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2022 Michigan Kritik
Cybernetics K Supplement—Wave 1—FMPS › Answers › Impact Defense

Framing issue---we are physchologically predisposed against emerging tech.

Thierer 14 - senior research fellow at the Mercatus Center at George Mason University. “Permissionless Innovation: The Continuing Case for Comprehensive Technological Freedom.” Semantic Scholar. Mar 14. , AG

C: WHY DOES DOOMSAYING DOMINATE DISCUSSIONS ABOUT NEW TECHNOLOGIES?

One of the reasons that precautionary thinking often creeps into technology policy discussions is that, as already noted, our collective first reaction to new technologies often is one of dystopian dread. We assume the worst for a variety of reasons.25 In the extreme, the initial resistance to new technologies sometimes takes the form of a full-blown technopanic, which refers to “intense public, political, and academic responses to the emergence or use of media or technologies, especially by the young.”26 Some new technologies were initially resisted and even regulated because they disrupted long-standing social norms, traditions, and institutions.

2022 Michigan Kritik
Cybernetics K Supplement—Wave 1—FMPS › Answers › Alt Fails—Crackdown

Extreme post-pandemic politics incites resistance that coopts the alt.

Bratton 21 – Benjamin Bratton’s work spans Philosophy, Architecture, Computer Science and Geopolitics, He is Professor of Visual Arts at University of California, San Diego, Program Director of The Terraforming program at the Strelka Institute, and author of several books including “The Stack: On Software and Sovereignty.” “The Revenge of the Real - Politics for a Post-Pandemic World.” June 2021. AG

The rapid but awkward appearance of face masks in the West entails an even more radical confrontation with the limits of the subjective per se . It makes clear that regardless of one’s subjective ethical intention, good or bad, one remains a contagion vector just the same. As said, it doesn’t matter if one wishes to do good or harm, one’s biological proximity to others will cause good or harm regardless. Subjective intent is irrelevant.

A source of confusion for many is a shift in ethics from a position that calibrates subjective moral will to one that recognizes one’s self and body as an object in a cause-and-effect relationship with the world. It is often presumed that agency and subjectivity (if not also identity) are interchangeable, but the consequentialist ethics of being an object (less a subject) works differently. Outcomes are not a mirror of an internal mental state. They are not directly dependent on public demonstration, performance, and ritual to effect physical change. The implications for other biopolitical and ecopolitical conditions, such as combating climate change, are decisive.

2022 Michigan Kritik
Cybernetics K Supplement—Wave 1—FMPS › Blocks › AT: World Getting Better

Their data cherrypicks limited stats to represent a whole, thus using a concept of progress to create a metastable closed-off world that they have under control. This project is violently extractive.

Bardin and Ferrari 22 – Dr Andrea Bardin is Senior Lecturer in Politics at Oxford Brookes University, UK; PhD Political Philosophy and History of Political Thought (University of Padua); PhD Political Theory (Brunel University London); Laurea summa cum laude in Philosophy (University of Padua). Marco Ferrari is Ph.D in Philosophy and Postdoctoral Research Fellow in Political Philosophy at the Università di Padova. “Governing progress: From cybernetic homeostasis to Simondon’s politics of metastability.” Sagepub. The Sociological Review Monographs 2022, Vol. 70(2) 248–263. Mar 2022. , AG

The point of government in a neoliberal perspective is neither to limit the freedom of initiative, nor to assume that social stability depends on an invisible hand, but rather to carry on a detailed regulation of liberties for the sake of the ‘spontaneous’ equilibrium of the markets. An incessant work of data extraction through ever perfected algorithms sets the conditions of possibility of the subjects’ behaviour – economic actors, ideally selfemployees – and orients it towards the preservation of the system’s dynamic stability. Social change is thus governed and reduced to the hyper-modern idea of progress, conceived as a variation within the parameters deemed necessary for the reproduction and survival of the system. All the ‘irrational’ noise that is not immediately reducible to progress thus conceived is either silenced or – once neutralised – included in the pattern as a risky and unforeseen opportunity to perfect the system’s survival (Castel, 1991; Dean, 1998; Ewald, 1991). More radically, these elements are normatively integrated in the system’s core dynamics in the form of an ethics of flexibility (Fraser, 2003) establishing the ‘good’ functioning of governmentality.

The government of progress is thus resolved in the incessant operation of protection, management and promotion of homeostatic mechanisms deemed capable of self-regulation, but in fact selected and – if necessary – substituted with others, offering a more inclusive and complex capacity of adaptation to the macro-mechanism of the market. This macromechanism is the undisputed horizon that imposes to political power the task of providing a homeostatic equilibrium functional to its progressive implementation. With its ‘soft’ determinism and immanent teleology the market thus appears to be a hypermodern version of the clockwork universe theorised in early-modern mechanical science, and the vector of a similar onto-epistemological reduction of social reality to a mathematical form. And this reduction still relies on a ‘mythical’ concept of progress alimenting an ‘illusion of simultaneity’ that hides a plurality of paths by projecting the ‘eternal present’ of the market on all possible futures.

2022 Michigan Kritik
Cybernetics K Supplement—Wave 1—FMPS › Blocks › AT: Tech Good—Peace

Technology doesn’t reduce violence, but obscures it as a failure to take advantage of liberal freedom. The impact is permanent everywhere war.

Johnson, 18—Professor, Environmental History, Loyola University Chicago (Benjamin, “Coded Conflict: Algorithmic and Drone Warfare in US Security Strategy,” Journal of Military and Strategic Studies, Volume 18, Issue 4, dml)

Understanding technology as more than a neutral tool that is exogenous to political and social life has been an important site of intervention for critical theory, especially in understanding how technology interacts with social and political existence to obscure and perpetrate violence. The conceptual, theoretical and discursive underpinnings of the liberal peace have been advanced and critiqued on a number of fronts. For example, these works have focused on the adherence of research to quantitative ‘large-N’ statistical testing where the liberal peace is treated as a scientific phenomenon; 35 the role of liberal peace as a ‘tripartite international discursive environment’ in which superficial technical solutions to resolve conflict are produced; 36 the ‘punitive ethos’ inherent to liberalism’s normative influence on counter-terrorism policy;37 the limits to liberalism’s understanding of actors in terms of states and their institutions;38 the inherent violence of Western modernization and its links to liberal peacebuilding; 39 and lastly the liberal character of empire building through imperial expansion.40

This body of literature has teased out the implicit and explicit forms of violence that underpin liberal internationalism. Violence undertaken in the name of spreading liberal democracy has increasingly been exposed and difficult to ignore, especially as war has expanded through visual representations and made available to people outside of conflict zones.41 James Der Derian has gone so far to argue that with respect to a global liberal project of civilizing the world, “in spite of, and perhaps soon because of, efforts to spread a democratic peace through globalization and humanitarian intervention, war is ascending to an even higher plan, from the virtual to the virtuous.”42 Commenting on the discursive narrative that technology enabled distance has allowed for a peaceful or ‘clean’ type of war, Der Derian goes on to argue that “at the heart of virtuous war is the technical capability and ethical imperative to threaten and, if necessary actualize violence from a distance – with no or minimal casualties” and that “on the surface, virtuous war cleans up the political discourse as well as the battlefield [...] virtuous wars promote a vision of bloodless, humanitarian, hygienic wars.”43

2022 Michigan Kritik
Cybernetics K Supplement—Wave 1—FMPS › Blocks › AT: Tech Good—Info Tech

Despite potential positive uses of technology, information tech has fueled radicalization and violence.

