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2022 Michigan Affirmative
Aff – Cyborg Writing – BFHR 7wk › 1AC › 1AC

Our praxis takes shape in the dissonant gaps of normative international relations – the 1AC destabilizes the monolithic signification of cisheteronormativity that the resolution’s political project relies on.

Weber ’14 -- Professor of International Relations at the University of Sussex (Cynthia Weber, 2014, “From Queer to Queer IR,” Queer International Relations, International Studied Review (2014), 16, 596-622, accessed 7-21-2022) -- nikki

What is queer? Why are queer international theories relevant to international relations? What might queer investigations of international relations look like? While debates about the meaning of the term “queer” and whether or not queer can be or ought to be defined rage on (Butler 1994; Warner 2012; Wilcox, this forum), many self-identified queer scholars cite Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick’s description of queer as their point of departure. Sedgwick suggested that queer designates “the open mesh of possibilities, gaps, overlaps, dissonances and resonances, lapses and excesses of meaning when the constituent elements of anyone’s gender, of anyone’s sexuality aren’t made (or can’t be made) to signify monolithically” (1993:8).2 Sedgwick’s exposition of queer makes clear the affinities queer studies has to feminist studies and gender studies—with their analyses of the political work that gender, sex, and (sometimes) sexuality do—and to poststructuralist studies—with their analyses of the political work that multiple significations do. Yet queer studies is neither reducible to feminist studies, gender studies, or poststructuralist studies. Nor is it the sum total of these theoretical dispositions. As an academic practice, queer studies has been and remains, as Teresa de Lauretis described it, an attempt “to rethink the sexual in new ways, elsewhere and otherwise” in relation to but also beyond traditional Gay and Lesbian Studies, Feminist and Gender Studies, and Poststructuralist Studies (De Lauretis 1991:xvi; Rubin 1992; Butler 1990). The “elsewhere” of queer studies about which de Lauretis writes has generally functioned to locate queer international theories outside of the discipline of International Relations (IR), largely because queer has been regarded as “otherwise” to what most IR scholars have been schooled to understand as international relations theory and practice (Weber 2014a). While the advantages and disadvantages of categorizing queer international theories as “elsewhere and other-wise” to a broader body of work called IR theory are still hotly debated in the discipline (Weber 2014b), there is a growing recognition among many IR scholars that the distinction between international relations theories and queer international theories upon which such debates rely is unsustainable. This is for at least four reasons. The first reason has to do with what queer studies and queer international theories are and do. Queer studies and queer international theories primarily investigate how queer subjectivities and queer practices—the “who” and the “how” that cannot or will not be made to signify monolithically in relation to gender, sex, and/or sexuality—are disciplined, normalized, or capitalized upon by and for states, NGOs, and international corporations. And they investigate how state and nonstate practices of disciplinization, normalization, and capitalization might be critiqued and resisted (Weber 1994a,b, 1999; Duggan 2003; Puar 2007). This is precisely what Foucauldian-informed international relations scholarship does, albeit usually without an explicit focus on nonmonolithic genders, sexes, and sexualities. Second, why a focus on nonmonolithic genders, sexes, and sexualities matters for the discipline of international relations is in part because states and states’ leaders in particular have made it a focus of their domestic and foreign policies. How states, for example, answer questions about the normality or perversion of “the homosexual” and “the queer” and how these two figures are related to one another currently influences how some states make domestic and foreign policy. For example, claims made by Putin’s Russia and Museveni’s Uganda that “the homosexual” and “the queer” are perverse led each country to formulate domestic policies that were to varying degrees punished by some states and international organizations (Rao 2010, 2012, 2014; Weiss and Bosia 2013). In contrast, the Obama administration’s figuration of “the homosexual” but not “the queer” as normal led it to champion “gay rights as human rights” as part of its foreign policy (Clinton 2011), a general and specific foreign-policy position that queer scholars critique (Duggan 2003; Puar 2007, 2010; Wilkinson and Langlois 2014). Third, queer international theories explicitly engage with what many IR scholars regard as the discipline’s governing dichotomy—order versus anarchy. Among the ways the “order vs. anarchy” dichotomy functions (and, importantly, fails to function) in international relations is by articulating “order vs. anarchy” as “normal vs. perverse” and, more specifically, as “hetero/homo-normative vs. queer”—which is one of the dichotomies that queer theorists investigate and resist. When an order vs. anarchy dichotomy is constituted and sustained by a hetero/homo-normative vs. queer dichotomy in international practice (as it is in the above examples regarding Russia, Uganda, and the United States), any distinction between a general IR and a specific so-called Queer IR disappears. For investigating how these dichotomies function is (or ought to be) of central concern to both queer international theorists and IR theorists more generally. Finally, the breadth of Queer IR investigations now extends to what are arguably the three core domains in which IR scholars claim expertise—war and peace, international political economy, and state and nation formation.3 What this discussion suggests is that there is no definitive distinction between something called IR and something called Queer IR. Having said that, though, it is important not to lose site of the unique, critical difference “queer” makes— ontologically, epistemologically, and methodologically—to investigations of international relations theory and practice. Ontologically, Queer IR scholars focus on queer ontologies that do not or cannot be made to signify monolithically. These include trans*, inter, cross, and pan gendered, sexed, and sexualized bodies—be they physical, geographical, political, historical, economic, ideological, or other.4 These queerly figured bodies are often analyzed intersectionally through and in relation to figurations of race, age, ability, and class (for example, Nash 2008). Epistemologically, Queer IR scholars recognize that knowledge and ignorance in and about international relations are intricately bound up with sexual knowledge and sexual ignorance. This was Sedgwick’s general conclusion, based upon her observation that twentieth-century Western culture depends upon knowing who and/or what it means to be homosexual—because the heterosexual/homosexual dichotomy supports so many other meaningful distinctions. Sedgwick’s list of meaningful distinctions includes public/private, domestic/foreign, discipline/ terrorism, secrecy/disclosure, natural/artificial, wholeness/decadence, and knowledge/ignorance (1990:11). When critically employed, these matrices of knowing and/or not knowing allow us to reconsider not only a variety of heterosexual/homosexual dichotomies but also a variety of cis-gender/trans* dichotomies. In light of Lisa Duggan’s observations about how homonormativity functions in twenty-first-century Western culture—as “a politics that does not contest dominant heteronormative assumptions and institutions, but upholds and sustains them, while promising the possibility of a demobilized gay constituency and a privatized, depoliticized gay culture anchored in domesticity and consumption” (Duggan 2003:50; also see Duggan 2002)—contemporary Queer IR scholars recognize how various homonormative/homodeviant dichotomies increasingly are used to make sense of and to order intimate, national, and international relations. Informed by such queer epistemologies, Queer IR scholars employ methodologies that (like poststructuralist methodologies) do not seek to uncover “the truth” of sexed, gendered, and sexualized bodies, assemblages, institutions, and orders (Foucault 1979). For in what I call a queer logic of the and/or,5 such “truths” are never stable and their representation is never guaranteed; therefore, any attempt to represent them as if they were stable is understood as a political act. For this reason, Queer IR scholars instead track when queer figurations emerge and how they are normalized and/or perverted so that they might challenge but also support heterosexual, heteronormative, cis-gendered, homonormative, homophobic, and trans*phobic assumptions, orders, and institutions. The resulting “deviant knowledges” of international relations these methodologies produce can disorient Disciplinary IR knowledges not only about queer subjects (Ahmed 2006) but also about international relations subjects and the discipline of IR as a subject. What research themes and questions follow from queer understandings of international relations? I would suggest that there are at least (but not exclusively) three, often overlapping, indicative sets of research questions that Queer IR scholars have been and are generating. The first set of research themes explores how “queer” and “queering” are mobilized in international relations theory and practice. These questions often investigate how queer and queering challenge “the normalizing mechanisms of state power to name its sexual subjects: male and female, married or single, heterosexual or homosexual, natural or perverse” (Eng, Halberstam, and Munoz ~ 2005:1) in intimate, national, and international relations. This has led queer international theorists to consider: • Which figurations in/of international relations do not and cannot be made to signify monolithically in terms of gender, sex, and sexuality, and how research focused on these queer figures might make it possible to think and to do international relations differently (Weber forthcoming); • How queer(ing) nations, states, sovereignties, and empires affects international theory and practice (Weber 1998a, 1999; Peterson 1999, 2013, this forum; Agathangelou et al. 2008); • How queer(ing) the intimate relations of family and households queers the international (Peterson 2010a,b, this forum); • How queer(ing) mainstream IR theories like the “territorial peace” potentially rearticulates what the discipline of IR is and can be (Sjoberg, this forum; and more generally, see Wilcox, this forum; Nayak, this forum); and • How queer(ing) borders (Sjoberg, this forum) and movement across borders by queer subjects (Fortier 2002; Gopinath 2005; Luibheid 2005, 2008; Arondekar and Patel forthcoming) might unanchor international relations from its obsession with sovereign nation-states as its relatively fixed object of study. This first batch of themes might give the impression that the queer (and Queer IR) research questions queer(ing) generates are always transgressive and transformative. This is not the case. Indeed, to reduce queer and/or Queer IR to some heroic championing of an always already dissident figuration is to overlook how “queer” is mobilized to constitute and preserve various hegemonic imaginaries of sex, gender, and sexuality and the powerful assumptions, orders, and institutions they support. It is, therefore, vital to pose a second set of Queer IR research themes and questions that take account of how “queer” is sometimes claimed in the name of normalizing and depoliticizing understandings of sex, gender, and sexuality rather than contesting them. Research questions that explore these dimensions of queer often investigate how the nonmonolithic character of queer signification—a queer logic of “and/or”—is appropriated by hegemonic actors, alliances, and orders as a national and international strategy of governance through securitization and marketization. How, for example, do states, international alliances, international orders, and international institutions present themselves as: Simultaneously straight and/or queer, as I argue the United States (US) performs its hegemonic masculinity in relation to the Caribbean (Weber 1998a, 1999); • Simultaneously politicizing and/or depoliticizing, as Duggan’s account of how homonormativies sustain a plethora of depoliticizing neoliberal institutions and aims in the name of a selective politics of inclusion suggests (2003); • Simultaneously exceptionally tolerant and/or intolerant of LGBTQ populations, often in the form of policies that praise so-called modern states for their tolerance as a way to further abject as intolerant and intolerable so-called traditional populations, as Puar (2007), Kuntsman (2009), Schulman (2012), and Remkus Britt (forthcoming) argue supports Israeli policies of occupying Palestinian territories; • Simultaneously pro-LGBTQ and/or anti-LGBTQ, as Lind and Keating argue is the case with present-day Ecuadorian state policy (Lind and Keating 2013; Lind, this forum); • Simultaneously protective of LGBT citizenship rights and/or dangerous to these same citizens because of the specific ways LGBTQ citizens are incorporated by states, as Haritaworn, Kuntsman, and Posocco argue through their analysis of how “queer necropolitics” functions (Haritaworn, Kuntsman, and Posocco 2013b)? In so doing, these scholars have generated a range of useful concepts and ideas that enable a rethinking of specific aspects of international theory and practice, including how actors, orders, institutions, and alliances are formed through and sustained by “queer compensatory strategies” (Weber 1999), “homonormativities” (Duggan 2003), “pinkwashing” (Puar 2007), “homonationalisms” (Puar 2007), “homoprotectionism” (Lind and Keating 2013), and “murderous inclusions” (Haritaworn et al. 2013b). These analyses have also led to speculation on what kinds of “queer protest” and “queer protesters” might be the most effective in challenging conservative mobilizations of queer (Rao 2010; Duggan and Kim 2011–2012). Finally, a third set of themes and questions generated by Queer IR scholars and scholarship considers what being a Queer IR scholar and doing Queer IR scholarship does specifically in and to the discipline of international relations, especially Disciplinary IR. For example: • How do disciplinary strategies like shunning on the one hand and the “gentrification” of Queer IR research on the other give the impression that “there is no queer international theory?” (Weber 2014a,b); • As LGBTQ issues become significantly more visible in foreign policy, might it be at the discipline’s peril to erase Queer IR scholars and scholarship and to relinquish their domains of analysis to other (inter)- disciplines like Global Queer Studies? • Could acknowledgment of Queer IR scholarship broaden and deepen understandings of what Disciplinary IR claims as its three core domains of research excellence: state and nation formation, war and peace, and international political economy? • Might such analyses generate a novel range of theoretical insights that are primarily informed by both queer theory and international relations theory, particularly because both of these theoretical perspectives have so much to say about (in)securities? • If so, should Queer IR scholars enter into a proper institutional alliance with Disciplinary IR—into a “gay marriage” of sorts—with (in) security functioning as their axis of sameness/similarity? • Would this “queer the discipline of IR”? Is “queering the discipline of IR” possible? Or would the discipline of IR never accept a theory that “elevates perversion to philosophy”?6 As this discussion suggests, queer theorizations of international relations exist, they are relevant to core international relations questions and topics, and they have long been generating robust international relations research programs. The contributions to this forum evidence and further these research programs, making clear the critical difference queer can make for international theorizing.

2022 Michigan Affirmative
Aff – Cyborg Writing – BFHR 7wk › 1AC › 1AC

The politics of the cyborg is a form of queer digital experimentation that affirms the ontological instability of queer life – we appropriate and reconstruct the technologies of modernity in order to transgress biopolitical boundaries of gender and sexuality and generate new worlds of possibility.

Haber ’16 -- (Benjamin Haber, 2016, "The Queer Ontology of Digital Method,” Women's Studies Quarterly , FALL/WINTER 2016, Vol. 44, No. 3/4, QUEER METHODS (FALL/WINTER 2016), pp. 150-169, https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/44474067.pdf?refreqid=excelsior%3A16ac84823d870932dfbc4dad72c01232&ab_segments=0%2FSYC-6451%2Fcontrol&origin=, accessed 7-15-2022) -- nikki

