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Security K – BEJJ 2022 › Links › 2NC---Hegemony
Timothy Guzman, 16, Independent researcher and writer with a focus on political, economic, media and historical spheres. Published in Global Research, The Progressive Mind, European Union Examiner, News Beacon Ireland, WhatReallyHappened.com, EIN News and a number of other alternative news sites. Graduate of Hunter College in New York City. “The American Empire is Playing a Dangerous Game with its Nuclear Weapons Arsenal”
The American Empire is playing a dangerous game with its nuclear weapons arsenal. The US-NATO and Israel alliance has declared directly and indirectly that Russia, China, North Korea and Iran are a threat to world peace and security.
Let’s be clear on who is the real threat to world peace and it is not the countries I just mentioned, it is Washington’s geopolitical ambitions to bring its enemies under their sphere of control. Washington’s geopolitical moves are antagonizing its enemies which can ignite a catastrophic world war that can go to nuclear at a moment’s notice. The threat of a nuclear war is at almost the same level of the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis, but if you listen to the main-stream media (MSM) you may never know what is really going on concerning world events.
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Security K – BEJJ 2022 › Links › 2NC---Failed States
---Somalia is a good example for failed states debates
Aleksandar Pašagić 20, Aleksandar Pašagić holds an MA in International Security & works as a Chief Security Officer in the private sector, “Failed States and Terrorism: Justifiability of Transnational Interventions from a Counterterrorism Perspective,” Perspective on Terrorism, Volume 14, Issue 3, p23-25 \\pairie
Failed States, Counterterrorism and Interventionism
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Security K – BEJJ 2022 › Links › 2NC---Environment
Michael Mason & Mark Zeitoun 13, Associate Professor in the Department of Geography and Environment and Associate of the Grantham Research Institute for Climate Change and the Environment at the London School of Economics and Political Science & Professor of Water Security and Policy at the School of International Development of the University of East Anglia, December 2013, “Questioning Environmental Security”, The Geographical Journal, Vol. 179, No. 4, p. 294-297 /lg
Threats to and from ‘the environment’ inform geographical depictions of danger with wide- spread reach in political and policy circles. While these fears are partly replaying past neo- Malthusian concerns about limits to growth, they are also associated with a distinct millennialist anxiety about the lethality made possible by collapsing conditions of life. 'Dangerous climate change' is at the forefront of these apocalyptic imaginaries, but existential threats are seen to issue also from biodiversity extinction, fossil fuel depletion and endemic water shortages (Dalby 2009; Swyngedouw 2010). The 'securitisation' of environmental processes is at once both a consequence and driver of such apocalyptic concerns, and this discursive framing is intuitively straightforward for those who argue that it justifies urgent, even emergency, measures to prevent or miti- gate serious dangers. Security here denotes that which is evoked or invoked when acting to protect core institutions or freedoms in the face of serious ecologi- cal threats. This is the dominant notion of environ- mental security questioned by contributors to this themed section.
From a geographical perspective, environmental security straddles uneasily across a territorial/post- territorial axis, where tensions are immediately appar- ent between competing spatial performances of security. This expresses contrasting claims over the political subjectivity being secured. It is not surprising that state actors have invoked environmental security practices and discourses according to territorial doctrines of national security, whereby environmental risks supplement traditional threats to the state. Thus, 'climate security', 'biosecurity' and 'energy security' are employed to refer to the protection of state interests with regard to the projected and perceived con- sequences of environmental change, biotechnologies and fossil fuels scarcity. Numerous think-tank and academic publications have fed these state-centred imaginaries of environmental danger on the basis of disputed natural and social scientific scenarios (e.g. Klare 2008; Brown and Crawford 2009; Chellaney 2011). In apparent opposition to statist representa-tions of security are non-territorial notions of 'human security', which profess a universal concern for the protection of individuals or groups from serious threats to wellbeing. Constructions of human security have identified environmental dangers as potential threats to human welfare; for example, 'water secu- rity' and 'food security' mark out areas of practical application for international development and humanitarian organisations (Matthew et al. 2010; Cook and Bakker 2012).
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Security K – BEJJ 2022 › Links › 2NC---Environment
Peter Hough 22, Associate Professor in International Politics at Middlesex University with a PhD in International Relations from City University in London, 06/09/2022, “Ecological Security” (book chapter in Rethinking Security in the Twenty-First Century: A Reader), Middlesex University Research Repository, p. 183-194 /lg
Many states have come to take a widened approach to security since the 1990s and the resource wars literature was particularly influential on the Clinton Administration in the U.S. HomerDixon is known to have been invited to brief Vice President Al Gore and the State Department on several occasions in the early 1990s.13 In 1993, a new government position in the Defense Department was created with the Deputy Under Secretary for Environmental Security, and the Environmental Task Force set up as part of Washington’s intelligence network. The impact of all of this was made explicit in the 1994’s “National Security Strategy,” the US’s annual foreign policy manifesto.
Not all security risks are military in nature. Transnational phenomena such as terrorism, narcotics trafficking, environmental degradation, rapid population growth and refugee flows also have security implications for both present and long term American policy.14
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Security K – BEJJ 2022 › Links › 2NC---Economy
Bulman 2021 (David Bulman, Assistant professor of China Studies and International affairs at the John Hopkins School of China Studies and International Affairs,” The Economic Security Dilemma in US-China Relations” ) //sethlee
China and the United States are caught in an economic security dilemma. In response to perceived economic aggression, both countries now feel impelled to bolster domestic economic security through protectionist and retaliatory measures that the other side perceives as threatening. In game theoretic terms, a mutually beneficial “Stag Hunt” coordination game devolved into an uncooperative “Prisoner’s Dilemma” after the global financial crisis. In the economic security dilemma that emerged under Trump and Xi, both sides unsuccessfully attempted to coerce opponent behavior, further harming both economies. Using a game framework—as opposed to a structural or leadership-based account—helps demonstrate that China’s recent reform reversal and revisionist approaches to the international economic order were not unavoidable parts of a long-term strategy, but rather developed partially as a response to perceived US aggressions. Two contrasting narratives now define the economic relationship between the United States and China. US policymakers perceive China as a revisionist economic power using “state-driven protectionist policies and practices” to threaten US economic vitality (White House 2020). Chinese policymakers in turn argue that the United States will “do everything in its power to use bullying measures” to prevent China’s rise and keep China from accessing key technologies, thus requiring a strong state sector to support technological self-reliance (Wang 2019; Wang and Xin 2018). The evolution of these contrasting narratives reflects an economic security dilemma: In response to perceived economic aggression, both countries now feel impelled to bolster domestic economic security through protectionist and retaliatory measures that are in turn perceived as threatening by the other side. The resulting downward ited degree, financial fronts, significantly harming both economies. In game theoretic terms, a mutually beneficial “Stag Hunt” coordination game prior to the 2008 global financial crisis (GFC) devolved into an uncooperative “Prisoner’s Dilemma” over 2009–2016, in part due to growing misperceptions and faulty assumptions regarding domestic economic security. By the time of Donald Trump’s election, both sides thought the game had switched to “Chicken” and sought to force the other side to swerve. The actual payoff matrices still reflected a Prisoner’s Dilemma, however. Misidentification of the game led to coercive threats rather than attempts at reassurance, ensuring a further downward spiral. This game-theoretic framework helps interpret changes in US-China economic relations over the past three decades, enabling an understanding of the emergence of current economic tensions more nuanced than structural or leadership-based approaches. According to structural arguments, economic conflict is part of an unavoidable zero-sum great power conflict (Allison 2017; Walt 2018; Jin 2015; Li J. 2019). In contrast, leadership approaches blame economic tensions on Xi Jinping’s economic reform reversals, external aggression, and domestic repression, which necessitated a US response (e.g., Economy 2018), or Donald Trump’s (avoidable) decision to instigate a trade war in 2018 (e.g., Yang 2016). These frameworks explain part of the story: great power competition has become more prominent, with direct consequences for the economic relationship, and Xi and Trump indeed made choices that Li Keqiang and Hillary Clinton may not have. But structural arguments imply an inevitably that seems misjudged, and leadership accounts often underestimate or ignore the structural dimensions that constrain and inform leader decisions. A dynamic game framework is a more fruitful way of understanding developments, combining aspects of both of these frameworks: Structure and structural shifts help set payoff matrices, and leaders choose how to play the game given their own perceptions and the existing payoff distributions.