Bunse ’21 Dr Simone Bunse is a Content Manager for the Stockholm Forum on Peace and Development and Researcher at SIPRI. Her previous positions have included Director of Academic Affairs at Lead University, Costa Rica; Associate Teaching Professor at Georgetown University’s McCourt School of Public Policy, Washington DC, USA; Assistant Professor at INCAE Business School, Costa Rica; and Visiting Researcher at the Free University of Brussels, Belgium. (Simone Bunse, "Social media: A tool for peace or conflict?", Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, 8-1-2021, https://www.sipri.org/commentary/topical-backgrounder/2021/social-media-tool-peace-or-conflict. Accessed 7-4-2022, RS).

Human rights activists have used social media technology to organize peaceful protests and defend democracy for more than a decade. More recently, peacebuilders have discovered it can be a tool to understand conflict dynamics and counter extremism better. Yet the potential of social media as a megaphone for promoting human rights, democracy and peace is overshadowed by its dismal record of being used to drive radicalization and violence through disinformation campaigns. This ‘online frontline’ will continue to be the case, unless regulators, social media firms and citizens revisit current policies and practices.

At the 2021 Stockholm Forum on Peace and Development researchers, policymakers, tech companies and civil society organizations had an opportunity to explore how social media can be harnessed for peacebuilding purposes and to assess policy responses to harmful online disinformation campaigns. This Topical Backgrounder is inspired by these discussions, particularly on the Janus-faced nature of social media. It makes four recommendations—one each for peacebuilding practitioners, policymakers, social media companies and citizens—to protect peace, democratic institutions and people’s welfare:

2022 Michigan Kritik
Cybernetics K Supplement—Wave 1—FMPS › Blocks › AT: State Good

State rhetoric under the illusory guise of technological solutionism covertly perpetrates structural violence.

Félix Tréguer 19 – PhD in political studies from the School for Advanced Studies in the Social Sciences, associate researcher at CNRS and post-doctoral researcher at CERI Sciences Po in Paris. “Seeing like Big Tech: security assemblages, technology, and the future of state bureaucracy.” Taylorfrancis. Mar 2019. , AG

Stopping the machine? That begs the question of how best to challenge these new security assemblages.

For one thing, it is worth stressing that Big Data bureaucracies might not be that good at doing what they are supposed to. We can therefore oppose the arguments of those legitimising these new governance models on the grounds of accuracy and reliability. There are reasons – and growing evidence – to doubt that the new “regimes of truth” championed by “Big Data security assemblages” will in any meaningful way provide solutions to security issues (Aradau and Blanke 2015). Technological solutionism in the age of data governance, bolstered by marketing discourses, might only be recreating a veil of illusion of technocratic control, while putting evermore distance between bureaucracies and the social world they wish to make more orderly. After all, history tells us, bureaucracies tend to fail. By disregarding “all the subtleties of real social existence,” “reducing everything to preconceived mechanical or statistical formulae,” bureaucratic dispositifs like “forms, rules, statistics, or questionnaire” – even when fuelled by complex algorithms and troves of data –, remain abstract simplifications that might only reinforce the forms of structural violence they are said to alleviate or even solve (Graeber 2015, p. 75; see also Eubanks 2018, O’Neil 2016).

2022 Michigan Kritik
Cybernetics K Supplement—Wave 1—FMPS › Blocks › AT: Perm

Fantasies DA: the perm reinvests in the cybernetic dream of perfectly self-organizing markets. Refusing their fantasy of cybernetic control is both necessary and sufficient.

Halpern, 22—associate professor in sociology and anthropology at Concordia University (Orit, “The Future Will Not Be Calculated: Neural Nets, Neoliberalism, and Reactionary Politics,” Critical Inquiry, Volume 48, Number 2, Winter 2022, dml)

It is perhaps an irony of history that the answer to this problem of overinundation and data surplus appeared to be a turn to cybernetics, new models of networked cognition, and ultimately perhaps even a new model of machine learning that might indeed learn from the distributed intelligence of millions, and now billions, of people. At the same time, such technologies make it impossible to encounter the very legitimate sources of pain in contemporary societies whether induced by structural racism, poverty, disease, or environmental degradation.

This returns us to our present. If Hayek and Hebb still worried about liberal subjects and objectivity, we might ask what concerns animate our contemporary networks? Markets, and now reactionary politics, seek instability and discrimination but without diversity. Shock has been normalized to be managed through our electronic networks. Networks appear to have the power to exacerbate fantasies of individual control and paranoid imaginaries of agential patterns. If “shock” for Klein was a mechanism to destabilize systems and nations to allow the entry of neoliberal governance, we might extend her observation to recognize that now it has become a tool to maintain existing neoliberal systems and to encourage the growth and proliferation of machine learning networks and algorithmic finance.58

2022 Michigan Kritik
Cybernetics K Supplement—Wave 1—FMPS › Blocks › AT: Perm

The perm fails—sequencing is key. Refocusing our priorities is necessary.

Félix Tréguer 19 – PhD in political studies from the School for Advanced Studies in the Social Sciences, associate researcher at CNRS and post-doctoral researcher at CERI Sciences Po in Paris. “Seeing like Big Tech: security assemblages, technology, and the future of state bureaucracy.” Taylorfrancis. Mar 2019. , AG [language modifications denoted by brackets]

But post-Snowden controversies also show that these forms of resistance create a risk that we will overlook the pervasiveness of the institutions and technologies, of the rationalities and practices that created the problem in the first place. The risk is that all we are able to come up with are legal, technological or bureaucratic fixes to try to contain the most disturbing aspects of data-driven bureaucracies, without affecting the longer-term trend of a technological arms race that only seems to intensify the issues it was allegedly meant to solve.

