropriate for critical ethico-political interventions into phenomena that critical security studies interprets as security or securitization. My final suggestion is that militarism is yet another concept that risks being obscured in critical security studies analysis by this tendency to measure rather than critique. By contrast, I have shown above how a more critical concept of militarism as ideology can offer a superior starting point for an analysis of the shortcomings of various justifications for the use of force, including those encountered in critical security studies. Militarism can help us to think more precisely about the circumstances in which the use of violence to achieve political objectives (such as ‘security’) can descend into a more generalized and intractable desire for war and military activity. My hope is that from such an understanding we might also better equip ourselves to intervene in this process and resist it.

2022 CNDI Kritik
Negative › Alts/Framework › Alt- Critical Peace Research

The alternative is critical peace research, a strategy that continuously critiques and questions sovereign conceptions of violence and peace while simultaneously committing to the ethical and practical imperative of non-violent resistance to structures of domination.

Jackson 15 – prof of peace and conflict studies @ U of Otago

(Richard, ‘Towards critical peace research: Lessons from critical terrorism studies,’ chapter in Researching Terrorism, Peace and Conflict Studies: Interaction, synthesis, and opposition, edited by Ioannis Tellidis and Harmonie Toros, pp. 24-31)

Critical peace research: a proposal On the basis of the above assessment, this section briefly outlines a set of core commitments which I believe ought to characterise CPR. I conceive of ‘critical’ (peace) research in two primary senses. First, it simply means an intellectual orientation or attitude which attempts to stand apart from the existing order (while at the same time acknowledging that one can never fully escape one’s own situatedness or biases), which questions widely accepted common- sense and dominant forms of knowledge about peace and conflict, and which asks probing questions about how existing social and epistemic orders came into existence and the processes by which they are maintained. Second, and more narrowly, the term ‘critical’ is used to refer to approaches which draw upon the analytical tools and insights of Frankfurt School- inspired Critical Theory, as well as related critical-normative social theories and disciplinary approaches such as critical constructivism, post- structuralism, feminism, post- colonialism and others. In the first instance, critical approaches are characterised by a healthy scepticism towards accepted knowledge claims and dominant ideas, and instead, seek to continuously question and interrogate that which is taken for granted. In particular, critical scholars are committed to interrogating how the status quo is implicated in some of the very problems that traditional theory seeks to solve, in this case, the ‘problems’ of conflict, violence, lack of reconciliation and the like. In part, this is because critical approaches recognise that knowledge and power are intimately connected– that knowledge is never neutral, but ‘theory is always for someone and for some purpose’ (Cox 1981). Lastly, in contrast to the social scientific adoption of a purportedly neutral standpoint on political and ethical issues, critical approaches are characterised by an openly ethical- normative commitment to human rights, social justice, progressive politics, and improving the lives of individuals and communities – or what is often called ‘emancipation’ or praxis (McDonald 2009). Ontological commitments What exactly are the things called ‘conflict’, ‘peace’, ‘violence’, ‘terrorism’, ‘mediation’, ‘reconciliation’ and the like, that we study, and how should we conceive, understand and speak of them? An openly critical approach would suggest that all of these objects of study are not free- standing, ontologically distinct phenomena discoverable by objective social scientific study. Instead, things like ‘peace’, ‘humanitarian intervention’, ‘cultural violence’ or ‘reconciliation’ are social formations and sets of social activities that are in large part contingent upon, and constituted by, the terms, languages and discourses used to describe and study them. A concept like ‘peace’ is actually ‘an ontologically suspicious concept’ (Elshtain quoted in Neufeld 1993: 172), and whether a particular society is described as ‘peaceful’, ‘post- conflict’, ‘reconciled’, or ‘violent’ is not a value- free fact or ‘truth’ waiting to be discovered by a scholar through the scientific method, but the consequence of the operation of a series of academic, political and social discourses, judgements and practices in different locales. In other words, there is a discursive, political, cultural and academic process by which real world actors and processes are given meaning through the negotiated application of different kinds of political and intellectual labels, categories and narratives, including a set of discursively constructed measures by which ‘peacefulness’ or ‘violence’ can be ranked, or groups judged to be ‘spoilers’, for example. Such measurements are inherently ideological in that they prioritise some values over others: direct violence over structural violence, order over social justice, dialogue over resistance. Moreover, such labels, concepts, categories and meanings are prone to change and contestation; they never just ‘speak for themselves’. In terms of exactly what a ‘conflict’ consists of, for example, something that started as a ‘rebellion’ might then become a ‘terrorist campaign’ (or ‘The troubles’), before being designated a ‘civil war’ (usually, by virtue of reaching an arbitrary fatality threshold), a ‘genocide’ or a ‘counter-insurgency campaign’. This is not to say that critical approaches do not recognise actual physical violence in the ‘real