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Security K – BEJJ 2022 › Links › 2NC---Drones
No Author, 6-23-2022, "Securitization of Iran's drone capability; Another sign that America has not changed its behavior," nournews, https://nournews.ir/En/News/81607/Securitization-of-Iran's-drone-capability;-Another-sign-that-America-has-not-changed-its-behavior//jc
NOURNEWS - According to US media reports, a number of members of the House of Representatives from both the Republicans and Democrats parties proposed a plan to counter Iran's drone program, on Tuesday. Democrat Gregory Meeks, chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, Republican Michael McCaul, Democrat Ted Deutch, and Republican Joe Wilson have introduced a bill called the Stop Iranian Drones Act (SIDA) in coordination with existing US sanctions against Iran's weapons program, also including the supply, sale or transfer of UAVs. The drafters of the anti-Iranian plan said the purpose of the Stop Iranian Drones Act (SIDA) was to prevent the Islamic Republic and its resistance forces from accessing drones that could be used to attack the United States or its allies. Gregory Meeks also claimed; Iranian deadly drones endanger US security and regional peace! He also said that the recent attacks by Iranian drones on US forces, merchant ships and against regional partners, along with the export of drone technology to areas where there is conflict, is a serious threat. Noting that the "Stop Iranian Drones Act (SIDA)" is in line with current US sanctions law, Gregory Meeks said the plan sends a strong message to the international community that the United States will not tolerate government support for Iran's drone program. In this regard, a few months ago, in early April of this year, General "Kenneth F. McKenzie", the commander of American terrorists based in West Asia known as CENTCOM, said in a written testimony to the Armed Forces Committee of the US House of Representatives: "Iranian-backed Houthis in Yemen have targeted military, infrastructure and civilian targets in Saudi Arabia since January with more than 150 missiles and drone strikes." McKenzie warned that Iran's widespread use of small and medium-sized drones for reconnaissance and attack operations meant that for the first time since the Korean War, the United States had lost its air superiority for operations in the region. "Unless we can find a network to detect and defeat this superiority of drone use, Iran will remain aggressive in the region," the CENTCOM terrorist commander said. Simultaneously with these hostile atmospheres, the military and political figures of the Zionist regime also talked about the drone capability of Iran, together with the American officials, in order to provide security. Israeli War Minister Benny Gantz recently spoke of the dangers of Iranian drones for the security of the West Asian region and the world, and called on Westerners to take joint action to impose restrictions on Iran's drone industry. The US Treasury Department also sanctioned four Iranian citizens, including the commander of IRGC's aerospace unit, along with two other Iranian companies, for collaborating with the Iranian drone project. It seems that, contrary to the apparent statements of US officials that they are trying to reduce tensions between Tehran and Washington, they are working with some European countries, especially Britain, to try to reopen new security cases against Iran to justify the extension of a series of current unjust sanctions, or even its escalation, is in contradiction with Washington's claims. The Americans have shown that they have no real interest in ending their issues and conflicts with Iran. The US's main strategy is to engage Iran in an endless cycle of security cases, extensive sanctions and endless negotiations in order to contain Iran at the lowest cost in the region, on its consideration. General Mckenzie's remarks about the imbalance in the region and the inability of the US military to take full control of the entire West Asian sky due to the breadth and complexity of Iran's drone capability are clear signs of a shift in equations in the region. Saudi Arabia's widespread failure in the Yemeni war and the defeat of the naval war project against Iran, which included US-British piracy and Israeli attacks on Iranian-owned and private-sector oil tankers and merchant ships, are all signs of Iran's widespread retaliation. In this regard, the United States and its allies are announcing a shift in the security balance in the West Asian region. But can the Americans succeed on the Iranian drone issue? In the current situation, as a first step, as in previous projects aimed at securitization of Iran's environment, the language of panic and the media and speech apparatus of American, European and Zionist politicians are working, to gradually raise the issue of Iran's drone capability in a legal process as a threat, introducing it as an acute for regional and world stability. It should be noted that, unlike the nuclear issue, we do not face a global disarmament regimes with a global consensus or, like the missile issue, a control regime agreed upon by some major powers in the form of the MTCR. The issue of UAVs as a military tool in the context of arms control is a completely new case, about which there is still little legal literature, and Westerners are trying to establish a legal procedure by intimidating the world against Iran's UAV capability. In the last two decades, drones have been used more as a military tool in the West Asian region, and in recent years Turkey, Pakistan and the Zionist regime have begun to expand their drone industry, in addition to Iran. Given this, although the Americans can not provoke a global consensus against Tehran on Iran's drone capability, such as the nuclear issue, or bring some Western countries with them, such as the missile issue, they are trying to maintain the status quo on Iran's security case as an option to take advantage of it. The US withdrawal from Afghanistan, the inability of its Arab partners to successfully end the Yemeni war, and the failure of the naval war project with Iran are all signs of a shift in the security equation in the West Asian region. The Islamic Republic of Iran has repeatedly stated that its military equipment is manufactured entirely for deterrence and for purely defensive purposes, and that foreign military intervention in the last two decades on the borders of Iran with Afghanistan and Iraq is a sign of Tehran's right defense strategy that is neither negotiable nor will it involve disarmament.