Some kind of deeper resistance might be warranted. In his writings on power, Foucault once asked: “How can the growth of capabilities” – and he explicitly mentioned “techniques of communication – “be disconnected from the intensification of power relations?” (Foucault 1984, 48). Computing technologies have since become immensely powerful and yet, we are still struggling to find a satisfactory answer to this crucial question. Despite the hopes of early hackers and Internet pioneers, the decoupling of technology and power is not happening. The key question then becomes whether technology itself or law or ethics can actually be effective instruments to achieve such decoupling.

2022 Michigan Kritik
Cybernetics K Supplement—Wave 1—FMPS › Blocks › AT: Nation-States Matter

Cyberwar distorts the idea of the nation.

Dyer-Witheford and Matviyenko 19(Nick and Svitlana, Associate professor at the University of Western Ontario, Professor of Communications at Simon Fraser University “Cyberwar and Revolution”, Chapter Two, CS) [redacted a slur said in a quote, denoted by brackets]

A state’s interpellation of its subjects, or of the subjects of another state, is in part a question of its cyberwar apparatuses’ access to or interdiction from specific platforms. Though platforms may be more or less global or local in scope, they are also national, in terms of ownership and legal governance and relations to a homeland state security apparatus. This is a dynamic around which the profit interests of specific blocs of digital capital and political interests of security state apparatuses mutually revolve (Google/Facebook/Twitter for the United States; VKontakte/ Yandex for Russia; Weibo/Baidu/Tencent for China). “National” interpellation of state subjects is manifestly in play in the banning by the Ukraine government of Russian social media and search engines in the midst of an ongoing war. It may also, however, manifest when military conflict is merely anticipated, as we saw in chapter 1 in regard to the “Sino-Google war” (Bratton 2016, 112) and its imbrication in intensifying China–United States hostilities. However, cyberwar subjectification is not simply a question of demarcating “national” platforms and “national” identities. The profit dynamics of Web 2.0 capital demand both an ever-enlarging user base and the self-activity (and hence self-revelation) of users. Because of this, it is possible to construct within social media interpellative micromachines, that is to say, specific user communities, as a sort of “partisan” presence inside ostensibly foreign digital territory. Within Facebook, one can form a nation, or a caliphate, or perhaps even an assembly or commune. Platforms owned by capital of another state, even an adversary state, can be seeded with subversive practices or used as digital territories across which wars are fought between other competing states, as the Gaza conflict was digitally fought out across Twitter. The truly global social media platforms, owned by U.S. capital, are particularly liable to this process, precisely to the degree that their huge profitability depends on amassing global users. This cyberwar seeding of subjectification involves agents. These are of various kinds: state military public relations agencies, such as the IDF’s Spokesperson’s Unit (now being widely copied by other militaries); clandestine troll armies, such as those of Russia’s Internet Research Agency; U.S. military “sock puppets”; or ISIS militant recruiters. The efforts of such agents may also be articulated with autonomous interpellative processes, such as those of dissenting movements within foreign states or citizen journalists with a spontaneous patriotism for the homeland. Agents may work positively, as “friends”; negatively, harassing enemies; or in contradictory, chaotic directions, generating a paralyzing anomic blur. Each of these comes with its own interpellative processes. For example, one can contrast the careful cultivation of the subject of an ISIS recruitment process with trolling practices associated with Russian hybrid warfare. In the former process, recruiters “monitor online communities where they believe they can find receptive individuals,” sifting through visitors to militant sites. They then create a warm virtual microcommunity around potential recruits, saturating them with messages that, depending on the orientation of the target, may emphasize religious devotion, the appeal of violent action, grievances against racism, religious discrimination, poor economic prospects, or positive depictions of life in militant-held territories. At the same time, they encourage the potential recruit to isolate himself from other contacts. At a certain point, communication shifts from public forums into private and encrypted channels. It is in this phase that options such as emigration to ISIS territory, as a civilian or fighter, or attacks at home are discussed. The cycle is a sustained, modulated “hailing” of an identified data subject as a supporter of the caliphate, a data relation that then translates into corporeal action (Berger 2015a, 2015b).9 Cyberwar trolling is an interpellation that reverses the logic of recruiting. An enemy, rather than a friend, is identified, vilified, enraged, exhausted, and metaphorically (and sometimes literally, through “doxing” and the like) destroyed, silenced, intimidated, or forced offline—with the correct subject position established negatively, in contrast to that of the unfortunate and despicable victim. While the term is loosely applied to many forms of online harassment, it is often more specifically used to characterize a strategy of escalating rancorous dissensus, for example, making a provocation that can be bootstrapped into intensifying abuse and insult. In this form, trolling is sometimes analyzed as having a distinct sequence; the lure, the catch, reeling in, and so on. It may be practiced solo or in teams (with one troll reinforcing another or making an apparently innocent conversational setup that can later be exploited) and can involve a number of gambits (such as professing support for a position but then undercutting it with damning “concerns”). Thus, for example, on a nationalist Ukraine internet forum, pro-Russian trolling can ramp up from an apparently measured remark about U.S. support for Ukraine to intensifying attacks on Ukraine’s corrupt incapacity for self-governance, Western homosexual degeneracy, ubiquitous fascism, cowardice, and inevitable defeat. The subjectifying address is “if you are like that, you are worthless; you don’t want to be like them, the [redacted]/fascists/CIA dupes, but like us, your brave Slavic brothers” (Szwed 2016).

2022 Michigan Kritik
Cybernetics K Supplement—Wave 1—FMPS › Blocks › AT: Nation-States Matter

Our arg obviously isn’t that nation-states don’t exist, but that focusing primarily on them is unproductive.

Joque, 18—PhD from the European Grad School, researches philosophy, technology and media and is the visualization librarian at the University of Michigan, go blue (Justin, “Buffer Overflow: The Space and Time of Cyberwar,” Deconstruction Machines: Writing in the Age of Cyberwar, Chapter 1, 31-32, dml)

Throughout the short history of cyberwar, the vast majority of attacks have taken place outside of declared conflicts and kinetic wars. It is striking, then, that if we follow both the media and military establishments in calling these events war, war appears no longer to exist in a specific time or place. If cyberwar is taken in its broadest sense to mean a new mode of war targeted against systems, it then marks a new relationship to the space and time of war and attests to the reconfiguration of global spaces by economic, legal, social, and military forces. While many are quick to see in cyberwar an inevitable apocalyptic catastrophe, and while others dismiss these warnings as pure hype, it is most productive to set aside that particular debate and instead explore the specific logic of cyberwar. Under the logic of computer and network-based attacks, certain tendencies of military and economic thinking about the global space of the twenty-first century come to the fore regardless of the ultimate success or failure of these computerized attacks.