For many in the field, the idea of queer method will always sound hope- lessly discordant - an awkward codification of a deliberately unstable and ontologically interdisciplinary discourse. If academic method describes a procedure, a codification of disciplinarily grounded rules, then we might imagine that queer thought would thrive mostly through provocation and deconstruction, not the building of a new canon. Indeed, to the limited extent queer method has been articulated, it has typically been to bring queer theory to method - subjecting the epistemological assumptions of fieldwork and textual analysis to critical scrutiny. While this tendency to mobilize queerness as a critical verb preserves maximum theoretical malleability while usefully complicating the assumptions of academic systemization, there is a limit to the political efficacy of queering existing methodologies. Of course there will never be a queer method, but the time has come to shift: from queering methods to experimentally using methods to more widely distribute queer politics, sociality, and sensibility. My focus here is encouraging queer digital experimentation in the practices of the everyday by appropriating, hacking, and even construct- ing networks of social, corporeal, and environmental sensors. While I'm not arguing that the built architectures of sensing and tracking data - networked, embodied devices like the Fitbit, ambient environmental sensors like Nest, or the oedipally named, versatile sensors of Mother by Sen.se - are queer, the increasingly pervasive underlying technology pro- vides possibilities for distributing a queer politics of ontological intercon- nection and indeterminacy. This sense of possibility, however, rests on an uncomfortable resonance between data capitalism and queer ontology that requires a critically engaged and reflexive methodology. Reaching into the beyond of biopolitics (Clough and Willse 2011), I look at capitalism and digital media after "the normal." As queer theo- rists continue to debate the value of critical orientations to normativity (Wiegman and Wilson 2015; Halberstam 2015), I explore the emergent postnormative, where the modulation and capitalization of bodies and populations rests less on broad cultural and technical averaging. In sug- gesting this realignment of queer attention, I do not discount the strik- ing persistence of wildly inequitable distributions of violence and death through the calcified norms of sexual, racial, classed, and otherwise corpo- really marked social violence. Rather, I hope to galvanize queer critical ca- pacity toward new forms of sociocorporeal modulation and classification and encourage experimentation with those quantitative and digital meth- ods typically dismissed or ignored by queer theorists. By foregrounding queer experimentation with digital methods, I look to balance an oppo- sitional epistemology with the more active development of "transgressed boundaries, potent fusions, and dangerous possibilities" (Haraway 1990, 154). How might we create new open-ended circuits using emergent tech- nologies to proliferate forms of relationality and bring queer notions of ontological indeterminacy and interconnection into consciousness? While the notion of using digitally processed quantitative data to pro- mote a queer indeterminacy might sound counterintuitive to some, it is a strategy that reflects the intensified biopolitical modulation that defines our age. While submitting "our" data to networks gives us free (Facebook) or subsidized (23andMe1) products, we rarely have access to these pref- erences, traces, or bodily processes. Therefore, while this networked data gets used by corporate entities to serve us ads or design our drugs, we are blocked from reimagining its social utility except in highly circumscribed conditions.2 In part, I'm advocating for queer theory to take a hard look at the quan- titative methodologies of what Nigel Thrift calls "knowing capitalism," the increasingly big business of studying and modulating the everyday (2005). Notably, the first stop of capitalisms "micro-sociological turn" (Thrift 2012, 148) is sex and relationality. Social connection is an almost unfath- omably massive enterprise, and companies like Facebook, Twitter - and a million upstarts - have a voracious appetite for difference. Its worth bald- ly stating: these are sociological companies with a narrowly instrumen- tal focus involved in not just knowing but actively modulating social life. And as I have argued elsewhere, companies like Facebook have monetized queer notions of sociality: the mutability of identity through the event and over time, the centrality of nonfamilial community in the understanding of the self, the celebration of recognition and visibility as core strategies of political engagement, and the interest in the nontextual, performative, and ephemeral (Haber 2016). Robert Payne has similarly suggested a queer modality of network culture that promotes a "multiplication and com- plication of intimate relations, the promiscuous commingling of self and other, self with self, user with interface, public with private, individual with social, and leisure with labor" (2014, 2). While these are infrastructures that many are already familiar with, more intriguing and concerning for me are still-emergent computational systems that attempt to build on the randomness-inflected development of life itself - circuitry that strives toward the complexity and plasticity of neural systems in the brain. There are even suggestions that biodigital sys- tems will increasingly try to harness the "realm of extension and thought at the inanimate level" (Parisi 2012, 45), to try, in other words, to monetize the indeterminacy and potentiality at the heart of all matter. In short, while I am arguing that queer theorists should take advantage of the indetermi- nate potential of digital networks, we must also sharpen our critical voices, as capitalism is increasingly able to profit through an alignment with queer ontologies of sociality, embodiment, and materiality. Queer method must be a witness to violence, and it must be performa- tively involved in the creation of new worlds. Knowing capitalism - much like the genealogy of queer indeterminacy I draw from - is increasingly concerned with the above and below of consciousness, the strange and monstrous assemblages that bypass our phenomenological experience of Cartesian boundaries. I draw connections between queer writing about materiality and biological systems with technoscientific investments also inspired by the indeterminacy of life and matter. I also look to blur and break down boundaries between queer and feminist theory, a split that has been hopelessly overdetermined. This is not to say that queer theory and feminist theory are the same, or that they always get along, but that there have been important crosscurrents of continuity in rejecting a determined body, subject, and form of relationality. I then highlight recent theoretical engagement with the work of Alfred North Whitehead by media scholar Mark Hansen, as perhaps offering a vision of this queer methodological potential, and I end with a discussion of the politics of queer method. With the ascendancy of a conservative LGBT agenda, including the nationalization of gender-neutral marriage law and impending changes to military rules allowing trans-identified folks to serve openly (Cooper 2016; Schaefer et al. 2016), queer ideas and queer politics have never been more needed, and methodological in- vention is key here as well. While corporate-owned social networks are solidifying their hold on the distribution of ideas, we are asked to believe assurances from Facebook s social scientists that the movement of media across their proprietary networks has more to do with "individual choice" than algorithmic predestination (Bakshy, Messing, and Adamie 2015). An active experimentation with the forms and formulas of digital media, espe- cially as it increasingly colonizes the depths of the body, is perhaps the key challenge of queer politics in the twenty-first century.

2022 Michigan Affirmative
Aff – Cyborg Writing – BFHR 7wk › 1AC › 1AC

We take refuge in hybrid spaces, revel in the forbidden queer life that exists always already in between the lines – cyborg subjectivity is a process of queer technological assembly and reassembly that transcends the boundaries of normative international politics and identity constructions.

Carlson ’01 -- (Dennis Carlson, 2001, “Gay, Queer, and Cyborg: The performance of identity in a transglobal age,” Discourse: Studies in the Cultural Politics of Education, 22:3, 297-309, DOI: 10.1080/01596300120094343, accessed 7-19-2022) -- nikki

To address that question, I want to turn to the metaphor of the cyborg queer, as suggested by the work of Donna Haraway (1991), an in uential postmodern philosopher of science. The cyborg is the creation of science fiction and fantasy, although, as Haraway observes, science Ž ction always represents a projection of contemporary cultural myths. Throughout the modern era, the cyborg has fascinated the public consciousness, ever since Mary Shelley introduced Frankenstein’s monster, the part-hu- man, part-animal, part-machine who would be free. The cyborg is often treated in popular culture as a monster, or a robot with no autonomy or free will—like the Borg on Star Trek: the next generation. But this is not always the case. Haraway finds in some feminist science fiction novels, and in films such as Blade Runner, a model for a progressive type of cyborg, one who is struggling to be free, like Frankenstein’s monster, but is now living in a postmodern age. In this form, Haraway suggests, the cyborg myth is both a reflection of and constitutive of a new type of human or posthuman subject, no longer divisible into a ‘mind’ and a body, and no longer separable from the technologies that locate it on a worldwide information web and in cybernetic feedback loops, a cyborg who has carved out limited freedom in a borderland space. The postmodern cyborg moves back and forth across identity borders. The cyborg is a metaphor for ‘shapeshifting’ subjects who exist at the boundaries and interfaces between outside and inside, between subjectivity, body, and technology, able to adapt to a heterogeneous and rapidly changing environment. They have no authentic unity or identity and can only be said to exist as partial, always in ‘guises’, always in the process of being assembled and reassembled out of parts circulating on the worldwide web, always part of a continuous feedback loop that connects everything in a cybernetic, global information age. In Haraway’s language, the subject is ‘stitched together imperfectly’ and always being restitched, without a master plan. If this postmodern cyborg is still only a fantasy, only beginning to be made into reality, Haraway suggests it is the future for more and more of ‘us’. It is the ‘postmodern collective and personal self’ (p. 163). The education of the cyborg occurs at the borderlands, that new hybrid space being constructed around the major national boundaries that divide peoples and cultural identities. This is the land, she says, of the mestizo, the queer, the postcolonial. Postmodern cyborg subjects also inhabit a cultural landscape in which identities are blurred, multiple languages are spoken, and different cultural traditions and rituals rub up against one another. We might take Gloria Anzaldua’s writing in her influential book Borderlands (1987) as an example. For Anzaldua, a Chicana lesbian, marginalized from the white, middle class women’s movement, marginalized within a patriarchal Mexican culture, and marginalized as a lesbian in a heteronormative culture, the borderlands is a permanent place of residence. The geographical borderland Anzaldua inhabits is that which separates Mexico from the United States, marked by ‘this thin edge of barbwire’. If this barbwire is symbolic of cultural hegemony and violence, it is a barbwire that does not frighten some—in fact many—from crossing over or under it every day. Those who are border crossers learn to shift back and forth from one culture to the other, speaking in diverse tongues, surviving by interweaving and juxtaposing ideas, literary forms, linguistic styles, and identities. Who now lives in the borderlands? The ‘prohibited’ and the ‘forbidden’ find it their home. In short: ‘the squint-eyed, the perverse, the queer, the troublesome, the mongrel, the mulato, the half-breed, the half dead’. This is a territory, in short, for those who ‘cross over, pass over, or go through the conŽ nes of the “normal” ’ (p. 25). Cyborgs and mestizos are metaphors for a new form of postmodern subject who no longer, according to Haraway, is caught in the ‘spiral dance’, no longer needs an Other to define itself. Haraway borrows a phrase from the Vietnamese film maker and postcolonial theorist Trinh T. Minha-ha—‘inappropriate/d others’—to refer to the cyborg subject who does not engage in self-definition through reference to dominant categories of ‘self’ and ‘Other,’ the kinds of identities offered to the late modern subject by identity politics. To the extent that cyborgs define themselves by identity labels it is always for strategic purposes. Politically, cyborgs prefer a politics of personal communicative freedom and strategic political mobilizations to a politics of welfare state progressivism and reformism, forms of politics that allow cyborgs to ‘join with another, to see together without claiming to be another’ (Haraway, 1991, p. 193). Rather than view gender, class, race, and sexual identities as the basis for a progressive politics, Haraway and other postmodern feminists seek to liberate us from the taken-for-granted character of identity categories. The cyborg subject is not accustomed to thinking about ‘race’ or ‘gender’ or ‘class’ or ‘sexual orientation’ as if these were naturally given and meaningful categories. In the subversion of identity in the new borderlands of culture, Haraway sees the possibility for weaving together a new hybrid identity, linked to a new affinity politics that draws people together based on common interest and lifestyle and that dissolves again when it is no longer useful. Affinity politics is the only kind of politics that makes sense in a postmodern world, according to Haraway, in which ‘none of “us” have any longer the symbolic or material capability of dictating the shape of reality to any of “them” ’ (p. 157). This all sounds very appealing and very liberating—to cast off the mask and shield of identity, to be free agents at last, engaged in constructing and reconstructing ourselves outside of the binary logic of dominant identity categories. Yet I remain somewhat suspicious of postmodern identity formation. We may live in a world in which borders are increasingly meaningless, and in which all identity is understood to be performance and representation. The worldwide information web and the global village may also now provide opportunities to build new kinds of  uid, afŽ nity-group communities and shapeshifting identities. At the same time, we cannot walk away from the historic struggles over power that still define class, race, gender, and sexual identity in the postmodern world. We are participants, wittingly or unwittingly, in historic struggles against oppression and invisibility, and to suggest that these ‘old’ modern era struggles are no longer relevant, that we are now free, if we want to be, to creatively engage in our own self-production outside of identity, outside of the dialectic between self and Other, is to engage in a fantasy we should not mistake for reality. In an essay on ‘The “Uncanny”’, Sigmund Freud tells a story about riding on a train, half-asleep in his compartment, when suddenly he was jolted awake as the washing-cabi- net door across from him swung open. As he sat up, Freud writes, ‘an elderly gentleman in a dressing-gown and a traveling cap came in’. Freud assumed that the man had taken the wrong direction and come into his compartment by mistake. ‘Jumping up with the intention of putting him right, I at once realized to my dismay that the intruder was nothing but my own re ection in the looking-glass on the open door.’ What was uncanny about the situation, he observes, is that ‘I can still recollect that I thoroughly disliked his appearance’ (Freud, 1958, p. 248). Freud provides, in this brief example, a representation of the myth of the ‘double’; a myth based on the metaphor of the looking-glass self. The Other is an exteriorization of our own subjectivity, a construction of our own ego, a projection of part of ourselves we would deny, exclude, and repress. So Freud projects upon the Other in the mirror a dislikeable appearance, afŽ rming his own likeability. But he also means to imply that his own self-likeability is constructed on shaky ground, that it is dependent upon the dislikeability of the man in the mirror. Yet the man in the mirror is a re ection of himself. We cannot but fail to see ourselves in the negativity of the Other we have created. To bring issues of identity into education is to help young people recognize that the degree to which the Other has been represented as a ‘double’, an alter ego re ected in the mirror. Hegel and Marx, of course, based a whole narrative of history on the dialectic between self and Other, making it the driving force of history. From this standpoint, identity is constructed out of the relationship between master and slave, between independent and dependent consciousness. The destination of history is the recognition that we no longer need these identity categories to deŽ ne ourselves, so that difference dissolves and truth is once more uniŽ ed. This modernist mythology of history has been pretty well discredited in recent years, both because of its utopianism and because the promise of unity is itself inconsistent with commitments to difference and diversity. But postmodern theory may offer only the negativity of this modern myth, rather than a transformative new mythology. Whereas modernism understands identity as requiring an Other, postmodern identity seeks to deŽ ne itself without the need for ‘Othering’ practices. Whereas modern forms of identity formation emphasize a movement towards the unity of all oppositions, postmodern identity formation offers only a movement towards the dispersal of all unities, a proliferation of differences that never comes together in any coherent cultural politics. I think one way to proceed is down a path suggested by Judith Butler (1999). As a leading postmodern theorist of the self, Butler understands identity as performance and believes that a progressive cultural politics is about troubling all essentialistic treatments of identity. This seems to imply a cultural politics that is organized around afŽ nity groups rather than fixed and unidimensional identity groups. For to organize around identity is to participate in legitimating identity categories, even though these categories have served to oppress women, people of colour, gays and lesbians, and the ‘working class’. Still, Butler backs away from this extreme, post-identity position. She is Hegelian enough to believe that identity in Western culture has been and continues to be a dialectical production. Within the historical dialectic between dominant and subordinated groups, identity categories are more than categories of oppression. They are also categories used in the slave’s struggle for freedom. At this historical juncture at least, she writes, the subject requires an identity forged out of ‘a radical and constitutive relation to alterity’. This means that there are limits to the idea of moving beyond identity, at least as ‘the point of departure for politics’ (p. xiv). At the same time, identity is never Ž xed or unidimensional. Various identity dialectics push the human subject towards continuous reconstruction. Butler observes that the self constantly Ž nds itself outside itself, without the possibility of a ‘return to a former self’. No return is possible because there is no recovery from ‘self-loss’, the losing of who we have been, the lack of a stable foundation upon which to construct a stable identity (p. xv). The subject is always recognizing itself through identity. But the moment it Ž nds itself is simultaneously the moment it begins to lose itself again, as identity is revealed as a mere representation, a performance, a re ection in the mirror. The moment that identity is used subversively, to afŽrm a liberatory politics, is also the moment it begins to be commercialized and stripped of its liberatory politics. Where does this leave progressive educators, scholars, and cultural workers? I think it leaves us trying to reconcile identity politics and post-identity politics rather than choosing one over the other. It means learning to afŽrm identity and troubling it simultaneously. For although identity may still be constructed as a relation between self and Other, the current categories of identity are not permanent fixtures on the cultural landscape, and self and Other can move toward a more equitable recognition. Given all this, it seems likely that sexual identity, along with gender, race, and class identities, will continue to play a part in constructing the postmodern self. Indeed, for all the talk about queer theory as a movement beyond identity, it may be appreciated as a new stage in an historic movement characterized by a heightened self-awareness regarding identities that were once largely taken for granted as naturally given. In some ways, gayness is even more Žrmly established as an axis of identity formation in the postmodern age, although its name and form keep changing. And lesbians and gay men, along with bisexual and transgendered people, are coming out, and thus afŽrming an identity, at a younger and younger age. One example of just how much things are changing is an event that took place in 1998, at a middle school in Falls Church, Virginia. David Grossman, the 13-year-old guest of honour, held a coming-out party one day after school, proudly afŽ rming a gay identity before family and other gay teens (Steiner, 2001). If David’s story is not typical, it suggests that sexual identity is not going away, that gay/queer identity still serves a very important role in helping most homosexual and bisexual young people afŽ rm their bodies and their desires, and also build an identity that is more than about sexuality, that involves solidarity with others and commitment to a cultural politics. At the same time, gay youth are still coming out into the margins, and the struggle against the commodiŽ cation of sexual identity continues. Although the cyborg queer is a useful metaphor for a new phase in the conscious development of sexual identity at the margins, it is fraught with contradictions. The cyborg is a creature of the global web, the internet, and as we move into what Jean Baudrilliard (1983) has called a ‘hyperreal’ world, identity is increasingly hyperreal or virtual as well. We stitch a self-image together by cutting and pasting images and texts, by creating multiple personae. Virtual communities of identity replace ‘real’, geographical communities. Eugene Provenzo (1998) observes that these developments are for the most part progressive, that the worldwide web can provide a liberatory space for gay youth outside of the regulatory and normalizing power of the local community. The internet allows gay youth across America, even in remote rural areas, to participate in gay culture and build communities of afŽ nity. But how liberatory, how politically aware, are these new virtual communities that we spend so much time inhabiting? As Darren Pascavage argues, ‘the Internet can quite literally keep gay youth “in their place”— speciŽ cally, in front of the computer’ (2000, p. 9). And that place, as he notes, is increasingly commercialized. This means that the struggle over control of identity continues, as does the marginalization of gayness. The homecoming parade  oat sponsored by the Gay, Lesbian, and Bisexual Alliance at Miami University which I referred to at the beginning of this essay was performing queer identity in the belly of the beast, one might say. But it was a performance that still kept gayness in its place, isolated to one  oat. The  oat signiŽ ed that there is now a limited space for gayness, so long as that space is still a separate space, so long as gay people continue to be the Other. In such a context, one must afŽ rm identity and trouble it simultaneously, constructing and reconstructing self and Other in the process.

