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2022 Michigan Kritik
Answers to Security K › Impact Turns › 2AC---Russian Cybersecurity Threat

Russia cybersecurity threat is real---we’re the only team that’s read statistics---if we prove it is, it proves we’re not securitization

Frank Konkel 22, Frank is Nextgov’s executive editor & has a degree from Michigan State University, “Microsoft: Russia Stepping Up Hacking, Cyber Penetration Efforts on 42 Ukraine Allies,” Nextgov, 06/23/2022

Four months into its war on Ukraine, Russia is carrying out cyber operations on much more than its neighbor, according to a report released by Microsoft Thursday.

In the report, Microsoft said it detected Russian network intrusion efforts in 128 organizations in 42 countries outside Ukraine, with the majority of its “strategic espionage” focused on governments, think tanks, aid groups and businesses. Russia has most often targeted the U.S. and other NATO countries, including Poland, where military logistics and humanitarian assistance is being coordinated.

2022 Michigan Kritik
Answers to Security K › Link Answers › 2AC---AT: Space

Space threats are real and should be considered security threats based on the many existential possibilities --- satellites solve ag, fisheries, and environmental damage --- military protection is key

Michael Sheehan 15, Professor of International Relations at Swansea University who worked for the U.S. State Department, 2015, “Defining State Security”, Handbook of Space Security: Policies, Applications, and Programs, p. 7-21 /lg

Security has been defined as “the assurance people have that they will continue to enjoy those things that are most important to their survival and well-being” (Soroos , p. 236). For something to be defined as a “security” issue, there needs to be a sense in which it poses a real threat to human well-being or survival. If a “security” issue requires that there is such an “existential” threat, can the environmental issues in Earth orbit be seen as security issues? Is interference with the optimum efficiency of a frequency, or damage to an inanimate piece of metal, an “existential threat” in any meaningful sense?

In fact such issues can be seen as security questions and in a very real way. Satellites are used for an enormous range of purposes, and many of them have the potential to produce large-scale loss of life if the satellite capability is lost. A 2011 report by the British Royal Academy of Engineering noted that global navigation systems alone are crucial for the following functions for UK users: “transport, agriculture, fisheries, law enforcement, highways management, services for vulnerable people, energy production and management, surveying, dredging, health services, financial services, information services, cartography, safety monitoring, scientific and environmental studies, search and rescue, telecommunications, tracking vehicles and valuable or hazardous cargoes and quantum cryptography” (Royal Academy of Engineering , p. 13).

2022 Michigan Kritik
Answers to Security K › Link Answers › 2AC---AT: Failed States

No link---failed states discourse doesn’t cause Western interventions or violence

Sebastiaan Debrouwere 11, “Are Failing and Failed States a Post-Cold War Phenomenon”, E-International Relations, -07/16/2011,

As early as 1651, political theorists, such as Hobbes, warned that in societies where government fails and no laws exist, there would be “a coercive Power to tye [sic] their hands from rapine, and revenge” that would doom their citizens to “solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short” lives marked by “continual fear, and danger of violent death” (Hobbes, 2003 [1651], p. 89). Is the phenomenon of the failed state, in vogue with security analysts and political scientists alike since the aftermath of the Iraqi invasion, an expression of the Risorgimento of Hobbesian fears? Or, are failed states, to which academic literature includes examples as varied as Afghanistan, DR Congo, Myanmar, and Somalia (François & Sud, 2006), really a unique new challenge for the post-bipolar era? Since the end of the Cold War, debates over international order and threats to security have changed in nature, and so has their lexicon. Where hazards were once identified as coming from “tyrannical rogue states”, post-1989 challenges are seen as originating in various “arcs of instability” composed of “weak or collapsing states” (Ignatie , 2002, p. 114; Ayson, 2007). The 21st Century’s benighted states are “un-governed, under-governed or mis-governed” (Lamb, p. 15) dysfunctional societies, where global threats such as terrorist breeding grounds and transnational crime are present. The real question is, however, to what extent is the concept of failed and failing states, and their underlying assumptions and implications, the product of the politics of language and “a political agenda of security-concerned Western powers” (Buzan, Waever, & de Wilde, 1998, p. 32). By first defining the concept of failed states, then scrutinizing its political implications and the extent to which the idea is politicized, and finally considering its relevance in the contemporary world, this essay will argue that the discrepancy between these ideas and their meaning for the multipolar world is minimal, and they do not merely represent a taxonomical-linguistic issue. Instead, this terminology is seen as a logical and valid product of a changed world, a world where the Westphalian model of international politics, such as the interactions between equally sovereign states, presents an unrealistic conception of insecurity.

Defining Failed States

2022 Michigan Kritik
Answers to Security K › Link Answers › 2AC---AT: Hegemony

Security doesn’t explain how hegemons act- no root cause

Kaygusuz no date- (Özlem Kaygusuz- assistant professor at Mersin University, “SECURITIZATION IN THE CONTEXT OF GLOBAL HEGEMONY: US-TURKISH RELATIONS IN PERSPECTIVE” Mersin University-Department of International Relations, https://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.408.7396&rep=rep1&type=pdf)//mishelle

There is one important point, however that should be underlined here. The emphasis on the cognitive element as a common ground or a point of connection between hegemony as the structure and securitization as the medium, should not mean that the states’ behaviors are determined by structure of ideas as they are by material structure of the neorealist hegemony that is by coercive force (McSweeney, 1999: 132-33). The internalization of ideas, values, and the security truths by the actors is not a mechanistic process of acceptance. The actors participate into the construction and consolidation of security truths through their security practices, acts and decisions in the international field. In other words, the subordinated units under hegemony are not only consumers but also producers of securitization. In this study, the enrichment of the idea of securitization as a medium in the mutual constitution of hegemonic structure and agents is based particularly on Bill McSweeney’s study on security and identity which is developed on the basis of Giddens’s Structuration Theory. The Structuration Theory can be utilized also to analyze the social relations and the constitution of identities at the international level. According to the theory any social order, including the international order cannot be considered as an independent phenomenon, external to acting units within it. The structure and the agent are ontologically interdependent (McSweeney: 138-145). In such a framework, security identity at the state level cannot be viewed as a dependent variable with respect to hegemonic security structure and accordingly, securitization is not a one way process. Here, as McSweeney proposed, the concept of political spillover can be utilized to explain the harmonization of security interests produced intersubjectively in the international field (McSweeney, 1999: 170-171) Concerning the subject of this study, that is to establish a connection between securitization and functioning of hegemony, again an understanding of spillover can be used. As in the integration to a security community, the adherence to a hegemonic order also necessitates the shifting of loyalties, expectations and political activities toward a new security truth and the secondary states learn to identify their interests with the hegemon. Here, structure is used by actors to produce meanings of domestic conduct and in that moment, it is drawn into the temporal, contextual dimension of action, thus to be reinforced and modified by usage and repetition. In a sense, actors subject themselves to the constraints of behaving within the confines of habit. Actors learn and relearn their security interest in interaction with the sub-state level actors, with other states but mainly with and with the hegemon. Such a perspective towards securitization will provide us a richer conception of security and the functioning of hegemony. Giddens’s Structuration Theory puts forward that far from being passive receptors and reproducers of an assumed consensus about meaning and norms, actors draw strategically upon such consensus to establish an agreement or to repair a relationship, in short they manage the rules that make the game interaction possible. In the same way, under hegemony, the patterns of meaning about what is to be secured or the shared knowledge of what is the threat are reproduced through typified behaviors of state actors that simultaneously sustaining it.

