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2022 Michigan Kritik
Security K – BEJJ 2022 › Links › 2NC---Climate

The alarmist climate security narrative presented of the 1ac generates massive skepticism – causes emerging countries to reject the plan which crushes solvency

Jeroen Warner, Ingrid Boaswageningen University, Netherlandscorresponding Author, 3-13-2019, "Securitization of climate change: How invoking global dangers for instrumental ends can backfire," SAGE Journals,

By strengthening the climate security coalition, more pressure was put on those states still needing to make ambitious mitigation commitments during the UNFCCC negotiations on the post-Kyoto Framework. The primary countries the FCO targeted at that time were the US and the emerging developing countries (FCO, 2007: 71). But these emerging countries were precisely those overtly rejecting the security narrative on climate change, criticizing the move to discuss climate change in the Security Council during the UN Security Council debates on climate change in 2007 and 2011, and expressing great scepticism regarding alarmist security framings on climate change. To counter the security discourse on climate change, the Brazilian delegation for instance argued: ‘…utmost caution must be exercised in establishing links between conflict and the utilization of natural resources or the evolution of climate on our planet’ (UNSC, 2007: 20). Similar comments were made by other emerging countries, such as China and India, and received support from other developing countries who see climate change as a matter of sustainable development (Boas, 2015; Sindico, 2007). In particular, emerging giants with no special voting powers in the UN Security Council, such as India and Brazil, have been highly sceptical of these moves and preferred climate change to be discussed in fora where they do have decision-making power. In the 2011 debate, Brazil, Russia, India and China, generally expressing scepticism with respect to a security framing of climate change, showed consideration with the precarious situation of developing small island states (SIDS). The four BRICS countries however accused the West of intending to change the terms of the debate by lifting climate change to the level of the UN Security Council (Boas, 2015) – a clear case of ‘venue shopping’ (Pralle, 2009). In India, for instance, it triggered distrust and a defensive position towards the UK’s intentions, adding to a tense negotiation climate. In the words of the former Indian Prime Minister’s Special Envoy on Climate Change, ‘the security argument put forward by the West is an attempt to deflect attention away from what they need to do themselves’.10 In 2013, the UK together with Pakistan tried to convene another formal UN Security Council debate on the subject, which was however blocked by Russia and China (King, 2013). The debate still happened but in an informal setting under the so-called ‘Arriaformula’. In 2015, another ‘Arriaformula’ debate was held, then initiated by Spain and Malaysia (Werrell and Femia, 2015). Thus while some emerging developing countries continue to oppose the idea, others, such as Malaysia and Pakistan, shifted to the side of the securitizers, suggesting an increasing disagreement on the subject amongst the leading countries of the G-77 group. Whilst the Small Island States actively raise the security argument in the UN Security Council, there is dissent at home as to whether this is the appropriate frame. For instance, small-island state populations resist the associated helpless image of drowning islands producing so-called ‘climate refugees’ (Farbotko and Lazrus, 2012). In addition, the alarmist climate security narrative was also unable to maintain a support base within the UK itself in recent years. The tide turned when the Conservatives came to power in 2010 and gave the promotion of climate action in the UNFCCC a lower level of priority. The focus turned more to other crises, which were experienced more directly at home, such as the economic crisis and Brexit. In the 2010 National Security Strategy and the 2010 Strategic Defence and Security Review, the striving for a multilateral deal on climate change mitigation was only mentioned once (Cabinet Office, 2010: 18), without employing a security narrative to promote efforts towards such action. The policy constituency within the UK had eroded, making space for alternative and related framings (see Boas and Rothe, 2016, for details).

2022 Michigan Kritik
Security K – BEJJ 2022 › Links › 2NC---China Threat

‘China threat’ scholarship creates a self-fulfilling prophecy and enables violence against the Chinese other.

Weiqing Song 15, associate professor of political science at the University of Macau, received his Ph.D. in political science from the University of Siena, Italy. His research interests include European politics, Chinese foreign policy, and China’s post-socialist regime. His research has appeared in a number of international peer-reviewed journals,5-1-2015, "Securitization of the "China Threat" Discourse: A Poststructuralist Account", The China Review, //AW

The concept of the “China threat” is not new; its history in the West is more than a century long. Initially, the implications of the term China threat were primarily cultural and social: the Chinese people and their traditions were portrayed by popular Western writers as malevolent, alien, and threatening to Western culture.1 This depiction remained in the Western imagination and later expanded to include the political realm, in which China was represented as brutal and belligerent, especially during the heyday of McCarthyism or the “Second Red Scare” following China’s regime change in 1949.2 In recent decades, and particularly since the end of the Cold War, the so-called China threat has become a topical issue within contemporary international relations (IR).3 The concept has taken on a more prominent role in Western political discourse—especially, but not exclusively, in the United States—over the past two decades. It not only has been introduced into the public sphere by journalists and other opinion leaders, but has entered the domain of policy through the work of policy analysts and politicians.4 Those concerned by the China threat argue in essence that a rising China poses an increasing, imminent, and real threat both to its neighbors and to far-distant countries. Moreover, this threat is perceived to be comprehensive, with security-related, military, economic, and environmental implications. Naturally, this hotly debated topic has also received scholarly attention. Most researchers have taken either a positivist or a normative approach to the issue of the “China threat.” Positivist studies emphasize causal factors, whereas the aim of normative research is to refute or support a given thesis from a historical and ideological perspective. Both positivist and normative researchers provide theoretical and practical insights into the study of the alleged “China threat,” together with recommendations for dealing with it. Roy, one of the first scholars to address the issue of the China threat from an IR perspective,5 provides a survey of the major arguments on both sides of the debate, including a literature review of neorealist and neoclassical–realist theories of the threat posed by China and policy recommendations for Western governments. Notable original research on the China threat topic has continued to emerge over the years. Taking a more liberal approach, Li argues that the challenge posed by a fastgrowing China to stability in and beyond the Asia-Pacific region depends on the expectations of Chinese policy makers, who operate in a highly economically interdependent environment.6 They are more likely to use peaceful means to settle disputes with neighbors and others if they perceive economic benefits to arise from such a strategy. Other scholars use realist-IR theory (particularly power-transition theory) to contend that the so-called China threat has emerged in the political discourse of the United States and other Western countries in response to the rise of China.7 In another review article, Jeffery argues thought-provokingly for the danger of creating a real China threat through “historical analogies” with previous challenger states.8 For instance, power-transition theorists in the realist-IR school compare China’s threat with that of 19th-century Germany, and adherents of the successor state image theory draw analogies with the Soviet Union. Most of the Chinese scholars involved in this debate take a normative approach to the issue. They focus on two major questions: why the issue of the China threat exists and how to cope with it. Chen argues that from a legal and historical perspective, the China threat allegations made by U.S. politicians, defense officials, and academics are nothing but a reincarnation of the “yellow peril” conspiracy theory promulgated by Tsarist Russia and Wilhelmine Germany in the late 19th century.9 This view is echoed by Shi, who takes a postcolonial approach to interpreting the position of the China threat within Western discourse.10 More directly, Luo challenges the China threat thesis on the grounds that the nature of the international threat posed by China depends on its foreignpolicy strategy rather than on its growing power; as Chinese policy makers have exhibited little inclination to challenge international peace and stability, the China threat argument is unfounded.11 In terms of policy recommendations, Chinese scholars such as Chen, Feng, and Jiang suggest that the Chinese government should win trust from other states by making its peace-loving foreign strategy clear and participating more actively in the international community.12 A few researchers diverge from the mainstream response to this issue. Oliver Turner, for example, highlights the ideational rather than material factors in the processes of representing the China threat complicit in the U.S.–China policy.13 He argues that the main purpose of these processes is to create a threatening Chinese identity, foreign to that of the United States, to trigger actions that reinforce the binary opposition between the two countries. Before Turner and in the same vein, Pan takes a poststructuralist discursive approach to interpreting the role of the China threat within the U.S. political discourse. He focuses on the “discursive construction of otherness” by which China is fashioned as a “threatening, absolute other” to the “US-led evolutionary scheme.”14 Much of Pan’s discussion of this issue is devoted to real policy implications, namely the risk that considering “theory as practice” in U.S. policy will give rise to a real “China threat.”15 He further expands his scope of enquiry by deconstructing the Western representation of China’s rise. To him, dominant Western perceptions of China’s rise tell us less about China and more about Western self-imagination and its desire for certainty.

2022 Michigan Kritik
Security K – BEJJ 2022 › Links › 2NC---China Threat

The language that we use matters---it contributes to the way we construct the Chinese threat

Qiana Gilkey, xx-xx-2022, "How do speech acts contribute to the securitization of China?," Malmo University, //jc

[analysis of Dr. Stephen Roach, a senior fellow at the Jackson Institute of Global Affairs and senior lecturer at Yale University]

In Roach’s quote, the language used is quite interesting. It is not brazen to say Roach is being rather presumptuous by speaking on behalf of ‘the world’ and the perspectives it has on China. The international system and particularly the economic system is dominated by American and Western norms, so while this statement may be true for states in the Global North, the same cannot be assumed of states in the Global South. Therefore, by assuming and stating that ‘the world’ is in an uncomfortable position with China’s growing presence, Roach constitutes a securitizing actor and is attempting to securitize China by framing its rise as leaving the world in an uncomfortable place that may further devolve in the future. This relates to the aspects of American strategy by Chengqiu (2020) by preventing China from challenging its hegemony.

2022 Michigan Kritik
Security K – BEJJ 2022 › Links › 2NC---China Threat

The Aff’s framing of “China threat” is part of a broader violent attempt to protect the “American identity”

Qiana Gilkey, xx-xx-2022, "How do speech acts contribute to the securitization of China?," Malmo University, //jc

The framing of the ‘China threat’ draws attention to securitization theory as this construction is a distinctive example of securitization. Many are divided on if China actually poses an existential threat. Amongst scholars, the threat China poses is overinflated, while US elites frame China as a genuine threat that should be taken seriously and policies should reflect it. The US-Sino tensions are based in relevance to competition regarding hegemonic status based on the perceived ‘China threat’ from the US. This power shift of China as a rising power can lead to the US and China falling to the Thucydides Trap (Lee, 2019; Mastro, 2018), and there will be a major war during the shift of power. This concept is closely related to the power transition theory which can be operationalized to predict the probability of a war between the two states. While power transition theory is important in understanding the potential for conflict, it does not illustrate why and how tensions arose, much less the effect securitization had on the tensions. It can also lead to a security dilemma in which the US perceives the modernization of China’s military as a threat and challenging its regional hegemonic status (Ambrosio et al, 2020; Jie, 2020). The modernization and advances in military capabilities are not the only way in which the US perceives China as a threat. The ‘China threat’ has been used by the US to protect its interests in national security, the international economic sector, and energy security (Campion, 2020; Nyman, 2014). Campion (2020) and Nyman (2014) use a critical discourse analysis of the energy and cybersecurity sectors to see how they have become intertwined in the construction of China as a threat. Since perceptions of security and insecurity are discursive constructions, it is useful to use speech-acts to uncover how the issues are advanced from everyday politics to high politics (Buzan and Wæver, 2009) and how it constitutes an existential threat. Despite both countries being economically intertwined and cooperative through international organizations and bilateral agreements, China perceives the US as untrustworthy and imposing, while the US views China as a threat in many sectors and a potential challenger to its position as a unipole and regional hegemon. (Nyman, 2014). China is perceived as a threat to the status quo, therefore it poses a threat to the American identity. Chengqiu’s (2020) article does not analyze the US-Sino rivalry in relevance to securitization, but ideational differences and perceptions have been factors that affect the relationship between the two countries. The theoretical framework used is a combination of the cognitive psychology of perceptions and misperceptions by Jervis and social constructivism by Wendt. The data of the American strategy toward China was surmised on four aspects, 7 integrating China into the Western-dominated international economic system, transforming China into a liberal democracy, engaging with China to solve regional and international issues, and preventing China from challenging American hegemony (Chengqiu, 2020: 35). By analyzing the policies towards China from the 1990s to 2020 the results showed how much of a threat China was constructed to be according to each president and if they were competitive or collaborative. The results showed the policies towards China varied according to the perceptions of each president but have progressively become more combative while China’s policies towards the US have been relatively stable. Contrastingly, Almén et al (2021) specifically analyze the perceptional differences between the US and China in three sectors: political, economic, and security. Diverging from Chengqiu, their findings show that the US perceives China as trying to spread authoritarian and communist ideologies and overturn the international order, which China perceives the US as an ‘increasingly antagonistic hegemon that strives for regime change in China’ (Almén et al, 2021: 79). Their position and findings are better suited to this thesis, as the assumption is the US perceiving China as an existential threat that needs immediate attention.