2022 Michigan Affirmative
Aff – Cyborg Writing – BFHR 7wk › 1AC › 1AC

Thus we affirm queer cyborg writing, a liberatory methodological queering of the contemporary technosphere that embraces a symbiotic subjectivity between human and machine and deconstructs the normative binaries that structure the social order of modernity.

Ghan ’20 -- (Ben Berman Ghan, 02-24-2020, "Queering the Cyborg: How the Hybrid Body Can Set Us Free," Strange Horizons, http://strangehorizons.com/non-fiction/queering-the-cyborg-how-the-hybrid-body-can-set-us-free/, accessed 7-20-2022) -- nikki

The Cyborg as a figure in popular culture—the body in a literal state of “human/machine symbiosis” (Katherine Hayles How We Became Posthuman 112)—is often conceived as a monstrous figure, as a figure of otherness, a being whose status as a hybrid has made it less deserving of the title of humanity. The Cyborg, when portrayed as an inhuman monster, has “always defined the limits of community in the western imagination” (Donna Haraway The Cyborg Manifesto 64). However, in embracing this hybrid status, the Cyborg need not remain a subhuman Other, but rather, can become the figure in which queer and repressed bodies might break free from the constraints that their normative culture places on them. This essay argues that the Cyborg, under critical posthumanist and queer theory, can range from hybrid subjectivities grafted to the human body, or inhuman bodies fused with human subjectivities, to bodies that have found an equilibrium in both their human/machine avatars, and finally, to figures that have become cyborgs of both the body and the mind. Subjectivity, throughout this essay, refers to how a creature sees its world, and how that creature sees and defines itself as a part of that world. A human’s subjectivity, for example, might involve an understanding of linear time and mortality, and an understanding of who they are in relation to others. A dog’s subjectivity, by contrast, might be similar to the human’s, but not identical, with its subjective understanding of time, and certainly of social structures, differing. How a machine or extraterrestrial might perceive themselves and their universe is further still from what the human subjectivity perceives. In short, subjectivity will be used as a shorthand for how characters are capable of thinking about their external and internal worlds. This Mind and Body Cyborg as a queer figure raises its head in Amal El-Mohtar and Max Gladstone’s 2019 epistolary novel This Is How You Lose the Time War, as two Cyborg bodies shed their previous subjectivities in order to find a queer understanding of one another. Through their altered subjectivities, the post-human Cyborg as a queer figure is one that can flourish and reach out to one another in new forms of "Cyborg writing" (Haraway 54) that the "pure" human world could never achieve. This is How You Lose The Time War opens with each of the two protagonists already in possession of two separate types of Cyborg bodies. Red—the agent of a post-singularity "techy-mechy dystopia” (El-Mohtar & Gladstone 36)—represents the most traditional figure of the Cyborg as a human/machine symbiosis, whose “gyroscopes whir in her gut, lenses click beneath the camouflage jelly of those pure black eyes” (14). She operates in a world where these enhancements and implantations are not invasive but natural. Blue—Red’s initial opponent, and eventual romantic partner—descends from an opposing “viny-hivey elfworld” (36) future. Blue exists as a body in symbiosis not with the traditional artifice of technology but with a sentient nature represented as “Garden” (6). “Garden” stands as a potential alternative future to the AI intelligence of “Agency” (6) that created Red. To continue to call Blue a literal Cyborg is to acknowledge how “plant sentience and intelligence are […] explicitly associated with the mediation of machines” (Teresa Castro The Mediated Plant 11). Blue remains a figure of human/machine symbiosis, even if that machine has taken a different form (that of a human/plant-machine). Like Red, Blue sees her own body as natural, and Red’s as the unnatural. She emphasizes that while the Cyborgs of Red’s world are created artificially and decanted, the children of Garden are “grown […] seeds planted, roots combing through time” (El-Mohtar & Gladstone 126). The struggle to overcome the dualisms of natural/unnatural is both a central conflict of El-Mohtar and Gladstone's novel and a critical project in queering the figure of the Cyborg, the hybrid body focused on breaking down the dualisms and binaries of normative human culture. When This Is How You Lose the Time War speaks of being infected by or "infiltrated" (8) by one another both mentally and physically, Red and Blue often speak of the act of reading as the most potent infiltration point for the writer. In a letter, Red—one of the two correspondents of the novel—acknowledges that their reading of each other has “built a you within me, or you have” (94). The novel treats the act of reading and writing as a way for Red and Blue to trigger personal "apocalypses" (defined below) of their subjective notions of purity and otherness within one another, with writing creating not new moments, but new worlds. “Letters are structures, not events. Yours give me a place to live inside” (94) argues Red, illustrating how Blue’s words alone have restructured her sense of self, and her sense of belonging. The novel's preoccupation with ways to instigate such personal apocalypses mirrors the very literal apocalypses on a planetary scale that both Red and Blue seek to trigger through history, travelling "upthread into the stable past or downthread into the fraying future" (10) to infect and destroy timelines by changing events in an attempt to “preserve what matters [for their own sides] and let what doesn't fall to dust: mulch for the more perfect future's seed" (El-Mohtar & Gladstone 60). The planetary apocalypses throughout the story intend not to end the world, but to radically alter it. As I explain below, this is a posthumanist application of the term apocalypse, and the one best applied to how Time War treats change in both character and world. Creating not the physical but the cognitive Cyborg always requires these apocalyptic rearrangings of subjectivity in order to wipe away the binaries and dualisms of traditional human culture—binaries such as the strict gender norms of man/woman in a single binary (hetero) normative sexuality, or the dualisms of self/other, human/inhuman, or us/them that would keep the figure of the Queer Cyborg constrained. As Time War applies apocalypse on a global scale by rewriting events, it applies apocalypse on the subjective scale through Red and Blue’s literal writing of themselves and each other. Apocalypse, as applied to subjectivity, is not the "end to the physical world, per se, but the world as structured for the characters" (Glazier, Beck 5). Looking outside of Time War, the cognitive Cyborg received its post-apocalyptic birth in literature by coming into contact with transformative and apocalyptic writing. In Ted Chiang’s novella Story of Your Life, the protagonist Louise Banks correctly identifies how her personal apocalypse and global/societal apocalypse coincide “when ships appeared in orbit and artifacts appeared in meadows” (Chiang 2). In Chiang’s global apocalypse, the mere arrival of the alien is enough, as the presence of otherworldly beings forces the Earth to re-examine the idea of "human exceptionalism" (7) that is assumed by humanism. However, while the mere arrival of the Heptapods is the epoch for the global apocalypse in Chiang, for Louise, their arrival is only “how it began” (Chiang 2). While Story of Your Life only briefly concerns itself with the global apocalypse that the Heptapods herald, Chiang’s narrative keeps its focus on Louise's more personal apocalypse: the restructuring of her subjectivity. The radical change to Louise’s subjectivity goes beyond the presence of the alien, and actually hinges on the insights forced onto Louise by the Heptapods' languages, and more specifically the Heptapods' written language, which gives birth to Louise’s own “unique sense of apocalypse” (Glazier, Beck 5). The Heptapods’ written language—what Louise refers to as “Heptapod B” (Chiang 14)—suggests a version of temporality unlike the “sequential mode of awareness” (31) that Louise had previously experienced. Where human language—analogue language—uses separate symbols to act as signified/signifier for one another, Heptapod B suggests a "digital" mode of temporality, where there are no separate words or terms that can represent signified or signifier (Glazier, Beck 12). The Heptapods “experience events all at once” (Chiang 31) without being bound to sequence or linear cause and effect, and they express this “simultaneous mode of consciousness” (Chiang 32) through Heptapod B. Louise’s pre-apocalyptic life was “before [she] learned to think in Heptapod B” (Chiang 35). While there are instances where Louise truly experiences “past and future all at once” (36) as Heptapods do, Louise's subjectivity becomes “an amalgam of human and Heptapod” (Chiang 35). Instead of becoming entirely digital, as the Heptapods are, Louise's after(-)life is one which must incorporate both her previous human language and the "memories of destiny" (Glazier, Beck 16). Through these changes in language and writing, Louise revises her concept of the subject, as it forces her to reconcile different identities through her life. Her new subjectivity revises her many identities through time as single, married, divorced, childless, pregnant, a mother, and a mother grieving for her child into a single digital sense of self. The personal apocalypse that Louise experiences through this new language is one that shatters her humanist, static identity of "I" into an "I" of many simultaneous "multiple selves" (16). Louise's apocalypse ultimately results in not only a change but a radical expansion in her subjectivity. Chiang’s narrative then creates a type of cognitive Cyborg with an entirely “pure” physical human body, but a mind that has become a fusion, with an inhuman understanding being fused to a human subjectivity. However, the cognitive Cyborg can go further in muddling notions of human purity, as can be seen in Alan Moore's Saga of the Swamp Thing: Book One. In the comic, the protagonist initially believes himself to be only a literal fusion of plant and a human body, akin to the physical human/plant-machine symbiosis of Time War’s Blue. Though his subjective understanding of self has incorporated an inhuman body, he still maintains a self-image of a purely human existence underneath, separate and apart from the inhuman. But this notion of human purity is destroyed through contact with writing, when Swamp Thing stumbles upon writing about himself and his own nature. This writing reveals the origin and truth of Swamp Thing’s body and creation: he is not a human within a monstrous figure but "a mass of plant fiber that had somehow been infected with the consciousness of Alec Holland" (66). Returning to the idea of subjectivity being an infection, Swamp Thing becomes the inverse of Louise from Story of Your Life, an entirely alien body of inhuman origin, whose subjective understanding of the world and the self has become more like the human. Swamp Thing’s subjective self after this apocalyptic revelation is no longer that of Time War’s Blue, but a new cognitive symbiosis of human consciousness/plant-machine body. As with Time War, the figure of Moore’s comic had already begun as a kind of physical hybrid, but only through writing do they become a new kind of Cyborg through a fusion of human/artifice within the mind alone, free to cast off the constraints of their previous understanding of the self. The Cyborg of the mind, or the cognitive Cyborg, exists not in opposition to Hayles’s physical Cyborg, but as a less literal companion. Andy Clarke, in Natural-Born Cyborgs: Minds, Technologies, and the Future of Human Intelligence, proposed that a Cyborg could be created out of any fusion between the "pure" human and the use of any artifice that the human might use to express themselves or enable their identities. Clarke alludes to the use of writing utensils, digital platforms, and other technologies that can become an extension of the self without the literal "intrusion of silicon and wire into flesh and blood, as anyone who has felt himself thinking via the act of writing already knows" (Clarke 5). This alternative method of Cyborg creation suggests it is not the physical hybrid status of the body that triggers the creation of the cognitive Cyborg, but how writing may expose a body to new ways of thinking about themselves. Returning to The Cyborg Manifesto, Haraway argued that Cyborg writing is "about the power to survive, not on the basis of original innocence, but on the basis of seizing the tools to mark the world that marked them as other" (55). This Is How You Lose the Time War creates an opportunity for two characters to engage in Cyborg writing as an active, rather than passive process, as they each receive their apocalypse through contact with the writing. Neither Red nor Blue are limited to the role of author or audience, but rather both serve as reader and writer for one another, each allowing the other a chance to redefine what it means to be a hybrid for both. Though Haraway originally posited how women of colour might be understood as the “cyborg identity” (54) most powerfully placed to be enabled through Cyborg writing, applying Cyborg theory to narratives like This Is How You Lose the Time War shows how other “taboo fusions” (52) that stray from the notions of purity that are “persistent in western traditions” (59)—such as those inherent in heteronormativity—might also be primed for the act of writing as a transformative process. The letters sent and shared between Red and Blue continually infect them throughout the narrative. In both purpose and style, they evolve throughout the novel from only short taunts and cruel allusions of what each believes the other’s world to be like to a “confession of real, curious ignorance" (El-Mohtar & Gladstone 36) about the other's opposing world. Their ignorance of any real knowledge of one another has been fostered by both Agency and Garden's "manic compulsion to name the Enemy" (Haraway 9) as entirely Other. When these early letters speak of infection and infiltration, it is only in binary terms, each fearing the other is trying to entirely convert or “recruit” (36) them to the “enemy’s” side. However, Red and Blue’s letters to one another move into Cyborg writing once they begin to seek understanding over conversion. Curiosity and desire drive them to each attempt to "say something true" (37) about themselves to one another. In this quest for truth, Red and Blue move past writing in stifling binaries into the realm of storytelling, each attempting in letters to write their own origin stories to one another. Haraway also defined Cyborg writing as the act of “retelling stories, versions that reverse and displace the hierarchical dualisms of naturalized identities.” (Cyborg Manifesto 55). From the beginning, each origin complicates the binary definitions of what each Cyborg believes the other to be. Within the binary of their war, Red’s world is one of connection, a species all plugged into one another where “there is no mono-we, there are many uses […] pieces laid atop pieces" (El-Mohtar & Gladstone 43). Red's cyborg civilization is supposed to be the one where the entire human race is in a constant state of symbiosis. However, the origin story that Red writes for herself destroys that image of constant connectivity with a tale of isolation and solitude. Blue’s image of Red’s world and Red’s identity is that of one massive “artificial god the size of mountains, built for making war” (64); so Blue is then asked to reimagine her idea of Red as a small girl who has purposefully walked away from the whole to be “the only person on that tiny rock.” (63). In writing her origin story, Red not only takes control of how she is observed by Blue, but it also allows her to subvert the myth of purity that her culture has placed upon her. Though Red's culture is one of vast sameness, in her writing, she can label herself "deviant" (64), as something other than only the cultural norm enforced upon her by both Blue's perceptions and Red's society. Similarly, the origin story Blue writes for herself is of one not subsumed by the myth of purity that is her culture, that her world demands one be a part of a greater whole, and though she is “enmeshed in this wholeness—they are not the whole of me” (72). Blue contrasts Red’s origin by being involuntarily “cut off” (123) from Garden, as opposed to Red’s self-imposed episode of solitude. In the choice to create and share these origin stories of themselves for each other through writing, Red and Blue as “cyborg authors subvert the central myth” (Haraway 55) of the normative cultures that would keep the one/other binary intact at all costs. While sharing each other’s origin stories through writing is an act of empowerment and fusion – empowering Red and Blue to tell their own stories, and making their writing a part of each other in the process—Time War goes further, giving Red and Blue a chance to retell the other's origin once they have told their own. They can perform this new fusion of entering each other's origin stories through time travel, Blue becoming the "something like a wolf" (63) that Red encounters, saving her from attackers during her solitude, and Red going back to give the infection of a "kiss and something to eat" (122) that had initially cut Blue off from her Garden, inoculating her against the poison that Red's Agency will later attempt to use to kill her. Both of these retellings allow the two Cyborgs to redefine the stories of their origins from events of barely surviving "enemy action" (121) to an event of being protected by a loved one. Having shared this act of Cyborg authorship, Red and Blue can no longer continue along the constraining dualism that their cultures insist upon. As they embrace each other’s writings, each taking the other’s story into their own, Red understands that “it’s wrong to call you enemy” (79). It is in the death of the idea of the enemy that the figure of the Queer Cyborg can finally be born. Red, having broken the binary holding her back, is allowed to admit, "I love you, Blue. Have I always? Haven't I?" (129). If the Cognitive Cyborg is a Queer Cyborg, as they are in Time War, it's the breaking down of the dualisms and restrictions inherent in a heteronormative subjectivity that necessitates that queerness. The body and mind under heteronormativity work to “affirm a structure, to authenticate [the] social order” (Edelman No Future: Queer Theory and the Death Drive 2-3) that man/woman is an absolute binary, there are two genders, and two sides to a single “pure” sexuality (that of heterosexual couplings), all of which is subsumed under the politics of what queer theory labels “reproductive futurism” (3)—the idea that the goal of all couplings must be to produce children, that by “transmit[ting life] to the future in the form of its inner Child” (3), life and romance gain their only meaning. If the goal of Cyborg writing is political—and all writing is political—then "Cyborg politics” (Haraway 59) is queer politics as well. In reference to Terry Eagleton’s 1990 play Saint Oscar, “you hold that a man is a man and a woman is a woman. I hold that nothing is ever purely itself, and that the point where it becomes so is known as death” (Eagleton, cf. Heaney 1995, 86-87). These binaries, imposed by culture and not nature, can be cast aside by those who reject the absolute power and authority of such binaries. As Red and Blue fall in love, Red states, “I want to be a body for you” (El-Mohtar & Gladstone 129). The body, as constructed in Cyborg politics, stands as opposed to the body and its purpose under heteronormativity. Queer/Cyborg bodies and Queer/Cyborg politics are bodies of “those not fighting for the children [but fighting on] the side outside the consensus by which all politics confirms the absolute value of reproductive futurism” (3). The queer Cyborg is free to “subvert the structures of desire, the force imagined to generate language and gender” (Haraway 57). The binaries of man/woman, mother/father, and parent/child are not necessary destinies for the body of the Cyborg, who is free to seek out other forms of coupling, and pursue other desires. Or, in Blue’s own words: “Sex improves when decoupled […] from animalistic procreative desperation” (El-Mohtar & Gladstone 50). Cyborgs' bodies, unbound from the “purity” of the human body that is promoted by normativity, and indeed heteronormativity, do not need to "dream of community on the model of the organic [nuclear, or reproductive] family" (Haraway 9). Though queer couplings of course can have children (and heteronormative couples who choose not to reproduce are equally valid), and queer parents are as capable and legitimate as any other parent type, Edelman’s argument is not that queer culture cannot produce children, but instead that queer culture is one where the end result of love and couplings does not necessitate children, with love flourishing beyond the normative demand that reproduction be the end goal of coupling. Cyborgs are free to pursue new modes of community and ideas of love through their altered states of subjectivity, their hybrid status, and their place as a fusion of different modes of thinking/being. This Cyborg idea of love is not a separate concept from that of queer love under Edelman’s argument, but is an expression of queer love. Cyborg love, as Red and Blue love each other, is a love without the motivation of creating future generations, or a love constrained by the pressure to do so. They do not aim to find children, or necessarily a place within child-rearing culture, but instead aim only to find each other, without the ulterior motives or directives that (hetero)normative culture might demand of them. They do not dream of procreation, but only of one another. For the two hybrids of This Is How You Lose the Time War, the choice to become that cognitive Queer Cyborg through writing is embraced both as a state of mind and as a physical manifestation. As Red completes her apocalyptic transformation, she "reads Blue into her: tears, breath, skin […], she builds a model of Blue's mind from the words she left; models her body to the letters' measure" (El-Mohtar & Gladstone 183). Red takes the Cyborg writing of connection and origin and takes it into herself until "new organs bloom from autosynthesized stem cells to shoulder old bits of her away […] a different mind plays around the edges of her own" (183). Red becomes a new fusion, human/machine and human/plant-machine, forsaking all normative concepts of purity and dualism as she becomes a hybrid that is capable of crossing back and forth from the post-singularity future of her Agency to the Mediated Plant future of Blue's Garden. Still a Cyborg of Agency's origins, she is rejected by Garden. Nevertheless, no longer the pure Cyborg of her own culture, she cannot be accepted back. Her Agency, strictly adhering to the dualism of Us/Them, cannot accept the queer Cyborg as a creature no longer playing within the rules of normative dualism. The queer body of the Cyborg, that which has been achieved by an apocalyptic shift of subjectivity, cannot exist within binary culture. A queer culture, a Cyborg culture, is a hybrid of impurity that must create its own writing and politics, and must write its own origin story and future, not as a part of "pure" heteronormative culture, or as an option within normativity's binaries, but as something that exists as a new state, as a fusion of states. As Time War ends, Red and Blue have embraced one another as hybrids, and so no longer belong to Agency or Garden. They seek a Cyborg culture all of their own, a “bridge between our shifts” (198) that yields to neither. As Blue proposes in their final letter, the cognitive Cyborg has the power to defect “not to each other’s sides, but to each other” (198). Queer bodies and the hybrid bodies of Red and Blue can find each other not through the language of binary or heteronormativity or war, but by forging that new Cyborg culture through their writing, and through their cognitive states. When the queer Cyborg embraces Cyborg writing and embraces the power and changes and fusions that such writing brings, then the queer body is free. To quote the final words of This Is How You Lose the Time War, as the two cognitive cyborgs set out to become those new queer bodies for one another: "This is how we win" (198).