2022 Michigan Kritik
Answers to Security K › Link Answers › 2AC---AT: Hegemony

Securitization of hegemony necessary for understanding and continuing normal politics

Broecker and Westermeier, 19 --- (Hannah Broecker- Masterstudium in International Security Studies, Warwick University, UK (2011-2012). Carola Westermeier- Visiting Professor of Political Economy @goetheuni | Project Financial Infrastructures & Geoeconomic Security, "(PDF) Securitization as Hegemony: Beyond State and International System",1-19, ResearchGate, https://www.researchgate.net/publication/330783385_Securitization_as_Hegemony_Beyond_State_and_International_System)//mishelle

Hegemony theory can go some way in this respect as it is able to consider in more detail the dynamics and structures that lead to power within discourse. The power to securitize then lies within rules of the social – all of which are, essentially, discursively constituted. It is the structure of discourses that determines which subject-positions may carry legitimacy as well as which institutionalised positions carry weight and meaning under which circumstances. The power to securitise then essentially lies on the level of differences within discourse, while the power of securitization is the constitution of an antagonist divide. Both levels, of course, cannot be analysed independently of each other. Hegemony theory offers a perspective to combine the analysis of these two levels. It allows us to move beyond the speaker-audience dichotomy, and offers a view on the processual formation of identities through the drawing of antagonist lines. Its explanatory power hence extends to both the question of the boundaries of the discursive formation and simultaneously allows to account for change in this formation. The hegemony approach articulates an understanding of politics as the conflictual negotiation of that which represents the common space. 64 In this understanding, securitization is not the end of normal politics but part of it.

2022 Michigan Kritik
Answers to Security K › Link Answers › 2AC---AT: AI Securitization (Inevitable)

The link is non unique---securitization is a global trend and an ongoing process---no reason why the AFF is uniquely bad OR triggers the impact

Jinghan Zeng 21, Jinghan Zeng is a professor of China and International Studies, “Securitization of Artificial Intelligence in China,” The Chinese Journal of International Politics, 08/14/2021,

The article also explores how the Chinese AI approach and its security logic are embedded in China’s historical, geopolitical, and domestic contexts. China’s desire for AI sits in the wider context of the country’s pursuit of modern technologies. China’s high anxiety over technology competition arises from the historical discourse that blames China’s “century of humiliation” on its past under-performances in global technology competition. In this regard, the historical experience of “humiliation”—not just in being militarily invaded, but also failing to keep pace with technical development, justifies the need for contemporary mobilization, thus to avoid history repeating itself. Geopolitically speaking, China’s national approach towards AI and moves to make it a security matter are fuelled by ever more competitive United States– China relations. Each side’s perception of the other’s AI advancement as a threat accelerates the securitization process. In the domestic arena, where the primary concern is the regime security of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), the practical use of AI and its relevant discourses are geared to securing authoritarian rule. In this regard, China’s bold AI experiments practice a unique digital technocracy, making its AI approach quite distinct from that in Western societies.

Currently, this securitization is an ongoing process. Although the extent of its impact on targeted audiences, namely, local governments, market actors, intellectuals, and the general public, remains unclear, all nevertheless enthusiastically echo the central government’s AI campaign. In this regard, such securitization appears to convince domestic actors. However, it also generates unintended consequences. They are: (i) creation of a nationalistic environment that makes China less attractive to global AI labor and capital; (ii) impaired industrial efficiency by virtue of focusing on self-reliance; (iii) obstruction of China’s global AI governance leadership; (iv) reinforced technological rivalry due to disregard for potential global AI cooperation; and (v) constraints on the global access of Chinese AI companies. All could undermine China’s key objectives of fostering a booming AI economy and becoming a global AI leader.

2022 Michigan Kritik
Security K – BEJJ 2022 › Alt › 2NC---Rethink Security

Vote negative to rethink security

Burke et al 2014 - Associate Prof and Reader in International and Political Studies at UNSW Australia; Anthony, Katrina Lee-Koo, and Matt McDonald, Ethics and Global Security, Routledge, p. 19-21