2022 Michigan Kritik
Security K – BEJJ 2022 › Links › 2NC---China Threat

Threat constructions of China that rely on totalizing theories of IR are detached from epistemological or ontological foundations—scientific theories crowd out alternative perspectives.

Weiqing Song 15, associate professor of political science at the University of Macau, received his Ph.D. in political science from the University of Siena, Italy. His research interests include European politics, Chinese foreign policy, and China’s post-socialist regime. His research has appeared in a number of international peer-reviewed journals,5-1-2015, "Securitization of the "China Threat" Discourse: A Poststructuralist Account", The China Review, //AW

Securitizing the China Threat as Scientific Theory Within the China threat genre there is a broader range of discursive examples following the scientific mode of securitization. These are mostly scholarly works enacted by academics. Here is a classic “theory as practice” text: Can China rise peacefully? My answer is no. If China continues its impressive economic growth over the next few decades, the United States and China are likely to engage in an intense security competition with considerable potential for war. Most of China’s neighbours—including India, Japan, Singapore, South Korea, Russia and Vietnam—will join with the United States to contain China’s power.40 At the very beginning of this essay, boldly titled “China’s Unpeaceful Rise,” John Mearsheimer, a world-renowned IR scholar, pessimistically predicts the consequences of China’s rise. Mearsheimer’s claim that China’s rise will be “unpeaceful” is clearly in antithesis to the Chinese government’s promise of a “peaceful rise.” In a typical example of the latter, Zheng, a former Chinese official and policy advisor, assures the outside world that “China does not seek hegemony or predominance in world affairs,” and that “China’s development depends on world peace— a peace that its development will in turn reinforce.” 41 People are thus faced with two opposing scenarios for IR in East Asia. Which should one believe? A poststructuralist reading of the above extract suggests that Mearsheimer articulates the China threat theory through the scientific mode of representation. First, there is a process of structural incorporation, whereby the subject of China serves the broader interests of academic enquiry. In short, although this is a serious issue of “hard” security, it is presented as a research topic. The author does not mention the China threat directly in the essay, and his argument develops in a fairly objective tone. Indeed, Mearsheimer emphasizes at the outset the need for a “theory of international politics” that explains the behavior of rising great powers when one tries to “predict” the future of world politics.42 Therefore, the issue of China’s rise and its consequences is fashioned as an academic subject rather than an internationally current topic of passionate debate. In the scientific mode, the China threat is securitized via “scientific” reasoning. In this regard, the referent object is the national security of the United States, the world’s single remaining superpower and its allies. The subject or audience comprises the intellectual elites and, more important, policy makers of the United States and its allies. The securitizers are IR academics and policy analysts, represented in the above extract by Mearsheimer. From the poststructuralist perspective, these agents perform securitization acts by formulating theories, predicting inevitable outcomes, and advocating policy options. As a result, the distinction between theory and practice disappears at this point. To ensure that the issue of the China threat is situated in the relevant epistemic terrain, the proper language must be adopted for academic debate on the existence and nature of the threat posed by China. Mearsheimer thus claims that his argument is based on a “theory” of rising great powers and the effects of their rise on international politics. As students of international politics will immediately recognize, this “theory” is the “offensive” variant of the realist IR tradition, well documented in Mearsheimer’s 2001 book The Tragedy of Great Power Politics.43 In this influential study, Mearsheimer presents his argument on the China threat issue with consummate professionalism. He first enumerates the five “bedrock” assumptions of offensive realism: an anarchic international system; the inherently offensive military capabilities of great powers; uncertainty about other states’ intentions; survival as the primary goal; and the rationality of state actors. The combined effects of these assumptions are that great powers tend to be fearful of each other, to rely upon themselves for their survival, and to try by any means to maximize their own power.44 Mearsheimer concludes that this “scientific” logic is generally applicable as an explanation of the behavior of great powers that “seek to gain as much power as possible over their rivals.” 45 The issues of power and knowledge are crucial to the scientific mode. Only certain individuals can lay claim to the “knowledge” that is widely accepted as legitimate. The dominant “knowledge” of global affairs is both “arbitrary” (in the sense that it is only one of many interpretations) and “non-arbitrary” (in the sense that certain interpretative practices predominate worldwide).46 For an interpretation of global affairs to become dominant, it requires power and authority in its field. The epistemological and ontological foundations of interpretations of IR thus matter less than their authority. Due to his well-established reputation worldwide as a scholar of IR, Mearsheimer’s acts of securitization have considerable power and authority. One survey ranks him among the scholars with the greatest influence and most interesting output in the field over the past few decades.47 According to Google Scholar, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics has been cited as many as 3,371 times (as of April 2014). With regard to substantial modality, the main social spheres addressed by the scientific mode of securitization are military and strategic. Unlike China, which defends itself against China threat allegations primarily with reassurances of goodwill, a securitizer, like Mearsheimer, seeks to argue from a “scientific” basis. He reasons that “to predict the future in Asia, one needs a theory of international politics” that is “logically sound.”48 Mearsheimer builds a specific communicative “sign system” in the use of scientific language to make claims to knowledge.49 He speaks from the perspective of a scientifically trained expert in world politics, thus privileging technical language over everyday language. The threat posed by a rising China to international security is reasoned “scientifically” to be inevitable. This raises the question of what practice or activity this use of language is designed to elicit. By persuading readers of the inevitability of a Chinese threat, for example, Mearsheimer may aim to prompt the action perceived as necessary to prevent this threat. According to a survey titled “The Ivory Tower,” published in Foreign Policy, the majority of both academics and practitioners in the United States consider China’s rise to be the most important U.S. foreign-policy challenge.50 Similarly, both IR scholars and practitioners regularly pinpoint East Asia as the region of greatest strategic importance to the United States today and over the next 20 years. Although most IR scholars agree that China’s political influence has not yet exceeded that of the United States, they predict that the chance of war between the two countries will increase from 13 percent in the next 10 years to 23 percent in the next 30 years.51 In the scientific mode, securitizers reason deductively from scientific theory to the existence of a “China threat.” This deductive process entails many instances of “intertextuality,”52 moments at which one spoken or written text alludes to, quotes, or otherwise relates to another. Discussion of the China threat is no longer limited to the world of academia; for instance, the issue has been widely referenced and examined by U.S. journalists in books that have subsequently become bestsellers.53 It is difficult to trace the ways in which academics and policy makers influence each other. However, it is clear that renowned IR scholars like Mearsheimer are influential not only in their own fields but far beyond. Here, knowledge and power mutually reinforce each other. With the increasing popularity of offensive realism and powertransition theory, people in many different professions are alluding to or talking at length about the so-called China threat. In scholarly discussion, policy analysis, and strategic planning, the issue is often taken as a given.

2022 Michigan Kritik
Security K – BEJJ 2022 › Links › 2NC---China Threat

Securitizing against the China threat is reductive and self-defeating—‘China threat’ paradigm risks overreaction.

Abdur Shah 21, Professor at Department of International Relations (IR), National University of Modern Languages, Islamabad, Pakistan, 4-8-2021, "Revisiting China Threat: The US’ Securitization of the ‘Belt and Road Initiative’", Chinese Political Science Review , https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s41111-021-00179-0 //AW