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Security K – BEJJ 2022 › Links › 2NC---Drones
Scott Romaniuk & Stewart Webb 15, researchers at the University of South Wales at the International Centre for Policing and Security and holds a PhD in International Studies, 2015 "(PDF) Extraordinary Measures: Drone Warfare, Securitization, and the "War on Terror"", ResearchGate, //AW
The utility of the WoT securitization, even in spite of its many critics who rebuke its leaders and supporters, has as a result of its attachment with such a universal issue that stands in sharp contrast and opposition to such beloved values, peoples, and ways of life (in principles all that America embodies and stands for) as referent objects led to the establishment of a powerful narrative (McCrisken 2011, 786). At the heart of this narrative lie the dramatis personæ: the US and the liberal democracies of the world, and AQ and the “evil tyrants and murderers that support it” (McCrisken 2012, 786). Such a narrative, linked inextricably to the events of 9/11 has assumed such rich symbolism, emotional value, and representation of a zero-sum game, that the WoT securitization has become “institutionalized and normalized” or engrained as part of American foreign policy (Jackson 2011). “It has,” in Jackon’s (2011, 391) words, “in the years since 9/11 become a powerful social structure (a hegemonic discourse) that both expresses and simultaneously co-constructs US interests and identity.” The WoT and US opposition to the threat of international terrorism has become overly manifest within the US’ national security structure and deep into American culture (McCrisken 2011, 786). If we are to accept the WoT to have become institutionalized by the majority of American society as just plain good sense, then we might reasonably assume that elites have no little or choice but to move stridently forward in addressing AQ and international terrorism as exceptional threats vis-à-vis extraordinary measures only even if an actor would prefer to find a solution through the (normal) political system. Having intertwined the existential threat with American society to such an extend and with such extensive institutionalization having taken place over the previous decade, “it is then,” states McCrisken (2011), “extremely difficult for any policy-maker or opinionshaper in the US, even a new president dedicated to ‘change’, to seriously challenge the underlying assumptions of the ‘war on terror’ and move policy significantly in a new direction” (786). Drone Warfare as an Extraordinary Measure The previous section touched upon the idea of the WoT exerts a degree of influence on the new security environment of the post-Cold War era than that of the post-9/11 environment by acting as a powerful narrative of that dichotomizes the international community according to the understanding of the “West and the rest,” or in the words of Bush, “Us vs. Them” and “Good vs. Evil” (Greenwald 2008; Soblic 2009). The WoT also functions as a normative organization that allows the leadership of the US (both the Bush and Obama administrations) to construct understandings of and sensitivities about security and threats to that security. Within this normative organization we can observe public perceptions of the existential threat and the policy designed and implemented by elites as mutually reinforcing. While many policies that were adopted by the US and other states allied in the fight against terrorism existed before 9/11, its main events and the WoT directly made them easier to introduce to the public and even helped legitimize “their application across a wider set of issues and areas than would otherwise have been the case (Buzan and Hansen 2009, 226). Taking into consideration that this section brings our attention directly to the marketability (to the public) and employment of extraordinary means to confront the existential threat posed by international terrorism, Buzan and Hansen (2009, 226) note: [a]s Realists, Liberals, and critical widening perspectives all point out: in times of (discursively constituted) war, the money and manpower allocated to the military increase, and encroachment on civil, liberal and human rights are more likely to meet with public acceptance. Concerns about terrorism were not entirely new by 2001 (although it was seen more as a peripheral problem in both public spheres and within IR by scholars), 9/11 elevated the prominence of terrorism to a new level. This might be said to have combined with the view that the events of 9/11 drilled the enduring truth into the hearts and minds those at all levels of American society that, “the absence of international conflict was not indication of an irreversible change [about the existence of violent and deadly threats in the world], but [merely] a temporary lapse in the ebb and flow of tensions within an anarchical system (Buzan & Hansen, 2009, 229). The extraordinary measures that have been implemented since 9/11 have served as some of the most explicit characteristics and definers of the WoT securitization program. Neither the Bush or Obama administrations have been enormously open about the use of any of them but when they have, a great deal of support, claims McCrisken (2011), was evident and often referred to the legitimacy of these measures as part of the US’ responsibility to protect its citizens, to defend itself, and act if there exists the imminence of threat. Both administrations have maintained the elevation of international terrorism as an extra-politicized and thus securitized state, subjecting it to measures deemed well beyond the parameters of normal politics. In the last decade, the WoT has provided the institutional framework for putting these extraordinary measures into practice: (a) Abrogation of civil, liberal, and human rights and freedoms of individuals a. Irregular rendition b. Systematic torture c. Military commissions d. Indefinite detention e. Political surveillance (b) US affording itself the right to attack based upon suspicion of further or imminent threat (c) State intervention and military campaigns such as those in Iraq and Afghanistan (d) Long-term military occupations and military presence in Iraq and Afghanistan (e) Acceptability of increasing military losses and collateral damage (f) Use of drones and unmanned military systems as part of an ever-growing TK campaign. The extraordinary measures represent a toolkit of security actions that the US has put to use in its response against the existential threat of international terrorism as part of the WoT’s core. One of the most direct means of defining these as extraordinary measure is simply by noting the extent of publicity as well as criticism and opposition they have received over the past decade, while viewing these actions as extraordinary measures can be achieved further still by signaling the level of discretion with which the US has treated to them. Policymakers and scholars alike have clearly accepted these as security actions in the WoT, many of which would unlikely claim that they do not stick out in the realm of normal politics. The considerable overlapping then seen amongst these various approaches as measures within the WoT can be taken as evidence that the use of drones falls within the field of extraordinary measures, particularly given that it constitutes an action that has both emerged and evolved within the purview of the WoT. We might also link the use of drones and TK more closely to those measures inescapably regarded as extraordinary in measure. With the closing of detention centers and an avowal to indefinitely abandon Guantanamo as a method of tackling (suspected) terrorists, the US invariably took a step back from one of its methods in the WoT. Here, two competing, but equally useful logics are at play and serve to frame the use of drones and TK as extraordinary means. First, viewing the use of detention and rehabilitation centers, not to mention the use of interrogation (whether in extreme forms or not) as an expression of normal politics, we can rightfully claim that this measure (undertaking predominantly by the US) was considerably ineffective in dealing with international terrorism for a number of clear reasons that center, at least in part, on: (a) The difficulty of capturing known and suspected terrorist abroad (b) Mitigating the efforts of those within prisons to radicalize anyone not fully dedicated to the cause of terrorism in the name of AQ or other groups or networks (c) The impossibility of guaranteeing that those released will not endow the existential threat by committing or re-committing themselves to terrorism’s violent cause. Stepping from the first logic considered we might consider this proposition in different light. If the practice of irregular rendition and detainment in such detention and interrogation centers as Guantanamo is taken as one of many extraordinary measures enacted in the fight against terrorism but that has come under increasing fire from domestic and international public spheres, there existed a need to step back from practice that can no longer be officially condoned and to fill the void with another measure capable of engaging with the threat. The rationale presented here is that while the acceptance of a certain degree of encroachment on civil, liberal, and human rights might occur, the continuity of any single measure that does so cannot necessarily be guaranteed or continued ad infinitum. Using drones as a part of the US’ evolving and expanding TK program (Obama’s “Kill-Not-Capture” program) (McCrisken 2011) was ideal for taking the place of irregular rendition and exchanging one set of legal challenges with another – one that might be easier to deal with. Retracting from a program of irregular rendition and the use of extreme forms of interrogation that have become the focus of intense legal debate might even serve to shrink the political, military, and social gap that lies between states and the WoT. The prospect of achieving this and subsequently renders the identity of the WoT far more likely to be deeply internalized and become more stable as a result (Lasmar 2010). The effectiveness of the US’ TK program remains a topic of immense debate. Previously, it was noted that the use of drones has been dragged into the security domain and reasonably tagged as an extraordinary measure given the level of public outcry and criticism attached to it. In hindsight it seems that it might have only been a matter of time before those who actually employ the tactic begin to question its viability for future counterterrorism efforts. It is suggested here that drone warfare has not only become a concrete part of the Bush administration’s 2001 securitization of terrorism and an iconic feature of the WoT, but TK as an extraordinary measure has by its direct effects and impact cultivated an understanding that it has come to represent a