A final point is necessary on the relationship between security and ethics as we conceive it, by way of introduction to this book. To develop a cosmopolitan ethics of security is not simply a case of applying "cosmopolitanism" to a particular issue area in global politics (security), but rather, rethinking how we understand and practice security. What limits existing accounts of the relationship between ethics and security is the tendency to ignore or downplay the particular politic of security: its centrality to the political legitimacy of the key actors in global politics; its capacity to define the core values of communities, and the manner in which they might be protected or advanced; its capacity to mobilise particular political responses or the actors undertaking them. -Fins is particularly applicable to discourses of "human security'', for example, and to some extent, critical engagement with security grounded in concerns with emancipation (Booth 2007). It is for these reasons that security is often seen to belong to the realm of "high politics": the most important objective of states, wherein the naming and relationship of "security" and "threat" designates political priority and can trigger extraordinary (and frequently illiberal and antidemocratic) responses, such as the violation of human rights or international law. This political function of security makes an analysis of the ethics of security more urgent, in part because of what is at stake in debates about security (definitions of community and values, and responsibilities to the self and others, for example). But this politics of security also complicates the simple application of cosmopolitan thought. In our view, what is needed is sustained engagement with the "politics of security" that argues for moral progress, while taking seriously the dangers of securitization and the apparent constraints placed upon the articulation of radical security alternatives. When taking account of the politics of security here, we particularly focus on the 'function of representations or discourses of security in defining group identity, enabling particular policy or legitimating particular actors as security providers' (Browning and McDonald 2013). Engagement with the politics of security in this way has tended to come from theorists ofs ecurity in the post-structural tradition. For such thinkers, representations of security define political community or integrate individuals into an abstract notion of political community or national values (Burke 2008a; Campbell 1998a; Weldes 1999). Security, in this sense, can become a form of governmentality that shapes and moulds individuals for political ends. David Campbell's (1992, 1998a) analysis of the function of Cold War discourses of the communist threat in the United States is perhaps the most obvious case here. For Campbell, national security discourses served to define American identity in a narrow and highly, politicised way. In the process of constructing external threats to which the state ( in this instance) positions itself as the actor capable of providing security, those with power can exclude dissenting voices and political alternatives, and shut down needed debates about policy. For the so-called Copenhagen (or "securitization") School, security can be understood as a social construction, brought into being through "speech acts" that define particular dynamics, actors or things as existential threats. In the process, these issues are elevated above the realm of "normal- politics and into the high politics arena of security, where they are dealt with through urgency and secrecy. While its proponents do not deny the possibility that such developments may be progressive, ultimately their preference is for desecuritization: the removal of issues from the security agenda. This is most frequently based on the claim that security has an illiberal logic, limiting the possibility for dialogue and locating responsibility for providing security to those with power. But such a sedimented view of the logic of security can also apply to its meaning. For Ole Wxver (1995), at the heart of the concept of security 'we still find something to do with defence and the state' ( see also Berki 1986; Neocleous 2008). These alternative conceptions of security will be examined in more detail in the Chapter 1. They suggest something distinct about the study of security that makes it qualitatively different from other issue areas or "promises" of government. In this, we would agree, and reaffirm the need to take seriously the politics of security. But if these critics have most explicitly engaged with the politics of security and its dangers, their proposed response to the dangers of securitization—resisting or escaping security and its logics is problematic (Dillon and Reid 2009; Dillon 1996; W;,ever 1995). For these scholars, security is something that should be resisted, escaped or challenged. We think such critics go too far. They are right to identify the dangers of an unthinking embrace of security as a site of progress, and right too in drawing attention to the ways in which the promise of security for some can all too easily be defined on the basis of the continued suffering and marginalization of others, both within a particular political community and beyond. Yet, in acknowledging the pathologies of a dominant security discourse, and in failing to articulate a progressive alternative, they mistake this discourse for the timeless essence of what security means and does, paradoxically reinforcing its centrality in international relations. In rejecting the possibility that a range of actors can and do enact progressive notions of security, they deprive marginal actors and communities of a site of contestation and change. This pessimism has been contested in a range of " positive. " critical accounts of security (Booth 2007; Burke 2013a; Floyd 2011; Nunes 2012; Hoogensen-Gjory 2012; McDonald 2014; Roe 2012). What is needed, then, is an approach that is at once attuned to the dangers of embracing security—given its history of contributing to exclusionary practices and the status quo—while refusing to give up on defining a cosmopolitan conception of security oriented towards an integrated global society, and the rights and needs of the least powerful and most vulnerable. In a related way, we are concerned to see global security as a major priority that can be addressed as a part of the normal (not exceptional) practice of government and civil society action that are democratically and internationally accountable. In part, this is because exceptionalist practices have tended to reinforce nationalism and alienation, privilege the security of the few and undermine it for the many, and gravely damage global cooperation and consciousness. When international organisations become involved in global security governance, it is imperative that their practices and objectives either reflect the global interests and international norms painstakingly developed over decades, or seek to improve them in the cause of a just global security order that supports human dignity and flourishing.

2022 Michigan Kritik
Security K – BEJJ 2022 › Alt › 2NC---Reread World Minus NATO

We need to reread the world outside of NATO---it solves best

Giovanni Ercolani 11, “Keeping Security and Peace: Behind the Strategicalization of NATO’s “Critical Security Discourse””, Security Strategies Journal, Vol 7, Issue 14, Dec 2011, p76-80

Conclusion: We Have to Reinvent Ourselves I would like to conclude this paper by stating that the human species is living in a particular moment in which globalisation has made the world smaller and where not everybody is a NATO model reader. NATO readers should need to reinvent themselves and face the world outside their GPNF, and this is a discourse close to the concept of “emancipation” developed by Ken Booth.

“As discourse of politics, emancipation seeks the securing of people from those oppressions that stop them carrying out what they would freely choose to do, compatible with the freedom of others. It provides a three-fold framework for politics: a philosophical anchorage for knowledge, a theory of progress for society, and a practice of resistance against oppression. Emancipation is the philosophy, theory, and politics of inventing humanity” (Booth, 2007, p. 112).

2022 Michigan Kritik
Security K – BEJJ 2022 › Alt › 2NC---Transform Discourse

Vote neg to reject China securitization in favor of transforming our discourse and knowledge production

Rogelja and Tsimonis 2020 (Igor Rogelja, Fellow at European University Institute, and Konstantinos Tsimonis, Lecturer at Lau China Institute “Narrating the China Threat: Securitising Chinese Economic Presence in Europe”, ) //sethlee

The structure is thus complete. In this securitising narrative, China’s actions in Europe are wholly political, designed to sow dissent and discord and aided by a number of collaborators and sleeper agents. Yet as we have argued, the securitising discourse rests on rhetorical devices, de-contextualised cases, and a callous disregard for alternative, more convincing and falsifiable explanations which do not take CCP propaganda at face value. The resulting image of Chinese companies, associations, and individuals as the long arms of the Chinese state is a distortion, and one can easily identify many areas of overlap with the original version of the 1990s China Threat scenario in the USA.

What is missing in these reports is, first of all, a case-by-case examination of the deals, the agency and the degree of involvement of different actors, the behaviour of Chinese companies within existing regulatory frameworks, and a contextualisation through comparison with companies from other third countries. This would include fine-grain academic research on Chinese-financed projects, analysing their actual impact, and assessing their individual and collective implications without recourse to disparaging comparisons to so-called ‘banana republics’. An analytical approach that gives precedence to facts over perceptions would also contribute to a calmer assessment of the broader issues of EU–China trade reciprocity and market access which need to be resolved. In this regard, the ‘China Threat’ frame advocated by many think tanks, journalists, and politicians risks transforming these issues into a zero-sum game, thereby reducing the political space for negotiation and compromise.

2022 Michigan Kritik
Security K – BEJJ 2022 › Alt › 2NC---Cosmopolitanism

The alternative is to embrace a cosmopolitan ethic

Burke 2015 (Anthony Burke, Professor of Politics and International Relations at the University of New South Wales, “Security cosmopolitanism: the next phase”, ) //sethlee