2022 Michigan Affirmative
Aff – Cyborg Writing – BFHR 7wk › 1AC › 1AC

The international system as we know it is not governed by structure but rather by a constant chaotic process of violent statecraft, the representational production of sovereign political identities that ground themselves in gendered and sexual normativities – to rehearse the grammars of the resolution is to rehearse the grammars of our death.

Montpetit and Weber ’17 -- (Melanie Richter Montpetit and Cynthia Weber, 2017, “Queer International Relations,” Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Politics, DOI:10.1093/acrefore/9780190228637.013.26, accessed 7-21-2022) -- nikki

State and Nation Formation How does Queer IR scholarship help us to understand state and nation formation? Like Mainstream IR scholars, Queer IR scholars study the historical rise of the modern interstate system, contemporary examples of state-building, and the politics of nationalism and national political identification practices. Like the work of Feminist and Gender scholars, Queer IR scholarship examines the role of gendered norms and identities in past and present processes of state and nation formation and thus the social construction of states, nations, and national identities. Taking these concerns further, Queer IR scholars study these in the register of sexuality. A classic argument in Queer IR on state and nation formation is V. Spike Peterson’s (1999,2013) scholarship on “nationalism as heterosexism.” Peterson’s research investigates how state and nation formation is not only socially constructed but works through ongoing processes of reproduction, resistance, and reconfiguration. Peterson’s Queer IR scholarship evidences the central role of gender and heteronormative norms and institutions in imagining or inventing nations, nationalism, and national identities. Drawing attention to how gendered and sexualized normativities fuel political identification processes and conflict, Peterson challenges state-centric conceptualizations of national groups and political identities found in Mainstream IR. Her queer analysis also challenges the implicit heterosexism underwriting much of the feminist scholarship on the fundamental role of gender identity and hegemonic masculinity for national identityconstruction. Peterson argues that early state-making processes were generative of gendered and sexualized norms and normativities, including heteropatriarchal marriage and family. In short, “making states makes sex” (Peterson, 2014A, p. 390). Peterson’s most recent work pursues these concerns through registers of intimacy in relation to heteronormativities and homonormativities (2014a, 2016). A prominent example for Queer IR scholarship that shows how state and nation formation is not a one-off occurrence but an ongoing process is the work of Cynthia Weber (1998A,1999, 2016A). Weber’s Queer IR scholarship on U.S.-Caribbean relations after the Cuban Revolution, for example, demonstrates how sovereign nation-states mobilized what she calls “queer performativities” in practice. Weber agrees with mainstream IR theorists thatmany U.S. policymakers and military officials perceived the Cuban Revolution as a crisis that jeopardized U.S. hegemony in the Caribbean region. By extending Mainstream,Feminist, and Gender analyses into the realm of Queer IR, Weber argues that this crisis of hegemony was related to two further U.S. crises—a masculinity crisis (which feminist andgender scholars identify) and a heterosexuality crisis (which Queer IR scholars identify).Weber reads key U.S. foreign policy documents and speeches to show how, contrary towhat one would expect, the United States addressed these crises of hegemony, masculinity, and heterosexuality by using what she called “queer compensatory strategies”—strategies that refigured the U.S. state in its Caribbean relations as queer(i.e., non-normative in relation to the gender and sexuality of the figural U.S. body politicthat appears in these documents) in order to appear to be hegemonically heteromasculine. Weber followed up on these classic Queer IR texts in her recent bookQueer InternationalRelations: Sovereignty, Sexuality and the Will to Knowledge, where she explains some ofthe broader domestic and international sexualized logics at work in both state and nationformation and in the organization of international politics. Through her queerreconsideration of Richard Ashley’s work on “statecraft as mancraft” (see Queer IRMethods section above), Weber explains how what she calls “queer logics of statecraft” function in domestic and international politics to create what she calls “sexualized organizations of international relations” (2016a, 2016b). Recent Queer IR scholarship on sexual justice struggles show that contestations overLGBT rights have come to constitute a key terrain of state- and nation-building and theconstruction of supranational identity—both among proponents and opponents of LGBTrights. For example, Lind and Keating’s (2013) work on postcolonial state-building in thecontext of Ecuador’s recent turn away from neoliberalism shows that in the quest tocentralize authority, the Ecuadorian state relied on a mix of state homophobia and what they call state “homoprotectionism.” Other Queer IR research on state- and nation-building argues that “the international”consists not only of states and international organizations but also non-state institutionsand queer popular culture. Catherine Baker (2016), for instance, conceptualizes theEurovision Song Contest as a popular-cultural text/event produced by a non-stateinternational actor as an important sight and site of international relations.

2022 Michigan Affirmative
Aff – Cyborg Writing – BFHR 7wk › 1AC › 1AC

This resolution calls us to know the world through technology which is to engage in an intimate encounter with queerness – technologies are not static or rigid but rather are malleable, unstable, and deconstructible – the ontological indeterminacy of queerness is the generative point for digital possibilities.

Haber ’16 -- (Benjamin Haber, 2016, "The Queer Ontology of Digital Method,” Women's Studies Quarterly , FALL/WINTER 2016, Vol. 44, No. 3/4, QUEER METHODS (FALL/WINTER 2016), pp. 150-169, https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/44474067.pdf?refreqid=excelsior%3A16ac84823d870932dfbc4dad72c01232&ab_segments=0%2FSYC-6451%2Fcontrol&origin=, accessed 7-15-2022) -- nikki

Ontology after the Normal Responding in part to the limitations of a discursive politics built upon the implicit corporal malleability of social constructionism, queer and fem- inist theorists have been articulating a weirder and less determined un- derstanding of embodiment for some time. As heralded through a variety of turns and critical réévaluations (see, for example, Clough and Halley 2007; Coole and Frost 2010; Mortimer- Sandilands and Erickson 2010), these more complicated ontologies understand a body as more distribut- ed, less human, and dynamically undone through strange temporalities encompassing food, plastic, and distant relatives (Landecker 201 1). Both drawing from and intervening in the natural sciences, this new attention to matter and embodiment has produced exciting new interventions in fields like physics (Barad 2007), biology (Wilson 2010; 2015), and neu- roscience (Pitts-Taylor 2016). While fruitful, moving queerness from its discursive and deconstructive roots to a more generative and ecological ontology has provided the politics of queer indeterminacy with some un- comfortable mirrors. The scientific uptake of a postnormal biological ontology has led to a productive réévaluation in feminist and queer social theory of the in- herent political value of indeterminacy. The increasing body of research highlighting the strong, temporally strange "epi" (i.e., socioenvironmen- tal) influence on genetics (Landecker 201 1) has both usefully complicated deterministic ideas about genetic inheritance (Lock 2005) and lead to troubling suggestions of state management of pregnant bodies (Bateson 2001, 932-33). While the notion of the body as an autopoietic system guarding against the harmful outside world is increasingly superseded by a queerer, more flexible looping process of body formation in action, the politics of this move are unsettled as well (Maturana and Varela 1980). Victoria Pitts-Taylor, for example, has explored how plastic notions of the brain can be smoothly resonant with a "neoliberal logic of self-care and responsibility" (2010, 639), while Catherine Malabou looks at the trauma of war and the ways that brain plasticity and an ontological openness can be radically destructive to subjects (2012). While scientists are just begin- ning to recognize the vital role of nonhuman cells in regulating the body, once speculative moves to queer the notion of the subject beyond the human, bounded body, or even the organism (Clough 2012) are becom- ing increasingly widespread. This opens up possibilities for new alliances and deeper connections as well as new ground for military and biomedical intervention and modulation (Cooper 2008). The interest in indeterminacy in the life sciences finds increasing paral- lels in the computer sciences. More precisely, the biodigital is converging in ways that render the distinction less meaningful as the body s capacity is leveraged, for example, by creating rewritable digital data storage in live cells (Bonnet, Subsoontorn, and Endy 2012). There is also the growing field of machine learning; notable in particular are "neural" systems of par- allel algorithms, inspired by the stochastic and plastic human brain, which learn how to perform tasks like scanning "800 million people to find a sin- gle face in 5 seconds" (Hemsoth 2015). More speculative are the moves to harness indeterminacy at the small- est scales of matter. Nanotechnologies involve computational bioengi- neering of materials "before they become qualified in a specific form or function" (Parisi 2012, 38). For Parisi, this is the extension of affect, that realm of precognitive capacity, away from life and the organism in order to see an indeterminate potential at the heart of all matter. Parisi writes of the futurai potential of "programmable matter" designed to operate in a specu- lative environment of emergent relations and unknown equations (40). This is an indeterminacy with vast potential for instrumentalized capital- ization - a paradoxical indeterminacy where "nano-ergonomic control indeed leaves nothing to approximation and yet its precise design remains infinitely open," such that nanotech is "almost designed to remain exact but uncertain" (46). This vision is of capitalism well beyond the normal, a new kind of postprobabilistic modulation where "if control is investing in chaos, it is because it is working to grasp the randomness" (37). While the technoscientific uptake of ontological indeterminacy re- quires an ongoing interrogation of the queer political project, it also sug- gests a unique opportunity for both biopolitical critique and, essentially, queer experimentation. As the tracking and sensing technologies of the everyday rearticulate embodiment and environment, queerness can more forcefully articulate a vision of indeterminacy that whisks away from capi- talization and is bent toward thoughtful interconnection and the perverse proliferation of pleasures and expressions.

2022 Michigan Affirmative
Aff – Cyborg Writing – BFHR 7wk › 1AC › 1AC

In the contemporary digital era emerging technologies are no longer material but rather are subjective and ideological constructions grounded in the erasure of queered difference – normative technological computation and the system of laws that proceed from it form an infrastructure of control structured to maximize the functionality of technology while effacing its inextricable relationship to queer life – only a queer digital aesthesis can solve.