threat to toward the very objectives that it seeks to achieve. The drone program has undoubtedly given the US political and military leadership the mindset of having the strategic initiative – the ability to choose where and when to attack without constraint. Director of the Center for Peace and Security Studies at Georgetown University’s School of Foreign Service Daniel Byman has noted on multiple occasions that the use of drone technology has enabled the US to more accurately strike at terrorists as opposed to conventional weaponry at the US’ disposal (Lafontant, 2013). The marked different between AQ and like-terrorist groups’ offensive capabilities prior to 9/11 and after the establishment of the WoT can be attributed, suggests Byman, to the employment of drone warfare. They are relegated to a defensive position rather than being poised to strike wherever and whenever they like (Lafontant, 2013). Former-Director of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) Leon Panetta, during the first year of Obama’s presidency stated bluntly that, it‘s [drone warfare] the only game in town in terms of confronting or trying to disrupt the al-Qaeda leadership,” and noted that AQ leaders no longer regard the tribal regions of Pakistan as “neither safe nor a haven” (Cable News Network [CNN] Politics, 2009). David Kilcullen reported to a congressional hearing in 2009: [s]ince 2006, we’ve killed 14 senior al-Qaeda leaders using drone strikes; in the same time period, we’ve killed 700 Pakistani civilians in the same area. The drone strikes are highly unpopular. They are deeply aggravating to the population. And they‘ve given rise to a feeling of anger that coalesces the population around the extremists and leads to spikes of extremism (McManus 2009). Although the claim is often made that the drone strikes are having a significant impact on the operationality of AQ and present a clear practical effectiveness, their use compromises the ability of the US and its allies in the WoT to gain valuable intelligence information from the eliminated target. Despite his support for the use of drones in the fight against terrorism, Byman (2009) reported a darker reality related to drone warfare that has raised concern regarding the idea that drones now pose a threat the US achieving its own objectives in the WoT, noting that, “[e]ven when they are effective, TK can create strategic complications. They create martyrs that help a group sell itself to its own community” (Byman 2009, 100). To build on the previous point: [a]fter an arrest, security forces can interrogate the suspect and learn about future plots and additional operatives, who can then be arrested too. Killing suspects prevents them from striking, but dead men also tell no tales (Byman 2009, 98-9). Collateral damage in these drone strikes also cultivates an environment where the indigenous civilian community will enlist or engage favourably with the targeted insurgents. An insurgency requires the indigenous populace’s “sympathy, acquiescence, silence, reaction to provocation, or fully active support” (Kilcullen 2010, 8). The collateral damage incurred by the drone strikes in Pakistan has become a relentlessly reoccurring issue between the American and Pakistani governments and has damaged bi-lateral relations. After numerous drone strikes, there have been protests with hundreds of protesters burning American flags and holding signs displaying anti-American slogans (Williams 2010, 872). Although the debate on whether anti- American sentiment is heavily instigated by the (collateral) damage incurred by the strikes continues, but there is a correlation to numerous temporary spikes in anti- Americanism. Anti-American sentiment in Yemen has been fuelled by the US drone strike program (Al-Haj & Batrawy 2012). The debate regarding the efficacy of the use of drones given the negative impact it might have within the WoT even in spite of its positive impact raises a certain set of assumption regarding, not that it can reasonably be considered an extraordinary measure but rather to what extent has it become too extraordinary a measure in the securitization of international terrorism by the Bush administration. Rather than being considered purely a response or a security action set-up in the defense of the reference object in the face of an existential threat, it might well be taken as a sort of threat in and of itself. The view, while shown to exist within the US among political elites, has become overtly evident given widespread opposition that has formed in multiple societies beyond the US, including those Western liberal democracies that they are used to defend. The secrecy of the drone program also creates a situation where it is difficult for the WoT to be desecuritized by the majority of the American population. States are permitted to securitize an issue through the consent of the population, even though the securitization message is controlled by in large by the government through the media. Five years after the 9/11 attacks with American forces deployed both in Afghanistan and Iraq, only three percent of Americans believed that that terrorists were a great threat to the US (Bobbitt 2008, 7). There is hubris in American mentality when it comes to the drone strike program (Gardner 2013, 212-34). There are a couple of factors that are instrumental in maintaining this hubris. With the drone program, no American lives are directly at stake by being in a hostile theater of operations as the drone pilots are hundreds (even thousands) of miles away. Therefore, there is a lack of domestic protests to bring the troops back home as they are at home or at safe operational bases. A second factor is that there is a general lack of widely distributed reports and images of the collateral damage incurred by the drone strikes in the Western media. This is in stark contrast of the desecuritization, (i.e., protest and opposition) movements in the Vietnam and Second Gulf Wars. The drone strike program not only allows for the strategic initiative to strike whenever and wherever deemed necessary, but also severely reduces the conversation within American discourse.
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Security K – BEJJ 2022 › Links › 2NC---Drones
Ronja Schahira Kaya Metzger 21, Spring 2021, Faculty of Culture and Society (KS), Department of Global Political Studies, "Security or Security Issue of tomorrow? Lethal Autonomous Weapon Systems", Malmo University, //AW
This section examines how LAWS are presented as a threat or security issue in the material. Furthermore, to which extend LAWS are not securitized or portrayed as threatening, in which a discourse of progress and growth play a role. The threats or vulnerabilities that lethal autonomous weapon systems create are linked to different thematic clusters and discourses. They can be summarised under key themes of technological discourse and threat of other actors, a military threat. Firstly, an important aspect in the construction of a threat in LAWS identified in the material is a cluster which will be referred to here as a new technology discourse. In this discourse, rapid technological advances are perceived as a security issue. The term new technology appears repeatedly in the material, though not always associated with linguistic means of threat production, but it is characterised as a discourse concerned with technological development. Where new technology is variously clustered with terms as: “cyber attacks” (E1) a “new technological age” (E2), “Hackers” (E1; E8)) and consequential terms such as “miscalculation”(E2), “manipulation”(E1), “misuse”(E1). To demonstrate this discourse element, I will use various examples from the material: New technologies are far more susceptible to proliferation, manipulation and misuse that conventional weapons. Hackers don´t need much more that a computer in order to carry out cyber attacks. (E1) 28 The second big driver of change and new technologies the topic of our conference today autonomous weapons systems have created the fear of killer robots that attack targets without human control. Cyber-attacks on critical infrastructure could paralyse entire countries. And while attribution remains difficult, retaliation could easily provoke unintended conflicts. (E2, cursive by me) These quotes exemplify the threatening or concerning discourse around new technology. In the first quote the threat is enacted in temporal and special terms of proximity, an ‘attack’ could occur at any moment inflicting some sort of personal harm as nothing more than a computer is needed. In the second quote, the modality marker ‘could’ contributes to the creation of an ominous threat. The source is not known or a ‘killer robot without human control’. All these construe images of speed, devastating effects, and imminence toward the recipient of the message. killer robots that Lord over life and death on the basis of autonomous datasets and entirely beyond human control are already a frightening real prospect today (…) fully autonomous weapons are susceptible to manipulation and also to miscalculation. Automatic escalations - ‘flash wars’ - and arms races are virtually inevitable. This is therefore a red line that we must not cross we are committed to this in Geneva [and] We need your support for this. (E1) Here, the metaphor of a red line is invoked concerning autonomous weapons systems, which is commonly used to symbolize a point of no return. Additionally, in the speech, analogies are used to induce fear. Analogies are often used to illustrate a threat, creating a link between a current crisis and a past situation in which neglect led to the fulfilment of the threat scenario (Cap, 2017). For example, in the 2019 speech, a link between the current crisis of technological developments and their possible impact on warfare to the discoveries of the German chemist Fritz Haber is made. Besides paving the way for “mass production of artificial fertilizers” (E1) which saved countless lives, Haber is known as the “father of gas warfare” (E1). Therefore, the example exemplifies the potential as well as threat emanating from new technologies. The linguistic creation of a threat emanating from LAWS and new technologies is more pronounced in the speeches of Foreign Minister Maas than in the small inquiries and the material of the CCW. An observation that coincides with the fact the speech genre functions in a broad category in which the speech is argumentative and supposed to entertain and persuade (Fairclough, 1995). While the statements from the CCW and the small inquiries fall more strongly in a category that is more argumentative, in which the text serves to inform and persuade. The statements for the CCW are published in an environment in which what is said is very controlled and the content is intertextually linked to prior statements which as Fairclough argues, signals continuity of