Hence, I disagree with Robinson that we can jettison moral principles or rules entirely in favour of ‘practices of responsibility that emerge in the thick context of sustained social interactions among moral subjects’ or, differently, in favour of what Arendt termed ‘thinking without a banister’, relying on ‘the silent dialogue between me and myself which, since Socrates and Plato, we usually call thinking’ (Arendt 2003, 45). To be sure, there is great value in cultivating practices of social and internal dialogue that resist the reduction of ethics to unthinking habits and procedures, or undemocratic structures of institutional command. However, such practices of responsibility need to be embedded in a deeper level of guidance and commitment, so that we know what ends we should seek, whose voices and interests matter, and what kind of world we ought to try to collectively create on the basis of what we take to exist there. Cosmopolitan calls to move beyond the nation-state, and posthuman calls to push beyond anthropocentrism, are precisely efforts to reshape that fundamental matrix for ethics and politics by expanding our understanding of what exists and matters. In the era of Fox News, Islamic, Christian, and market fundamentalism, anti-scientism, climate denial, and right-wing populism, we cannot rely on the iterative wisdom of social interaction by itself, because there are already background discourses working furiously to instantiate a crippled and divisive vision of common ends that are – quite literally – working to destroy our planet. In the space of international relations, cosmopolitan and posthuman perspectives are of enormous value because they are a metaphysical challenge to existing, architectonic visions of realist-cumliberal global order (Burke 2013b). Such visions of order already prescribe a moral and ethical system that has sunk deep roots in our social and political worlds. It seems selfdefeating to oppose the articulation of alternative visions because of an automatic (and historically warranted) poststructuralist suspicion of universalism. Vulnerable communities and ecologies need the protection of a just and responsive global order, yet many of my critics disdain even thinking on the plane of that order. In this light, cosmopolitanism and the categorical imperative of security have a crucial function that many of the commentaries fail to recognise. By universalising the right to security, by emphasising the determining demand of equality between all humans and the planetary ecology (indeed the moral priority of the ecologies in which humans are existentially embedded), the theory insists that it is no longer permissible to prioritise one state or group’s security over another, or humanity over nature. It is no longer permissible to license structures and responses that undermine fundamental rights or damage the security of others, including non-human others, in defense of the imagined self. The self is dispersed into the world, into the past and future, and our ethics must honour that. The ethics of security cosmopolitanism in fact encodes contestability and context, while setting up crucial boundaries and principles of balance. Principle 1 requires an ongoing and complex dialogue within and between governments, communities, groups, scientists, and policymakers over how to create systems that will preserve the planetary ecology and ‘protect the vital core of human lives in ways that enhance human fulfilment’ across multiple spheres of activity and risk (Burke 2013a, 21; quotations from CHS 2003). Groups may perceive ‘survival, livelihood and dignity’ in different ways; their voices must be heard and honoured, but it is when these differences generate threats to others or a clash over security needs, that dialogue, compromise, and active forms of ameliorative politics must come into play. This includes the discursive dimension: groups must be willing to redefine their understanding of security to take account of the security needs of others and the biosphere. Principles 2 and 3 similarly require dialogue and deliberation, but also science and expertise, because of the challenge of mapping potential futures, the technical complexity of many domains, and the profundity of the responsibility that these principles enact. As earth systems ecology and the nuclear space highlight, there is a challenging need to combine predictive scientific models, probabilistic reasoning, the precautionary principle, and public dialogue to consider potential futures and their associated responsibilities in the now. I regard these future-oriented principles to be the most significant part of the entire theory. Climate scientists and ecologists implicitly grasp their import: as the group that warned the world to restrict global warming to less than 1°C concluded, ‘continuation of high fossil fuel emissions, given current knowledge of the consequences, would be an act of extraordinary witting intergenerational injustice’ (Hansen et al. 2013, 1).

2022 Michigan Kritik
Security K – BEJJ 2022 › AT — Realism › 2NC — AT: Rational Choice Theory

Collapses in on itself.

Tuomas Forsberg 21, Professor of International Politics at the University of Tampere and Deputy Director of the Centre of Excellence on Choices of Russian Modernization at the Aleksanteri Institute of the University of Helsinki; Christer Pursiainen is Professor of Societal Safety and Environment at the Department of Engineering and Safety, Faculty of Science and Technology, Arctic University of Norway, 2021, “The Psychology of Foreign Policy,” Palgrave Studies in Political Psychology, [ML]

The key problem with thin rational choice theory is that it cannot be directly tested. The very meaning of rationality is too broad, and open to post hoc formulations. If the idea of utility is subjective, any action can be explained rationally. Self-interest understood as utility may mean whatever one wishes, including altruism or self-destruction. However, the more open the concept of utility is rendered, the less useful it becomes. When preferences are deduced from the action, they are tautological as explanations and rational choice loses its celebrated predictive power. If rational choice theory explains everything, it explains nothing (Nicholson, 1996; Smelser, 1992, p. 403), in which case it is of little help in explaining human choices. Some IR rational choice theorists think that rational choice is only a partial theory insomuch as it explains states’ behavior when they are behaving rationally (Glaser, 2010, p. 27), but this reasoning becomes circular. The logic is reminiscent of Hans Morgenthau’s (1955) view of political realism concerning the life sphere of a ‘political man’, but not that of a ‘moral’ or ‘religious man’. Further, rational choice theory’s popularity is not necessarily based on rational reasons. Its theorists have not been open to criticism and have been reluctant to consider alternatives to their theory. For example, Donald Green and Ian Shapiro (1994, pp. 6–7) have argued that a large number of rational choice propositions have not been tested empirically. They contend that empirical research applying rational choice has been theory-driven rather than problem-driven, and they suspect that rational choice hypotheses are often formulated in ways that are inherently resistant to genuine empirical testing. Even if they have been tested, they have not been compared with other possible explanations. Hence, proponents of rational choice theory have not followed their own doctrine in weighing the available alternatives and choosing the best among them. In order to be more than a formal theory of modeling, rational choice needs to be modified to a middle-range theory. In this way, it can be part of a larger conceptual toolbox upon which a social theorist can draw when devising tractable theoretical explanations of social phenomena (Rutar, 2020a, 2020b). Yet in order to be a middle-range theory, providing testable hypotheses to begin with, it has to assume more than the idea of utility maximization in the abstract (Wolbring, 2020). In security studies, scholars such as Stephen Walt (1999, p. 8) have seen little value in the increasing volume of very technical research based on rational choice. In his view, “while the formal techniques have facilitated the construction of precise and deductively sound arguments, the problem is that rational choice theorists have generated comparatively few new hypotheses and have for the most part not been tested in a careful and systematic way.” An interesting question arises as to when states rely on a rational choice type of decision-making in practice. A cost–benefit calculus and a probability assessment make sense when the alternatives are numerical. This is the case in trade policy and economic bargaining where the alternatives are known at least with some certainty and can be compared. If there is considerable uncertainty about the expected consequences, a decisionmaking calculus becomes more abstract and various cognitive factors start to play a more significant role. Many rational choice theorists have assumed that the theory is universal; any individual would behave similarly in a similar situation. Positing that this is not literally true—as in reality the adoption of a rational choice type of decision-making depends on the cognitive styles of individuals, or the organizational culture—but an abstraction, rational choice theorists do not see that sensible scope conditions were available. However, Brian Rathbun, Joshua Kertzer and Mark Paradis (2017) have argued that there are individual differences that are traceable to psychological microfoundations, at least on a sliding scale: rationalist foreign policymakers are ego-centric and possess high epistemic motivation. The instrumentally rational archetype, homo diplomaticus, is reflective, engaging and active. In Rathbun’s (2019) view, an instrumentally rational leader relies on an objective analysis of the situation, including taking how the adversary interprets one’s own actions seriously, and conducts careful deliberation before making decisions. Although such leaders do not necessarily have to be realists, a policy of Realpolitik is not possible without such rationality. Rathbun believes that very few state leaders or advisors actually follow such a model of instrumental rationality with any consistency

2022 Michigan Kritik
Security K – BEJJ 2022 › AT — Realism › 2NC — AT: All IR theories

Every IR grand theory lacks explanatory power — insufficient structural factors.