Ruberg et al ’18 -- (Bonnie Ruberg, Jason Boyd, James Howe,2018, "Toward a Queer Digital Humanities," University of Minnesota Press, https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/10.5749/j.ctv9hj9r9.11.pdf?refreqid=fastly-default%3Ab631047a0664f3e40ceb61daa13f4225&ab_segments=0%2FSYC-6451%2Fcontrol&origin=search-results, accessed 7-15-2022) -- nikki

Queer DH Methodologies: Inspiration from Existing Work While queer studies can usefully employ DH tools and practices to produce scholarship focused on queer subjects, it is also important to examine how queer theory can inform current and future digital humanities methodologies. One of the key areas of debate in DH is the role that computing plays in differentiating DH from other modes of humanities scholarship. Some have argued that the digital humanities’ narrow focus on computation has led the field to imagine itself, supposedly like computation itself, as free from concerns of economics, race, gender, and sexuality. As Alan Liu observes, “While digital humanists develop tools, data, and metadata critically . . . rarely do they extend their critique to the full register of society, economics, politics, or culture. How the digital humanities advances, channels, or resists today’s great postindustrial, neoliberal, corporate, and global flows of information-cum-capital is thus a question rarely heard in the digital humanities” (Liu, web). Liu goes on to argue that DH must develop a “methodological infrastructure” that unites computational and cultural criticism. Similarly, Roopika Risam, in her essay on intersectionality in DH, suggests four areas in which the digital humanities need to develop in order to create a more inclusive and socially engaged standard of practice: “cultivating a diverse community,” “acknowledging inclusions and exclusions in data,” applying “theoretical models that position intersectionality as an already existing but oft-overlooked part of computation,” and developing systems “for understanding the ways difference [or lack thereof] shapes digital practices” (Risam). Liu’s and Risam’s critiques make it clear that currently dominant DH methodologies are not sufficient for the development of a queerly inflected digital humanities. The last two areas of development mentioned by Risam (theoretical models in which to identify existing intersectionalities and systems for understanding how difference shapes computation) are of particular interest to the present project. They suggest a queer DH praxis that is distinguished from mainstream DH through its conceptual models—models that can usefully be informed by queer theory. To draw from key questions that queer theory has asked in literary and historical studies, how can we discover, uncover, and recover the queerness (in its various intersectional manifestations) in computation, as well the effects that queerness has had on computing and the potential effects it could have in the future? To date, this praxis has taken the form of speculating on the interconnected histories of queerness and computing, imagining the queering of the fundamental structures of computing technologies, conceptualizing queerness itself as a technology, exploring the queerness of code, and utilizing concepts of “speculative computing” to enact queer work. A number of these existing works can help us think about queer methodologies for DH. A generative starting point is Kara Keeling’s “Queer OS,” which outlines the properties of an imagined queer operating system that itself offers new frameworks for making sense of society and identity. In Keeling’s formulation, inspired by Tara McPherson, Queer OS is “a project at the interfaces of queer theory, new media studies, and technology studies” that structures itself around the logics of queerness (153). Keeling’s Queer OS, should it exist, would understand cultural phenomena like “race, gender, class, citizenship, and ability . . . to be mutually constitutive with sexuality and with media and information technologies.” Keeling continues: “Queer OS names a way of thinking and acting with, about, through, among, and at times even in spite of new media technologies and other phenomena of mediation. It insists upon forging and facilitating uncommon, irrational, imaginative, and/or unpredictable relationships” between human subjects and digital media (154). As a launching point for imagining queer DH methodologies, Keeling’s Queer OS can be read as an imperative for queer DH scholars to embrace the complex and often contradictory tangle of intersectional investigation. It also directs DH researchers more generally to understand computing not as outside of social issues but rather as shaping and indeed being shaped by cultural determinants. In addition to informing our vision of a queer digital humanities, Keeling’s essay has inspired others to interrogate the intersection of queerness and DH. In their 2016 piece, “Queer OS: A User’s Manual,” Barnett and colleagues take up Keeling’s call to conceptualize a Queer OS, which, the authors point out, “remains a largely speculative project” (50). However, as the authors themselves point out, the speculative operations of the queer system shouldn’t necessarily conform to conventional notions of functionality. To the contrary, they state, [Our goal] is to engage with the challenge of understanding queerness today as operating on and through digital media and the digital humanities. Our intervention therefore seeks to address what we perceive as a lack of queer, trans, and racial analysis in the digital humanities, as well as the challenges of imbricating queer/trans/racialized lives and building digital/technical architectures that do not replicate existing systems of oppression. As such this is a speculative proposition for a technical project that does not yet exist and may never come to exist, a project that does not yet function and may never function. (51) The “user’s manual” the essay provides is a provocative queer reimagining of what form and role various key components in digital computing (such as interfaces, applications, and memory) might take, with “each component given a poetical and theoretical description of its features and limitations” (50). While these descriptions inspire the reader to imagine a potential future in which computing is more in line with the ethos of queerness, some readers may ask where, in the present, we might identify the beginning points that might lead us toward a concrete instantiation of a Queer OS and, along with it, a queer DH. DH practitioners who are themselves queer and therefore potentially marginalized subjects working within the reward and accreditation structures of contemporary academia may feel that they need to produce work of a more tangible sort than “theoretical vapourware, speculative potentialware, ephemeral praxis” (51). These individuals may wish to (or feel the need to) develop computing technology that shares meaningful connections with this theoretical work but that does not itself embody “an unreliable system full of precarity” with an “inherent instability,” given the already precarious position of many queer subjects within the digital humanities (54). In order to further explore the trajectories along which queer DH might unfold, we turn next to three of the scholarly works from which Keeling draws. The first is Jacob Gaboury’s series of articles titled “A Queer History of Computing.” One question that vexes the development of a queer DH is how to theorize the relationship between queerness and the ways in which computing itself can enact queer erasure. In his piece, Gaboury addresses this tension through a discussion of Alan Turing and other figures from the history of computing whom Turing influenced. Though Turing is considered to be a central figure in the development of modern computing, rarely have conceptualizations of his work overlapped with discussions of his queerness or the injustices he suffered at the hands of the British government. Gaboury recognizes that any claims about a direct correlation between Turing’s sexuality and his theories of computation would be problematic. To posit that the former “inspired” the latter would be simplistic, says Gaboury, yet to conclude that no relationship exists between the two “parses what is technologically significant in such a way so as to exclude the personal, the emotional, and the sexual” (Gaboury). Faced with the problem of articulating how the sexual signifies within the technological, Gaboury traces historical connections between a community of queer figures who played key roles in the early history of computing. Though it remains unclear what direct effects sexuality may have had on their work, Gaboury finds value in refiguring their production through a “speculative history” that foregrounds the oft-elided place of queerness. This type of fabrication (i.e., speculation) resonates in unexpected ways with the digital humanities practices of critical making. Gaboury’s history of computing both extends and problematizes DH methodologies by recasting making as “making up.” Additionally, Gaboury’s focus on historical absence—the suppressed, missing, unrecorded, and always partial nature of queerness in the history of computing—points toward the restorative work that could be done by a queer digital humanities. Turing’s place within the history of artificial intelligence connects Gaboury’s work to Jack Halberstam’s earlier essay “Automating Gender: Postmodern Feminism in the Age of the Intelligent Machine.” Halberstam’s essay too provides useful models for conceptualizing a queer digital humanities. “Automating Gender” offers, among other things, a critique of feminist theories that rely on reductive ideas of phallotechnocracy and essentialist conceptions of gender. Like Gaboury, Halberstam looks to Turing to counter these narratives. What is now commonly referred to as the “Turing Test,” Halberstam points out, began as a “sexual guessing game” in which an interrogator attempted to determine the genders of players as they answer questions via technological mediation. “Turing does not stress the obvious connection between gender and computer intelligence,” writes Halberstam. However, “both are in fact imitative systems, and the boundaries between female and male . . . are as unclear and as unstable as the boundary between human and machine intelligence. . . . Gender, like intelligence, has a technology” (443).2 To illuminate this unstable binary between the human and the machine, Halberstam takes up Donna Haraway’s delineation of the female cyborg as a representation of technology’s ability to transcend binary structures. Given that queerness, unlike essentialized gender or sexuality, has been closely aligned with artificiality, unnaturalness, imitation, and the subversion of binaries, one might describe Haraway’s cyborg as queer—and, by extension, Halberstam’s vision of cyborg technology as queer technology. In addition to envisioning technology as queer, Halberstam implicitly posits queerness itself as a technology. Such a formulation suggests a symbiotic, dialectic relationship between technology and queerness. It also suggests that the interface between human and computing technology might be understood as a space of queer intimacy and relation. Placed within our discussion of digital humanities methodologies, “Automating Gender” challenges us to account for the ways in which gender and sexuality are in fact inextricable from computational systems. Another valuable touchstone for interrogating the relationship between queerness and the digital is Blas’s Queer Technologies project, mentioned above, which similarly turns to Turing in theorizing the relationship between queerness and computation. “For us,” write Blas with his collaborator cárdenas in an article outlining the work of Queer Technologies, “Turing is a crucial historical figure for thinking the politics of digital technologies from queer and feminist perspectives” (2). Yet, perhaps more than a historical figure, Turing appears here as a founder of queer computational thinking. Did Turing’s homosexuality affect his research? Blas and cárdenas answer this question with a resounding yes. “The drives and assumptions of a heterosexual sexuality produce certain ways of producing and knowing that can be embodied in objects created by heterosexual scientists,” they assert. “Similarly, homosexual desires can inform and help to materially construct the technicity of objects.” That is, for Blas and cárdenas, the very logics around which contemporary computation has been founded are shaped by Turing’s queerness. Fittingly, it seems that the impulse behind the many artistic works that make up the Queer Technologies project is to reimbue or perhaps rediscover the queerness in computational technology. Of these works, the one of most interest here is Blas’s transCoder, which Blas describes as “a queer programming anti-language.” Works written using transCoder are not executable. Instead, transCoder functions primarily as a critical tool—in Mark C. Marino’s words, “a theoretical software development kit, made not of functional functions but of encoded plays on the methods and discourse of critical theory” (“Of Sex,” 187). As an unexecutable coding language, transCoder suggests a suite of approaches to queer digital humanities methodologies that play with failure and loss. We will return to reflect on the critical concerns that surround failure below. Still, our vision of a queer DH must account for an investigation of the times when technologies, like heteronormative modes of meaning, break down. Queer Technologies models how practice-based work might speak to potential queer DH methodologies. It also directs us to consider the queer potential of other forms of digital praxis. transCoder can be seen as a queer application of what has been called codework. Codework subverts the tenets of “well-written” code: simplicity, functionality, transparency, and legibility. Examples of codework range from the nonexecutable net.art creations of “Mez” (Mary-Ann Breeze), written in a hybrid language called “m[ez]ang.elle,” to obfuscated code and esoteric programming languages (“esolangs”). In “Interferences: [Net.Writing] and the Practice of Codework,” Rita Raley notes that codework allows programming languages to break the surface, rather than simply leveraging them to perform the invisible labors of technology. This refiguration of code—as elusive, hidden, and ultimately uncontrollable—resonates with queer theory’s notion of queer meaning as similarly submerged and anxiogenic. Referring to Jessica Loseby’s net.art work Code Scares Me, Raley notes how it thematizes “anxieties about [the] intrusion, contamination, and uncontrollability” of code (Raley). Like queerness as interpreted by many queer literary scholars, code in Raley’s formulation becomes monstrous, invisible, unknowable, and alien: “It lurks beneath the surface of the text. . . . The fear, further, is that code is autopoietic and capable of eluding . . . attempts to domesticate it and bring it into order.” Practitioners of codework, Raley observes, see their production as expressly political; it resists assumptions about the neutrality of programming, reclaims code from corporate functionalism, and repurposes the pragmatic as the aesthetic. Such sentiments stand in contrast to the seemingly apolitical sensibilities of programmer communities dedicated to composing obfuscated code and esolangs. These practices tend to fall into the domain of professional programmers for whom testing the boundaries of coding represents an opportunity to demonstrate mastery. Yet obfuscated code and esolangs too represent potentially generative modes of queer DH methodologies. They refuse established expectations for readability and intentionally walk an anxious line between the domestication of code and code’s refusal to “be brought into order.”3 This discussion of esolangs brings us to the last work from which we draw inspiration for our vision of queer DH methodologies. This is what Johanna Drucker has termed “speculative computing.” As Drucker recounts in her book SpecLab, speculative computing emerges from a “productive tension” within the digital humanities. Specifically, speculative computing aims to invert DH’s focus on the use of digital tools in humanities scholarship by focusing instead on the development of “humanities tools in digital environments” (Drucker, xi). Extending the conceptual stakes of speculative computing, Drucker advances a theory called “aesthesis,” which foregrounds “partial, situated, and subjective knowledge” and proposes imaginative play with digital objects as an antidote to the totalizing authority of meaning. “Aesthesis,” writes Drucker, “allows us to insist on the value of subjectivity that is central to aesthetic artifacts . . . and to place that subjectivity at the core of knowledge production” (Drucker, xiii). In Drucker’s characterization, speculative computing takes seriously the destabilization of categories, including taxonomies of entity, identity, object, subject, interactivity, process, and instrument. In short, speculative computing rejects mechanistic and instrumental approaches, replacing them with indeterminacy and potentiality, intersubjectivity, and deformance. Speculative computing operates as a critique of the computational logics that structure much digital humanities scholarship. While Drucker does not mention queerness in SpecLab, her work gives voice to an ethos that could serve as a powerful directive for the queer digital humanities. A queer DH would extend the “otherness” that speculative computing enacts by focusing deliberately on issues concerning gender and sexuality in computing. Like queerness itself, the methodologies of a queer digital humanities must not be monolithic. Indeed, with its resistance to totalizing knowledge, speculative computing demonstrates the importance of methodological diversity. Accordingly, we believe that modes of queer DH scholarship must themselves be multivalent, multiplicative, and self-critical: a set of practices in flux. Taken together, the works considered in this section challenge us to think about queerness in digital humanities methodologies as a matter of fundamental computational structures, as well as (if not more than) a matter of content. These works also encourage us to reflect on the foundational role that intersectional issues related to gender and sexuality play in the formation of new media and digital tools. They insist upon the importance of queer thinking within the history of computation; they delineate the queerness of technology as well as the technology of queerness. Some of the research we have discussed employs traditional scholarly methods. Equally compelling, other works make their arguments through fabrication and artistic interpretation. In our vision, a queer digital humanities too stands poised at the intersection of critique and creation. Drawing from these conceptual frameworks, queer DH itself emerges cyborg-like: a playful methodological hybrid of perspectives, tools, and meaning.

2022 Michigan Counterplan

Realism true

Realism is more relevant than ever – Ukraine proves Walt, 22 --- columnist at Foreign Policy and the Robert and Renée Belfer professor of international relations at Harvard University (Stephen M. Walt, "The Ukraine War Doesn’t Change Everything", 4-13-2022, Foreign Policy, https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/04/13/ukraine-war-realism-great-powers-unipolarity/)//EG