Cyberwar exploits security gaps in digital systems and networks and at the same time leverages the global reach of these networks. The attacks that have been organized under the name of cyberwar create nearly immediate effects at a distance, sending information and malicious code around the globe at the speed of light. Cyberwar exists intimately within what Castells calls “the rise of the network society.”1 These attacks on networked digital systems both speak to and engage with these increasingly connected global spaces. Moreover, even while these attacks exploit the vulnerabilities of programs, they are exploited by and in order to leverage spatial and temporal networks. To understand what is at stake in cyberwar, especially as it moves outside the time and space of declared war, requires us to account for these shifts in geography and for the impact of cyberwar on the continual reconfiguration of geography and networks.

2022 Michigan Kritik
Cybernetics K Supplement—Wave 1—FMPS › Blocks › AT: Nation-States Matter

The nationstate is a myth of nostalgic rage.

Bifo 20 (Franco “Bifo” Berardi, founder of the famous Radio Alice in Bologna and an important figure in the Italian Autonomia movement, is a writer, media theorist, and social activist, “Desire, Pleasure, Senility, and Evolution”) // ‘ansel’

Let’s think about the worldwide resurgence of “fascism.” Donald Trump, Matteo Salvini, Boris Johnson, Nigel Farage, Vladimir Putin, and Recep Erdoğan. Are they fascists? No, they are not. And the process that is expanding in large parts of the world, is this fascism? No, it is not.

Fascism was a historic phenomenon comprised of young people. It was a movement based on the will-to-power of a strong, energetic, futuristic movement. It involved people who expected a bright future, and promoted expansion, the colonization of territories and markets. Nobody expects a bright future nowadays. And expansion is no longer possible because the entire planet is subjugated, while markets are saturated. The colonization of territorial spaces is over—only time can be colonized nowadays. The only direction for expansion today is the intensification of time and the acceleration of mental rhythms. Only the virtual expansion of cognitive space and the accelerated circulation of signs is possible. But this kind of intensification is blowing up the nervous systems of humankind.

2022 Michigan Kritik
Cybernetics K Supplement—Wave 1—FMPS › Blocks › AT: Liberalism Good—Peace

Liberal peace is inseparable from the violent façade of liberal pacification which obscures the escalating cycle of phenomenological violence at the heart of the world order that kills value to life and ensures nuclear war

Baron, et al, 19—Associate Professor in the School of Government and International Affairs at Durham University (Ilan Zvi, with Jonathan Havercroft, Associate Professor in International Political Theory at the University of Southampton, Isaac Kamola, assistant professor of political science at Trinity College, Jonneke Koomen, Associate Professor of Politics, Sociology and Women’s and Gender Studies at Willamette University, Alex Prichard, senior lecturer in International Relations at the University of Exeter, and Justin Murphy, anticlimactically just an independent scholar, “Liberal Pacification and the Phenomenology of Violence,” International Studies Quarterly (2019) 63, 199–212, dml) [ableist language modifications denoted by brackets]

Phenomenology, as we are using it, is not about lived experience. It is the philosophical tradition of revealing different types of beings and things that contain meaning in our world, the structures and/or contexts in which they exist, and how these structures and contexts are meaningful. Understood in this way, violence is one of these structures and/or contexts. A phenomenological perspective does not approach violence from a particular normative position, although it does not preclude normative critique. A phenomenological approach does not treat violence as a discrete thing that one agent does to another, although it does not preclude such acts being described as violent. Instead, a phenomenological perspective adds to our intellectual and methodological toolbox by identifying violence as a condition or context in which people function. Phenomenology allows us to identify violence occurring in ways and in places that we otherwise would not be able to recognize. It does not change the meaning of violence (as harm, for example). Instead, it treats violence ontologically, enabling us to reveal more accurately the extent to which violence exists in the world.

From a phenomenological perspective, violence is often inconspicuous. Violence can function as a naturalized or internalized regime of compulsion or domination. Pacification reveals both the pervasiveness of violence and forms of violence that may otherwise remain inconspicuous. The erasing of tradition and the enforcement of particular legal codes at the expense of indigenous cultural norms is one example of an inconspicuous form of violence that involves conspicuous and inconspicous consequences (Cocks 2014). In understanding violence phenomenologically, as a structure of revealing across multiple worlds, we are better able to reveal the extent to which violence shapes our world and how we are then shaped by violence.

2022 Michigan Kritik
Cybernetics K Supplement—Wave 1—FMPS › Topshelf › Framework—Optimization DA

Optimization DA: Framework functions as an attempt to optimize our processing power in the digital age, which quantifies the self.

Theo Hug 21. Professor at the University of Innsbruck, Department of Media, Society and Communication. “Five Theses on (Dis)Comfort in the Educational Cultures of Digitality.” 2021. //GJ

Thesis 2: Operative fictions of optimizing processes of learning and education correspond with poorly reflected assumptions of mathematization and of the computability of the world

Notions of optimizing processes and methods to quantify the self and others are not inventions of the digital age. From choosing a lubricant for the first rotating fixed wheels to choosing efficient neural networks in machine-learning programs, narratives and leitmotifs of optimization have been diversified and developed. An end to these traditions is not in sight, on the contrary: Computer network technologies have made available processing capacities without which developments in structural sciences and their manifold technological applications would not have been possible.

2022 Michigan Kritik
Cybernetics K Supplement—Wave 1—FMPS › Topshelf › Framework—Epistemology Key—cybersecurity

Cybersecurity is an assemblage of knowledge and power. Their interpretation functions as cybernetic obfuscation to hide its operations.