Tuomas Forsberg 21, Professor of International Politics at the University of Tampere and Deputy Director of the Centre of Excellence on Choices of Russian Modernization at the Aleksanteri Institute of the University of Helsinki; Christer Pursiainen is Professor of Societal Safety and Environment at the Department of Engineering and Safety, Faculty of Science and Technology, Arctic University of Norway, 2021, “The Psychology of Foreign Policy,” Palgrave Studies in Political Psychology, [ML]

We hold that while power relations, societal and cultural norms and identities, or domestic systems and politics, cannot be overlooked as structural conditions or causal factors, in the case of most important foreign policy decisions, this will not suffice. Such structural factors or variables provide the necessary but not sufficient conditions for something to happen. Left alone, as structures without agency, they are nothing more than a frame for various non-predictable actions, some of which may blow back at these structures and modify them. Indeed, a good test case for the predictive and explanatory power of IR grand theories is the aforementioned Russian behavior in respect of the Crimean crisis in 2014. In a poll conducted among 905 American researchers about a week before Russia invaded Crimea (only) 14% of those interviewed responded affirmatively to a question on whether Russia would interfere militarily in Ukrainian affairs. No major differences between the schools—such as realist, constructivist, or liberal—could be detected, although area studies (in-depth knowledge of Russia and the post-Soviet area) performed somewhat better (Maliniak et al., 2014; Voeten, 2014). The striking fact remains that a couple of days prior to the invasion, all IR grand theories failed to anticipate Russia’s behavior on the basis of their respective and rather stable structurally oriented explanatory models, but their advocates still rushed to provide their expected singlefactor explanations of the case right after it materialized (McFaul et al., 2014). This reminds us that concepts such as power, identity, regime type or domestic political determinants are so vague that one can always use them to retrospectively explain an event that was regarded as unlikely beforehand on the basis of the self-same concepts (Forsberg & Pursiainen, 2017). The structural factors, or the dynamics of the agent-structure relationship, are hence not sufficient to fully explain or understand a foreign policy decision, and we may need to consider the psychological factors involved in such a situation. Without understanding the psychological dimension of the main decision-maker(s), namely the notion that beliefs, cognitive biases, personality, and interpersonal relations may play a role, we are not really able to explain some aspects of any decisions. This is not a revolutionary conclusion, but suffices to raise the question of when and how psychology matters. While psychology is always present in human decision-making, some decisions are rather clear-cut from the explicitly pronounced psychological perspective and others more complex. In some cases, psychological factors matter more than in others. We can regard it as an empirical issue when it comes to how much they matter in comparison with a particular baseline. It is one thing to argue that there are psychological mechanisms involved in decision-making and we need to study them, but quite another to say that they are the most important or decisive factors. Peter Hedström and Petri Ylikoski (2010, p. 60) argue that “only those aspects of cognition that are relevant for the explanatory task at hand should be included in the explanation, and the explanatory task thus determines how rich the psychological assumptions must be.” Although psychological mechanisms can only provide partial explanations, they can however sometimes make a crucial difference. Knowledge of rare or weak mechanisms still increases our understanding. When conducting research, we may gain more by revealing new or surprising explanatory mechanisms than proving that the most obvious explanation for an event or a pattern of behavior has something to do with it.

2022 Michigan Kritik
Security K – BEJJ 2022 › AT — Realism › 2NC — AT: Realism — T/L

Offensive realism is empirically disproven — WW2 transition from Britain to the US.

Jeremy Garlick 16, Director of the J. Masaryk Centre of International Studies and Associate Professor of International Relations and China Studies at Prague University of Economics and Business, 2016, “Not So Simple: Complexity Theory and the rise of China,” SAGE Publications, DOI: 10.1177/0009445516661884 [ML]

John Mearsheimer’s offensive realism, derived from the same structural principles as Waltz’s ‘defensive’ realism, states unequivocally that a rising power will always challenge a hegemon militarily, an outcome he designates ‘the tragedy of great power politics’ (Mearsheimer 2001). Mearsheimer, thus, consistently and confidently predicts that a rising China will inevitably clash with the USA (Mearsheimer 2006, 2010). Mearsheimer’s hard-and-fast prediction of war between USA and its challenger China gives offensive realism a clear edge over neorealism and constructivism in terms of theoretical falsifiability. Eventually, such a war will either occur or it will not. If global leadership passes from USA to China with or without military confrontation at some point in the 21st century, then Mearsheimer will be proved right or wrong: it is simply a matter of waiting to see. However, Buzan and Cox (2013) point out that there is already one historical case of peaceful power handover that casts doubt upon Mearsheimer’s hypothesis: the transition without military confrontation from British to USA world hegemony in the aftermath of the Second World War. This, they suggest, invalidates Mearsheimer’s assertion of the inevitability of a US–China war, and thus also upon offensive realism’s main tenet. Even if historically the majority of rising powers have challenged hegemons militarily, one exception is sufficient to negate the theory’s predictive power, and to suggest that a peaceful power transition is possible. Mearsheimer also does not expound upon non-militaristic aspects of China’s rise (such as economics and soft power), but focuses exclusively on security issues (see Mearsheimer 2010). So, like neorealism and constructivism, offensive realism emphasises one aspect of China’s rise to the exclusion of all others and thus offers a clear, parsimonious, but not a complete theoretical picture.

2022 Michigan Kritik
Security K – BEJJ 2022 › AT — Realism › 2NC — AT: Realism — T/L

Realism can’t explain complex interactions — omits every domestic variable.