The National Defence Strategy (2018, p. 2) cautioned that China (along with Russia) is “now undermining the international order from within the system by exploiting its benefits while simultaneously undercutting its principles and “rules of the road””. According to this line of argument, Beijing’s policies—including its Belt and Road project—are antithetical and harmful to American vision, values and interests at global level (White House 2019; US Department of State 2019b). Simultaneously, the Trump administration insisted that China seeks global predominance by displacing the US as a sole super power (National Defence Strategy of the US 2018; Lynch 2019). Beijing does so by promoting its “repressive vision of world order” (White House 2017, p. 45) and model of “authoritarian capitalism” (Director of National Intelligence 2019, p. 25) as “a “new type” of global governance” even if “the existing system has served the world—China included—very well in the seven decades since World War II” (US Embassy & Consulate in South Korea 2019). In retrospective sense, the US’ portrayal of China’s ambitions under the Trump administration is a revisit to decades-old ‘China threat’ paradigm thriving in the US from time to time. An analysis of the narratives of Trump administration vis-a-vis BRI reveals that the US’ approach actually reflected the ‘China threat’ mindset (Interviews with diplomats from Central Asia and South Asia, June–July 2019, researchers working for Pakistan government, July–December 2019, Douglas Paal, July 2019, Eyck Freymann, August 2019, Li Xing, August 2019, Yiwei Wang, November 2019). Chengxin Pan (2012, p. 23) aptly explains the paradigm. The ‘China threat’ is a fundamental image that casts China’s rise and its international implications primarily in a negative, alarming, and threatening light. It is more than a particular argument, or a singular ‘China threat theory’, as many of its Chinese critics often call it. Rather, it represents a paradigm that, as a lasting normative concern and cognitive habit, both informs and lends coherence to otherwise divergent ways of looking at China in scholarly analysis, government documents, popular culture and mass media. Eminent analysts, researchers, and academics (i.e. Kishore Mahbubani, Fareed Zakaria, Suzan L. Shirk, Danial Drezner, Taylor Fravel et. al., Stapleton Roy, Michael D. Swaine, Susan A. Thornton and Ezra Vogel etc.) believed that under Donald Trump administration, American perceptions of and actions towards the challenge posed by China were increasingly guided by the ‘China threat’ or ‘China scare’ or ‘Red scare’ thinking (Economist 2020; Swanson 2019; Fravel et al. 2019; Waldman 2019; Wong 2019a; Zakaria 2020). There was a palpable understanding running across both the parties (Republicans and Democrats) in Congress and all the departments of government (the State Department, Department of Defence, Department of Justice, Pentagon, FBI and other spy agencies etc.) in Washington concurring that China poses a threat to US on multiple fronts (Reuters 2019b; Economist 2019a, b, c). The Trump administration was at the forefront of stimulating and building on this thinking both at discursive and policy levels. The threat personification at this level was rather sweeping and oscillating and any pattern of China’s foreign policy behaviour could be interpreted as an ultimate threat. Accordingly, a diverse range of China’s policies and initiatives were identified as part of the broader China problem: unfair trade practices; subsidising Chinese businesses and state owned enterprises; 5G technology and risk of espionage; theft of intellectual property and trade and corporate secrets; ‘Made in China 2025’; and off course the BRI reify the threat posed by China to US’ interests. Policy Responses to Counter the Threat BRI The discourse of BRI securitisation was complemented by a set of policy actions adopted by the US government aimed clearly at the containment of expanding Chinese footprints and influence. First, the Trump administration employed the policy of diplomatic and rhetorical dissuasion to cajole and pressurise other countries not to join the BRI (Wong 2019b). Washington’s warnings against the negative consequences of BRI’s infrastructure-based investments aimed to deter the states like Ukraine, Italy, Sri Lanka, Pakistan and Kazakhstan from opting for Chinese money. Besides this direct pressure, discursive characterisation of the project itself has profound repercussions on the potential appeal of BRI investments to other countries. As a consequence, China’s soft power image, which is an important component of BRI (Li 2019, p. 42), is time and again put to the test to convince international community that Beijing does not harbour any malign designs with regard to BRI. At second level, the US tried to tackle this challenge through acts of institutional balancing. Washington came up with its own aid programs to outcompete the reach of BRI. In 2018, the US government increased the portfolio of its development finance institution Overseas Private Investment Corporation from $30 billion to $60 billion and passed the Better Utilisation of Investments Leading to Development (BUILD) Act as counter response to China’s Belt and Road project. A new US aid agency International Development Finance Corporation with $60 billion funding was launched to counter BRI in Asia (Lo 2020). Similarly, the US reached out to like-minded countries in the Asia–Pacific to balance China’s increasing influence across the region. Hence, US, India, Australia and Japan revived the “Quad” with this particular policy objective. Finally, Trump officials incessantly tried to undermine China’s BRI diplomacy at the international fora such as the United Nations (Lynch 2019), Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (Guardian 2018) and as recently as Munich Security Conference in February 2020. How Far is the Securitisation of BRI Warranted? During the last six years of its implementation, BRI has exhibited ample reasons to question different aspects of this initiative and its methods of functioning. From ballooning debts to unviable projects etc., a familiar pattern of undesirable outcomes has trailed the BRI projects across many of the countries. The US’ viewpoint does identify these issues with BRI rightly but only partially. A critical cross-examination of securitisation approach towards the BRI and ultimately China’s international role as adopted stridently by the Trump administration shows that American approach is far-fetched on many counts across conceptual, empirical and policy spectrums. In addition to general observations, discussions and communications with diplomats, academics, researchers and analysts from a range of countries with links to Belt and Road project help develop the following critique of the US’ approach. Unlike the American Perspective of Zero-Sum Game, BRI is Generally Viewed as an Opportunity by Many, Though Not Without Concerns for Some Strategic, Political and Economic Implications Most of the countries view BRI investments as opportunity to develop critical infrastructure so direly needed across the Asian countries (Interviews with diplomats from Central Asia and South Asia, June–July 2019, researchers working for Pakistan government, July–December 2019, Ngeow Chow Bing, August 2019, Harris Zainul December 2019). In response to American assertions that BRI holds grave risks to the sovereign integrity and economic development of recipient countries and should therefore be shunned, a Central Asian diplomat (2019) observed. Geography is an unalterable force for states. We cannot change our neighbours and the geopolitics of surrounding states even if the US wants us to do so. So we have to work with this OBOR model…The potential significance of OBOR for regions like Central Asia and South Asia is undeniable for us. This thinking stands diametrically opposite to American narratives proclaiming the BRI as ‘predatory economics’ and ‘debt-trap’ diplomacy. There is a genuine reason for that: Most of the BRI members suffer from acute deficit of development infrastructure. According to a much-cited report by the Asian Development Bank (2017), Asia needs whopping annual $1.7 trillion investments in infrastructure through 2030 or $26 trillion from 2016 to 2030 in order to maintain its growth momentum, tackle poverty and respond to climate change. American observers also agree that BRI investments have the potential to bring ‘win–win’ outcomes for both the parties (Interviews with Douglas Paal, July 2019, Joshua Kurlantzick, July 2019, Eyck Freymann, August 2019, James Schwemlein, September, 2019). However, there is an understanding that BRI with all its promising prospects might also hold some economic and strategic implications. Member countries are conscious of the fact that China has likely pinned strategic interests and goals with certain BRI investments in South Asia (Interviews with South Asian diplomat, August 2019, researcher working for Pakistan government, August 2019) or the BRI might further tip the trade balance in favour of China (Interviews with a Central Asian diplomat, June 2019). Still these countries perceive the project primarily as an economic opportunity. The ‘agency’ of Member Countries and Their Domestic Politics has Played Key Role in Evolution and Dynamics of the BRI. The US’ Perspective Ignores that The US’ perspective stands on the assumption that China holds predominant position of “dictating” (Hindustan Times 2017) and “leveraging” (US Senate 2019) its model “in a more muscular manner, demanding other nations become tribute states kowtowing to Beijing” (U.S. Department of Defense 2018b). This notion is flawed both on conceptual and empirical bases. First, the argument that China unilaterally dictates the BRI reduces the ‘agency’ of member countries and their domestic politics to that of a ‘black box’ playing to the sweet wills of Beijing. The argument therefore is reductive at best. In fact, in many cases the incumbent governments of the member countries approach China for investments and assistance. The cases of Pakistan’ Gwadar port and Sri Lanka’s Hambantota port are notable in this respect. In addition, these governments are quite egoistic in assessing the costs and benefits of Chinese money though their interests are more likely parochial in the sense they prioritise their own political capital or survival (Interviews with Eyck Freymann, August 2019, researchers working for Pakistan government, July–December 2019 and Harris Zainul, December 2019; Brautigam 2019). Therefore, it also depends a lot more on the ruling government’s priorities while discussing the terms and conditions of BRI projects with Chinese. (Interviews with a Central Asian diplomat, June 2019, Hong Zhang, December 2019). In similar vein, these countries have adroitly manoeuvred relations with both China and its rival powers, seeking to get aid form both groups while they compete against each other (Markey 2020). Sri Lanka opened its arms to Indian and Japanese offers in the aftermath of Hambantota port deal. Similarly, Pakistan has been warming lately to US and even reportedly tried to assure the latter that Islamabad attaches great significance to ties with Washington and will not allow Beijing to use Gwadar port for strategic purposes (Siddiqa 2019a, b). On the empirical side, BRI does not function as a linear model steered or imposed all the way from Beijing. Member countries enjoy great deal of leeway in implementing, delaying and even leveraging the Belt and Road projects. Domestic politics are a complex of changing regimes, different interest and pressure groups vying for their respective political agendas and interests. The evidence shows that BRI is not immune to vagaries of domestic politics. One of the top officials of China–Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) confided that after daily Dawn divulged the details of CPEC ‘master plan’ (Husain 2017), the erstwhile government had to downsize considerably parts of the actual plan due to harsh outcry from media and the public (Interview, December 2019). Changes of governments after elections in Malaysia, Pakistan and Maldives had a great deal of impact on the implementation of BRI projects across these countries. Malaysia even halted the BRI projects and then renegotiated the deals with China. In Pakistan, the government of Pakistan Tehreek e Insaf (PTI) explicitly questioned the terms of CPEC deals signed by the previous government of Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz (Anderlini 2018). The Chinese side developed many apprehensions and grievances with regard to PTI’s approach towards the CPEC (Interviews with researchers working for Pakistan government, July–December 2019). Unlike the American assertion that China beguiles other countries into trap, member countries are mindful of ceding too much control to China as a result of BRI projects. For example, Pakistan’s invitation to Saudi Arabia to become the third partner in the CPEC (that some thought was done without taking China into confidence) and its withdrawal of Diamer-Bhasha dam from CPEC in November 2017 were motivated by strategic considerations (Interview with a government researcher).Footnote2 Similarly, the newly elected President of Sri Lanka Gotabaya Rajapaksa said (Xinhua 2019) that his government is “not worried about the commercial aspect” of the Hambantota port deal but is “concerned about the security aspect as to whether there are any security lapses. That is what I am discussing with China.” Many of the intricate details of the Belt and Road falls beyond the tight control of China even if the latter would desire to be on the top of everything. In this way the progression and ultimate success of BRI hinges in many ways on the agency of member countries and their domestic politics. Securitising BRI Outrightly is Erroneous and Self-Contradictory for Many Reasons China’s BRI approach has many limitations but the way Trump administration securitised the subject is questionable for some reasons. To begin with, the US hyped and overstated the challenge of BRI and China’s role (Interviews with a South Asian diplomat, August 2019 and researchers and government officials of Pakistan, July–December 2019). The argument that BRI is “predatory” or “debt trap” is not persuasive as it draws its reasoning from a singular case of Hambantota port deal which is more of an exception than a pattern (Interviews with Douglas Paul, July 2019, Eyck Freymann, August 2019, Ngeow Chow Bing, August 2019 and Harris Zainul, December 2019; Freeman Jr. 2019; Swaine 2019). The facts related to that debt-to-equity swap deal are far more complex than the US or other conventional sources have asserted so far (Moramudali 2020). According to Yiwei Wang (Interview, November 2019), “it is a problem but this is the case of a debt not necessarily a trap.” For others, rather than being a debt-trap diplomacy, BRI is “just globalisation with Chinese characteristics” (Brautigam 2019). The notion that China gains influence over other countries by miring them in massive debts stands on self-contradictory footing. Each failing project brings China profound economic and diplomatic liabilities. After all the China’s BRI mantra is based on ‘win–win’ narratives. Hence, this kind of approach would be self-defeating and unsustainable in the long run. The fallouts of Hambantota port deal—in the form of international backlash—for China’s soft image are too enormous to be ignored. As massive debts and unsustainable projects can make China “a victim of its own lending practice and hubris”, the reasoning of the ‘debt-trap diplomacy’ would be a “misreading” of a complex phenomenon (Ferchen 2018). Patronising behaviour of the US’ approach is another issue. The Trump administration presented countries with a binary proposition that China is an imminent threat and the US is the saviour hence they should forsake China for the US. Even though many of the countries have resisted and countered American assertion with argument that BRI is not a debt trap, the US insists otherwise. For instance, Pakistan and Sri LankaFootnote3 have repeatedly tried to dispel the notion that BRI investments are a trap yet the US is parroting the same line with a missionary zeal. Instead of successfully convincing others to eschew the BRI or Chinese assistance, the US risks overreacting to the issue at hand. Finally, the Trump administration’s policy to identify and counter China threat is regressive and counter-productive. The US approach, according to Chas Freeman Jr. (2019), seems to be influenced by Cold War thinking wherein two superpowers could force other countries to take side with either the US or its rival. A broad range of prominent scholars, analysts, and experts agree that the approach to characterise China as an outright threat and consequently counter it is far-fetched and based on overreaction to the so-called threat of China (Beckley 2019; Feigenbaum 2018; Johnston 2019; Joshua 2019; Swaine 2019; Swanson 2019; Fravel et al. 2019; Zakaria 2020; Interviews with Douglas Paul, July 2019, Eyck Freymann, August 2019 and James Schwemlein, September, 2019).

2022 Michigan Kritik
Security K – BEJJ 2022 › Links › 2NC---China Threat

China threat construction is a self-fulfilling prophecy—Cold War Rhetoric shapes government policy toward China.

Zhengqing Yuan and Qiang Fu 20, Zhengqing Yuan , Senior Fellow at the Institute of World Economics and Politics, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences and ‡ Qiang Fu is an Associate Professor at the School of Foreign Studies of Central University of Finance and Economics, 9-1-2020, "Narrative Framing and the United States' Threat Construction of Rivals.: EBSCOhost", Chinese Journal of International Politics , //AW