Dyer-Witheford and Matviyenko 2019—associate professor of information and media studies at the University of Western Ontario; assistant professor of communication at Simon Fraser University (Nick and Svitlana, Cyberwar and Revolution: Digital Subterfuge in Global Capitalism) //ansel

These definitional debates are not abstract semantic disputes. As Robert Kaiser (2015) argues, since 2000, cyberwar has named an emergent “knowledge power assemblage,” mobilizing institutional powers, lavish budgets, and lucrative career paths. It has become the core of a discursive “resonance machine,” with its own “catalyzing agents,” “shimmering points” of elaboration, refinement and subtle discrimination, and “centers of calculation,” focused around the materialization of a “new policy object” (Kaiser 2015, 11–20). In 2009, after tortuous bureaucratic infighting between competing governmental departments and military agencies, the Pentagon created a Cyber Command to conduct operations in a “cyberdomain” now deemed as important as land, sea, air, and space. This is a logic being duplicated within national security states around the world. The observation that cyberwar has now become extremely handy for acquiring big funds for research and militarization (Rid 2013) is true, but, with a self-validating circularity, the cyberwar apparatuses built on this promotional discourse not only speak but also prepare and act. Public knowledge of these cyberwar acts is, however, limited and distorted; if the new cyberwar complexes are in one way new “assemblages of knowledge and power,” they are also assemblages of power, nonknowledge and antiknowledge, military factories of ignorance and obfuscation. War always involves secrets, but cyberwars are exceptionally deeply cloaked. As Michael Kenney (2015, 117) observes, “cyber-warfare is typically a covert form of statecraft. Herein lies much of [its] utility as a weapon: states can attack their adversaries without declaring war against them.” If there is one cyberwar cliché more common than “you may not be interested in cyberwar,” it is a redo of Clausewitz’s “fog of war” as “fog of cyberwar” (Valeriano and Maness 2012; Canabarro and Borne 2013; Rantapelkonen and Salminen 2013). Digital war is a veritable fog machine, because operations are usually conducted covertly and are often intended to confuse; hacks are hidden from view and, when discovered, are laden with misdirection; signals intelligence implodes into infoglut. Apparently incriminating traces of hacking tools left at the site of a digital breach may be intentional false flags and what looks like a singular exploit actually a chain of attacks by different actors “piling on” to a discovered system vulnerability. Is a hacking exploit that leaves as a signature the name of the founder of the Soviet secret service a careless, or cavalier, disclosure of national responsibility—or a blatant red herring? As of today, it can be said that all, or nearly all, obvious indicators pointing to a potential responsible party, such as time, specifics of code, politics or other motifs, and cybertactics, can be manufactured to point in a wrong direction. In investigating cyberwar, conspiracy theory is methodologically mandatory. However, not only attribution of attacks but also the distinction between attacks and accidents becomes highly problematic; “fog of war” (ignorance) and “friction of war” (mishap) intermingle. Cyberwar thus tends to “obliterating proof ” (Filiol 2011, 260), sometimes by producing too many proofs, “incessant fluctuations” of proofs, to use Claude Shannon’s phrase for noise, or, in the words of W. Ross Ashby ([1963] 1966), “variety [that] can destroy variety.”

Cybersecurity experts argue that, given sufficient time, it is indeed possible to make a reasonable determination of responsibility for cyberattacks. This process can involve analyzing technical details, such as the design of malware payload or “IP addresses, email addresses, domain names, and small pieces of text” used in the attack; comparing the modus operandi of hackers with the known profiles gathered from other cases; and assessing the likely reasons for an intrusion—but even then, verification is a matter of degree of certainty rather than a binary yes or no answer (Rid and Buchanan 2016). In this book, we often necessarily rely on such “balance of probability” interpretations, but with an awareness that cyberwar is a weaponization of information that always threatens to destroy truth. It is, as Justin Joque (2018, “Foreword”) writes, a force of “machinic deconstruction” that constantly threatens “to sweep away any belief in security.” We write also knowing that, in “a world where it is not clear who is hacking whom” (Ridgeway 2017), the attribution of cyberwar activity can itself become a tactic setting up an adversary for sanctions and retaliation. Academic interpretation, too, can be weaponized; those who stare into the abyss of cyberwar soon find it staring back at them.

2022 Michigan Kritik
Cybernetics K Supplement—Wave 1—FMPS › Topshelf › Alt—Radical Nonpreference

We must turn to the question of the dream in politics and the question of politics in dreaming. The alternative is radical nonpreference – a radical formulation of subjectivity that dwells in the gap between individualism and individualization to create new collectivites and embrace the contingency of the world.

Gray and Eloff, 22—School of Philosophy at North-West University (Chantelle and Aragorn, “Fabulation in a Time of Algorithmic Ecology: Making the Future Possible Again,” Technology, Urban Space and the Networked Community, Chapter 5, 105-133, SpringerLink, dml) //ansel recut [pharmakon=something which is both poison and cure simultaneously]

The answer to our problems does not lie in primitivism or any other return to a (mythical) better past. We are here; we need to find ways to deal with now if we are to rescue the future. The answer, equally, does not solely lie in reform. Rather, we need to ask what we want our societies to look like—and here we can look to the past for some ideas without returning to it. In short, we need to foster new forms of collectivity in the maze of individualism and individualisation. This requires radical new formulations of subjectivity that take into account our contemporary situation. Like Bartleby, it might consist of a preference not to, which is neither refusal nor acceptance: it simply “posits an impossibility” (Deleuze 1997, 71). This impossibility or nonpreference produces a tension, an ambiguity that creates a path for escaping the neurosis of the world. That is, the little fissure it creates gives way to a mapping of trajectories away from subjugated groups and towards new types of group subjects that do not merely concede to the present, either in terms of an eschatology of techno-singularitarianism or hikimomori-style withdrawal. For Guattari, this involves processes of resingularisation, where singularisation refers to a self-organizing process that at its most basic level concerns bringing together ensembles of diverse components (material/semiotic; individual/collective), that is, assemblages … that deploy their own intrinsic references (inventing relations with the outside as well), and the analysis of their effects (especially transformations) on the formation of subjectivity beyond the individuated subject and prefabricated versions of him/her. [them](Genosko 2001, 129)

Far from the homophile groups of online life, this requires, as Guattari foresaw, an injection of heterogeneity where individuals can be confronted with ideas dissimilar from their own and opportunities to talk this through rather than reactively cancelling 27 someone. It requires forms of offline life that nurture transgenerational, intergenerational, interpersonal, personal and pre-personal long-circuits in order to reach the Neganthropocene, a place of dreams. As Stiegler puts it: we must turn to the question of the dream in politics and the question of the politics of dreaming—where dreams would be the resource of any neganthropogenesis, that is, any exosomatic organogenesis such that it would preserve its future by maintaining its noetic capacity. (Stiegler 2019, 162)

2022 Michigan Kritik
Cybernetics K Supplement—Wave 1—FMPS › Topshelf › Alt—Governable Stacks

Vote negative to pursue insurgent governable stacks that reassemble the technical layers of the cybernetic episteme in ways that fractally spill up to align with radical struggles across the globe.