Jeremy Garlick 16, Director of the J. Masaryk Centre of International Studies and Associate Professor of International Relations and China Studies at Prague University of Economics and Business, 2016, “Not So Simple: Complexity Theory and the rise of China,” SAGE Publications, DOI: 10.1177/0009445516661884 [ML]

For Waltz, states in the anarchic international system are, according to the well-worn metaphor, like billiard balls bouncing off each other and jostling for position in order to serve their own interests. Waltz’s theory implies that China, like all other states, will compete for power, territory and resources amid the Hobbesian anarchy of the Westphalian system of sovereign states. Waltz’s neorealism is a parsimonious theory which depends on a structural analysis of the international system to predict a dog-eat-dog world of competing states. However, the very parsimony of the theory means, as Humphreys (2006) points out, that its explanatory power is limited and unsatisfactory. For Humphreys, the main problem with Waltzian neorealism lies in the fact that it inexplicably attempts to reduce the complexity of the international system to a single independent variable (anarchic structure). This means that Waltz perceives the international system in a linear fashion, with the independent variable of anarchy (i.e., the ‘war of all against all’) exerting a direct causative effect on states’ behaviour in the international system, leading them to pursue strategies of self-help. The linearity of Waltz’s theory may appear parsimonious and compelling, but, as neoclassical realists and complexity theorists point out, fails to account for complex phenomena in terms, for instance, of how foreign policy impacts upon and is impacted by developments in international affairs (see for instance Bousquet and Curtis 2011; Kavalski 2007; Rathbun 2008; Rose 1998). In the specific case of China’s rise, Waltz’s focus on anarchy tells us that China will compete with other states, but not how. In essence, he does not tell us enough to enable us to see anything beyond a vague picture of China and self-help, undifferentiated from all the other ‘like units’ (states). Waltz’s neorealism cannot predict in what direction China’s rise will take both it and the world in general, beyond a general expectation of competition and increasing influence as China’s capabilities increase. Thus, it does not provide us with any detailed or useful explanation or prediction beyond what is already quite obvious. This is largely because of what Waltz consciously leaves out. He claims that the logic of his structural analysis necessitates omitting ‘attributes and interactions’, by which he means ‘questions about the cultural, economic, political, and military interactions of states’, as well as ‘the kinds of political leaders, social and economic institutions, and ideological commitments states may have’ (1979: 80). Questions concerning ‘environment, situation, context and milieu’ are, according to Waltz, ‘vague and varying systemic notions’ which can be entirely replaced by the analysis of structure alone because they have no explanatory value in a theoretical sense (1979: 80). Waltz does attempt to account for differences in the sizes and capabilities of states, but does not satisfactorily build these factors into his states-as-like-units model. For understanding a rising China, then, there is ostensibly little more that can usefully be gleaned from Waltzian neorealism beyond the general expectation of Hobbesian self-help in an anarchic international system. Because Waltz believes that the international level of analysis has to be sharply demarcated from the domestic, and so he thinks it is necessary to omit all information about China’s culture, economy, politics, and so on, his theory cannot reveal anything about the detailed mechanics of China’s rise on the international stage as the nation interacts and develops its relationships with other actors. On the other hand, neoclassical realism offers an interesting development of Waltzian neorealism, in that it attempts to analyse the complex impact of domestic policy on international affairs. Neoclassical realists such as Rose (1998), Christensen (1996), Wohlforth (1993) and Zakaria (1999) base their theorising on Waltz’s emphasis on structure and anarchy, but attempt to develop his theory further by giving more weight to domestic factors in foreign policy decision-making. Christensen’s (1996) study is particularly interesting for students of China because it attempts to apply a ‘two-level’ analysis of international and domestic factors to Sino-US relations between 1947 and 1958. Neoclassical realists, in essence, claim that neorealism, by focusing exclusively on the international level of analysis, does not account for ‘domestic politics and ideas’ (Rathbun 2008: 294) in its analysis of states’ behaviour at the international level. However, there is disagreement about the value of neoclassical realism, and also about whether neoclassical realists are really doing something different to neorealists in general or just expanding on its ideas about structure and anarchy (see Legro and Moravscik 1999; Rathbun 2008; Vasquez 1997). Two notable neoclassical realists (Thomas J. Christensen and Jack Snyder) have even further muddied the waters by going so far as to decline to take part in a debate about whether they are neorealists or not; they do this on the basis that they neither want to be ‘apologists for neorealism’ nor to attempt to ‘reconcile the heterogeneous arguments’ of scholars who are generally labelled ‘neorealist’ (Christensen and Snyder 1997: 919). The other major weakness of the neoclassical realist project is that it has not yet come to fruition in terms of being fully expounded in theoretical terms. To be specific, while there is value in pointing out that domestic variables need to be incorporated into realist theory, neoclassical realism has not yet managed to convincingly posit an explicit theoretical framework within which this can be done. It is for this reason perhaps that neoclassical realism has been criticised for being ‘an ad hoc and theoretically degenerative effort to explain away anomalies for neorealism’ (Rathbun 2008: 294), ince neoclassical realists’ ‘use of whatever tools are necessary to plug the holes of a sinking ship’ results in ‘paradigmatic incoherence and indistinctiveness’ (Rathbun 2008: 295). There, therefore, remains an obvious need to develop a clear and convincing theoretical framework for neoclassical realism’s attempt to take neorealism in a direction which systematically accounts for the effect of domestic variables on foreign policy. Thus, the possibility that CT might be able to provide the missing link from neorealism to neoclassical realism, by supplying some conceptual tools with which to study the way in which foreign policy interacts with international phenomena, is an intriguing one. In this article it is not possible to do more than point out the need for more research into the possibility of CT providing a set of tools for filling out the internal mechanics of neorealism and neoclassical realism, and to suggest that this could be done in order to attempt to develop a more complete theoretical framework within which to analyse complex international phenomena such as China’s rise.

2022 Michigan Kritik
Security K – BEJJ 2022 › AT — Realism › 2NC — AT: Realism — T/L

Any amount of complexity shreds realism.

Ross Douthat 22, a New York Times columnist and The Atlantic senior editor, March 9th, 2022, "They Predicted the Ukraine War. But Did They Still Get It Wrong?" The New York Times, [ML]

It’s a curious feature of Western debate since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine that a school of thought that predicted some version of this conflict has been depicted as discredited by the partial fulfillment of its prophecies.

From the 1990s to the 2010s, from George Kennan’s opposition to NATO expansion to John Mearsheimer’s critique of American involvement in Ukraine, thinkers associated with foreign policy realism — the school known for its cold-eyed expectation of great power conflict, its doubts about idealistic visions of world order — argued that the attempt to integrate Russia’s borderlands into Western institutions and alliances was poisoning relations with Moscow, making great-power conflict more likely, and exposing nations like Ukraine to disastrous risks.

2022 Michigan Kritik
Security K – BEJJ 2022 › AT — Realism › 2NC — AT: Realism — T/L

Realism fails — neglect of psychological elements.