Whatever the outcome, many observers believe the war will have a . They see the war in Ukraine as a watershed moment: a giant fork in the road. If Russia loses big, the “liberal world order” will get a new lease on life and the forces of autocracy will suffer a setback. If Putin ekes out some sort of win, however, they foresee a . Existing norms against the acquisition of territory by force will be eroded, and other autocrats will presumably be empowered to launch similar campaigns whenever the geopolitical stars align in their favor. I see it differently. The war in Ukraine is a significant event, but not because the outcome will have a dramatic independent effect on the global balance of power or the normative environment that states have constructed (and sometimes adhere to). Rather, it is important because it signals the end of the brief “unipolar moment” (1993-2020) when the United States was the world’s sole genuine superpower and because it heralds a return to patterns of world politics that were temporarily suppressed during the short era of unchallenged U.S. primacy. The end of that era was in sight long before Russia invaded Ukraine, however, and the war itself is more of a punctuation mark. (For a similar take, see Stephen Kotkin .) I am less inclined to see the war in Ukraine as a transformative moment because I’ve heard that song too many times in recent decades. We were told that “everything had changed” when the Berlin Wall came down, the Soviet Union imploded, and the Warsaw Pact dissolved. A new world order was at hand, the “,” mankind had supposedly reached the “,” and liberal capitalist democracy (preferably the American version) was now the only game in town. But then “everything changed” again on Sept. 11, 2001, and we were suddenly in a “global war on terror,” which some tried to repackage as “.” But hold on! “Everything changed” yet again when financial markets collapsed in 2008 and Wall Street’s “masters of the universe” were revealed to be gullible, fallible, and corrupt. And then “everything changed” once more when Donald Trump became president and began trampling every norm in the U.S. political playbook. So forgive me if I have trouble seeing the war in Ukraine as a decisive turning point in the history of humanity. For all the damage and suffering that have already occurred, it has a long way to go before it reaches the levels of destruction wrought by the wars in Indochina, between Iran and Iraq, or in —or by the . The war could still get there, of course—especially if weapons of mass destruction are used—but the odds are against it (a prediction that I fervently hope turns out to be correct). More importantly, what is different about the current war is that for the first time since the early 1990s—but hardly the first time in history—there are rival great powers on the opposite sides of a major war. But this is a reversion to familiar patterns of great-power conflicts (and proxy wars) and not something novel or unique. As suggested above, this war is more accurately seen as marking the official end of the brief quasi-peace that followed the end of the Cold War. War didn’t disappear in that period—the United States fought in a bunch of them and started several—but the conflicts during this period were either civil wars, wars between minor powers, gross mismatches between major powers and minor powers, or some combination of all three. Direct great-power competition was muted because neither Russia nor China was strong enough to openly resist the United States. Dartmouth College political scientist William Wohlforth was partly right when he wrote of the “”: Few countries wanted to face the “focused enmity” of the United States or take actions that might bring the United States into the game in opposition. Where Wohlforth erred was his prediction that unipolarity might last even longer than Cold War bipolarity. That misjudgment was not entirely his fault, however, as he could not have foreseen the repeated blunders that hastened the end of the unipolar era. U.S. primacy and unipolar stability would have lasted longer if U.S. policymakers had been smarter, less ideologically driven, and more realistic (in every sense of that term). If Ukraine retains all or most of its former territory, it will be because of the hard power its citizens employed (with lots of outside help) to stop its larger neighbor. Instead of preserving U.S. power, resolving conflicts wherever possible, and working to ensure that no peer competitor emerged, U.S. officials mostly did the exact opposite. They and squandered trillions of dollars in . Instead of extending liberal institutions gradually through mechanisms such as the Partnership for Peace, they expanded NATO with scant regard for Russian concerns and blithely assumed that Moscow could or would do nothing to stop it. Instead of taking a more measured approach to globalization and making sure its benefits were widely shared inside the United States, they embraced neoliberal approaches to global trade and investment and did not do enough to insulate endangered sectors of the U.S. workforce from globalization’s consequences. And instead of working overtime to make American democracy a model that other societies might want to emulate, U.S. politicians—and here I refer primarily to the Republican Party—repeatedly trampled on the principles and norms that are essential for true democracy to survive. The unipolar moment was never going to last forever, but repeated sins of omission and commission—for which no one was ever held accountable—brought it to a premature end. So where will this leave us? In the immortal words of Talking Heads: “.” First, it is a world where hard power still matters, as everyone has now been reminded. If Russia succeeds in incorporating the Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts and a land bridge to Crimea, it will be because its military forces were able to accomplish that mission despite their earlier miscalculations and missteps. If Ukraine retains all or most of its former territory, it will be because of the hard power its citizens employed (with lots of outside help) to stop its larger neighbor. If the much ballyhooed “norm against conquest” gets reinforced, it will not be because Putin suddenly remembered that norms ought to be followed but because the combination of Ukrainian nationalism and effective weaponry proved too much for Moscow to overcome. Second, the world has been reminded—again!—that economic interdependence is not without risks and trade-offs. Markets surely matter, but politics matter more. Connecting the world through trade, investment, complex supply chains, and gas pipelines brought obvious and enormous benefits, but tight economic links are not an ironclad barrier to conflict and being dependent on others can cause real pain if those ties get sundered, whether by a dangerous virus or a sudden geopolitical fissure. Looking ahead, most states and most firms are going to sacrifice some amount of economic efficiency for the sake of redundancy and resilience. Economic growth will be lower than it might have been otherwise, but disruptive shocks will occur less often and states and firms will be less vulnerable to economic pressure. When forced to choose between security and profits, most countries will choose the former. Third, even if Russia achieves some limited gains in the Donbass, the war will accelerate its relative decline. Putin may prevent Ukraine from ever joining NATO, but the long-term consequences of that achievement will leave Russia worse off as a whole. Unless he erects a new Iron Curtain, . State revenues will decline as more and more countries wean themselves off Russian oil, gas, and coal. Ukraine will continue to move toward Europe economically, a before the war began. If Putin does achieve “victory” in Ukraine—which is by no means certain—it will be a Pyrrhic one. Russia’s autocracy may be more secure but less consequential. The world of the future will be closer to true bipolarity than lopsided multipolarity, with Russia playing the role of China’s junior partner (and one whose economic vitality and long-term strategic value may be diminishing). It won’t help Beijing’s image to be closely linked to Russia’s destruction of Ukraine, and Moscow could need more propping up as Russia’s economy falters and its population ages and shrinks. The emerging future will be neither a U.S.-centered “liberal order” nor a Chinese-centered autocratic one. Instead, that incorporate states that either share similar values or have little choice but to align with one side or the other. And make no mistake: Both Washington and Beijing are going to expect a lot of loyalty from some of their allies. Expect to see greater division and contention in the digital space as the two countries compete to determine which technical standards will predominate and as the digital world gradually segments behind firewalls, safeguards, incompatible privacy standards, and other restrictions. We are back in a world that realism explains best, one where great powers compete for power and influence and others adapt as best they can. But as the , many countries—especially those in the global south—will resist pressures to pick a side and will try to remain aloof from quarrels that do not involve them directly. Some of them will try to extract greater benefits by playing the United States and China off against each other. Among other things, this situation is a reminder that trying to base U.S. foreign policy on a rigid dichotomy of “” is a . As in the past, success will require cooperating with like-minded partners where possible and with states that do not share U.S. values when necessary. Unfortunately, cooperation among the major powers is going to be a lot harder to achieve and sustain, even when their interests are partly aligned. This could be the most significant fallout from this nasty but thus far localized war: It gives major powers the excuse to ignore the less imminent but far more ominous danger of . Dealing with climate change is going to require sacrifices by all the major powers, but they will be less willing to make them when they are worried about the global balance of power and are reluctant to give up more than their rivals. We are back in a world that realism explains best, one where great powers compete for power and influence and others adapt as best they can. The jungle isn’t “growing back,” as ; it never really went away, even when the United States was the biggest beast and deluded itself into thinking it could make all the other animals behave. That’s not a particularly happy thought, but the world that realism depicts is not a particularly happy world.

2022 Michigan Counterplan

Desecuritization fails

Desecuritization fails – foundations laid will always be replaced by new threats

Maas, 13 --- Matthijs Maas is a postdoctoral research associate at the Centre for the Study of Existential Risk (CSER), University of Cambridge. (Matthijs Maas, "Desecurity Will Not Save Us: Securitization Studies, the Problem of 'Normal / Democratic' Politics, and the Limits of Desecuritization as Normative-Political Panacea", 16/8/13, The University of Edinburgh, https://www.academia.edu/8086735/Desecurity_Will_Not_Save_Us_Securitization_Studies_the_Problem_of_Normal_Democratic_Politics_and_the_Limits_of_Desecuritization_as_Normative-Political_Panacea)//EG

Briefly returning to the ‘operational’ critique which we touched upon previously, it is possible to also unpack this question of the ‘limits’ of desecuritization in a second, ‘strong’ sense—as indicative of a more general political irreducibility of ‘security’, which would have the rather significant implication that there is a structural impossibility—or at least, ‘net’ futility—to any strategy seeking to meaningfully ‘unmake’ security. While there have been a fair number of theorists (cf. Aras & Polat, 2008; Bilgin, 2006; Kim & Lee, 2010) who have traced instances of the desecuritization of one issue being intrinsically tied up with—or even predicated on—the shifting of the ‘security agenda’ to new threats in other sections, this line of argument has been taken the furthest in Behnke’s post-structuralist [2006] argument. The key claim he makes is that the ‘replacement’ of de-securitized issues with other, new securitisations is not coincidental and occasional, but in fact inevitable in the context of a level-one political ‘ontotheology’ [ibid] that is irredeemably constituted by the logic of security. Drawing on Campbell’s (1998) argument that states can only maintain ontological security, order, and national identity in contradistinction to an excluded ‘outside’ (or Other), Behnke argues that constant (re)production of a Schmittian (securitizing) logic is a necessary ingredient in all political community [2006:650], which implies that meaningful desecuritization cannot really happen (Behnke, 2007:109). We cannot, as it were, ‘gain ground’ against security, as every such attempt might merely be laying the foundations for the next security move. ‘Replacement’, while obviously not a ‘strategy of desecuritization’ (indeed, if anything it is the opposite), is nonetheless of key interest for the significant analytical and normative implications it has. In a straightforward sense, it should make analysts more suspicious of cases that on the surface appear to be straightforward examples of successful 31 desecuritization—but which on closer examination reveal the complex machinery of security at work, suggesting that this ‘desecuritization’ in one sector might perhaps be more accurately understood as merely the side-product of a counter-securitisation—or even a meta- securitization—in another sector (cf. Williams, 2003, 2011]. Furthermore, ‘replacement’ obviously has tremendous ramifications for the practical limits of desecuritization—and hence for the normative limits of both the CS, as well as that of many of its critics, as it suggests that even if desecuritization is achievable within specific cases and contexts, no political sphere is- or can be completely ‘de-securitized’. Nevertheless, even if are to concede the political irreducibility of security, and accept that desecuritization will at best leave state elites with a temporary ‘threat deficit problem’ [Buzan, 2006:6], it seems a stretch to conclude from this that desecuritization is entirely ‘meaningless’ politically. Instead, as also noted by Hansen (2012:541-542), we might take this opportunity to interrogate the differential effects of different forms of ‘otherness’, and whether trading in one securitisation for another, even if it fails to maintain ‘normal politics’, will only involve a substantive realignment of ‘threats’ within a self-same ‘war logic’, or whether the transfer could even be a desirable, qualitative one, towards a more reflexive or ‘stable’ securitisation.65

2022 Michigan Counterplan

Colonialist

The logic of securitization defends colonialism as an experiment to desecuritize and make continents like Africa more “Europeans”

Howell and Richter-Montpetit, 19 --- Alison Howell is Associate Professor of Political Science at Rutgers University, Newark, where she is also an affiliate member of Women's and Gender Studies, the Division of Global Affairs, and Global Urban Studies. She previously held research fellowships at the Humanitarian and Conflict Response Institute (HCRI) and in Politics, both at the University of Manchester, as well as a Fulbright at Brown University and SUNY. Dr. Melanie Richter-Montpetit is Senior Lecturer in International Relations and Director of the Centre for Advanced International Theory (CAIT). Before joining the University of Sussex, Dr. Richter-Montpetit worked as a Lecturer in International Relations at the University of Sheffield. (Alison Howell and Melanie Richter-Montpetit, "Is securitization theory racist? Civilizationism, methodological whiteness, and antiblack thought in the Copenhagen School", 8-7-2019, SAGE Journals, https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/0967010619862921)//EG

Does securitization theory overcome, replicate, or deepen antiblack thought on ‘Africa’? Certainly, securitization theory sees a tendency towards primal anarchy and the ‘state of nature’ in many non-Western parts of the world (the Balkans; Eastern Europe; Central, South, and East Asia; the Middle East; and South America), but ‘Africa’ is particularly maligned. Often, classic securitization theory treats the entire continent as a single entity, a space where normal politics is weak and oversecuritized, the state or social contract fails (or was never established), and ‘man’ reverts to (or never left) the state of nature. ‘Africa is a pessimist’s paradise, a place where the Hobbesian hypothesis that in the absence of a political Leviathan life for individuals will be nasty, brutish, and short seems to be widely manifest in everyday life’ (: 219). Elsewhere, however, it adds some complexity by seeing Africa in terms of multiple temporalities, being both ‘premodern’, having elements of the ‘modern’, and threatening a ‘back to the future’ scenario. On the one hand, a book like Regions and Powers () offers a sweeping history of Europe over millennia (containing little mention of colonialism), but a history of Africa that covers only official decolonization and the post–Cold War era: a matter of mere decades. Completely missing is any historical account of how colonialism and enslavement shaped not only African but also European security relations (; ; ; ), and the idea of Europe itself (; ). Conversely, another canonical securitization theory text asserts that ‘in the contemporary international system, some prestate referent objects are still active. The remnants of tribal barbarians still exist in parts of Central Asia and Africa. Some hint of how these tribes worked as referent objects for military security can be gleaned from contemporary civil wars in Afghanistan and Somalia’ (: 53, emphasis added). The past-tense ‘worked’ here implies that we can learn about premodern times (in Europe) by looking at present-day Afghanistan or Somalia, whose backwards ‘tribal barbarian’ populations constitute a prestate referent. These two temporalities come together in the statement that ‘in Africa, the main societal referent objects are a mix of premodern – the extended family, village, clan, and tribe – and modern, the “state-nation”’ (: 126). Securitization theory, then, sees Africa as temporally anomalous – that is, both premodern and modern – because it manifests both a postcolonial present and a potential degeneration to a precolonial/premodern past, as when : 221), drawing from other authors, including Kaplan, speculate that: the period of colonization and decolonization might, in the long view, appear as something of an interlude, a period with its own distinctive characteristics, rather than a point of permanent transformation from premodern to modern. If back-to-the-future pessimism is right, then what we are looking at now is some phase in the terminal collapse of the Westphalian experiment in Africa. This passage outlines a ‘back to the future’ scenario in which Africa returns to its default state of precolonial, tribal, anarchic statelessness. Here, as elsewhere, securitization theory does not entirely ignore histories of colonization: it admits that colonialism had an impact on Africa, but it understands this impact not as an extraction of resources and labor and a violent transformation of people into chattel, but as an ‘experiment’ aimed at bringing the European Westphalian state to ‘premodern’ barbarians (see : 221; : 53, 126). Colonial and ongoing postcolonial and settler-colonial exploitation does not feature in this analysis, and decolonization appears not as a project of liberation but as a potential backslide into primal anarchy (: 345). For securitization theory, histories of colonialism look less like violent ongoing exploitation than a missed opportunity for Africa to become more modern, desecuritized, and European. Why is ‘Africa’ missing this opportunity? Securitization theory’s methodological whiteness leads it to assert, without substantiation, that the cause of this backsliding must be not the ongoing extractive violence of liberal powers but the failure of African people and states to ‘desecuritize’: Because political violence has been such an endemic feature of the African landscape, and because the crisis of the African state is so central to the pervasive insecurity on the continent, we will take the existence of systematic political violence to indicate the presence of a dominant securitization. (: 223) This is strikingly circular reasoning, where premises and conclusions guarantee each other. Securitization theory starts, as we have seen, from the axioms that ‘normal politics’ tames violence and irrational securitizations threaten ‘normal politics’. Seeing Africa as a violent, anarchic space, lacking in ‘normal’ civilized politics, securitization theory assumes this must be because securitization has run amok. As a result, African ‘dominant securitization’ can be taken for granted, as a foil to the supposed peacefulness of Europe, and therefore as evidence that ‘normal politics’ tames violence, and so on. Securitization theory here turns an antiblack narrative of African (a)history (Africa is primitive, violent, anachronistic) into an equally antiblack normative proposition: that Africa is culpable for failing to produce ‘normal politics’. European colonial violence is occluded or, worse, exonerated: many African elites publicly embraced a negative view of globalization, and took the view that their weak position in the global periphery was a major explanation for their difficulties. This led to a convenient rhetoric of ‘neo-colonial’ securitization that sought, often successfully, to divert attention from the indigenous causes of Africa’s difficulties. (: 251) This not only sanitizes the violence of colonialism and enslavement, it goes so far as to cast anti-colonial politics as the problem.