world’ which is experienced by people as ‘civil war’ or ‘terrorism’, or conditions of low direct violence which is understood as ‘peace’. Rather, it is to adopt a Frankfurt School- inspired ontology which maintains a ‘minimal foundationalism’ in which the ontological distinction between subject and object is preserved, and discourse and materiality are conceptualised as shaping each other in a dialectical, never-ceasing dynamic, rather than the one being solely constituted by the other (Toros and Gunning 2009). Such an ontological standpoint recognizes that there are observable ‘regularities’ in human activity (what positivists might call laws), and that one can distinguish between different phenomena on the basis of their delineated characteristics, while at the same time recognising that these characteristics and how they are interpreted are a product of their social and historical context and thus, are not ‘objective facts’ in the positivist sense. Consequently, for critical scholars, the acceptance of the relative ontological insecurity of analytical concepts results in a real sensitivity to the politics of labelling and categorising, and extreme care in the use of different terms during research and teaching. However, critical approaches go even further, recognising that peace, conflict, violence, reconciliation and the like are in themselves constituted by social and political narratives, discourses and practices. As a consequence, critical scholars are interested in the constitutive nature of norms, ideas and other discursive elements which make the social practices of conflict, violence, dialogue, peace and reconciliation possible in specific historical and spatial contexts (Alkopher 2005: 716). In other words, critical approaches suggest that violent conflict cannot be fully understood apart from the particular kinds of narratives, discourses and social practices which make it possible by rendering it conceivable, legitimate and reasonable (see Jabri 1996). Crucial to this process is the role played by existing normative structures which function to construct identities, interests and modes of social action (Alkopher 2005: 720). Importantly, in addition to critical civil war research (see Jackson 2014) within the conflict analysis side of the field, a critical ontology which accepts the social construction and inherent instability of the key concepts is also starting to inform approaches to the study of peace (Richmond 2007, Shinko 2008) and conflict resolution (Hansen 2008), among others. Epistemological commitments A critical epistemology accepts that creating knowledge is ultimately a social process which depends on a range of contextual and process- related factors, not least the social position of the researcher, the institutional context within which they conduct their research, and the kinds of methods they employ. Such factors impact on the kinds of knowledge produced, as well as the purposes to which it is ultimately put. Importantly, this does not mean that all knowledge about the social world is hopelessly insecure, that scholarly standards and procedures in research should be rejected, or that ‘anchorages’ – relatively secure knowledge claims – cannot be found and built upon (Booth 2008). Rather, it suggests that CPR should be characterised by a continuous and critical reflexivity in regards to its own epistemology, methodology and assumptions. It also means that there are few if any knowledge claims about conflict, violence, peace, reconciliation and the like that cannot be challenged or questioned. Related to this, a critical perspective also recognises that no individual, including academic researchers, can completely put aside their personal identity, values, perceptions, and world view and then engage in purely objective, dispassionate, value- free research. Rather, every researcher brings with them a particular culture and set of values and understandings which shapes their research in important ways. At the very least, critical scholars argue that recognising and acknowledging the personal subjectivity of the researcher is an important step (see Breen Smyth 2009), not least because such continuous reflexivity acts as an antidote to the dangerous claim that some kinds of knowledge are objective and wholly unbiased, and therefore superior to others. Crucially, such an epistemological stance does not entail a wholesale rejection of the social scientific notion of objectivity, but instead accepts that there are multiple ways of knowing about objects of social analysis, such as conflicts or peace processes, that it is in any case beyond the capacity of any single narrative to provide the best account of such processes, and that through a pluralisation of perspectives and their inevitable clashes a more justifiable knowledge can be assembled (see Campbell 1998: 279–281). A critical approach therefore suggests that ‘continual contestation, rather than the aspirations of synthesis and totality, should be the aim of inquiry’ (ibid.: 281). A third important epistemological stance is a deep awareness of the linkages between power and knowledge, particularly in terms of the different ways in which knowledge can be employed by actors as a political tool of influence and domination. For example, critical scholars are sceptical of the way in which certain kinds of knowledge claims about peace and conflict – for example, that movements who resist and contest neoliberalism or reject dialogue are by definition ‘spoilers’, or that dialogue is an inherent social good, or that neo- liberal peacebuilding leads inevitably to ‘peace’ – have been used by governments and international organisations to de- legitimise certain kinds of struggles and support certain kinds of externally imposed ‘solutions’ (see Duffield 2001). Consequently, critical scholars begin by asking: Who is peace and conflict research for? How does peace research support particular interests? What are the ideological effects of peace research, particularly on those