Schneider, 22—assistant professor of media studies at the University of Colorado Boulder (Nathan, “Governable Stacks against Digital Colonialism,” tripleC 20 (1): 19-36, 2022, dml)

The spinning wheel remains a cipher and a site of conflict, an everyday technology summoned to a contest over the meaning of democracy. Despite having political ties with Gandhi’s assassin, the Hindu nationalist prime minister Narendra Modi promotes homespun cloth and has done photo-ops operating a spinning wheel. Modi has meanwhile shuttered boards that gave artisans a voice in policy under the slogan “Minimum Government and Maximum Governance” (Vincent 2020). The technology itself does not guarantee self-governance, but it can be the symbolic base from which ever-enlarging acts of self-governance defeat an empire.

In the spirit of the technological cipher I propose the pursuit of “governable stacks”: an orientation toward ungovernable organising under digital colonialism.

2022 Michigan Kritik
Cybernetics K Supplement—Wave 1—FMPS › Topshelf › Alt—Digital Socialism

Vote negative for movements of digital socialism

Kwet 21 (Michael Kwet, Yale Univeristy – Information Society Project, “People’s Tech for People’s Power: A Guide to Digital Self-Defense & Empowerment”, Right2Know Campaign, ) // EL

Let us begin this chapter with a simple observation: no country will ever become wealthy when the critical infrastructure powering its economy is owned and controlled by foreign corporations. South Africa’s modern history arises from a European-led invasion by the Dutch East India Company, who stole the land and brutally exploited the indigenous people for profit. Critical infrastructure and resources – railroads, mines, industrial equipment, housing, and land – were dominated by white settlers at the expense of the African people. White authorities also waged psychological and conceptual warfare on the population through the imposition of colonial interpretations of religion, culture, and political economy. Bantu education sought to instill passivity and acceptance of race and class-based inequality. Today, US-based corporations are colonising digital technology. Instead of taking over the land, they are colonising critical digital infrastructure and human knowledge. They seek to own the world’s knowledge and culture (intellectual property), the material infrastructure (cloud server farms, transoceanic cables, and other hardware), the code powering computers (software), and information about people and nature (data). Converting knowledge into private property is foundational to their system of domination. When Big Tech corporations do share knowledge, it is done in ways beneficial to themselves. Google and Facebook, for example, are happy to “open source” some of their artificial intelligence software (e.g. Tensor Flow and PyTorch) because they use it to monetise Big Data surveillance.xviii Yet if their access to surveillance data were shut out by new technologies and privacy laws, they would close off much of their “open source” technology and increase the share of proprietary code in the software market. The problem we face today is digital capitalism and authoritarianism, not simply surveillance capitalism. As I previously wrote in the Mail & Guardian, the Fourth Industrial Revolution (4IR) narrative claims Big Data, intellectual property, centralised clouds, the Internet of Things, “smart” cities littered with surveillance, automation, algorithmic decision-making, Big Tech corporations, and surveillance capitalism are the way of the future. A creation of the ultra-capitalist World Economic Forum (WEF), the 4IR concept is an elite construct which serves a useful purpose at the periphery of empire by steering inquiry about tech into the WEF agenda. Like the colonial missionaries of past, they preach a new religion, the 4IR, as the saviour of society. Not surprisingly, the tools they promote are the tools of the masters: corporate ownership, intellectual property, centralised clouds, Big Data surveillance, the profit incentive, and private production for the market. This will not work for the common person. As Audrey Lorde put it, “the master’s tools will never dismantle the master’s house”. The threat of proprietary technology – and the selective sharing of knowledge by corporations – was captured by Archbishop Desmond Tutu, who stated in 2007: Freedom is an ongoing process, and not an end in itself … We are not shy to use the word freedom, and do so in contexts where its importance is not always recognised. In a digital world, there are many threads to a hard-won liberty. There are those who take our ideas and lock them up for business gain. There are those who will take the fruits of the human mind and lock them up, dishing them out to us in meted amounts for a fee that locks most of our people out. And there are laws that are reserved for business reasons and changed to rob society of its own rights ... To paraphrase Edmund Burke, who said, ‘the only thing necessary for the triumph of those who take away our freedom in the digital world is for organisations [like universities] to do nothing.’ But there are people, like our keynote speakers … who are not content to do nothing. Indeed, there is a whole movement that is rapidly gaining momentum worldwide arising out of the work of people like Free Software Foundation founder Richard Stallman, creating socially responsible businesses out of the very freedoms that we are talking about. Free Software and Open Source, Free and Open Resources for Education, new ways to create and share cultural artifacts such as music, writing, and art – all of these are changing the world for the better. Unfortunately, intellectuals who believe themselves to be "critical" of Big Tech have formulated a liberal imperialist narrative called the "techlash" that fails to address digital colonialism. These USEurocentric "critics", drawn from elite Western university and media outlets, ignore the centrality of property and the Free Software Movement. Much like the Sullivan Principles during apartheid,xix their solutions offer minor reforms that maintain US interests, such as weak privacy laws, "competitive markets" created through antitrust, and corporate ownership of the digital ecosystem. The "techlash" extends Francis Fukuyama's "end of history" to tech, where nothing fundamentally different can occur other than what we have seen in the West. If we are going to create a society that prioritises freedom and equality, we will have to develop a new framework to restructure the digital ecosystem. This requires more than the array of Free Software technologies outlined in this guide. We must also have supportive laws, critical education, and a grassroots movement to counter digital colonialism and replace it with a democratic digital commons owned and controlled directly by the people. There is no way around this. Laws like POPIA are designed to safeguard surveillance capitalism. This can be seen in its provisions that allow Big Data surveillance to flourish with mild restrictions said to “protect” your privacy. Under POPIA, exemptions include data processed for national security, such as “defense or public safety”, instances in which “the public interest in the processing outweighs, to a substantial degree, any interference with the privacy of the data subject”, and instances where the processing provides “a clear benefit to the data subject or third party that outweighs … interference with [their] privacy”. The “public interest” includes “national security”, “the prevention, detection and prosecution of offences”, “important economic and financial interests of a public body”, and “historical, statistical or research activity” (as well as the “special importance of the interest in freedom of expression”). POPIA also allows people to “consent” to Big Data surveillance through terms and conditions, defined as “any voluntary, specific and informed expression of will in terms of which permission is given for the processing of personal information.” Yet we know that nobody can read these terms and conditions, even if they wanted to. One study showed that the average person would have to spend about 76 working days per year to read the Terms and Conditions of the websites they visit. Google South Africa sent me about 20,000 words of “terms and conditions” covering the Google technologies used in South African schools. Users can either “consent” to Google’s data processing, or they can’t use its technologies at all. Forcing people to endure surveillance just to visit a website, join a social network, or use a weather app, on the basis that they “consent” is unjust. Yet POPIA does not appear to prohibit this “take it or leave it” surveillance society. Digital capitalism has a business model crisis. It concentrates and extracts wealth, cedes authoritarian control over digital experiences to transnational corporations unaccountable to the public, and subjects users to surveillance, advertising, and manipulation. If it moves to a “pay-for-ethicaltreatment” model, it will generate class inequality, especially for the poor who have no disposable income. In a commons-based system of digital socialism, knowledge is free and open for all to consume, modify, and share. Free Software, interoperability, federated services, and decentralisation tools provide the public with the means to own and control their experiences. To support the global commons, production and maintenance of digital technology and culture could be paid for by the rich through progressive taxation and heavy taxes on Big Tech corporations. This requires a Tech New Deal that transforms the digital ecosystem from a profit-seeking enterprise into a publicly funded global commons. A movement for digital socialism dovetails with efforts to build an environmentally sustainable global economy based on wealth redistribution and equality, not limitless growth. Many of the core technologies powering the digital revolution were funded by the state, including computers, the internet, and GPS. The state also supports the education of computer scientists and engineers. Research and development institutions like the CSIR could help develop decentralisation technologies like FreedomBox instead of surveillance systems like Cmore. University researchers could work on voice assistants like Almond, which does not spy on its users, as they are doing at Stanford University. With enough funds from taxes, talented developers could be awarded comfortable middle-class salaries to work on public interest technologies, instead of joining exploitative institutions like Google and Microsoft, who pay researchers a few million rand per year. As noted in previous chapters, government policy can require the use of People’s Tech in schools, universities, and the public sector; protect user privacy; and teach people about tech freedom. But none of this will occur without you. Technology corporations have concentrated enormous sums of wealth into the hands of a few, and they will not give it up without a serious fight. It doesn’t help that elected representatives are tempted to exploit corporate tech for their own surveillance and control. Nhlanhla Mabaso, a champion of Free Software, headed the Open Source Centre – since renamed the Meraka Institute – at the CSIR. (“Meraka” is Sotho for “open grazing land”.) In a research interview, Mabaso told me some of his colleagues argue the government’s Free and Open Source Software policy preference means “open source is law” in South Africa. Efforts by Mabaso and his peers once aimed to undermine the power of corporations like Microsoft from colonising the South African tech ecosystem. Decades earlier, anti-apartheid activists protested against the use of computers from tech corporations like IBM to facilitate the apartheid system. They eventually forced IBM to withdraw its business operations from South Africa. During the struggle against apartheid education, Zwelakhe Sisulu asserted: We are not prepared to accept any ‘alternative’ to Bantu Education which is imposed from above. This includes American or any other imperialist alternatives designed to safeguard their selfish interests in the country, by promoting elitist and divisive ideas and values which will ensure foreign monopoly exploitation continues. Only through democratic institutions and committees could students, parents, and teachers take control of their own education. “We are fighting for the right to self-determination in the education sphere as in all other spheres … It has become a struggle of the whole community with the involvement of all sections of the community”, Sisulu said. In the neoapartheid era, a new wave of US tech transnationals are pushing oppressive products into the country once again. A People's Tech movement to kick Big Tech out of Africa could form a critical part of the global protests against the enduring legacy of racism and colonialism. Activists across the world could unite to form a targeted boycott, divestment, and sanctions (BDS) movement centered on Big Tech corporations and their supporters in the United States. South African communities are tasked to build a digital ecosystem that the people own and control, so they are not subjects of American or any other imperialist powers. People’s Tech for People’s Power, a holistic solution based on a Free and Open Source technology commons, socialist legal solutions, people's education, subsidies for public interest technology, and a vigorous grassroots movement, is urgently needed to avert disaster and build a truly democratic and egalitarian society.