discourse practices (Jorgensen & Phillips, 2002). The threat discourse of new technologies closely links the threat of LAWS with a discourse of cyber threat. The perception of cyber space as a threat environment has developed in Germany in recent decades. Cyber security became part of the public debate in Germany in the early 1990s. Yet, it was not strongly perceived as a threat until the early 2000s with the fear of the Millennium, bug. Then the terror attacks of 9/11 led to increased attention to various security risks. These included cyber security. In Germany, the cyber threat is particularly perceived in connection to the protection of personal data. Besides the event of 9/11, especially Edward Snowden led to increased public attention. Snowden's disclosure of the US National Security Agency (NSA) documents led to the increased relevance of cyber security. It raised the threat perception in the general public in 2013 (Schallbruch & Skierk, 2018). Sandywell (2006) suggests that post 9/11 new technology and especially the cyber space caused new insecurities through a blurring of the boundary between the physical and virtual, the global/regional. Where “states of emergency settle into a condition of permanent societal instability” (p.48). That these insecurities create a field in which the extreme manifestations of the cyber threat are linked to the threat discourse of global terrorism. Sandywell (2006) suggests that both discourses are marked with boundary dissolving characteristics, which have intrusive attributes. Further,that the blurring of common and familiar binaries suggests a more general state of emergency. On the textual level, the temporal and spatial boundaries are dissolved, and the threat is emanating from an unknown intrusive other (Sandywell, 2006). It is this sociocultural context that the threat of new technologies and risk perception of LAWS is linked with within Germany. A second theme or cluster of threats in which LAWS is embedded is the threat of ‘other actors’ and the changing of capabilities that could come with LAWS. Particularly, other states and illegitimate actors. As previously mentioned delegitimization can be used as a counterpart to underpin own legitimization, which can be enacted through ideas of difference, negative representations and geographical or cultural boundaries (Cap, 2017). In the speeches a starker image of the ‘other’ is created in representations: ‘we are urging President Putin (…) to ensure that Russia returns to compliance with the INF treaty. Its termination would have grave consequences for Europeans` security. (…) as a result of infringements, trust, transparency, and stability which we have built up labouredly over decades [is] at risk of being forfeited’(E1) ‘Players such a China must also take responsibility for strategic stability’(E1) ‘I (…) therefore welcome the willingness shown by the US to conduct talks with North Korea on the North Korean nuclear programme’(E1) These quotes while taken out of direct context serve to demonstrate the creation of images of other states. Russia is represented as non-compliant ‘other’ and while the substantives serve as negative attributions toward Russia, they simultaneously positively represent the in-groups Europe and Germany. Thus, it reinforces the mental-geographical boundary of Europe as a whole and its common identity. Undergirding the call on China is implicit a lack of taking responsibility for strategic stability. Contrary, the US is portrayed as positive, willing to conduct talks, while North Korea becomes a passive other. Therefore, a representation of the world is reinforced with positive attributes to allies such as the US and representations of ‘other’ to Russia, North Korea, and China. The ‘other’ in terms of states in the CCW material is only visible in reference to ‘potential adversaries’(E8), however, there is a reference concerning illegitimate actors as “terrorists” (E1; E8), “criminals” (E1) “illegitimate actors” (E1), and “illegitimate groups” (E9) who are “expanding their capacity to indiscriminately inflict harm and inflict terror on civilians” (E8). There are also consequential threats present in the material which are in causal relation with the aforementioned threat of ‘other actors’, the threat of arms race and arms proliferation. The threat of arms race is mentioned in different ways. That with the development of LAWS “threat perceptions are likely to change under the impression that potential adversaries have or are in the process of acquiring such weapon systems” (E8, omitting underline) and that “Arms races are under way around the world” (E1). However, an increase of possible arms race is articulated as not being limited to the development of LAWS: [In] the German government's assessment, the development of autonomous functions for use in weapon systems can further strengthen the already existing armament trends. (E18) Noticeable is that while in the material of the CCW conference the threat of an arms race is discussed in future terms, it is declared as already ongoing in the small inquiries and speeches. An image of a growing threat is generated through increased capacities of other states, which are, however not named and thus contribute to an ominous external threat. Further, a consequential threat of proliferation is articulated. It relates to illegitimate actors and how “transfer of software” (E8) is “difficult to prevent and even harder to detect” (E18) and that “the risk of [LAWS or predecessor technologies] uncontrolled proliferation [is] significantly greater than the corresponding risks of uncontrolled proliferation of finished weapon systems” (E18). Acknowledgement of the problem is followed by arguments that: 32 these concerns are being addressed and regulated by national administrative laws, in particular weapon laws and transport and traffic law. This enables governments to effectively stop or limit the spread of dangerous dual use technologies, if necessary. (E18)
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Mika Luoma-aho 02, Head of the Department of Social Studies and a Lecturer in International Relations at the University of Lapland in Finland, 12/01/2002, “Body of Europe and Malignant Nationalism: A Pathology of the Balkans in European Security Discourse”, Geopolotics, Vol. 7, Issue 3, p. 117 – 142 /lg
Cancer is a mysterious disease difficult to treat, and one that is often equated with death. Of all diseases, cancer has provided probably the most potent metaphor of illness since tuberculosis became treatable in the midtwentieth century.60 While tuberculosis is understood as a disease of one organ, cancer is understood as a disease that can turn up in any organ and one whose outreach is the whole body. It is a disease of growth – sometimes visible, more characteristically insidious – which may be arrested for periods of time, but is prone to recur. As defined by Mel Greaves, cancer is a collection of many disorders of cell and tissue function that have one special biological property in common: the territorial expansion of a mutant clone.61 Susan Sontag argued that when used as a metaphor, cancer appears as a pathology of space; its principal metaphors refer to topography – it may ‘spread, ‘proliferate’, or be ‘diffused’.62 This is also the most striking single image that can be found in almost all representations of malevolent nationalism in European security discourse: the threat of geographical escalation or spill-over from one part of Europe to another – most typically from east to west. Furthermore, the language used to describe cancer evokes a systemic catastrophe: ‘cells without inhibitions, cancer cells will continue to grow and extend over each other in a “chaotic” fashion, destroying the body’s normal cells, architecture, and functions’.63 Reliance on similar dichotomies, such as order/chaos and normal/abnormal, in the discursive economy of nationalism is striking and more than coincidental. What is also interesting is that in the discourse of cancer the language of military strategy is often applied: cancer cells do not simply multiply, but are ‘invasive’; they ‘colonise’ from the original tumour to far sites in the body by metastasising; and only rarely are the body’s own ‘defences’ strong enough to fight a tumour made of millions of destructive cells.
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François Debrix & Alexander D. Barder 11, Professor and Director of ASPECT of the Department of Political Science at Virginia Tech University & Associate Professor and Graduate Program Director for International Relations at Florida International University, 08/29/2011, “2. Nothing to fear but fear itself: governmentality and the reproduction of terror” (book chapter in Beyond Biopolitics: Theory, violence, and horror in world politics) /lg
A telling example of this self-mobilization and self-immunization against one ’s body and flesh can be found in the way Western states (or, rather, some of their governmental agents and agencies) along with some transnational organizations (the World Health Organization, the United Nations) asked populations the world over to preemptively take charge of their health, hygiene, and everyday routines in the context of the recent A/H1N1 (or “ swine flu ” ) pandemic. In this popular health scare, as with many other instances of spreading epidemics over the past decade (SARS, the H5N1 “ bird flu, ” but also AIDS before), individual beings were asked to be the primary layer of securitization and defense against terror by turning their bodies (and those of family members, neighbors, co-workers, and so on) into primordial sites of scrutiny, intervention, and indeed governance. With the “ swine flu ” fear, a constant questioning of one ’s body movements and symptomatic features, along with one ’ s daily habits, became an automatic (and auto-immune) and mostly unquestioned safeguard against the epidemic. Humanity ’s bodies, the physiology of the human species, but also the meaning of what it means to be human (and whether humanity should be reduced to a management of the fl esh) became the main targets of the pandemic terror but, just as crucially, of the containment terror that followed the revelation of the pandemic. This governance of the “ swine flu ” and its scare (the disease and its terror were indeed inseparable from the moment a pandemic discourse was launched) was then based on a series of menial operations at the level of the human body and flesh (do I have a fever? Is my cough a sign that I have been infected? Did I remember to wash my hands after riding the bus or the subway?). Of course, it also relied on several self-cancellation measures (I must stay home for days if I feel sick; I must wear a protective mask if I venture outside and have a runny nose; we must close entire schools for as long as necessary if we suspect that children in the community have the flu).