societies being studied? Another important epistemological issue for CPR is the notion of categories and how they are applied, particularly in research on political violence, peace, reconciliation and the like (Jackson et al. 2011: 158–164). While categories can be very useful for understanding complex realities and uncovering salient aspects of a particular phenomenon, they are at the same time profoundly problematic. In particular, critical scholars are concerned that when typologies are presented as universally applicable, without recognition of the specific power- knowledge structures in which they emerged and which sustain them, they can function as a tool of ideology, in part through their assumptions of ‘sameness’ and ‘otherness’, and their reliance on presumed essences and binary differences. As Foucault (1970) argues in The Order of Things, at their root, orders or categories are never natural or objective, but part of a political- historical structure. In contrast, critical scholars do not view their categories as timeless or universal, but as products of a particular set of power structures and their regimes. As such, they should be continuously interrogated, their boundaries, dichotomies and causal implications problematised, and their political and ideological effects exposed. This has certainly been the case by CTS scholars in the terrorism field (see Jackson et al. 2011). Methodological commitments The ontological and epistemological commitments outlined thus far have a number of important specific consequences for method and research practice. First, critical scholars are committed to transparency about their own values and standpoints, particularly as they relate to the interests and values of the societies in which they live and work. For Western- based scholars, this translates into an abiding commitment to being aware of, and trying to overcome, the Eurocentric, Orientalist, and patriarchal forms of knowledge often prevalent within Peace Studies, Security Studies, IR, and other areas of social science more generally (see Henderson 2013; Toros and Gunning 2009). Related to this, critical scholars are committed to taking subjectivity seriously, in terms of both the researcher and the research subject (Dauphinee 2007). This means being aware of, and transparent about, the values and impact of the researcher on the process and outcomes of the research, and being willing to seriously engage with the viewpoint and perceptions of the Other, particularly those who have been demonised or silenced in broader peace and security discourses. As Jutila, Pehkonen and Vayrynen (2008: 628) put it, the peace researcher ‘should enter into the life- worlds of the groups she or he studies before venturing to write about them’. Another commitment of a critical approach is to methodological and disciplinary pluralism – a willingness to embrace the insights and perspectives of different academic disciplines, intellectual approaches, and schools of thought. In particular, critical scholars see value in post- positivist and non- IR-based methods and approaches, such as discourse analysis, post-structuralism, constructivism, Critical Theory, historical materialism, history, ethnography and others. In one respect, this means refusing to be limited by the narrow logic of normal social scientific explanation based on linear notions of cause and effect. Instead, a critical perspective argues that adopting an interpretive ‘logic of understanding’ rooted in ‘how possible’ rather than ‘what causes’ questions, can open space for subjects, perspectives and affective forms of understanding that are often foreclosed by traditional social science (see Doty 1993). A final important methodological commitment is a permanent adherence to a set of responsible research ethics which take account of the various end- users of peace and conflict research, including informants, the communities from which insurgents or rebels come, vulnerable populations like refugees or child soldiers, and the populations who bear the brunt of counter- insurgency campaigns or peacebuilding programmes – as well as the wider public, other academics, and policymakers. More concretely, this means ‘recognising the human behind the label’ (Booth 2008: 73), identifying marginalised and silenced voices, the adoption of a ‘do no harm’ approach, operating transparently as a researcher, recognising the different kinds of vulnerability of those being researched, honouring undertakings of confidentiality and protecting interviewees, utilising principles of informed consent, and taking responsibility for the anticipated impact of research and the ways in which it may be utilised (Breen Smyth 2009). A critical praxis of peace research Simultaneous with the ontological, epistemological and methodological commitments described above, CPR is rooted in a broad but clear set of ethical- normative and praxiological commitments. These commitments are based first and foremost on the recognition that ‘no reality transforms itself ’ (Freire 1993: 53); rather, human agents must engage in critical interventions – critical praxis – in order to transform oppression. Related to this, it is based on the acceptance of the inherently degenerate and harmful nature of all forms of structural, cultural and direct violence. Consequently, critical research implicitly and explicitly questions both the ways in which dominant Western narratives have constructed their own practices of war and humanitarian intervention as legitimate violence, and the power structures, practices and narratives in the Western- dominated status quo which make direct and structural violence possible – including narratives of ‘new barbarism’, ethnic essentialism, worthy and unworthy victims, ‘good wars’, democratic peace, peacebuilding and the instrumental rationality of legitimate political violence (see Jabri 1996). More specifically, a critical approach involves a shift from state- centrism and making state security and system stability the central