American hawks, especially those of the ‘deep state’ intelligence and defence community, advocate a new Cold War script where China constitutes a progressively serious political threat. This rhetoric has been on the rise over the last couple of years. In the first place, an existential threat is the ideologically and politically antithetical Other. To American hawks, China is an authoritarian regime under Communist one-party rule, which in itself constitutes an existential threat to the free democracy of the United States. For example, the 2017 US National Security Strategy states that China ‘spreads features of its authoritarian system’.115 This mindset is even more apparent in an open letter from former military officials, scholars, and other conservative China watchers to President Trump in 2019, in which they emphasise that China and its Communist party are an existential threat to US values and the US-led world order.116 Meanwhile, it should be noted that although there is a rising rhetoric on ideological differences, it is more about China’s political system itself than the expansive nature of communism so often promoted in the Soviet threat story. In the second place, there is the China Model. In this frame, China represents an authoritarian capitalism, and its great economic success offers other countries an alternative model. This constitutes a challenge to the United States’ free democratic market economy model in the global order. The Worldwide Threat Assessment of the US Intelligence Community released by the Director of National Intelligence Daniel Coats in 2019 bluntly points out that China will more actively ‘seek to assert China’s model of authoritarian capitalism as an alternative’ for other countries to the Washington Consensus, which may ‘threaten international support for democracy, human rights, and the rule of law’; also that China’s Belt and Road Initiative is a platform to expand China’s ‘global economic, political, and military reach’ and ‘diminish US influence’.117 In the third place is the whole-of-society threat. In this hawkish portrayal, China is taking advantage of the United States’ open environment and political loopholes to gain economic, political, and military benefits, thus threatening US security from the inside. Although this mode of thought has long existed in the China threat discourse, the ‘whole-of-society threat’ concept was coined by FBI Director Christopher Wray during a Senate hearing in February 2018. He said that, in order to replace the United States’ global leadership, China employs not only state institutions but also non-traditional collectors like students and professors to amass intelligence and steal intellectual property rights, so this is ‘not just a whole-of-government threat, but a whole-of-society threat’.118 This narrative template was reinforced in Vice President Pence’s China policy speech in October 2018, in which he said China was attempting to ‘shift American public opinion and public policy’, influence US elections, and fragment domestic interest groups by ‘rewarding or coercing’ agents of influence, such as students, scholars, journalists, and think tanks in the United States.119 One month after the Pence speech, a report from the Hoover Institution echoed this frame by detailing how China has employed agents of influence to influence American domestic politics and policies towards China.120 This narrative was rapidly transposed into government policy. Over the last two years, the visas of certain Chinese scholars have been withdrawn, a number of Chinese Confucius Institutes closed, and the enrolment of Chinese students in certain key areas has also clearly been affected. Military Threat While both China and the Soviet Union are narrated as a military threat, China is largely framed as a regional one rather than a global one. Admiral Philip. S. Davidson, the Commander of US Indo-Pacific Command said in his statement before the Senate Armed Services Committee on US Command Posture on 12 February, 2019: ‘The PLA is the principal threat to US interests, US citizens, and our allies inside the First Island Chain’.121 It should be noted that China’s so-called military threat does not signify that China’s forces have surpassed or actively challenged US military power but rather that China’s military threat arises as long as China can potentially pose a challenge to US military predominance. In this narrative logic, China’s increased military spending, upgrading and expanding of weapons systems and technologies, and overseas deployments to protect its commercial interests, or even the limited access to information on China’s military planning are taken as evidence of China’s rising military threat. This kind of hawkish rhetoric is widespread in annual Department of Defense reports to Congress on China’s military power and in US Defense Intelligence Agency reports on China’s Military Power. One notable feature of the evolving discourse is the growing attention the United States is paying to the PLA’s cyber and nuclear warfare capabilities. Conclusion Rather than the rationalist approach to national security, we adopt a narrative approach to unravelling the narrative process whereby national threats are constructed. Having encountered three successive national rivals since WWII, the United States has constructed three distinctive threat stories to safeguard its hegemonic identity. The Soviet threat consists in the story of two ideologically opposed rivals competing for world domination; the Japan-bashing narrative tells a victimhood story stemming from Japan’s unfair competition. China threat stories, however, are now more complex,conflating a story of US victimhood at the hands of China’s unfair competition, advocated by President Trump,with a widely embedded but malleable epic tale of power competition between a rising power and the ruling power, and a new, ‘deep state’ defence community-propagated Cold War script. All these threat stories have framed what is perceived and what should be done, but they are merely those from among other alternative narratives that eventually gained a dominant position at critical junctures. These socalled national threats are hence no more than narrative constructs in a self-other manner of articulation rather than one of objective existence. Upon examining the narrative templates of US threat stories, we find striking differences among them. The Soviet threat spectrum ranges from the ideological to the political and military domains, and economic challenge is the focus of the Japan threat. But China represents the full spectrum of threats that previously featured in both the Soviet threat story and the Japan-bashing narrative. Upon zooming in, we further find that an ideological conflict constitutes the main thread of the Soviet threat storyline, but that the economic challenge of the China threat outweighs the ideological and political ones. On the political front, the Soviet Union’s totalitarian dictatorship is the polar opposite of liberal democracy, while China is often styled as an authoritarian state—a far less antagonistic wording. As to military threats, the Soviet threat is urgent and global, but the China threat is only a rising and regional one. To counter the economic challenge emanating first from Japan and then from China, the United States adopted different strategies to construct its victimhood story, namely, coining new concepts for Japan, and cashing in on stereotypes for China. In spite of the above-marked differences, however, we can also clearly discern continuity in the United States’ national threat stories. This is reflected not only in the United States’ consistently resorting to the victimhood narrative to counter economic challenges from both Japan and China, and unremittingly cashing in on its widely-shared mythologies and images regarding the Self and Others to achieve resonance, but also, more revealingly, in the underlying logic of US national threat-making. The United States will invariably adopt a zero-sum mindset in making a diametrical self-other story for any country—be it a formidable power with an antagonistic ideology like the Soviet Union, an ally like Japan, or a rising peer competitor like China—that might threaten its hegemonic identity. According to this logic, the American Self is always superior to Others, and articulating the threat confirms its superiority. Not surprisingly, when Others, like Japan or China, challenge its economic primacy, the United States, rather than examining its own problems, will always blame such others for playing an ‘unfair game’. This paper also provides us with a vantage point to appreciate the current debate on Sino–US relations. Clearly, we are in the second half of the critical juncture wherein the question is not whether the United States and China will compete with each other but in which way the competition will unfold, for the bankruptcy of the liberal international order discourse makes it unlikely to revert to yesteryear’s policy of engagement. As the three narrative threads of the China threat stories all point to competition and conflict, and can be self-fulfilling, we may witness increasing tensions between them. Specifically, the Japan-bashing victimhood story can shed considerable light on our understanding of Trump’s China policy. We find that the story President Trump advocates to a large extent matches the victimhood story that the revisionists concocted to deal with Japan in the 1980s. Trump’s rhetoric regarding unfair trade and industry targeting, slapping of trade tariffs amounting to blackmail on both China and US allies, resultsoriented approach to trade negotiation, and the US high-tech stranglehold that curbs or bars investment in the industry by US competitors can all be found in the Japan threat story toolbox. Having pivoted China policy towards conflict, however, there are few indications that Trump wants to act out a Cold War script. In accordance with the storytelling logic, should Trump retain his presidency in the coming election, the trade war will probably not end in a ‘fair’ trade agreement until such time as the US economy far outperforms China’s, because US superiority entails outperformance, failing which the blame must go on unfair play. That is what happened to Japan, that is to say, successive rounds of sanctions and negotiations until Japan drifted into the Lost Decade. China may, moreover, face even greater US hostility to its high-tech industry and investment, as happened in 1980s. These are issues that China’s political nature and growing military may further complicate. But it should be noted that China is not Japan and will neither give in easily as Japan did nor pose a solely economic challenge to the United States. The Soviet threat story also offers insight. Indeed, a new Cold War rhetoric is rising in Sino–US relations narratives in the United States. Hawks in the US defence community, among them congressman like Senators Rick Scott and Marco Rubio, former officials like John Bolton, and to some extent even Vice President Mike Pence and Secretary of State Mike Pompeo, have all contributed to the rise of a Cold War mentality. The effect of this Cold War rhetoric is apparent in government policy, such as the barring of visits from certain Chinese scholars and treating Chinese news media as ‘foreign missions’. Although this new Cold War script may sensationalise and aggravate the already deteriorated Sino–US relations, unless major events or crises occur, it seems unlikely to become a grand dominant narrative in the near future. This is partly due to the fact that China, unlike the Soviet Union, does not export Communism, so what Americans are agonising most about now is China’s catching up and the United States’ relatively underperforming economy. Moreover, quite apart from China’s refusal to accept and act on such a script, China has become deeply embedded in the world economy, and its trading partners have little incentive to contain China. The future dominant threat story is hence likely to be a hybrid one that allows cooperation while being open to confrontation.

2022 Michigan Kritik
Security K – BEJJ 2022 › Links › 2NC---China Rise [Rogelja]

Conflating the rationality of Chinese economic actors with the CCP’s political aims lead to serial policy failure—obfuscates the real motives that drive effective policymaking.

Igor Rogelja ‘20, Max Weber Fellow at the European University Institute and a Teaching Fellow at the Lau China Institute, King’s College Londo, 2-17-2020, "Narrating the China Threat: Securitising Chinese Economic Presence in Europe", OUP Academic, Vol 13, Issue 1, https://academic.oup.com/cjip/article/13/1/103/5739302?login=true //AW *ableist language replaced in brackets