2022 Michigan Counterplan

Criminalizes Justice

Securitization is fundamentally flawed – criminalizes those who advocate for social justice to justify securitizing “threats” – Milagro Sala proves

Selister Gomes and Rodrigues Marques, 21 --- Mariana Selister Gomes is an associate Professor of the Department of Social Sciences, of the Post-Graduation Program in Social Sciences and of the Post-Graduation Program in International Relations of the Federal University of Santa Maria. Collaborating Professor of the Post-Graduation Program in Sociology of the Federal University of Sergipe. Doctor in Sociology at the Lisbon University Institute. Master in Sociology by the Federal University of Rio Grande do Sul and Bachelor in History by the same institution. Renata Rodrigues Marques is a teacher in International Relations at the Federal University of Santa Maria (UFSM). Graduated in International Relations from the same institution. Member of the GIDH Extension Project - Gender, Intersectionality and Human Rights and of the Feminist and Decolonial Research Methodology Research Project. (Mariana Selister Gomes and Renata Rodrigues Marques, "Can securitization theory be saved from itself? A decolonial and feminist intervention", 10-26-2021, SAGE Journals, https://journals-sagepub-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/doi/full/10.1177/09670106211027795)//EG

Despite the limitations set out above, securitization theory proves to be useful in enabling the analysis of power dynamics involved in state security discourses and the construction of threats as an instrument of state governmentality (). Feminist approaches to security and decolonial feminism, in turn, complement structural analysis by exposing the modern state as a gendered and racialized construction. The second argument of this intervention is a defense of empirical studies as a way of overcoming the neglects of the classical perspective of securitization theory by analyzing how the dimensions of coloniality intervene in processes of securitization. To illustrate how an empirical turn can make the case for securitization theory, we present our research on the construction of racialized women who actively participate in political life as a threat to the governmentality of the modern state. Our investigation focused on the case of Milagro Sala, an indigenous woman who is the leader of the organization Tupac Amaru in Argentina and who was arrested in 2016. The organization is linked to several different ethnic groups, such as the Mapuche, the Guarani, and the Kollas. The objective of our study was to analyze how the process of securitization in this case is intertwined with processes of racialization and genderization. With this example, which reinforces the requirement for theoretical openness, we seek to demonstrate the importance of methodological openness and empirical research that employs the variables race and gender in studies of securitization processes. Sala was elected as a member of the Mercosur Parliament, the civil representation body of the trade bloc’s member-states, at the end of 2015, and arrested shortly afterwards, in January 2016, because she was perceived as being the ‘organizer’ of a protest in front of the seat of government in Argentina’s Jujuy province. Sala and other activists from Tupac Amaru were accused of several crimes in relation to their protest in Jujuy, and legal recognition of the organization was suspended by Executive Decree 402-G. We conducted our analysis of these events using content analysis and critical discourse analysis of political and media discourses. The political speeches we analyzed were from 13 statements and interviews published in the newspaper La Nación during 2016, given by the governor of Jujuy, Gerardo Morales, and by Argentina’s president, Mauricio Macri, as well as by official representatives and allies of their governments. We also analyzed the decrees that removed legal recognition and government funding for Tupac Amaru (Decree No. 402-G and Decree No. 403-G, promulgated in the ‘Official Diary’ of the province of Jujuy on 13 January 2016). From the analysis of the data, we identified the state as the main actor in the securitization process under study. We verified the state’s actions through an examination of: (i) the speeches of Gerardo Morales (provincial governor), Mauricio Macri (president of Argentina), and their coalition allies in their respective governments, which reinforce an image of both Sala and the Tupac Amaru organization as enemies of the population of Jujuy; and (ii) the executive decrees that criminalized the political demonstrations that were being held in front of the provincial government headquarters, which were published shortly after Morales took over the government of Jujuy province. Several international movements and organizations denounced the criminalization of Tupac Amaru activists, highlighting the arbitrary arrest of Milagro Sala. This made it difficult to legitimize the process, but did not prevent the final decision of the state apparatus. Sala was sentenced to three years for the protest conducted outside the headquarters of the Jujuy government and barred from holding a position in any social organization. After her arrest, the Argentine government constantly tried to legitimize the process. Sala was granted house arrest after the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (IACHR) requested a precautionary measure for her detention (). We therefore conclude that the actions of international organizations such as the IACHR had drawn attention to the case, which made it more difficult to establish the criminalization and securitization processes. However, the house arrest was revoked less than a month after its concession, and Sala subsequently returned to regular imprisonment. In relation to the gender variable, we observe that references to danger and violence were made more frequently in relation to Sala than to the organization as a whole. The statement that ‘she was the leader of an organization that politically managed a province’ was a constant (see, for example, ). As a political leader, Sala was constructed as being manipulative, dangerous, and violent – a treatment that reinforces the view, highlighted by , that women should not be in the political space and, if they are, it is because they are not good women. For our analysis, we also draw on fieldwork carried out by : 315), who regard the actions against Tupac Amaru as an example of criminalization of ‘female activists who question entrenched racial, gender, and class inequalities in Latin America’ given the large numbers of women in leadership positions within the organization. : 316) conclude that the persecution of the Tupac Amaru movement is related to ‘the circulation of radicalized hatred in a multi-ethnic society’, and that the government’s policy is based on an alleged need to ‘save’ the poor women and men who belong to the organization. In relation to the race variable, we observed that no explicit references were made to the indigenous issue and that Sala was not enunciated as an indigenous person in any of the political discourses we analyzed. This fact highlights deracialization as a form of securitization. This process by which ‘deracialization’ is used as a way to legitimize the criminalization of socially classified groups is related to what perceive as the link between securitization and racial governmentality. As deracialization is not explicit in the speeches analyzed, we can only perceive its colonial dimensions when we approach the context – in this case, the construction of Latin America, the Argentine state and its whiteness policies. While Sala herself uses the rhetoric of race, referring to herself as black, and the organization of which she is a part has an indigenous name, the apparatus of power silences this dimension. In the Argentinian case, then, race intervenes to deracialize, to diminish the strength of the indigenous movement. Our findings thus contribute to the discussions about deracialization as an instrument of power, reinforcing the argument that Latin American ideas about miscegenation (; ) were meant to hide racism and continue to be a method of silencing black and indigenous movements. Our findings thus appear to be relevant for several discussions about deracialization as an instrument of power in Latin America (; ; ; ; ), reinforcing the idea that ‘race’ was politicized by the state for purposes of homogenization, this time based on the concept of ‘mestizaje’. Whiteness played a strategic role in the project to homogenize the Argentine nation, where the participation of immigrants from Europe was extolled, while African and indigenous influences were rendered invisible in the nation’s historical-social and cultural construction. The imaginary that the nation is ‘plural’ at the same time that European descent is magnified can even be used as a resistance strategy when socially classified groups question pre-established categories of ‘race’ (: 104–105), but it mainly reflects the invisibility of the indigenous population. The term ‘ethnocidal miscegenation’ was coined to refer to a strategy to silence the participation of indigenous and Afro-Latino populations in Latin American societies that built the idea of ‘mestizaje’. The removal of racial/ethnic identifications in official population statistics and censuses in Argentina has been verified empirically by and . Against this background, we could observe in our results what has been identified as ‘silenced racialization’ of the indigenous population, whereby speech can be racialized even if such racialization is not done formally (: 77). We also carried out an analysis of media discourse in order to assess the extent to which the securitization process had met with acceptance and been regarded as legitimate. Our analysis was centered on the newspaper La Nación, since this is a recognized source of information on Argentina and has dedicated specific sections to the case of Sala and Tupac Amaru. More than one hundred news stories from 2016 were analyzed. As in the political speeches, the threat posed by Sala and her leadership role were underlined – often appearing together, as occurred in 31 news stories. As an example, one of these reports, published four days after Sala’s arrest on 16 January 2016, states that ‘thief, gangster and threatening are three of the softest words people use to describe Milagro Sala when asked who she is’ (). The articles emphasized the organization’s ‘accumulated power’, and the idea that Tupac Amaru constituted a ‘parallel state’ in the province of Jujuy was also reiterated. We see in this a ‘coloniality of security’ () that finds danger when communities inside the state practice any degree of self-determination, causing the state to perceive self-determination and difference as a threat. Rooted in power relations, the media discourses that we analyzed play an important role in the securitization process since they articulate affective dimensions on which the social representations of Sala and the Tupac Amaru organization are built. Sala is not represented as a woman who is the leader of an ethnic organization of political and territorial resistance, but as a violent and dangerous woman who has accumulated power in the province. This establishes an affective dimension of aversion: given that a significant part of the Jujuy population identifies itself as indigenous (), the failure to identify the organization and its leaders as indigenous prevents any form of empathy from being built in relation to them. Our analysis also allowed us to perceive various discursive disputes present in the securitization process, mainly related to the fact that Sala is a woman, indigenous and a parliamentarian. The exposure by international organizations of the race and gender dynamics present in Sala’s imprisonment is constructed by the media as a defense ‘rhetoric’, as if the use of such terms represented an attempt to ‘cover up the crimes’ of Sala. Paradoxically, Sala is constantly described as a violent woman. The Tupac Amaru movement employs a strategy of acting transnationally in an attempt to ‘counter-balance’ its confrontation with the state and securitization in the domestic arena, a characteristic also seen in several other social movements in Latin America (see ; ). In other words, our analysis showed that state authorities and the media engage in a silencing of the racial and gender dimension as a way of legitimizing the criminalization of the activities of Sala and Tupac Amaru, while international organizations and the Tupac Amaru organization itself emphasize these dimensions as a form of political resistance. Race and gender thus proved to be important variables that intervened in the process by which Milagro Sala was securitized – in ways that are not immediately obvious. The case analyzed here thus reinforces our argument about the need for empirical research on how the variables of gender and race interfere in securitization processes.

2022 Michigan Counterplan

Racist

ST seeks to prevent western order form falling into a state of nature which maintains the colonial system of global inequality

Howell and Richter-Montpetit, 19 --- Alison Howell is Associate Professor of Political Science at Rutgers University, Newark, where she is also an affiliate member of Women's and Gender Studies, the Division of Global Affairs, and Global Urban Studies. She previously held research fellowships at the Humanitarian and Conflict Response Institute (HCRI) and in Politics, both at the University of Manchester, as well as a Fulbright at Brown University and SUNY. Dr. Melanie Richter-Montpetit is Senior Lecturer in International Relations and Director of the Centre for Advanced International Theory (CAIT). Before joining the University of Sussex, Dr. Richter-Montpetit worked as a Lecturer in International Relations at the University of Sheffield. (Alison Howell and Melanie Richter-Montpetit, "Is securitization theory racist? Civilizationism, methodological whiteness, and antiblack thought in the Copenhagen School", 8-7-2019, SAGE Journals, https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/0967010619862921)//EG

We have established that securitization theory is founded in a civilizationist conceptualization of politics and security that occludes racial and colonial violence. We now demonstrate that, on the basis of these assumptions, securitization theory develops a methodologically and normatively white theory. As postcolonial, critical race, and feminist scholarship argues, methodology involves making choices about whose perspectives or histories we (de)value. defines methodological whiteness as a way of reflecting on the world that fails to acknowledge the role played by race in the very structuring of that world, and of the ways in which knowledge is constructed and legitimated within it. It fails to recognize the dominance of ‘Whiteness’ as anything other than the standard state of affairs and treats a limited perspective – that deriving from White experience – as a universal perspective. Operating in supposedly neutral and universal terms, methodological whiteness naturalizes the racial status quo, eliding the crucial role of racism in political systems or intellectual traditions. has critiqued securitization theory’s methodology for setting up a colonial relation wherein subalterns cannot speak and securitization theorists speak for them. Our critique is somewhat different: we argue that since securitization theory aspires to describe not just ‘what is’ but ‘what should be’, its methodological whiteness also becomes normative whiteness. To illustrate this argument, we evaluate securitization theory’s incorporation of speech act theory and ask how it interfaces with its civilizationist conceptualizations of politics and security. Securitization theory bases its methodology in J. L. Austin’s notion of illocutionary speech acts: forms of speech having some element of force, such as making a promise or giving a warning. Combining this with an Arendtian concept of politics seems intuitive: Arendt defined politics as action through communication, and Austin provides a method for analyzing communication as action. Notably, this methodology enacts a normative stance, being designed to ‘protect’ Arendtian normal politics: Securitization theory was built from the start on speech act theory, because it is an operational method that can be designed to protect politics in Arendt’s sense. Put in short form, the political conception of securitization theory is inspired by Arendt, implemented through speech act theory. (: 122, emphasis in original) As we have seen, by defining violence as outside politics, Arendt failed to acknowledge that, by virtue of gender and racialization, some people are produced as the ‘raw materials’ of others’ political freedom. When securitization theory claims that the purpose of its method is to protect Arendtian ‘normal politics’, it implicitly undertakes to defend the status quo of a violent international racial order. To begin, we can observe that securitization theory does not challenge the ways in which structures of speech acts (like law, civil hierarchy, or international treaties) are and have been central to enforcing a colonial system of global inequality. On the contrary, securitization theory is structured, through its apparent neutrality, to supplement and reinforce those structures: Our relative objectivism on social relations has the drawback of contributing to the reproduction of things as they are, of contributing to the taking for granted that [critical security studies] wants to upset. The advantage is – totally in line with classical security studies – to help in managing relations among units. (: 206) While acknowledging this methodological and normative investment in maintaining the status quo as a ‘drawback’, the authors claim it is worth the price. ‘Managing relations among units’ – maintaining order – is a higher priority than justice. And how is order to be maintained? By preventing civilized ‘normal politics’ from ‘regressing’ into a ‘state of nature’: Austin gives us insights into the capacity of mankind [sic] for creating shared environments through language…. Herein lies the power of human civilization, as opposed to the ‘state of nature’; the power which alone makes it possible, on occasion, for someone weak and without weapons to be listened to and even obeyed, the power which makes it possible to conceive and pursue things such as social equality or solidarity and equal opportunities for genders, all of which would not be conceivable in a ‘state of nature’ ethology. To acknowledge in theory and investigate such power is at the same time to foster and defend it against the regression into forms of social life based on brute force and coercion. (: 121, emphasis added) Although this passage avoids overt mention of race, it mobilizes a racial imaginary. Its argument is that through the use of language to form social contracts, civilized people lift themselves above the savage ‘state of nature’ and create a public political sphere. This superiority is evidenced by the capacity for (Western, liberal) discourses like ‘equal opportunities for genders’ (here, securitization theory echoes imperial feminism’s racist claim that gender equality is most advanced in the West and should be exported, especially to ‘Muslim’ societies). However, while traditional Hobbesian social contract theory views the social contract in quasi-legal terms as happening once for all in the past, securitization theory redefines it as continuously intersubjectively produced through speech acts, and therefore constantly in need of reproduction. For securitization theory, white Western superiority is therefore precarious: it must be protected from (excessive) securitization that risks a ‘regression’ to a lower level of civilization or a fully uncivilized ‘state of nature’. This passage does not merely retell a classic civilizationist narrative in newer philosophical language. It operationalizes this narrative, making its assumptions into a method. If the ability to do things with words and not force distinguishes civilized man, it argues, then to analyze ‘how to do things with words’ via Austin’s method must be in itself to step to the defense of civilized normal politics. Securitization theory offers a methodological procedure by which the scholar can observe that a speech act meets the criteria for ‘securitization’ and make normative statements about whether it should be heeded. For securitization theory, when we deploy this methodology, we inherently proceed in a civilized manner and so contribute to and protect illocutionary, Arendtian politics.