concern, to a focus on the security, freedom, and well- being of human individuals and communities. Critical scholars tend to prioritise human security and societal security over national security, and they are committed to minimizing all forms of physical, structural, and cultural violence (Toros and Gunning 2009), including that which results from states and international organisations, and from practices such as humanitarian intervention, diplomacy, peacebuilding, and the like. Importantly, this means abandoning the established conflict resolution norm of neutrality in conflict resolution practice, because ‘a neutral stance, without an analysis of power between the parties in conflict, can obfuscate the power differential that exists between parties in conflict and actually undermine the efforts of oppressed people by tacitly or explicitly supporting the prevailing ideology and social order oppressing them’ (Hansen 2008: 412). Third- party neutrality, in this context, functions to reinforce the status quo and unwittingly oppress the very people they are serving. Related to this, CPR takes seriously the scholarly and practical exploration of non- violent resistance and agonistic dialogue as practical alternatives to both legitimate and illegitimate forms of political violence. Importantly, this entails the adoption of an explicitly critical approach to conflict resolution practice, whether it is third- party peacemaking or peacekeeping (Pugh 2004, 2005) during the open conflict stage, or stabilisation and peacebuilding (Mac Ginty 2012a) during the post- conflict stage. In either case, CPR entails a commitment to non-violent alternatives to the use of military force, local ownership and empowerment, resistance to oppression, the priority of social justice, the transformation of structures of structural and cultural violence (which may therefore entail the rejection of neo- liberal economic and political forms), and agonistic forms of politics. Critical scholars are committed to engaging equally with both policy-makers – the officials who have to make policies to deal with conflict and violence – and policy- takers – the groups and wider societies who have to bear the brunt of humanitarian intervention, neo- liberal peacebuilding policies or other peace efforts. Engaging with policy- takers lessens the risk of co- option by the status quo, particularly if those thus engaged include members of communities labelled as ‘protestors’, ‘activists’, ‘rebels’, ‘insurgents’ or even ‘terrorists’. However, to be effective in realising the potential for positive change within the status quo, critical scholars must simultaneously strive to engage with those who are embedded in the state, international officials, and so on. Collectively, this set of commitments – to human security over state security, to ending avoidable suffering, to minimising and questioning all forms of violence, to continuous immanent critique, including conflict resolution practice, and to positively transforming existing structures, including neo- liberal capitalism – can be described as a broad commitment to the notion of emancipation (see Jackson et al. 2009: 226–227), or what Freire (1993: 66) more simply calls ‘the ontological and historical vocation of becoming more fully human.’ Despite objections to the term and its past implication in violent hegemonic projects, critical scholars for the most part see emancipation as a process of trying to construct ‘concrete utopias’ by realising the unfulfilled potential of existing structures, freeing individuals from unnecessary structural constraints, and the democratisation of the public sphere (Wyn Jones 2004: 229–232). Importantly, emancipation should be seen as a continuous process of struggle and critique rather than any particular endpoint or universal grand narrative. Critical pedagogy Lastly, given the importance and centrality of teaching to Peace Studies, I would argue that CPR is openly committed to critical pedagogy (Freire 1993; see also Hansen 2008). Such a commitment is rooted in an understanding that teaching can never be neutral; instead, ‘education either functions as an instrument that is used to facilitate the integration of the younger generation into the present system and bring about conformity to it, or it becomes . . . the means by which men and women . . . discover how to participate in the transformation of their world’ (Shaull 1993: 34; original emphasis). In other words, instead of problem- solving education, CPR ought to be oriented towards a kind of ‘problem- posing education’ in which ‘students learn to deconstruct the societal ideology affecting them in their everyday lives, see how it inhibits attainment of their interests, and visualize possible societal changes that could better serve their interests’ (Hansen 2008: 408). This necessarily entails providing students with a language and set of conceptual tools for understanding the ‘problematics of power, agency, and history’ (Macedo 1993: 17), and for developing appropriate modes of resistance and emancipatory action. Such forms of critical pedagogy are inherently praxiological because ‘when individuals reach critical consciousness, it allows them to become subjects in their world, actively and consciously co- creating it, rather than passive “objects” who accept their social reality’ (ibid.). From one vantage point, it also means accepting that ‘education is . . . a subversive force’ (Shaull 1993: 29), and the goal of teaching is in part to radicalise the student because ‘the more radical the person is, the more fully he or she enters into reality so that, knowing it better, he or she can better transform it’ (Freire 1993: 39). Clearly, at the present juncture, such a critical pedagogy is far removed from the current teaching of Peace Studies, which is largely focused on abstract theorising, (positivist) methodological training, the accumulated empirical findings of the field, inter- personal conflict resolution skills transfers, and the like.