In the end, the swine flu terror also raised vital questions about what humanity today is by proliferating a succession of moral quandaries that actually sought to recon figure humanity as that which is always already primed for sacrifice. Among such so-called fundamental social dilemmas were questions like: Must I sacrifice my body and my self if my children are not yet sick but I am (and thus, I could infect them)? Will I have to allow myself to go without treatment (and possibly not make it) if it turns out that, as was reported, there are not enough vaccines for everybody? Must I segregate myself, and remove my body from the community of the living, so as not to let the remaining healthy bodies be even more at risk? The sacrificial logic involved in the swine fl u scare may evoke some of René Girard ’ s theorizations, particularly to the extent that this form of sacrifice appears to be aimed at the safeguarding of the community. But today’s self-sacrificial or self effacing logic goes far beyond the claim advanced by Girard that “ the sacrifice serves to protect the entire community from its own violence. ” 71 Or, for that matter, that the ritual of the sacrifice “ prompts the entire community to choose victims outside itself. ” 72 To the contrary, the encouraged sacrificial ritual of the swine flu pandemic terror is, to repeat, an auto-immune response or attitude that, far from casting violence away, actually seeks to keep it within and strives to spread it, sometimes in a horrific fashion, to as many living members of the community as possible. In fact, by placing itself beyond the threshold of both life and death, and by questioning the meaning of the human itself (and suggesting that the human should be redefi ed as that which is always ready for sacrifice), the swine flu sacrificial terror enters the realm of agonal politics and brings in the specter of a horror whereby humans must allow themselves to be quarantined, potentially culled, possibly manipulated and tested upon beyond death, and eventually left to decay in a condition of neither life nor death (not bios , not zoe , and not even thanatos ) where the human is rendered unrecognizable as human.
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Gunther Hellman, et. al, 17; Benjamin Herborth, Gabi Schlag, and Christian Weber—Professor of Political Science at Goathe University of Frankfurt, Assistant professor at the University of Groningen, Faculty of the Arts, critical security studies senior lecturer at the University of Tuebingen, Goethe University, Faculty of Social Sciences, “The West: a securitizing community?” Journal of International Relations and Development (2017) 301–330. doi:10.1057/jird.2013.9;
NATO’s strategic discourse and the self-authorisation of ‘the West’ While the first research area dealt with representations of ‘authoritarian regimes’ that are by definition categorised as being outside of the boundaries of ‘the West’, this research area focuses on the transformation of NATO, that is, the military alliance that is considered to be the institutional core of what we usually call ‘the West’ (e.g., Gress 2004; Brzezinski 2009). Obviously, transatlantic security cooperation has been a classical theme in IR, either from a realist vantage point, where NATO is primarily described as a defence alliance subordinated to national purposes (Waltz 2000: 18), or from a liberal perspective, where NATO is understood as an alliance of democracies (RisseKappen 1995: 4). In both perspectives, however, the dynamics of security cooperation between North America and Europe seem unproblematic as long as the allies are convinced of their common interest or their shared values.
NATO’s (lasting) ability to voice in-/securities — for example a ‘Soviet threat’, ‘terrorism’, or ‘new challenges’ — directs our attention to highly institutionalised dynamics of securitisation that, as the subsequent analysis will show, manifest themselves as a self-authorisation of ‘the West’ in order to defend its normative foundation. Such a tendency towards self-authorisation has become visible in different forms since the North Atlantic alliance was founded in 1949. During the Cold War, it primarily enabled a rather deep institutionalisation of military cooperation with an integrated command structure including US nuclear weapons, as well as common strategic planning and defence exercises. After the Cold War, this project was continued but it has certainly changed in form. Out-of-area operations and the development of a globally active alliance is one of the most visible expressions of such self authorising practices. These dynamics were central to re-constitute NATO during critical junctures and have been productive of a highly self-confident Western alliance today (Jackson 2003; Bially Mattern 2005; Behnke 2013).
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Dr. Donald Stoker 20, Professor of Strategy and Policy for the U.S. Naval War College program at the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, California. Dr. Craig Whiteside is an associate professor of National Security Affairs at the U.S. Naval War College as part of the resident program, Winter 2020, “Blurred Lines: Gr ed Lines: Gray-Zone Conflict and Hybrid W one Conflict and Hybrid War—Two Failures of American Strategic Thinking,” Naval War College Review, V. 73 No. 1 Article 4 [ML]
Tactics, or the tactical realm, deal with how military forces directly fight the enemy. Weapons technologies and methods for using them drive tactics more than any other factor, and the constant roiling of technology means tactics never stand still. Also relevant to this discussion is the so-called spectrum of conflict. This is a commonly used term that seeks to classify the interaction among nations (at war or not), often (but not always) by the scale and type of means being used. 11 Soldier-scholar Harry Summers pointed out that this notion entered the U.S. military lexicon as the “spectrum of war” via the U.S. Army’s 1962 Field Service Regulations. Then the spectrum stretched from cold war to limited war. Summers correctly identified a “serious flaw”: the spectrum fails to delineate between war and peace. 12 This type of defective thinking continues to feed current American misconceptions as we continue to confuse war and peace, something manifest in the discussions of hybrid war, gray-zone war, and so-called cyber war. In a 2016 article, Lieutenant General James Dubik, USA (Ret.), made an argument similar to that of Summers, observing that U.S. leaders are fuzzy about just what war is, a problem fed by the 1994 adoption (really, readoption) of a spectrum-of-conflict approach to strategic analysis. 13 Objecting to using this inaccurate analytical tool does not, as some argue, merely “perpetuate the binary peace/war distinction.” 14 It is in reality an insistence on clear analysis and an embrace of the notion that peace and war are not the same. Their relationship is not binary; it is dialectical. War and peace are best defined in opposition to one another, as one is the antithesis of the other. If a state is engaged in armed conflict, it is at war. The armed conflict can be with another state or not. Clausewitz famously defines war as “an act of force,” one intended to achieve a political object. Lukas Milevski cogently observes that Clausewitz’s definition “elegantly encapsulates the three most important elements of war: violence, instrumentality,” and its adversarial nature. If the state is not in an armed conflict, it is at peace. Thomas Hobbes tells us that peace is the absence of war. 15 War should not be confused with warfare, which usually is defined as the undertaking of the military actions themselves. Understanding this is critical because we begin our analysis with the question whether the nation is at war. One must remember, though, that nations can be in competition with one another and not be at war and involved in killing the soldiers (and usually civilians) of the other state. Competition among all states, friendly or not, is a norm—and to be preferred. But allowing our analysis of wars or competition among states to rest on intellectual constructs that fail to honor the critical distinction between war and peace means we have lost the logical foundation for critical analysis.