2022 Michigan Kritik
Cybernetics K Supplement—Wave 1—FMPS › Topshelf › Alt—Ecological Ethics

Vote neg for a reorientation of human agency towards a co-evolutionary assemblage with technology.

Sy Taffel 19 - Senior Lecturer in Media Studies and co-director of the Political Ecology Research Centre at Massey University, PhD at the University of Bristol. “Digital Media Ecologies.” Google Books. Oct 2019. AG

Given the current forecasts for the Anthropocene, an ecological ethics emphasizes the urgent need for modifying current practices. As Cubitt (2005: 59) astutely observes, ‘Techne is the only route through which we can now sense the world, most especially the part of the world’s conversations which are not conducted in wavelengths we can hear, see or otherwise comprehend.’ Without contemporary information-processing technologies, humans would not have sufficiently developed understandings of looming ecological crises to enact urgent calls to action. This is exemplified by the fact that when considering climatic trends, we are addressing global datasets with durations measured in decades and centuries – a temporal scale far slower and a spatial scale far larger than those readily perceptible to humans.

We can only understand climate change via technological mediations which allow us to see enduring trends within noisy, chaotic and complex global climatic systems. This technocultural assemblage includes satellites that measure tropospheric temperatures, thermal drills that can extract 3-kilometre-deep ice cores from polar regions and the storage facilities that preserves these geological artefacts, and the supercomputers that are used to simulate climatic futures. Ecological ethics, then, must not advocate abandoning mediation and technology as a means of retreating to a romanticized past but instead requires reorienting modes of production and consumption towards ecologically beneficial outcomes. Only through repurposing technics along ecological lines – creating commonwealth rather than commodities – are potential solutions to ecological crises likely to become visible; there exists no option to return to a pre-industrial state before technics supposedly altered the harmonious ‘balance of nature’, as is commonly suggested by conservationist and deep ecological discourses.

2022 Michigan Kritik
Cybernetics K Supplement—Wave 1—FMPS › Topshelf › Alt—Cloud Ethics

The alternative is cloud ethics, which chooses an episteme of opacity over cybernetic transparency.