2022 CNDI Kritik
Negative › Impacts › Turns Case- SPF

The aff’s solvency rests on the promise of ‘restabilizing’ the future- it ignores that the socio-economic contradictions that created the crisis are inevitable- the result is a suture of the system that forecloses change and ensures serial policy failure

Peter Bloom in 2016

Open University Business School, Open University, Milton Keynes, UK; Back to the capitalist future: Fantasy and the

paradox of crisis; Culture and Organization, 22:2, 158-177, DOI: 10.1080/14759551.2014.897347

2022 CNDI Kritik
Negative › Impacts › War/Extinction

Prioritizing everyday violence is key- responding to it later causes error replication and movement burn out, only re-orienting focus away from macro-level violence produces sustainable political coalitions

Cuomo ’96

(Chris, Prof. of Political Science @ U of Cincinnati, “War is not just an event: reflections on the significance of everyday violence”, Hypatia, vol. 11, no. 4 Fall (1994))

Theory that does not investigate or even notice the omnipresence of militarism cannot represent or address the depth and specificity of the everyday effects of militarism on women, on people living in occupied territories, on members of military institutions, and on the environment. These effects are relevant to feminists in a number of ways because military practices and institutions help construct gendered and national identity, and because they justify the destruction of natural nonhuman entities and communities during peacetime. Lack of attention to these aspects of the business of making or preventing military violence in an extremely technologized world results in theory that cannot accommodate the connections among the constant presence of militarism, declared wars, and other closely related social phenomena, such as nationalistic glorifications of motherhood, media violence, and current ideological gravitations to military solutions for social problems. Ethical approaches that do not attend to the ways in which warfare and military practices are woven into the very fabric of life in twenty-first century technological states lead to crisis-based politics and analyses. For any feminism that aims to resist oppression and create alternative social and political options, crisis-based ethics and politics are problematic because they distract attention from the need for sustained resistance to the enmeshed, omnipresent systems of domination and oppression that so often function as givens in most people's lives. Neglecting the omnipresence of militarism allows the false belief that the absence of declared armed conflicts is peace, the polar opposite of war. It is particularly easy for those whose lives are shaped by the safety of privilege, and who do not regularly encounter the realities of militarism, to maintain this false belief. The belief that militarism is an ethical, political concern only regarding armed conflict, creates forms of resistance to militarism that are merely exercises in crisis control. Antiwar resistance is then mobilized when the "real" violence finally occurs, or when the stability of privilege is directly threatened, and at that point it is difficult not to respond in ways that make resisters drop all other political priorities. Crisis-driven attention to declarations of war might actually keep resisters complacent about and complicitous in the general presence of global militarism. Seeing war as necessarily embedded in constant military presence draws attention to the fact that horrific, state-sponsored violence is happening nearly all over, all of the time, and that it is perpetrated by military institutions and other militaristic agents of the state.