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Glenn Edward Greenwald 13, an American journalist, author and lawyer. In 2014, he cofounded The Intercept, January 28th, 2013, “Pentagon's new massive expansion of 'cyber-security' unit is about everything except defense, The Guardian, [ML]
As the US government depicts the Defense Department as shrinking due to budgetary constraints, the Washington Post this morning announces "a major expansion of [the Pentagon's] cybersecurity force over the next several years, increasing its size more than fivefold." Specifically, says the New York Times this morning, "the expansion would increase the Defense Department's Cyber Command by more than 4,000 people, up from the current 900." The Post describes this expansion as "part of an effort to turn an organization that has focused largely on defensive measures into the equivalent of an Internet-era fighting force." This Cyber Command Unit operates under the command of Gen. Keith Alexander, who also happens to be the head of the National Security Agency, the highly secretive government network that spies on the communications of foreign nationals - and American citizens.
The Pentagon's rhetorical justification for this expansion is deeply misleading. Beyond that, these activities pose a wide array of serious threats to internet freedom, privacy, and international law that, as usual, will be conducted with full-scale secrecy and with little to no oversight and accountability. And, as always, there is a small army of private-sector corporations who will benefit most from this expansion.
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Joe Burton & Clare Lain 20, Joe Burton is the Associate Lecturer in the School of IR at the University of St Andrews, Clare Lain is the Head of International Bodies and Technical Engagement, “Desecuritising cybersecurity: towards a societal approach,” Journal of Cyber Policy, Volume 5, Issue 3, 12/14/2020, p455-460 \\pairie
Reinterpreting cyberconflict – path dependency, securitisation and the national cybersecurity state
If the societal security approach is an effective theoretical tool to understand recent cyber events, and a potentially more salient policy framework, then how is it that national and military security-based approaches to cybersecurity have become so dominant in the previous two decades? In answering that question, this section analyses several events that led to the emergence and subsequent consolidation of national cybersecurity states and undermined the emergence of a more decentralised, societal approach based on identity conflicts and socio-psychological factors. This is not an extensive history of post-Cold War cyberconflict. Nevertheless, these cases provide snapshots of the process by which cybersecurity was ‘securitised’ by many governments in the West and national security agencies obtained considerable power in this emergent domain. Cyberattacks were framed in the discourse of political leaders during this period as an existential threat to nations that would cause major disruptions to national economies and be catalysts for conflict between the great powers. Growing concerns over internet failure and instability and attacks against critical infrastructure were instrumental in creating fear and paranoia, but also served the political and commercial purposes of securitising actors and hindered the emergence of societal approaches. Later in the period, owing partly to the growing influence of social media platforms, the societal effects of disinformation were layered into anxiety-saturated cyber policy. Importantly, these cases also created path-dependencies in which the relationship between government and the societal sector worsened and through which military agencies and structures have taken actions that have intensified societal and cybersecurity dilemmas.
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Ivan Arreguin-Toft 22, Ph.D teaches cybersecurity strategy @ Brown University Watson Institute of International, “Achieving True Cybersecurity Is Impossible,” The National Interest, 06/17/2022,
Cybersecurity the way we like to think of it is actually impossible to achieve. That’s not to say we shouldn’t try hard to achieve it. Nor is it the same thing as saying that our costly efforts to date have been wasted. Instead, if our aim is to make our interactions in cyberspace more secure, we need to recognize two things.
First, part of our troubles has to do with a culture that defines things like success, victory, and security as dichotomous rather than continuous variables. Think of a switch that’s either on or off. Second, speed is hurting us, and calls to replace humans with much faster and “objective” machines will continue to gain momentum, putting us at extreme risk without increasing either our security or prosperity. Let me explain.
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---ask them in CX who attacks? How do they attack? The internal link chain for cyberattacks escalating to nuclear war is intentionally made as vague as possible
Sean Lawson & Michael K. Middleton 19, Sean is an associate professor in Communication at the University of Utah, Michael is an associate professor in Communication at the University of Utah, “Cyber Pearl Harbor: Analogy, fear, and the framing of cyber security threats in the United States, 1991-2016,” First Manday, Volume 24, Number 3 – 4, March 2019, https://journals.uic.edu/ojs/index.php/fm/article/view/9623 \\pairie
Cyber Pearl Harbor in the securitization of cyberspace
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AT: No Link---AFF will say something like our specific instance in securitization---this card is just like it’s part of broader violent framing
Karsten Friis & Olav Lysne 21, Karsten is a Senior Research Fellow and head of NUPIs Research group on security & defense, Olav is a directed of Simula Metropolitian & professor of Communication Systems @ Oslo Metropolitan University, “Huawei, 5G and Security: Technological Limitations and Political Reponses,” Development and Change, Volume 52, Issue 5, p1174-1179
This changed dramatically as Western states begun preparing for the fifth generation (5G) networks. The United States embarked upon a global campaign to prevent Chinese suppliers — and in particular the company Huawei — from delivering 5G infrastructure. The American claim was that Chinese equipment would represent a national security hazard for those depending upon it — not because of its technical functionality and stability, but because it allegedly could be a gateway for Chinese espionage and sabotage of Western critical infrastructure. In other words, 5G and Chinese suppliers were securitized. The topic was elevated from the realm of ordinary politics and treated as an emergency, thus legitimizing extraordinary countermeasures (Buzan et al., 1998).
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Joe Burton and George Christou 21, Joe Burton is the Associate Lecturer in the School of IR at the University of St Andrews, George Christou is the professor of chemistry @ the University of Florida “Bridging the gap between cyberwar and cyberpeace,” International Affairs 97, 11/01/2021,
However cyber warfare is defined—and, just as with the term ‘terrorism’, there is unlikely to be a uniform definition or understanding accepted across all polities—explanations for its emergence as an empirical phenomenon are fairly limited. At the systemic level on which structural realist accounts of international relations tend to focus, cyber capabilities emerge to fulfil political needs within an anarchic system (and a global network of computers), which is ungoverned and ungovernable by nation-states. In this sense, cyberwar capabilities are developed as a natural extension of (and new medium for) existing geopolitical tensions and disputes. The development and use of cyber warfare capabilities by one power drives fear and uncertainty in other states, which invest in similar capabilities themselves. According to this logic, cyber warfare is a strategic chain reaction caused by security dilemmas. That these systemic dynamics are only now receiving sustained and rigorous academic attention,11 and that the second-order effects of cyber deployment (such as arms races) are only beginning to be fully recognized,12 is surprising and disconcerting. A further explanation relates to the nature of the domain of cyberspace itself. Because cyber capabilities can be used covertly, and cyber attacks are difficult to attribute (at least legally and politically, if not technically), they are attractive to revisionist actors, who use them as part of hybrid operations (in combination with special forces operations, disinformation and propaganda, and economic or political coercion) to advance their interests.13
Most of these structural and systemic explanations of the emergence of cyber warfare fail to appreciate the historical, cultural and ideational drivers of cyber conflict, and indeed the cultural, historical and political contexts in which cyberwar capabilities have emerged. Cyber warfare entered the popular imagination during a period of immense historical change and uncertainty. In the 1990s, the fear of hackers, often depicted as cloaked and masked figures, began to displace the fear of the ‘communist under the bed’.14 The instability caused by the disintegration of states in the post-Cold War era and the emergence of complex identity-based conflict was also influential. In Kosovo in 1999, networks of Serbian and Chinese hackers retaliated through cyberspace for the bombing of, respectively, Serbian forces and the Chinese Embassy. This fed into concerns within national security establishments that the modern battlefield was no longer a place in which nations had a monopoly on the use of force, and that a form of warfare was emerging unlike what soldiers had faced before.15 These dynamics were compounded by anticipation of the Millennium (Y2K) Bug, an event which many feared would lead to a global internet meltdown, and which set a precedent for military involvement in cyber-security affairs.16 The ‘war on terror’ perhaps did more than anything to heighten fears around the internet, with fears about cyberterrorism and ‘cyber doom scenarios’ (digital 9/11s) emerging out of acts of real violence by jihadists.17 This period of fear and uncertainty corresponded with an exponential growth in internet users, the formation of social networks, and the use of securitizing discourse to present the internet as something that needed to be managed, controlled and fought over. As Richard Ashley has argued, the conditions of the post-Cold War era—particularly the uncertainty that was inherent in both policymaking and academic communities during this period—created the conditions (a vacuum) for new security narratives (cyberwar in this case) to emerge.18 The cyberwar narrative thus gave meaning and order to a seemingly anarchic international environment. Cyberwar was not, of course, the only narrative that arose to fill the gap created by the demise of the Soviet Union. Fears over environmental and social disintegration, and the threats of civilizational conflict and jihadism, were also prominent; and the destabilizing impact of technology on national and global security became a dominant discourse that was often integrated with other security concerns—the overwrought fear of cyberterrorism, for example.