2022 Michigan Counterplan

Flawed Epistemology

Securitization theory is based on the racist concept of the social contract and cites authors who either justify racism or ignore it

Howell and Richter-Montpetit, 19 --- Alison Howell is Associate Professor of Political Science at Rutgers University, Newark, where she is also an affiliate member of Women's and Gender Studies, the Division of Global Affairs, and Global Urban Studies. She previously held research fellowships at the Humanitarian and Conflict Response Institute (HCRI) and in Politics, both at the University of Manchester, as well as a Fulbright at Brown University and SUNY. Dr. Melanie Richter-Montpetit is Senior Lecturer in International Relations and Director of the Centre for Advanced International Theory (CAIT). Before joining the University of Sussex, Dr. Richter-Montpetit worked as a Lecturer in International Relations at the University of Sheffield. (Alison Howell and Melanie Richter-Montpetit, "Is securitization theory racist? Civilizationism, methodological whiteness, and antiblack thought in the Copenhagen School", 8-7-2019, SAGE Journals, https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/0967010619862921)//EG

In this section, we describe how civilizationist thought underpins securitization theory’s concepts of politics and security. Civilizationism is a term used to describe racist (theoretical) perspectives that contain three assumptions: (1) Civilizations can, and ought to, advance, and some (Western) civilizations are more ‘advanced’; (2) civilizational progress is not only technological and material, but political and moral; and (3) the ‘underdevelopment’ of certain civilizations represents a problem for, or threat to, developed ones. Drawing on a broad canon of civilizationist political philosophy, canonical securitization theory texts develop a narrative of world-historical progress in which civilizational advancement beyond the violence of ‘primal anarchy’ involves curtailing securitization through the instantiation of civilized ‘normal politics’. Classic securitization theory frequently and favorably cites Samuel Huntington’s racist () ‘clash of civilizations’ thesis (: 36, 53, 112, 125) and Robert Kaplan (: 221, 252; : 47, 54, 69–70, 112, 127), infamous for his theory of ‘the coming anarchy’, his warnings of the danger of ‘tribalism’, his neo-Malthusian arguments about ‘overpopulation’ in the global South (, ), and his defense of ‘tempered imperialism’ (). Social theorists such as Durkheim, who built his theory of society on racist anthropological distinctions between civilized men and savages (), also feature (: 67). Perhaps more fundamentally, securitization theory draws on social contract thinkers such as Hobbes (see : 69, 209; : 54) for their ‘state of nature’ concept (Sbisà in : 121). has convincingly argued that racism is integral, not incidental, to social contract theory, which typically casts the social contract as an achievement of Western civilization and locates the contrasting ‘state of nature’ in African ‘tribes’ or indigenous ‘savages’ (: 13). Securitization theory extends social contract theory to cast ‘normal politics’ (and the curbing of securitization) as an achievement of civilization. ‘Primal anarchy’ and the ‘state of nature’ act as the foils to this ‘normal politics’ in a teleological hierarchy of civilizational advancement from securitization towards politicization (: 53, 69). Following Hobbes, securitization theory locates this supposed progress in the West, particularly Europe: It perhaps begins with the construction of the Hobbesian state in the eighteenth century. The creation of the Leviathan was aimed at opening a sphere of public economic and political life, and this could not be done without pushing the use of force back into a contained space controlled by the state. Under the Leviathan, citizens could not draw swords over economic grievances or political disagreements, which were to be handled by the rule of law and the market. The logic of existential threat and the right to use force … were reserved to the state and thus were largely desecuritized among the citizens. (: 209, emphasis added) The social contract, for securitization theory, is an (18th-century, white, European, liberal) feat of desecuritization, both within nation-states and among them (: 51). Securitization theory, then, does not merely replicate social contract theory and civilizationist thought: it develops it. By introducing a constructivist methodology, securitization theory places politicization (the instantiation of ‘normal politics’ or social contracts) and minimizing securitization as integral to civilizational progress. Admittedly, securitization theory is an eclectic theory. In addition to thinkers easily identified as civilizationist, it also draws on apparently more critical theorists, notably Arendt. Responding to Foucauldian critiques that describe securitization theory’s conceptualization of security as the exception to politics as Schmittian, : 470) argues that these critics have misunderstood: ‘it is wrong to claim … that securitization theory involves a “Schmittian” concept of politics – the theory has a Schmittian concept of security and an Arendtian concept of politics’, further clarifying that: The concept of security is Schmittian, because it defines security in terms of exception, emergency, and a decision (although not by a singular will, but among people in a political situation). This does not in itself make securitization theory’s concept of politics Schmittian, because the place of security in the theory is as an anti-politics or the politically constituted limit to politics. This general politics is inspired by Hannah Arendt. (: 478) Elsewhere, : 122) summarizes Arendt’s concept of politics: ‘politics takes place among people, in-between us, because power only emerges when people act together, it basically consists of action directed to and dependent on the reaction of others, not doing things directly’. Here, he adverts to Arendt’s distinction between power (Macht) and violence (Gewalt), which securitization theory mirrors by dividing politicization from securitization. Arendt drew on racist German anthropology that distinguished between (uncivilized) ‘nature people’ (Naturvölker) and (civilized) ‘cultured people’ (Kulturvölker) (; ) to divide the world into communities with history, language, and political institutions, and those without (: 396). She cast the former as (morally and politically) superior and warned that the latter’s ‘primitivism’ posed a threat to political freedom and democracy. When securitization theory adopts Arendt’s concept of politics, it does not dispense with her civilizationism but replicates and develops it, conceptualizing ‘normal politics’ as the achievement of civilized people capable of resisting violence (securitization) through reasoned dialogue (politicization). Securitization theory also replicates Arendt’s evacuation of violence from politics. Arendt built her idea of power (Macht) on an idealized vision of the Athenian polis, ignoring the ‘raw materials’ of ancient Athenian democracy – slave labor and women’s unpaid reproductive labor (: 249f). She similarly idealized the American republic (; ; ; ). Although in her famous ‘boomerang thesis’ located the origins of Nazism in European racism and colonialism, she asserted that the USA had never been guilty of imperialism or indigenous genocide (see ; ). Though she spoke out against Nazi white supremacy in Europe, she insisted US racism was merely a social phenomenon, not a political structure (: 253; ), even though Nazi policies were explicitly inspired by US settler-colonial genocide, the reservation system, and Jim Crow segregation (; ; ; ). In praising ancient Athens and contemporary America, Arendt actively minimized the imperial, racialized, and gendered violence structuring these ‘civilized’ democracies (; , ; ; ; ).

2022 Michigan Counterplan

Essentialist/narrow

Securitization is narrow – solely focused on dominant actors and threats to security

Šulovic, 10 --- BCSP Intern (Vladimir Šulovic, " Meaning of Security and the Theory of Securitization", 10/5/10, PDC, http://pdc.ceu.hu/archive/00006385/01/Security_Theory_Securitization.pdf)//EG

The securitization framework has been a useful tool to analysts who want to challenge the notion of the objectivity of security threats. The framework is elegant and has generated much academic interest and sparked the number of critiques and debates, aiming to broaden and further specify the framework in order to increase its logical coherence and explanatory power. However important and innovative contribution to our understanding of security may it be, the securitization framework is problematically narrow. First, the form of act constructing security is defined narrowly, with the main focus on the speech of dominant actors, usually political leaders, which encourages an interpretation that securitization is only happening when there are discursive interventions of those who are institutionally legitimate to speak on behalf of a particular political community (usually a state). This also excludes a focus on other forms of representations, such as images or material practices. (McDonald, 2008: 564). Thus, the focus is on the speech and its performative power to construct security. At the same time, the conceptual framework of securitization puts a special emphasis on the acceptance of the audience which is claimed to be essential in the successful securitization process. Contextual factors, which the Copenhagen school terms facilitating conditions, help explain why some securitizing moves are more likely to be accepted by the audience than the other. These facilitating conditions are taken as givens that either help or hinder securitization but are not conceptualized as constitutive of the speech acts, which is at odds with the claim that security is a social construction. There is tension between understanding securitization as a productive process by focusing on the performative power of the speech act, and as a constructed process by claiming that security is intersubjectively constituted. This tension gave rise to critique by the so-called Second Generation of securitization analysts who argue that securitization can not be properly understood outside historical and cultural context in which security discourse takes place. Thus, the very meaning of security is contextual. Finally, the framework of securitization is narrow in the sense that the nature of the act is defined solely in terms of the designation of threats to security (McDonald, 2008: 564). This claim is based on a commitment to the idea that security is constituted in oppositional terms: by designating that which it is not or that from which it needs preservation or protection (Waever, 1995: 56). Sometimes it is more effective if security is conceptualized in terms of normative goals that should be achieved or expression of the core values that are in need of being protected, than if it is articulated only in terms of “from what and from whom it needs protection”. Thus, seeing security as something negative per se does not represent a logical imperative anymore.

2022 Michigan Evidence
NATO Bad › 2NC – Sustainability

NATO’s unsustainable – Ukraine, midterms, and Eurasian movements.

Peter Isackson 22, chief strategy officer at the Fair Observer, 3/3/2022, "How Coherent Is NATO Today and in the Future?," Fair Observer, , RMax

One of the longer-term consequences of the current crisis is something no one seems willing to talk about at this moment as everyone is concerned with expressing their solidarity with the Ukrainian people. Numerous commentators have interpreted Russia’s aggression as a signal that the West is for once becoming united and will be stronger than ever when the fighting dies down and Russia is humbled.

The question no one wants to assess realistically is precisely the evolving image of NATO, particularly for Europeans. The idea that the Russian assault will strengthen Europe’s commitment to NATO to avoid future crises is naive at best and the product of the kind of illusion Biden has created with his rhetoric. What is happening today is frightening, and to the extent that the problem itself turns around the existence of NATO, without compromising their empathy for Ukrainians, Europeans have already begun reflecting on the danger NATO represents for their political and economic future.

2022 Michigan Evidence
NATO Good › 2AC – AT: Nuclear Sharing – Germany

End of nuclear sharing with Germany causes extinction.

Rafael Loss 20, European Leadership Network, 2020, “A plea for realism in Germany’s nuclear sharing debate,”

Dr Mützenich is mistaken. The removal of US nuclear weapons from German soil would undermine the Euro-Atlantic security architecture and, ultimately, increase the likelihood of war in Europe, including that of nuclear use. Exiting nuclear sharing would also raise concerns in the Baltics and Eastern Europe about Germany’s commitment to protect its immediate neighbourhood, end Germany’s influence over launching nuclear strikes, render German preferences less relevant for US policy, remove a geostrategic barrier to Russian armament and unduly jeopardise the already strained relations with Moscow.

To be sure, the pace of nuclear disarmament has slowed since the 1990s. This liberal interlude saw the indefinite extension of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and the opening for signature of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT). Although the nuclear powers have also cut their nuclear arsenals by some 75% since the mid-1980s, an estimated 13,355 nuclear weapons remain in the arsenals of nine countries today. This reduction contains an important unilateral component; the United States and Russia, which possess the vast majority of global warheads, have reduced mostly very expensive, excess stockpiles.

2022 Michigan Evidence
NATO Good › 2AC – AT: Nuclear Sharing – France

France umbrella goes nuclear – escalate-to-de-escalate posture and geography guarantee it

Christine Leah 17, former Chauncey Postdoctoral Associate at Yale University, 2/14/17, “A European Nuclear Deterrent?” https://www.the-american-interest.com/2017/02/14/a-european-nuclear-deterrent/

The point is that any country, such as France, that wishes to extend nuclear deterrence in the future would have to significantly change its current posture, which evolved without considering these issues. It could be, for example, that extended deterrence by its nature encourages larger arsenals. Is it reasonable to imagine that France would significantly expand and diversify its arsenal to ensure a second-strike capability not only for the purposes of central deterrence but for extended deterrence as well? Sea-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), for instance, have a crucial advantage in this respect, since they are less vulnerable to attack than land-based ICBMs and manned bombers. Would France send its force de frappe to sea in a big way? Could it?

Another important distinction is geography. Both the United States and the Soviet Union possessed vast acreage, making the notion of waging an initially limited nuclear war at least theoretically plausible. It was possible to imagine nuclear exchanges at the margins in defense of allies that left both homelands basically viable. France is probably too small for that, besides which, for that reason and perhaps others, French policymakers never accepted the notion of limited nuclear war, or riposte graduée. France instead relies on an ultime avertissement “ultimate warning,” which seems to rule out the concept of escalation control for the sake of starting-point credibility. The ability and willingness to escalate a small confrontation to higher levels of exchange is a critical component of the credibility of extended deterrence, and the ability and willingness to “fight” a nuclear war, both limited and full-scale, falls into that logic. These two elements—geography and the associated dynamics of both conventional and nuclear escalation—meant that the United States and the Soviet Union had more “time” compared to other potential nuclear dyads, both before and during a nuclear exchange. France doesn’t have these chops, and neither would Japan if it decides to go nuclear. India makes for an interesting question in this regard.

2022 Michigan Evidence
NATO Good › 2AC – AT: Nuclear Sharing – General

Alternatives are worse.

Kristin Ven Bruusgaard 21, assistant professor of political science at the University of Oslo, member of the Oslo Nuclear Project, 8/23/2021, " Anti-Nuclear Sentiment and the Continuing Relevance of Nuclear Deterrence," Policy Roundtable: The Future of Trans-Atlantic Nuclear Deterrence, Chapter 5, https://tnsr.org/roundtable/policy-roundtable-the-future-of-trans-atlantic-nuclear-deterrence/, RMax

This past January, the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons entered into force, after 50 states ratified it.83 This disarmament treaty is unlikely to contribute to reducing nuclear arsenals, given that no nuclear weapons state has expressed any interest in joining it. But the treaty does capture a contemporary sentiment among many non-nuclear NATO member states: that nuclear deterrence is unfashionable, untenable, and out of date. Civil society movements and political youth parties in Europe are pushing the treaty’s agenda hard.84 Nuclear deterrence, to them, has run its course.

The humanitarian rationale for never employing nuclear weapons is compelling and a key reason for the popularity of this anti-nuclear sentiment across Europe.85 It remains a fact that nuclear weapons can bring existential destruction to humanity. The Bulletin of Atomic Scientists’ Doomsday Clock concludes that we are closer than ever to midnight.86

2022 Michigan Evidence
NATO Good › 2AC – AT: Nuclear Sharing – General

Critics of nuclear sharing are wrong.

Tobias Bunde 21, postdoctoral researcher at the Hertie School’s Centre for International Security, Director of Research and Policy at the Munich Security Conference, project lead of the “Understanding Nuclear Assurance, Deterrence and Escalation in Europe,” 1/22/2021, "Germany and the Future of NATO Nuclear Sharing," War on the Rocks, https://warontherocks.com/2021/08/the-risks-of-an-incremental-german-exit-from-natos-nuclear-sharing-arrangement/, RMax

Proponents of a withdrawal of U.S. non-strategic nuclear weapons from German soil argue that it would make Germany and Europe more secure and downplay the potential risks of such a decision. For them, Berlin’s refusal to continually host U.S. nuclear weapons and invest in the next generation of dual-capable aircraft would neither mean the end of nuclear sharing nor undermine NATO cohesion. They often try to distinguish between the so-called technical and political elements of nuclear sharing, arguing that ending the former would not necessarily affect the latter. Pointing to states such as Canada or Greece that once hosted U.S. nuclear weapons but got rid of them a long time ago and still participate in NATO’s Nuclear Planning Group, they argue that Germany would still be able to influence NATO nuclear strategy, that the United States would still be willing to protect NATO, and that NATO and the nuclear sharing arrangement as such would continue to exist and function well.

These arguments are based on rather heroic assumptions. First, they assume that it does not matter what you bring to the table. According to Rolf Mützenich, chairman of the Social Democrats in the Bundestag, a withdrawal of non-strategic nuclear weapons from Germany “would not result in the end of the American nuclear guarantee nor of Germany’s say in nuclear matters … as it would still be guaranteed through its membership in the Nuclear Planning Group.” Yet, it would be very surprising if those states that actively contributed to NATO’s nuclear sharing mission didn’t have more influence than other member states. After all, it is well known that those NATO members that provide troops to allied operations (in particular those that carry special risks) have more influence on NATO strategy for a given operation than other member states.

2022 Michigan Evidence
NATO Good › 2AC – Sustainability

NATO’s sustainable – U.S. reliance and public support prove.

Simon Koschut 21, Heisenberg Fellow at the Otto Suhr Institute of the Freie University Berlin, Ph.D. from the University of Potsdam, former Fellow at the Weatherhead Center for International Affairs at Harvard University, “Whither the Liberal Security Order: The End of NATO as We Know It?” Hegemonic Transition, Chapter 8, , RMax

Despite these obvious problems, however, it seems premature to join in the swan song for NATO. Indeed, with the incoming Biden administration there are many indications that NATO will continue to exist. A dissolution or disintegration of NATO cannot be ruled out entirely, but it is not very likely. This is mainly due to two reasons.

First, the US needs NATO in its conflicts with other hegemons. When the Cold War drew to a close, NATO lost its central importance in the eyes of many US decision-makers in Congress and in the White House, e.g., consider the sidelining of NATO during the so-called War on Terror or the Obama administration’s troop surge in the Pacific region in the wake of the so-called Asian Pivot. Recently, however, the organization has regained importance for the US in the course of the Russian annexation of Crimea and the threat to US security interests in the South China Sea. The US, in particular, is currently pushing NATO members to invest more in military defense in order to increase the deterrent potential against Russia and China (Defense News, 2016).