Pillar 1: Centralising Agency The rapid rise in Chinese outward FDI into Europe has reached a historic point and surpassed the reverse annual flows of capital since 2010, yet in cumulative terms, EU-held investments in China exceed those of Chinese entities by a factor of 2.6, while US-held FDI stock in the EU dwarfs China’s by a ratio of 35:1.30 Rather than size, what the ‘China threat’ discourse problematises is the nature of Chinese investment, which is said to be centrally controlled and subject to the Chinese state’s geostrategic considerations.31 Moreover, as Tingley et al., have shown, opposition to incoming Chinese FDI on grounds of national security is often a vehicle for other grievances,32 while Nyman explains that the securitisation of US energy policy relies on similar, simplistic accounts of strategic competition.33 In this manner, Chinese investment as a whole is transformed into a security threat even when the evidence to support security concerns in individual cases is scant. Establishing privatisations and foreign acquisitions as a threat to economic security in a liberal economic context that promotes the role of businesses vis-à-vis the state in economic activity can be ‘intellectually incoherent’, as BWW note.34 Therefore, securitisation depends on identifying or constructing spill-over effects on politics, military security, society, and environment by ascribing the agency of various actors involved in these deals up the command chain to Beijing. This is not to say China, especially under Xi Jinping, has not promoted narratives of Chinese exceptionalism and reassertion of the party’s control, but such propaganda should not be taken at face value, as it obscures the complex decision-making processes in China proper. ‘Centralising agency’ involves two discursive tactics: (i) subsuming all commercial rationality of Chinese firms into a political frame, and (ii) negating informed rationality on part of the host states or host business partners. In the first instance, centralising agency allows securitising actors to attribute all Chinese economic activity to the machinations of the CCP, so obviating the need to establish factually such a link on a case-by-case basis, and without considering the full set of relevant contingencies, interests, and dynamics. Chinese firms, regardless of ownership status, are cast as agents of the Chinese state, unable to make their own financial decisions and beholden to their political masters in Zhongnanhai. This view of China as a singular entity does not take into account a growing body of literature that understands the Belt and Road Initiative as an inherently decentralised endeavour wherein state-owned enterprises (SOEs), local governments, different bureaucracies, and private companies pursue their own interests, often competing with each other for the centre’s attention.35 The assumption that initiatives such as the Belt and Road constitute a centrally executed conspiracy has a major impact on the way we analyse Chinese economic presence abroad. Because the securitisation of investment relies on establishing ‘spill-overs’, so-called critical infrastructure is especially prone to such a biased interpretation. Thus, in the field of maritime logistics, companies like COSCO are presented as CCP agents taking over Europe’s port infrastructure,36 while emphatically ignoring alternative business explanations. The focus on security achieved through centralising agency, no matter how tenuous, differentiates Chinese from other (state-led) port investment companies, such as Dubai’s DP World, without proposing comparative insights between the effect of investment from different authoritarian states such as the United Arab Emirates or Saudi Arabia. Furthermore, one should consider that during a time of falling profits for shipping operators, port operations remain a highly profitable aspect of the logistics business. In addition, significant overcapacity is predicted for terminal operations globally in the coming years,37 signifying fierce competition among European ports for market shares. Therefore, as the top eight big carrier groups largely determine global cargo flows, a tie-in with a large carrier/port operator like COSCO, particularly for less established ports, presents a viable strategy. Italy’s IAI (Istituto Affari Internazionali) accurately notes that Piraeus’s takeover will increase competition for ports in ‘Northern range’ countries such as Belgium and the Netherlands, but nevertheless frames it as a ‘political and commercial threat’.38 Seen from Piraeus, however, both the 2008 (concession of container Piers II&III) and 2016 (Piraeus Port Authority privatisation) deals had a clear commercial logic.39 COSCO got involved in Piraeus because it was looking for a faster transportation channel for Chinese products, and gradually solidified its commitment to the Greek port, especially since its investment in Naples became unsustainable. An even stronger attempt at securitisation is seen in comparisons of Piraeus to Chinese-run ports outside Europe where the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) has occasionally been granted access—with the host country’s permission.40 Absolutely no indications that Piraeus will become a ‘double use’ port hosting the PLAN exist, but framing a Chinese takeover of a port authority as an existential threat to Europeanness is less plausible without linking it to a military (‘a base for Chinese warships’) or political (‘control over host government’) issue. What these reports disregard is that Piraeus often hosts foreign navies, both from NATO and third countries, including Russia, and that the latter have no access to facilities or services that could sustain military action of any kind. The PLAN visits in Piraeus have taken place either under the UN anti-piracy mandate or as part of the evacuation of Chinese civilians from Libya. In addition, the European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR)’s 2017 report41 makes the unsubstantiated claim that Japanese ships have experienced difficulties when docking in Piraeus, arguing that there is no clear distinction between taking over the management of the Port and sovereign control over it.42 The logic of centralising agency paints any Chinese investment at worst as a security risk and at best as a political one. The creation of such intersubjective meanings in the representation of Chinese companies as agents of a malevolent state blurs the boundaries between ‘technical’, ‘economic’, ‘environmental’, and ‘political’ matters, as well as between sectors and regions, in effect politicising any and all incoming investment. This is especially important when there are clear and valid concerns about the entry of Chinese investors who might fail to comply with EU laws on competition, labour standards, or environmental protection, for example. Yet the securitising logic which lumps disparate Chinese investments and projects together obfuscates rather than illuminates their contingent and complex nature. For example, when Croatia awarded the €270 m Pelješac Bridge contract to China Road and Bridge Corporation (CRBC) in early 2018, it did so not due to direct political pressure or by circumventing public tender rules. Quite the reverse, this moment marked the first successful bid by a Chinese company for an EU-funded project and the culmination of the CRBC’s decade-long effort to progress to public bids in developed countries. The Croatian authorities rejected the losing parties’ allegations of price dumping because even the Chinese offer was significantly higher than the expected tender value set by the Croatian road authority.43 More than the issue of price dumping—a longstanding concern of European industry—what is curious about the case is that the Austrian complainant specifically cited as a key argument in its complaint the interest of the Chinese state in entering the EU market. Accordingly, the bridge regularly features in articles discussing China’s attempts to ‘divide’ the EU44 or spread its influence to Western Balkan states.45 CRBC’s choices, however, seem consistent with the literature on Chinese outgoing investment, which emphasises the efforts of companies to leverage their firm-specific assets to gain market share in advanced economies46—a relatively typical pattern of behaviour with few discernible security aspects. Similarly, COSCO obtained gradual control of Piraeus following two international tenders (in 2008 and 2016), both scrutinised by EU institutions. In fact, COSCO was the sole contender for the 2016 privatisation of the Piraeus Port Authority, one of Greece’s commitments under its 2015 bailout agreement with the EU. China’s construction and infrastructure acquisition spree in SE Europe was thus more about Chinese actors pursuing their business interests within the legal framework of the EU than changing the rules of the game. This is not to say that the entanglement of politics and economics in China is irrelevant, yet denying Chinese firms’ economic rationale provides a singular account of what is a complex form of decision-making. The second thread of centralising agency concerns the role of European states, companies or other actors and treating them as naïve or selfish, dismissing their rational calculations as insufficiently considering China’s ‘true’ intentions. In this vein, the 2016 acquisition of German robotics firm Kuka by the Chinese Midea caused a stir in the German political class, and is heavily used in think tank narratives as an example of technology-stripping by Chinese actors, with the ECFR report even calling it a ‘raid’.47 However, Midea and Kuka executives emphasised the business rationale for the deal giving Kuka access to a huge market ripe for automation in manufacturing.48 Still, in a meeting with German industrialists, Chancellor Merkel reportedly told them that they were ‘naïve’ about Chinese intentions.49 Essentially, by negating the business rationale of the deal the German state politicised competition. In the race towards ‘Industrie 4.0’, both corporate and state actors pursue strategies to ensure their continued competitiveness; these strategies may come into conflict but they are decided by autonomous and rational European actors. The Belgrade–Budapest ‘high-speed’ railway is another case of allegedly naïve governments being ‘duped’ into paying for China’s grand schemes. In this narrative, the railway, built using preferential loans from Chinese banks to Serbia, serves the purpose of creating a logistical corridor from Piraeus to the markets of central Europe at Serbian and Hungarian taxpayers’ expense.50 However, Serbian authorities had scheduled an upgrading of the rail line in question before the idea of a Chinese corridor from Piraeus even existed.51 The importance of the line to Serbia is traceable to decisions made not in Beijing but in Brussels. The TEN-T corridor from Athens to Hamburg bypassed the direct route via Serbia and Macedonia to favour member states Bulgaria and Romania. Imminent isolation from EU-funded infrastructural connectivities explains why Belgrade had been advocating a rail upgrading since the mid-2000s. China wasn’t even the preferred lender, given that plans originally envisaged World Bank participation, while the current upgrading is partly financed by a Russian loan. Rather than being naïve, Balkan countries are using what leverage they can muster in suboptimal surroundings, namely, the flexibility to accommodate bilateral deals by balancing Western and other funders. Unable to rely on EU support, Serbia is a prime case since it should be particularly susceptible to Chinese pressure and could so become a ‘Trojan Horse’ in Europe.52 Yet Chinese influence has so far resulted in just one symbolic gesture53 which illustrates the limitations of Chinese ‘sharp power’54 rather than its reach. Elsewhere, the ‘selfishness’ of European entities is emphasised, as with Italy’s premier shipbuilder Fincantieri. Using suggestive language, a report by the ECFR attempts to construct a conspiratorial web out of Fincantieri’s takeover of French shipyard STX, its joint venture in Shanghai, and a Chinese SOE’s acquisition of a minor Italian yacht maker (Ferretti) without putting forward a shred of evidence. It correctly points out that Fincantieri agreed to share cruise ship production technology, but does not make clear why the business decisions of one Italian firm should subsequently be linked to the takeover of another (Fincantieri was not a shareholder in Ferretti), nor why Fincantieri’s takeover of a French shipyard should be considered a ‘still apparently unrelated development’55 rather than a genuinely unrelated one. The report then goes as far as to characterise Fincantieri’s takeover bid for STX as being done ‘… in a very Chinese way’.56 While we deal with the rhetorical tool of ‘othering’ in a subsequent section, the ECFR report questions the economic rationality of this major (and, incidentally, state-owned) Italian shipbuilder by suggesting that it is selling out cruise ship technology in pursuit of corporate profits. But as this charge is not sufficiently alarmist, the issue of Ferretti’s military speedboat arm is loosely associated with Fincantieri, and the securitising loop is thus complete: European corporate profit-seeking leads to the leaking of military technology to China. Kuka, Serbia, and Fincantieri were following their own agenda—as were the Greek ship-owning elite and the Greek government. Greek ship-owners promoted the idea of COSCO’s presence in Piraeus to both sides, lobbying the Greek government in favour of the 2008 Concession, and playing a crucial role in its successful conclusion.57 The appeal of Piraeus for COSCO increased due to the active support of this key constituency, who were clients of Chinese shipyards and banks,58 and trusted providers of services for COSCO and other Chinese companies.59 The financial benefits for Greek ship-owners, the Piraeus Port Authority, and the Greek economy have since been considerable.60 Similarly, for all Greek governments since 2008, companies like COSCO constitute an important source of investment, especially at a time of financial crisis when privatisation tenders run the risk of low offers. A Chinese company’s bid in such international tenders creates additional competition, which raises the value of the deal for the Greek state. What is more, COSCO’s diversion of container traffic from other European ports to Piraeus could lead to technological upgrading of the Port’s facilities, job growth, and spill-over effects in other economic sectors.61 Issues of reciprocal market access are a longstanding and valid concern of European businesses operating in China. Indeed, the future of EU–China relations will be largely defined by the ability of the two sides to resolve these issues, either through bilateral negotiations or dispute resolution instruments. Yet the discourse presented in the analysed reports does not stop there, rather advocating the upgrading of such concerns to full-blown panic about Europe’s strategic industries and assets being bought, stolen, or neutralised by actors associated with the Chinese Communist Party. This level of analysis conveniently ignores the agency of firms, interest groups, and host states by instead concentrating agency in the hands of the Chinese state. Yet Chinese companies have adapted to dealing with the many practices, voices, legal and business environments, and individual agents across Europe. In a similar vein, European states, companies, and elites have shown a remarkable propensity to think about their own bottom line or national interest. Paradoxically, the centralising agency narrative portrays Chinese actors as subsuming their economic rationality to the state’s political concerns, while European actors are faulted for following particularistic economic concerns instead of collective political interests. As the next section will clarify, the identification of ‘collective’ interests vis-à-vis China is a contested field, and we [cannot afford] to assign the spectres haunting the politics and economy of Europe to Chinese agency or present them as a threat to European security through a one-size-fits-all contextualisation of Chinese investment.

2022 Michigan Kritik
Security K – BEJJ 2022 › Links › 2NC---China Rise [Rogelja]

Securitizing Chinese economic dominance dooms policymakers to failure and displaces a focus on legitimate risks—single minded focus and discursive feedback loops locks in false threats.

Igor Rogelja ‘20, Max Weber Fellow at the European University Institute and a Teaching Fellow at the Lau China Institute, King’s College Londo, 2-17-2020, "Narrating the China Threat: Securitising Chinese Economic Presence in Europe", OUP Academic, Vol 13, Issue 1, https://academic.oup.com/cjip/article/13/1/103/5739302?login=true //AW *ableist language omitted

The first step is to identify the role and space of think tanks in a securitisation move. In this regard, Sjöstedt11 proposes an empirically observable conceptualisation of the securitising move as ‘the public framing of an issue as a national threat, accompanied by a strategy for action’. She further draws our attention to the initial stages of this framing process12—what Kingdon calls the elusive ‘pre-decision processes’ that led to policy-makers’ adoption of proposals.13 Sjöstedt and Kingdon thus offer a more nuanced view of the securitisation process which permits us to pin down the think tanks' role and importance. Think tanks are not decision makers, yet participate as securitising actors in the process of idea formation and bidding, ultimately helping to articulate a securitising frame of reference that resonates with decision makers. In our case, think tanks operate as securitising actors to an audience of EU and national-level decision-makers, whose involvement is necessary for the securitising move to be carried forward. The success or failure of such a securitising move depends, according to Sjöstedt, on decision makers ‘internalising’ idea-frames that constitute something as a threat.14 Here, she gainfully redeploys the concept of ‘idea entrepreneurs’ who use their authority to give credence to the idea frame and insert it in the discursive space around an issue initiating the internalisation process by decision makers.15 Sjöstedt’s understanding of the securitisation move, however, is somewhat linear and can, therefore, miss the complexity of agency involved. In Balzacq’s analysis, the success of securitisation depends on the audience’s predisposition to a securitising narrative on one hand, and the securitising actors’ competency on the other.16 For both these processes to work, therefore, the ‘idea entrepreneurs’ must not just ‘say’ security, but also possess a recognised level of expertise and have access to an audience that is positively predisposed to their message—in our case the institutional cachet accorded to top think tanks and their inclusion in internal briefing papers for MEPs. What is more, the ‘idea entrepreneurs’ of the ‘China threat’ argument do not operate in a vacuum, nor are their audiences passive recipients of their message. Instead, we identify a process of securitisation that is bidirectional and discursive, involving agency by both decision makers and securitising actors. This allows us to conceptualise the securitisation move not only as a final outcome of a linear process, but as a dialectical construction of a common frame of reference. In this frame, policy entrepreneurs and decision makers sharing a certain predisposition to an issue start to discuss it in the same language, what Balzacq conceptualises as ‘congruence’.17 Essentially, think tanks offer specialist narratives that enable decision makers to crystallise their policy preferences, so explaining the credence given to the European ‘China Threat’ variant. That several European leaders, including Angela Merkel, Emmanuel Macron, Sigmar Gabriel, and Jean-Claude Juncker, have made pronouncements congruent to the output of the think tanks does not mean they were ‘convinced’ by a unidirectional process, but that a common interpretive platform is emerging that understands Chinese economic presence as a threat requiring extraordinary responses. As a result of this congruence, the European ‘China threat’ discourse is already legitimising policy initiatives targeted against China. It also continues to fuel policy debates in Brussels and other European capitals that call for further action, in the form of economic protectionism, or more direct interventions by security apparatuses to Chinese companies, in effect producing what Hanneman and Huotari call ‘downward convergence’18 with China. But the most disquieting element in this discursive congruence is that it is becoming increasingly axiomatic, and thus ‘[deprives]’ the parties involved to alternative explanations that empirical evidence may suggest. The screening mechanism’s single-minded focus on security and public order19 also ignores legitimate areas of concern such as environmental protection and sustainability. We believe that the emergence of such a unidimensional discursive space around Chinese investment is ultimately harmful to the EU’s ability to respond to the challenges arising from China’s expanding economic presence, and may have negative implications for its traumatised cohesion.

2022 Michigan Kritik
Security K – BEJJ 2022 › Links › 2NC---China Rise [Rogelja]

Rhetoric of Chinese as subversive authoritarians locks in violent policymaking and Sinophobia—security concerns conflate business motives with existential threats.