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Akin Ünver and Ahmet Kurnaz 22, Department of International Relations, Özyeğin University, İstanbul; Turkey; Ahmet Kurnaz Department of Public Administration and Political Science Çanakkale Onsekiz Mart University, Çanakkale, Turkey. “Securitization of Disinformation in NATO Lexicon: A Computational Text Analysis”, 2/21/22 \\pairie
Since then, strategic communicative actions that are intended to influence, mislead and confuse foreign populations have assumed a central position in global debates about politics and foreign policy. Given the impact of such actions on elections, polarization and crisis management, it was natural for the rhetoric about these actions to assume such a central position(Bradshaw, Howard, 2018). However, over time, popular buzzwords like ‘disinformation/misinformation’, ‘fake news’, and ‘information operations’ have proliferated in global political mainstream discourse and assumed an accusatory nature worldwide as more leaders, diplomats, and politicians have begun using them to discredit and delegitimize their political opponents. This dynamic was later conceptualized as ‘discursive deflection’ (Ross, Rivers, 2018; Smith, 2019) and became acutely visible in the foreign policy domain, as more countries have begun securitizing the concepts ‘fake news’, ‘disinformation’, and ‘information warfare’ to similarly discredit, and delegitimize rival countries(Baum, Potter, 2019). Broadly speaking, ‘discursive-deflection’ is the strategy of discrediting competitors and rivals by portraying oneself as the sole source of truth. While the domestic political use of these terms is well-studied, we are still somewhat in the dark with regard to why countries choose to securitize these terms and what happens in their interactions with other countries when they do so.
The foreign policy use of such terms predates the 2016 US elections and proliferated after the Russian military involvement in Crimea and Donbas (Khaldarova, Pantti, 2016). The primary reason for this contextual proliferation was the Russian decision to deny the initial stages of its involvement in Ukraine and its broader strategy of distracting and dividing Western attention over Russian military operations (Mejias, Vokuev, 2017). There is still a debate over whether it was really Russian information operations that had derailed NATO response in Ukraine, or if disinformation discourses are employed in order to shift the blame over to Russia at a time when NATO was already divided over its commitment to Ukraine (Lysenko, Brooks, 2018). While there is robust evidence of Russian information operations in Ukraine and its role in spreading disinformation in NATO countries, sustained NATO apathy towards rising Russian military influence in the Black Sea after 2014 and Syria after 2015 support the latter claim.
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Jeroen Warner, Ingrid Boaswageningen University, Netherlandscorresponding Author, 3-13-2019, "Securitization of climate change: How invoking global dangers for instrumental ends can backfire," SAGE Journals,
Davoudi (2014) shows how the social understanding of nature moved from nature-as-clockwork (Enlightenment) through nature-as-finite (Club of Rome, 1970s), through nature as risk (1990s) to discourses of global danger and insecurity caused by nature. The author traces the rise of ‘climate securitization’ back to a conference, ‘The Changing Atmosphere: Implications for Global Security’ in Toronto in 1988, which portrayed the consequences of climate change as only second to nuclear war. Since the 1990s climate change has often been presented as a global crisis, an existential threat to human civilization, a planetary catastrophe (Paglia, 2018). Yet, unlike an aggressive force out to conquer foreign territory, climate change is a special domain of emergency, that of ‘threats without enemies’ (Prins, 1993). As argued by Methmann and Rothe (2012: 328), climate is depicted as an external threat, with impacts coming suddenly, ‘from the outside’. Issues of risk and security ‘can provoke strong emotions, legitimise extraordinary practices, and lead to practices that are otherwise indefensible’ (Davoudi, 2014: 371–372). Environmental securitization however is an uncertain domain for securitization (Buzan et al., 1998; Trombetta, 2008). In climate change, the burden of proof to legitimize securitization is especially tricky. While a clear majority of the academic community considers anthropogenic climate change sufficiently proven, its invisibility as a source of anticipated catastrophes that have yet to happen, cannot easily compete with visible weather events in the ‘attention economy' (Hamblyn, 2009). Other publics, then, are not convinced, as has become clear for instance under the Trump administration. Moreover, there is no ready consensus within the academic community on a clear and present nexus between climate change, violent conflict and/or migration (Adams et al., 2018), and if there is, that it can be successfully averted through a particular course of action. The lack of ‘full closure' has not stopped some from trying to securitise climate change. But overstressing the security dimension risks reducing democratic accountability (Coaffee et al., 2008). Some scholars have indeed warned for a security discourse to induce aversive policies, such as a larger role for the military to cope with feared effects of global warming like climate migration (Hartmann, 2010). Indeed, issues that can harm military capability, are more likely to become securitized than those that cannot (Fidler, 2007). Not only is climate a ‘threat without an enemy’ (Prins, 1993) but also lacks a ‘hero’ to save the day. Armed forces can defeat an invading enemy, a SWAT team can neutralise a terrorist, ICT experts can intercept a hacker, civil engineers and water managers can stop the flood, but no single actor can stop climate change. A pitfall of climate securitization therefore is that of instilling a sense of ontological insecurity in the intended audience rather than rallying support. Presenting an apocalyptic picture without a ‘way out’ upsets people’s basic sense of security and trust in the world around them. ‘Insecuritizing’ them (Bigo, 2002) instils a feeling of helplessness in the recipients of the message, a perceived lack of agency, leading people to ignore the issue and hide behind a false sense of security in their home and community (Harries, 2008). The way out becomes the domain of more mundane technocratic practices. ‘[A]pocalyptic climate change is articulated as overstraining the capacity of political actors, and thus as ruling out exceptional measures and passing responsibility to the “political machine” (…)’ (Methmann and Rothe, 2012: 324). The security discourse on climate change has not resulted in successful securitization in the sense of having led to exceptional measures being accepted and implemented (Corry, 2012; Methmann and Rothe, 2012; Oels, 2012). Instead, it ‘is so exaggerated that it prompts the opposite: routine and micro-practices of risk management: mitigation as precautionary risk management, adaptation as investing in preparedness, and security not as pre-empting but as a combination of the former two’ (Methman and Rothe, 2012: 337). In adding to these scholarly analyses, our study interrogates the question of failed climate securitization through an in-depth empirical account. It hereby further contextualizes and situates arguments provided by others, such as Methmann and Rothe (2012), and points to further explanatory factors that thus far have received less attention. Indeed, both cases point to the rather instrumental character of the securitizing moves by political actors to ‘sell' climate policy and explain why this has not benefited their success amongst the core target audiences. The next section will examine such discursive strategies on climate change and security through the case of the UK’s climate diplomacy in the international policy arena in the late 2000s. Thereafter, our second case traces the genesis, ‘marketing' and resonance of a national plan to make the Dutch delta climate-proof. A comparison between the two (see Table 1) looks at the key elements of securitization – an existential threat and the ‘only way out’, the degree to which this resonated and was responded to by key audiences.