2022 CNDI Kritik
Negative › Impacts › War/Extinction

Militarism causes war, suffering, and deepens inequality – only understanding militarism’s global reach will avert extinction

Gusterson and Besteman in 2019

Hugh Gusterson is Professor in the Department of Anthropology ofGeorge Washington University; Catherine Besteman is Professor inthe Department of Anthropology of Colby College; Current Anthropology Volume 60, Supplement 19, February 2019; https://www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/pdfplus/10.1086/700648

It goes without saying that militarism, like its close siblings capitalism and colonialism, is deeply imbricated with suffering and social injustice. While everyone who is not a pacifist can reference armed struggles they consider for just cause (from the Sandinistas for some on the left to the Afghan Mujahadeen of the 1980s for some on the right), it is the very essence of military operations that they kill and terrorize people—including, inevitably, innocent civilians as well as combatants. Some military operations exact a higher death toll than others, and some are more discriminate in picking targets than others (and we should not be dismissive of the importance of these distinctions), but it is the lowest common denominator of military operations that they all inflict death, injury, and suffering. This suffering includes a lingering aftermath to conflict that may take the form of cancer and other ailments settling into a population over decades because depleted uranium weapons, defoliants, heavy metals, solvents, and other toxins were released in war or preparation for war; or it may take the form of elevated rates of suicide, drug addiction, alcoholism, and spousal abuse among mentally and spiritually injured veterans. And, even when military forces are not used in war, there is a high incidence of prostitution, violence against women, and damage to public health and the environment around military bases (Lutz 2001; McCaffrey 2002; Vine 2015).18 Essays in this volume by Lutz (2019) and Vine (2019) explore this kind of damage with nuance and precision. Moreover, the ways military spending is directed tend to reinforce and deepen social inequalities, enriching senior executives and stockholders of large military contractors such as Lockheed Martin, Boeing, BAE Systems, General Dynamics, Dyncorp, and CACI as well as the penumbral swarm of retired military officers and highpriced consultants who provision them with advice, “studies,” and lobbying services. It should come as no surprise that macroeconomic analysis has found a clear correlation between high levels of military spending and high levels of social inequality (Abell 1994; Ali 2007). Seen in this light it is surely of the utmost concern that global military spending continues to rise and that processes of militarization reach ever more deeply into social and cultural life—from Hollywood movies to children’s toys and video game design (Allen 2017; Cheng 2013; Enloe 2000a, 2000b; Gibson 1994; Jauregui 2015). Much anthropological writing on militarism, imbued with anthropology’s traditional preferential option for the poor and marginalized, emphasizes the suffering militarism leaves in its wake. However, some ethnographers have studied up or sideways (Stryker and Gonzalez 2014) to understand the perspectives of actors inside militarist organizations, and some strands in the literature on the anthropology of militarism make descriptively real, for example, the aesthetic beauty soldiers and weapons designers see in weapons, the threats soldiers and planners fear, or the felt righteousness of the causes for which warriors fight. In this volume Weiss (2019) provides a complex evocation of the contradictions and ambivalent feelings experienced by Israeli soldiers rebelling against their expected role in the subjugation and occupation of the Palestinian community. Analyses such as Weiss’s provide a much-needed window into the lived experience of militarist actors, challenging anthropologists to empathize with their dilemmas rather than just condemning them. Anthropology cannot produce a complete descriptive analysis of militarism without exploring the experience and cultural logics of soldiers, weapons scientists, and intelligence officers—perhaps anthropology’s ultimate others— as well as militarism’s victims. This raises problems of method and writing. How do anthropologists study people who may not want to be studied or are for other reasons inaccessible for conventional fieldwork? This may involve defetishizing participant observation in favor of a mixed-method approach that gives more weight to textual sources and set-piece interviews of the kind journalists practice. And, when it comes to writing, how do we write critically about militarist actors without leaving our subjects (as well as some of our readers) feeling set up and betrayed? Alternatively, how do we convey the cultural sense of militarist practices and institutions without feeling complicit (Gusterson 1997)?19 Militarism’s Global Web This volume goes to print at a moment when military programs continue to enjoy strong public support in the United States despite the fact that militarist processes have set entire regions of the planet (especially in the Middle East and the Horn of Africa) ablaze. According to Brown University’s Costs of War project (http://watson.brown.edu/costsofwar/) the US interventions in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Pakistan have led to at least 370,000 direct deaths and 800,000 indirect deaths, have displaced over 10 million people, and have so far cost US taxpayers $5.6 trillion. If we then consider the conflict in Syria, that adds another 350,000–500,000 deaths