Tuomas Forsberg 21, Professor of International Politics at the University of Tampere and Deputy Director of the Centre of Excellence on Choices of Russian Modernization at the Aleksanteri Institute of the University of Helsinki; Christer Pursiainen is Professor of Societal Safety and Environment at the Department of Engineering and Safety, Faculty of Science and Technology, Arctic University of Norway, 2021, “The Psychology of Foreign Policy,” Palgrave Studies in Political Psychology, [ML]

Realism, in its various formulations, has always had a somewhat ambivalent relationship to psychology (Donnelly, 2000, pp. 43–80; Edinger, 2021). Hans Morgenthau (1955), the founder of political realism, warned against the search for the clue to foreign policy exclusively in the motives of state leaders because it was both futile and deceptive. Yet many political realists have still paid a great deal of attention to major figures in international politics and their actions, starting from some implicit psychological analysis on the basis of the leader’s experience or moral characteristics. Political realism assumes rationality as the methodological starting point for analysis, yet Morgenthau (1946, p. 154) himself fundamentally doubted the extent to which foreign policy decision-makers or any human being can be rational; indeed, he called the idea of human rationality a “rationalist superstition.” To the extent that rationality in realism would be tantamount to basing one’s actions on power alone, Reinhold Niebuhr (2013, p. 4; see also Meinecke, 1957, p. 433) in turn admitted that in reality this is not the case: “Politics will, to the end of history, be an area where conscience and power meet, where the ethical and coercive factors of human life will interpenetrate and work out their tentative and uneasy compromises.” Yet neither Morgenthau nor other classical realists provided a clear account of the psychological aspects of foreign policy other than the general deficiency of human nature. Structural realism (neorealism) shifted the angle of the older political realism away from state leaders to the structural conditions of the international system (Elman, 1996). In a vulgar reading of structural realism, it is sometimes maintained that any statesperson would behave in a similar way in given structural conditions. The most visible scholar of offensive realism in the past twenty years or so, John Mearsheimer, argues that Russia’s actions in Ukraine in 2014 should be seen as a self-evident reaction to the West’s aggressive grand strategy: “No Russian leader would tolerate a military alliance that was Moscow’s mortal enemy until recently moving into Ukraine. Nor would any Russian leader stand idly by while the West helped install a government there that was determined to integrate Ukraine into the West” (Mearsheimer, 2014, p. 82, italics added). Hence, the psychological idiosyncrasies of individual decision-makers are completely neglected. Yet Mearsheimer titles his article ‘Why the Ukraine Crisis is the West’s Fault: The Liberal Delusions that Provoked Putin’, revealing the clear psychological microfoundations of the author’s overly structuralist argument.

2022 Michigan Kritik
Security K – BEJJ 2022 › AT — Realism › 2NC — AT: Neorealism

Neorealism structurally guarantees resource conflicts through securitization.

Nafeez Mosaddeq Ahmed 12, an international security analyst specialising in the historical sociology and political ecology of mass violence. He is Executive Director at the Institute for Policy Research and Development, and Associate Tutor at the Department of International Relations, University of Sussex, “The international relations of crisis and the crisis of international relations: from the securitisation of scarcity to the militarisation of society,” Global Change, Peace & Security, 23:3, 335-355, DOI: 10.1080/14781158.2011.601854 [ML]

Ultimately, this theoretical hypothesis on the causes of environmental or resource-related conflict is incapable of engaging with the deeper intersecting global structural conditions generating resource scarcities, independently of insufficient government management of the internal distribution of resources in weak states. It simplistically applies the Hobbesian assumption that without a centralised ‘Leviathan’ state structure, the persistence of anarchy in itself generates conflict over resources. Under the guise of restoring the significance of the biophysical environment to orthodox IR, this approach in effect actually occludes the environment as a meaningful causal factor, reducing it to a mere epiphenomenon of the dynamics of anarchy in the context of state failure. As a consequence, this approach is theoretically impotent in grasping the systemic acceleration of global ecological, energy and economic crises as a direct consequence of the way in which the inter-state system itself exploits the biophysical environment. The same criticism in fact applies to opposing theories that resource abundance is a major cause of violent conflict. Bannon and Collier, for instance, argue that resource abundance and greed, rather than resource scarcity and political grievances, generated intra-state conflicts financed by the export of commodities in regions like Angola and Sierra Leone (diamonds) or West Africa (tropical timber). In other regions, abundance rather than shortages of oil, drugs and gold fuelled and financed violent secessionist movements in the context of widespread corruption and poor governance.57 Ultimately, this departs little from the theoretical assumptions above, with weak central state governance still blamed for generating anarchic conditions conducive to conflict over abundant resources. Furthermore, as Kaldor shows, this simplistic perspective overlooks the wider context of the global political economy – the evolution of regional ‘war economies’ was often enabled precisely by the devastating impact of neoliberal structural adjustment programmes, which eroded state structures and generated social crises that radicalised identity politics.58 Under traditional neorealist logic, a strategic response to global environmental crises must involve the expansion of state-military capabilities in order to strengthen the centralised governance structures whose task is to regulate the international distribution of natural resources, as well as to ensure that a particular state’s own resource requirements are protected. Neorealism understands inter-state competition, rivalry and warfare as inevitable functions of states’ uncertainty about their own survival, arising from the anarchic structure of the international system. Gains for one state are losses for another, and each state’s attempt to maximise its power relative to all other states is simply a reflection of its rational pursuit of its own security. The upshot is the normalisation of political violence in the international system, including practices such as over-exploitation of energy and the environment, as a ‘rational’ strategy – even though this ultimately amplifies global systemic insecurity. Inability to cooperate internationally and for mutual benefit is viewed as an inevitable outcome of the simple, axiomatic existence of multiple states. The problem is that neorealism cannot explain in the first place the complex interdependence and escalation of global crises. Unable to situate these crises in the context of an international system that is not simply a set of states, but a transnational global structure based on a specific exploitative relationship with the biophysical environment, neorealism can only theorise global crises as ‘new issue areas’ appended to already existing security agendas.59 Yet by the very act of projecting global crises as security threats, neorealism renders itself powerless to prevent or mitigate them by theorising their root structural causes. In effect, despite its emphasis on the reasons why states seek security, neorealism’s approach to issues like climate change actually guarantees greater insecurity by promoting policies which frame these ‘non-traditional’ issues purely as amplifiers of quite traditional threats. As Susanne Peters argues, the neorealist approach renders the militarisation of foreign and domestic policy a pragmatic and necessary response to issues such as resource scarcities – yet, in doing so, it entails the inevitable escalation of ‘resource wars’ in the name of energy security. Practically, this serves not to increase security for competing state and non-state actors, but to debilitate international security through the proliferation of violent conflict to access and control diminishing resources in the context of unpredictable complex emergencies.60 Neorealism thus negates its own theoretical utility and normative value. For if ‘security’ is the fundamental driver of state foreign policies, then why are states chronically incapable of effectively ameliorating the global systemic amplifiers of ‘insecurity’, despite the obvious rationale to do so in the name of warding off collective destruction, if not planetary annihilation?61

2022 Michigan Kritik
Security K – BEJJ 2022 › Impacts/AT: Impact Turns › 2NC---Turns Russia War

Turns case---their fear of a Russia war is self-reinforcing and is just part of a broader narrative of US exceptionalism

Kari Roberts 16, Kari Roberts joined the Policy Studies Department in 2009. She received her BA (Hons) and MA in Political Studies from the University of Manitoba and her PhD in Political Science from the University of Calgary in 2004, “Why a Normal Relationship with Russia is so Hard: Russophobia in Clinton-era American foreign policy discourse and the decision to expand NATO,” Mount Royal University, 05/21/2016, p7-9