Amoore 20 (Louise Amoore, Professor of Political Geography at Durham University, “Cloud Ethics: Algorithms and the Attributes of Ourselves and Others”, Duke University Press, 8/30/20, ) // EL

In this book I propose a different way of thinking about the ethicopolitics of algorithms. What I call a cloud ethics is concerned with the political formation of relations to oneself and to others that is taking place, increasingly, in and through algorithms. My use of the term cloud here is not confined to the redefined sovereignties and technologies of a “cloud computing era,” as understood by Benjamin Bratton and others, but refers to the apparatus through which cloud data and algorithms gather in new and emergent forms. The cloud in my cloud ethics is thus closer to that envisaged by John Durham Peters, for whom clouds are media in the sense that they are “containers of possibility that anchor our existence and make what we are doing possible.” To consider algorithms as having ethics in formation is to work with the propensities and possibilities that algorithms embody, pushing the potentials of their arrangements beyond the decisive moment of the output. A cloud ethics acknowledges that algorithms contain, within their spatial arrangements, multiple potentials for cruelties, surprises, violences, joys, distillations of racism and prejudice, injustices, probabilities, discrimination, and chance. Indeed, many of the features that some would like to excise from the algorithm—bias, assumptions, weights—are routes into opening up their politics. Algorithms come to act in the world precisely in and through the relations of selves to selves, and selves to others, as these relations are manifest in the clusters and attributes of data. To learn from relations of selves and others, the algorithm must already be replete with values, thresholds, assumptions, probability weightings, and bias. In a real sense, an algorithm must necessarily discriminate to have any traction in the world. The very essence of algorithms is that they afford greater degrees of recognition and value to some features of a scene than they do to others. In so doing, algorithms generate themselves as ethicopolitical beings in the world. If to have ethics is not merely to have a code prohibiting, for example, bias or assumptions, but to work on oneself via relations, then the ethicopolitics of algorithms involves investigations of how they learn to recognize and to act, how they extract assumptions from data relations, and how they learn what ought to be from relations with other humans and algorithms. To be clear, the cloud ethics I propose here does not belong to an episteme of accountability, transparency, and legibility, but on the contrary begins with the opacity, partiality, and illegibility of all forms of giving an account, human and algorithmic. To advance a cloud ethics is to engage the ungrounded politics of all forms of ethical relations. The significant new ethical challenges that algorithms seem to present to society actually manifest novel features of some profoundly old problems of the grounds for ethical action. As Judith Butler explains in her Spinoza lectures, the demand to give an account of oneself will always fall short, for “I cannot give an account of myself without accounting for the conditions under which I emerge.” If one assumes that the determination of an unequivocal I who acts is a necessary precondition of ethics, as Butler cautions, then this identifiable self is “dispossessed” by the condition of its emergence in relation to others. For Butler, this persistent failure to give a clear-sighted account does not mark the limit point of ethics. On the contrary, the opaque and unknowable nature of making all kinds of acting subjects is the condition of possibility of having an ethicopolitical life. In short, and in contrast to the equation of ethics with transparency and disclosure, ethical responsibility is sustained by conditions of partiality and opacity. My notion of a cloud ethics extends the opacity of the human subject, envisaging a plurality of venues for ethical responsibility in which all selves—human and algorithmic—proceed from their illegibility. The apparent opacity and illegibility of the algorithm should not pose an entirely new problem for human ethics, for the difficulty of locating clear-sighted action was already present. The I who forms the ethical relation was always in question and is now, with algorithms, in question in new ways. Though the mathematical propositions of algorithms cannot be made fully legible, or rendered accountable, they can be called to give accounts of the conditions of their emergence. These conditions include some relations that are identifiably between humans and algorithms—such as the selection and labeling of training data, the setting of target outputs, or the editing of code “in the wild,” for example—but others still are relations of algorithms to another algorithm, such as a classifier supplying the training data from which a neural network will learn. In all such instances of iterative learning, the significant point is that the conditions of an algorithm’s emergence—a composite of human-algorithm relations—are venues for ethicopolitics. In a discussion on the impossibility of the transparent algorithm, the brilliant and generous scholar of black studies and machine learning Ramon Amaro once said, “Well what would it be if we even could open it? It’s just math.” Of course, he intended the comment as a provocation, but mathematics is never only “just math,” as Amaro’s work vividly shows. To reflect on the conditions of an algorithm’s emergence is also to consider how, as mathematical knowledge forms, algorithms have achieved the status of objective certainty and definiteness in an uncertain world. Ludwig Wittgenstein observed mathematical propositions to be “given the stamp of incontestability,” a mark of the “incontrovertible” and an “exemption from doubt” that other propositions, such as “I am called,” are not afforded. For Wittgenstein, mathematics as practice—like all other language games—is concerned with particular uses of propositions, where “what a proposition is, is in one sense determined by the rules of sentence formation, and in another sense by the use of the sign in the language game.” His concern is that the mathematical proposition has achieved a particular status of certainty in an otherwise uncertain world, so that it becomes “a hinge on which your dispute can turn.” For Wittgenstein, the mathematical proposition should be regarded as no less doubtful or uncertain than the “empirical propositions” otherwise made about the world. Indeed, Wittgenstein’s point is to address mathematical propositions as empirical actions that are “in no way different from the actions of the rest of our lives, and are in the same degree liable to forgetfulness, oversight and illusion.” Following Wittgenstein, the use of mathematical propositions is profoundly social and, in my reading, ethicopolitical. An algorithm is formulated through a series of truth claims about its match to the world, and yet, in its use in the world it is as prone to forgetfulness, oversight, misrecognition, and illusion as any other language game. Algorithms such as those used to detect latent social unrest in the city may appear in the world as Wittgenstein’s “hinge on which your protest can turn” in the most direct sense that the hinge delimits and circumscribes the arc of the politics of protest. But the algorithm as hinge does not merely mark the limit point of resistance; rather, it presents something as a singular optimal output, when it is actually generated through multiple and contingent relations. My cloud ethics considers the algorithmic hinge to be akin to Karen Barad’s scientific apparatus, which decides what matters in the world, what or who can be recognized, what can be protested, and which claims can be brought. Understood in this way, the algorithm is not the hinge as an incontrovertible axis, exempted from doubt, on which all social, political, and economic life turns. “The hinge point,” as Foucault differently identifies, can also be the point of “ethical concerns and political struggle,” as well as the point of “critical thought against abusive techniques of government.”

2022 Michigan Kritik
Cybernetics K Supplement—Wave 1—FMPS › Topshelf › Impact—Meltdowns

Technospheric breakdown causes global nuclear meltdowns—extinction.

Nadesan ’14 [Majia; September 13; professor of communication at ASU, their interdisciplinary research examines the ethical implications of societal governing logics and risk-management strategies; “The Nuclear Energy Paradigm Collides with Earth Changes and Technospheric Breakdown,” The Millenium Report, themillenniumreport.com/2014/09/will-fukushima-become-an-extinction-level-event]

As Technospheric Breakdown Accelerates, Nuclear Power Generation Mishaps will Increase and Intensify

There is really no way around this eventuality. As all the nuclear power plants age, they will succumb to the micro-stresses which inevitably occur in such an ever-deteriorating environment. Most people are unaware of the true depth and breadth of technospheric breakdown since it is a concept rarely taken up by academia or the media. The following excerpts provide a wider perspective of this unavoidable byproduct of the Industrial Revolution.