and, astoundingly, over 6 million more refugees. And then there are the conflicts in Somalia, Yemen, and Libya, which have killed and displaced many more. And, while the numbers are horrifying enough, they do not begin to speak to other dimensions of suffering and destruction associated with the sundering of families, the trauma of witnessing relentless, organized violence for years, and the hopelessness that comes from watching the collapse of social institutions. From our perspective as analysts of militarism, these conflicts in different countries, which tend to be reported separately in the media, are coproduced by a single bundle of underlying militarist processes and are integrated with one another, no matter how much local dynamics may vary. Indeed, this is the essence of militarism—its ability to be simultaneously local and global, to connect different geographical spaces and meaning systems through organized violence or the preparation for it, while obscuring the workings of the connective circuitry. The conflicts that appear to be “in” the Middle East, but that are really global in their reach and origins, are simultaneously “about” Sunni-Shi’a hostility in local Iraqi neighborhoods, the rivalry between Pashtuns and Tajiks in Afghanistan, jihadists’ dreams of a new Caliphate, the diaspora’s fantasies of“home,” a “clash of civilizations” in the heads of American neoconservatives, human rights hawks’ claims to want to protect Muslim women’s rights, military planners’ search for pipeline routes and geostrategic advantage, US presidents’ anxieties about reelection, and aerospace executives’ drive for increased profits. Barefoot guerillas in the Hindu Kush, suicide bombers in Mosul, US special forces knocking down doors in the middle of the night, drone operators in Nevada, bemedaled generals in the Pentagon, speakers in suits at Washington think tanks, refugees clinging to flimsy boats in the Mediterranean, and assembly line workers churning out ammunition for M16s may never meet one another but are fundamentally joined by processes of mil itarism that adhere to certain patterns: through a process of polarization, they create and intensify enmities, turning neighbors against one another; they create novel alliances between locals and outsiders; they inject weaponry beyond the normal reach of local fighters; and they spread, through a sort of process of contagion, exporting violence to and bringing weapons and fighters from contiguous territories and diasporic communities. Above all, following global capitalist and colonial pathways that have sedimented over centuries, they tend to transmogrify the bodily suffering and death of those in the periphery into wealth in the metropole: jobs in munitions factories or in the everexpanding US Department of Defense, profits for shareholders in arms manufacturers, book contracts for defense intellectuals, and roles for actors in Hollywood war movies. This is not to say that no one in the metropole suffers and dies, but militarism is a global system that is tilted in favor of the West, which profits from suffering beyond its borders. A number of commentators observed that, after World War II, Western societies failed to demobilize as they had after World War I, and that the world was increasingly in a permanent war orientation: military research and development continued; the arms industry remained a leading sector in the economy; nuclear weapons were placed on hair-trigger alert, and the horizon was constantly scanned for incoming missiles; the United States built a global network of hundreds of military bases, while both superpowers used military aid to build global patron-client networks; the United States and the Soviet Union used their military and intelligence forces to intervene in other countries’ affairs; and conflicts, invariably worsened by superpower sponsorship of contending factions, regularly erupted in the global south. Far from ameliorating this situation, the end of the cold war has, in the context of a struggle for resource access in the global south and the emergence of the so-called war on terror, produced a further intensification of militarism, which has morphed opportunistically as it has adapted to new economic, ideological, and strategic realities. If, instead of focusing on particular conflicts, we try to hold in awareness the system of global militarism in its entirety, we see a system that generates expansionary energy from its own internal conflicts: as actors within the system argue that threats from elsewhere within the system justify the accumulation of weaponry, the use of force, or the further securitization of daily life, the system deepens its grip upon us To make this case is to recapitulate an argument made by the great social historian E. P. Thompson (1980) in a much debated essay on “exterminism, the last stage of civilization.” Analyzing the cold war nuclear arms race, Thompson argued that Western and Eastern bloc critiques of the other bloc seemed, in their own context, progressive, but, seen from outside the entire conflict, merely served to consolidate and expand the underlying system, which he dubbed “exterminism.” He reframed democratic capitalism and communism not as contending systems but as complementary components of this exterminist system. Looking forward, he feared that this system could only be ended in a self-destructive genocidal spasm as its own contradictions became inescapable. The question before us now is whether exterminist militarism might be ended otherwise, slowly rolled back (as slavery and colonialism were) through the combined efforts of intellectuals, institutions, and social movements. Until we recognize militarism for what it is, we cannot begin to roll it back.