Igor Rogelja ‘20, Max Weber Fellow at the European University Institute and a Teaching Fellow at the Lau China Institute, King’s College Londo, 2-17-2020, "Narrating the China Threat: Securitising Chinese Economic Presence in Europe", OUP Academic, Vol 13, Issue 1, https://academic.oup.com/cjip/article/13/1/103/5739302?login=true //AW

The third discursive pillar in the construction of Chinese FDI as a threat concentrates on the authoritarian polity of the PRC. Of course, the CCP’s authoritarian rule, its poor human rights and civil liberties record, and the subordination of the judiciary and legislative branches to the executive are the defining characteristics of the PRC’s political system that render it the precise opposite of ‘Europeanness’. At the international level, as Holslag has eloquently described, the EU’s liberal agenda and China’s state-centred foreign policy-making have led to a ‘normative incongruence’ between China and Europe which has affected their strategic cooperation.83 The ‘authoritarian other’ logic, however, assumes that China’s behaviour on the international scene could never be compatible with the interests of liberal, democratic European states, or the EU as a whole. We need to point out that the GPPi–MERICS report is the most explicit effort so far to use identity as a basis for threat construction, and serves as the main point of reference in this section. This report stands out as an illustrative example of the erroneous assumptions and potentially harmful implications that ‘othering’ can have in the context of understanding Chinese investment in Europe. We concentrate on this case because we would like to record the transition from a fact-based approach to a discourse of securitising everything—and everyone—Chinese. The most basic function of ‘othering’ in the GPPi–MERICS report is to establish China as a threat not because of what it does but for what it is. This crucial element of the securitising discourse deflects attention from an evidence-based discussion towards a vague interpretation of ‘motives’ based on the CCP’s essential characteristics as an authoritarian entity. In turn, this interpretation provides the prism whereby various incidents can be reconstructed as a threat. It is a tactful logic, which gives an aura of credibility to an essentially non-falsifiable argument that can be summarised as follows: China is an authoritarian state, so whatever it does is potentially harmful. Let’s consider the following passage: … from the perspective of liberal democracies, all areas of interaction with China are potentially problematic and deserve scrutiny. After all, China’s political model is based on an authoritarian regime intent on strengthening a deeply illiberal surveillance state at home while also exporting—or at least trying to popularise—its political and economic development model abroad.84 Ergo, all areas of Europe’s interaction with China have strong political undertones. This ‘othering’ is distinct from recognising what has been described as ‘pluralisation and diversification of the global ideoscape’85—China’s normative impact at a global level. For the authors of this report, China is a threat because of its domestic politics, which the CCP is allegedly exporting. Being deprived of agency, according to the first discursive pillar, and with their economic activities presented as a threat to EU unity, according to the second, Chinese actors are now villainised as possible tentacles of authoritarianism. This is a key step in the process of reframing Chinese investment as an existential issue which requires extraordinary action. But assigning ulterior, dark motives to Chinese actors on the basis of the PRC’s authoritarian system of government is not confined to SOEs, as the report unfolds a logic of limitless securitisation. Indeed, in their effort to substantiate ‘authoritarian advance’, GPPi–MERICS target not just the activities of Chinese intelligence services or companies, but also that of Chinese think tanks, scholars, students, and associations, all of whom are treated as ‘influencing’ tools.86 In doing so, the report makes the dubious leap of assuming perfect success rates for any of the Chinese government’s campaigns aimed at its citizens abroad. Although the report warns in its introduction against ‘a campaign targeting Chinese citizens’, its framing of the problem and suggested policy solutions achieve exactly that: the creation of an environment of suspicion that can legitimise future extraordinary action against individuals. Constructing Chinese activities as a threat is pursued through the instrumentalisation of institutional initiatives and individuals. The activities of Chinese think tanks are discussed under the label ‘Tool 1: China sets up research exchange mechanisms and think tanks in Central and Eastern Europe to influence perceptions and agendas’.87 The first example is the creation of SiLKS (Silk Road Think Tank Network) by the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, a network engaging European think tanks that includes, among others, Chatham House, the Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ), the France China Committee, the Fundación Alternativas, the Institute of Development Studies, and the Development Centre of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). The report does not explain how the creation of a loose network will influence the research impartiality and integrity of these reputable institutions, nor why engagement of this type is a source of concern. After all, interactions between think tanks from democratic and authoritarian states are neither new nor a China-specific phenomenon. What is more, the institutional affiliations of Chinese think tanks are well-known and taken into consideration by European counterparts when developing joint projects. The example of SiLKS is followed by a consideration of the China–Central and Eastern European (China–CEE) Institute, a think tank known for openly promoting China’s BRI in the 17 + 1 framework. The authors of the GPPi–MERICS report claim that the China–CEE pursues ‘track 1.5 exercises’, involving ‘exchanges tak[ing] place behind closed doors’. The lack of evidence to substantiate the effectiveness of these activities and the presentation of routine public diplomacy as harmful to EU interests demonstrate that these reports offer a discourse for policy consumption, rather than fact-based analysis. Similarly, the section on knowledge production and lobbying (‘Tool 2’) uses random examples that fail to amount to more than a set of standard practices, such as employing lobbyists and local ‘experts’ to promote Chinese interests in the EU’s multifarious policy-making process. In an effort to provide some evidence to support their discourse, the authors refer to events organised by the Chinese Mission to the EU, the annual Europe–China forum, and the involvement of China Daily in broadcasting them.88 However, once again the reader needs to try hard to discern how these activities, involving official actors openly affiliated to the Chinese government, constitute anything more than standard public diplomacy efforts similar to those undertaken by many third countries within the EU. The third institutional tool, titled ‘China shapes academic programs’, discusses the CCP’s alleged determination to ‘control how China is taught and studied in Western academic institutions. The authors refer to controversies surrounding Confucius Institutes (CIs hereafter) in the US and Europe, particularly their clumsy censorship attempts. The problematic nature of the CIs is a well-discussed topic that has indeed drawn considerable criticism. Many studies have shown significant variances of experience as regards the operation of CIs, and that attempts to use them as anything other than their stated role have met with recipient universities’ determination to protect academic freedom,89 particularly when CIs have been egregiously ham-fisted, as was the case at the European Association for Chinese Studies (EACS) conference in Portugal in 2014.90 As Hartig91 has argued in his examination of CIs in Europe, Oceania, and Africa, by attempting to project a state-sponsored image of China, CIs are compromising their effectiveness in increasing China’s soft power. Hubbert,92 in an ethnographic study of CIs as soft power tools, reaches the same conclusion; when teachers side-lined official teaching guidelines and material, putting aside propaganda content, they were more effective in communicating an appealing image of China. Put differently, the more political CIs are, the less effectively they operate as soft power mechanisms. Yet, the GPPi–MERICS report makes no mention of these important findings in relation to CIs, as this would weaken the sense of urgency it aims to create. ‘Othering’ is ultimately extended to Chinese nationals (the fourth ‘tool’), particularly university students, who are identified as potential agents of the CCP. The report concentrates on the activities of the Chinese Students and Scholars Associations (CSSAs), a network developed under the auspices of the Overseas Chinese Affairs Office that has gained visibility in the US and Australia with high-profile (counter-) protests during visits of the Dalai Lama, the 2008 Olympic torch relay, and demonstrations by dissidents on minority rights.93 The authors employ the same tactic of lumping together non-EU related examples with certain minor incidents within EU member states to create an exaggerated sense of imminent threat. Characteristically, they confound probability with intent: While there have not been as many cases of CSS-related retaliation in Europe as in the US, it is possible that this trend might feature more prominently at European institutions in the future. These incidents represent an escalation of Chinese government tactics … 94 These descriptions are accompanied by a map titled ‘The CCP Could Mobilise a Critical Mass of Europe-Based Nationals Organised in Chinese Students and Scholars Associations’ that shows the number of CSSAs in European countries, essentially instrumentalising members of these associations as CCP tools. We are not oblivious to the fact that the CSSA has been involved in controversial activities. However, such examples are scarce (very few have taken place within the EU95) and cannot justify the exaggerated threat perception advocated by the authors of this report. What is more, research on the role of Chinese students’ associations as ‘soft power’ mechanisms96 demonstrates that they face significant limitations, similar to those of CIs. However, GPPi–MERICS operates under the assumption that Chinese nationals have a significantly enhanced potential for political action compared to others. This is evident in the polemic language used, with references to China’s assumed ‘retaliation’ and ‘escalation’, especially since 2012. The authors do not take into consideration that many student societies are formed on the basis of nationality, and engage in political activities on European campuses, even in coordination with their respective embassies. GPPi–MERICS imposes the authoritarian other lens that renders even inconsequential acts—for instance, Chinese students formally complaining about an invitation to a Falun Gong practitioner and Human rights activist to give a talk at Durham97—as evidence of China’s authoritarian advance. Under such an interpretative context, providing evidence of the actual influence and effectiveness of these ‘tools’ becomes unimportant. Lastly, ‘othering’ is also applied in relation to European actors: governments, businesses, news agencies, academic and research institutions, and individuals. As early as 2009, the first version of the ‘China Audit’ ECFR reports categorised EU governments according to their China-policy preferences,98 while the recent GPPi–MERICS study identified ‘willing enablers’ within European elites and opinion setters.99 These references include justified criticism against populist politicians who use China to legitimise their illiberal views, but they also target European newspapers and agencies as vehicles of Chinese propaganda, accusing them of carrying content that is ‘prepared and controlled by China’s party-state media’, thus ‘spread[ing] China’s concept of journalism’.100 The evidence provided is, once again, incoherent, including lists of European media carrying the supplement ChinaWatch, and various media forums organised on a national basis. The authors represent every instance of engagement as evidence of China’s instrumentalisation of European media, disregarding their critical reporting on China’s domestic affairs. Going a step further, the Association for International Affairs (AMO) study, funded by the National Endowment for Democracy, presents a ranking of domestic ‘opinion setters’ in the Czech Republic, Slovakia, and Hungary, including journalists, political scientists, economists, businessmen, business analysts, artists, publicists, translators, and sinologists, according to their positive or negative attitudes towards China.101 But whereas elected politicians and businessmen need to be scrutinised, the targeting of non-political and non-business actors as pro-China opinion setters raises concerns about the perceptions created, including potential damage to one’s professional reputation. This labelling, the ultimate practice of ‘othering’ is a worrying development that we expect to see in a more intensified form as Chinese FDI in Europe is increasingly discussed in security terms. Lastly, the GPPi–MERICS’s continuous distinction between ‘independent’ and ‘dependent’ China expertise in Europe creates the impression that sectors of the academic and research community on the continent perform propaganda functions.102 Having neglected to provide any further justification for this claim this repeated statement casts an unacceptable shadow of suspicion over the entire scholarly community of Chinese Studies in Europe. Taken as a whole, the othering discourse on China’s institutional initiatives glues together incidents of limited importance, disregarding both their actual (in)effectiveness and the resilience of European democracy. Ultimately, there is no justification for such an alarmist tone. On the contrary, we are concerned that if othering practices are adopted widely, they may fuel Sinophobic policies and social attitudes that will challenge the already repeatedly questioned liberal foundations of the EU and limit the debate on EU–China relations to a speculation regarding the motives of the involved parts. For the time being, the vast majority of think tanks examined are careful in this regard. However, the GPPi–MERICS and AMO cases demonstrate that the transition from fact to extreme discourse-based policy discussion is simple once the securitising prisms are applied. Indeed, considering the hardening political discourse of (mainly north-) European leaders in the past few years, it is not difficult to imagine that ‘othering’ will be used more extensively in efforts to securitise Chinese investment.

2022 Michigan Kritik
Security K – BEJJ 2022 › Links › 2NC---Biotech

Biological weapons framed as a security issue- countries produce biological weapons to inherently protect themselves

Saunders-Hastings, 14 --- (Patrick Saunders-Hastings- s an epidemiologist risk scientist working with Accenture. With expertise in pandemic preparedness and response, " Securitization Theory and Biological Weapons", Jan 8 2014, E-International Relations,

Securitization theory is a constructivist approach informing how certain issues become framed through a security lens6 . It offers a useful analytical framework for understanding how, why, and what issues come to be viewed as security threats. Securitization is an active process wherein a securitizing actor, in this case the American government, presents and addresses an issue as an existential threat to a particular group, or referent object7 . In these situations, emergency response measures and extensive resource commitments are considered justified7 . Securitization theory generally promotes desecuritization as preferable because it avoids the negative consequences of securitization, including a heavy-handed state response, reduced democratic accountability, and the narrowing of public choice8 . However, it also recognizes that securitization is sometimes appropriate. Recent considerations of securitization theory identify three criteria that, if fulfilled, justify securitization: an objective, existential threat, a referent object whose protection promotes human well-being, and a response appropriately measured to the particular threat6 . In the case of bioweapons securitization, the second criterion is less controversial, given that the referent object is human population; thus, any harm to the referent object would directly reduce a human well-being. However, the question of whether securitization of biological weapons meets the other two criteria is more contentious. Skeptics may point to Colin Powell’s 2003 address to the United Nations as a case where the biological weapons security threat may have been exaggerated and securitization was promoted for political ends, thereby calling into question the legitimacy of the securitizing actor, the U.S. government. In his speech, Powell made the case for an invasion of Iraq by claiming Iraq had capabilities to produce biological weapons of mass destruction, including mobile bioweapons labs, a claim that later turned out to be false9. Critics also target the policies resulting from securitization, arguing that the capacity of aggressors to carry out large scale attacks causing mortality has been overestimated, calling into question whether an existential threat truly exists and whether the response has been appropriately measured10. Government funding may be seen as unjustifiably skewed in favour of biodefense, defined as the capacity to respond to a biological weapons attack, to the neglect of other key areas, such as endemic and pandemic diseases. For instance, Klotz calculated what is referred as the “likelihood-adjusted mortality” for biological weapons, pandemic diseases, and endemic diseases by multiplying the probability of occurrence by an estimate of mortality were an event to occur11. By comparing these values with government funding allocated to each category, he demonstrated that biodefense receives more funding than its likelihood-adjusted mortality estimate would suggest is warranted11 . However, objections have been raised to this argument. Supporters of biodefense prioritization point to the fact that focusing solely on potential fatalities ignores other issues, such as the negative social and economic fallout from an attack12. Additionally, they point to the possibility that it is more expensive to combat intentional threats, where there will be an explicit effort to circumvent current practices by exploiting weaknesses12. It should also be considered that the probability of one attack is not independent from another, and that an increasing probability of success may elicit more attempts12. To follow will be an examination of whether government spending and policies constitute a justified response to the threat of biological weapons. Securitization is relevant in that it was a way for decision-makers to implement the policies they want and is justifiable to the extent that the programs themselves are necessary and appropriate. Despite other consequences of securitization, such as public fear, political manipulation, and a heavyhanded response, which may give the impression of an overreaction, the reality is that securitization was a means of enabling the implementation of certain policies and programs necessary to respond to the threat of biological weapons.