Lieven speculates that the intellectual basis for this Russophobia may stem from 19th Century British propaganda regarding Russian expansionism and its inherent wickedness. Lieven notes that this demonization of other peoples, sometimes taking on a racist tone, has long been present within Western, and American, foreign policy making. 34 Moreover, there is a tendency to assume that what was once assumed about a nation and its peoples shall forever be true about them, even in the absence of supporting evidence. This sort of historical determinism denies a nuanced appreciation for cultural evolution and very much denies the potential for American leaders to view post-Soviet Russia’s disappointing struggles with democracy for what they are. Instead, they have been viewed against the backdrop of Russia’s Tsarist and Communist experiences and are therefore “wicked.”35 This is evidenced by Henry Kissinger’s 2000 remark that Russian imperialism has continued for centuries, characterized by subjugation of its neighbours and “overawing those not under its direct control” and in Zbigniew Brzezinski’s assigning of blame for Stalinist-era policies to present day Russians.36 For Lieven, to view past conduct as less a product of history and more a product of culture or “national DNA” of sorts, comes perilously close to racism. There is a certain essentialism in the American discourse on Russia that equates these acts with “Russianness.” Perhaps, as Tsygankov suggests, demonizing Russia continued to help justify US strategy toward the USSR in the Cold War. For Lieven, this legitimized the military buildup, the containment, the worldview and actions that stemmed from the need to balance Soviet power.37 Yet, as Lieven importantly notes, even those who demonize Russia for its past seem to have little problem embracing Communist China, 38 so perhaps it is not communism in Russia’s past the Western leaders fear, but rather something cultural, something innately “Russian.”

Lieven concurs about the self-reinforcing nature of Russophobia, noting the US’ “need for enemies”39 as an instrumental component of its own narrative of exceptionalism. Perhaps the result of viewing Russia as the enemy for so long is the reason it has become one. Russophobia has enabled the judging of Russia “by utterly different standards than those applied to other countries.”40 Tsygankov and Lieven are correct to suggest a linkage between Russophobia and America’s own mythologies about its place in the world. America’s destiny is to be a cultural hegemon atop the global hierarchy of nations. The perception of American superiority seems to require an “other” to assume a position of inferiority. Russia has long represented a new cultural frontier and a divergent history, one that was assumed to be far less “exceptional” than the American experience. Challenges to the presumption of American hegemony have often been met with not simply disagreement, but a de-legitimizing of the very existence of the ‘other.’ Russia is not immune from ideas of exceptionalism and the two nations have perpetuated a soft rivalry that possesses “nationalist phobias” 41 that can be mutually reinforcing.

2022 Michigan Kritik
Security K – BEJJ 2022 › Impacts/AT: Impact Turns › 2NC---Turns Asia War

The liberal international order is just military orientalism---it causes Asian war---Korea military occupation proves

Inderjeet Parmar 18, Parmar is a professor of international politics @ the University of London & an honorary research Fellow @ then university of Manchester, “The US-led liberal order: imperialism by another name?”, 2018, International Affairs 94

CFR and State Department wartime planning was therefore driven above all by a vision of global–imperial leadership exercised by US elites, strongly supported by Britain’s ruling elites, via an international order of organizations and relationships.61 The aim was, acting in concert with Britain’s elites, to resurrect European Great Powers by means including the restoration of shattered colonial trading and economic and financial linkages. The Marshall Plan viewed European reconstruction in just that global context.62 The UN was envisaged as a key international agency for American imperial internationalism, at least in its earliest days63—and, as its role in the making of South Korea shows, it remains the official basis of America’s role in that country today. And, as I will show below, the building of a hegemonic multilateral order indicates the significance of a Gramsci–Kautsky synthesis.

The UN and Korea

2022 Michigan Kritik
Security K – BEJJ 2022 › Impacts/AT: Impact Turns › 2NC---Serial Policy Failure

Turns the case---the logic of the US “lagging behind or “losing the race” is used to generate more threats – this serves to justify the expansion of the US war machine and results in serial policy failure

Nima Shirazi & Adam Johnson 20, Nima Shirazi is a co-creator & co-host of citation needed podcast and Board Member @ Proteus Fund, Adam Johnson is a co-host of citation needed, “Episode 117: The Always “Lagging” U.S. War Machine”, Citations Needed, 09/09/2020, \\pairie

We just can’t win. We’re perma-lagging. So this was written by Charles Beames. The bio in the op-ed says Beames, quote, “is executive chairman at York Space Systems” which is kind of buried, without mentioning that York Space Systems at the time was up for a major government contract that would have benefited greatly from the policies the piece was lobbying for. In Spring of 2020, Beames’s small firm was awarded a $450,000 contract for “SPACE VEHICLE MAINTENANCE, REPAIR, AND CHECKOUT SPECIALIZED EQUIPMENT V126 TRANSPORTATION/TRAVEL/RELOCATION- TRANSPORTATION: SPACE TRANSPORTATION/LAUNCH.” So that’s just one contract, they may have others. So here you have someone who’s, I mean, so much of these things, again, whether or not they’re laundered through think tanks are directly the corporate CEOs themselves or they are military brass whose careers are based on the acquisition of funds, they’re just marketing tools basically. This is just like any other, anyone who’s ever worked in marketing, getting an op-ed on CNN saying, ‘Man, we really need to buy all this stuff. Oh, incidentally, my firm happens to sell this’ would seem like a sort of conflict of interest you’d want to disclose but again, if you sort of keep it a half a degree removed, then it’s just normal journalism.

Nima: Right now I know we’ve mentioned the United States outspending every other country on the planet by a lot when it comes to military spending. It’s very similar in terms of the US outspending its supposedly adversaries like China and Russia when it comes to this space race. You wouldn’t know it from these articles — we’re always lagging behind — but according to account by the Massachusetts-based Union of Concerned Scientists, the US military and other government agencies, universities and private companies together operated over 1,300 satellites as of March 2020. China, in contrast, operates 363 satellites and Russia itself has 169 satellites. So the United States has exponentially more satellite capability. NASA’s 2020 budget was more than $22 billion, while the White House’s 2021 federal budget request allotted $15.4 billion to the newly formed Space Force. So yeah, the US leads the world in space spending. It’s not even close. Closest behind the US budget in this regard is China, which spends a mere $8 billion, according to the Space Foundation, a US nonprofit that tracks these things, and despite the impression that China wants to accelerate military combat in space, China is actually called the Space Force a, quote, “direct threat to outer space peace and security” end quote. Meanwhile, Russia’s own government run space agency has kind of pulled back on its own budget. In 2014 it was about $5 billion, six years later, this year, 2020, it is only $1.7 billion.