2022 CNDI Kritik
Negative › Impacts › Racial Violence

Militarism is inextricably linked to the maintenance and expansion of white supremacy- their call to shore up the US’s defense is a racial project to project violence into every pore of American society

Joshua Inwood & Anne Bonds in 2016

Inwood- Affiliation: Pennsylvania State University Research interests: Geography, Critical Race Theory, Landscape studies & Bonds- PhD, Geography, University of Washington, 2008. MA, Women's Studies, University of Arizona, 2003

Confronting White Supremacy and a Militaristic Pedagogy in the U.S. Settler Colonial State; Annals of the American Association of Geographers Volume 106, 2016 - Issue 3

2022 CNDI Kritik
Negative › Impacts › Global Warming/Env

Militarism is the largest cause of global warming- it’s impossible to address climate change without demilitarization

Mag. Florian Polsterer in 2015

University of LuxembourgEuropean Master’s Degree in Human Rights and DemocratisationAcademic Year 2014/2015; The Impacts of Militarism on ClimateChange: A sorely neglected relationship; European Inter – University Centre for Human Rights and Democratisation

Within MIMEC the US Department of Defense (DoD) is the largest polluter and waster. 135 Although data is generally hard to come by, it reportedly burns at least a startling 365,000 barrels of oil daily (other estimations amount to 500,000 barrels) 136 . Per year this is a usage of unimaginable 20 billion litres (5.46 billion gallons) 137 . To make matters worse, this number might include neither fuel consumed by contractors or in leased and privatised facilities nor the excessive energy and resources used to produce and maintain weapons and equipment.138 It has been calculated that about one third of the total US military spending just accounts for securing energy supplies worldwide.139 To top it all, the efficiency of fuel use is far from improving, admitted the pentagon, with soldiers in the Iraq and Afghanistan Wars consuming 16 times more fuel140 than in the Second World War.141 Bearing in mind that the data from the pentagon are possibly even undervalued, it is clear that the USA is a hopeless oil addict142 , making the US military “the world’s largest institutional source of greenhouse gases.”143 The DoD is alone responsible for about 40% of global military expenditures. 144 Including the costs of bygone wars145, the USA is spending 40% (almost 1 trillion USD146) of its annual budget on militarisation. This imbalanced spending has dire consequences for programs addressing climate change, education, healthcare, culture, preventing war or reducing income inequality.147 It is troubling that the US Government Accountability Office (GAO) has not been able to audit the DoD for the last 20 years and deems it to be of high risk for waste, fraud and abuse.148 This serious diversion from better use is obvious and weighs even heavier when one compares the annual subsidies to fossil fuel industries (37,5 billion USD)149 to (only non-binding) pledges for long-term climate finance (1,5 billion USD) 150 . 151 Interestingly, already in 1992 the UN Secretariat estimated the annual costs for effectively preserving the environment (and securing development) to be 1000 billion USD, back then the almost exact amount the world spent per year for military defence. Today the ratios surely have changed (and probably for the worse, since delayed climate investments have to be far bigger), but it is unthinkable to curb climate change without a fundamental redirection of the financial and material resources that are being wasted on the illusion of military security. An illusion because modern weapons are a main threat to all life forms and life-supporting systems. 152 Comparing the graphs of rising GHG emissions and the US military expenditures (Figure 14), one can find similarities. The rise of GHG emissions and military spending reflects an undeniable connection between MIMEC and global warming.153 The USA was so bold to demand the inclusion of a provision exempting its military activities from measurement and reductions worldwide before signing the Kyoto Protocol in 1997. But even after seizing this concession the Bush Administration refused to sign the protocol. Furthermore, the US Congress adopted a provision guaranteeing the US military forces immunity from any measurement or energy consumption limits. The executive order from President Obama for federal agencies to reduce their GHG emissions (only by 2020) does not apply to the US military and leaves it free from any climate responsibility154 . 155 The US military industry is of course a blatant example of how militarism threatens the achievement of climate goals, but many of its conditions are also true, in varying degrees, for other militaries.156 Europe, as a major conglomerate of military forces and an ally of the US in many wars requires a quick inspection as well.