2022 Michigan Kritik
Security K – BEJJ 2022 › Links › 2NC---Biotech

The discourse of ‘food insecurity’ is one that allows for liberal humanitarian interventions – that alienates the global south as a place to expand the neoliberal system

Melanie Sommerville et al 14, Professor in the Department of Geography, University of British Columbia, Jamey Essex, Professor in the Department of Political Science, University of Windsor, & Philippe Le Billon, Professor in the Department of Geography, University of British Columbia, June 20th 2014, “The ‘Global Food Crisis’ and the Geopolitics of Food Security”, Geopolitics, 19,

The emergence of food security as a pressing geopolitical concern is clearly demonstrated in the popular press, which has carried a steady flow of stories about poor harvests, food shortages, famine, and rising food prices over the last six years. More in-depth studies asking “Could Food Shortages Bring Down Civilization?” and explaining “How Hunger Could Topple Regimes” have appeared in Scientific American and Time, respectively.3 A June 2009 story in National Geographic asserted that the crisis represents a Malthusian moment in humankind’s struggle to feed an ever-growing population, while former head of the US Agency for International Development Andrew Natsios warned of “The Coming Food Coups” in The Washington Quarterly. 4 More recently, prominent environmental commentator and Melanie Sommerville et al. activist Lester Brown identified a “new geopolitics of food,” arguing that the failure to resolve the underlying causes of the 2007–2008 food price increases and volatility meant that “the food crisis of 2011 is for real.” He warns that “farmers and foreign ministers alike” should get ready “for a new era in which world food scarcity increasingly shapes global politics.” This new era of food-insecure geopolitics is driven by familiar ills (for example, “population growth and climate change”) coupled with deepening global inequalities and an international system unable or unwilling to coordinate across the range of policy fronts required to resolve the underlying roots of crisis.5

Yet it is not just the media that is heralding a new era of food-insecure geopolitics, but also mainstream policy narratives. A report to the World Food Program suggested that “food insecurity – especially when caused by a rise in food prices – is a threat and impact multiplier for violent conflict”, though noting it is rarely the direct (and singular) cause of conflict.6 Participants to an FAO Forum on Addressing Food Insecurity in Protracted Crises “emphasized the circular link between food insecurity and conflict”.7 The UN High Level Task Force on Global Food Security, the philanthropocapitalist Alliance for a Green Revolution in Africa (AGRA), and many other development, aid, and philanthropic organisations have suggested that there is an urgent geopolitical need for rapidly increased food production through a so-called “new” or “second Green Revolution”, with massive new investments targeted for agricultural production and research in the developing world.8 At a 2012 symposium in Washington on global food security, US President Barack Obama stated that the danger of food riots and price volatility producing global geopolitical instability “will only grow if a surging global population isn’t matched by surging food production.” Investment in agricultural productivity that reduces the incidence of hunger and vulnerability, argued Obama, “advances international peace and security – and that includes the national security of the United States.”9

2022 Michigan Kritik
Security K – BEJJ 2022 › Links › 2NC---Biotech

US securitization of terror causes state follow-on AND excessive use of violence – Bush administration proves

Ellen Edman 19, Evaluator in civil preparedness at MSB (Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency), B.S. at Lund University, 2019, “Can securitization be just? A case study of the U.S securitization of bioterrorism post 9/11”, Lund University, \\iris

Critique has been directed towards the U.S after the consequences of the global War on Terror have been unveiled. The security policy of the Bush administration has been described as a deeply illiberal means, for achieving liberal ends (Singh, 2014: 117). The security measures described in the previous section will be discussed with regards to how harmful they were to the referent object, bystanders and the aggressor.

The consequences of the securitization will be compared to the imminent risk of a bioterrorist attack. As mentioned before, 50 kg of anthrax could kill 250.000 people in an urban city. Human extinction is not very likely as a consequence of bioterrorism, especially not with anthrax since it is not contagious. However, it has been estimated that it would not be difficult to smuggle five bags of anthrax, containing 50 kg each, into the U.S. If five bags were to be efficiently dispersed in five major cities, the casualties could amount to over a million. Such a coordinated attack would completely overwhelm the U.S medical system. This is the threat the U.S was dealing with and acted to prevent (Millett & Snyder-Beattie, 2017: 380, Davis, 2004: 303).

2022 Michigan Kritik
Security K – BEJJ 2022 › Links › 2NC---Biotech

Biotechnology is an ethnicization of security--shapes the production of knowledge and truth

Rychnovská, 16 --- (Dagmar Rychnovská- Charles University In Prague and Metropolitan University Prague, Czech Republiccorresponding Author, "Governing dual-use knowledge: From the politics of responsible science to the ethicalization of security", 8-5-2016, SAGE Journals, https://journals-sagepub-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/doi/full/10.1177/0967010616658848)//mishelle

Managing the risks of techno-scientific progress is unique neither to life sciences nor to contemporary politics. However, existing concerns over a potential misuse of scientific research were given a new meaning and salience in the post-9/11 environment with the rising fears of hostile non-state actors. In comparison with that of the Cold War era, though, the current focus is less on nuclear physics or technologies related to conventional weapons and more on emerging technologies that are more accessible and thus more attractive for potential terrorists. This article has pointed out that, as part of this development, more and more attention is given to the regulation of knowledge, and it has explored how knowledge politics plays out in life sciences, where these concerns have gained great prominence. It has found that the attempts to secure potentially dangerous research and innovation are based on redefining the principles and practices of scientific responsibility and transforming an ethics-based system of governance into a technology of security, and has suggested understanding this phenomenon as an ethicalization of security. However, building a ‘culture of responsibility’ as a technology of security may raise tensions both within the scientific field and between scientists and society and breed a ‘culture of insecurity’. The prevailing all-embracing approach to the security governance of science does not help in this regard either. Instead of providing better understanding of the ‘threatening’ issues at stake, along with their contextualization and prioritization, it shifts the attention to action – that is, how to effectively ‘secure’ science. This further reinforces the role of apparently apolitical expert decisionmaking processes and downplays debates on how relevant these issues are, who shall decide on them, on behalf of whom, and how. Especially in undemocratic settings, the introduction of similarly motivated policies may be prone to the misuse of power in academia and have unforeseen consequences (see Schiermeier, 2015). The implications of ethicalization for the ontology of science will be explored in further research. For science as a cognitive domain, ethicalization may lead to changing the criteria for the validity of knowledge – that is, the norms and practices defining how scientists observe the world, produce truth claims about its functioning and reflect on the process of knowledge production. By shaping the meaning of scientific progress and tying it more closely to the neoliberal risk–benefit framework, ethicalization is also related to shifting the attention to ‘desired’ objects and methods of research while downplaying others. As such, it may contribute to constructing new scientific taboos narrowly defined by material rather than social factors. However, the question is not only how ethicalization shapes the ‘production of knowledge and truth’ in science, but also what status this knowledge is to have under the new social contract for science. This raises further questions: How does the turn to state-imposed self-regulatory modes of governance affect the role of science in society as well as the functioning of the academic field? How does it affect the practices of security expertise and the prospects of politicizing and potentially resisting security? And how does the dynamic of ethicalization vary across different disciplinary fields and (political) contexts? To move beyond the simplistic understanding of scientific knowledge as a double-edged sword, it is important not only to better understand the functioning of science, but also to reflect on the interplay among science, politics and security in which the current concerns over dual-use research are situated. More critical engagement with this topic can not only move the debate on dual-use research, but also provide new inspiration for the social scientific research on security.

2022 Michigan Kritik
Security K – BEJJ 2022 › Links › 2NC---AI

The K turns the Aff – alarmist narratives in the 1ac is the CAUSE of the US-China confrontation – by securitizing AI, the Aff produces the real threat.

Jinghan Zeng, 8-1-2021, "Securitization of Artificial Intelligence in China," OUP Academic, https://academic.oup.com/cjip/article/14/3/417/6352222#303568932//jc

First, a highly securitized AI sector will affect the flow of foreign AI labor and capital to China’s AI industry. To make it attractive to global talent and capital, a booming AI industry requires an outward-looking, open-minded, and international socio-politico-economic environment. However, the securitization trend is pushing in the opposite direction by producing a rising nationalistic, inward-looking, security AI discourse. This is counterproductive to China’s AI ambitions, because it puts China at a disadvantage in the global market. More specifically, there is a global shortage of AI talent and, as previously mentioned, China is short of 5 million or more qualified AI industry workers. This has led to fierce global competition in the AI industry for qualified workers, to the extent where Chinese tech companies offer extremely—or unreasonably—high salaries.126 Such financial attraction, however, could be offset by an unfavorably nationalistic domestic environment. Second, the securitization trend could hinder economic efficiency. As previously discussed, it contributes to the rise of a self-reliance discourse on technology whose creation is often at the cost of economic efficiency. Precisely because China is lagging behind in AI development, it needs to make use of the global AI supply chain to catch up. However, the self-reliance discourse considers the risk of relying on foreign technology too high, and thus focuses on “Made in China.” Such self-reliance is difficult (if not impossible) to realize in the short run, and hinders China’s ability to benefit from the global AI market and thus maximize industrial efficiency. Similarly, the securitization of AI in the United States also undermines the appeal that America holds for Chinese national AI talent, capital, and technology. Growing tension between China and the United States has, moreover, undermined Chinese companies’ willingness to invest in the United States. In the long run, therefore, securitization is detrimental to the competitiveness of the American AI industry. Third, in connection with the above paragraph, the domestic inward-looking nationalistic trend that securitization has created hinders China’s realization of global leadership. To lead AI in the global arena, China must provide public goods and win support from others through successful partnerships. It must play a key role in promoting global governance and, as a global leader, act according to common interests rather than solely national interests. However, a security-focused, inward-looking, nationalistic AI discourse is helpful to neither global governance nor common interests. For example, it can foster the rise of inward-looking national AI policies that prioritize national interests over those of the globalized world. This is in direct contrast to global governance goals, i.e., to build a shared future through global solidarity. Indeed, many of the problems that AI has created, such as those relating to ethics, represent collective challenges to humankind that require a globally concerted response. Inward-looking national AI policies may contribute to a fragmented global governance structure, and thus obstruct concerted global actions to address AI problems. Fourth, the securitization trend has reinforced technological rivalry at the expense of the potential for global AI cooperation, and will likely exacerbate the United States–China confrontation. This is not to deny the existence of United States–China cooperation in the field of AI. However, by speaking of AI in the language of security and a global race, the relevant security AI discourse emphasizes competition over cooperation and destruction over creation. This may produce a real security threat, and perhaps an actual global AI race, thus undermining the space for cooperation from which both the United States and China can benefit. In other words, the rivalry discourse adopts a zero-sum geopolitical angle for understanding AI innovation that is inevitably to the latter’s detriment in both countries.127 More importantly, securitization may push AI further into the hard security area by virtue of its military applications. The securitizing actor tends to exaggerate the security threat to achieve a successful securitization, so enhancing the strategic risks of AI military practices and increasing the likelihood of war, and of escalating ongoing conflicts. In this regard, a highly securitized AI politics may set China and the United States on a dangerous path towards a catastrophic confrontation that imperils everyone’s interests and security. In the worst case scenario, as in all arms races, blithe assertions about the inevitability of AI-enabled war are a self-fulfilling and self-defeating prophecy. In this regard, the aforementioned Fu Ying’s call to regulate AI’s military application merits more attention. Lastly, by strengthening state involvement in China’s AI industry, securitization may undermine the interests of Chinese AI companies. The boundary between the state and the market is always far less defined in China than in other countries, due to China’s political environment. Making AI a national security matter justifies the necessity for heavier state involvement, if not control. Although a blessing in the Chinese domestic market, close ties with the state are a burden on the global stage. Take the aforementioned civil-military integration as an example. Although helpful in gaining China’s AI companies and research institutes more state funding, it undermines their global access. Close relations with the Chinese government have caused certain Chinese AI companies, including members of the “national AI team of China,” to be subjected to punishment, in the form of the aforementioned American sanctions. In this regard, securitization could hinder the access of China’s AI companies to the global market, and hence their future development. It also remains to be seen whether heavier state involvement in the AI industry hinders market efficiency.

2022 Michigan Kritik
Security K – BEJJ 2022 › Links › 2NC---AI

The framing of an AI arms race is dangerous---turns the case--it creates a self-fulfilling prophecy and wrecks any safety precautions

Stephen Cave 18, Stephen holds a PhD in philosophy from Cambridge University, “An AI Race for Strategic Advantage: Rhetoric and Risks,” January 2018, AI Ethics and Society 2018, Volume 1

The Dangers of an AI Race for Technological Advantage: In Rhetoric and in Reality What is so bad about framing the development of AI in terms of a race for technological advantage? After all, it is widely agreed that AI brings enormous potential benefits across many sectors. One recent report estimated that it could add £232 billion by 2030 to the UK economy alone, with healthcare one of the sectors most enhanced, potentially bringing faster, better service to consumers (PwC 2017). There is a widespread belief that competition and other market forces are central to such innovation. So in as much as a race to develop AI technology means these kinds of benefit come sooner, we have reason to view it positively.

But at the same time, the development of such a potentially powerful new technology will need to be steered if it is to be as beneficial as possible while minimising the risks it might pose (Crawford and Calo 2016). In the words of the Future of Life Institute’s open letter on ‘Research Priorities for Robust and Beneficial Artificial Intelligence’, signed by over 8,000 people including many leading figures in AI, work should focus “not only on making AI more capable, but also on maximizing the societal benefit of AI.” (Future of Life Institute, 2017a). The danger of an AI race is that it makes exactly this thoughtful steering towards broadly beneficial outcomes more difficult.

2022 Michigan Kritik
Security K – BEJJ 2022 › Discourse Shapes Reality › 2NC---AT: Threats Real

National security threats suggested by the state are amplified and presented as facts by the media --- Iraq war proves that the media fails to check the government or present anti-war viewpoints because of their desire for profit

Robert Bejesky 15, has an M.A. in Political Science as well as Applied Economics from the University of Michigan, an LL.M. in International Law from Georgetown Law, and has taught American government and constitutional law courses for Alma College, business law courses at Central Michigan University and the University of Miami, courses for Western Michigan University Thomas M. Cooley Law School, and classes for the Department of Political Science at the University of Michigan, 2015, “HOW SECURITY THREAT DISCOURSE CAN PRECIPITATE A PRESS CLAUSE DEATH SPIRAL”, Drake Law Review, Vol. 63, No. 1, p. 1-108 /lg

From the media entity decision equation, U(v) = X (r, + nal) - [(1 - (c + f,)], ri is a composite for viewer emotion and is comprised of patriotism, security threat perceptions, and humanitarian justice; nal is perceived utility in attacking a security threat first; c, is the media's perceived current period loss for inaccurate reporting or for not providing diversity; f, is the possible future loss for biased and inaccurate reporting; and X is the likelihood that the Executive's security threat advocacy is real.365 The equation probes potential discord between constitutional aspirations for the news media as a purveyor of political discourse and corporate media profitability obligations to shareholders and suggests that a media entity could view departing from the industry status quo and investigating and challenging the government's security threat allegations as a move that risks losing viewership-which it must avoid at all costs.3 66

Prior to the 2003 Iraq War, top Bush Administration officials proffered hundreds of unequivocal threat claims in the media, and the media broadcasted allegations as fact while ignoring antiwar positions and dissent.3 67 Media positions of advocacy and repetition of official and quasiofficial sources' arguments converged and drowned out alternative views to generate an extremely pervasive prowar bias in the news media.368 Rhetoric and polls intimated that nal and ri were positively related and high and that the perceived cl was low due to median viewer perceptions. 369 Media entities may have individually assumed that they would earn a higher utility payoff by declining to challenge threat allegations or provide more diverse viewpoints.

2022 Michigan Kritik
Security K – BEJJ 2022 › Discourse Shapes Reality › 2NC---Reps First

Language is its own creator and creation—the absolutization of language creates an ontological negotiation, excluding existence beyond the world language has created

Federico Campagna, 18, PhD from Royal College of Art, London; MSc and BSc in economics and Management of the Arts from Bocconi University, Milan; MA in Cultural Studies from Goldsmiths University, London; Technic And Magic: The Reconstruction of Reality, Technic’s Cosmogony “First Hypostasis: Absolute Language” pg. 65-67//ekc

Since we are investigating the underlying principles that give rise to a specific kind of world, we shall look at language through the lens of what language does, that is, what it produces when it is used. Any time we put forward a linguistic statement, every time we express a linguistic unit, we are suggesting to our interlocutors that a certain figure (an object, property or relation) be admitted as legitimately present in the world. The interlocutors' acceptance of our linguistic utterance as meaningful, grants legitimate presence in the word to the suggested figure- thus making it available to be employed in the larger game of linguistic exchange and recombination. The same happens in a soliloquy or at the level of one's conscious thinking - though the rapidity with which we accept our own linguistic proposal as plausibly present in the world, tends to obfuscate this questioning process. And of course, the same also applies to cases in which the utterer or interlocutor is not a human, but a machine.

In this sense, language's production is fundamentally ontological, consisting in a continuous negotiation on which figures could or should be included in the catalogue of the world. Every linguistic unit thus takes on the form of a candidature and of a proposition. Equally, the world becomes the negotiating table onto which the figures of our daily experience are alternatively granted or denied legitimate ontological status as ‘present’. In this sense, language functions as a way to manage what entities make it onto the catalogue of the communicable and operable layer of reality.

2022 Michigan Kritik
Security K – BEJJ 2022 › Discourse Shapes Reality › 2NC---Reps First

Discourse analysis is a prerequisite to understand the potential effectiveness of policy

Kate Anderson and Jessica Holloway, 18, PhD and Associate Professor at Arizona State University; Senior research fellow at Australian Catholic University, “Discourse analysis as a theory, method, and epistemology in studies of education policy” https://www.researchgate.net/publication/329912399_Discourse_analysis_as_theory_method_and_epistemology_in_studies_of_education_policy/ekc

Discourse analysis as a theory, method, and tool has illuminated ways that education policy is messy and dynamic. Evaluative approaches to policy analysis might be appealing to policymakers and other government officials due to their supposed promise of efficiency and accuracy. However, discourse analytic approaches offer analytic and practical complementarity via their demonstration of the complexities of policy development and the context-dependence of policy effects. As such, discourse analysis offers invaluable tools for understanding the ‘how’ and the ‘why’ of education policy (rather than just the ‘what’ or ‘whether’), especially as policy landscapes and networks are shifting to more global terrains and relationalities (Ball 2012; Rizvi and Lingard 2009).

In this article, we have argued that acknowledgement of conceptual definitions and theoretical and epistemological stances are paramount toward establishing methodological coherence that allows for the continued creative and productive uses of discourse analysis to push the field forward. Our argument follows Rabinow and Rose’s (2003) call to treat ‘indeterminacies, contingencies and difference as assets rather than as disconfirming evidence that feeds into already established logics of “science” and established logics of “justice”’ (13, as cited in Webb and Gulson 2015, 46). Therefore, our effort is not to ‘tame the wild profusion of existing things’ (Foucault 1970, xv, cited in Lather 2006, 36), but rather to illustrate the complexity of the various ways discourse analysts structure and execute their projects in order to study educational policy. It would seem that there are as many ways of doing this as there are people who do it, which is itself not problematic. However, our conclusions from the analysis of these 37 articles is that complications in terms of theoretical and analytical coherence might prevent the promise we expect from our collective and individual work. The analysis of literature presented here took years to complete and only brings us through articles published in 2014. With the proliferation of discourse analytic studies focusing on education policy in the ensuing years increasing exponentially, the field is rife for further analysis of this dynamic and evolving sub-field from 2015 onward. We hope that this initial consideration can help identify the conceptual boundaries between operationalizations of discourse and policy, epistemological assumptions informing methods and findings, and ontological stances on the purpose and promise of research. Yet, we remind readers that these categories are never fixed, and that cracks and fissures within and between them always provide potential ‘site[s] of being and becoming’ (Lather 2006, 52) to emerge.

2022 Michigan Kritik
Security K – BEJJ 2022 › Discourse Shapes Reality › 2NC---AT: Reality

The 1AC is a theatrical performance of international relations that discursively brings the state into existence.

Erik Ringmar, 14, a professor in the Department of Political Science and International Relations at İbn Haldun Üniversitesi, Istanbul, Turkey, 2014, “Performance, Not Performativity: An Embodied Critique of Post-Structural IR Theory,” Lund University, [ML]

Yet performances do not only take place in theaters, but also in society at large. Social interaction is to a considerable extent a matter of presenting oneself before others on any of the many small stages constituted by daily interpersonal interaction.96 Here too we project an imaginary self, a person we would like to be, and we ask the people observing us to recognize us under this description. In the process we build sociality and inauthenticity into our being. It is easy to be disgusted with this spectacle, especially of course if the performance goes badly and we fail to receive the kind of recognition we feel we deserve. For this reason the playacting self, its antics and its fate, have often been a source of mournful laments. “Life's but a walking shadow, a poor player,” as Shakespeare's Macbeth put it, “That struts and frets his hour upon the stage.”97 And Jean-Jacques Rousseau, scathing in his criticism of the superficiality and decadence of Parisian high-society, was equally scathing of the theater which he saw as a threat to a more natural, more rural and thereby more authentic, way of life.98 Yet what Rousseau wished for is not available. Away from the many small stages of everyday life, the self, as we know it, does not exist. But performances are presented also on a larger stage as social and political events are made to happen, and to appear, in a certain manner.99 We can talk of “public performances” as staged events through which imaginary blends of social facts and visions are presented to vast audiences, perhaps to entire societies, at the same time. Through the public performance the world is cast in a certain form and held up for our contemplation; something is discovered, something is remembered or exposed.100 Examples include a terrorist attack on a building in a major city; an attempt to “shock and awe” a civilian population; the signing of a peace treaty by two former enemies; the funeral of a world leader; the diplomatic rituals shared by members of the same international system.101 But make no mistake, these are not the performative reiterations of discursive practices. Public performances are originals, not citations; they involve all the senses and engage all neurological systems, not just the literal-minded mind. The way we, as members of the audience, react to these public performances may often surprise us. We scream at a rock concert; we raise our fists at a political rally, or we speak in tongues at a religious convocation. These are physical reactions, performed by us to be sure, yet they are in a sense not ours. They may be referred to as cases of “mass hysteria,” or as examples of “conversion syndrome,” but we could also say that they are the reactions of a shared, a public, body.102 It is in this public performance and in this public body that we come across ourselves as a society. It is also here that we find the state. The state ― pace Weber, Campbell, Derrida and Butler ― is not declared into existence through the iteration of texts, but neither is it abolished through military interventions. Instead, in next to all cases, before independence could be declared it had to be fought for. People had to present themselves to themselves and to others as willing to risk their lives for the right to self-determination.103 Such struggles constitute clashes of real interests, and often of real weapons, but they are also performances in a fully theatrical sense ― involving aspirational plots, fluttering flags, arousing music, self-sacrifice, betrayal, and heroism. It was by watching these performances, and by getting involved with them themselves, that “the people” and “the state” came to be constituted as subjects of international politics.